RACIAL VIOLENCE, PAST AND PRESENT:

EXAMINING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING, RACIAL UPRISINGS, AND CONTEMPORARY POLICE VIOLENCE

by

Andrew C. Gray

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology

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Andrew C. Gray

Approved: _____

Eric Rise, Ph.D.
Interim Chair of the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice

Approved: _____

John Pelesko, Ph.D.
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

Approved: _____

Louis F. Rossi, Ph.D.
Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education and
Dean of the Graduate College

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: _____

Karen F. Parker, Ph.D.
Professor in charge of dissertation

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: _____

Aaron Kupchik, Ph.D.
Member of dissertation committee

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: _____

Ellen A. Donnelly, Ph.D.
Member of dissertation committee

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: _____

Geoff Ward, Ph.D.
Member of dissertation committee

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the history of the United States, racialized forms of violence and social control have been used to enforce racial boundaries and the racial hierarchy of the nation. My dissertation offers a historically guided study of racial violence, resistance, and social control since the late 19th Century. I provide a detailed discussion of historical racial violence and how past violence has been embedded in more recent racially disparate forms of violence and formal criminal justice practices. Specifically, I examine two historical periods—the era of lynching and the era of resistance to racial injustices that was prominent through the 1960s and early 1970s—and consider how these periods may be related, as well as their potential legacy effects on more contemporary issues around policing (i.e., the use of lethal force by police measured through fatal shootings of Black Americans). We must grapple with forces of the past and attempt to understand how they may have transformed over time and may continue to influence contemporary social phenomena (e.g., criminal justice practices). The field of criminology has largely failed to acknowledge how the past may continue to influence contemporary issues. Thus, my dissertation offers a further step in understanding historical racial violence and resistance while addressing how this history can help us to understand contemporary forms of violence and social control.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE, PAST AND PRESENT

Between the years of 1883 and 1929, twenty-two lynchings were perpetrated in Jefferson County, Alabama.[1] Of these lynchings, twenty Black men were killed including George Meadows who was murdered by a White mob in Birmingham, the county seat, on January 15, 1889. Meadows had been accused of assaulting a White woman and for this allegation—despite the woman expressing uncertainty about Meadows being the guilty man—he was lynched, riddled with bullets, and photos were taken for distribution while his body was left on public display (Bingham, 2019). Lewis Jackson, another Black man, was arrested for the assault the next day after the sheriff reached the conclusion that Meadows had not been guilty (Bingham, 2019).[2] Accusations against the remaining Black men lynched in this county included alleged

[1] These numbers are based on data collection efforts of Tolnay and Beck that were originally described in their 1995 book and later updated in 2015. Besides these twenty-two completed lynchings, there were two probable lynchings in the county: one of a Black man and the other of a White man (Tolnay & Beck, 1995).

[2] As this lynching demonstrates, allegations were all that was needed to ensure the lynching of Black Americans. It was not necessary that the mob's victim was actually guilty of a crime, all that mattered was that some perceived offense had sufficiently outraged the White community, and this was especially the case when the alleged offense was committed against a White woman (Ayers, 1984; Brundage, 1993; Buckser, 1992; Raper, 1933; Wells-Barnett, 1892).

offenses such as rape and sexual assault, strikebreaking, and murder.[3] Decades later, Birmingham experienced collective racial unrest twice between 1964 and 1971 that was attributed to the actions of Black citizens in the city.[4] One of these occurred on July 22nd, 1967 when an estimated crowd of 200 Black youths was dispersed by police firing shotguns into the air after the youths had been "throwing stones and looting stores in the area" (*New York Times*, 1967). This confrontation continued into the following day when the National Guard assisted police in trying to enact control, which also resulted in several persons injured and more than 70 arrests (*U.S. News Staff*, 2017). Finally, between the years of 2013 and 2018, sixteen persons were killed by police in Birmingham, all of whom were male, and these killings included ten Black men (62.5% of the fatal shootings in the city).[5] Of these ten Black men, seven were killed by police firearms while other means (e.g., tasers) were responsible for the remaining deaths.[6]

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[3] The two other lynchings involved White men charged with the separate offenses of murder and the criminal assault of a White girl who was seventeen years old (Seguin & Rigby, 2019).

[4] These were based on data collected and described by Gregg Lee Carter (1983, 1986). Building on the database constructed by Spilerman and using his definition of "riots," Carter's data includes only incidents of Black aggression with 30 or more participants that included "property destruction or interpersonal violence" (Carter, 1986, p. 118). Further, these events had to take place outside of schools and the context of organized demonstrations (Carter, 1986).

[5] Notably, Birmingham, AL has a Black population totaling almost 70.0% of the city's population based on 2019 American Community Survey estimates.

[6] Based on Mapping Police Violence data (2019; https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/).

While lynching was heavily concentrated in the South, there were instances of this collective violence throughout almost every state in the US.[7] For example, in 1924, William Bell, a Black man living in Chicago, IL, was lynched by being beaten to death in the presence of a mob of an estimated 200 persons for the alleged offense of sexual assault.[8] Between 1964 and 1971, Chicago experienced fourteen acts of collective racial resistance classified as involving primarily Black Americans, including the unrest that occurred within the city—and across cities nationwide—the day after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 (Braimah, 2017). Finally, contemporary police killings of Chicago residents show clear racial differences in the level of force used. From 2013 to 2018, there were 75 citizens killed by police with Black Americans being killed in 57 of these incidents—or about 76.0% of all police killings in Chicago during that period despite the Black population only equaling approximately 30.0% of the city's total population.[9] Notably, 51 of these killings were the result of gunshots being fired by the police officers involved. Included in these 51 gunshot-involved police killings was the murder of Laquan McDonald by a White officer who fired sixteen shots with most of them hitting

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[7] Seguin and Rigby (2019) noted that only five states remained free of lynching: Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

[8] This was the only lynching recorded for Chicago, though Cook County did experience one other lynching in 1897 according to Seguin and Rigby's (2019) database. In this case, Hermann Koltzep, a White man residing in Mannheim, IL, was hanged in front of a mob for the accused offense of sexual assault.

[9] This population estimate is based on the 2019 American Community Survey.

McDonald after he had already fallen to the ground. In a rare occurrence, the now ex-Officer, Jason Van Dyke, was charged with first-degree murder though this was dropped to second-degree murder resulting in a relatively light sentence for the offense (*Associated Press*, 2019).

What do these series of events have in common? How do these different forms of violence and resistance compare across regional boundaries of the US? Do the same socio-structural forces associated with Southern lynchings cross regional boundaries? Do similar predictors of lynching continue to influence other forms of violence in the present-day (i.e., fatal police shootings)? How might the collective resistance of Black Americans relate to contemporary police violence? Do lynchings and acts of racial resistance from the past help to contextualize contemporary incidents of police violence? These are the types of questions that I attempt to answer in following chapters.

When it comes to exploring these questions, various academic fields—criminology, history, sociology—offer important insights that have enhanced our understandings of past racial violence, especially lynching, and the legacy created by this violence. However, there have been notable limitations and, thus, areas for further advancement in this field of study exist. Beyond just answering questions like those above, my dissertation attempts to address some of these limitations in existing lynching research while advancing our understandings of this violence, its legacy, and its relationship to collective racial resistance, and contemporary justice issues (i.e., police violence). To this end, the theoretical frameworks of racial threat (Blalock,

1967) and ethnic competition (Olzak, 1992)—detailed in Chapter 2—will take a central role since past research has illuminated their importance in helping us to understand racial violence throughout US history. The remainder of this introduction will be devoted to providing an overview of the history and periods of violence examined throughout my dissertation, a discussion of US regions and culture, and will also provide a roadmap for the chapters that follow.

Historical Periods Under Investigation

Lynching, 1880s and Onward

Early in American history, lynching was an "unofficial" system of justice involving extra-legal punishments that were often nonlethal (e.g., whippings) (Buckser, 1992; Dray, 2002; Markovitz, 2004). Gradually, lynching changed, and this act of violence evolved in severity and, eventually, began to be characterized almost exclusively by lethal violence and death (Brundage, 1993; Buckser, 1992). Due to this evolution, defining what acts constituted a lynching was widely debated until 1940 when antilynching groups settled by defining lynchings as acts with evidence that a death occurred and was caused by a group in an illegal manner, and that this violence occurred under the pretext of serving justice, race, and tradition (Brundage, 1993; Dray, 2002; Markovitz, 2004; Waldrep, 2000). This is the definition that has been largely relied on for data collection efforts of past lynchings (Seguin & Rigby, 2019; Tolnay & Beck, 1995).

While lynching was not initially racialized, this violence became almost exclusively used against Black Americans around the Reconstruction era and, as a result, lynching helped shape and even continues to shape racial meanings and race relations (Clarke, 1998; Hill, 2016; Markovitz, 2004; Smångs, 2017). Thus, beyond the instrumental terroristic and social control purposes of lynching, it helped symbolically define and reinforce racial boundaries (Hill, 2016; Smångs, 2017). Lynching informed the color-line and racial hierarchy, it demonstrated to Black Americans their "place" in society and bonded Whites under beliefs of their supremacy (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Eventually, lynching lost support across the nation; however, other forms of violence and control were implemented in its place to continue enforcing racial boundaries and ensure the continued repression of Black Americans (Smångs, 2017). Many of these new forms of control were more subtle and formalized in legal practices; thus, contemporary institutions and their practices may "to a certain extent carry on the coercive race-making practices...of yesteryears" (Smångs, 2017, p. 147).

While there are several arguments regarding the legacies created by past racial violence, we are still unsure of how exactly this legacy persists and of the implications that come with this legacy (Ward, 2015, p. 307). What is clear is that the history of lynching appears to have a continued influence on racial violence and social control practices today. Where lynching was most prevalent in the past, there continues to be more racially disparate forms of violence and social control, including criminal justice practices, as well as other phenomena (i.e., contemporary mortality rates, passage of

stand-your-ground laws, segregation) (DeFina & Hannon, 2011; Dirlam, Steidley, & Jacobs, 2020; Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2015; Jacobs, Malone, & Iles, 2012; King, Messner, & Baller, 2009; Messner, Baller, & Zevenbergen, 2005; Petersen & Ward, 2015; Probst, Glover, & Kirksey, 2019; Ward, Petersen, Kupchik, & Pratt, 2019). Thus, on top of examining lynching as a national phenomenon historically (Chapter 3), Chapter 4 also examine the potential legacy effect of lynching on one form of violence and control not examined in this manner previously: the use of lethal force by police, which is discussed in greater detail next.

Policing and Lethal Force, Today

The history of policing in the US is complexly intertwined with slavery and slave patrols, and with the upholding and reinforcement of the nation's racial hierarchy (Butler, 2017; Bass, 2001; Du Bois, 2012[1903]; Hadden, 2001; Vitale, 2017). Additionally, the police were sometimes supportive of public violence targeting Black Americans as well. For instance, throughout the early and mid-twentieth century regardless of region, "white police either joined the attacks on African Americans or…passively stood aside as whites stoned houses, set fires, destroyed cars, smashed windows, and threatened to kill any Blacks who got in their way" (Taylor, 2016, p. 33). Regarding lynching specifically, police were sometimes active or passive participants in the violence—including handing over people from their custody into the mob's hands, not taking the necessary actions to prevent the mob from removing the victim from legal custody, or by refusing to identify mob participants if investigations did follow the lynching (Buckser, 1992; Raper, 1933; Skolnick & Fyfe,

1993; Teague, 2018; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2018). However, police and other officials did have the ability to prevent this violence if they wanted to (Beck, 2015; Raper, 1933; Teague, 2018). In fact, "[w]hat white authorities did vis-à-vis both African American prisoners or fugitives and fellow whites in the lynch mob thus was often critical to whether an attempted lynching became a lynching in fact" (Griffin et al., 1997, p. 27).[10] As such, the inaction of law enforcement, especially when they were aware of the potential that a mob was forming or failed/refused to hold lynchers accountable, also sanctioned and provided the opportunity for lynching to occur and helped to uphold White supremacy and messages of terror (Griffin et al., 1997; Teague, 2018; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2018). Consequently, the police largely came to be seen as an institution that has been unresponsive to the needs of Black communities (Williams & Murphy, 1990).

Eventually, due to the injustices Black Americans faced at the hands of police and the justice system, it has been argued that police began to be viewed as an occupying army in Black neighborhoods (Blauner, 2001). Further, in response discrimination and to policing and issues of police brutality, collective racial resistance led by Black citizens began to occur throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Blauner, 2001; Hinton, 2021; Sugrue, 2008). That is, the tensions between police and the Black community—influenced by police violence and the underrepresentation of

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[10] Antilynching strategies that were employed by legal officials and law enforcement included dispersing mobs through force, transporting prisoners to other locations, or bringing in state militias or the National Guard (Griffin et al., 1997).

Black Americans on the police force as well as the other inequalities impacting Black lives—culminated in mass resistance in cities across the US (Levy, 2018; Williams & Murphy, 1990). Williams and Murphy (1990, p. 2) argue that:

> "It was this movement, led primarily by black Americans, and that political empowerment that finally began to produce the putative benefits of professional policing: a fairer distribution of police services, less use of deadly force, greater respect for individual rights, and equal opportunity for minorities within the Nation's police departments. Without that movement, the promise of professional policing would have remained hollow."

However, this period of unrest led to calls for more intensive policing that seem to persist to the present day. As suggested by this history, the foundations and functioning of policing have always been intertwined with the management of marginalized racial groups and enforcement of the social and racial order (Butler, 2017; Vitale, 2017).

Today, the lethal use of force by police is one of the most visible forms of racial injustice and violence today whereas lynching was this in the past (Ward, 2015). However, the state-sanctioned use of lethal force by the police is not just a contemporary issue though it has been widely understudied (Embrick, 2015; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Vitale, 2017; Ward, 2015; Zimring, 2017). Further, there has been a lack of historicization regarding the use of lethal force and research has not empirically examined whether past lynchings are reflected in the contemporary use of lethal force by police.[11] As lynching helped define racial boundaries, I argue that

[11] One study considered other policing practices in the context of past lynchings by examining responses to hate crimes by police in the South (King et al., 2009).

policing continues this legacy through practices that are racially disparate and that continue to rely on criminalizing stereotypes comparable to those of the past (Smångs, 2017). That is, like lynching, police turn to lethal force in response to feelings of threat and fear based on perceptions associating Black people with crime and dangerousness (Butler, 2017; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993) while simultaneously contributing to race-making processes and reinforcing racial boundaries. In sum, policing has functioned towards the subordination of Black Americans thereby reinforcing the status of Whites (Butler, 2017), which may be the connection linking lynchings of the past with contemporary racial injustices regarding policing. Ultimately, it is important for studies of policing and policy responses to be mindful of the fact that the history of policing cannot be separated from rest of US history and the racism built into our society, as such, we need to confront the legacies of this history to truly address contemporary issues (Williams & Murphy, 1990).

Collective Black Resistance, 1960s-1970s

When we think of protesting and resistance to racial injustices today, images of nationwide movements following the fatal police shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 or the more recent widespread demonstrations following the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd in 2020 at the hands of police come to mind. However, resistance from Black Americans against repression and injustice has existed since slavery. For example, Jones (1987) detailed the insurrection that happened on the *Amistad* when enslaved Africans overthrew the Spanish crew and took control of the ship for a period as it crossed the Atlantic Ocean in 1839. Further,

slave conspiracies and rebellions on US soil were not infrequent and took place across the South, including the revolt led by Nat Turner and Gabriel Prosser's planned rebellion that was thwarted (Aptheker, 1963). Besides these past acts of collective resistance against the conditions of slavery and those we have seen in recent years responding to police violence, the US witnessed a series of acts of racial resistance spanning the mid-1960s to the early 1970s as Black Americans protested a swath of racial injustices—including police violence—and unequal social conditions (Blauner, 2001; Hinton, 2021; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968; Levy, 2018; Lieberson & Silverman, 1965). As a result, these acts of resistance may have partially been a response to experiences with past racial violence—including lynching. Instead of addressing these injustices and unequal conditions, "White Rage" and calls for "law and order" merged anti-crime and anti-poverty policies, and led to larger police forces and political conservativism, which all together gave rise to the system of mass incarceration (Anderson, 2016; Hinton, 2015).

Thus, while the acts of collective resistance at this time were a response to injustices Black Americans faced in this country, instead of addressing these issues, calls were made to double-down on repressive measures. In fact, some research has suggested a relationship between civil rights activities and disorders, which led to increasing conflict and threat, and factors related to arrests (Chamlin & Liska, 1992). Additionally, activities of the Civil Rights Movement and race "riots" of the 1960s have been important factors when examining police force size and increasing expenditures to police (Jackson 1989). Two other notable studies have more direct

bearing on the analyses presented here. First, Jacobs and Britt (1979) found that an index of violence, which included an estimate of rioting, was related to police-caused homicides spanning 1961 to 1970. Second, a recent study examined the relationship between racial protests and the use of lethal force by police that followed in a more direct manner. Specifically, Cunningham and Gillezeau (2019) found that Black protesting was related to a higher prevalence of police killings in the immediate years following the protests, regardless of the race of the person killed by police. However, the elevated prevalence of non-White killings persisted for around a decade while killings of Whites fell to pre-protest levels after a few years; thus, the differences in lethal force became race-specific in the years following racial protests and persisted only as lethal force pertained to the deaths of non-White citizens (Cunningham & Gillezeau, 2019). Building on this study, my chapter on police shootings considers the even longer-termed potential for a legacy effect of racial resistance/protests on fatal force while also accounting for the historical context of lynching.

The Importance of Regional Differences and Culture

While my study of lynching and its legacy is conducted through a national scope, this does not change the fact that there are notable regional differences in the prevalence of this violence (see Table 1).[12] One possible explanation for regional

[12] Appendix A provides a more detailed table with lynching totals broken down by race, region, and state.

distinctions in violence may involve cultural differences. In the South, there existed an "honor code" and "culture of violence" that allowed for retaliation against people who wronged you in some manner (Ayers, 1989, 1991; Bailey, 2003; Nisbett, 1993). Some research has suggested that the South continues to exhibit this culture to some degree (Baller, Zevenbergen, & Messner, 2009; Ellison, 1991; Messner, 1983; Nisbett, 1993). Relatedly, the South exemplified a culture of "*rough justice*" in which there was proclivity to turn to violence for settling matters of law and disorder (Pfeifer, 2004). On the other hand, the Northern region of the US has been argued to have been more culturally disposed to "*due process*" ideology and a pursuit of legal justice instead of justice grounded in "rough" or vigilante traditions (Pfeifer, 2004).

Table 1 The Distribution Lynching Totals by Region and Race, 1900-1929

Region	**Black**	**White**	**Total**
Midwest	59.01	24	83.01
Northeast	1	1	2
South	1503.99	112	1651.99
West	12	29	50
US Totals	1576	166	1787

Note: Regions are defined according to US Census Bureau classifications. Lynching data is not recorded for Alaska or Hawaii and five Northeastern states were determined to have never had a recorded lynching: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont (Seguin & Rigby, 2019). The decimal places result from the crosswalk method used to situate the lynchings into contemporary counties boundaries as of 2010 (Eckert, Gvirtz, Liang, &Peter, 2020).

That said, the "culture of violence" from the South made its way outside of that region and into the West and North, especially within cities that received large migrant populations after slavery and during the Great Migration (Ayers, 1984). Specifically, conditions hostile towards Black citizens resulted from the Great Migration as this population was blamed for various social problems (e.g., crime) in the cities they were settling in outside of the South (Tolnay, 2003). Further, "[f]ed by the weakness and perceived injustice of the law, the culture of violence grew in the cities and towns of the New South and followed Southerners of both races into their new homes in the twentieth-century North" (Ayers, 1991, p. 103). Thus, while the South was the most violent region historically, research today indicates that violence is most prevalent in areas across the nation with a large portion of residents who have cultural ties to the South (Ayers, 1991). As such, urban settings outside of the South are believed to have adopted this "Southern culture" meaning that any lack of regional distinctions in research on violence today could be the result of an evolved "culture of violence." It also means that certain pockets of the country may be more likely to exhibit a legacy of lynching or be more prone to violence in general, and these pockets may not be limited to the South.

Further, with my focus on policing, it is important to note that this institution did not develop at the same time or in a consistent manner across the US. In fact, the development of policing can be separated into three general regional trajectories: 1) the North, 2) the South, and 3) the West (Brown, 2019). Mixed into these trajectories was the growth of the "Frontier," which corresponded to the general westward

expansion that began during colonial times as the settler population migrated from the east coast and this movement often involved an initial absence of formalized law and justice (Walker, 1980). That being said, much of what is discussed as the beginning point in the history of US policing comes from the developments that occurred within Northern urban centers (e.g., Boston, New York, Chicago) during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were largely informed and modeled after the police force established in London, England (Brown, 2019; Vitale, 2017; Walker, 1980; Williams & Murphy, 1990). However, policing did not have the same foundation and development trajectory in the South or in the Frontier, at least initially, but the institution has become a blend of all these histories over time (Brown, 2019).

Samuel Walker's *Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice* (1980) provides an important overview of the US justice system's development. In this account, Walker (1980) notes that the US justice system has always been influenced by *popular justice* (i.e., public influence) to a degree whether directly or indirectly. While public influence over the administration of justice can have upsides, this influence is also one of the worst characteristics of US justice and has allowed for serious injustices, especially when individuals decide to take justice into their own hands (Walker, 1980). For instance, with westward expansion and migration, formalized forms of government and law were often weak or absent to begin with and popular justice took the strongest hold through practices such as the formation of vigilante groups as "law" enforcers (Brown, 2019; Walker, 1980). Eventually, this vigilantism took on a major role in supporting White supremacy and even found

support, or at least little resistance, from more formalized justice as indicated by lynch mob participants having little fear of legal repercussion (Clarke, 1998; Walker, 1980). Even formalized law enforcement took on characteristics of vigilantism at times. For instance, Walker (1980) referred to police brutality as *delegated vigilantism* whereby violence at the hands of police is tolerated and approved of by citizens when the victims are members of marginalized groups. Furthermore, racism was embedded in the vigilante tradition and the foundations of formalized criminal justice included this system being an instrument of White supremacy (Walker, 1980).

In the South, the early development of policing included slave patrols and the surveillance of free Black citizens as well as the enslaved population (Du Bois, 1903; Hadden, 2001; Williams & Murphy, 1990; Vitale, 2017). Beyond slavery, policing in the South during the nineteenth century was not a simple replacement for vigilante Whites; instead, the institution of policing reinforced this behavior (Malka, 2018). As policing evolved in this region, and elsewhere in the US, functions of the slave patrol were incorporated in formal policing practices and the control of racially marginalized persons was largely transferred to the police (Hadden, 2001; Hinton & Cook, 2020). Thus, after slavery, the police became more formalized and "professional" in the South and were central to the economic and political repression of the emancipated Black population—including involvement with prison farms and the leasing of imprisoned persons for forced labor (Vitale, 2017).

Harring (2017[1983]) suggests that the rise of formalized policing outside of the South was more directly the result of class conflict where the capitalist class—who

were often also political elites—relied on police to control the working class. This control was maintained through practices of strike breaking and combatting labor movements more generally, but also included the management of (European) immigrant populations who were entering the labor force in competition with "native" White Americans (Harring, 2017[1983]). This is not to say that non-South police were separate from more racialized control practices. In fact, law enforcement organizations outside of the South also functioned to control Black communities early on, even dating back to and in conjunction with the enforcement of slavery (Hinton & Cook, 2020). Following the end of slavery and the eventual mass migration of Black Americans leaving the South, non-South police forces began to subsume racialized control practices even more centrally. That is, "[a]s blacks replaced European immigrants as the major group in the cities, the problems of justice (police conduct, disparities in sentencing) became inseparable from questions of race and racism" (Walker, 1980, p. 166). Further, "[m]ore than simply a remnant of the southern environment they left behind, African-Americans' distrust of the criminal justice system sprang from early evidence that they could not rely on police—even in the promised land—to protect or process them impartially" (Muller, 2012, p. 313).

As this illustrates, the institution of policing has always had a place in enforcing class and racial hierarchies and surveilling Black people and communities—from slavery to present day and regardless of region (Bass, 2001; Brown, 2019; Butler, 2017; Hadden, 2001; Harring, 1995; Hinton & Cook, 2020; Steinmetz, Schaefer, & Henderson, 2016; Walker, 1980; Williams & Murphy, 1990; Vitale,

2017). Further, as discussed above, the development of the criminal justice system, including policing, was closely tied to *popular justice* and the influence of public opinion (Walker, 1980). In fact, Pfeifer (2004) suggests that police brutality and the excessive use of force was racially motivated and subsumed some of the characteristics of *rough justice* exhibited in vigilantism and lynching. Additionally, the public has often been supportive of and condoned violent and brutal policing tactics, especially when dealing with already marginalized populations (Walker, 1980). This is also seen when individuals endorse notions of *honor* in ways that approve of police violence since the police are seen as imbued with the "cultural values of honor" (Pomerantz et al., 2021).

As Figures 1 and 2 show, when examining racial violence throughout different periods of US history under analysis here, we see evidence that this violence occurred nationwide. Specifically, Figure 1 displays the number of cities—Total, South, and Non-South—that had at least one lynching of a Black American (1883-1929) in the surrounding county, one act of Black resistance (1964-1971), or one fatal police shooting of a Black American (2014-2018). First, looking at the sample of cities used in the analysis presented in Chapter 4, 225 (35.1%) of them fall within counties that had at least one lynching of a Black American between the years of 1883 to 1929. When comparing the South to the rest of the nation, we see that 153 of 178 (86.0%) Southern cities and 72 of 464 (15.5%) non-South cities are in counties that had at least one lynching of a Black American. Thus, lynching was much more prevalent across the South as one would expect.

Figure 1 Distribution of Cities with at least One Lynching, Act of Racial Resistance, or Fatal Police Shooting



Turning to the racial resistance that occurred between 1964 and 1971, there were 606 incidents across the total city sample, but only 208 (32.4%) of the 642 cities had at least one act of Black resistance during this period of history. When examining regional differences, 72 (40.4%) of 178 Southern cities had at least one act of collective Black resistance during this period while 136 (29.3%) of 464 non-South cities had at least one. There was also a maximum of 16 Black protests in one Southern city and an average of 1.1 protests per city. In contrast, there was a maximum 14 acts of resistance in one non-South city and an average of 0.9 per non-

South city. These findings confirm that more cities outside of the South experienced at least one act of collective Black resistance even though one city in the South experienced more protests in total than the non-South city with the highest prevalence. This appears to support arguments made by Spilerman (1971, 1976) suggesting that mass resistance from Black Americans was less frequent across cities in the South, which could be, in part, due to past experiences of racial repression that may have exerted pressures on the Black population in the South in a way that deterred the movement toward collective resistance. Specifically, Spilerman (1971) wrote that Black Americans in smaller Southern communities may have been slower to engage as readily in collective expressions of resistance relative to non-South urban settings.

Police shootings of Black Americans are distributed across 248 (38.6%) cities of the full city sample with a range of 0.0 to 52.0 total police shootings of Black Americans spanning the 2014 to 2018 timeframe or 0.0 to 10.4 when averaged over these five years. In the full sample, 128 (19.9%) cities had at least one police shooting of a Black American and a history of at least one lynching of a Black person while 138 (21.5%) cities with at least one police shooting had one act of Black resistance (Figure 2). Only 65 (10.1%) cities with at least one police shooting had a history that include both at least one lynching in the surrounding county and one act of resistance.

In Figure 2, cities with overlapping histories of lynching and Black resistance as well as contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans are displayed. When considering the overlap of lynchings and resistance, only 87 (13.6%) cities had at least one of each in its history. When restricting to the sample to only the South, 67

(37.6%) cities of 178 had both a history of at least one act of Black resistance and one lynching. This suggests that there was much more overlap of these two historical contexts in the South than elsewhere. On the other hand, only 20 non-South cities shared both of these histories.

Figure 2 Distributions of Lynching, Racial Resistance, and Fatal Police Shooting Combinations



Across the sample of Southern cities, 111 (62.36%) cities of 178 had at least one police shooting of a Black American that occurred between the years of 2014 and

2018. The maximum number of fatal police shootings of Black Americans in the South totaled 37 in one city summed over the five years of MPV data considered and there was an average of 2.6 fatal shootings per Southern city.[13] Once these totals were averaged over the five-year period, the maximum was 7.4 Black shootings and there was an averaged average of 0.5 fatal shootings of Black Americans per Southern city. Turning to distributions shown in Figure 2, of the Southern cities with at least one police shooting, 102 (57.3% of 178 cities) had a history of at least one lynching of a Black American while 56 (31.5%) had a history of at least one act of racial resistance. Thus, almost all Southern cities with at least one police shooting also had a history of lynching, but the history of Black resistance did not share the same scope of overlap with police shootings. However, 52 (29.2%) of the cities in the South that had at least one contemporary fatal police shooting of a Black American also had a history of both at least one Black lynching and one act of Black resistance—this means almost all cities with an act of Black resistance between 1964 and 1971 also had a history of lynching.

On the other hand, 137 (29.53%) of the non-South cities had at least one fatal shooting of a Black person by police. In the non-South cities, the maximum number of fatal police shootings of Black Americans in a single city totaled 52 from 2014-2018

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[13] Regarding fatal police shootings of White Americans, there was a maximum of 17 killings in one city and 1.8 fatal shootings of White Americans per city on average. Once these values were averaged over the five-year period, the maximum was 3.4 shootings in one city and an average of 0.4 fatal shootings of White Americans per city in the South.

with an average of 1.1 per city. When these values are averaged over the five-year period, the maximum number of fatal police shootings equals 10.4 total and averages 0.2 per non-South city.[14] Further, there were 26 (5.6% of 464) non-South cities with at least one fatal police shooting and, also, at least one Black lynching in the surrounding county's history. As for the history of racial resistance, 82 (17.7% of 464) non-South cities with at least one police shooting of a Black American also had one protest classified by Black aggression during the 1964-1971 timeframe. Finally, only 13 (2.8%) non-South cities had at least one police shooting, one act of Black resistance, and one lynching.

Overall, Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the fact that these three distinct periods were not isolated to just one region of the United States. Thus, it is important to consider lynching, racial resistance, and police shootings through a national scope. However, this does not contradict the fact that some of this violence and resistance was much more prevalent in specific regions and may be dependent upon regional characteristics including possible cultural differences. Additionally, there is notable overlap in the places where these phenomena occurred despite the decades of time between them. As such, it is an important next step in the study of legacies of racial violence to make possible connections between lynchings, Black led resistance to injustices, and more recent fatal police shootings that are all too common in the US.

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[14] For fatal shootings of White Americans in the non-South, there was a maximum of 32 in one city with an average of 1.2 per city. When averaged over the five-year period, the maximum fatal shootings in one city totaled 6.4 and the average across all non-South cities equaled 0.2 fatal shootings of White Americans.

The analysis in Chapter 4 will delve into the relationships between these three phenomena more deeply while Chapter 3 will look more closely at the national and regional characteristics of lynching outlined in Table 1.

Overview of the Remaining Chapters

Throughout the past several years, there has been growing attention to issues around policing in the United States, especially cases where police officers use lethal force. While this issue has been around for decades, police violence has generally lacked empirical attention regarding what social structural factors may contribute to the prevalence of fatal force. There has also been little research addressing policing practices through a historical context (see Teague [2018] and King et al. [2009] for exceptions), which is a major oversight in the fields of criminology and criminal justice given the direct intertwining of policing's foundations with racialized social control and the control of marginalized populations more generally. My dissertation addresses both of these shortcomings. Specifically, this project examines contemporary police violence through a race-centered and historical context. To place contemporary police violence in a historical context I incorporate two periods of past racial unrest: 1) the era of lynching and 2) acts of racial resistance led by Black Americans during the 1960s and early 1970s. That is, my dissertation makes connections between lynching, Black resistance to racial injustices, and contemporary police violence. While this is the ultimate goal of my dissertation, I begin this research by first advancing the lynching literature through analyses that examine lynchings as a

nationwide problem—not just a Southern one—before moving on to discussions and analyses connecting lynching, resistance, and police violence. Racial threat theory, ethnic competition theory, and other related hypotheses are used to make these connections and guide the arguments presented here. My dissertation advances the literature on police violence by testing structural determinants of lethal force, including the historical contexts of lynching and racial resistance.

In the following chapter (Chapter 2), I offer an overview of the theoretical perspectives and arguments used in framing the analysis of my dissertation. Specifically, I provide an in-depth discussion of racial threat theory and ethnic competition theory, including the history of their development, how they are related, and how they pertain to the forms of violence examined throughout history. I also provide a brief discussion of the other arguments that have been made about the legacy of lynching and its relationship to more contemporary forms of violence.

Regarding the forthcoming analyses, the central and overarching question driving my dissertation and that formed the baseline of my inquiry is: "Do historical acts of (racial) violence or resistance help us to understand trends in contemporary acts of (racial) violence and social control?" However, there are other pertinent questions that are more specific to the two analytical chapters. In brief, these more specific questions include:

1. *Was the lynching of Black Americans the result of similar socio-structural conditions nationwide or were there regional distinctions?* (Chapter 3)

2. *Are modern-day police shootings reflective of past race relations through the legacy of lynching?* (Chapter 4)
3. *How do acts of Black resistance that occurred between the era of lynching and the contemporary police shootings examined here factor into this history?* (Chapter 4)

In exploring answers to these questions, I begin the analytical chapters by first exploring the national context of lynching. Specifically, Chapter 3 examines the lynching of Black citizens between the years of 1900 to 1929 across the contiguous US in pursuit of answering the question of whether the lynching of Black Americans was the result of similar structural conditions nationwide or whether there were regional distinctions to this violence. Notably, this exploration is possible because of advancements in the data collection of lynching in recent years. Using a combination of a Southern inventory of lynching (Tolnay & Beck, 1995) and Seguin and Rigby's (2019) lynching database for the remaining US states, I advance the lynching literature by examining the structural context surrounding lynchings beyond just the Southern region of the US.

