Faline, Matthew2015-10-072015-10-072015-05http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17073Presentism is the view that all of reality is exhausted by the present. That is, the only objects and individuals that exist are those that exist in the present; anything else literally does not exist. How then is a presentist able to ground the truths of propositions uttered in the present which seem to be about wholly past individuals? I examine three possible solutions proposed by the presentist, concluding all three suffer from the shifting truth-maker objection. I then look at how a presentist might employ a descriptive theory for the meaning of names to avoid apparently committing themselves to the existence of non-present individuals. This is then contrasted by the direct reference theory of names as argued for by Kripke, before concluding the descriptive view is unacceptable as a theory of meaning. After considering the proposed solutions presented by the presentist, I argue that Presentism should be avoided due to its counterintuitive consequences in favor of Eternalism.en-USPhilosophyThesis