CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, 1770-1830

by

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Finally, this is all dedicated to Sara Vasko. She still knows why.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(NM):	"nicht mitzuteilen" (police files withheld from Dr. Karl Glossy)
AVA:	*Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv*
BArch:	*Bundesarchiv Berlin*
BayHSta:	*Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv*
Bl.	*Blatter*
BLHA:	*Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv*
Gend KK:	*Gendarmeriskorpskommando*
GStA PK:	*Geheimes Staatsarchiv preußischer Kulturbesitz Dahlem-Berlin*
HHStA:	*Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*
IB:	*Informationsbüro*
JKP:	*Allgemeine deutsche Justiz-, Kameral-, und Polizeifama*
KA:	*Kabinettsarchiv*
KKA:	*Kabinettskanzleiakten*
MA:	*Außenministerium*
MdÄ:	*Ministerium des Äußern*
MInn:	*Innenministerium*
NaP:	*Noten an die Polizeihofstelle*
NvP:	*Noten von der Polizeihofstelle*
PA:	*Pergen Akten*
PHSt:	*Polizeihofstelle*
StK:	*Staatskanzlei*

ABSTRACT

Based upon police reports and other state documents from six regional and state archives in Germany and Austria, this study traces evolving state responses to new, radical ideas and forms of political participation over three historical epochs. As such, the dissertation captures the early development and expansion of conservative state practice in Central Europe, tying absolutist era concerns over public opinion and an increasingly engaged civil society to trends in post-Napoleonic political repression. State surveillance looms large in modern history, and scholarship has rightly focused on twentieth-century abuses in Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Yet state surveillance has a much deeper history. This study argues that prior to the French Revolution, Central European states developed state security measures to control public opinion, surveil society, and manage threats to the monarchy. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras highlighted the importance of those agencies and promoted their continued development and institutionalization, thus inaugurating qualitative changes in surveillance and information gathering in Central Europe. New concepts such as popular participation, constitutionalism, and popular sovereignty, birthed after 1789, laid the groundwork for political alternatives to absolutist rule throughout Europe. Countering

these new political threats, Central European statesmen relied upon several techniques developed prior to the French Revolution to monitor and police their changing societies

The decades between 1790 and 1815 proved critical for the development of conservative state practice in Central Europe as they witnessed the increased elaboration and professionalization of agencies designed to monitor political participation. These repressive practices, honed during a period of war and revolutionary upheaval, later found full institutionalization in the Mainz Central Investigative Commission (1819-1827) and in the Frankfurt Central Investigative Authority (1833-1847).

Introduction

CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE

In July 1786, Count Anton von Pergen, the governor of Lower Austria and nominal head of Vienna's police directorate, issued a secret set of instructions to provincial governors regarding the importance of good policing. For Pergen, "the inner peace, security, and welfare of the state can only be established through well-arranged institutions." Though Pergen had shaped his vision of a centralized policing agency for almost a decade, his secret memorandum first identified policing as both a tool of good government and a means of defending the internal security of the state against "dangerous tendencies" and "secret enemies."[1] By the end of the 1780s, Joseph II established police directorates in all major Habsburg cities. As the Minister of Police, Pergen created a system that employed both a public and secret police to root out spies, monitor the movement of foreigners, surveil secret societies, and report on public opinion. Although Emperor Leopold II (1790-1792) curtailed Pergen's police directorate, the outbreak of the French Revolution and the succession of Francis II (1792)

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[1] Hermann Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei: Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des Sicherheitswesens in den Ländern der ehemaligen österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie,* 2 vols. (Vienna: Gerlach & Wiedling, 1938), II: 168.

guaranteed the longevity of Pergen's centralized policing system. On 3 January 1793, Francis established Vienna's Ministry of Police to supervise society and defend the security of the state. In 1804, Pergen stated to Francis that it was the duty of Habsburg police to defend Christianity and monarchical governments throughout Europe.[2] What began in the 1770s as an attempt to limit the effect of Josephinian reform and to defend Austrian subjects against the "harmful influence of secret societies" within Habsburg territory, now monitored radical organizations in all corners of Europe by the second decade of the nineteenth century.

State surveillance looms large in modern history, and scholarship has rightly focus on twentieth-century abuses in Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic.[3] But a much deeper and pan-European story exists. Prior to the French Revolution, Central European states developed critical security measures to control public opinion, surveil society, and manage threats to the monarchy. This included the monitoring and eventual arrest of members of secret societies, such as the Freemasons and Illuminati.[4] The Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras highlighted the importance of

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[2] August Fournier, *Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress: Eine Auswahl aus ihren Papieren* (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1913), 7.

[3] Geoff Eley, et. al, "Forum: Surveillance in German History," *German History* 34 (2016): 293-314.