In Chapter 4, I then turn to an analysis of the lethal use of force by police (i.e., police shootings of Black Americans) across US cities while accounting for the historical context of lynching and acts of Black resistance from the 1960s and early 1970s. Specifically, the discussion moves to whether there is a legacy of lynching effect on contemporary fatal police shootings and, again, whether there are regional distinctions regarding this legacy and police violence. In doing so, Chapter 4 explores

three separate periods in history—the era of lynching, an era of racial resistance, and contemporary police shootings—and the possible interconnections between them. That is, I trace forms of violence from the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction (i.e., lynching) to the collective racial resistance prevalent during the latter part of the Civil Rights Movement to contemporary issues around the use of fatal force by police that have become central to current discussions about racial justice. After that will be a concluding chapter (Chapter 5) tying everything together and offering directions for future research in these areas.

In sum, my dissertation is a historically guided study of racial violence, resistance, and social control spanning periods of the last century of US history. Here, I offer a detailed discussion of past racial violence and resistance as well as how this history is embedded in more contemporary racially disparate violence, including fatal police shootings which have been referred to as "modern-day lynchings" (Embrick, 2015; Rios, 2015). In this way, my dissertation makes contributions to the fields of race studies, sociology, criminology, political science, and history by expanding on past studies of lynching and its legacy while also incorporating acts of Black resistance into this historical context. We must grapple with forces of the past to understand how they may have transformed over time or how they may continue to influence contemporary violence and justice issues. This acknowledgement of the past and its potential influence on contemporary criminal justice system operations has largely been absent in the field of criminology (Ward, 2015). Thus, I offer further steps in addressing historical violence and how the past can help us continue to make

sense of contemporary violence and criminal justice issues. Unless we can address this history, reconciliation with the past and transformation of our society and justice system is unlikely (Equal Justice Initiative, 2017; Ifill, 2018).

Chapter 2

THEORIZING RACIAL CONFLICT, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Race is a central feature of social relations and a central organizing characteristic of social hierarchies, and White Americans have played a dominant role in creating and perpetuating racial oppression in the United States (Feagin & Elias, 2013; Omi & Winant, 2014). That is, White Americans have controlled racial formation processes and have been central actors to the creation of dominant beliefs about race, social practices, and the functions of various institutions (Feagin & Elias, 2013). The racial hierarchy was constructed in a way that allowed economically and politically powerful White Americans to build a system of racial domination that included the privileging of "Whiteness" (Buck, 2016; Du Bois, 1998[1935]). This White privilege encouraged lower-class White Americans to align themselves more with White elites based on "race" than with other racial/ethnic groups they shared similar social positions with along other lines such as economic class (Buck, 2016; Du Bois, 1998[1935]). In this vein, Karl Marx also offered insights on race relations, especially in the post-slavery years, in that he "grasped the modern dynamics of racism as the means by which workers who had common objective interests could also become mortal enemies because of subjective, but nevertheless real, racist and nationalist ideas" (Taylor, 2016, p. 208). Ultimately, Whiteness and the privileges

associated with it were cast as “natural” benefits despite class differences between members of the White racial group, and this notion of White superiority kept lower-class Whites focused on other racial/ethnic groups as their enemies instead of the elite White population that was also responsible for upholding the class hierarchy (Buck, 2016; Du Bois, 1998[1935]).

The history of the US has been rife with racial conflict in the forms of repressive violence and social control that have long been used to impose a racial hierarchy where the White racial group has forcefully positioned itself at the top. Following the end of slavery, the Reconstruction era was set to guarantee the emancipated Black population new rights and resources as US citizens and, therefore, the position of Whites who had benefited from enslavement and fully exploited labor became threatened (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). In response to this new threat, White Americans and institutions worked to reestablish the color-line by devising new and revising old forms of control, including explicitly violent tactics like lynching, to reinstate racial boundaries between them and the newly freed Black citizenry (Smångs, 2017). To illustrate these responses, one only has to look to the Reconstruction Era and the subsequent manners wherein White-controlled Southern governments turned to various methods of political disenfranchisement, labor conditions reminiscent of re-enslavement, increasing use of prisons and convict leasing for slavery-like labor exploitation, the implementation of “Black Codes,” and the mob violence of lynching and riots (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). While the

Reconstruction Era saw the rise of these tactics, they persisted for decades after Reconstruction efforts were dismantled and abandoned.

These coordinated attempts to reinstate the racial hierarchy and dominance over the Black population in the US correspond to what Carol Anderson (2016) termed "White Rage," which is a response that has occurred following every major attempt made to reduce racial inequality. While early examples of White Rage include the enactment of Black Codes and other conditions discussed extensively by Du Bois in *Black Reconstruction* (1998[1935]), White Rage—and racism in general—has become more covert and subtle in modern America; it is hidden in the social structure, institutions, and the formality of policies that appear "race-neutral" on the surface (Alexander, 2010; Anderson, 2016; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Davis, 2003). Through a process of "frontlash," White Rage has more recently taken form in the expansion of the criminal justice system in response to advancements made during the Civil Rights Movement and as a response to the collective acts of racial resistance that swept across US cities during the 1960s (Anderson, 2016; Oliver, 2008; Wacquant, 2010; Weaver, 2007).

One example of White Rage becoming more covert comes from Michelle Alexander's (2010) work arguing that the way the criminal justice system operates today has allowed for the construction of a "new" caste system that provides a comprehensive form of racialized control. Alexander (2010) notes that the adaptability of racism allows for caste systems to die and be reborn in new ways that continue to control Black Americans and, as a result, the modern justice system in the US can

pose as “colorblind” while rampant disparities exist and are disguised by the historically persistent conflation of “Blackness” with criminality. In the past, White beliefs of “Black criminality” were used to justify lynching—especially when the alleged crime was sexual violence against a White woman, even though this offense was not the most common (Ayers, 1984; Brundage, 1993; Harris, 1995; Raper, 2003[1933]; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Wells-Barnett, 2014[1892]). Today, Black Americans continue to be criminalized in ways “justifying prejudicial thinking, discriminatory treatment, and/or acceptance of racial violence as an instrument of public safety” (Muhammad, 2011, p. 4). Consequently, this criminalization is a persistent historical and political process that changes based on contemporary states of cultural and racial mores, even in a “colorblind” context where criminalization shapes the criminal justice system in ways that normalize racial oppression (Bell, 2017). Thus, this history, which continues to inform race relations today, and the recurrent White responses to threat and competition, will be at the forefront of the coming chapters. Racialized violence and social control practices have arisen in several manners since the end of slavery (e.g., lynching, convict leasing, police use of force) and the purpose of my dissertation is to empirically explore different periods of racial violence in US history—including the resistance efforts on the part of Black Americans in response to violence, criminal injustice, and unequal social conditions (Blauner, 2001; Levy, 2018).

Beyond considering violence and social control throughout American history though, I also focus on the legacies created by past racial violence. In previous studies,

sociologists and criminologists have examined how a historical context of past racialized violence may create a legacy effect that influences contemporary patterns of racial violence and social control. As Ward (2016) contends, forms of violence and inequality remain distinct where racial violence of the past was most pronounced, and the meanings of this violence linger in attitudes, behaviors, and social structures of these localities. As such, several theoretical arguments have been proposed in studying race relations and racial violence, and how a legacy of lynching may have been created that continues to inform contemporary violence and social control through (Petersen & Ward, 2015; Ward, 2016). These arguments include those from *racial threat* (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Blauner, 2001; Key, 1949) and *ethnic competition* (Olzak, 1992) theories prominently, but also incorporate ideas from *racial socialization*, *cultural norms* conducive to violence, *collective memory* processes, and the process of *criminalization* (Alexander, 2010; Durso & Jacobs, 2013; Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017; Petersen & Ward, 2015). While I draw from each of these arguments throughout later chapters, the driving theoretical frameworks I rely on include those of racial threat and ethnic competition theory due to their shared centrality of race/ethnicity and structural arguments around racism as well as their application to the study of racialized violence and social control throughout different historical periods. In brief, central to racial threat and ethnic competition theories are their focus on the role of competition and the resulting threat—perceived or actual—this competition arises among racial/ethnic groups regarding access to economic, political, and social resources (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Olzak, 1992; Petersen & Ward,

2015; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). I now turn to a deeper discussion of threat and competition theories before offering a brief overview of the arguments about socialization, cultural norms, and other recent theoretical developments that have been argued to influence the legacy effect of past racial violence.

Racial Threat Theory

Theoretical arguments that were developed and eventually fused into what has today been labeled "racial threat theory" have come from several notable scholars including V. O. Key, Jr. (1949), Herbert Blumer (1958), and Hubert Blalock (1967). Key (1949) offered an assessment of Southern politics that viewed the local context as a major factor in the racial character of politics; specifically, that the concentration of the Black population mattered in discussions of Southern political trends (see Giles and Buckner [1993] for a test of Key's contentions and Voss [1996] for a critique of their study and the usefulness of Key's arguments in understanding politics in the Southern context considered). As for Blumer (1958), he saw racial prejudice as a phenomenon tied to the position of racial groups by focusing "on the collective processes by which a racial group comes to define and redefine another racial group" (p. 3). He specifically argued that prejudicial practices result from collective feelings—a sense of superiority, views of other groups as inherently different or "alien," sense of claim to privileges, and fear and threat—held by a "dominant" racial group, especially when a "subordinate" racial group is perceived to be challenging the positionality of the dominant group in some manner (Blumer, 1958; Bobo &

Hutchings, 1996; Kusow & DeLisi, 2020). “Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of the sense of a group position” that also works as a “protective device” that functions “to preserve the integrity and the position of the dominant group” (Blumer, 1958, p. 5). Further, while individuals may experience feelings of threat to varying degrees based on their other social or class positions, “the sense of group position cannot be reduced to an individual level” (Kusow & DeLisi, 2020, p. 3). While Key and Blumer have offered important contributions to our understanding of racial threat, I follow many studies of lynching and police use of force conducted before this and draw my arguments more directly from Blalock’s theorizing about racial threat.

In Blalock’s *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (1967), numerous propositions concerning conflict between racial/ethnic groups over access to economic and political (power) resources were outlined. Since its publication, the propositions of this book have been summarized into one central contention. The basic argument put forward is that as a racial minority group’s population increases, the racial majority group will experience or perceive a growing threat to their status and will work to ensure the minority group is kept from advancing economically or politically (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018; Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1992). Specifically, the racial majority group will enact discriminatory practices and forms of social control to prevent the—perceived or actual—advancements among racial minority groups that threaten the majority group’s social standing (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). When Black Americans challenge Whites in

contests for political power and/or economic resources, they may threaten the dominant racial position of Whites.[15] The maintenance of White dominance and removal of Black threat has been theorized to be a key feature driving racial violence past and present (Blalock, 1967; Petersen & Ward, 2015; Tolnay & Beck, 1995).

Important to Blalock's theory is the emphasis on different threat effects regarding the economic and political realms of racial contestation. According to the *economic threat hypothesis*, as the size of the racial minority group's population increases in size, the discriminatory practices of the racial majority group will also increase (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018). However, Blalock also proposed a curvilinear relationship between the racial minority group's size and the discriminatory response from the racial majority group. Specifically, once the racial minority population reaches a threshold, the relationship between the size of this population and the racial majority group's discriminatory response may taper-off and become negative (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018). The closer the population size of the majority and minority racial groups, the more competition between them economically. Thus, once the racial minority group is sufficiently large, they may no longer convey threat, or come into the same direct contact, in the same manner as when the two groups were on more equal ground (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). When the racial minority group's population is large

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[15] Notably, Blalock (1967) focused primarily on the race relations between African Americans and Whites given the long history of oppression imposed on the Black population in the US.

enough, discriminatory practices of the majority group will no longer be perceived as necessary (Stults & Swagar, 2018).

In contrast to the economic arguments, are those regarding Blalock's *power-threat hypothesis*—or *political threat*. According to his political arguments, as the racial minority group's population increases, the discriminatory practices of the racial majority group against the racial minority will also increase (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). The difference between Blalock's economic and political arguments comes down to his curvilinear hypotheses. Whereas the *economic threat hypothesis* predicts a potential tapering or negative effect between the racial minority group's size and discriminatory practices, the *power-threat hypothesis* predicts the opposite. Specifically, Blalock (1967) argued that for the racial majority to maintain its dominant position, they would have to mobilize their resources and social control practices at an increasing rate beyond the resource gains being made by the racial minority group. Thus, while the size of the racial minority group's population is a key measure of threat, it is believed that this threat may take on two different forms since the response to the racial majority group would have to be more extensive to address political gains of the racial minority (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018).

Limitations in Testing Racial Threat Theory

While racial threat is one of the most used theoretical frameworks in the study of racial violence and racialized criminal justice outcomes, there are some limitations with how this theory has been employed and tested. The theoretical and

methodological shortcomings of racial threat theory and tests of it have been greatly detailed elsewhere (for examples see the works of Dollar [2014], Feldmeyer and Cochran [2018], Stults and Swagar [2018], and Smith [2021]), so I focus only on a portion of them here. One limitation of past racial threat studies is that, oftentimes, the researchers are not always clear in their differentiation of economic and power-threat effects (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). Relatedly, based on Blalock's propositions, most studies of racial threat only rely on estimates of the racial minority group's population size as the predictor of threat. However, scholars have brought attention to the potential limitation and issues of using "actual" population size estimates to capture racial threat (Gallagher, 2003). Specifically, Gallagher (2003) demonstrated how White respondents often overestimate the size of non-White populations and provided implications about what this could mean for race relations. For example, this misperception may allow Whites to "ignore, discount, or negate claims that being white affords its members social, political, or economic privileges because there is the perception that with parity in size comes equal access to social resources" (Gallagher, 2003, p. 392). Thus, relying on actual estimates of racial group sizes may not accurately capture the amount of "threat" felt among Whites since they may view racial minority groups as larger than they actually are in the US population.

Studies have attempted to address both of these concerns. In doing so, some research has used perceptual data from surveys to better capture estimates of threat (King & Wheelock, 2007; Kusow & DeLisi, 2010). For example, King and Wheelock (2007) found that there was a relationship between not only structural characteristics

(e.g., Black population size) and public punitiveness, but also perceptions of Black Americans captured at the individual-level. Despite these findings, including direct measures of perceptions of threat among US citizens is beyond the scope of the analyses presented in upcoming chapters. On the other hand, research has considered separate effects for economic and power-threat that are more direct than just the racial minority group's population size. This has been accomplished through macro-level measures of race-specific ratios that capture these types of threat more directly (Gray & Parker, 2020; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Stults & Swagar, 2018)—though some studies accounting for economic inequality did not make arguments directly aligned with those of racial threat theory (e.g., Jacobs & Britt, 1979). In fact, an important feature of threat is that it results from *competition* between racial/ethnic groups over various economic and political resources (Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992), which brings us to the closely related theory of ethnic competition.

Ethnic Competition Theory

It is important to first note that ethnic competition and racial threat theory both share a common foundation that includes many of the same early theoretical contributors. A more contemporary and major contributor to ethnic competition theory is Susan Olzak (1992) who has provided arguments focused more directly on competition between racial (or ethnic) groups beyond Blalock's contentions that focused primarily on racial group population sizes. As Olzak (1992) stated in *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition & Conflict*, "The key claim of competition theories is

that changes in levels of ethnic and racial competition for valued resources—such as jobs, housing, and marital partners—ignite ethnic collective action" (p. 7). According to competition theory, conflict arises when racial/ethnic groups who have been marginalized find ways to compete for the same resources that more powerful racial/ethnic groups have access to because of their social positioning (Olzak, 1992). For example, socioeconomic changes between racial/ethnic groups are argued to contribute to conflict and the resulting competition between groups is the potential result of niche overlap (Olzak, 1992). Further,

> "…increasing labor market competition between ethnic populations raises the likelihood of ethnic collective action. Likewise, political challenges to existing ethnic power structures increase rates of ethnic and racial conflict and protest" (Olzak, 1992, p. 30).

When competition—perceived or real—between racial/ethnic groups arises, the majority group will respond through collective action that attempts to prevent racial/ethnic minority groups from accessing coveted resources and power (Olzak, 1992).

One area of ethnic competition theory that was largely overlooked in Blalock's theorizing of racial threat is the role of immigration in racial conflict and competition. In fact, immigration can force racial/ethnic group boundaries to the forefront of peoples' consciousness,' especially among workers who now find themselves in direct competition with an immigrant labor force (Olzak, 1992). According to ethnic competition theory, immigration increases the supply of workers thereby increasing competition among various racial/ethnic groups in the labor market while also

possibly causing a decline in wages for workers, particularly if employers decide to differentially pay wages based on worker racial/ethnic group membership in order to divide and conquer their employees (Bonacich, 1972; Olzak, 1992). When wages are split in this manner racial antagonism can result as the majority racial/ethnic group attempts to sustain their control over the labor market (Bonacich, 1972; Olzak, 1992). Thus, while racial/ethnic groups may already be in competition over scarce resources, immigrant populations can also arrive on the scene and similarly begin to compete in ways that may bring about discriminatory and exclusionary collective actions on the part of the majority racial/ethnic group (Olzak, 1992). Notably, the recent immigrant population may be subjected to the majority group's collective actions; however, when other racial/ethnic groups are also present, the least powerful group with the inability to retaliate or defend themselves is the group most likely to be victimized even if they are not part of the immigrant group (Olzak, 1992).

As the preceding discussions indicate, ethnic competition theory is closely related and "complexly intertwined" with racial threat theory (Petersen & Ward, 2015, p. 118). The major difference is that competition theory more explicitly argues that competition between racial/ethnic groups should be captured directly through estimates of differences between these groups and their access to various resources, such as those in the economic and political realms (Olzak, 1992; Tolnay et al., 1992). On the other hand, racial threat theory is more often conceptualized by the relationship between the racial minority group's population size—including the potential for a curvilinear relationship whether in support of economic (inverted U-shape) or power-

threat (increasingly positive curve)—and the form of discrimination being examined as the response by the racial majority group. There has been some support for racial threat and ethnic competition theories when examining forms of racial violence, resistance, and social control throughout history, including studies of lynching, racial protests, and the use of fatal force by police.

Racial Threat, Ethnic Competition, and Studies of Racial Violence

Lynching

At its inception lynching was not reserved exclusively for racialized control; however, Black Americans became the primary targets of White mobs that defied the law and arbitrated "justice" on their own terms (Baker, 1964[1908]; Du Bois, 1998[1935]; Raper, 2003[1933]; Williamson, 1986). Lyching and even just the threat of this violence, helped restore and maintain the dominance of the White racial group—it redefined and reinforced racial boundaries after Reconstruction offered Black Americans citizens and opportunities for advancement in the US within politics and the economy (Brundage, 1993; Cox, 1945; Harris, 1995). As such, economic and political competition were other major factors contributing to the prevalence of lynchings.

For example, poor and "planter" class White Americans were united against Black Americans as racial identities were constructed in a manner that made them more salient than class distinctions (Du Bois, 1998[1935]; Raper, 2003[1933]; W. J. Wilson, 1980[1978]). Black and White workers saw each other through lenses of hate

and fear and were divided along race on issues related to labor conditions in ways that prevented them from uniting against the upper-class based on their shared class positions (Du Bois, 1998[1935]; W. J. Wilson, 1980[1978]). That said, White laborers who struggled economically still benefited from a "wage of Whiteness" since their race guaranteed they still had caste status above Black laborers—even if their class status placed them in a position more similar to Black laborers (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). As a result, actual wages could be kept low for both races while Whites were kept in fear of Black labor replacing them and Black workers were always threatened by encroaching White labor (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). To this end, Du Bois (1998[1935], p. 701) argued that lynching was inevitable based on the relations between these two groups of laborers since any economic advancements among Black Americans would be seen as a threat to the status of Whites.

These relationships have been explored through studies of lynching using racial threat and ethnic competition theories. Early studies of lynching conveyed support for Blalock's *power-threat hypothesis* (Reed, 1971; Corzine, Creech, & Corzine, 1983). However, these studies were eventually challenged along methodological concerns and evidence supporting the *economic threat hypothesis* was found instead in a replication study—at least within counties of Deep South states (Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1989). Further, Tolnay and Beck (1995) provided substantial evidence in support of racial threat and competition arguments in association with lynchings, especially regarding economic arguments but little evidence was found in support for political ones. The lynching of Black Americans

was prevalent when it served economic interests of Whites and Black citizens were especially likely to face lynching when it benefited Whites across all class standings (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Specifically, Black Americans were less likely to be lynched when the cotton economy was more successful and were more likely to be lynched in places where there were more White tenants, which Tolnay and Beck (1995) argued was the result of poor Whites resorting to violence to uphold the racial caste system dividing them from Black citizens who shared a similar class position. Expanding on this work, Christian (2017) further reported that the cotton market was directly related to lynching. Specifically, poor cotton prices led to more lynchings of Black Americans in order to reduce labor competition and increase wages since Black migration often followed this violence (Christian, 2017). On the other hand, little evidence has supported political arguments from threat theory in regards to lynching (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). While research has been supportive of threat and competition arguments in explaining lynching, especially their economic arguments, data limitations have restricted our understanding of lynching to the South. As a result, we are less certain to what extent these theoretical processes help us to understand the lynching of Black citizens beyond the Southern region.

Racial Protesting and Resistance

The racial protests of the 1960s and 1970s were often the result of conflict involving Black Americans responding to forms of exploitation and exclusion they were experiencing as well as further wrongs committed against them by members of other racial groups—including the police force that was often viewed as an occupying

White army in Black neighborhoods (Baskin et al., 1971; Blauner, 2001; Chambliss, 2001; Hinton, 2015; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [a.k.a. Kerner Commission], 1968; Lieberson & Silverman, 1965). As such, these acts of resistance typically resulted from confrontations between racial groups or violations of one racial group against another (Lieberson & Silverman, 1965, p. 888). Further, these incidents often started because conflicts with police and injustices experienced at their hands, and often involved protest participants targeting institutions that "embodied white power and exacerbated racial inequality" (Sugrue, 2008, p. 291). The collective resistance of Black Americans in response to various injustices—economic, political, social—from Whites and "White" institutions may have symbolized and enhanced Black-group membership against the oppression of a White-dominated society and, as such, could be explained in part by arguments related to threat and ethnic competition.

In fact, based on previous research examining racial protests, some support for economic competition and threat arguments has been reported. For example, Lieberson and Silverman (1965) stated that "riots are more likely where Negroes are closer to whites in their proportions in 'traditional' Negro occupations, and where Negro-white income differences are smaller…" (p. 897). In addition, Spilerman (1970, 1971, 1976) reported that the most important predictor of racial disorders from 1961 to 1968 and their level of severity across American cities is the size of the Black population, while measures of economic deprivation and disadvantage did not garner much support in his analysis. However, studies building on Spilerman's work have incorporated competition and threat arguments more directly and found that riots

resulted from declining deprivation among racial minority groups and growing competition between racial/ethnic groups (Olzak & Shanahan, 1996). Further, Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney (1996) incorporated segregation arguments with competition ones and found that declines in levels of segregation resulted in increased racial contact and competition leading to more race riots between 1960 and 1993. In addition, Myers (1997) concluded that, "Economic and migration pressures in U.S. cities created different levels of intergroup competition, which in turn contributed to the chances of experiencing racial riots" (p. 108).

Finally, Olzak (1990) considered ethnic competition arguments regarding lynching and urban racial violence against Black Americans from 1882-1914 and found that, "Economic slumps, particularly those that affected the least skilled workers, appear to have increased rates of both forms of racial violence, as did rising competition from immigration" (p. 415).[16] In addition, Olzak's (1990) study suggested that lynchings were also influenced by unique Southern factors relating to politics and the economy, while the rate of urban violence against Black Americans throughout Northern cities was also influenced by Southern lynchings during the time-period observed in this study. In sum, competition and threat arguments not only help us understand collective violence against Black Americans in the US, but, in some ways,

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[16] Urban racial violence is specifically defined here as "violence against blacks if two or more persons engaged in threatening or actual violent behavior against blacks and used racial epithets or symbols. A conflict was distinguished as violent if anyone was killed or injured or if guns, knives, bricks, or other weapons were deployed or used to threaten victims" (Olzak, 1990, p. 403).

can help us understand the collective resistance of Black Americans that resulted during the twentieth century in response to injustices and inequalities being faced in US cities.

Policing and Fatal Force

In the United States, the policing institution was founded on the management of economically and racially/ethnically marginalized groups (Hadden, 2001; Harring, 1995; Vitale, 2017). Lynchings sometimes included law enforcement officers as participants to various degrees (Buckser, 1992; Raper, 2003[1933]; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2018) and police were also often involved in conflicts and violence preceding acts of Black resistance during the 1960s and 1970s (Blauner, 2001; Sugrue, 2008). Core to policing are interactions with civilians as are the unique powers and authority bestowed to police that allow them to maintain order, prevent crime, and enforce the law. These unique powers include the ability for officers to employ state-sanctioned force against civilians when necessary (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Vitale, 2017; Zimring, 2017). Due to high levels of discretion afforded police, racial disparities in police interactions are not uncommon (Alexander, 2010) including when they resort to the use of fatal force (Butler, 2017; Durán, 2016; Zimring, 2017). That said, institutional practices among police are likely to blame for racial disparities in fatal force, not just "bad apple" officers acting on their own racism and biases (Menifield, Shin, & Strother, 2018). In fact, disparities in fatal force appear to be driven by disparities in policing more generally—officers disproportionately kill

Black Americans because they interact with Black persons in disparate manners (Menifield et al., 2018).

As for tests of the use of fatal force by police, racial threat has been one of the most consistently used frameworks while ethnic competition arguments have been less present. In fact, the closest arguments and tests related to ethnic competition have pertained to measures of Black-White economic ratios. For example, economic inequality between White and Black Americans has been associated with a higher prevalence of lethal force across states (Jacobs & Britt, 1979); however, these findings have not been replicated in other studies (Gray & Parker, 2019, 2020). More typically, studies of police use of force—ranging from excessive to lethal—account for the size of the Black population more consistent with Blalock's original propositions. Results in support of this theoretical tradition have been relatively inconsistent though. Some studies suggest that the size of the Black or non-White population is related to violent policing practices (Holmes, 2000; Liska & Yu, 1992; Ross, 2015; Smith, 2004; Smith & Holmes, 2003, 2014), while other studies have not found similar support (Holmes, Painter, & Smith, 2019; Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom, & Deckard, 2016). But studies have not always been consistent in the unit of analysis used to study the use of force by police, which could be a reason for these inconsistencies since larger units may mask the heterogeneity that could be present across smaller units (Klinger et al., 2016; Nix, Campbell, Byers, & Alpert, 2017). When examining fatal force specifically, several studies examining states and smaller units of analysis reported no support for racial threat (Holmes, Painter, &

Smith, 2019; Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Klinger et al., 2016) while others have found that the Black population size is significantly associated with fatal force (Ross, 2015; Smith, 2004). Additionally, not all studies of fatal force have been conducted using race-specific disaggregated incidents of force (e.g., Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Smith, 2004); thus, the racial characteristics of this violence have not always been clearly examined.

Some studies of racial threat and lethal force have considered Blalock's curvilinear hypotheses as well (Holmes et al., 2019; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Lautenschlager & Omori, 2019). For example, one study supported racial threat propositions when examining the total force incidences as well as the severity of force used by police in New York City (Lautenschlager & Omori, 2019). Specifically, the Black population size was consistently related to both outcomes in the positive direction. When accounting for the curvilinear hypothesis, the squared term of the Black population was significantly and negatively associated with incidents of force supporting Blalock's proposed existence of a threshold. On the other hand, while total use of force occurrences decreased once the Black population reached a threshold, a curvilinear relationship was not present in models measuring the severity of force police used (Lautenschlager & Omori, 2019).

Besides these traditional threat and economic arguments, some studies of lethal force have considered the political realm. This aspect of threat theory is often accounted for by capturing whether persons in political positions are members of racial minority groups. Results have been mixed regarding these types of political

estimates in studies of the use of force by police (Parker, MacDonald, et al., 2005) and the use of lethal force (Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Legewie & Fagan, 2016). Specifically, the presence of Black city mayors had no significant relationship with arrests (Parker, Stults, et al., 2005) or deadly force (Legewie & Fagan, 2016). Further, the presence of Black city council members was not significantly associated with lethal force (Legewie & Fagan, 2016) and neither was an estimate of Black elected officials in national and state legislatures in a state-level study of race-specific police shootings (Gray & Parker, 2020).

Regarding immigration arguments from ethnic competition, competition resulting from immigration has increased the prevalence of racial violence (Olzak, 1990, 1992). Increasing immigration has been associated with the prevalence of lynching in support of arguments that racial competition due to an increasing low-wage labor supply led to higher rates of racial violence (Olzak, 1990). Additionally, European immigrants were lynched at rates and in manners similar to native Whites; thus, the "Whiteness" of European immigrants appears to have offered protection while Black Americans were situated as the least powerful and most vulnerable to lynching (Rigby & Seguin, 2018). Only one lethal force study to my knowledge has considered the role of immigration directly (Gaston, Fernandes, & DeShay, 2021), but some studies have considered ethnic threat as it pertains to Hispanic/Latinx populations (e.g., Holmes et al., 2019; Zimmerman, Fridel, Sheppard, & Lawshe, 2021). Thus, more work on police use of force should be done to examine possible

competition and threat effects regarding other racial/ethnic minority groups or recent immigrants to the US.

The Legacy of Racial Violence Literature and its Limitations

While studies have addressed the legacy of racial violence, especially the historical context of lynching, and have offered key insights, there are some notable limitations in this research. I discuss five major limitations here and these limitations include (1) the gaps in time between the historical and contemporary periods chosen to be examined, (2) the primary focus on legacy effects in just the South (3) or at the state-level, (4) only considering lynching as a form of racial violence that created a legacy, and (5) how the legacy is captured empirically. Each of these is discussed in greater detail next as I plan to overcome them in the analyses provided in Chapters 3 and 4.

Gaps in Time

First, quantitative studies often measure lynching between a certain time-period (e.g., 1882-1930) that leaves a large gap of time between the end of lynching and the contemporary violence or social control phenomena that have been examined. For example, Jacobs et al. (2005) had a nearly forty-year gap between their estimate of lynching and the more contemporary death sentences considered, and Jacobs et al. (2012) examined lynchings only spanning 1889 to 1918 while their estimate of prison admissions covered the years of 1972 to 2000. Thus, these studies left several decades unaccounted for in their analysis and, as a result, do not account for other historical

forces may interact with the legacy of lynching in some way or have their own legacy effect on contemporary phenomena. To address this limitation, researchers have started to consider what social forces occurring between their estimates of lynching and contemporary homicides may have either disrupted (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017) or sustained (Petersen & Ward, 2015) the legacy of lynching. Gabriel and Tolnay (2017) considered how "*indicators of resistance*" may mediate lynching's effect on contemporary homicides. They found that lynchings were positively associated with White-on-Black homicides, but this relationship became nonsignificant when controlling for measures that they had argued may disrupt the legacy created by a history of lynching (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017).[17] In addition, Petersen and Ward (2015) considered how anti-civil rights violence/enforcement (ACRE) that occurred between 1954 and 1974 may help us understand the legacy of lynching and its relationship with contemporary homicides. Specifically, they "found that lynching has an indirect effect on overall levels of lethal violence through its prior effects on ACRE, while the legacy of lynching has a more direct effect on interracial violence. Moreover, ACRE activity positively predicts overall levels of violence, but not interracial conflict in particular"

[17] For example, Gabriel and Tolnay (2017) considered how population churning may interrupt the legacy of lynching. They argued that where there was more population turnover—people moving in and out of counties—the legacy of cultural traditions conducive to the interracial violence of lynching and contemporary homicides may be altered. They also considered various political factors that may impact the lasting effect of lynching.

(Petersen & Ward, 2015, p. 131-132).[18] Based on these results, they concluded "that anti-civil rights violence acts as a conduit for the transmission of violence over time, apparently sustaining or cultivating the latent functions of lynching, which in turn, shape current homicide rates" (Petersen & Ward, 2015, p.135). No studies have examined possible mediating factors between past lynchings and contemporary criminal justice practices though.

I address this oversight by examining the period of Black resistance spanning 1964 to 1971 since this is a middle point between my estimate of lynching (1883-1929) and contemporary police shootings (2014-2018). I consider the protests from this timeframe since they largely characterized by Black aggression and responses to unequal social conditions, racial discrimination, and experiences with violence (e.g., police brutality) (Blauner, 2001; Carter, 1986; Levy, 2018). Further, since acts of collective resistance from Black Americans were often a response to injustices, they may interact with the legacy of lynching in some manner.[19] On the other hand, these

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[18] In this paper, ACRE refers to "anti-civil rights enforcement" and these historical events are used to examine potential mediating processes between lynchings and contemporary homicides (Petersen & Ward, 2015, p. 122).

