A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

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Author(s)Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios
Author(s)Malikopoulos, Andreas A.
Date Accessioned2023-07-25T19:27:04Z
Date Available2023-07-25T19:27:04Z
Publication Date2023-05-05
DescriptionThis article was originally published in PLOS ONE. The version of record is available at: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0285322. © 2023 Chremos, Malikopoulos.
AbstractIn this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a “mobility game” with coupled action sets. We formulate an atomic routing game to focus on the travelers’ preferences and study the impact on the efficiency of the travelers’ behavioral decision-making under rationality and prospect theory. To control the innate inefficiencies, we introduce a mobility “pricing mechanism,” in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers’ selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability analysis to establish that the mobility system’s inefficiencies remain relatively low and the social welfare at a NE remains close to the social optimum as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our mobility game to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a detailed discussion of implementing our proposed mobility game.
SponsorThis work has been supported by the US National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-2149520 (https://www.nsf.gov/). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
CitationChremos, Ioannis Vasileios, and Andreas A. Malikopoulos. “A Traveler-Centric Mobility Game: Efficiency and Stability under Rationality and Prospect Theory.” PLOS ONE 18, no. 5 (May 5, 2023): e0285322. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0285322.
ISSN1932-6203
URLhttps://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/33034
Languageen_US
PublisherPLOS ONE
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Keywordsgame theory
Keywordstransportation
Keywordspayment
Keywordsroads
Keywordsdecision making
Keywordsdecision theory
Keywordssocial welfare
Keywordshuman mobility
TitleA traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory
TypeArticle
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