[4] As we will see, as sites of sociability and social leveling, these societies represented sources of authority and allegiance outside of the state to Central European heads of state. On the relationship between the Enlightenment and new forms of civil society see, Isabel V. Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

those agencies and promoted their continued development, inaugurating qualitative changes in surveillance and information gathering in Central Europe. Such radical concepts as popular participation, constitutionalism, and popular sovereignty laid the groundwork for political alternatives to absolutist rule throughout Europe. Countering this threat, Central European statesmen expanded a political police and a censorship regime that, by the mid-1790s, increasingly assumed jurisdiction across borders to check the spread of revolutionary ideas. As such, this dissertation places state security at the very center of Central European foreign and domestic politics in the nineteenth century.

The emergence of political policing in Habsburg territory and the German states has a significant history, with studies dating back to the very inception of these agencies.[5] More recent work has uncovered the extent of political policing especially in the German states after 1819, the year that Prince Clemens von Metternich issued the Carlsbad Decrees.[6] Still others have investigated how the Carlsbad Decrees functioned, while

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University Press, 1996); Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, *The Politics of Sociability: Freemasonry and German Civil Society, 1814-1918,* trans. Tom Lampert (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), esp. Chap. 1.

[5] Friedrich Fürstentreu, *Ueber geheime Bündnisse und geheime Polizeien: Ein Sendschrieben an die Herrscher Deutschlands* (Carlsbad, 1819).

[6] For Germany see, Eberhard Büssem, *Der Karlsbader Beschlüsse von 1819: Die endgültige Stabilisierung der restaurativen Politik in Deutschen Bund nach dem Winder Kongreß, 1814/15* (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1974); Dirk Blasius, *Geschichte der politischen Kriminalität in Deutschland 1800-1980: Eine Studie zu Justiz und Staatsverbrechen* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1983); Wolfram Siemann "*Deutschlands Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung*"*: Die Anfänge der politischen Polizei 1806-1866*

detailing the decree's chilling effects within German universities.[7] Yet historians overlook the decades between 1780 and 1815 and have not yet fully tied this period to post-Napoleonic trends in political repression.[8] By tracing *ancien régime* preoccupations

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(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1985); Jakob Nolte, *Demagogen und Denunzianten: Denunziation und Verrat als Methode polizeilicher Informationserhebung bei den politischen Verfolgungen im preußischen Vormärz* (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2009); George Williamson, "'Thought Is in Itself a Dangerous Operation'": The Campaign Against 'Revolutionary Machinations' in Germany, 1819–1828," *German Studies Review* 38 (2015): 285-306; Jean Tyrichter, *Die Erhaltung der Sicherheit: Deutscher Bund, politische Kriminalität und transnationale Sicherheitsregime im Vormärz* (Frankfurt a/m: Vittorio Klostermann, 2019); Jürgen Wilke, *200 Jahre Karlsbader Beschlüsse: Zustandekommen, Inhalte, Folgen* (Bremen: Edition Lumière, 2019). For Austria see, Donald Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police: Security and Subversion in the Hapsburg Monarchy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); Ernst Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials: Government Policy and Public Opinion in the Habsburg Dominions in the Period of the French Revolution* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1969); Frank T. Hoefer, *Pressepolitik und Polizeistaat Metternichs: Die Überwachung von Presse und politische Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland und den Nachbarstaaten durch das Mainzer Informationsbüro, 1833-1848* (Munich: Sauer, 1982); Paul Bernard, *From the Enlightenment to the Police State: The Public Life of Johann Anton Pergen* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991); Michal Chvojka, *Josef Graf Sedlnitzky als Präsident der Polizei- und Zensurhofstelle in Wien (1817-1848): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Staatspolizei in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang, 2010). For the policing of Europe more generally after the Congress of Vienna see, Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Beatrice de Graaf, *Fighting Terror after Napoleon: How Europe Became Secure After 1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

[7] Manfred Brümmer, *Staat kontra Universität: Die Universität Halle-Wittenberg und die Karlsbader Beschlüsse, 1819-1848* (Weimar: Böhlaus, 1991); Thomas Oelschlägel, *Hochschulpolitik in Württemberg 1819-182: Die Auswirkungen der Karlsbader Beschlüsse auf die Universität Tübingen* (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1995); Sebastian Schermaul, *Die Umsetzung Der Karlsbader Beschlüsse an Der Universität Leipzig 1819-1848* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013).

with popular opinion through the revolutionary period and into the Restoration era, this dissertation traces the institutional development and evolving responses to revolutionary threats to the state across three historical epochs – an approach that historians have yet to undertake. By detailing how Central European states transformed cameralist notions of "*Polizei*" from an administrative concern into one of state security, this study locates a critical moment in the origins of political policing and conservative state practice.