[19] During the lynching era, arguments were made suggesting that the only way to respond to White violence was through Black Americans arming themselves and becoming militant; that is, responding with their own violence against White America. This violence, it was argued, would send a message to White Americans, and would have the potential to change the power structure of the US (Waldrep, 2009). Given this history, it could be that this tradition of calls for violence may have influenced the rise of Black racial resistance in later decades. Thus, where lynchings were prevalent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there may have been a greater likelihood of Black resistance during the 1960s-1970s.

protests may also have their own legacy relationship with contemporary policing (e.g., Cunningham & Gillezeau, 2019) given the tensions between police and communities that existed and often spurred these actions (Levy, 2018). Thus, I will consider these acts of collective Black resistance as an independent historical context, which may also serve as a mediator between lynching and contemporary violence and social control. Specifically, Black unrest during the 1960s may be a response to a history of lynching in a given location since these protests were a response to unjust conditions and social institutions. In addition, Black resistance may enhance the effect of past lynchings through an increased perception of threat by the White racial group that believed their only way to maintain dominance would be through extra levels of violence and control. Thus, a history of Black resistance may have its own legacy to contend with regarding violence against Black Americans by Whites, which may have increased following Black resistance, or the policing of Black Americans following the racial conflict of the 1960s.

While Black resistance of the 1960s has been implicated in the increase in formal forms of social control, research has not fully addressed whether these protests have this direct effect. For example, based on research of arrests in 1972 (Liska & Chamlin, 1984) and a follow-up study of arrests in 1982, it has been suggested that the civil rights activities and disorders of the 1960s increased conflict and threat, which then impacted factors associated with arrests in 1972 (Chamlin & Liska, 1992). However, by 1982, these racial and economic factors (threat) that had been influenced by the conditions of the 1960s, no longer expressed the same effects on arrest

(Chamlin & Liska, 1992). These results suggest that the unrest of the 1960s did have a possible effect on racial threat, but this study did not examine whether there was a direct effect on policing practices that followed this era of unrest. On the other hand, some studies have examined the direct effect of 1960s disorders on different measures related to social control. For example, Jackson and Carroll (1981) examined the effects of riots that took place in the 1960s on municipal police expenditures in non-southern cities in 1971. They found that the size of the Black population and Civil Rights Movement mobilization were significant predictors of expenditures, but riots had no independent significant effect. This led the authors to suggest that the effects of the riots in the 1960s were not felt in just the cities where they occurred, but that these effects were more widespread. In addition, Jacobs and Britt (1979) found that an index of violence, which included the number of riots in each state, was positively and significantly associated with police-caused homicides that spanned 1961-1970. However, existing research has not fully considered the impact of or responses to the racial protests of the 1960s and the possible long-term legacy effect on social control these acts may have helped create.

In sum, racial protests, their possible relationship to lynching, and the violent and punitive conditions that may have followed this collective resistance of the 1960s-1970s should receive further theoretical and empirical attention and these possible relationships will be explored in this dissertation. In the second and third chapters, Black resistance will be examined in relation to the legacy of violence that lynching has created. In addition, given findings suggesting that some historical forces act as a

conduit for (Petersen & Ward, 2015) or interrupt the relationship between past lynchings and recent homicides (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017), I will also consider racial resistance of the 1960s as a possible mediating force between lynching and contemporary fatal police shootings.

Beyond the South

A second limitation is the primary focus on lynching's legacy in the South. While the South had a particularly unique history of mob violence, lynching occurred across every region of the US (Carrigan & Webb, 2003; Pfeifer, 2004; Seguin & Rigby, 2019).[20] In fact, the social conditions outside of the South were not often much better in regards to racial inequality and types of violence and social control Black Americans were subjected to—including lynching. Regarding the North specifically, this region "did not turn out to be the 'promised land' of racial equality, economic security, and full citizenship for which migrants yearned" (Meier & Rudwick, 1968[1966]; Wacquant, 2001, p. 102). Instead, racial boundaries were established, and the "ghetto" was constructed in response to the growing Black population—that is, Black Americans were systematically relegated to segregated spaces through political and economic means as well as through animosity and violence from everyday White citizens trying to keep Black residents from challenging their segregated status

[20] Lynching was also not uncommon with Westward expansion of the US, and other racial-ethnic groups—Asian, Mexican, Native American—were also often the targets of this violence throughout the West (Carrigan & Webb, 2003; Pfeifer, 2004; Seguin & Rigby, 2019).

through relocation attempts (Anderson, 2016; Meier & Rudwick, 1968[1966]; Taylor, 2016; Wacquant, 2001). Specifically, Baker (1964[1908]) had the following to say:

> "While the Negroes were an inconsequential part of the population, they passed unnoticed, but with increasing numbers…accompanied by competition for the work of the city and active political power, they are inevitably kindling the fires of race-feeling. Prejudice has been incited also by echoes of the constant agitation in the South…" [including] "…by the increased immigration of Southern white people with their strong Southern point of view" (p. 111).

As such, lynching likely played a similar role in establishing racialized control outside of the South and there may be a legacy of lynching outside of the South as well, despite this violence being less prevalent elsewhere in the US.

In support of this possibility, Jacobs et al. (2012) found the independent effect of lynching on contemporary imprisonment rates persisted at the state-level even when they removed ex-Confederate states from their analysis. In addition, Madison (2001) provided compelling evidence of how lynching continued to shape community members' memories and race relations in a Northern community (i.e., Marion, Indiana). Thus, more work should consider the legacy of lynching in other regions of the US to further assess whether these effects are unique to the South, and quantitative analyses would benefit from considering the legacy of lynching outside the South at units of analysis smaller than states. New data collected and made available by Seguin & Rigby (2019) allows for an exploration of lynching and its possible legacy outside of the South at the county-level. For this reason, I am able to examine lynching nationwide and test for whether there is a legacy of lynching at a smaller unit of

analysis than the state-level nationally when this new data is combined with Tolnay and Beck's (1995; Beck & Tolnay, 2015) database.

Units of Analysis

A third related limitation is that lynching was a highly localized phenomenon; thus, capturing the true effect of the legacy of lynching may require smaller units of analysis than are typically studied (Messner et al., 2006). This sentiment is echoed by Tolnay and Beck (1995) who contend that the perception of Black threat would probably be best observed at the local-level (i.e., counties, communities) than at the national-level. Further, Ward (2018) argued that states are too large and varied internally to describe microclimates of racial meaning in a relevant sense. Counties are the smallest level of aggregation typically examined in the lynching literature, at least in quantitative analyses and this is the unit of analysis I use here; however, we may need future work to observe lynchings within counties as well. The legacy of lynching and how it informs community memories and contemporary race relations have been successfully examined in communities (e.g., Madison, 2001; Wolf, 1992). Thus, more studies should investigate specific communities and the legacy of lynching within them. We should also explore how lynching memories have been passed through generations and how this history of lynching may have transferred to localities beyond the South.

Other Periods of Racial Violence and Resistance

Fourth, while lynching has been the major focus of racial violence in the past that appears to influence violence and social control practices today, other forms of

past racial violence likely matter as well. Lynching illustrates only one type of violence that was used in response to Black advancement in America. For example, the most prevalent race riots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved White people and even the police at times attacking Black people and entire Black communities (Feagin, 1987; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Taylor, 2016). Thus, other forms of historical racial violence and social control (e.g., legacy of slavery) should be considered to determine whether they relate to lynchings and/or contemporary forms of violence and social control.

Besides violence and control, the legacy literature may also benefit from the inclusion of acts of collective resistance on the part of Black Americans as well. As such, Black protests during the 1960s and 1970s may have elicited direct criminal justice responses that persisted for years to follow, including the prevalence of the use of lethal force by police (Cunningham & Gillezeau, 2019). Since these collective acts of racial resistance were a direct response to racial injustices experienced by Black Americans in a society where Whites are at the top of the hierarchy, it stands to reason that these acts of resistance may have been a product of past experiences with lynching and/or that they may have their own legacy effect on the functions of modern-day policing. Thus, while the links between these protests and criminal justice policy have been discussed, little research has considered the impact that racial protests have on communities (see Collins and Margo [2004, 2007] for exceptions) or whether there is a lasting legacy effect resulting from the acts of collective Black resistance prevalent during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Measuring "Legacy Effects"

Finally, all our understandings of this legacy are latent functions that are difficult to fully capture quantitatively. For example, tests of racial threat often rely on the size of the Black population as a proxy, but the use of this estimate has been criticized (Gallagher, 2003). In addition, considering mediating effects of other social phenomena may help to further specify the mechanism that connects past lynchings with contemporary social phenomena. Based on quantitative and qualitative studies, it appears that a legacy of lynching does continue to inform race relations today. What has been widely absent from the literature is a full discussion of the criminalization of Blackness, especially how this enduring stereotype may contribute to the legacy of lynching's influence on contemporary criminal justice practices. Also absent is a greater focus on how policing practices may be influenced by racialized violence or protests of the past.

Overall, existing evidence suggests that a legacy of lynching does continue to inform race relations today; however, there are several limitations that should be addressed as well as extensions upon existing research that can be made. Thus, the purpose of my dissertation is to build on this previous research by addressing some of the limitations noted above. Specifically, I will consider lynchings in and outside of the South, as well as the legacies of racial violence (i.e., lynching) and resistance (i.e., Black protests) and their influence on contemporary policing practices (i.e., use of lethal force). While the past has set the stage for America's racial divide, this division is also the product of contemporary practices and policies, including a criminal justice

system that disproportionately targets Black lives (Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014). Thus, the link between past and present acts of racial violence as well as racial resistance warrants further theoretical and empirical attention.

Other Theoretical Insights on the Legacy of Racial Violence

While I rely primarily on racial threat and ethnic competition arguments throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation, other theories and concepts have been used in discussions of past lynchings and the legacies created by this violence. This area of study includes several theorized "latent functions" argued to influence lynching and why contemporary trends in violence and social control may reflect the past (Petersen & Ward, 2015; Ward, 2016). These include arguments around racial threat and ethnic competition such as those discussed previously, as well as *racial socialization*, *cultural norms/traditions*, *collective memory*, and *criminalization* (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017; Petersen & Ward, 2015; Ward, 2016). Although arguments like those around *racial socialization* and *cultural norms* offer important insights into lynching and its legacy, these two prove difficult to capture directly. For example, the use of past lynching as a predictor variable of contemporary violence and control itself has been argued to capture the hypothesized latent effect of cultural traditions (King et al., 2009). That being said, I detail these other theorized functions regarding the legacy of lynching here since these arguments will help inform the arguments and possible relationships I examine in a later chapter.

First, according to *racial socialization* arguments, "the spectacle of lynching is an important socializing event, reinforcing White supremacist cultural and institutional systems" (Petersen & Ward, 2015, p. 119). This socialization was bolstered by the attendance of families, including children, at public lynching events as well as by photographs and "souvenirs" from the lynchings that were shared and spread throughout the community and beyond (Petersen & Ward, 2015; Ward, 2016; Wood, 2005). Specifically, lynching enhanced solidarity and social cohesion among Whites by defining racial boundaries that made "Black" a signifier of stigma and exclusion while enhancing White supremacy (Brundage, 1993; Cox, 1945; Smångs, 2017). As such, where a tradition of racial violence (i.e., lynching) was prevalent and, thus, White supremacy was most heavily enforced, "enduring norms which intensify perceptions of threat or insult, and rationalize racial violence" would be established (Durso & Jacobs, 2013; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005; Petersen & Ward, 2015, p. 119).

Second, it has been argued that lynching was an outcome of *cultural norms/traditions* that were accepting of violence (Harris, 1995; Petersen & Ward, 2015; Waldrep, 2009; Ward, 2016). Before the development of formalized systems of justice, crime was often controlled by "popular justice" or crowd action (e.g., mob violence) that was sanctioned according to "habit and custom" (Waldrep, 2009, p. 1; Walker, 1980). After slavery, in places where Whites felt they were being personally challenged by Black Americans in some capacity no matter how minor, cultural norms—especially notions of "honor" and racial etiquette (in the South)—made

violent reactions an acceptable defense (Ayers, 1991; Bailey, 2003; Harris, 1995; Petersen & Ward, 2015). Included under this perspective is the perception of the criminal justice system as insufficient and ineffective at dealing with alleged offenders and restoring honor to victims; simultaneously, it often failed to protect marginalized populations from racial violence (Petersen & Ward, 2015; Ward, 2016). As such, "[l]ynchers often saw themselves as law enforcers, even when they acted outside the law" (Waldrep, 2009, p. 2).[21] Relatedly, there is also a theorized "brutalization effect" (Bowers, 1984) that may help to understand cultural orientations to violence since past racial violence (i.e., lynchings) may inform a legacy of approval for continued violence today (Petersen & Ward, 2015; Messner et al., 2005).

One recent study suggests support for honor ideology in the context of police violence today (Pomerantz et al., 2021). They found that "honor endorsement may contribute to regional police violence rates… as well as individual-level perceptions of police violence" (Pomerantz et al., 2021, p. 13). Regarding the first point, "states' honor status had a significant effect upon the incidents of police shootings" thus "honor norms appear to manifest in regional incidence of police violence" (Pomerantz et al., 2021, p. 13).[22] As for individual-level findings, "honor endorsers were more

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[21] Further, "[a]nyone opposed to lynching ran the risk of seeming to side with criminals" and "lynchers usually claimed that they acted with universal public support in response to some particularly heinous crime committed in the absence of effective law enforcement" (Waldrep, 2009, p. 10).

[22] In Pomerantz et al.'s (2021) study, they determined "state honor" according to "Cohen's (1996, 1998) classification system, in which states in the south and

approving of police violence when they perceived it to be in the purpose of honor defense, and...this relationship was a function of the belief that the police reflect the cultural values of honor" (Pomerantz et al., 2021, p. 14). Thus, it appears that cultural ideas around honor that justified lynching may continue to offer endorsement for the use of violence by police. This seems consistent with what Nisbett (1993) noted in a study about violence and regional culture. Specifically, "Southern men were more likely to say that police should shoot, or even shoot to kill, to protect against rioters, whether the rioters are Blacks, gangs of hoodlums, or students (all examples from Blumenthal et al., 1972)" (Nisbett, 1993, p. 444-445).

Third, scholars have considered notions of *collective memory* in assessing the longevity of the influence of past racial violence in contemporary society (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017; Madison, 2001; Markovitz, 2004; Wolf, 1992). Gabriel and Tolnay (2017) proposed that collective memory has guaranteed lynching and its symbolic meanings have been passed through generations by stating that the "ethos of extreme racial domination reflected by lynchings resulted in a historical legacy" (p. 81). The collective memory of lynching is intertwined with understandings of racial categories and that this memory continues to shape racial politics and race relations (Markovitz, 2004). Qualitative research has illuminated some of these collective memory processes. For example, Wolf (1992) found that past lynching continued to influence Black and White relations in a rural Tennessee community including intense

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southwestern parts of the USA, due to their history, demographics, cultural norms, and the presence of honor-related phenomena…" (p. 4).

emotions—fear and resentment—among Blacks, their memories of White participants, and how this violence continued to inform their perceptions of White identities. Among the White community, there were sentiments of appropriateness and praise towards the violence, with some even bragging about relatives who had participated (Wolf, 1992). Additionally, Madison (2001) found that stories and memories of a lynching that occurred in Marion, Indiana informed the color-line throughout the twentieth century. Specifically, many citizens hoped to ignore the past and forget the lynching and what it symbolized; however, the memories of violence continued to separate the community as an unhealed wound and "no one…could claim that color lines were extinct, that race no longer mattered…" (Madison, 2001, p. 153). Further, Dray (2002) stated, "it is a living memory to most black Americans that their forebearers were lynched and routinely subjected to violence and intimidation, and that they lived in almost constant fear of seeing a loved one lynched or of being targeted themselves" (p. xi). Ultimately, the memory of past racial violence appears to still be connected to racial formation processes and race relations (Madison, 2001; Markovitz, 2004; Wolf, 1992).

Finally, discussions of *criminalization* have implicated this process as important to the study of racial violence and its legacy as well. Though the criminalization of "Blackness" has not been a central focus of this research I argue that this concept is important to consider since the persistence of perceptions linking race and crime could be partially responsible for the legacy of racial violence. The criminalization of blackness is a political and historical process that changes and

adapts based on the current state of cultural and racial mores, even in a colorblind context where criminalization shapes the criminal justice system in ways that normalize racial oppression (Bell, 2017). When it comes to lynching, Ida B. Wells gave a speech at the first NAACP meeting in 1909 arguing notions of criminality were used to justify lynchings though crime was not necessarily a cause (Blain, 2017). Further, Durso and Jacobs (2013) provided a proxy for Black criminalization in their analysis examining the legacy of lynching in the context of the presence of White supremacist groups. They found support for their hypotheses; specifically, anti-Black groups were prevalent where past lynchings occurred, threat from the size/growth of the Black population was associated with the presence of White supremacist groups, and these hate groups exist where murder rates were higher due to public belief of Black criminality. In addition, Smångs (2017) suggested the legacy of lynching may be more about the racial boundaries and meanings that it helped to form and enforce than the violence itself. Thus, as Durso and Jacobs (2013) suggested, we should consider the importance of past anti-Black sentiment in creating an enduring legacy of racial antagonism and we must continue to acknowledge possible historical contexts and connections to truly understand the present. Further, racism is adaptable and takes on different characteristics to match the times and, today, conceptualizations of race and crime have become intertwined in a way that mass incarceration is the “new” Jim Crow (Alexander, 2010).

Conclusion

In sum, my dissertation offers an examination of racial violence at three distinct time periods from lynchings that took place during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the Black resistance of the 1960s and early 1970s to the fatal police shootings of Black Americans that occurred during the past several years. In this examination, I rely on the theories of racial threat and ethnic competition theory to frame the analyses that follow. In the next chapter (Chapter 3) I consider the lynching of Black Americans as a national phenomenon, not just a Southern one and in the chapter after that I consider the use of lethal force by police contemporarily. In the chapter focused on policing (Chapter 4), I also consider the potential legacies created by lynchings and past acts of collective Black resistance to oppression and injustice and how they may interact to help us understand fatal police shootings today. Thus, my dissertation contributes to and expands on existing areas of research in new and important ways; especially, regarding the historicization of police shootings within a historical context. The institution of policing and its development cannot be viewed separately from the rest of US history and the racism built into our society, as such, we must confront the legacies of this history to truly address contemporary issues (Williams & Murphy, 1990).

Chapter 3

RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH AND BEYOND: AN EXAMINATIN OF LYNCHING AS A NATIONAL PHENOMENON, 1900-1929

> "It is now no uncommon thing to read of lynchings north of Mason and Dixon's line, and those most responsible for this fashion gleefully point to these instances and assert that the North is no better than the South" (Ida B. Wells-Barnett, 2014[1900], p. 395).

> "Lynchings occur mostly in those areas where the laws discriminate against Negroes…However, the lynching attitude is to be found everywhere among whites in the United States" (Oliver C. Cox, 1945, p. 577).

In Chapter 2, I covered two of the major theories that have been used to study racial violence and social control in the United States—racial threat and ethnic competition. As these theories argue, when racial-ethnic minority groups challenge the dominant group over economic and political resources, the dominant group will respond with discriminatory practices including violence. Using these theories, I present the first quantitative analysis of my dissertation in this chapter. Specifically, this chapter examines lynching nationwide during the early decades of the twentieth century. I begin by detailing the history and significance of lynching before turning to a discussion of the existing literature studying this violence and then detail the methods, analytic approach, and results from the present analysis.

Lynching in the United States

After the institution of slavery ended, a period of transformation began with the potential to cause a real disruption to the way of life among (Southern) Whites who had long benefitted from a racial hierarchy. Reconstruction, which spanned several years following the Civil War, promised to make the United States a more egalitarian nation where the newly emancipated Black citizenry would gain access to economic resources, political power, and equal rights under the law. However, the era of Reconstruction was quickly dismantled as Whites turned to various practices, including widespread violence and a general lawlessness, to reestablish control (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). A racial caste system was erected to replace slavery by "maintaining the essence of the old status order in the South" (Dollard, 1957[1937], p. 62). The "caste line" was "an automatic block to social advancement for the Negro and this means that the highest prestige prizes are not accessible to him" (Dollard, 1957[1937], p. 62). Importantly, this caste line and racial prejudice was not restricted to the South and some of the tactics used to prevent advancement in status among Black citizens were similar across the nation, especially as the Black population migrated and increased in size outside the South (Baker, 1964[1908]; Pfeifer, 2013).

Lynching was a tactic of control that became highly racialized during the Reconstruction era and this violence remained prominent through early decades of the twentieth century. As Cox (1945) said of lynching, it was

> "an act of homicidal aggression committed by one people against another through mob action for the purpose of suppressing either some tendency in the latter to rise from an accommodated position of subordination or for

> subjugating them further to some lower social status. It is a special form of mobbing—mobbing directed against a whole people or political class" (p. 576).

Lynching was an instrument of (extra-legal) social control and "punishment" that was also a highly symbolic act of terror and of race-making that helped to define the racial boundaries between persons identified as "Black" and those identified as "White" (Cox, 1945; Hill, 2016; Smångs, 2017). While lynching was not reserved exclusively for racialized control at its inception, Black citizens eventually became the primary targets of White mobs that ignored and defied the law by taking law and "justice" into their own hands (Baker, 1964[1908]; Du Bois, 1998[1935]; Raper, 2003[1933]; Williamson, 1986).[23] That is, this form of violence evolved and became reserved for Black persons who were cast as "inferior" while Whites became largely protected from lynching; thus, lynching was also related to broader political transformations that maintained Black-White divisions (Dray, 2002; Hill, 2016). This violence, and even just the threat of it, helped to restore and maintain "supremacy" and dominance to the White racial group (Brundage, 1993; Cox, 1945). It was the presence of a symbolically created color-line, established in part through such violence, which helped to reconstruct and reinforce racial boundaries (Brundage, 1993; Harris, 1995).

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[23] Some scholars have suggested that a major cause of lynching was due to "the widespread contempt of the courts, and the unpunished subversion of the law in this country, both South and North" (Baker, 1964[1908], p. 194). Further, the prevalence of lynching across counties, North and South, appeared to correspond to prior violent crime as well as the presence of weak or inadequate law enforcement practices (Baker, 1964[1908]; Raper, 2003[1933]; Williamson, 1986).

In his book, Smångs (2017) refers to a process of "making race" by "doing violence," by which he means that interracial violence helped to articulate symbolic boundaries and meanings associated with racial categories. The interracial violence of lynching enhanced the collective solidarity and social cohesion among Whites—thereby furthering White supremacy—by defining boundaries that made "Black" a signifier of stigma and exclusion (Brundage, 1993; Cox, 1945; Smångs, 2017). Thus, in reestablishing the racial order, "Whiteness" united Whites in a way that superseded other distinctions (i.e., class) (Raper, 2003[1933]). All lynchings contributed to race-making processes and were intended to convey White superiority and terror; thus, symbolizing to Black citizens the impenetrability of White supremacy and what could happen when racial boundaries were challenged, no matter how trivial the offense (Markovitz, 2004; Smångs, 2017; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). The terror of lynching helped restore race relations to a caste system wherein Whites were at the top of the racial hierarchy while systematically subjugating Black citizens (Brundage, 1993; Dollard, 1957[1937]; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). The mob became a comfort to Whites since lynching offered protection from social order threats, and members of the White caste justified aggressive acts directed against Black Americans in the name of "safety" (Dollard, 1957[1937]; Raper, 2003[1933]; Tolnay & Beck, 1995).

Closely tied to race relations, economic and political competition were major factors contributing to the prevalence of lynching. The racial caste system was important because racial identity came to supersede class distinctions; the "planter" and poor White populations were united against Black Americans (Du Bois,

1998[1935]; Raper, 2003[1933]; W. J. Wilson, 1980[1978]). Thus, instead of uniting along class lines against the upper-class Black and White workers were divided on issues of wages and improved working conditions; they saw each other through lenses of hate and fear (Du Bois, 1998[1935]; W. J. Wilson, 1980[1978]). The "wage of Whiteness" allayed White laborers who struggled economically since their race guaranteed they still had caste status above that of Black laborers (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). As a result, actual wages could be kept low for both races while Whites were kept in fear of Black labor replacing them and Black workers were always threatened by encroaching White labor (Du Bois, 1998[1935]). As Du Bois (1998[1935]) argued, "Mob violence and lynching were the inevitable result of the attitude of these two classes…" and "White labor saw in every advance of Negroes a threat to their racial prerogatives…" (p. 701). Further,

> "lynching and the threat of lynching is the fundamental reliance of the white ruling class in maintaining the status quo…it serves to keep both Negroes and poor whites in their place. The keeping of these black and white masses antagonized leaves the exploiting class an easy opportunity to play one against the other thus destabilizing their position of sub-standard American workers" (Cox, 1945, p. 588).

Empirical studies of lynching have found support for arguments that economic conditions are a key explanatory factor in the prevalence of lynching in the American South (Christian, 2017; Olzak, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). That being said,

> "lynching scholars have sometimes posited the southern experience with mob violence as the American norm, casting the lynching violence that occurred in other parts of the country as anomalous or insignificant, ignoring or eliding the lengthy and complex histories of collective murder that occurred in other parts of the country" (Pfeifer, 2013, p. 3).

Thus, while lynching has been a widely studied form of racial violence, this literature has been limited by largely focusing on the practice of lynching as a Southern phenomenon. While the South does appear to have had a particularly unique history of lynching compared to the greater US, collective violence occurred across the nation and lynching was often racially motivated in every region (Pfeiffer, 2004). No community appeared free from the potential of mob violence (Raper, 2003[1933]) and attitudes favorable to lynching existed everywhere (Cox, 1945). Based on an examination of 1930 lynchings, Raper (2003[1933]) reported that eleven of the twenty-one lynchings—including four outside of the South—occurred in counties with no lynchings earlier in the century, which he claimed provided evidence that lynching could take place anywhere, even places without a recent history of such violence.

A further reason this is an important area of inquiry is that the Great Migration, which spanned the early decades of the twentieth century, occurred during the years of the lynching era. This migration "dramatically altered the geographic profile of the black population…" and "Within a few decades, a largely southern, rural population had become considerably more northern and urban" (Tolnay & Beck, 1992, p. 103). Research has suggested that the migration and resulting growth of the Black population in northern spaces led to violent conditions and forms of social control not unlike those of the South (Muller, 2012).[24] Thus, migratory Black citizens, many of

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[24] Muller (2012) found that the northward migration of non-Whites in the years spanning 1880 to 1950 was associated with increasing non-White prison populations in the states studied, while the White incarceration rate saw no similar increase during

whom were likely leaving the South in response to mob violence, were met with hostile conditions like those they were fleeing (Tolnay, 2003; Tolnay & Beck, 1990, 1992). Further, Ayers (1984) suggested that the social conditions leading to lynching in the South may have travelled northward with the migration of Black and White citizens. Thus, it is important to examine lynching beyond the South since this violence may have been a result of similar conditions that led to southern lynchings: the presence of a relatively large Black population that was in direct competition with other racial groups over economic resources and political power.

The present study addresses this gap in the lynching literature by considering earlier explanations of lynching and exploring whether they hold across the entire country. Thus, the purpose here is to examine lynching nationally, moving the quantitative lynching literature focus from just the South into other regions. Examining lynching as a national phenomenon allows for exploration into whether similar economic and social conditions were associated with this collective violence regardless of regional boundaries. To this end, I use the newly constructed and publicly shared lynching data from Seguin & Rigby (2019) that captures this violence outside of the South and combine it with Tolnay and Beck's (1995; Beck & Tolnay, 2015) existing Southern inventory on lynching. I then explore the effects of structural predictors of lynching across the contiguous states of America. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the lynching of Black citizens in counties across the entire US

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this period. Muller also noted that as migration slowed, collective violence in the North against the Black population also tapered-off while incarceration remained high.

while considering arguments from racial threat/ethnic competition theory and related hypotheses. A subsequent analysis is then conducted to determine whether lynching outside of the South had similar structural antecedents as lynching in the South.

Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks

As noted in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), this analysis relies on theoretical arguments that were developed by a variety of scholars and that have coalesced into "racial threat" and "ethnic competition" theories (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Key, 1949; Olzak, 1992). Studies of lynching have found varying support for ethnic competition theory arguments and Blalock's general racial threat hypothesis predicting that as the population of marginalized racial group increases (i.e., Black Americans), the racial group with the greatest access to power and resources (i.e., Whites) will perceive a growing threat to their status and will, therefore, act in ways to ensure they will not lose economic and political resources to the marginalized group (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018; Olzak, 1990; Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1992). Specifically, Tolnay and Beck (1995) supplied substantial evidence in support of economic threat and competition arguments pertaining to the frequency of lynching. The lynching of Black citizens was more prevalent when it served the economic interests of Whites, and the members of the Black population were especially likely to face lynching when it benefitted Whites across all class standings. Further, Black lynchings significantly corresponded to the dependence on cotton within Southern counties (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). That is, lynching responded to economic cycles of

cotton—when profits from cotton were high and the cotton economy was more successful, Black citizens were safer from lynching (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). In addition, Black citizens were more likely to be lynched where there were more White tenants, which Tolnay and Beck (1995) argued was the result of poor Whites resorting to violence as their only means to cling to their claims of racial superiority while upholding the caste system dividing them from Black citizens in a similar class position. On the other hand, they found little evidence supporting political arguments from threat theory (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). A recent study reported further evidence supporting these economic interpretations. Specifically, Christian (2017) found that cotton market shocks were related to lynchings, and these shocks were more strongly felt where there were more Black farm workers present. Thus, when cotton prices were in poor shape, Whites turned to the lynching of Black citizens to reduce the labor supply and increase wages since lynchings often foreshadowed future Black migration (Christian, 2017).

Besides this general support for threat arguments, early lynching studies supported Blalock's *power-threat hypothesis* (see Reed, 1972; Corzine, Creech, & Corzine, 1983),[25] which argues that as the marginalized racial group's population increases, the discriminatory practices of the powerful racial group will also increase (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). However, these studies were later challenged over methodological concerns and, in a replication

[25] Other studies have not found the size of the Black population or its squared form to be significant predictors of lynching (e.g., Corzine, Huff-Corzine, and Creech [1988]).

addressing these issues, evidence supporting the *power-threat hypothesis* was not found (Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1989). Instead, evidence has been more suggestive of Blalock's *economic threat hypothesis*, at least within Deep South states (Tolnay et al., 1989). According to this *economic threat hypothesis*, when the powerful and marginalized racial group populations are close in size, the more competition there is between them. However, once the marginalized group is sufficiently large, they may no longer convey the same threat as when they were on more equal ground; thus, discriminatory practices of the majority group would no longer be demanded (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018).[26]

On the other hand, regarding ethnic competition arguments more directly, Corzine et al. (1988) employed a "cheap labor threat" estimate of Black-to-White tenant farmers. This measure was the most powerful predictor of lynching in their study, supporting claims that poorer Whites (i.e., farmers, unskilled laborers) were likely to express the strongest racial prejudice, including participation in lynch mobs, since they came into direct competition with Black workers (Baker, 1964[1908]). Further, it appears Whites worked to "minimize or eliminate Negro competition in the spheres of economics" when competition appeared "in the form of aggressive demands or acts on the part of the Negro which are directed toward the modification

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[26] This relationship was described earlier by Raper (2003[1933]) who noted that the Black population was safer from lynching where they made up more than half of the population and that the threat of lynching would be more prevalent as their share of the population was less than half and, especially, when they were less than one-fourth of the county population.

of the superior advantages enjoyed by the white caste" (Dollard, 1957[1937], p. 315). Besides cheap labor, Corzine et al. (1988) also considered Black and White farm ownership; however, this measure of "Black success" was not a significant predictor of lynching in the cotton dominated South while it was significant in the non-cotton South but in the opposite direction than expected. That is, outside the cotton dominated region, the presence of Black farm owners was negatively associated with lynching (Corzine et al., 1988).

Olzak (1990) also conducted a study examining the relationship between competition and racial violence and found that economic slumps were related to increased racial violence in the forms of both lynching and urban violence against Black Americans. This was especially the case when the economic slump was experienced by the least skilled workers. Competition from immigration also increased the prevalence of both forms of racial violence. Thus, as immigration increased so did the lynching of Black Americans. Ultimately, racial competition resulting from increases in the low-wage labor supply led to higher rates of racial violence, including lynching (Olzak, 1990). Additionally, Rigby and Seguin (2018) found that European (White) immigrants were lynched at rates and in manners similar to native Whites lending some support to the notion that even though the color-line in the Midwest was not as institutionalized as in the South, the "Whiteness" of European immigrants protected them leading Black Americans to still be situated as the least powerful and most vulnerable group of these three when it came to lynching.

Building on arguments about threat and competition, recent research has explored the impact of modernization on lynching in the South. Modernizing processes in the South ran parallel to the lynching era's time frame which led Smångs (2016a) to argue that these processes likely had a destabilizing effect on traditional White values and on Black-White relations. For this reason, instead of seeing modernization as a progressive force suppressing racist attitudes and racial violence, modernizing processes should be understood as creating conditions conducive to lynching in the South (Smångs, 2016a). As such, a "modernization thesis of lynching" was proposed as an explanation based on more than competition; specifically, this thesis "invokes mob violence as a form of reactive white collective action resisting the modernizing forces undermining the traditional values and relations at the foundation of white communities" (Smångs, 2016a, p. 827). Thus, lynching was an adaptation of traditional values and race relations under a new set of circumstances; that is, under modernization, interracial contact and competition increased with the rise of industrialization resulting in lynchings as Whites tried to reinstate traditional principles and racial authority (Smångs, 2016a). Smångs reported support for this argument in Southern states for public lynchings, which were more prevalent in places where industrialization arose. Additionally, W. J. Wilson (1980[1978]) discussed the role of changing systems of production being related to race relations and conflict. Specifically, he noted that the shift from plantations to industries "transformed traditional patterns of race and class in the postbellum South" and this growing industrialization also worked to "establish a new context for black-white interaction

and confrontation in the North" (W. J. Wilson, 1980[1978], p. 83). Thus, industrializing processes may have had some relationship with lynching outside of the South as well.

