Browsing by Author "Lynch, Lori"
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Item Conserving Spatially Explicit Benefits in Ecosystem Service Markets: Lab and Artefactual Field Tests of Network Bonuses and Spatial Targeting(Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE., 2014-01) Fooks, Jacob; Higgins, Nate; Messer, Kent D.; Duke, Joshua M.; Hellerstein, Dan; Lynch, LoriConserving contiguous areas often enhances environmental benefits. However, most conservation efforts are voluntary, incentive-based, do not reward landowners for contiguity, or select based on contiguity. Thus, achieving optimal contiguity of conserved parcels is unlikely especially with limited budgets. Using laboratory and artefactual field experiments, this paper evaluates two mechanisms in the context of reverse auctions for achieving optimal contiguity: network bonuses and spatial targeting. Results suggest that spatial targeting alone improves the aggregate environmental and social welfare outcomes while network bonuses alone result in worse outcomes. The interaction of the bonus-effect and the targeting-effect is positive, suggesting that in a competitive auction environment that already includes bonuses, adding spatial targeting minimizes the damage.Item Farmland Preservation Techniques: Identifying New Options(2003-06) Duke, Joshua M.; Lynch, LoriThis report describes over 20 novel techniques for preserving agricultural land. Using a survey of various literatures, phone interviews with program managers, and original policy design, these techniques are explained and categorized. A conceptual framework is offered that distinguishes the various roles governments can assume in order to affect outcomes in agricultural land markets. These roles are regulatory, incentive-based, and governmental participatory. Also, a fourth category of hybrid techniques are presented.Item Gauging Support for Innovative Farmland(Department of Food and Resource Economics, 2005-10) Duke, Joshua M.; Lynch, LoriThis report describes the results of interviews and focus groups, gauging support for innovative farmland preservation techniques. Four techniques were selected for assessment from approximately 30 novel techniques identified in previous research: (1) Term conservation easements; (2) Land preservation tontines; (3) Rights of first refusal; and (4) Agricultural conservation pension with purchase of agricultural conservation easements. Data were collected from three types of stakeholder groups, including land preservation program administrators in Delaware and Maryland, Delaware legislators, and Delaware landowners. The results show that these stakeholders believed rights of first refusal was the most promising concept, and the groups identified some specific challenges to effective implementation. Targeting areas to implement the technique and having a dedicated, regular funding source were perceived to be essential. Agricultural conservation pensions were also viewed favorably, although some were skeptical that it could be implemented in practice. Tontines were perceived to be an interesting concept, but confusing, difficult to implement, and needing more work to flesh out details. Term easements were, for the most part, not viewed favorably. Most saw term easements having the fatal shortcoming of impermanent preservation. A fiscal analysis was preformed to demonstrate how additional funding for innovative techniques might complement continued purchase of agricultural conservation easements (PACE) activities. The results show that the conservation pension might preserve more acres than PACE, while rights of first refusal will preserve less, but more threatened, acres. Term easements should preserve many more acres than PACE, albeit temporarily. The land preservation tontine will likely act to increase the value of land maintained in agricultural land use, but will not preserve land in the same manner as the other three techniques. Hence, land preservation tontines might best be viewed as a complement to the other preservation techniques.Item Reverse Auctions for Purchases of Ecosystem Services: The Effect of Information on Auction Structure Performance(Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE., 2016-03) Duke, Joshua M.; Messer, Kent D.; Lynch, Lori; Li, TongzheDifferences between private and public decision-making are quantified using willingness-to-accept (WTA) data collected in artefactual field experiments. Participants first makedecisions in a second-price auction (private rounds) followed by majority-rule voting (public rounds) on the median price collected in the private rounds. Results suggest that other-regarding behavior in the public rounds regarding stigma and disgust can significantly reduce WTA. Chatbox communication can further reduce WTA, and social preferences, education, and unrelated communication are the primary drivers that lead participants to accept significantly lower prices for potentially disgusting tasks. The results have application for sustainable, cost-effective recycled water projects.Item When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?(Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE., 2016-03) Messer, Kent D.; Duke, Joshua M.; Lynch, Lori; Li, TongzheGovernment conservation agencies that conduct reverse auctions traditionally provide a significant amount of public information about past auction results. This information includes not only the amount of money spent by the government but also can include the number of offers received, number of offers accepted, highest accepted bid, lowest accepted bid, and the average accepted bid. This research uses induced-value experiments to evaluate the effect of past auction information on seller rent seeking. Results from 140 participants suggest that sellers use some public information to learn how to secure higher rents. However, when sellers are given information only about the buyers’ budget, they secure lower rents. Results also suggest that relative budget size affects rents and that budget variability in the presence of market information diminishes the effect. Thus, in the presence of public information and equivalent total outlays, variable budgets are more likely than stationary budgets to achieve conservation auction fiscal efficiency. Finally, this research finds that auctions with greater heterogeneity in seller opportunity costs are less fiscally efficient than when the distribution is more homogeneous.