Director networks and firm value

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Author(s)Bakke, Tor-Erik
Author(s)Black, Jeffrey R.
Author(s)Mahmudi, Hamed
Author(s)Linn, Scott C.
Date Accessioned2024-04-11T18:51:15Z
Date Available2024-04-11T18:51:15Z
Publication Date2024-02-13
DescriptionThis article was originally published in Journal of Corporate Finance. The version of record is available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102545. © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
AbstractAre the professional networks of directors valuable? To separate the effect of director networks on firm value from the effect of other value-relevant director attributes, we use the unexpected deaths of directors as a shock to the director networks of interlocked directors. By studying the announcement returns and using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find the negative shock to director networks reduces the value of interlocked firms – a result that is stronger for firms that are more likely to benefit from access to information from board connections. This evidence is consistent with director networks being valuable and improving access to information.
CitationBakke, Tor-Erik, Jeffrey R. Black, Hamed Mahmudi, and Scott C. Linn. “Director Networks and Firm Value.” Journal of Corporate Finance 85 (April 2024): 102545. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102545.
ISSN0929-1199
URLhttps://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/34278
Languageen_US
PublisherJournal of Corporate Finance
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Keywordsboard of directors
Keywordsnetwork centrality
Keywordsquasi-natural experiment
Keywordsfirm value
TitleDirector networks and firm value
TypeArticle
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