Again though, while evidence has been supportive of threat and competition arguments in explaining lynching, data shortcomings have largely restricted our understanding of lynching to the South, at least for quantitative analyses (see Rigby and Seguin [2018] for an exception). As a result, we are less certain to what extent these theoretical processes help to understand the lynching of Black Americans beyond the South. The color line and lynching in other regions, especially the North, is important to consider since, as the Black population grew in the North and began to directly compete for employment and political power, racial prejudice similar to what was seen in the South likely arose and this is likely especially true in places where Southern Whites were also migrating and, thus, bringing their viewpoints (Baker, 1964[1908], p. 111).

For the current study, I incorporate hypotheses from racial threat and ethnic competition as well as the modernization thesis to examine race-specific lynchings from 1900 to 1929. First, I hypothesize that counties with a larger Black population will have a greater prevalence of Black lynchings; however, this relationship may be curvilinear in the positive or negative direction as *power-threat* and *economic threat hypotheses* predict, respectively. Consistent with earlier studies, I hypothesize the curvilinear relationship will be in the negative direction consistent with economic threat. Second, I hypothesize that where competition between Black and White

workers is greatest there will be more lynchings of Black Americans since, given their caste position, Whites actively worked to discourage Black Americans and their attempts at advancement (Dollard, 1957[1937]). Third, in counties where Black Americans have greater levels of economic success relative to Whites, I hypothesize that the prevalence lynchings will also be greater there. Fourth, where there is a large population of immigrant Whites, I hypothesize that the lynchings of Black Americans will be greater based on competition arguments and the findings from Rigby and Seguin (2018). Fifth, I hypothesize that where modernization is strongest, contact and competition between Black and White citizens likely increased and, thus, Black lynchings also increased there as a result. Sixth, since this study improves on earlier research by considering lynching nationally, the final hypothesis is that there will be differences in results when examining lynching in the South compared to the non-South, especially since the Black-White color-line was likely more institutionalized in the South (Rigby & Seguin, 2018). In the next section I lay out the methods, measures, and analytical approach before turning to the results.

Methods

Dependent Variables

One of the most comprehensive and commonly used lynching databases was constructed by Tolnay and Beck (1995); however, their data includes lynchings from only ten Southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. There is no contest that

examining lynching in these states is of great importance, but we should not overlook the fact that lynching occurred throughout the US and stark racial disparities in lynching victimization were quantitatively clear in at least one other region (i.e., the Midwest) (Pfeifer, 2004, 2011; Rigby & Seguin, 2018). Further, there are other Southern states that had high levels of lynching not present in their data, including Texas and, until recently, Virginia (Beck & Tolnay, 2015).[27] Thus, while the importance of this database cannot be disputed, there has been room for a nationwide expansion of lynching data collection efforts (Pfeifer, 2014).

To fill this gap in our knowledge, Seguin and Rigby (2019) constructed a new database including lynching data for the remaining 38 contiguous states in the US.[28] Seguin and Rigby (2019) modeled their data collection efforts following Tolnay and Beck's lead by first using the NAACP and *Chicago Tribune* inventories of lynching as a baseline; however, they did not have access to the Tuskegee Institute inventory as Tolnay and Beck did. They also drew data from lists of lynching victims compiled by historians. After gathering this information, Seguin and Rigby (2019) used newspaper

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[27] Since there was Virginia data in both the inventories due to the collection efforts of Seguin and Rigby and the recent updates from Beck and Tolnay, I went through each incident of lynching in this state to ensure that there were no duplicates and to make sure any cases reported in one but not the other were included in the final lynching tally for this study.

[28] They do note that their database faces possible limitations as well, such as underreporting. For example, their data quality across the US may be uneven because of a lack of local newspapers in some areas, which limited their ability to confirm some lynchings that were reported by their starting data sources (Seguin & Rigby, 2019).

archives to confirm lynchings that occurred between 1883 and 1941 and found that only five states had no confirmed lynchings: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.[29] For this reason, I remove the counties of these five states from my analysis.[30] In the end, Seguin and Rigby (2019) are confident that their data is an improvement on other inventories (i.e., NAACP, *Chicago Tribune*), and they also reported that their database appears comparable to Tuskegee's lynching records when examining the Texas records.

Combining these two databases allows for an examination of lynching beyond just the South, which has not been done in this manner before. Specifically, it allows for a comparison of lynchings that occurred in the South and outside this region and examining lynchings nationally is important given the suggestion that social conditions conducive to lynching may have spread beyond the South with waves of migration (Ayers, 1984). In the end, I summed lynchings of Black Americans across all counties in the sample over three decades. That is, lynchings were totaled for each decade: 1900 to 1909, 1910 to 1919, and 1920 to 1929. From 1900-1909 there were 772 lynchings of Black Americans, from 1910-1919 there were 539, and from 1920-

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[29] It is not surprising that Seguin and Rigby did not find and confirm any lynchings in these five northeastern states. As Pfeifer (2004) has argued lynching never really took hold in this region and this was likely due to the rise of a more formalized justice system that occurred earlier in this region than in other parts of the country.

[30] I also do not include the District of Columbia as a separate entity in this analysis.

1929 there were 265 lynchings with Black victims based on the joint databases.[31] Of the Black lynchings that occurred between 1900 to 1929, 1,274 occurred in the ten Southern states from Tolnay and Beck's original data while 302 occurred throughout the remaining states. When tallying the full South versus the non-South, per regional Census definitions, the totals become 1,504 and 72, respectively for this period of time. The trends between the decades for Black, White, and total lynchings in the US are displayed in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Lynchings by Race, 1900-1929



[31] From 1900 to 1929 there were a total of 1,787 lynchings, 1,576 of which were lynchings of Black Americans while 166 were lynchings with White victims. The remaining 45 lynching victims were from other ethnic/racial groups.

Independent and Control Variables

To capture competition/threat, immigration, and modernization effects on lynching, as well as other control variables, I obtained county-level Census data for the decennial years of 1900, 1910, and 1920 from the NHGIS. While the peak years of lynching were the 1890s (Olzak, 1990), I chose to focus only on lynchings from 1900 until 1929 since the Census data more consistently reported race-specific estimates after 1900. Included in the Census data across these years are estimates on farming (e.g., crops, farm ownership, tenant populations), manufacturing (e.g., establishments, wages), and population characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, immigration). This data allows me to consider whether similar structural conditions were equally associated with lynching outside of the South.

First, racial threat theory was captured using the size of the Black population within the counties examined as originally proposed by Blalock (1967). Specifically, the percentage of the population in each county identified as Black in the Census was constructed and included in the analysis presented here. Further, since Blalock proposed the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between the size of the Black population and the racially discriminatory outcome under study, the squared value of the percent Black population was also included in some of the models. Several studies of lynching have included these variables (e.g., Smångs [2016a], Tolnay & Beck [1995]).

Second, consistent with threat and competition arguments around economics, I capture competition between Black and White Americans through two estimates based on farm tenant populations and farm ownership. Specifically, Black-to-White ratios were used to estimate economic competition/threat between these two racial groups. These corresponded to other estimates of competition from previous studies (Christian, 2017; Corzine, Huff-Corzine, & Creech, 1988). For example, Corzine et al. (1988) employed a "cheap labor" estimate created from the ratio between the number of Black tenants per county and the number of White tenants per county and they also included similar measure taking Black and White farm ownership into account. Thus, following their lead, I constructed similar variables labeled as *Cheap Labor Threat* (Black-White tenant ratio) and *Black Advancement* (Black-White farm owner ratio) where higher values correspond to a larger cheap labor pool of Black Americans and more Black-owned farms relative to Whites, respectively. Both were log transformed due to the skewed nature of these estimates.

Third, given the focus on immigration in ethnic competition theory and Olzak's (1990) finding that immigration was a significant predictor of lynching, I also include an estimate that captures the immigrant population across US counties. Specifically, I constructed a percentage measure of the White immigrant population since competition may have been heightened by the presence of this population, which could then result in the group with the least power being more likely to be lynched (Olzak, 1990, 1992).

Fourth, following Smångs' (2016a) research on modernization and lynching, I used the Census to capture the total per capita wages devoted to manufacturing across the counties examined. This measure was used to capture modernization instead of other measures of manufacturing (i.e., the number of establishments) since there were Census inconsistencies and changes of such measures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Smångs, 2016a). Further, because the 1910 Census did not include manufacturing estimates, the average of wages from the 1900 and 1920 Censuses was taken for each county in this decade (Smångs, 2016a). This variable was then log transformed to correct for skewness.

Given the importance of the cotton economy to the South (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Christian, 2017), I also include a measure to capture the prevalence of cotton production across US counties. As Tolnay and Beck (1995) noted, the lynching of Black Americans was more prevalent when it served the economic interests of Whites, and the terror of lynching was an integral part of Southern society and economy built on the pursuit of "King Cotton." For this reason, I include a measure that captures the percent of farm acres devoted to cotton production across the counties observed (Smångs, 2016b; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Due to a high amount of missing data in the 1910 Census, I followed the same procedure as for the manufacturing wages estimate

and averaged the cotton acres of 1900 and 1920 and used these averages as the county cotton acre values for 1910.[32]

Another factor that has been important in past studies of lynching in the South is the prevalence of lynchings that occurred in the previous year(s) (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Thus, an estimate totaling the Black lynchings of the prior decade(s) for each county was constructed and included in the models below. For example, for the 1900-1909 decade, the prior lynching variable would include the sum of all Black lynchings that occurred in each county from 1883 to 1899. Then, for the 1910-1919 decade, the 1883-1899 totals were added to the 1900-1909 lynching totals, and this process was then repeated to create the prior lynching estimate for 1920-1929 as well. This variable is included since there was a pattern of lynching given the tendency for this violence to reoccur where past lynchings took place (Williamson, 1986). It shows the proneness to anti-Black violence in the history of the given county, which has been a

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[32] This still resulted in missing values for the cotton acres variable. Specifically, in the 1920 Census data there were 72 counties with missing cotton acre data; thus, these same counties were missing for the 1910 averaged values as well. Ultimately, there were 147 counties missing cotton acres data. Another problem with this missing data is that 72 counties in 1920 with missing data were in Kentucky (144 total due to missing in 1910 as well). This concentration of missing data in one state suggests potential issues with the analysis regarding Kentucky and the apparent non-randomness of the missing data. To address these concerns, I ran other models (not included here) controlling for the missing Kentucky counties instead of the cotton acres estimate to test whether these missing counties would significantly affect the results. This Kentucky control never reached significance in the models. Due to this missing data and the loss of these counties from the analyses below, ten lynchings of Black Americans are not accounted for across the three decades examined (nine in Kentucky, and another one missing from an Oklahoma county).

consistent and important predictor of the prevalence of lynching in the South (Tolnay & Beck, 1995).

Due to lynching being a largely Southern phenomenon, I also include variables to capture different regions of the US. In models examining all US counties, the regional variable captured states in the South. Specifically, the *South* variable was coded for counties that fall within the South as defined by the Census: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. If the county was in one of these states it was assigned a "1" value. Importantly, this variable captures the eleven states that formally seceded from the Union prior to the Civil War, but also includes the "border" states that were technically slave states though they never formally seceded: Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Missouri was also one of the "border" slave states, but since it is part of the Midwest per Census definition, it was not included in the *South* variable or the models restricted to only the South.

For the models restricted to just the South, two more sub-regional dummy variables were considered. The first measure, which I refer to as *Border States*, captured all counties from the states noted above that had a history of slavery but never formally seceded from the Union (excluding Missouri).[33] The second

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[33] This differs from earlier measures of "border" states. For example, Tolnay and Beck (1995) included Florida, Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, and North Carolina, which were the only states in their data that were not part of the Deep South.

subregional variable for the South models captured the *Deep South* states—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—since this subregion was dominated by the cotton economy and a plantation system. Importantly, this subregion also housed a large competitive Black population that had the potential to displace White workers—specifically, part of this subregion included the area that has been referred to as the "Black Belt" where many lynchings were concentrated (Baker, 1964[1908]; Corzine, Huff-Corzine, & Creech, 1988; Tolnay & Beck, 1995, p. 35-36; Williamson, 1986). Notably, threat and competition estimates have differentially been related to lynching depending on whether examining the "cotton" or "non-cotton" South in past studies (Corzine et al., 1988; also see Tolnay and Beck [1995]).

For the non-South models, I created a predictor of *Lower Midwest* states. Capturing this section of states is potentially important since it is possible these states would have adopted more similar ideations around race and racial violence given their proximity to the South, especially the counties in the southern parts of these non-South states (Baker, 1964[1908]; Pfeifer, 2013; Raper, 2003[1933]).[34] Further, large numbers of migrating Black (and White) Americans settled in portions of states directly bordering the Old South and this growing Black population led to increases in race prejudice across these places (Baker, 1964[1908]; Raper, 2003[1933]). This

[34] Specifically, Pfeifer (2013) refers to the "Lower Midwest" as a cultural and political borderland that likely shared some southern racial views and, therefore, would show similar reactions to racial equality to an extent. Further, the rates of lynching in the Midwest were high enough to suggest it was a risk for many and there was growth in both the Black and immigrant populations in this region during the lynching era (Rigby & Seguin, 2018).

Lower Midwest variable coded the counties from four states as a "1" including Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Ohio (Pfeifer, 2013).[35] Due to the history of Missouri being a slave state and a "border" state, I also controlled for this state separately in these models. Given its history with slavery, it is likely that Missouri would be more prone to lynching than other non-South states.[36] Thus, Missouri counties were coded as "1" in a separate variable in the non-South models.

Finally, every model includes a variable coded for the decades in the study and one for the total residential population within counties. First, the year variable is used to capture the variation in lynching over time since lynching was on a decline following 1900 (Williamson, 1986). This variable is ordinal in nature and is coded with a "0" for 1900-1909, a "1" for 1910-1919, and a "2" for 1920-1929. Second, an estimate for the total population of each county was also included in the models for this study as a control. This estimate was log transformed to correct for skewness. The table in Appendix B displays the descriptive statistics of all variables discussed and considered in this chapter.

Analytical Techniques

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[35] Regarding the *Lower Midwest* and *Border States* variables, it should be noted that, based on the data presented by Raper (2003[1933]), the vast majority of Black lynchings that occurred outside the South occurred in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Ohio, and West Virginia.

[36] Just looking at the lynching counts in the data this seems to be the case since Missouri had 35 out of 72 Black lynchings in the non-South.

Before running the analyses in this study, I first had to establish consistent county units since there were changes in county boundaries across the decades examined. For this reason, I standardized the historical county boundaries in a way that allowed for smaller and more precise county boundaries than earlier studies have employed. For example, some studies have used Horan and Hargis' (1995) *County Longitudinal Template* (1840-1990) (e.g., Messner, Baller, & Zevenbergen [2005]); however, this approach clusters counties to new boundaries that combines some counties into single units thus making the county distinctions less varied and less numerous. Besides their approach, another study used the *Atlas of Historical County Boundaries Project* to account for boundary changes which also merges counties to the smallest consistent unit (Christian, 2017). Christian (2017) suggested this is important to the study of lynching since borders could be arbitrary regarding where lynchings occur and this aggregation allows for consistency and lower chances of error; however, this method reduced the number of counties in Christian's study to 275 instead of 876. Another alternative approach to Horan and Hargis' method that has been used is "proportional allocation," which supplies smaller and more meaningful units of analysis that are also less liable to issues of multicollinearity (Ward, Petersen, Kupchik, & Pratt, 2019).

The approach I take here does not require a reduction in data like the Horan and Hargis or *Atlas* approaches but keeps the information for all counties by accounting for county boundary changes over time with weighted estimates. Specifically, I employ Eckert, Gvirtz, Liang, and Peter's (2020) county crosswalk

method, which allows for situating the lynchings that occurred in the past within geographic areas that reflect 2010 county boundaries. Eckert et al. (2020) supply a template for crosswalking that allows you to take Census data (obtained through NHGIS) dating back to 1790 and situate it within contemporary counties.[37] Once the data you are using is matched to the counties as specified in the appropriate county crosswalk template for the corresponding decade, you apply the "weight" estimate they constructed to the variables of interest. This weighted estimate takes changes in the county boundaries into account between the decade of interest and 2010 boundaries. After weighting the relevant variables, the estimates are then reaggregated to the county boundaries as of 2010's county designations. I used the 1900, 1910, and 1920 templates to crosswalk the corresponding lynching and Census data to 2010 county boundaries.[38] Specifically, once the historical lynching data for one decade was merged with the corresponding Census data for that decade, I would then "one-to-many merge" this combined data with a crosswalk template for that decade and apply the weight to each variable of interest. Once the weights were applied, I then reaggregated (using the "sum" function) this weighted data to the 2010 boundaries. Importantly, I only included the Census data and Tolnay and Beck inventory in this crosswalk process since the Seguin and Rigby (2019) lynching data was already

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[37] This template and Eckert et al.'s (2020) corresponding method can be found and accessed online at Eckert's website (https://www.fpeckert.me/eglp).

[38] I also used the templates for the 1880 and 1890 decades to crosswalk the corresponding lynching data (i.e., 1883-1889, 1890-1899) to construct the prior Black lynchings variable used in this study.

situated in the corresponding contemporary counties. Ultimately, this approach preserves historical data and allows for consistent geographies throughout the time-period under study here.

Once the data were all crosswalked and the independent and control variables were constructed, I used count models as my methodological approach. Since lynching was not evenly distributed across US counties it is difficult to examine the data in other ways (Tolnay et al., 1989); thus, I rely on count models to examine the lynchings of Black Americans (Beck & Tolnay, 1995). Due to the nature of the dependent variables, negative binomial regressions were used in the analysis below.[39] Negative binomial regressions are appropriate for dependent variables that measure counts, or integer-valued responses, and for dependent variables that are over-dispersed, which refers to when the variable's variance exceeds the mean (Osgood, 2000). Negative binomial models were chosen over other techniques (i.e., Poisson) given indications of overdispersion in the dependent variables based on the *likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0* which reported *chibar2(1)* values that were significantly different from zero for all models (Osgood, 2000). Robust standard errors were requested to correct for heteroskedasticity, and incident rate ratios (IRRs) were requested since they offer

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[39] Since there were many counties that did not have a lynching, I also explored whether zero-inflated negative binomial regressions would be more appropriate. Specifically, there are 8,983 total counties included in the full models over the three decades examined for this study and only 2,107 had non-zero values. Based on the Vuong test (though there has been some criticism against using this test [P. Wilson, 2015]) and a comparison of the results of the various models, negative binomial regressions appeared to be the most appropriate method.

coefficients comparable to odds ratios in interpretation. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were also reported to check for multicollinearity. As the results show, the results here show that there are instances when the VIFs rise above the suggested cut-off that some scholars suggest (i.e., 4.00) indicate multicollinearity. However, all the VIFs still fall within the suggested cut-offs of others (i.e., 10.0) (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004)—apart from the models also testing for the curvilinear relationship proposed in racial threat theory.[40] These results suggest that ethnic competition and racial threat variables are correlated with each other and their relationship with lynching may be affected. Model-fit statistics were also reported for each model, including the *estat ic* command for the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) value. *Stata Version 16.1* was used to conduct the analyses below.

Besides regression models examining lynching across all counties in the US, I also examine lynching in Southern counties and non-South counties separately. Since this study is concerned with whether social conditions predictive of lynching were the same across the nation it is important to compare the results from the South to those of

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[40] Principal components analysis was considered to address multicollinearity issues. However, I chose to forgo the reduction of estimates in the models due to the uniqueness of the variables and their relationship with Black lynchings. For example, *Cheap Labor Threat* and *Black Success* wanted to load into one factor but, for theoretical reasons and due to their unique effects in the models below I chose not to reduce these estimates into one component. Theoretically, *Cheap Labor Threat* and *Black Success* are unique predictors since one captures the economic marginality of Black Americans relative to Whites while the other captures the level of economic success among Black Americans relative to Whites. Further, while the percent Black population estimate sometimes wanted to load into a component with these two predictors or the cotton acres estimates, the importance of this variable by itself to racial threat theory called for keeping it an independent predictor in the models.

the non-South. To make these comparisons, I rely on the z-score calculation that compares regression coefficients from models using the same variables but different samples (Clogg, Petkova, & Haritou, 1995; Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998). The equation for this calculation is as follows:

$$Z = \frac{b_1 - b_2}{\sqrt{SEb_1^2 + SEb_2^2}}$$

where b_1 and b_2 are the coefficients from the groups being compared (i.e., South, non-South) and SEb_1^2 and SEb_2^2 represent the variances of their respective group's coefficients (Clogg et al., 1995; Paternoster et al., 1998). Thus, where the regression results suggest differences between the South and non-South, I use this calculation to examine whether these results are significantly different. Significant differences between the coefficients are shown based on whether the Z-value falls beyond the range of values spanning ± 1.96 under two-tailed tests. The negative binomial and Z-value results are discussed next.

Results

The results of this study are reported in four tables below. The discussion of results will begin with the full sample examining all counties across the US (Table 2). Then, the analysis will focus on Black lynchings in just Southern counties (Table 3) separately from the lynchings of Black Americans that occurred throughout the rest of the US (Table 4). In Table 5, comparisons between the South and non-South are reported using the Z-value calculations.

Table 2 Negative Binomial Regressions of Black Lynchings for Southern Counties displaying IRR Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors) [N=4,108][a,b]

	Model S1	**Model S2**	**Model S3**
Ethnic Competition Variables			
Cheap Labor Threat (log)	1.332** (0.121)	0.493*** (0.064)	1.131 (0.185)
Black Advantage (log)	1.199 (0.217)	0.971 (0.188)	1.172 (0.221)
White Immigrants (%)	0.976* (0.012)	0.985 (0.012)	0.992 (0.013)
Racial Threat Variables			
Black Population (%)		1.041*** (0.004)	1.084*** (0.008)
Black Population² (%)			0.999*** (0.000)
Independent & Control Variables			
Manufacturing Wages (log)	0.868*** (0.020)	0.833*** (0.019)	0.803*** (0.019)
Cotton Farm Acres (%)	1.005 (0.005)	1.009† (0.005)	1.008 (0.005)
Prior Black Lynchings	1.139*** (0.020)	1.130*** (0.018)	1.109*** (0.016)
Deep South	1.552*** (0.164)	1.307* (0.140)	1.315** (0.135)
Border States	0.467*** (0.099)	0.595* (0.127)	0.732 (0.159)
Year	0.511*** (0.031)	0.552*** (0.033)	0.547*** (0.032)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics			
Pseudo R^2	0.090	0.106	0.116
Log pseudolikelihood	-2,927.185	-2,875.605	-2,842.859
BIC	5,945.897	5,851.057	5,793.887
VIF Range	1.07, 2.88	1.09, 6.12	1.09, 22.00

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. Non-zero observations = 2,038
b. Models are offset by an estimate of the total population (logged) across counties.

All Counties

To begin discussing the results for all US counties (Table 2), I focus on the variables capturing racial threat/ethnic competition arguments. First, in Model 1 there is some support for ethnic competition arguments regarding *Cheap Labor Threat*; however, there is no significant support for arguments about *Black Advancement* being a threat leading to more lynchings. This finding suggests that lynching of Black Americans was 33.2% more likely to occur in counties that had a large labor pool made up of Black tenant farmers relative to White tenant farmers. However, this relationship did not remain consistent in direction in Model 2 and was not significant in Model 3 with the inclusion of traditional measures of racial threat. Specifically, in support of Blalock's arguments, counties with larger Black populations were 5.1% more likely to have had a lynching according to Model 2. In support of previous studies (e.g., Tolnay & Beck, 1995) and Blalock's economic threat hypothesis, the curvilinear relationship between the Black population and lynchings of Black Americans is a negative one, which suggests that once the Black population reached a sizable portion in a county the likelihood of lynchings occurring declined significantly. Specifically, counties where the Black population was sufficiently large and made up a sizable section of the labor pool, lynching was less likely since fewer Whites meant less competition between them and Black Americans.

Further, contrary to expectations about the role of immigration as it pertains to the lynching of Black Americans (Olzak, 1990), it appears that where the population

of White immigrants is larger there were fewer Black lynchings. While this finding does not support competition theory arguments, it may not be surprising. For example, it could be that the White immigrant population was a bigger threat in these counties drawing attention away from the Black population or it could be that immigrant Whites did not share racial prejudices in a manner that matched native Whites and for this reason immigration may have disrupted traditional norms supporting anti-Black violence.

Regarding other notable variables related to the economic conditions of the decades under study, we see mixed support for previous arguments. First, another finding contrary to expectations is the negative relationship between manufacturing wages and the lynching of Black Americans across all three models. Thus, it appears that lynching, at least nationally, was less prevalent in places where industry had taken a stronger hold instead of lynching being positively associated with the modernizing forces of industry at the turn of the century (Smångs, 2016a). A final finding consistent with past arguments is the significant relationship between cotton farm acres across the models. This suggests that where the economy was most dependent on cotton agriculture there was likely more competition between Black and White laborers and, thus, lynching was more prevalent.

Turning to the remaining variables of this analysis, there are additional findings supporting earlier arguments. First, Black lynchings are associated with the prevalence of past lynchings in the county across all models. Thus, it appears that counties with a history of lynching were predisposed to additional lynchings in the

future. Further, the regional variable capturing the South is significant, which supplies further evidence that lynching was highly concentrated in the Southern states and supports claims of the uniqueness of the South in this regard. The final predictor that was significant in all models is the ordinal year variable showing that lynching was consistently on the decline at a rate of nearly 50.0% per decade from 1900 to the 1920s. Thus, despite the decline in lynching across the decades under study here, all the aforementioned significant relationships existed. Finally, according to model fit statistics, it appears that Model 3 including all measures of competition and threat is the model that is best fit.

Southern vs. Non-South Counties

Now that the lynching of Black Americans has been considered nationally, I will discuss the findings of Table 3 depicting South and Table 4 depicting non-South counties separately. Table 5 then shows the Z-value results comparing coefficients from these models. First, looking at variables related to ethnic competition, *Cheap Labor Threat* is related to Black lynchings in the predicted positive direction in two of the Southern models (Models S1 and S3: Table 3) and all three of the non-South models (Table 4). That said, this positive relationship is only significant in one of the Southern models (Model S1: Table 3) and was only significant at the $p < 0.10$ level in one of the non-South models (Model N1: Table 4). Thus, there is some support for the argument that counties with a larger Black labor force relative to Whites experienced more racial competition leading to a higher prevalence of lynchings, especially in the South and before traditional racial threat estimates are added to the models. On the

other hand, *Black Advancement* did not have a significant relationship with Black lynchings in any of the models, regardless of regional distinction.

Table 3 Negative Binomial Regressions of Black Lynchings for Southern Counties displaying IRR Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors) [N=4,108][a,b]

	Model S1	**Model S2**	**Model S3**
Ethnic Competition Variables			
Cheap Labor Threat (log)	1.332** (0.121)	0.493*** (0.064)	1.131 (0.185)
Black Advantage (log)	1.199 (0.217)	0.971 (0.188)	1.172 (0.221)
White Immigrants (%)	0.976* (0.012)	0.985 (0.012)	0.992 (0.013)
Racial Threat Variables			
Black Population (%)		1.041*** (0.004)	1.084*** (0.008)
Black Population² (%)			0.999*** (0.000)
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Manufacturing Wages (log)	0.868*** (0.020)	0.833*** (0.019)	0.803*** (0.019)
Cotton Farm Acres (%)	1.005 (0.005)	1.009† (0.005)	1.008 (0.005)
Prior Black Lynchings	1.139*** (0.020)	1.130*** (0.018)	1.109*** (0.016)
Deep South	1.552*** (0.164)	1.307* (0.140)	1.315** (0.135)
Border States	0.467*** (0.099)	0.595* (0.127)	0.732 (0.159)
Year	0.511*** (0.031)	0.552*** (0.033)	0.547*** (0.032)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics			
Pseudo R^2	0.090	0.106	0.116
Log pseudolikelihood	-2,927.185	-2,875.605	-2,842.859

Table 3 *Continued*

Model-Fit Statistics	**Model S1**	**Model S2**	**Model S3**
BIC	5,945.897	5,851.057	5,793.887
VIF Range	1.07, 2.88	1.09, 6.12	1.09, 22.00
Note: Significance (two-tailed): † p < 0.10 * p < 0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 a. Non-zero observations = 2,038 b. Models are offset by an estimate of the total population (logged) across counties.			

Turning now to the traditional measures of racial threat, as predicted by Blalock, the size of the Black population has a positive and significant relationship with Black lynchings in the South and non-South models. Notably, for the non-South models, the effect sizes of this predictor are even larger in the non-South than the South, and these differences are significant (Table 5). Specifically, when comparing the Black population estimates between Models S2 and N2 the Z-value calculated was equal to -3.232 showing significant difference while the Z-value for the comparison of Models S3 and N3 was equal to -2.448 also showing significant difference. When the percent Black squared term gets added into the models (Models S3 of Table 3 and N3 of Table 4), evidence regarding the curvilinear prediction of racial threat theory was again supporting the *economic threat hypothesis*; however, significance for this estimate was weaker in the non-South even though the effect size is greater than the finding depicted in the Southern model. This term had a negative impact on the lynching of Black citizens suggesting that once the Black population was sufficiently large, they no longer posed the same amount of threat as when they were less populous and in more direct competition with Whites in the county (Blalock, 1967). Further, the Z-value comparing these coefficients showed a significant difference [Z =

2.000] in Table 5 suggesting that the curvilinear effect is stronger inside of the South. Finally, it is important to note that the model accounting for racial threat's curvilinear effect appears to be better specified in the South (Model S3: Table 3) while the model for non-South counties with this estimate (Model N3: Table 4) is not as well specified relative to another non-South model (Model N2: Table 4).

Table 4 Negative Binomial Regressions of Black Lynchings for Non-South Counties displaying IRR Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors) [N=4,875][a,b]

	Model N1	**Model N2**	**Model N3**
Ethnic Competition Variables			
Cheap Labor Threat (log)	1.572† (0.429)	1.468 (0.364)	1.475 (0.365)
Black Advantage (log)	0.707 (0.490)	0.000 (0.001)	0.026 (0.112)
White Immigrants (%)	1.025 (0.039)	1.038 (0.036)	1.042 (0.036)
Racial Threat Variables			
Black Population (%)		1.216*** (0.054)	1.354*** (0.110)
Black Population² (%)			0.995† (0.002)
Independent & Control Variables			
Manufacturing Wages (log)	0.795† (0.103)	0.745** (0.078)	0.727** (0.073)
Cotton Farm Acres (%)	1.103* (0.043)	1.096* (0.044)	1.082* (0.039)
Prior Black Lynchings	2.741*** (0.578)	1.704** (0.321)	1.584* (0.329)
Lower Midwest	2.018† (0.806)	1.492 (0.604)	1.645 (0.660)
Missouri	11.667*** (5.536)	7.314*** (3.431)	6.001** (3.097)
Year	0.493* (0.159)	0.562† (0.175)	0.571† (0.175)

Table 4 *Continued*

Independent & Control Variables	**Model N1**	**Model N2**	**Model N3**
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics			
Pseudo R^2	0.145	0.194	0.200
Log pseudolikelihood	-318.276	-299.714	-297.711
BIC	729.962	701.331	705.816
VIF Range	1.01, 1.39	1.01, 1.40	1.01, 3.98
Note: Significance (two-tailed): † p < 0.10 * p < 0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 a. Non-zero observations = 69 b. Models are offset by an estimate of the total population (logged) across counties.			

Contrary to earlier research and the hypothesis derived from ethnic competition, White immigration is a negative predictor of lynching in the South, but this finding is only significant in one model (Model S1: Table 3). However, consistent with competition arguments (Olzak, 1990), the effect is in the predicted positive direction per competition arguments in the non-South models though this relationship never reaches significance. Second, consistent with the full county models, manufacturing wages are a significant and negative predictor of Black lynchings across almost all models in both regions contrary to expectations about the South based on Smångs' (2016a) arguments regarding the prevalence of lynching being at least partially a response to modernizing processes that threatened the existing traditions of Southern Whites. Further, the manufacturing wages estimate's negative relationship had a larger effect size with the lynching of Black Americans across both non-South models compared to the South models; however, the Z-values in Table 5 do

not show a significant difference between the manufacturing coefficients. Third, the cotton acres estimate is positively associated with a higher prevalence of lynching in the non-South models significantly and only approached significance in the second model looking at Southern counties (Model 2 of Table 3). The Z-values calculated between the South and non-South models even show a significant difference between the cotton acres coefficients in the models not accounting for Blalock's curvilinear hypothesis. This finding suggests cotton acres was a stronger predictor outside of the South and, while initially unexpected that cotton acres would be related to lynching in the non-South but not the South, this finding may be a function of cotton farming being more prevalent across the South making it a less unique predictor in this region and may also be a result of Missouri being included as a non-South state despite its history of slavery.

Consistent with past arguments and the full county models, prior Black lynchings were a significant and positive predictor of later Black lynchings. Thus, a history of anti-Black violence in a county is associated with continued violence against Black Americans in the South (Tolnay & Beck, 1995) and this relationship also exists outside of this region and actually had larger effect sizes. The coefficient differences were only significant when examining the comparisons between Models S1 and N1 though (Table 5). The variable controlling for the decades being examined has a negative significant relationship in the South and a negative but not consistently significant association with Black lynchings in non-South models. Despite the lack of consistent significance in the non-South models, the effect sizes are relatively stable

across all models—there were no significant differences between the South and non-South—which may call into question claims about lynching declining outside the South more quickly (Raper, 2003[1933]), at least over the decades examined.

Table 5 Comparing Coefficient Differences Between the South and non-South Models of Table 2 Using Z-value Calculations

	Comparing Models S1 & N1	**Comparing Models S2 & N2**	**Comparing Models S3 & N3**
Cheap Labor Threat (log)	-0.538	-2.638*	-0.841
Black Advancement (log)	0.918	5.165*	4.625*
White Immigrants (%)	-1.201	-1.397	-1.306
Black Population (%)		-3.232*	-2.448*
Black Population² (%)			2.000*
Manufacturing Wages (log)	0.696	1.096	1.008
Cotton Farm Acres (%)	-2.264*	-13.587*	-1.882
Prior Black Lynchings	-2.770*	-1.785	1.442
Year	0.111	-0.056	0.135
Note: Significant differences are indicated by Z-values that are greater than ± 1.96 (*)			

Further, there are notable sub-regional variant findings in the South and non-South. First, the *Deep South* dichotomy was significant across each Southern model suggesting that this subregion was unique from the rest of the South, which may not be surprising given the prevalence of the Black population in these states that encompassed the "Black Belt" (Raper, 2003[1933]). Second, the *Border States* measure was negatively related to lynching compared to the rest of the South, which may be a function of these states not formally seceding from the Union with the rest of

the South, but this finding was not consistently significant across all three models. Regarding the non-South regional variations, lynchings of Black Americans were much more likely to have taken place in Missouri than the rest of the non-South, which may not be surprising given this state's history with slavery that may make it more similar to the South than the rest of the country. Further, the *Lower Midwest* variable did have a positive relationship with the lynching of Black Americans across all non-South models, but this finding was not significant.

Discussion

In response to the fall of slavery and during the short-lived push for Reconstruction, the practice of lynching evolved into a racialized form of violence directed primarily at the emancipated Black population of America. The terroristic violence of lynching was one method used to enforce caste and to re-subjugate the Black population that was no longer controlled by the institution of slavery (Brundage, 1993; Dollard, 1957[1937]; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). While the South was the region where most lynchings occurred, this violence also existed in the North and throughout the rest of the country; attitudes favorable toward lynching existed everywhere (Cox, 1945; Pfeifer, 2013; Wells-Barnett, 2014[1900]). Despite this fact, much of our knowledge on lynching has been limited to the South—and often only a part of this region—especially regarding quantitative analyses due to a lack of comprehensive data beyond the South (Pfeifer, 2013; Seguin & Rigby, 2019). Recent data advancements have provided the ability to examine lynching across the entire US at

the county-level, which allows us to investigate whether structural factors associated with the lynching of Black Americans in the South were the same as those related to lynching elsewhere. That is the gap in the literature I address here.

Earlier studies of lynching tended to focus on hypotheses derived from racial threat and ethnic competition theory. According to both, racial conflict and violence results from racial/ethnic groups being in competition with each other over economic and political resources (Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992). Where there is a large Black population, there is a chance that the White population will be challenged in economic, political, and social realms. For this reason, Whites turn to discriminatory caste line practices, such as lynching, to quell attempted status advances of Black Americans (Blalock, 1967; Dollard, 1957[1937]). As with past studies of lynching, there is some support for both; however, racial threat appears to garner stronger support than more direct competition variables. Specifically, while one measure of ethnic competition (*Cheap Labor Threat*) was significantly associated with Black lynchings in some models, the inclusion of traditional threat variables (size of the Black population) changed the effect of this variable and made it nonsignificant at times.

On the other hand, the percent Black population estimate was a positive and significant predictor in every model, South and non-South, which suggests that counties with a relatively large Black population were more likely to have a higher frequency of Black Americans being lynched. Further, taking Blalock's (1967) curvilinear hypothesis into account, the quadratic term of the percent Black estimate

was significant across all but one model showing a negative relationship with lynching, which supports earlier research and Blalock's *economic threat hypothesis* (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). This finding suggests that once the Black population was sufficiently large, they were not seen as a threat in the same way as when they were a smaller portion of the total population and in direct competition with other racial groups (Blalock, 1967). Specifically, when the marginalized group's population is large enough, discriminatory practices of the majority group would no longer be called for since it is when the powerful and marginalized racial groups are close in size that instills the most competition between them (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). When comparing the South and non-South coefficients for the percent Black estimate there was a significant difference based on Z-values, which held for the curvilinear effect as well—though the linear estimate appears stronger outside of the South while the curvilinear estimate appears stronger in the South. Thus, it appears that the Black population may be a stronger predictor of lynching outside of the South, which offers support for arguments about lynching in the non-South and how it was a response to a migratory Black population that was growing in destinations outside of the South (Ayers, 1984; Baker, 1964[1908]; Pfeifer, 2013; Raper, 2003[1933]). While the findings here appear to support this migration claim, this study did not directly model migration or changes in the Black population over the decades examined. Thus, future research should explore this potential explanation further.

There were other findings worth noting regarding the similarities and differences between the South and non-South models. First, in exploring the

arguments from the recent scholarship of Smångs (2016a), I found that manufacturing wages were a relatively consistent, negative, and significant predictor of Black lynchings in the South and non-South models. This finding appears to contradict Smångs' (2016a) arguments that the modernizing processes of industry posed a threat to traditional, Southern White values, which led to Whites acting more aggressively toward Black Americans in that region. Second, prior Black lynchings were a positive predictor of future Black lynchings in the South and this finding was relatively consistent for non-South counties as well. This suggests there was a reoccurring pattern of lynching where earlier lynchings took place (Williamson, 1986) and that the proneness to anti-Black violence established in the history of the given county is a consistent predictor of lynching in the South and beyond (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Finally, the presence of farm acres devoted to the production of cotton was a significant and positive predictor of lynching in the non-South and full county models, but not in the Southern models. While this relationship seems puzzling outside of the South, it may be a product of Missouri being a part of the non-South even though it was a slave state initially. Given the prevalence of lynching and the history of Missouri, it appears this state may have more in common with the South. Finally, contrary to other ethnic competition arguments and research (Olzak, 1990, 1992), immigration did not have a positive and significant relationship with the lynching of Black Americans in any models. Future research should explore these relationships further since this is one of first studies to quantitatively examine lynching beyond the South.

While this study has addressed some of the limitations of past lynching research and has offered some new insights on the different structural forces related to lynching in the South and beyond, there are some limitations. First, this study only examined lynching between the years of 1900 and 1929, which includes only part of the years commonly considered as falling within the era of lynching since the 1880s through the 1940s are generally seen as encompassing this era (Williamson, 1986). Importantly, this limitation in scope also misses the peak years of lynching since the violence began to decline in prevalence starting around 1900 (Williamson, 1986). Second, while studies have found little or mixed evidence for the *power-threat hypothesis* and the role of politics in lynching (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Tolnay et al., 1989), they have been limited to Southern lynchings. Thus, it would be important for future work to examine politics as they pertain to lynching beyond the South. Third, this study did not include any estimates of legal executions or crime proxies as have been used in the past (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Legal executions may be important to consider in future work of lynching in the South and beyond given the *substitution hypothesis*, which argues that executions replaced lynching; however, the evidence for this hypothesis has been lacking (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Instead, research has suggested lynching and legal executions are mutually enforcing phenomena (Tolnay & Beck, 1995).

In conclusion, this study examined the lynching of Black Americans and tested racial threat, ethnic competition, and other hypotheses as they pertain to this violence. While lynching was widely prevalent in the South, this violence occurred nationally.

This study provides the first look at county-level lynchings that included counties across the entire US instead of just the South. As the results above show, there were similarities and differences in the effects of threat and other variables depending on whether the models examined all counties, Southern counties, or non-South counties. Questions remain and future research should continue to explore the violence of lynching, including the similarities and differences of this violence in the South and elsewhere in the US. Research should also consider how the history of lynching continues to matter for contemporary trends in violence, justice issues, and inequality. Until we can fully address the history of lynching and its continued influence on our society, reconciliation with the past and transformation of our society and justice system is unlikely (Equal Justice Initiative, 2017; Ifill, 2018).

Chapter 4

THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING, BLACK RESISTANCE, AND CONTEMPORARY FATAL POLICE SHOOTINGS

> "Once the classic method of lynching was the rope. Now it is the policeman's bullet. To many an American the police are the government, certainly its most visible representative. We submit that the evidence suggests that the killing of Negroes has become police policy in the United States and that police policy is the most practical expression of government policy." (Patterson, 1951, p. 8-9)

> "These modern day lynchings serve today in much the same way that they did in the past—as a way to illustrate and highlight white supremacy and emphasize minorities' place in a racialized social system." (Embrick, 2015, p. 837)

Now that the national scope of lynching has been examined (Chapter 3) and regional distinctions in this violence have been established, it is time to investigate this history as it pertains to the use of fatal force by police today—one of the most visible social and racial justice issues in the United States. In 2014, mass protests erupted throughout the country in response to lethal policing, including the highly publicized killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. While the US Department of Justice (2017) published a series of federal reports conducted on police killings in several cities and called for major reforms, killings by police continue to make headlines nationwide. In 2020 this country once again erupted in protests to the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and others by police officers as a global pandemic

simultaneously disrupted lives and highlighted continued inequalities in US institutions. These recent protests have led to calls for police abolition from some and have given rise to calls for "defunding the police" as a way to divert money from more policing into communities and other institutions that could help improve the quality of life for many US residents (Ray, 2020).

While incidents of lethal policing have received much attention in recent years, the institution of policing has always been tied to racialized practices and issues around race relations throughout US history. However, few empirical studies have addressed violent and racialized policing through a historical context. This study is an attempt to address this oversight by empirically bridging past forms of racial violence (e.g., lynching) to contemporary lethal policing. Addressing this gap is important since the history of the police is complexly intertwined with racial repression, violence, and resistance in the US—from slavery and lynching to the mass acts of resistance in the 1960s-70s, to contemporary issues around lethal policing that have also resulted in widespread protests and calls for change.

This study is an attempt to link these periods of history to show how police shootings today do not occur in a vacuum; repressive and violent tactics have always been a part of policing. Thus, I examine the potential legacy effects of lynching and racial resistance as they pertain to police violence while also considering the importance of ethnic competition and racial threat theory among other structural conditions of cities. This is important since past research has offered some support for threat and competition arguments and claims that there is a legacy of lynching that

continues to influence other criminal justice practices (Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005; Jacobs, Malone, & Iles, 2012; King, Messner, & Baller, 2009). Contemporary policing warrants much closer attention through the legacy of lynching framework, especially the use of lethal force. While killings by police do not equate to lynching exactly, "they are only a few of the far-too-numerous events that should provide evidence that…lynching is not limited to the realm of metaphor or memory" (Markovitz, 2004, p. 146). This study is unique in that it examines racial threat/ethnic competition and the historical context of cities and their surrounding counties in relation to contemporary police shootings of Black Americans, which has never been examined in this way before.

Literature Review

Policing and Lethal Force in a Historical Context

Historically, the police have helped reinforce the racial hierarchy in the United States (Butler, 2017; Bass, 2001; Hadden, 2001; Vitale, 2017). In the South, the formation of law enforcement groups were an innovation of the 18th and 19th centuries (Hadden, 2001), and early policing was designed to uphold slavery (Du Bois, 2012[1903]; Vitale, 2017). In fact, policing's foundation can be traced in part to slave patrols that were entrusted rights and legal duties to regulate and surveil enslaved persons, free Black persons, and Whites who consorted with the enslaved Black population (Bass, 2001; Hadden 2001). Once race became a less acceptable benchmark for law enforcement focus, slave patrol functions were subsumed within

other institutions: surveillance and investigation became duties of formal policing while violent and lawless aspects of slave patrols were continued by vigilante violence and racist organizations (Hadden, 2001).

Regarding lynching, police were sometimes active participants or played a passive role by not effectively ensuring the safety of the mob's victim—in some cases, Black Americans were removed from police custody or courtrooms, sometimes by force and sometimes by acquiescence on the part of officials (Buckser, 1992; Raper, 2003[1933]; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2018). After the lynching of James Irwin in Ocilla, Georgia that included public torture and gunshots fired into his burning body, police officers waited until nightfall to remove Irwin's body from public display (Raper, 2003[1933]). During another notable lynching, "Police directed traffic while the corpse was dragged through the streets to a cottonwood tree in the Negro business section" where the victim was then burned and Black businesses in the area were also burned while the fire department was prevented from extinguishing the flames (Raper, 2003[1933], p.7). Raper (2003[1933]) also noted that lynching rates were often higher in counties where there was "inadequate local police protection" (p. 29). Further, the failure or unwillingness of the police and other officials to identify or hold lynchers accountable coupled with the failure to protect the Black community upheld White supremacy and conveyed terror (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2018). That being said, while records show cases where lynching victims were sometimes obtained from police custody or courtrooms (Raper, 2003[1933]; Tolnay & Beck, 1995), sometimes officers and other state actors did

attempt to thwart mob efforts and protect persons in custody to varying degrees of success (Beck, 2015; Beck, Tolnay, & Bailey, 2016; Bell, 2017; Buckser, 1992).

During the 1960s and into the 1970s, cities across the nation erupted in mass resistance of Black Americans against White owned and dominated property and institutions, including the police who were perceived as a hostile occupying army (Blauner, 2001; Chambliss, 2001; Sugrue, 2008). These protests often "grew out of centuries of racial discrimination and long-standing white resistance to altering the racial status quo" (Levy, 2018, p. 19). However, they also highlighted issues related to policing and injustices at officers' hands, and frequently started after confrontations between police and Black persons (Blauner, 2001; Sugrue, 2008). Not only did police interactions often precede acts of resistance, but these acts were then used to justify more intensive policing practices through a process of "frontlash" (Weaver, 2007) or "White Rage" (Anderson, 2016). That is, acts of resistance and the Civil Rights Movement were framed as intertwined with crime to justify and double-down on repressive measures through the war on crime and the carceral state after the White-dominated system was challenged by calls for equal rights (Levy, 2018; Weaver, 2007).

As this history suggests, policing is founded on the management of marginalized racial groups and the upholding of the social order in a way that maintains White dominance in our racialized social system (Hadden, 2001; Vitale, 2017). In fact, the police have been seen by Black Americans as "colonial armies of occupation" operating to maintain racial power differentials and cultural repression

while Whites often view police as a "thin blue line" of protection from racial minority groups and the perceived threat of violence (Blauner, 2001, p.7). In carrying out their duties, the police have a great deal of discretion when interacting with civilians and have unique powers and authority to maintain order, prevent crime, and enforce the law. One example of this power is their ability to use state-sanctioned force against civilians when necessary (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Vitale, 2017; Zimring, 2017). The laws that allow police to use force have also allowed them to resort to lethal violence with great leeway (Vitale, 2017). Further, institution-wide practices among police may be to blame for racial disparities in lethal force, not just a few "bad apple" officers acting on their individual racism and biases (Menifield, Shin, & Strother, 2018). Specifically, disparities in police killings are driven by disparities in policing more generally; that is, officers disproportionately kill Black Americans because they interact with Black persons in disparate manners (Menifield et al., 2018).

The state-sanctioned use of lethal force remains widely understudied and there has been a lack of historicization regarding this violence (Embrick 2015; Ward, 2015). Recent killings by police have been referred to as "modern-day lynchings" since these killings indicate a systemic disregard for persons of color and show that racialized oppression has not changed much since Jim Crow (Embrick, 2015, p. 837). Further, it has been argued that police violence has replaced lynching as the most visible representation of racial violence (Ward, 2015). Like lynching, policing—especially when force is employed—is a response to perceptions that associate "Blackness" with crime and fear (Butler, 2017; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) note

three other ways police brutality is similar to lynching: 1) legal authorities often exonerate(d) the use of extralegal violence; 2) both relied on the perception that the legal order is not sufficient; and 3) like lynching, police violence is used in "teaching a lesson of retribution outside the bounds of the penal code" (p. 24). Further,

> "Like lynching, such brutality is employed to control a population thought to be undesirable, undeserving, and underpunished by the established law. Such beatings do not merely violate the law. They go beyond and above the law to achieve a fantasized social order" (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 24).

In sum, policing maintains racial domination and, like lynchers, officers who use brutal or lethal force rarely face consequences or are punished (Butler, 2017; Chaney & Robertson, 2015; Vitale, 2017). As lynching reinforced White supremacy so too do the police killings of Black Americans (Chaney & Robertson, 2015) and White supremacy has been argued to be a part of policing itself (Ward, 2018).[41] There are four ways killings by police support White supremacy: they continue and solidify a legacy of racialized policing; juries often deny the humanity and victimization of Black Americans;[42] they reinforce stereotypes of dangerousness and criminality; and officers rarely face consequences or are held accountable (Chaney & Robertson, 2015). Despite these claims and the comparisons made between lethal force and lynching, little research has examined current policing practices in a historical context.

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[41] Ward (2018) implicated "White supremacy in policing—including racist ideologies, violence, and other political actions of law enforcement authorities, and underpolicing of White supremacist threats by legal authorities" (p. 167) as a historical legacy and contemporary issue.

[42] White jurors are more likely to support police regardless of victim or officer race (Vitale, 2017).

Theorizing the Use of Lethal Force by Police

Racial threat theory and arguments about competition between racial groups have offered valuable insights regarding the study of racial violence, past or present, and this theory has been a central framework when examining racial differentials in criminal justice practices, especially the use of (lethal) force by police. Thus, I follow and expand on previous empirical tests of lethal force that have tested Blalock's (1967) central theorem arguing that as the population of Black Americans increases, the White racial group will perceive a growing threat to their status and, as a result, use their power and resources to ensure their dominance over the marginalized group in economic and political spheres (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Stults & Swagar, 2018). While several studies have considered the role of racial threat in helping us to understand police brutality and the use of lethal force, results have been inconsistent. Some studies suggesting that the size of the Black or non-White population does relate to violent policing practices (Holmes, 2000; Liska & Yu, 1992; Ross, 2015; Smith, 2004; Smith & Holmes, 2003, 2014), while other studies have not found similar support (Holmes, Painter, & Smith, 2018; Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Klinger et al., 2015). However, none of these studies examined the historical context of lynching and how this may combine with current racial threat as other studies have done when examining other criminal justice practices (Jacobs et al., 2005; Jacobs et al., 2012; King et al., 2009).

Ethnic competition theory is closely related to racial threat but has not received similar attention within studies of police violence. Notably, this perspective offers

arguments focused more directly on competition between racial groups compared to Blalock's contentions that focused largely on racial group population sizes (Olzak, 1992). While not testing this theory directly, previous studies examining threat arguments have used measures that more directly capture competition between Black and White populations through income ratios among other related predictors (e.g., Bohon & Ortiz, 2021). Additionally, ethnic competition includes arguments around immigration and, specifically, contends that the presence of immigrant populations can pose a threat resulting in exclusionary and/or violent acts directed at them or another racial-ethnic group depending on the relative amount of power each group holds (Olzak, 1990, 1992). While studies have considered ethnic threat as it pertains to Hispanic/Latinx populations (e.g., Holmes et al., 2018), only one lethal force study to my knowledge has considered the role of immigration more directly (Gaston, Fernandes, & DeShay, 2020).

The Legacies of Lynching and Racial Resistance

Legacy of Lynching

Violence and inequality remain unique where racial violence was most pronounced in the past and the meanings of this violence linger in attitudes, behaviors, and structures (Ward, 2016). However, "these historical relationships remain mysterious, such that theoretical and practical implications are still somewhat unclear" (Ward, 2015, p. 307). What we know from the literature is that a legacy of lynching has been associated with contemporary phenomena related to criminal justice including the application of death sentences (Jacobs et al. 2005), public support for the

death penalty (Messner, Baumer, & Rosenfeld, 2006), prison admissions (Jacobs et al., 2012), and a lack of hate crime enforcement (King et al., 2009). Thus, given the intertwined histories of policing and racial injustice, it is possible that past lynchings may continue to shape how policing operates today. Only one study has considered this possibility though. King et al. (2009) examined how responses to contemporary hate crimes by law enforcement are shaped by past lynchings in the South. They "suggest that racial antagonism is deeply ingrained in some pockets of the country, and there is continuity in how the state, via its law enforcement agencies, reacts to offenses motivated by bigotry" (King et al., 2009, p. 292). Specifically, there was less compliance with hate crime enforcement and fewer reports among police that hate crimes were committed against Black persons in counties with a history of lynching, and this relationship was enhanced by the presence of sizable Black populations (King et al. 2009). As police often failed to prevent lynchings, they continue to fail in protecting Black Americans from hate crimes.

Building on these insights, where a history of lynching exists, racial socialization and cultural norms conducive to violence and racial repression may also exist and the use of lethal force by police today may be an expression of these forces. This may especially be the case given the criminalization of Blackness, which provides "one of the most widely accepted bases for justifying prejudicial thinking, discriminatory treatment, and/or acceptance of racial violence as an instrument of public safety" (Muhammad, 2011, p. 4). Additionally, lethal force may act as a racial socialization event when the police and media frame officers as the victims while the

Black persons who are killed are portrayed as dangerous criminals (Pemberton, 2008). As the alleged criminality of Black Americans justified lynchings, this perceived criminality may continue to inform police violence and the lack of consequences officers face after employing brutal and sometimes lethal methods. For these reasons, the use of lethal force by police should be historicized in this context and the possibility that a legacy of lynching may influence this violence today should be examined. However, while lynching has been the major focus of the legacy of racial violence literature, other violence from the past likely matters as well.

Legacy of Racial Resistance

Riots are a distinct form of collective action from lynching since they "involve an assault on persons and property simply because they are part of a given subgroup of the community" while lynchings tended to be directed at a specific person because of a particular (alleged) act that was committed (Lieberson & Silverman, 1965, p. 888). In fact, when speaking of protests in the North during 1963, Sugrue (2008) noted that the targeted institutions were often "places that embodied white power and exacerbated racial inequality…" (p.291). Further, riots typically result from confrontations between and violations of one racial group by another (Lieberson & Silverman, 1965, p. 888), including conflicts with police which were a major preceding factor to past acts of resistance (Sugrue, 2008). Finally, there has been a failure to acknowledge that the underlying conditions associated with riots and resistance are often the result of institutions not functioning correctly or not

sufficiently addressing racial issues, issues which may not be resolvable given the arrangements of these institutions (Lieberson & Silverman, 1965).

Accordingly, acts of resistance during the 1960s-70s were often the result of conflict involving Black Americans responding to "the presence of exploitative and exclusionary institutions in black neighborhoods" and wrongs committed against them by members of another racial group—including the police who were often viewed as a White occupying force in Black neighborhoods (Baskin et al., 1971; Blauner, 2001; Chambliss, 2001; Hinton, 2015, p. 100; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [a.k.a. Kerner Commission], 1968; Lieberson & Silverman, 1965). While Smängs (2017) was concerned with racial boundary construction regarding the violence of lynching, his arguments may apply to other forms of collective action and may help to understand racial demonstrations and resistance. The collective resistance of Black Americans across the US in response to various injustices from Whites and "White" institutions may have symbolized an enhanced Black-group membership against the oppression of a White-dominated society. Importantly, during the same era Black resistance was widespread, calls for "Black Nationalism" and "Black Power" emphasizing Black solidarity and self-governing were also present (Blauner, 2001). Thus, the collective resistance of Black Americans may have been, at least partially, a response to past racial violence (e.g., lynching) as well.

In the wake of this collectivity expressed across Black communities was a response of "White Rage" and calls for "law and order" that resulted in the merging of anticrime with antipoverty policies, an increase of police presence, and a turn toward

political conservativism; all of which gave rise to the wars on crime and drugs, and the rise of mass incarceration and the carceral state (Anderson, 2016; Hinton, 2015; Levy, 2018). Thus, if cities implemented more repressive measures following acts of racial resistance, it is possible that this is reflected in violent policing tactics and/or these protests could have increased the perception of threat through which officers view civilians thereby influencing the use of lethal force (Cunningham & Gillezeau, 2019). Research on this era of Black resistance has considered the relationship between these collective acts and police killings. Jacobs and Britt (1979) constructed an index of violence, which included an estimate of racial riots, and found that it was associated with police-caused homicides spanning the years of 1961 to 1970. Further, a recent study examined the relationship between Black protests and the use of lethal force by police more directly. Specifically, Cunningham and Gillezeau (2019) found that protesting was related to a higher prevalence of police shootings in the short run, regardless of the race of the person killed by police. However, when considering the relationship between Black protests and lethal force in the long-run, the differences in lethal force became more race-specific. That is, the relationship between protests and police killings persisted only pertaining to the deaths of non-White civilians at the hands of police (Cunningham & Gillezeau, 2019). Ultimately, I account for two important historical periods and examine the possibility that legacies of both lynching and racial resistance are reflected in the prevalence of contemporary police shootings of Black Americans.

Besides just accounting for another historical context, capturing Black protests and resistance serves another purpose. One of the limitations of past research has been the amount of time between estimates of lynching and the contemporary phenomena considered. For example, one study had a nearly forty-year gap between the estimates of lynching and death sentences examined (Jacobs et al., 2005) while another examined lynchings between 1889-1918 but the estimate of prison admissions spanned 1972-2000 (Jacobs et al., 2012). Two studies have considered possible intervening forces that may enhance or disrupt the legacy of lynching's influence to address this issue. First, Gabriel and Tolnay (2017) considered "*indicators of resistance*" that may influence the legacy of lynching's relationship with contemporary homicides. They found that lynchings were positively associated with White-on-Black homicides, but significance was reduced when controlling for other historical forces (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017).[43] Second, Petersen and Ward (2015) considered how anti-civil rights violence (1954-1974) may help to understand the legacy of lynching and its impact on contemporary homicides. Based on their findings, they concluded "that anti-civil rights violence acts as a conduit for the transmission of violence over time, apparently sustaining or cultivating the latent functions of lynching..." (Petersen & Ward, 2015, p. 135). Studies have yet to examine possible mediating factors such as these in relation to contemporary criminal justice practices.

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[43] One example of "resistance" they considered was population turnover and they argued that when more people were moving in and out of a county the legacy of cultural traditions conducive to lynching and contemporary homicides may be changed (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017).

This study considers this issue by including the Black protests that occurred during the 1960s-1970s, which may interact with the legacy of lynching in some manner.

Methods

The variables for this analysis come from several data sources: *Mapping Police Violence* (MPV, 2019), Gregg Lee Carter's (1983, 1986) riot data spanning 1964 to 1971, the *American Community Survey* (ACS; 2014 5-year estimates) obtained from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) (Manson, Schroeder, Van Riper, & Ruggles, 2019), the FBI's *Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest* (OKCA) data (2011-2013), and nationwide lynching data (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Seguin & Rigby, 2019). This data was collected for a sample of 676 cities based on the criteria Spilerman (1970a) used in collecting riot data spanning 1961-1968. Specifically, Spilerman (1970a) collected riot data for all US cities with a base population of 25,000 residents in the 1960 Census. Even though I use Carter's (1986) data to measure the legacy of racial resistance, I rely on Spilerman's (1970a) city sample since this data provided a basis for Carter's data and since many of the riots/protests during this period took place in cities with populations between 25,000 and 100,000 residents (Levy, 2018). Due to missing data, my final sample is reduced to 642 cities, which still provides a much larger scope of police violence than previous studies that often only examine cities with populations of 100,000 or greater (Willits

& Nowacki, 2014).[44] Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables that are discussed next.

Dependent Variable

Due to the numerous and long-standing criticisms leveled at official counts of the lethal use of force by police (Finch et al., 2021; Fyfe, 1988, 2002; Holmes, 2020; Williams, Bowman, & Jung, 2019, Zimring, 2017), I rely on MPV to estimate the police shootings of Black Americans since it provides a more comprehensive picture of lethal force and its racial character than other databases (Gray & Parker, 2019). MPV has been collecting data since 2013 and this data is a combination of other crowdsourced databases (i.e., Fatal Encounters, U.S. Police Shootings Database, and KilledByPolice.net) that has also been supplemented through data collection efforts examining social media, obituaries, criminal records, and police reports. This database uses a more inclusive definition of lethal force than official sources (i.e., Supplemental Homicide Reports) including all incidents of death at the hands of on- and off-duty officers, whether accidental or not, and involving various acts of violence (e.g., gunshots, beatings, tasing). However, following suggestions from other scholarship, I limit this analysis to only police-involved deaths where firearms were indicated as the weapon used since they may be more indicative of the intention to use lethal violence

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[44] Due to changes in population over time, this includes 47 cities that now have a total population of less than 25,000 contrary to their size in 1960. In another study of policing, Willits and Nowacki (2014) used 25,000 as their cut-off. The removal of these 47 cities does not appear to alter the results in the models below (results in Appendix E); thus, I did not exclude them from the study.

against civilians (Zimring, 2017). Specifically, the dependent variable here includes all police shootings of Black Americans across the cities in the sample and this measure is averaged over a 5-year range (2014-2018) to account for possible yearly fluctuations in lethal force incidents.[45]

Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for Threat, Competition, Legacy Effects, and Control Variables

	All Cities (N=642)		**South Cities (N=178)**		**Non-South Cities (N=464)**	
	Mean	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Dependent Variable						
Police Shootings of Black Americans (avg.)	0.306	0.838	0.518	0.937	0.224	0.782
Ethnic Competition						
Black Gains Index	1.717	6.422	1.970	2.580	1.621	7.379
Immigration (%)	7.883	7.087	6.570	6.383	8.386	7.283
Racial Threat						
Black Population (%)	17.913	19.001	29.707	21.098	13.388	15.990
Black Population² (%)	681.340	1299.997	1325.127	1585.796	434.369	1076.049
Legacy Effects						
Lynching	0.350	0.477	0.860	0.348	0.155	0.362
Black Resistance	0.324	0.468	0.404	0.492	0.293	0.456
Control Variables						
Disadvantage Index	23.999	8.326	24.797	5.895	23.693	9.075
Gini Index	0.464	0.039	0.488	0.037	0.455	0.036

[45] Appendix D provides models looking at White Americans killed in police shootings captured over the same time-period with the same predictors.

Table 6 Continued

	All Cities (N=642)		South Cities (N=178)		Non-South Cities (N=464)	
Control Variables	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Black Mobility (%)	77.290	9.245	77.784	6.612	77.102	10.070
Male Divorced (%)	4.034	1.142	4.287	1.017	3.937	1.173
Population Age 15-29 (%)	23.486	6.137	23.924	5.276	23.318	6.434
Violent Crime Rate	829.979	4960.295	1609.203	9336.755	531.053	643.939
Deep South						
West	0.188	0.391				
Midwest	0.304	0.460				
Northeast	0.231	0.422				
Note: SD = standard deviation						

Racial Threat and Control Variables

First, following Blalock's arguments and past research on lethal force (Holmes et al., 2019; Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Klinger et al., 2016; Ross, 2015; Smith, 2004), I capture racial threat through an estimate of the size of the Black population. Specifically, the percent of the population that is Black was estimated across the cities. To capture the possibility of a curvilinear threat effect, I also estimate a squared version of the percent Black measure in some models which has been examined in past studies of police force as well (Holmes et al., 2019; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Lautenschlager & Omori, 2019). Besides traditional racial threat measures, ethnic competition is captured through an index including three measures: Black-White employment ratio, Black-White high school degree ratio, and Black-White Bachelor's degree ratio. These estimates loaded together on one component in a

principal component analysis (Table 7) and to this competition index is referred to as the *Black Gains Index* since higher values indicate more success in these three areas for Black Americans in comparison to Whites.

Table 7 Principal Component Analysis for the *Black Gains Index* and *Disadvantage Index*

	Component 1: *Black Gains Index*	**Component 2: *Disadvantage Index***
Variables		
Total Population in Poverty (%)		0.842
Households Receiving Public Assistance (%)		0.815
Unemployed Age 16+ (%)		0.813
Employed Age 16+ (B-W)[a]	.958	
Bachelor's Degree Age 25+ (B-W)[a]	.893	
High School Degree Age 25+ (B-W)[a]	.889	
Eigenvalue	3.286	1.453
% Variance Explained	54.771	24.220
Note: Only component loadings equaling 0.500 or greater are reported. [a] Black-White ratios of the named estimates.		

Two control variables were used to capture the economic structure of cities, and these were the *Gini Index* and a *Disadvantage Index* that was constructed based on principal components analysis. First, the *Gini Index* captures household inequality reported in the ACS, which has been used in past studies of lethal force and has been a significant predictor of Black-specific killings by police (Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998). Second, the *Disadvantage Index* is the combination of three structural conditions that

indicate the level of economic deprivation, which have been associated with higher levels of crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990) and may, therefore, correspond to more policing and the possibility for more coercive measures from police, including the possibility for lethal force to be used (Gaston et al., 2020). These three conditions are the total percent of the city population living in poverty, the percent of households receiving public assistance, and the percent of the total population that is at least sixteen years old and is unemployed in the labor force. Based on the principal components analysis in Table 7 these variables load onto one component and were combined to reduce the possibility of multicollinearity in the later analysis (Land et al., 1990). Additionally, Table 8 displays the correlations between fatal shootings of Black Americans, racial threat, ethnic competition, legacies of racial violence, and the *Disadvantage Index* to further illustrate that these measures are not highly colinear with a few exceptions (e.g., percent Black and *Black Gains Index* in South [0.787, $p < 0.001$]).

Several additional control variables were used to estimate aspects of city population composition that may be conducive to crime and the likelihood of use of lethal force by police as a result. Based on ethnic competition theory's arguments regarding immigrant populations, I control for a population estimate of immigration capturing the percent of city residents who are not currently US citizens. Since it is possible that lethal force is the result of police responding to the threat of violence or the perceived threat of violence where they patrol, I follow previous studies and capture the prevalence of violent crime across cities (Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs &

O'Brien, 1998; Smith, 2004). This was done through an estimate of the violent index crimes averaged over three years (2011-2013) and then these averages were turned into rates per 25,000 city residents since many cities in this sample have populations of less than 100,000 residents. To account for population turnover, which can disrupt communities, signal disorganization, and lead to more crime (Sampson, 1990), an estimate of *Black Stability* is included in the models. This variable is a percentage estimate of the population that is Black and has not moved from their current residence in the past year; thus, it would be expected that higher levels of stability would be associated with conditions where you would expect less crime and, consequently, less potential for violence on the part of police (Gaston et al., 2020). A percent estimate of the male population age fifteen and older that is divorced is used to account for family disruption across cities (Land et al., 1990; Pratt & Cullen, 2005), which may be important to account for since this disruption could impact social networks in cities that could influence informal social control processes that help prevent crimes (Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994). A final population composition estimate that may be related to the use of lethal force is the age structure of a city. Thus, a variable included in the models below is the percentage of the city population that falls between the ages of 15 and 29 since those involved in crime and those more likely to have lethal force used against them are typically of a younger age (Land et al., 1990; Durán, 2016; Sorenson et al., 1993). Finally, it is important to account for the possible regional variations in the use of lethal force by police. It is possible that historical differences and conditions of cities may differ across region of the US,

which may influence crime and policing as a result. For this reason, three dummy variables are considered in some of the models presented below. These variables include the West, Midwest, and Northeast; thus, the South is the reference region. The regional designation of cities is based on regional definitions from the US Census Bureau.

Table 8 Correlation Matrixes Examining Police Shootings and Other Key Variables

A. Full City Sample (n = 641)							
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Police Shootings of Black Americans (avg.)	1						
2. *Black Gains Index*	0.097 *	1					
3. Immigration	0.077 †	0.059	1				
4. Black Population (%)	0.277 ***	0.478 ***	-0.167 ***	1			
5. Lynching	0.189 ***	0.125 **	-0.034	0.397 ***	1		
6. Black Resistance	0.359 ***	0.172 ***	0.045	0.435 ***	0.098 *	1	
7. *Disadvantage Index*	0.141 ***	0.299 ***	-0.040	0.529 ***	0.052	0.344 ***	1
B. Southern City Sample (n = 177)							
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1.	1						
2.	0.277 ***	1					
3.	0.164 *	-0.100	1				
4.	0.209 **	0.787 ***	-0.355 ***	1			

Table 8 *Continued*

B. Southern City Sample (n = 177)							
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
5.	0.162 *	0.267 ***	0.045	0.447 ***	1		
6.	0.359 ***	0.275 ***	-0.086	0.355 ***	0.168 *	1	
7.	0.049	0.522 ***	-0.142 †	0.584 ***	0.191 *	0.094	1
C. Non-South City Sample (n = 464)							
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1.	1						
2.	0.076	1					
3.	0.071	0.083 †	1				
4.	0.255 ***	0.532 ***	-0.039	1			
5.	0.095 *	0.138 **	0.059	0.092 *	1		
6.	0.344 ***	0.170 ***	0.110 *	0.472 ***	-0.014	1	
7.	0.163 ***	0.283 ***	-0.009	0.569 ***	-0.030	0.415 ***	1
Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$							

Estimating Historical Legacies

Past lynchings and acts of Black resistance may set a legacy precedent that continues to inform the use of lethal force by police today, and this possibility is examined here for the first time. To examine the legacy of lynching in this study, I continue to use the combination of the two databases outlined in Chapter 3 (Seguin & Rigby, 2019; Tolnay & Beck, 1995), which improves on past research in two related

and important ways. Specifically, past research that examined the potential legacy of lynching could only examine lynchings in the counties of Southern states (e.g., Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017; Messner et al., 2005; Petersen & Ward, 2015)[46] or at the state-level nationwide (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2005; Jacobs et al., 2012). Instead of being limited by these constraints, this combined inventory captures nationwide lynchings at the county-level, which allows for a more nuanced examination of this legacy across the entire US.[47] To capture the possible legacy effect of lynching in this study I situated the sample of cities in their corresponding county using the Eckert et al. (2020) crosswalk method again for the Tolnay and Beck data. I then accounted for whether the surrounding county of the city experienced a lynching in the past—in the years spanning 1883 to 1929—by creating a dummy variable where the value of "1" indicated that the city is located in a county with at least one past lynching of a Black American while "0" represented no such lynching in the county's history.[48]

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[46] While the South's history with lynching was quite unique, Whites used this violence across the US and lynching was often racially motivated regardless of region (Pfeifer, 2004).

[47] It is important to consider the legacy of lynching beyond the South since state-level analyses have found that the independent effect of lynching on prison admission rates persisted even when ex-Confederate states were removed (Jacobs et al., 2012).

[48] Given the methodology used to crosswalk the Southern lynching inventory, some counties in this region have "partial" lynchings. The data are situated in contemporary county boundaries through a "weighting" process whereby lynchings were sometimes divided between counties. Thus, while some counties only had "partial" lynchings in the South, I still coded any values above "0" as a "1" which could overestimate the legacy effect of lynching in the South; however, even if this is the case, the results

Black protests and resistance against injustices are another historical context that may have created a legacy effect that continues to influence the use of lethal violence by police. Carter's (1983, 1986) riot data is used to capture this effect. Carter compiled data on riots for all cities across the US between the years of 1964 and 1971. Following and expanding on Spilerman's (1970) earlier data collection efforts, Carter relied on a similar definition of "riots;" specifically, the incident had to

> "(1) involve primarily black aggression (the most common type of racial street disturbance during the 1964-1971 period); (2) incur some detectable level of property destruction or interpersonal violence; (3) involve at least 30 participants; (4) occur outside a school setting; and (5) occur outside the immediate context of an organized civil rights demonstration…" (Carter, 1986, p. 118).[49]

To capture the possible legacy effect of these protests on lethal policing, I followed a similar process as with lynching and created a dummy variable for whether there was at least one act of protest/resistance in the city's history—coded as "1"—during the 1964-71 timeframe.

Analytical Technique

Since the dependent variable considered here is the average count (2014-2018) of fatal police shootings of Black Americans across US cities, count-based regression models were considered for this analysis. Based on the distribution of the dependent

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presented below in the models restricted to only Southern cities do not appear to have been influenced by this estimate.

[49] Carter (1986, p. 118) noted that he used several sources to collect this data and cross-check the information such as the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, US Senate data gathering efforts, and newspapers (i.e., *New York Times*, *Washington Post*).

variable and the *likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0* and *chibar2(1)* results, which suggested that the variable is not overdispersed, the Poisson regression technique appears to be the most appropriate analysis for these data (Osgood, 2000). Further, to account for population variation across the cities studied, these models are offset by the natural log transformation of the total population following other count model studies of police violence (Willits & Nowacki, 2014; Legewie & Fagan, 2016). Besides that, interval rate ratios (IRRs) were reported as an alternative to the usual count model coefficients and robust standard errors were requested to correct for possible heteroskedasticity. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were also reported for each model to ensure that collinearity among the predictors is not an issue in the analysis. Additionally, model-fit statistics, including the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values, were reported to showcase which models were better specified than others. For example, lower BIC values indicate better model specificity.

Finally, the results of this study are reported in two ways. First, in Table 9, are the results examining racial threat/ethnic competition, historical legacies, and the other predictors as they relate to police shootings of Black Americans across all cities in the sample. Second, to account for potential regional differences, especially given the concentration of past lynchings in the South since this may influence the results of the analysis, I report separate models of South and non-South cities. These results are reported in Table 10 to showcase possible similarities and differences in current city and historical conditions as they pertain to lethal police shootings. Further, I rely on z-score calculations to compare regression coefficients from these separate city samples

(Clogg, Petkova, & Haritou, 1995; Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998). These Z-values are calculated from the following equation:

$$Z = \frac{b_1 - b_2}{\sqrt{SEb_1^2 + SEb_2^2}}$$

where b_1 and b_2 are the coefficients from the samples being compared (i.e., South, non-South) and SEb_1^2 and SEb_2^2 represent the variances of their respective sample's coefficients (Clogg et al., 1995; Paternoster et al., 1998). Where the model results suggest differences between the samples regarding racial threat and the legacy effects, this calculation is used to determine whether these results are significantly different and significant differences between the coefficients are determined by a Z-value that falls beyond the range of values spanning ± 1.96 under two-tailed tests. The results of these comparisons are reported in Table 11. *Stata Version 16.1* was used to conduct the regressions below and the results of this study are discussed next.

Results

Full City Models

The results of Table 9 examining the full sample of cities are divided into five separate models: Model 1 depicts ethnic competition and the control measures, Model 2 adds the linear racial threat estimate, Model 3 tests Blalock's curvilinear hypothesis, and Models 4 and 5 repeat Models 2 and 3 but with the addition of the historical legacy estimates. First, there is mixed support for arguments from ethnic competition regarding the *Black Gains Index* and estimate of immigration. Specifically, where

Black Americans have made gains above Whites across cities, we see a positive relationship with the prevalence of fatal shootings of Black Americans across four models; however, this relationship is only significant in three of those models. Thus, there is evidence that the use of fatal force is related to direct competition between Black and White Americans across US cities. Additionally, four models provide evidence supporting ethnic competition theory arguments around immigration. Specifically, Models 2 through 5 indicate that cities with higher levels of immigration also exhibit a greater likelihood for fatal police shootings of Black Americans to occur. As such, this finding lends some support to a version of ethnic competition theory arguments suggesting that the salience of race and economic competition are heightened in the face of large immigrant populations resulting in the powerful racial group organizing resources on their behalf (Olzak, 1992). However, it appears that Black Americans experience the brunt of this added threat supporting claims that it is the least powerful group that faces the most violence when competition arises (Olzak, 1992).

Second, across the models there is consistent support for racial threat arguments when examining both the size of the Black population and the curvilinear relationship. Cities with larger Black populations are more likely to also have a higher prevalence of fatal police shootings. However, once the Black population is substantially large, the relationship with police shootings becomes negative and significant. Thus, in support of the *economic threat hypothesis*, once the Black population is large enough, the police shootings of this population become less

prevalent across cities. Notably, ethnic competition and racial threat, both linearly and curvilinearly, appear to be associated with police shootings of Black Americans even when considering the historical context of cities and the counties these cities are located within (Models 4 and 5).

Table 9 Poisson Regressions Examining Ethnic Competition and Racial Threat Arguments Regarding Police Shootings of Black Americans in US Cities (N=641)[a,b]

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Racial Threat					
Black Population (%)		1.030*** (0.006)	1.092*** (0.014)	1.027*** (0.007)	1.088*** (0.016)
Black Population $(\%)^2$			0.999 *** (0.000)		0.999*** (0.000)
Ethnic Competition					
Black Gains Index	1.019*** (0.005)	0.9997 (0.014)	1.012*** (0.003)	1.004 (0.011)	1.013*** (0.003)
Immigration (%)	0.995 (0.008)	1.034** (0.010)	1.027** (0.009)	1.029** (0.010)	1.026** (0.010)
Legacy Effects					
Lynching				1.290 (0.267)	1.020 (0.197)
Black Resistance				1.494** (0.187)	1.189 (0.146)
Control Variables					
Disadvantage Index	1.032** (0.011)	0.995 (0.012)	1.005 (0.010)	0.997 (0.012)	1.005 (0.010)
Gini Index	26.407† (45.821)	3.198 (5.207)	1.340 (1.957)	0.423 (0.765)	0.693 (1.205)
Black Stability (%)	1.030** (0.010)	1.008 (0.009)	0.996 (0.009)	1.002 (0.009)	0.995 (0.009)
Male Divorced (%)	1.114 (0.081)	1.255** (0.105)	1.221* (0.098)	1.257** (0.106)	1.219* (0.096)

Table 9 *Continued*

Control Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.021† (0.012)	1.034** (0.013)	1.019† (0.012)	1.033** (0.013)	1.019† (0.012)
Violent Crime Rate	1.000* (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)
West	0.491*** (0.072)	0.840 (0.155)	1.262 (0.255)	0.901 (0.164)	1.210 (0.240)
Midwest	0.791 (0.154)	1.093 (0.236)	1.087 (0.187)	1.154 (0.216)	1.059 (0.173)
Northeast	0.313*** (0.095)	0.497* (0.153)	0.489* (0.138)	0.631 (0.204)	0.492* (0.148)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics					
Log pseudolikelihood	-270.863	-261.888	-252.591	-259.429	-252.254
Pseudo R^2	0.134	0.163	0.192	0.171	0.193
BIC	619.282	607.795	595.664	615.803	607.917
VIF Range	1.18, 1.82	1.26, 2.70	1.26, 12.83	1.26, 3.04	1.26, 15.33

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors).
b. These regression models are offset by the total population (logged) of the cities.

Third, though the history of past lynchings has had a significant relationship with other criminal justice outcomes, this history is not significant in these full city models though the relationship is positive (Models 4 and 5). On the other hand, cities with a history of at least one act of Black resistance are more likely to have contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans as shown in Model 4. Thus, it appears that something about this history continues to be associated with violent

policing practices, which supports the findings from Cunningham and Gillezeau (2019). However, when considering the curvilinear threat hypothesis, this finding becomes nonsignificant in Model 5. Thus, contemporary estimates capturing racial threat may be more important than historical context regarding police shootings of Black Americans across the full sample of cities.

There are also notable findings across the models of Table 4 when examining the control variables. First, contemporary racial threat appears to be more important in the models than the *Disadvantage Index* that was only significant in Model 1. Second, contrary to previous research (Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998), the *Gini Index* appears to be unrelated to police shootings. Third, the measure of residential stability among Black Americans is largely nonsignificant and unrelated to police shootings when considering all the theoretically relevant predictors. Fourth, there is some evidence suggesting that cities with larger populations between the ages of 15 to 29 have more police shootings of Black Americans; however, the significance of this finding is not consistent. Fifth, contrary to expectations, the violent crime rate of a city does not appear to be associated with higher levels of police shootings. Sixth, cities with more family disruption have more police shootings today, which is fairly consistent across models. Finally, of the regions considered, the Northeast has the most consistent relationship with police shootings. Specifically, relative to the South, police shootings are less prevalent in the Northeast.

Comparing Cities in the South and non-South

To begin the discussion of the results split between South and non-South cities in Table 10, I will first detail the findings from ethnic competition and racial threat theory. Like the results from Table 9, there is mixed support for ethnic competition arguments across the South and non-South models. Specifically, the *Black Gains Index* had a positive and significant relationship with fatal police shootings in both South and non-South models when all theoretically relevant variables were included in Models 2 and 4, which supports competition theory. On the other hand, immigration only reached significance in the Southern models, suggesting that cities in the South with large immigrant populations are more likely to have a higher prevalence of fatal shootings of Black Americans. Notably, there are no significant differences between these two ethnic competition predictors when comparing the South and non-South models.

Further, as with the full city sample, the results of Table 10 show relatively consistent results regarding the linear and curvilinear hypotheses from racial threat theory. That is, the size of the Black population has a positive and significant relationship with fatal police shootings of Black Americans regardless of whether the city is in the South or non-South. Though there is some variation in the linear effect sizes being slightly larger in the non-South models, the differences between South and non-South models are only significantly difference when comparing Models 2 and 4 based on Z-value calculations (see Table 11). On the other hand, when considering Blalock's curvilinear hypothesis, once the size of the Black population reaches a large enough threshold, this variable's relationship with fatal police shootings becomes

negative and significant supporting the *economic threat hypothesis* regardless of city location in the South or non-South.

Looking at the legacies of racial violence there are notable findings. First, in the South, neither of the historical legacies considered are significantly associated with contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans. The lack of support for a legacy of lynching is surprising given the prevalence of lynching in this region and the past research suggesting a legacy of lynching effect being associated with other forms of violence (i.e., White-on-Black homicides) and criminal justice outcomes in the South (i.e., hate crime enforcement) (King et al., 2009; Messner et al., 2005; Petersen & Ward, 2015). However, the lack of significance regarding Black resistance from the 1960s and 1970s may not be as unexpected since some research has shown that the protests of this era were more likely to occur in cities outside of the South, at least initially (Spilerman, 1970b; Spilerman, 1971). In contrast, both historical contexts are positive and at least approach significance in the models of non-South cities despite the inclusion of racial threat estimates and other estimates of contemporary city conditions (Models 3 and 4 of Table 10). Regarding lynching, non-South cities that are in counties that had at least one lynching of a Black American had a greater likelihood of fatal police shootings of Black Americans in recent years—though this finding only approaches significance.[50] However, the Z-score calculations suggest that the results

[50] Notably, the legacy of lynching is positive with larger effect sizes and is more strongly significant in the non-South models when the additional regional variables—Midwest and West—are not controlled for. These results can be seen in Appendix C.

between regions are not significantly different (Table 11). On the other hand, the history of Black resistance indicates that non-South cities that had at least one act of resistance are more likely to have contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans. This finding expands on recent scholarship (Cunningham & Gillezeau, 2019) and suggests an even longer-term history of resistance exists pertaining to the use of lethal force, especially against Black Americans. This relationship is significantly different between the regions (Models 1 and 3) as suggested by the Z-value results (Table 11).

Table 10 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of Black Americans in US Cities Separated by Region[a,b]

	South (N=177)		Non-South (N=464)	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Racial Threat				
Black Population (%)	1.021** (0.008)	1.050** (0.017)	1.040** (0.014)	1.124*** (0.018)
Black Population (%)^2		0.9996* (0.000)		0.999*** (0.000)
Ethnic Competition				
Black Gains Index	1.023 (0.020)	1.044* (0.021)	0.995 (0.018)	1.012** (0.004)
Immigration (%)	1.026* (0.012)	1.023* (0.012)	1.017 (0.020)	1.007 (0.017)
Legacy Effects				
Lynching	1.098 (0.390)	0.903 (0.336)	1.524†[c] (0.334)	1.146 (0.224)
Black Resistance	1.203 (0.228)	1.163 (0.220)	2.377*** (0.524)	1.762** (0.343)
Control Variables				
Disadvantage Index	0.995 (0.018)	1.018 (0.021)	0.990 (0.017)	0.993 (0.013)

Table 10 *Continued*

	South (N=177)		Non-South (N=464)	
Control Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
Gini Index	0.622 (1.143)	0.153 (0.309)	0.013 (0.037)	0.074 (0.213)
Black Stability (%)	1.014 (0.015)	1.008 (0.014)	0.990 (0.015)	0.975† (0.013)
Male Divorced (%)	1.281** (0.103)	1.265** (0.101)	1.266 (0.247)	1.202 (0.167)
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.032* (0.016)	1.022 (0.016)	1.049* (0.024)	1.033 (0.023)
Violent Crime Rate	1.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)	0.9998 (0.001)	0.9997 (0.000)
Deep South	0.952 (0.178)	0.9996 (0.186)		
Midwest			1.381 (0.407)	1.651* (0.344)
West			1.511 (0.492)	3.060*** (0.901)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics				
Log pseudolikelihood	-107.438	-106.884	-148.489	-140.250
Pseudo R^2	0.126	0.131	0.171	0.217
BIC	282.166	286.233	382.936	372.599
VIF Range	1.21, 6.21	1.22, 24.86	1.21, 2.75	1.21, 13.07

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors).
b. These regression models are offset by the total population (logged) of the cities.
c. The p-value of this variable falls just outside of the 0.05 level of significance with a value of 0.055.

Moving onto the control variables across the South and non-South, as with the full city models, the *Disadvantage Index* and *Gini Index* continue to be nonsignificant predictors of police shootings regardless of regional variation, at least when

controlling for racial threat, historical legacies, and the other predictors simultaneously. Residential stability among Black Americans shows little significant relationship with fatal police shootings and is even in the negative direction in the non-South models suggesting that where there is more stability in non-South cities there are fewer police shootings. While family disruption across cities remains positive in both the South and non-South, it is only significant in the South. Similarly, the age structure has a positive relationship with police shootings regardless of regional variants; however, the significance is not consistent across models. Finally, the violent crime rate is positive and significant in the Southern models (Models 1 and 2 of Table 10) while it is negative and nonsignificant outside this region. Scholarship has suggested that the South has a unique history of violence and cultural values conducive to violence; thus, this finding may be a result of similar arguments (Ayers, 1989, 1991; Bailey, 2003; Baller, Zevenbergen, & Messner, 2009; Ellison, 1991; Messner, 1983; Nisbett, 1993; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967).

Table 11 Comparing Coefficient Differences Between the South and non-South Models of Table 10 Using Z-value Calculations

	Comparing Models 1 & 3	**Comparing Models 2 & 4**
Black Population (%)	-1.178	-2.989*
Black Gains Index	1.041	1.497
Immigration	0.386	0.769
Lynching	-0.830	-0.602
Black Resistance	-2.054*	-1.470
Note: Significant differences are indicated by Z-values that are greater than ± 1.96 (*).		

Discussion

Existing evidence suggests that there is a legacy of lynching that continues to inform race relations today; however, there have been notable limitations in this research. This study is an attempt to address these limitations and offer an extension of this area of research by considering the legacy of lynching nationally as well as how this legacy may be related to the use of fatal force by police. In addition to the history of lynching, I also incorporated another historical period of racial tension that may also influence the use of fatal force today. That is, I examined whether acts of Black resistance during the 1960s and early 1970s have a direct legacy relationship with police violence and whether this relationship interacted with the legacy of lynching and its relationship with the use of lethal force by police in some way. However, while the past has set the stage for America's racial divide, this division is also the product of contemporary practices and policies, including a criminal justice system that disproportionately targets Black lives (Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014). As Embrick (2015) noted about police killings,

> "The murder of brown and black bodies and the frequencies in which they take place are not outlier accidental situations… Rather, these murders point to the systemic and racialized ways in which murdering brown and black bodies have become normative practice in US society" (p. 837).

Thus, the current study is important as it pertains to the study of lethal force more generally as well, especially given the lack of attention these killings have received empirically until recent years.

Two findings from this study are worth re-highlighting here. First, racial threat theory continues to be a relevant framework to use when studying the use of lethal force by police against Black Americans. In this analysis, the size of the Black population was a consistently significant predictor of police shootings in the positive direction. Thus, cities with large Black populations have a higher prevalence of Black persons killed in police shootings regardless of regional boundaries as indicated by the models considering Southern and non-Southern cities separately. In addition, the curvilinear threat effect existed in the full city models supporting Blalock's *economic threat hypothesis* that once the Black population reached a threshold the relationship became negative. Second, this study found evidence that acts of racial violence and resistance of the past have created legacies that inform contemporary police shootings of Black Americans today. However, there were regional differences for these legacy effects. Specifically, it appears that both the legacy of Black resistance and, to a less significant extent, the legacy of lynching are only related to police shootings in non-South cities. Of particular interest is the lack of a legacy effect for past lynchings in the South, which is surprising since lynching was so prevalent in the South. Why may this be the case?

One reason for regional differences could be the dramatic change in the racial landscape of cities outside of the South during the Great Migration, which likely brought social conditions favorable to lynching and racial violence to other parts of the country (Ayers, 1984). With this mass migration, the Black population in the US became increasingly Northern and urban and, though Black Americans were often

fleeing the South in response to mob violence and other injustices, they were met with similar hostile conditions in their new settings (Tolnay, 2003; Tolnay & Beck, 1990, 1992). In fact, Muller (2012) found that the northward migration of non-Whites (1880-1950) was related to increasing non-White prison populations while the incarceration rate among Whites did not increase in a similar manner during this period. Thus, the growth of the Black population in Northern spaces led to violent conditions and forms of social control not unlike those in the South (Muller, 2012). For this reason, it could be that the shock of this migration radically altered the racial landscape and impacted the institutions of non-South cities, including the police and how they operated. In the face of the growing Black population in urban centers in the North (and elsewhere) coupled with the criminalization of this migrant group, the police become one of the state agencies used to uphold racial boundaries and ensure racial control (Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Muhammad, 2011; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Vitale, 2017). Thus, police were central to the picture of racial control in non-South cities, which may explain why the historical legacies are more pronounced outside of the South, especially since police often took the side of White rioters in Northern cities early in the twentieth century (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Further, tensions between police and Black civilians only continued through the century as the collective acts of resistance during the 1960s-1970s showcase (Blauner, 2001; Sugrue, 2008). Thus, an ethos of racial control that formed within policing after the Great Migration continues to this day in non-South cities and the response to the Black resistance may have further exacerbated this ethos resulting in more aggressive policing, including the use of lethal force.

Additionally, since the South had a large Black population and various institutions and informal/extra-legal violent means of racialized social control already present (e.g., lynching, death penalty, convict leasing/incarceration), the formalized police force may not have been as central to this equation. Therefore, the legacy of past lynchings may not be as closely tied to contemporary policing practices in this region. The lack of a relationship between past lynchings and contemporary police shootings in the South could also be the degree to which lynching was a rural phenomenon in that region (Olzak, 1990). Since lynching was so closely related to economic conditions around farming and crops (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Christian, 2017), this violence was likely more rural in the South. Because I focused on cities and the counties they are situated in, the full scope of Southern lynching is likely missing from this analysis. However, since Black migrants often sought urban centers when they left the South, it stands to reason that the violence of lynching may have been more prevalent in the non-South counties containing the cities under study here.

On the other hand, the most basic explanation for why there is not a legacy of lynching in the South regarding contemporary police shootings could be the prevalence of lynching in this region and the general "culture of violence" that was prevalent. Both legal and extralegal forms of Southern "justice" were characteristically lethal, especially towards Black Americans (Massey & Myers, 1989). Due to how widespread lynching was in this region, it could be that this historical context is not a "unique" predictor of fatal police shootings today—at least in quantitative methodological terms. While this relationship does not appear in quantitative analyses

of contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans, this does not mean that the history of lynching should be ignored regarding policing in the South. Other studies have shown that a legacy of lynching exists and continues to influence trends in other prominent forms of state violence and social control (Jacobs et al., 2005; Jacobs et al., 2012). Further, given the prevalence of other forms of control in the South—lethal and otherwise—there are other historical factors in play that may play a role in explaining fatal police shootings of Black Americans in this region. That is, there may be other histories that can better help us understand the absence of a relationship between the legacy of lynching and contemporary police shootings.

The "culture of violence" and notions around *honor* that were prevalent throughout the South are worth further discussion (Ayers, 1991; Bailey, 2003; Nisbett, 1993; Pomerantz et al., 2021). The development of the criminal justice system, including policing, was closely tied to popular justice and the influence of public opinion (Walker, 1980). In fact, Pfeifer (2004) suggests that police brutality and the excessive use of force was racially motivated and subsumed some of the characteristics of *rough justice* exhibited in vigilantism and lynching. Additionally, the public has often been supportive of and condoned violent and brutal policing tactics, especially when dealing with already marginalized populations (Walker, 1980). This is also seen when individuals approve notions of honor in ways that sanction police violence since the police are seen as imbued with the "cultural values of honor" (Pomerantz et al., 2021). Specifically, Pomerantz et al. (2021) found that "honor endorsement may contribute to regional police violence rates… as well as individual-

level perceptions of police violence" (Pomerantz et al., 2021, p. 13). Specifically, the honor status of states is significantly associated with police shooting incidents resulting in regional variations while individuals who endorse honor are "more approving of police violence when they perceived it to be in the purpose of honor defense, and that this relationship was a function of the belief that the police reflect the cultural values of honor" (Pomerantz et al., 2021, p. 14).

Overall, future research should continue to examine these relationships and work to better specify the processes connecting the legacy of lynching and legacy of racial resistance to contemporary police shootings across regional specifications. For instance, future studies could model the migratory patterns of Black Americans from the South to other parts of the country in an attempt to better understand the processes linking legacies of racial violence and resistance, the possible transmission of the "culture of violence" outside of the South, and racialized patterns of control like fatal police shootings. Further, besides the legacies of lynching and Black resistance, additional research has suggested a similar legacy of slavery effect. For example, this legacy has been considered as it relates to political affiliation and attitudes, racial resentment, and voter turnout in the South (Acharya, Blackwell, & Sen, 2015, 2016). Thus, this historical context should also be examined further as it may be related to lynching, racial resistance, lethal force, and a myriad of other social phenomena that followed the end of slavery (see Christian's [2017] study that included an estimate of slavery as it related to later lynchings). As Ayers (1991) wrote,

> "It was slavery that put violence and coercion behind moneymaking, that joined all white people in the domination of all black people. It was slavery that sealed off large parts of the South from the power of law, as slaveowners took the punishment of their slaves into their own hands" (p. 106).

Besides these directions for future research not addressed in this analysis, the current study does have limitations as well. For example, it offers only a snapshot of the police killings that have occurred in the US throughout history. Because I chose to use an alternative database to official data on police killings, I was only able to include a small span of years of this violence. Thus, despite the problems with official records, it may be fruitful to use one of these databases to capture lethal policing for a longer timeframe, but these findings would have their own limitations as well. Additionally, I do not account for other historical forms of violence and control or the protests that have been happening in recent years; thus, research should continue to explore these contexts and their potential relationships to fatal force today.

In sum, the institution of policing and contemporary justice issues associated with the police cannot be viewed separate from the historical context of past racial injustices (Williams & Murphy, 1990). This chapter examined contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans through the theoretical frameworks of ethnic competition and racial threat. Besides this focus, I also build on the legacy of lynching literature by examining it in relation to police shootings nationwide while also accounting for acts of racial resistance committed by Black Americans that occurred in cities throughout the US. Despite past research suggesting mediating processes of factors that occurred after the era of lynching and before the contemporary phenomena

considered (Gabriel & Tolnay, 2017; Petersen & Ward, 2015), the findings of this study suggest independent associations for both legacies as they pertain to contemporary police shootings. However, these relationships are dependent on the regions under study. Research needs to continue to explore the historical influence of past racial violence and resistance on contemporary justice issues since "to achieve transformative change rather than another round of weak police reform, it is vital that we confront specific local histories and legacies of White supremacy in policing" (Ward, 2018, p. 171).

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The use of fatal force by police has been one of the most visible social and racial justice issues in the United States, especially in the last several years. In 2014, the nation witnessed a series of mass protests throughout several cities in response to the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, as well as the killings of Tamir Rice (Cleveland, OH), Eric Garner (New York City, NY), and Laquan McDonald (Chicago, IL) to name a few. In response to these killings and the public outcry, the United States Department of Justice [DOJ] (2017) released a series of reports on policing and police killings in several cities and offered ideas for reforming the police to address these issues. However, despite reformation suggestions from the DOJ, police killings continue to make headlines and yearly trends in the use of fatal force have not shifted much nationally (for example, see *Mapping Police Violence*, 2021: https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/). In 2020, we once again saw mass protests and calls to "defund the police" or even for police abolition after the killings of George Floyd (Minneapolis, MN), Breonna Taylor (Louisville, KY), and others by police. In 2021, headlines have brought attention back to the use of fatal force as the trials of the officer(s) involved in the killing of George Floyd proceed and with the killings of Adam Toledo (Chicago, IL) and Ma'Khia Bryant (Columbus, OH).

As the cases noted above indicate, police violence continues to be a national problem and the use of fatal force is not limited to just one location or region in this country. However, while incidents showcasing the use of fatal force by police have received a lot of attention in recent years, the police have been tied to racialized practices and issues around race relations throughout US history. This history can be illustrated in several key manners. First, the foundations of policing are tied to slave patrols, at least in part, and the explicit control of racially and ethnically marginalized peoples that came with that control (Du Bois, 2012[1903]; Hadden, 2001; Hinton & Cook, 2020; Williams & Murphy, 1990; Vitale, 2017). Second, law enforcement officers were sometimes active or passive participants in lynchings and the race riots targeting Black people and communities throughout the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Buckser, 1992; Feagin, 1987; Raper, 2003[1933]; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Teague, 2018; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Walker, 1980; Ward, 2018). Third, tensions between the police and Black communities persisted throughout the twentieth century and confrontations between them often preceded the acts of Black resistance that occurred prominently during the 1960s and early 1970s (Blauner, 2001; Levy, 2018; Sugrue, 2008; Williams & Murphy, 1990). The violence of police during the twentieth century also spurred an appeal to the United Nations charging the US with genocidal crimes against Black Americans—with police killings being among the key offenses being committed as illustrated by cases where Black people were killed in jails and police stations or on city streets (Patterson, 1951).

The fields of criminology and criminal justices have largely neglected this history and the ways that the past may help us to better understand current trends in violence and social control. In contest to this oversight, I believe that, given this history and the ways policing and racial injustice have been so closely intertwined from past to present, we must empirically examine racialized practices of the past, their legacies, and the resulting ways that they have been institutionalized in the criminal justice system, especially policing. As such, my dissertation attempts to address contemporary police violence through a race-focused and historical lens. Three major questions guided my project's development and the analytical chapters of my dissertation. First, I asked whether lynchings of Black Americans resulted from similar social conditions nationwide. The second question was, are modern-day police shootings reflective of past race relations through a legacy of lynching? Finally, I asked whether and how the racial resistance of the 1960s and 1970s—a midpoint between the lynching era and fatal police shootings considered—may be related to the legacy of lynching and/or fatal police shootings today. I provided answers to these questions in the previous chapters, but I will summarize the major points here next. In these concluding thoughts, I also provide a discussion of what these findings mean within the context of police violence research and what they mean for addressing contemporary issues around fatal police shootings.

The National Scope of Lynching

In Chapter 3, lynchings were examined as a national phenomenon not just a Southern one given recent data collection efforts that made this a possible line of inquiry at units of analysis smaller than the state-level (see Seguin and Rigby's [2019] article discussing their collection of lynching data that moved beyond the boundaries of Tolnay and Beck's [1995] Southern inventory). Lynching was a violent tactic of social control that also served as a symbolic act of terror and race making that helped to restore and maintain White supremacy and the economic and political dominance of White Americans after the emancipation of the Black population (Brundage, 1993; Cox, 1945; Dollard, 1957[1937]; Hill, 2016; Smångs, 2017; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). As such, the lynch mob became a comfort to White America since lynching was said to offer protection from threats to the social order and this violence was often justified in the name of "safety" from Black Americans who came to be stereotyped as innately violent and criminal (Dollard, 1957[1937]; Raper, 2003[1933]; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). While the South did have a particularly unique history of lynching Black Americans, this collective violence was perpetrated across the US and often was racially motivated elsewhere (Pfeifer, 2004, 2013; Raper, 2003[1933]; Seguin & Rigby, 2019). In fact, it has been argued that the motivations for and attitudes favorable to lynching existed everywhere in the US (Cox, 1945).

One reason for these motivations beyond the South may have been related to the mass migration of Black Americans that took place in the early twentieth century where the geographic profile of the Black Americans became much more Northern

and urban as a result of this "Great Migration" (Tolnay & Beck, 1992). In response to the growing Black population in spaces outside of the South were violent conditions and forms of social control similar to those present in the Southern region (Muller, 2012). Thus, Black migrants—who were likely leaving the South due to experiences with racial discrimination and mob violence—were often met with hostile conditions like those they were fleeing (Tolnay, 2003; Tolnay & Beck, 1990, 1992). For this reason, the practice of lynching outside of the South may have been the result of similar conditions that led to Southern lynchings (Ayers, 1984): the presence of a growing Black population that was in direct competition with other racial groups (i.e., White Americans) over economic resources and political power. This prompted me to ask the following question:

1. *Was the lynching of Black Americans the result of similar socio-structural conditions nationwide or were there regional distinctions?*

The first point to note is that lynching was a nationwide phenomenon that occurred in nearly every state though there were still regional distinctions in the prevalence of this violence. That said, the second major finding of note is that my examination of lynching offered some support for arguments about lynching being the result of similar conditions in South and non-South counties—at least for lynchings that occurred from 1900 to 1929. Most notably were the findings regarding racial threat and those regarding the likelihood of lynchings to take place in the same places over time. Consistent with Blalock's (1967) arguments about racial threat, the size of a county's Black population was a positive and significant predictor of the likelihood for

lynching's to occur in that county. This finding was consistent regardless of regional specification. That is, South and non-South counties alike had a greater likelihood of lynching dependent on the size of the Black population in a given county though this linear relationship appears stronger outside of the South. This finding supports claims that non-South lynchings were directly associated with the growth of the migrant Black population due to the Great Migration (Ayers, 1984; Baker, 1964[1908]; Pfeifer, 2013; Raper, 2003[1933]).

Besides the linear threat results, I also found support for Blalock's curvilinear hypothesis. Specifically, consistent with Blalock's arguments about *economic threat*, counties with Black populations that exceeded a tipping point were less likely to exhibit a high prevalence of lynching. Again, this finding was not dependent on region. On the other hand, the *Cheap Labor Threat* estimate based on ethnic competition arguments was less significantly associated with lynching outside of the South though the relationship was more consistently positive between the two in non-South counties. Overall, though, ethnic competition arguments were not well supported in the models of lynching regardless of region, which may be a result of limitations in the Census variables available to assess these arguments during the early twentieth century. As for the pattern of lynching, I consistently found that lynchings of Black Americans were more likely to occur in counties that had a prior history of Black lynchings. This was the case nationally and supports arguments about prior lynchings showing a proneness to anti-Black violence in the history of a given county

and having a tendency to recur in the same places over time (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Williamson, 1986).

Legacies of Racial Violence and Police Shootings

Moving on to Chapter 4, I explored both questions two and three regarding the legacy of lynching's potential relationship to contemporary police shootings and how Black resistance of the 1960s-1970s may fit into this historical picture. While researchers have examined the legacy of lynching in relation to several forms of violence and justice issues in more recent decades (e.g., Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005; Jacobs, Malone, & Iles, 2012; King, Messner, & Baller, 2009; Petersen & Ward, 2015), quantitative studies had not yet directly examined this historical context as it may relate to police violence. Thus, one of my goals for this dissertation was to address this oversight in the literature. As noted earlier, law enforcement groups and the institution of policing have had a long history of reinforcing racial and class hierarchies in the US, from colonial times to slavery, and to this day even (Brown, 2019; Harring, 2017[1983]; Hinton & Cook, 2020; Steinmetz, Schaefer, & Henderson 2016; Vitale, 2017; Williams & Murphy, 1990). Further, it has been argued that police killings of Black Americans reinforce White supremacy in manners reminiscent of lynching (Chaney & Robertson, 2015) and that White supremacy is embedded in the institution of policing itself (Ward, 2018). As such, it is not about individual officers and their actions; rather, it is the institution of policing that has defended class and race boundaries throughout history and, in doing so, it is an institution that supports

the existing racial hierarchy. Given the historical foundations of policing and the White supremacy built into this institution, it stands to reason that there may be a legacy effect of past lynchings that continues to inform the way policing is practiced today—especially regarding the use of fatal force by police. Specifically, the racial socialization mechanisms enforced by lynching, the cultural norms that were informed by and allowed for this violence, and the criminalization of Blackness that justified lynching in the past may continue to inform justifications for violence and discriminatory policing practices more contemporarily. Thus, I asked the following question:

2. *Are modern-day police shootings reflective of past race relations through the legacy of lynching?*

I found some support for a relationship between past lynchings and contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans in the analysis presented in Chapter 4. However, there were several caveats to these results. First, in models examining cities across the entire US, there was no significant relationship between the legacy of lynching and fatal police shootings. Second, even though lynchings of Black Americans were much more prevalent in the South, the legacy of lynching remained nonsignificant in models limited to just Southern cities. On the other hand, there was a near significant legacy of lynching effect on police shootings of Black Americans in non-South cities. Thus, it appears than an ethos of racialized social control that started with lynching in the non-South continues to be enforced by the police through fatal shootings of Black Americans. As such, fatal police shootings do

appear to reflect past race relations but only outside of the Southern US. But what about the period of racial resistance that occurred during the 1960s and early-1970s? Specifically, I asked:

3. *How do acts of Black Resistance that occurred between the era of lynching and the contemporary police shootings examined here factor into this history?*

Acts of Black resistance during the timeframe examined were characterized according to several criteria: Black aggression, the inclusion of property destruction or interpersonal violence, the involvement of at least 30 participants, and they had to occur outside of a school setting or the immediate context of organized civil rights demonstrations (Carter, 1986). Conditions leading to these acts of resistance included experiences with discrimination, racial inequality, and, oftentimes, violations committed by one race group against another—usually some type of confrontation where a Black person or community was deeply wronged (Baskin et al., 1971; Blauner, 2001; Hinton, 2015; Lieberson & Silverman, 1965; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [a.k.a. Kerner Commission], 1968). Specifically, confrontations and conflict with the police, who were seen as a White-dominated institution, often preceded racial resistance during this time (Blauner, 2001; Sugrue, 2008; Walker, 1980). Further, acts of Black resistance often involved destruction directed at institutions that symbolized Whiteness and racial inequality (Sugrue, 2008). Since Black resistance resulted from experiences with discrimination and inequality, it is possible that places with a history of lynchings may have been primed

for collective protests on the part of Black Americans; thus, the prevalence of resistance may have been associated with a history of lynching. Further, Black protests at this time may have created their own legacy effect on how policing is carried out today. In the wake of this resistance, instead of addressing the underlying issues of racism and inequality, the US saw calls for "law and order" and the margining of anticrime and poverty policies, growth in police forces, and rising political conservativism leading to mass incarceration and the carceral state of today (Anderson, 2016; Hinton, 2015; Levy, 2018). As a result, it is possible that the history of Black collective protesting during the 1960s-1970s may have had a lasting impact on policing. Cunningham and Gillezeau's (2019) recent study offered some support for this possibility, and I extended on their analysis by considering the longer-termed impact of this history on fatal police shootings.

Despite the possibility that the history of lynching would influence the prevalence of the Black resistance examined, the models presented in the analysis did not suggest they were associated with each other. Thus, the historical contexts of lynching and Black resistance appear to have independent relationships with contemporary fatal police shootings of Black Americans. Though there is some support suggesting acts of Black resistance have had a lasting impact on policing practices, there are caveats similar to those noted regarding the relationship between lynching and police shootings. There is some evidence that cities with a history of Black resistance have a greater likelihood of fatal police shootings of Black Americans today nationwide. However, when separating the cities into South and non-

South models, the history of this resistance only remains positively associated with police shootings in cities outside of the South. The relationship is nonsignificant in the Southern city models. Thus, it appears that these acts of protest and resistance continue to inform policing to some degree offering further support to Cunningham and Gillezeau's (2019) findings—at least outside of the South.

Besides answering questions 2 and 3 above, my analysis in Chapter 4 uncovered other notable results related to racial threat and ethnic competition. First, racial threat (i.e., Black population size) and ethnic competition (i.e., *Black Gains Index*, immigration) were consistently associated with fatal police shootings in the positive direction across most models examining the nationwide sample of cities. Notably, once the cities were limited to South and non-South samples, the results changed in some ways but remained consistent in others. For instance, racial threat was positive and significantly associated with police shootings regardless of region consistent with both of Blalock's (1967) linear and curvilinear hypotheses. However, the linear effect sizes were larger in the non-South models and were significantly different from the Southern results suggesting racial threat is a stronger predictor of fatal shootings outside of the South. That said, racial threat is strongly and consistently associated with fatal police shootings today. Turning to ethnic competition arguments by region, I found that the *Black Gains Index* was positively associated with fatal police shootings in the South and non-South for the most part. Further, cities with larger immigrant populations were also more likely to experience fatal police shootings, but only within the South. Thus, there is some support for Olzak's (1992)

arguments about immigration increasing competition but not necessarily being the group that experiences the violence and social control efforts that result from this competition. Overall, ethnic competition arguments appear to garner more support today regarding police shootings nationwide in comparison to the models of lynching presented in Chapter 3. Thus, the literature on contemporary police shootings and the use of force more generally must expand on the theoretical frameworks they use to account for more than just the size of the Black population as many studies have done in the past. The following section of this chapter offers a few key directions for future studies of lynching and the legacy of this violence and racial resistance as well as a brief discussion of what the findings of my dissertation may mean for policy.

Moving Forward

Racial Threat & Ethnic Competition

Racial threat and ethnic competition theory have been developed with the goal of explaining racial conflict throughout history. Both rely on arguments around competition over economic resources and political power, and how this leads to the dominant racial/ethnic group enacting discriminatory practices and sometimes violence to maintain their position in society (Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992). Additionally, both suffer from limitations and have shortcomings in how they have been tested in previous studies (see Chapter 2). Here, I tried to overcome some of these shortcomings by incorporating multiple measures of threat/competition in the same models instead of just relying on estimates of the Black population size.

However, in doing so, I found that racial threat (i.e., Black population) was the strongest and most consistent predictor of racialized violence past (i.e., lynching) and present (i.e., fatal police shootings). On the other hand, ethnic competition estimates did not support the theory's arguments as consistently in Chapters 3, which could be a product of limitations in the measures used to capture competition. For example, the race-specific competition variables in Chapter 3 were restricted to estimates of tenant farm labor and farm ownership based on the data available from the Census in 1900, 1910, and 1920. On the other hand, ethnic competition estimates relying on more comprehensive Census measures were more consistently associated with fatal police shootings today as shown in Chapter 4. As such, future research on racial violence, past and present, should continue to use threat and competition frameworks and explore other ways of measuring their theoretical arguments. For example, politically focused variables may help to further explain the prevalence of lynching and fatal police shootings across counties and cities in the US (see Tolnay and Beck [1995] and Gray and Parker [2020] for discussions of political measures in relation to lynching and contemporary police shootings, respectively).

The Great Migration

Given the regional results discussed above, future research should continue to consider lynching and its legacy beyond the South quantitatively since this has largely been missing in the past (Pfeifer, 2013; Seguin & Rigby, 2019). One direction for future research would be to model the changing county/city demographics taking place more directly as a result of the Great Migration. Specifically, it could be that dramatic

changes from the Great Migration brought conditions favorable to lynching and other racialized forms of social control beyond the South (Ayers, 1984). As such, the growth of the Black population in cities outside South coupled with the criminalization of this migrant group, may have led to lynchings and the police becoming one of the main state agencies relied on to uphold racial boundaries and control (Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Muhammad, 2011; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Vitale, 2017; Wacquant, 2001; Williams & Murphy, 1990). Specifically, the continued growth of the Black population in cities of the North and West brought about policing directed at Black communities and, as a result, racism became further interconnected with the operations of the criminal justice system (Walker, 1980).

Thus, the institution of policing and its practices may have been directly shaped by the growing Black population in spaces, especially cities, outside of the South. This population influx brought about a high degree of racial tension as the migrant Black population began to compete directly for resources (e.g., employment, housing, education) and political power (Walker, 1980). Specifically, as the Midwest and Northeast industrialized and Black Americans were recruited or migrated of their own accord to the opportunities in urban centers, interracial interactions and confrontation took on new characteristics (Wilson, 1980[1978]), and the institution of policing was directly related to the industrialization and resulting class conflict of these regions (Harring, 2017[1983]). Further, the social problem blaming, and the criminalization of Blackness influenced responses to Black migration, including the how the policing institution functioned in destination cities (Muhammad, 2011;

Tolnay, 2003; Vitale, 2017). In fact, urban settings have been rife with tensions between Black communities and White officers (Walker, 1980). This tension resulted in lynchings and urban riots where White Americans would attack members of the Black population and police officers, who were virtually an all-White force, would often support or even participate in these violent attacks instead of offering protection to the Black people and communities being victimized (Meier & Rudwick, 1968[1966]; Walker, 1980). Thus, this history may have informed policing practices directly in the non-South in ways not seen in Southern settings. In fact,

> "As early as the 1920s, patterns of police abuse that would be recognizable today contributed to Blacks' growing disillusionment with the police and the supposed freedoms of the North. Police harassment and violence blurred the distinctions between the supposed 'land of hope' in the North and the Jim Crow apartheid of the South" (Taylor, 2016, p. 113-114).

At the time of this migration, the non-South did not have the same sweeping mechanisms of racialized social control that were established in the South with the history of slavery and the responses to emancipation. It was during the Great Migration that racial boundaries were developed and enforced more fully outside of the South (Meier & Rudwick, 1968[1966]). As a result, police may have taken the central role in racial control outside of the South through the enforcement of segregation (Williams & Murphy, 1990) as well as participation in riots (Feagin, 1987; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). In response to the Great Migration, we also saw violence against Black Americans decline in the South, especially regarding lynching, as this region faced threats to its economic structure through the loss of a major portion of its labor force (Anderson, 2016; Tolnay & Beck, 1992).

On the other hand, the North began to accept notions of racial domination that had been prevalent in the South and racial violence, such as race riots targeting Black communities, became more common (Anderson, 2016; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Thus, the police outside of the South may have been more inclined to resort to violent control tactics at the same time the police in the South began to prevent lynchings more frequently—since the entrenchment of White supremacy was already adequately accomplished through violent means and other mechanisms—while also helping to secure a cheap labor force by keeping Black Americans from migrating elsewhere, which was done in ways that included patrolling train stations and destroying the tickets of Black passengers (Anderson, 2016; Griffin, Clark, & Sandberg, 1997). As such, the Great Migration impacted policing outside of the South in unique ways that created a legacy that continues to inform policing functions today. Ultimately, future studies should examine the context of the Great Migration more directly and how the demographic shifts that were brought about by these migration patterns to places outside of the South may have impacted lynching, other racial conflicts, and criminal justice responses at that time (see Muller [2012]). Future studies should also consider the potential legacy impacts of the Great Migration since it is possible that this migration brought lasting cultural shifts to race relations and understandings of violence that may persist to this day in certain pockets of the country as competition over resources continued through the twentieth and into the twenty-first century (Ayers, 1991). To the degree that threat/competition findings are more strongly

associated with violence and control outside of the South today, the historical context of the Great Migration must be considered as a potential explanation.

The Legacies of Slavery and Racial Resistance

Besides the legacy of lynching, scholarship has also begun to consider the legacy of slavery and its relationship to various social phenomena. For example, the legacy of slavery has been examined in relation to political affiliation and attitudes, racial resentment, and voter turnout in the South (Acharya, Blackwell, & Sen, 2015, 2016). This historical context should also be examined in relation to lynching (see Christian [2017] and Rigby and Seguin [2021] for studies incorporating both slavery and lynching histories as predictors), racial resistance, policing practices, and a myriad of other social phenomena in the past and contemporarily. After slavery, there were concerns about keeping the newly emancipated Black population subjugated economically and politically; thus, new forms of racialized control were devised, and the crime control apparatus became one method of accomplishing race control (Adamson, 1983; Vitale, 2017). Thus, besides the prevalence of lynching, there are other institutional practices prominent in the South, historically and today, that may help us understand the lack of relationship between lynching and police shootings in Chapter 4.

Further, as the analysis from Chapter 4 showed, there is some support for a legacy effect regarding the historical context of racial resistance during the 1960s-1970s. These findings extend on Cunningham and Gillezeau's (2019) study showing that police often responded to these Black protests with further violence. Specifically,

protests were directly associated with police killings and, as my analysis indicates, non-South cities with a history of Black resistance continue to have a greater likelihood of fatal police shootings of Black Americans today. In response to these acts of resistance, instead of addressing the underlying conditions of racism and inequality, there were calls for "law and order" that resulted in the merging of anticrime with antipoverty policies, an increase of police presence, and a turn toward political conservativism; all of which gave rise to the wars on crime and drugs, and the rise of mass incarceration and the carceral state (Anderson, 2016; Hinton, 2015; Levy, 2018). Thus, more research should continue to explore the possible legacy of Black resistance empirically as they may relate to other forms of racialized social control today. Ultimately, research should continue to examine the ways that past racial violence, injustices, and resistance efforts (e.g., slavery, lynchings, protests) may continue to inform forms of violence today and how past violence may have been institutionalized in the criminal justice system and how this system functions today. A recent special issue of *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Cunningham, Lee, & Ward, 2021) offers an important development towards the study of these legacies and bringing attention to this area of research.

"Micro" Locales

Future research should also continue to examine lynching and its legacy at more "micro" locales since this violence highly localized phenomenon. For instance, states are too large and internally varied to describe microclimates of racial meaning in a relevant sense (Ward, 2018). Counties tend to be the smallest level of aggregation

examined in the lynching and legacy of lynching literature; however, we should observe lynchings within more micro-level spaces as well. The legacy of lynching and how it informs community memories and contemporary race relations have been successfully examined in single communities (e.g., Madison, 2001; Wolf, 1992). Specifically, contemporary race relations have been shown to be influenced by past lynchings in a rural Tennessee community (Wolf, 1992) and Marion, Indiana (Madison, 2001). Thus, next steps in the legacy of lynching literature should include the examination of more micro locales in this manner. These types of explorations may help us further specify the mechanisms linking past lynchings with contemporary phenomena through latent functions like the *racial socialization* process, *cultural norms,* and *collective memory* processes discussed in Chapter 2.

Limitations in the Measurement of Racial Violence, Past and Present

The US has a long history of poor record keeping when it comes to racial violence, especially violence against Black Americans and especially when the violence is state-sanctioned (Ward, 2016). There have been several attempts throughout history to accurately capture estimates of lynching; thus, only some of the major contributions are mentioned here. First, Ida B. Wells-Barnett provided one of the earliest records of lynching in her *A Red Record,* which she used to lobby for antilynching legislation (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2016). This record was "a watershed moment in the deployment of empirical evidence to document and thus challenge the racial violence of white supremacism" (Ward, 2016, p. 586). Second, the Tuskegee Institute kept a record of lynching that they released as yearly tabulations

from 1882 to 1968 (Dray, 2002). Monroe Work orchestrated the database through newspaper accounts by reworking the records that were kept by the *Chicago Tribune* (Ward, 2016). These records have come to be seen by some as the definitive record of lynching (Dray, 2002) and they have been used in research on the legacy of lynching (e.g., Messner et al., 2006). Third, in competition with the Tuskegee Institute, the NAACP began to collect and distribute their own record of lynchings between 1889-1931 (Ward 2016), which have also been utilized in studies of the legacy of lynching at the state-level (see Durso & Jacobs, 2013; Jacobs et al., 2005; Jacobs et al., 2012). More recently, Tolnay and Beck (1995) constructed their county-level database of lynchings, described in Chapter 3, across Southern states (1882-1930). This database has been widely used in studying lynching and its legacy (for examples, see Jacobs et al., 2005; Messner et al., 2005). Unfortunately, while studying lynching in the South is important, Tolnay and Beck's data does limit our knowledge of lynching elsewhere, which is what led to the development of Seguin and Rigby's (2019) database of lynching outside of the South. In addition, Smångs (2017) detailed modifications he made to Tolnay and Beck's data due to newer sources of information arising.

Overall, the records of lynchings share several limitations. First, many of the records have relied on newspaper reports, which always creates limitations in data collected (Seguin & Rigby, 2019; Ward, 2016). Relying on newspapers meant that records would likely capture lynchings that were most public and that offered the most spectacle (Dray, 2002), and that this meant local news was relied upon to accurately report the correct number and qualitative characteristics of lynchings (Ward, 2016). In

addition, while keeping a record of lynching is important, the records have been limited by only capture lynchings as they came to be formally defined (Ward, 2016) and only incidents "where bodies and supporting evidence were located" (Clarke, 1998, p. 271). This means that other forms of racial violence, which may have been just as important in informing race relations and the legacy of lynching, and killings that involved less than three perpetrators are not accounted for (Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Ward, 2016). For instance, violence against Black Americans between the end of the Civil War and the 1870s terrorism of the KKK has generally been ignored (Clarke, 1998), as have White-led race riots targeting Black Americans and communities as well as past police killings (Dray, 2002; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Adding to this problem, the competition between records led to conflict and confusion over the definition and count of lynchings (Ward, 2016). Thus, the comprehensiveness of lynching data may be flawed (Dray, 2002) and there is likely underestimation of historical racial violence in general (Clarke, 1998).

Regrettably, our society's collection of data on racial violence has not improved much over the years. There have been serious limitations in police violence data, especially the use of force by police, lethal or otherwise (Fyfe, 2002). However, despite limitations in data on police killings we still know more about them than nonlethal injuries inflicted by police (Zimring, 2017). Estimates of police killings have commonly been examined through the FBI's Supplemental Homicide Reports; however, the SHR consistently reports only a portion—about half—the number of killings reported by other "unofficial" databases (Fyfe, 2002; Zimring, 2017). The

problems with the SHR include not all departments reporting this information since it is voluntary, and no one auditing the accuracy of the data that is reported (Zimring, 2017). Due to these limitations, alternative databases have been constructed, including media databases, that provide more comprehensive estimates of police killings than leading "official" records (Zimring, 2017).

Limitations with lynching data are not dissimilar from the limitations we see in police violence data today. First, there are problems with defining policing killings, which exist in the SHR and media databases. For example, Zimring (2017) discusses the problems with how the SHR defines police killings, which are referred to as "justifiable homicides." This language suggests all killings are legally justified and offers police protection from blame by implying this (Zimring, 2017). In addition, two of the most prominent media databases rely on different definitions with the *Washington Post* (2015-present) only reporting on lethal police shootings, while *The Guardian* (2015-2016) and *Mapping Police Violence* capture all police killings (e.g., shootings, taser). While the focus on just shootings has been justified on the grounds of these acts indicating the most intent to cause lethal harm, Zimring (2017) argues the need to collect data on all killings. Finally, these media outlets also have a possibility of underreporting police killings if they never make the news (Zimring, 2017).

To paraphrase Butler (2017), what data a society collects is revealing of its values; we rightfully know how many police officers die in the line of duty, but not how many civilians are killed by police. We continue to live in a "democracy that does not tell us how often we are forcibly injured or killed by the people we pay to protect

us" (Fyfe, 2002, p. 8) and the best data we have available on police killings comes from the media and independent sources, not our government or police departments (Vitale, 2017). Thus, as Ward (2016) contends there is a need for the "Red Record" to continue and to be extended; specifically, we need to continue to challenge the trivialization of Black lives historically and today, especially racial violence committed by the state. While lynching "became the representative example of state organized racial violence," police violence became "the signature form…given the sheer number of incidents and what police terror represents in terms of governing principles and power relations of criminal social control" (Ward, 2015, p. 300). Despite now having fairly comprehensive data on lynching, our knowledge of police killings is vastly limited. We seem to be a turning point in this regard, so hopefully the trend in providing more comprehensive and accurate data on police killings continues.

Other Mechanisms of Racial Control

Additionally, future research would benefit from further examinations of the legacy of lynching and legacy of racial resistance as they relate to, not only contemporary police shootings, but other forms of violence and social control that are prevalent today. This is especially true given the regionally variant findings reported here. Thus, research moving forward should consider why the legacies of lynching and Black resistance were more significantly related to fatal police shootings in non-South cities.

The Death Penalty

Historically and to this day, the death penalty has been used more frequently in the South, especially in states with higher lynching totals, and there are clear racial distinctions in its use and where its use is localized today (Dieter, 2013; Fleury-Steiner, Kaplan, & Longazel, 2015; Ogletree, 2002; Zimring, 2003; see Figure 4 for execution trends since the late 1970s [Death Penalty Information Center, 2021]).[51] In fact, 82% of executions have been carried out in the South since 1976 while the West accounts for 6%, the Midwest accounts for 12% and the Northeast accounts for less than 1% of all executions (Dieter, 2013).

Regarding the connections between these forms of lethal violence, it has been argued by some scholars that the use of capital punishment was a direct and *legal* replacement for the vigilante violence of lynching (Bowers, 1984; Jacobs et al., 2005; Pfeifer, 2004). For instance, Pfeifer (2004) argued that the death penalty grew in prominence as a compromise between people supporting *rough justice* (i.e., lynching) and those in support of *due process*. Further, Griffin et al. (1997) wrote that, "Often legal sentencing and execution were conducted in an atmosphere of mob pressure and racial hysteria, rendering the state-sanctioned death little more than a 'legal lynching'" (p. 40). Further, Ogletree (2002) wrote,

> "Given the many similarities between the illegal but often officially sanctioned practice of lynching, and the current imposition of the death penalty, it seems at times that the only difference between lynching and capital punishment is the gloss of legality and procedural regularity that the latter enjoys. In this

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[51] Ogletree (2002) refers to the Southern states with lynching and execution overlap as belonging to the "Death Belt"—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.

regard, application of the death penalty may be fairer than the vigilante justice that characterized the Jim Crow era, but not by much" (p. 23).

Figure 4 Total and Race-Specific Executions by Region and Year, 1977-2020



Source: *Execution Database*, Death Penalty Information Center (2021).

These similarities have led to the *substitution hypothesis*, which argues that there would be a negative relationship between lynchings and state executions—

specifically, that where there were more lynchings would have fewer executions simultaneously and vice versa (Beck, Massey, & Tolnay, 1989; Phillips, 1987). This argument about the substitution of these forms of lethal violence relies on justifications from lynchers and their contemporaries themselves; specifically, claims that both lynchings and executions were responses to the criminal acts of individual's (Phillips, 1987, p. 364). As such, the death penalty may have replaced lynching and the character of this violence, including their disproportionate use against Black Americans (Ogletree, 2002; Pfeifer, 2004). That is, the death penalty is employed in a racialized manner and is supported in a racialized manner as well (Ogletree, 2002). That being said, there is some disagreement about these contentions that the death penalty replaced lynching and findings exploring this *substitution hypothesis* have been mixed (Phillips, 1987)[52] or have offered no support (Beck et al., 1989; Massey & Myers, 1989).

On the other hand, lethal sanctions are political and, as such, lynchings and executions may occur independent of individuals' crimes, function as instruments of control, and the prevalence of these lethal sanctions is dependent on social conflict (Phillips, 1987). As lynching was a response to social tensions and fears around Black racial threat to White dominance, executions spanning the lynching era likely resulted from these same conditions (Phillips, 1987; Wright, 1997). Thus, if both resulted from

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[52] Specifically, Phillips (1987) found that the relationship between lynchings and executions was positive from 1889-1903, but it started to become slightly negative in the years following the implementation of Black voter disenfranchisement in North Carolina in support of substitution.

the same tensions, there would be a positive relationship between them. In support of these arguments, Phillips (1987) reported that there was evidence of a correlation between lynchings and executions from 1882 to 1903 in North Carolina (NC).[53] Further, when looking at lethal sanctions between 1882 and 1930, Beck et al. (1989) found some support for these same conflict arguments with lynchings and executions being positively associated with each other in Georgia during the pre-disenfranchisement period; however, they did not report similar findings in NC.[54] That being said, in another study of legal executions in "Cotton South" states, Tolnay et al. (1992) found that executions only appeared to be used by White Southerners as a form of racial oppression in years prior to the institutionalization of other forms of repression (i.e., disenfranchisement) that neutralized the economic and political threat Black Southerners posed to the racial order.

Notably, the studies discussed thus far are contingent on lynchings and executions within the same time-period. On the other hand, research considers the legacy of lynching in the longer-term and finds clearer historical connections between

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[53] The relationship between lynching and executions appeared to have shifted due to the introduction of other forms of racial repression that changed social tensions; specifically, the passage of voter disenfranchisement legislation targeting Black voters in NC in 1900 (Phillips, 1987). Thus, the desire to lynch may have declined following the restrictions placed on Black political power and the assurance of White political dominance since these restrictions "carried no threat to the sanctity of law and sowed no seed of civil unrest" (Phillips, 1987, p. 372).

[54] Further, they reported that the total lethal sanctioning in Georgia—lynchings and executions—did decline following the passage of voter restrictive statutes (Beck et al., 1989).

lynching and death sentences; particularly, that the historical context of lynching is related to contemporary death sentences across the US (Jacobs et al., 2005; Rigby & Seguin, 2021)[55] and even (White) support for the death penalty (Messner, Baumer, & Rosenfeld, 2006). Regarding lynching's legacy and death sentences, Jacobs et al. (2005) wrote that,

> "The fervor that evoked this fierce repression suggests that violence used to ensure black subordination would endure in one form or another. But the unacceptability of vigilantism, particularly after the violent efforts to repress the Civil Rights movement that awakened the national conscience and destroyed Jim Crow, meant that this repression would have to take a different, more acceptable form. This fierce passion for violent control in the past nevertheless enhances the plausibility of claims that the harsh methods used to maintain the dominance of whites over blacks persist in sufficient strength to influence recent legal decisions about death sentences… It follows that acts based on such passions and notions of racial impurity are likely to persist over long periods in contrast to behavior not based on such primordial sentiments" (p. 659).

In their study, Jacobs et al. (2005) explored the legacy of lynching and contemporary death sentences at the state-level and in models restricted to the South and tested what they referred to as the *replacement hypothesis*—which argues that death sentences would be more prevalent in places with a combined history of lynching *and* higher levels of racial threat currently. Ultimately, they found that there is a legacy effect suggesting that states with a more prominent history of lynching have a higher prevalence of death sentences contemporarily, especially where high levels of racial

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[55] Notably, Rigby and Seguin (2021) found stronger support for a relationship between the legacy of slavery and executions. In fact, inclusion of slavery estimates made the lynching predictor nonsignificant in their models.

threat also exist (Jacobs et al., 2005). Thus, the death penalty is likely inseparable from racism and the legacy of lynching and did replace lynching to a degree nationally and in the long-term despite other studies examining lynching and executions simultaneously in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries reporting mixed results regarding this possibility (Beck et al., 1989; Pfeifer, 2004; Phillips, 1987). Further, racial resentment continues to be one of the factors most consistently related to public attitudes about punitiveness—including support for the death penalty (Unnever & Cullen, 2010). Overall, given the prevalence of the death penalty in the South and its relationship to the historical context of lynching it may be that police resort the lethal force less often in this region resulting in the nonsignificant findings from Chapter 4.

Incarceration

As with the death penalty, the reliance on incarceration as a means of state-sanctioned and racialized social control may have become more palatable to Americans than the mob violence of lynchings. While incarceration does not employ lethal means of control like lynchings and executions, the racially disproportionate character of imprisonment is similar to these more lethal mechanisms historically (Myers, 1990) and also in the present (Alexander, 2010; Campbell, Vogel, & Williams, 2015). After the Civil War and Reconstruction, Southern governments controlled by White elites implemented Black Codes—that is, "laws, rules, and restrictions imposed only on African Americans, criminalized poverty, movement, and even leisure" (Taylor, 2016, p. 108-9)—and the prison population became much more

diverse as Black Americans were incarcerated at disproportionate rates (Adamson, 1983; Myers, 1990). Further, the frequency with which incarceration is used as a means of control means that, "[i]t could symbolically affirm white hegemony in the face of economic threat and offer the instrumental advantage of removing a potentially significant portion of the black male population from direct economic competition with whites" (Myers, 1990, p. 628).

Given this reliance on incarceration, it could be that this is a more important form of control than police violence, at least in the South. As Adamson (1983) wrote,

> "Terrorism was one way to redeem the South; using the machinery of crime control was another. Thus, state penal policies whereby more and more blacks were subjected to perpetual hard labor helped to increase the cohesion of a white South" (p. 563).

Within incarceration and due to a 13th Amendment loophole also came the development of *convict leasing*, which acted as a more direct replacement to slavery (Adamson, 1983; Blackmon, 2008; Du Bois, 1998[1935]; Taylor, 2016). Law enforcement was central to this equation and police officers assisted the powerful class of society by providing them a new labor force in replacement of the slave system (Taylor, 2016; Vitale, 2017). In fact, the modernization of the Southern economy post-slavery was directly dependent on convict labor (Adamson, 1983).[56] However, beyond establishing economic subservience, this control also served a political function by redefining racial boundaries (i.e., the color-line) in the South (Adamson, 1983) similar

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[56] Convict leasing benefited the North as well; in fact, Northern business leaders and Southern legislators worked together in pursuit of their interests, which helped bring about prison growth during the 1870s and the convict lease system (Adamson, 1983).

to the practice of lynching (Hill, 2016; Smangs, 2017). Thus, as lynching lost widespread support in the South, which may have in part been a result of the cheap labor being lost due to Black migrants fleeing the region (Tolnay & Beck, 1992), the Southern prison system may have been poised to become the primary institution of social control in partnership with the death sentences that were being imposed on Black Americans. With this focus on securing a cheap, racially marginalized workforce the police were expected to facilitate the existence of the forced prison labor (Taylor, 2016; Vitale, 2017). Thus, as slave patrols captured and returned enslaved Black persons, the Southern police force was enforcing laws that brought the now free Black population back under forced labor conditions.

Ultimately, the penal system in the South has had a particularly racialized history (Adamson, 1983), but the racialization of imprisonment has not been isolated to that region (Muller, 2012). Specifically, Muller (2012) found that the Great Migration led to a higher rate of racial disparity in imprisonment between 1880 to 1950. First, "compositional shifts in the population contributed to the aggregate rise of racial disparity because migrants left a region [the South] with a comparatively low, and entered a region [the North] with a comparatively high, nonwhite incarceration rate" (Muller, 2012, p. 310). Second, he found that the growth in migrant populations in Northern states was directly related to increasing non-White prison populations—migrant and non-migrant alike—while White rates of incarceration did not increase

(Muller, 2012).[57] While Muller's study suggests, Southern incarceration was less prevalent during the time-period examined, this does not hold true for more contemporary trends. Specifically, like lynching in the past and the death penalty today, rates of incarceration have tended to be higher in the South as well (see Figure 5 for incarceration trends since the 1970s as reported from the *Prison Policy Initiative* [Wagner, 2014]).

Figure 5 Incarceration by Region, 1977-2010



[57] For Muller's (2012) study, the South includes twelve states—AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, and VA—while the North includes eleven states—CT, IL, IN, MD, MA, MI, MO, NJ, NY, OH, PA, and WI.

Source: *Prison Policy Initiative* (2014).

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/overtime.html

Further, there has been a documented legacy of lynching effect on rates of prison admission in the US (Jacobs et al., 2012). Jacobs et al. (2012) argued that as lynching became viewed as illegitimate other forms of racial repression would need to take its place. Specifically, they state that "the harsh punitive traditions exemplified by lynchings may persist by placing greater pressure on law makers, court officials, and juries to hand out severe punishments…" (Jacobs et al., 2012, p. 170). Their findings suggest that the past violence of lynching continues to inform trends in punishment in more recent decades for the total admission rate—not just Black prison admissions. Specifically, states with more lynchings in the past have larger imprisonment populations today relative to states with a less pronounced history of lynching (Jacobs et al., 2012). However, despite the prevalence of Southern lynchings, they also found that removing ex-Confederate states from the models did not change the relationship between state lynchings and prison admissions (Jacobs et al., 2012). Thus, the history of lynching nationally, not just in the South, is associated with imprisonment trends which appears to support arguments that legal mechanisms of control, prisons in this case, at least partially replaced lethal Black repression (Jacobs et al., 2012). That being said, a study examining Georgia from 1882-1935 found no evidence that incarceration (or executions) replaced lynching; that is, decreases in lynchings did not directly result

in increases in more formalized control mechanisms in this state at that time (Massey & Myers, 1989). Overall, though, race continues to be one of the strongest predictors of higher levels of incarceration in the US (Campbell, Vogel, & Williams, 2015) and racial animus is consistently associated with views of punitiveness among the public—including support for mass incarceration (Unnever & Cullen, 2010).

Given this history, it could be that the use of prisons in the South, along with the reliance on the death penalty, accounts for the continued repression of Black Americans in that region. On the other hand, given the immediate growth of the Black population in the North, police were more central to the violent upholding of racial boundaries in this region in ways that were not as extreme in the South. This is not to say that Southern policing was lenient on Black citizens, however, given the clear cases that police were sometimes participants in lynching and did employ brutal tactics of control or at least ignored the violence of the mob. It may just be that other forms of control are more directly related to the history of lynching. That being said, the influx of Black migrants to the North resulted in an explosion of racial animus (Wacquant, 2002), including police participation in race riots targeting Black communities and, as I showed in Chapter 3, large Black populations outside of the South were directly associated with the prevalence of lynching, and this relationship was even stronger that the relationship established in the Southern models. As such, social conditions leading to Southern lynchings appear to have followed migrant Black (and White) citizens as they settled outside that region (Ayers, 1984). Further, growing Black populations in non-South spaces led to racial prejudice and animosity, and

methods of establishing racial order—similar to those in the South—were implemented (Baker, 1964[1908]; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Wacquant, 2002). It is this history—the dramatic growth in the Black population as well as the direct and violent responses of lynching and riots—that I believe impacted the institution of policing outside the South and helps us understand why police shootings of Black Americans are more prevalent in non-South cities today that have a history of lynching Black Americans.

Addressing this History and Policy Implications

Given the racially discriminatory policing practices that have occurred throughout US history, policing has undergone several periods of reformation. During the Progressive Era (1900-1919), the professionalization of policing took central stage at a national scale (Walker, 1980). This included a focus on improved training, efficiency, and a public service commitment—simultaneously though, there was also a rise of militarization that created a long-term militaristic feature within the policing institution (Walker, 1980). Generally, as time went one, "get tough" attitudes and policies replaced more progressive and rehabilitative policies and tensions between "crime control" and "due process" orientations defined policing reformations throughout the twentieth century (Walker, 1980). Later in the twentieth century and in response to race-police tensions leading up to the 1960s, Walker (1980) noted that,

> "[m]ost of the ideas developed twenty years before were refurbished in the 1960s. Police-community-relations experts stressed the need for sensitivity training for police officers, the hiring of more black officers (and greater promotional opportunities for those on the force), formal liaison with leaders

> of the black community, and meaningful discipline of genuine police misconduct" (p. 227).

On the more "radical" end of the policy spectrum were calls for "community control" that included decentralizing the police department and placing police under the control of elected boards while the liberal solution emphasized an appointed board of civilians—including persons independent of law enforcement departments—that would offer "civilian review" of the complaints brought against police (Walker, 1980, p. 227). However, as noted earlier, what we saw instead following the 1960s were calls for "law and order" culminating in anticrime and antipoverty policies merging, movements towards increased policing, and mass incarceration (Anderson, 2016; Hinton, 2015; Levy, 2018).

Notably, variations of these policy proposals from decades ago have re-emerged in recent years. In fact, Alex Vitale's (2017) book, *The End of Policing*, he notes that public debate today tends to emphasize

> "new and enhanced training, diversifying the police, and embracing community policing as strategies for reform, along with enhanced accountability measures. However, most of these reforms fail to deal with the fundamental problems inherent to policing" (p. 4).

Regarding diversity in police forces, for instance, Vitale (2017) points out that even diverse departments often have problems with racial biases and officers of color tend to perform their duties in manners similar to White officers. In empirical tests examining the relationship between the presence of Black officers and fatal force only limited evidence has supported arguments that racially diverse police forces reduce incidents of fatal force, including the use of fatal force against Black citizens

(Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, & Fernandez, 2017; Smith, 2003). As such, while diversifying the police force is important, this reform largely does not address the underlying issues within the policing system (e.g., police culture) and likely would not result in reductions of police violence (Vitale, 2017). Further, when reformers emphasize training and professionalization, they "fail to directly address how the very nature of policing and the legal system served to maintain and exacerbate racial inequality" (Vitale, 2017, p. 14). Vitale (2017) goes on to state that reformers

> "fail to appreciate that the basic nature of the law and the police, since its earliest origins, is to be a tool for managing inequality and maintaining the status quo. Police reforms that fail to directly address this reality are doomed to reproduce it" (p. 15).

That being said, some states and cities have made moves to try to address the use of lethal force and other violent tactics by police. For instance, after the killing of George Floyd in 2020, states and cities have started to ban the use of chokeholds and other neck restraint methods as well as tear gas, rubber bullets, and chemical irritants; raised the threshold for the level of force officers can use; banned the purchasing of military-grade equipment; implemented body cameras on officers; and reduced police budgets to name a few of the measures taken (Rummler, 2020).

While these state- and city-level attempts to address police violence are important, federal responses may be necessary as well. In a 2017 *Washington Post* article, Keisha N. Blain suggests that Ida B. Wells provided a framework that could be used in addressing police violence today through her anti-lynching campaign which

"called for the immediate implementation of federal policies that would protect Black lives from lynching." Specifically, Blain (2017) wrote that Wells:

> "acknowledged three 'salient facts' about lynching that are equally relevant concerning police violence today: 1) racial prejudice is at the heart of these acts of violence; 2) criminality is 'the excuse' we use to justify these acts but they are certainly not the cause; and 3) 'it is a national crime and requires a national remedy.'"

Further, though other approaches were being called for at that time as well (e.g., political agitation, protests), Wells:

> "emphasized the need for one crucial response: federal protection of black citizens of the United States. Even in cases where white vigilantes were arrested and charged at the local level, Wells pointed out how easily they were acquitted by a jury of their peers. Federal legislation, therefore, would protect black citizens against violations by the state" (Blain, 2017).

Ultimately, Blain (2017) suggests that while ending police violence will need to be addressed at multiple levels of government, "we need renewed calls for federal policies that end the unlawful killing of black men and women – and ensure that those who are charged with these crimes are convicted." While directions for reforms have been proposed (see the DOJ's [2017] reports on police killings) and states and cities have begun to make changes, the national trends in incidents of police killings have not shifted much since 2014 (Mapping Police Violence, 2021); thus, addressing the use of fatal force may take a more encompassing approach from the federal government than we have seen so far. However, even when the relatively infrequent federal interventions do occur and the DOJ does get involved with trying to hold local police accountable, recommendations often still do not fully address the underlying

issues in policing and, instead, rely on reforms such as those discussed above (e.g., training, officer diversity) (Vitale, 2017).

Another notable, and somewhat related, recent development in attempting to address policing and racial justice issues is the creation of the Council on Policing Reforms and Race (CPRR) from the National Police Foundation (NPF, 2020). This Council is "a majority African American led nonpartisan initiative that will use research and evidence to consider and offer recommendations to resolve some of the most significant and pressing issues with regard to policing reforms and race" (NPF, 2020). Further, the NPF (2020) noted that,

> "In launching this effort, NPF is acknowledging the role that racism, bias, culture (societal and organizational), and patterns and practices have played and continue to play and will encourage the Council to offer commentary, recommendations, and solutions for addressing these issues, which have substantially led to the deterioration of trust and respect between law enforcement and Black communities."

This Council is working on developing a report with policing recommendations that will focus primarily on addressing reforms around areas such as police accountability, organizational culture issues, recruitment, training, and more (NPF, 2020).

Besides the approaches above, in the face of continued instances of police killings, demands for how our country should address this violence have shifted with some protestors and activists now "advocating for systemic changes that require a complete reimagining of law enforcement in the United States" (Fernandez, 2020; also see Vitale, 2017). Specifically, many persons calling for reform are really "asking for this oppressive system to be dismantled and to invest in institutions, resources, and

services that help communities grow and thrive" - they are calling for the "defunding of the police" (Fernandez, 2021). Thus, instead of our government continuing to allocate money towards increased policing, it is argued that these funds should be funneled into other institutions and services within communities that may be of greater benefit in helping to produce stability and safety – education, housing, healthcare, violence prevention programs, and so on (Fernandez, 2020). It is argued that budget reductions such as this "can help end decades of racially driven social control and oppression as well as address social problems at their root instead of investing in an institution that further oppresses and terrorizes communities" (Fernandez, 2020). Some other ways to move forward with systemic changes may include greater public oversight and transparency of policing;[58] decriminalizing and ending the enforcement of minor offenses; taking police out of school settings; developing services better equipped to handle mental health crises; addressing the reliance on pretextual stops and searches; and implementing further legal constraints on the use of force by officers (Fernandez, 2020; Vitale, 2017). Ultimately, any progress forward in addressing racial bias in policing and the use of fatal force may need to reevaluate the

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[58] This includes more openness and willingness to share information on incidents when police use force in the line of duty (Vitale, 2017). There have been serious limitations in police violence data within official records, especially regarding the use of force by police—lethal or otherwise (Fyfe, 2002). Despite limitations in data on police killings we still know more about them than nonlethal injuries inflicted by police (Zimring, 2017). With the rise of police violence data collection from "non-official" sources (e.g., MPV, Fatal Force [*Washington Post*]), we have begun to get a better picture of killings by police but there are still limitations with these databases (Zimring, 2017).

fundamental roles of policing in the US since the institution of policing has often functioned "as a tool for managing deeply entrenched inequalities in a way that systematically produces injustices for the poor, socially marginal, and nonwhite" (Vitale, 2017, p. 28).

On top of that, as my dissertation shows, the history of lynching and the legacies of this violence and racism in the US are clearly issues that need to be addressed. In 2016, the president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Terrence Cunningham, issued a statement and apology that focused on the mistreatment of communities of color throughout US history at the hands of police (Lopez, 2016). In this statement, Cunningham noted that, "[t]here have been times when law enforcement officers, because of the laws enacted by federal, state, and local governments, have been the face of oppression to far too many of our fellow citizens" (Lopez, 2016). He further spoke about how

> "this dark side of our shared history has created a generational – almost inherited – mistrust between many communities of color and the law enforcement agencies that serve them. Many officers who do not share this common heritage often struggle to comprehend the reasons behind this historic mistrust. As a result, they are often unable to bridge this gap and connect with some segments of their communities" (Lopez, 2016).

As for moving forward, Cunningham stated that there is a need to build shared understandings of this history; specifically,

> "[t]hat we must forge a path that allows us to move beyond our history and identify common solutions to better protect our communities… the first step in this process is for the law enforcement profession and the IACP to acknowledge and apologize for the actions of the past and the role that our profession has played in society's historical mistreatment of communities of color" (Lopez, 2016).

The analysis I have presented here supports this claim and shows direct evidence that acknowledging this history is an important first step since, clearly, histories of racial violence continue to be associated with police violence today in some manner. Thus, any future attempts to address police violence do need to acknowledge the history of racial injustice in the US and the legacy of past violence (e.g., lynching) that continues to inform racialized violence and social control practices today. We must contend with forces of the past and attempt to understand how they may have transformed over time or how they may continue to influence contemporary violence and justice issues. As Ward (2018) claims, "If we are to achieve transformative change rather than another round of weak police reform, it is vital that we confront specific local histories and legacies of White supremacy in policing" (p. 171).

Concluding Thoughts

In sum, my dissertation contributed to the lynching and police violence literatures in several ways. First, I examined lynching as a national phenomenon instead of just a Southern one and found that lynchings were associated with similar social conditions nationwide. Second, I offered the first direct, quantitative test examining fatal police shootings of Black Americans today through the historical context of the legacy of lynching. In doing so, I found some support for the legacy of lynching being associated with contemporary fatal police shootings, but this result was restricted to models examining non-South cities only. Third, I brought the history of

Black resistance from the 1960s and early-1970s into this literature and considered the possible relationship between these acts to past lynching and their possible legacy effect on fatal police shootings. I found that there was a legacy effect between this history of resistance and contemporary police shootings, but this finding was largely limited to cities outside of the South. Further, there was little evidence that the legacy of lynching and legacy of racial resistance were influencing each other within the models.

Finally, throughout my analysis I found that racial threat theory remains a relevant framework for the study of both historical and contemporary forms of violence and social control—lynchings and police shootings specifically. Racial threat was the most consistent predictor of lynching in the nationwide models as well as the models limited to South and non-South counties. In fact, racial threat may have even been a stronger predictor of lynchings outside of the South. The relationship between racial threat and fatal police shootings today continued to be one of the most prominent and consistent findings across nationwide, South, and non-South city sample models. On the other hand, ethnic competition estimates were less consistently associated with lynchings relative to contemporary police shootings, and there appeared to be more regional variation in these results.

In the end, criminological and sociological research should continue to explore contemporary issues around race relations and injustices through frameworks that also bring attention to historical contexts since the acknowledgement of this history and its potential influence on contemporary issues is largely absent in the field of criminology

(Ward, 2015). Unless we can address this history, reconciliation with the past and transformation of our society and justice system is unlikely (Equal Justice Initiative, 2017; Ifill, 2018). It is only through reconciliation with this past that present racial justice issues, especially within the institution of policing, can truly be addressed (Ward, 2018; Williams & Murphy, 1990).

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Appendix A

DISTRIBUTION OF LYNCHING BY REGION, STATE, & RACE: 1900-1929

Table 12 The Distribution of State-Level Lynching Totals by Region and Race, 1900-1929

South							
State	Black	White	Total	State	Black	White	Total
AL*	125.01	6	131.01	MS*	279	8	287
AR	98	13	111	NC	36	4	40
DE**	1	0	1	OK	33	9	44
FL	138.99	12	150.99	SC*	69	3	72
GA*	258	7	265	TN	64.01	10	74.01
KY**	51.98	9	60.98	TX	157	15	206
LA*	154	9	163	VA	26	4	30
MD**	5	0	5	WV**	8	3	11
Total	1503.99	112	1651.99				
West							
State	Black	White	Total	State	Black	White	Total
AZ	0	1	1	NM	0	1	3
CA	2	6	12	OR	1	1	2
CO	3	3	8	UT	1	0	1
ID	0	3	3	WA	0	1	1
MT	1	8	9	WY	4	4	8
NV	0	1	2				
Total	12	29	50				
Midwest							
State	Black	White	Total	State	Black	White	Total
IL†	9	5	14	MO**	35.01	8	43.01
IN†	5	0	5	NE	1	2	3
IA†	0	1	1	ND	0	2	2
KS	4	3	7	OH†	2	1	3

Table 12 *Continued*

Midwest							
State	Black	White	Total	State	Black	White	Total
MI	0	1	1	SD	0	0	0
MN	3	1	4	WI	0	0	0
Total	59.01	24	83.01				
Northeast							
State	Black	White	Total	State	Black	White	Total
CT	0	0	0	NY	0	1	1
MA	0	0	0	PA	1	0	1
ME	0	0	0	RI	0	0	0
NH	0	0	0	VT	0	0	0
NJ	0	0	0				
Total	1	1	2				

Note: Regions designated according to US Census Bureau classifications. Lynching data is not recorded for Alaska or Hawaii and five Northeastern states were determined to have never had a recorded lynching: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont (Seguin & Rigby, 2019). The decimal places result from the crosswalk method used to situate the lynchings into contemporary counties boundaries as of 2010 (Eckert, Gvirtz, Liang, &Peter, 2020).
*These are the "Deep South" states (Tolnay & Beck, 1995).
**These are the "Border" states that had a history of slavery but never formally seceded from the Union.
†These are the "Lower Midwest" states, which are suggested to have been the states where Black Americans migrated most and, thus, lynchings may have been most likely to have occurred (Baker, 1964[1908]; Pfeifer, 2013; Raper, 2003[1933]).

Appendix B

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LYNCHING, THREAT, COMPETITION, & OTHER VARIABLES CONSIDERED

Table 13 Descriptive Statistics for Lynching, Threat, Competition, and Other Variables

	All Counties		**Southern Counties**		**Non-South Counties**	
	Mean	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Dependent Variable						
Black Lynchings	0.172	0.676	0.353	0.945	0.015	0.151
Ethnic Competition Variables						
Cheap Labor Threat (log)	0.232	0.530	0.476	0.656	0.019	0.231
Black Success (log)	0.097	0.241	0.184	0.268	0.021	0.184
Racial Threat Variables						
Black Population (%)	12.842	20.509	26.346	23.526	1.032	2.408
Black Population² (%)	585.493	1312.659	1247.468	1694.656	6.861	51.935
Independent & Control Variables						
White Immigrants (%)	7.849	9.355	2.111	5.143	12.867	9.326
Manufacturing Wages (log)	11.266	3.187	10.797	3.201	11.677	3.116
Cotton Farm Acres (%)	3.764	8.067	8.144	10.236	0.069	1.331
Prior Black Lynchings	0.751	2.008	1.539	2.711	0.062	0.337
South	0.466	0.499				
Deep South			0.294	0.456		
Border States			0.142	0.349		

Table 13 *Continued*

	All Counties		Southern Counties		Non-South Counties	
Independent & Control Variables	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Lower Midwest					0.234	0.424
Missouri					0.071	0.256
Number of Observations						
All Counties	9,150		4,266		4,881	
Final County Sample	8,983		4,108		4,875	
Note: SD = standard deviation						

Appendix C

SOUTH & NON-SOUTH MODELS EXCLUDING REGIONAL CONTROLS

Table 14 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of Black Americans in US Cities (Excluding Regional Controls)[a,b]

	South (N=177)		Non-South (N=464)	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Racial Threat				
Black Population (%)	1.021** (0.007)	1.050** (0.017)	1.039** (0.012)	1.096*** (0.017)
Black Population (%)^2		0.9996* (0.000)		0.999*** (0.000)
Ethnic Competition				
Black Gains Index	1.025 (0.018)	1.044* (0.020)	0.995 (0.017)	1.015* (0.006)
Immigration (%)	1.026* (0.012)	1.023* (0.012)	1.020 (0.018)	1.023 (0.016)
Legacy Effects				
Lynching	1.097 (0.392)	0.903 (0.334)	1.736** (0.365)	1.557* (0.340)
Black Resistance	1.225 (0.204)	1.164 (0.189)	2.493*** (0.543)	1.985** (0.391)
Control Variables				
Disadvantage Index	0.995 (0.018)	1.018 (0.021)	0.990 (0.017)	0.994 (0.013)
Gini Index	0.506 (0.813)	0.152 (0.269)	0.007 (0.021)	0.014 (0.050)
Black Stability (%)	1.014 (0.015)	1.008 (0.014)	0.981 (0.014)	0.964** (0.012)
Male Divorced (%)	1.279** (0.104)	1.265** (0.101)	1.315 (0.245)	1.328† (0.217)
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.032* (0.016)	1.022 (0.016)	1.045* (0.023)	1.027 (0.023)

Table 14 *Continued*

	South (N=177)		Non-South (N=464)	
Control Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
Violent Crime Rate	1.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)	0.9997 (0.001)	0.9997 (0.000)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics				
Log pseudolikelihood	-107.450	-106.884	-149.199	-143.998
Pseudo R^2	0.126	0.131	0.167	0.196
BIC	277.014	281.057	372.078	367.814
VIF Range	1.19, 5.42	1.19, 24.74	1.06, 2.55	1.06, 11.70

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors).
b. These regression models are offset by the total population (logged) of the cities.

Appendix D

WHAT ABOUT WHITE AMERICANS KILLED IN POLICE SHOOTINGS?

The analysis of the chapter focused on the violence that Black Americans have faced throughout US history as well as a period of resistance that was a response to the frustrations of discrimination, violence, and injustices Black communities faced. However, it is important to note that White persons fall victim to police violence with a relatively high frequency as well. In fact, from 2014-2018, 900 White persons were killed by police gunshots across the sample of cities in this study while 990 Black persons were killed in the same manner. The question is, are the historical legacies of lynching and racial resistance unique in their relationships to fatal police shootings of Black Americans, or do these histories inform the police shootings of Whites as well? I do not offer a full test of this possibility here, but I do include three models with the average count of Whites killed by police gunshots as the dependent variable. These findings suggest that the legacy of lynching is a unique predictor of Black shootings; however, the legacy of Black resistance does not appear to be race-specific in nature. That is, cities with a history of Black resistance in the non-South appear to have a higher prevalence of both Black *and* White police shootings, which could be a result of more repressive policing practices in these cities more generally. On the other hand, this history of protest and resistance has a negative relationship with police shootings

of Whites in the South. More work should examine these racial differences in fatal police shootings and regarding the legacies of racial violence as well.

Table 15 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of White Americans in US Cities[a,b]

	All Cities	**South**	**Non-South**
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Racial Threat			
Black Population (%)	0.986 (0.004)***	0.992 (0.006)	0.971 (0.008)***
Legacy Effects			
Lynching	0.952 (0.131)	0.975 (0.246)	1.007 (0.161)
Black Resistance	1.064 (0.114)	0.672 (0.114)*	1.462 (0.202)**
Control Variables			
Disadvantage Index	0.998 (0.009)	0.972 (0.017)	0.999 (0.011)
Gini Index	1.056 (1.523)	22.567 (45.359)	0.305 (0.679)
Immigration (%)	0.969 (0.010)**	0.981 (0.013)	0.980 (0.013)
Black Stability (%)	0.992 (0.007)	1.011 (0.014)	0.986 (0.009)
Male Divorced (%)	1.568 (0.092)***	1.434 (0.138)***	1.670 (0.127)***
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.021 (0.011)†	1.025 (0.020)	1.017 (0.014)
Violent Crime Rate	1.000 (0.000)**	1.000 (0.000)*	1.000 (0.000)**
West	1.128 (0.177)		
Midwest	0.726 (0.113)*		
Northeast	0.474 (0.112)**		
Constant	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)***
Model-Fit Statistics			
Log pseudolikelihood	-284.822	-97.276	-188.697
Pseudo R^2	.144	0.070	0.170
BIC	660.126	251.490	444.933
VIF Range	1.25, 3.02	1.18, 2.88	1.05, 2.36
City Observations (N)	641	177	464

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors).
b. These regression models are offset by total population (logged) of cities.

Appendix E

RACIAL THREAT & FATAL POLICE SHOOTINGS MODELS LIMITED TO CITIES WITH POPULATION OF 25,000 RESIDENTS OR GREATER

Consistent with data collection efforts of riots/protests (Spilerman, 1970a) and another study of police violence (Willits & Nowacki, 2014), I provide models limited to cities with populations of 25,000 residents or greater. As noted in the footnotes of Chapter 4, 47 cities of the 642 in the presented analysis had populations of less than 25,000 as of recent years. Here, I present a series of models testing to see whether the results remain consistent. As shown below, the removal of these 47 cities does not appear to alter the racial threat results in the models presented in the main chapter.

Table 16 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of Black Americans in a Sample of US Cities with a Total Population Greater than 25,000 (N = 595)[a,b]

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Racial Threat					
Black Population (%)		1.031*** (0.005)	1.098*** (0.013)	1.028*** (0.005)	1.094*** (0.015)
Black Population (%)^2			0.999*** (0.000)		0.999*** (0.000)
Legacy Effects					
Lynching				1.312 (0.270)	1.044 (0.202)
Black Resistance				1.465** (0.194)	1.134 (0.142)

Table 16 *Continued*

Control Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Disadvantage Index	1.042*** (0.012)	0.995 (0.013)	1.007 (0.011)	0.996 (0.013)	1.006 (0.011)
Gini Index	17.630 (33.068)	2.556 (4.384)	0.666 (0.990)	0.323 (0.602)	0.382 (0.675)
Immigration (%)	0.994 (0.008)	1.035*** (0.009)	1.033*** (0.013)	1.032** (0.010)	1.032** (0.009)
Black Stability (%)	1.034** (0.010)	1.008 (0.009)	0.996 (0.010)	1.002 (0.009)	0.995 (0.010)
Male Divorced (%)	1.109 (0.082)	1.287** (0.109)	1.251** (0.099)	1.294** (0.110)	1.254** (0.096)
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.020 (0.013)	1.036** (0.013)	1.023* (0.012)	1.035** (0.013)	1.023* (0.012)
Violent Crime Rate	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)
West	0.476*** (0.071)	0.837 (0.150)	1.317 (0.267)	0.927 (0.170)	1.300 (0.259)
Midwest	0.763 (0.147)	1.093 (0.232)	1.081 (0.186)	1.182 (0.218)	1.081 (0.177)
Northeast	0.294*** (0.093)	0.507* (0.152)	0.492* (0.142)	0.666 (0.213)	0.513* (0.157)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics					
Log pseudolikelihood	-266.527	-256.212	-246.691	-253.859	-246.510
Pseudo R^2	0.127	0.161	0.192	0.168	0.193
BIC	603.328	589.087	576.434	597.158	588.848
VIF Range	1.23, 1.84	1.23, 2.27		1.23, 3.09	

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors)
b. These regression models are offset by total population (logged) of cities.

Table 17 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of Black Americans in a Sample of Southern US Cities with a Total Population Greater than 25,000 (N = 164)[a,b]

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Racial Threat					
Black Population (%)				1.026*** (0.006)	1.060*** (0.016)
Black Population (%)^2					0.999* (0.000)
Legacy Effects					
Lynching	1.984† (0.707)		1.676 (0.613)	1.107 (0.395)	0.874 (0.325)
Black Resistance		1.569** (0.260)	1.474* (0.249)	1.151 (0.194)	1.075 (0.174)
Control Variables					
Disadvantage Index	1.031† (0.016)		1.033* (0.016)	0.986 (0.018)	1.005 (0.020)
Gini Index	7.553 (14.400)		1.019 (1.978)	0.604 (0.968)	0.242 (0.408)
Immigration (%)	0.993 (0.008)	0.997 (0.007)	0.996 (0.007)	1.033** (0.011)	1.033** (0.011)
Black Stability (%)	1.038* (0.017)	1.033* (0.016)	1.030† (0.016)	1.017 (0.014)	1.014 (0.014)
Male Divorced (%)	1.167† (0.093)	1.167† (0.093)	1.150† (0.091)	1.320*** (0.100)	1.314*** (0.093)
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.026† (0.016)	1.026† (0.016)	1.023 (0.016)	1.038* (0.015)	1.031* (0.015)
Violent Crime Rate	1.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics					
Log pseudolikelihood	-108.298	-107.671	-107.211	-104.487	-103.837
Pseudo R^2	0.087	0.092	0.096	0.119	0.125
BIC				265.073	268.872
VIF Range				1.12, 2.63	

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors)
b. These regression models are offset by total population (logged) of cities.

Table 18 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of Black Americans in a Sample of Non-South US Cities with a Total Population Greater than 25,000 (N = 431)[a,b]

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Racial Threat					
Black Population (%)				1.037*** (0.008)	
Black Population (%)^2					0.999*** (0.000)
Legacy Effects					
Lynching	1.626† (0.427)		1.644* (0.404)	1.747** (0.367)	1.601* (0.352)
Black Resistance		2.524*** (0.614)	2.536*** (0.591)	2.492*** (0.551)	1.955** (0.411)
Control Variables					
Disadvantage Index	1.060** (0.021)	1.051* (0.022)	1.051* (0.022)	0.992 (0.017)	0.995 (0.014)
Gini Index	1.945 (7.115)	0.193 (0.732)	0.035 (0.129)	0.007 (0.024)	0.006 (0.021)
Immigration (%)	0.978 (0.017)	0.974 (0.018)	0.970† (0.017)	1.018 (0.017)	1.028† (0.016)
Black Stability (%)	1.018 (0.012)	1.003 (0.014)	1.009 (0.013)	0.983 (0.013)	0.965** (0.013)
Male Divorced (%)	1.166 (0.194)	1.133 (0.200)	1.124 (0.200)	1.333 (0.262)	1.336† (0.220)
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.018 (0.021)	1.007 (0.023)	1.015 (0.023)	1.045† (0.023)	1.029 (0.024)
Violent Crime Rate	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.000)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Model-Fit Statistics					
Log pseudolikelihood	-158.823	-156.447	-154.311	-146.752	-142.187
Pseudo R^2	0.099	0.112	0.125	0.167	0.193
BIC				360.231	357.167
VIF Range				1.06, 2.44	

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors)
b. These regression models are offset by total population (logged) of cities.

Table 19 Poisson Regressions Examining Police Shootings of White Americans in a Sample of US Cities with a Total Population Greater than 25,000 (N = 595)[a,b]

	Model 1
Racial Threat	
Black Population (%)	0.985 (0.004)***
Legacy Effects	
Lynching	0.945 (0.130)
Black Resistance	1.060 (0.115)
Control Variables	
Disadvantage Index	0.997 (0.009)
Gini Index	1.028 (1.488)
Immigration (%)	0.970 (0.010)**
Black Stability (%)	0.994 (0.008)
Male Divorced (%)	1.577 (0.095)***
Population Age 15-29 (%)	1.024 (0.012)*
Violent Crime Rate	1.000 (0.000)**
West	1.107 (0.175)
Midwest	0.732 (0.116)*
Northeast	0.438 (0.107)**
Constant	0.000 (0.000)***
Model-Fit Statistics	
Log pseudolikelihood	-277.939
Pseudo R^2	0.147
BIC	645.318
VIF Range	1.23, 3.09

Note: Significance (two-tailed): † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
a. This table displays IRR coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors)
b. These regression models are offset by total population (logged) of cities.