Unlike the United States or England, where a professionalized body devoted to fighting crime and civil unrest arrived in the 1830s,[9] the concept of "*Polizei"* in German-speaking Europe denoted the realm of absolutist state administration.[10] As a pillar of Central European cameralism, policing entailed the state's claim to regulate society for

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[8] There are important studies of the institutional development of policing agencies in Habsburg territory as well as the German states. For Austria see, Viktor Bibl, *Die Wiener Polizei: Eine kulturhistorische Studie* (Leipzig: Stein, 1927); Friedrich Walter, "Der Organisierung der Staatlichen Polizei unter Joseph II," *Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wiens* 7 (1927): 22-53; Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*; Anna Hedwig Benna, "Organisierung und Personalstand der Polizeihofstelle (1793-1848)," *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs* 6 (1953): 197-239; Emerson, *Metternich*, esp. Chap I; Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, esp. Chap. 6 and 7. For Prussia see, Walter Obenaus, *Die Entwicklung der Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei: Bis zum Ende der Reaktionszeit* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1940), 25-36, 89-106.

[9] J.M. Beattie, *The First English Detectives: The Bow Street Runners and the Policing of London, 1750-1840* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); William Miller, *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and London, 1830-1870* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Clive Emsley, *Policing and its Contexts, 1750-1870* (London: Palgrave, 1983).

[10] Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, "Polizei," in Otto Brunner et. al, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland,* 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1978), IV: 875-97.

the good of its subjects, an assertation that dates back at least to the sixteenth century. By the mid-eighteenth century, scholars such as Joseph von Sonnenfels and Johann von Justi taught *Polizeiwissenschaft*, or "public policy" in Vienna's universities.[11] Despite its nebulous meaning, this broad definition of policing continued into the twentieth century; these Central European agencies assumed a wide competence, ranging from forest management to price regulation and the policing of criminality.[12] By separating "security" from policing in the broad sense, Pergen introduced a major institutional and conceptual shift in Central Europe. To be sure, early modern states employed spies, censored objectionable work, and developed both public and secret policing forces. In fact, when considering reforms to her state, Maria Theresa financed a study of the Parisian police in 1770, hoping to develop a system of "secret agents" to monitor foreigners. Before 1789, as Chapter Two discusses, an inchoate, anti-Enlightenment

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[11] For the development of *Polizeiwissenschaft* in seventeenth-century Germany see, Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983). For Austria see, Karl-Heinz Osterloh, *Joseph von Sonnenfels und die österreichische Reformbewegung im Zeitalter des aufgeklärten Absolutismus* (Lübeck: Matthiesen Verlag, 1970), 49-79; Roland Axtmann, "'Police' and the Formation of the Modern State. Legal and Ideological Assumptions on State Capacity in the Austrian Lands of the Habsburg Empire, 1500-1800" in *Theories and Origins of the Modern Police*, ed. Clive Emsley (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 131-154.

[12] Richard Evans, *Rereading German History: From Unification to Reunification, 1800-1996* (London: Routledge, 1997), esp. Chap. VI. See also, Alf Lüdtke, *Police and State in Prussia, 1815-1850*, trans. Peter Burgess (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 [1982]); idem., ed., "*Sicherheit*" *und* "*Wohlfahrt*"*: Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1992).

"conservatism" attempted to limit the spread of secret societies.[13] But the impact of revolution, fundamentally altered Central European policing agencies as seditious ideas threatened the very foundation of the *ancien régime* order.

The so-called Age of Metternich (1815-1848) conventionally frames the history of political repression in Central Europe – and this is justified. After 1815, and especially after 1819, he designed an international system to combat revolutionary unrest that defined Central European political development for the following three decades.[14] Arbitrary arrest, the frequent recourse to secret police and informants, strict censorship of journalists and other intellectuals, the surveillance of universities, and the spread of secret investigative committees were critical tools in Metternich's repertoire of repression. These all combined to give the Metternichian period the sinister characteristics of a modern police state, at least in its embryonic form. As Howard Brown has argued for the case of Revolutionary France, the term police state has its "merits." But, as Brown argues, it also has significant limits, for it narrows our analysis of political repression to a select number of police practices.[15] The term police state is furthermore weighted with connotations of fascist totalitarianism. This is perhaps most apparent in Donald

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[13] On this birth of this anti-Enlightenment "conservatism" see, Klaus Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[14] Williamson, "Revolutionary Machinations," 286.

[15] Howard G. Brown, "Special Tribunals and the Napoleonic Security State," in *Napoleon and His Empire; Europe, 1804-1814*, eds. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 79-95, here, 79.

Emerson's 1968 work, which viewed Napoleon and Metternich as the forerunners of the Nazi police state. As both the first and third chapters show, Pergen never realized his dream of a fully autonomous secret police and no police minister after him attempted to establish the police as independent of the courts. Emperor Francis allowed for the use of indefinite detention and summary justice for those deemed too serious a threat to the state, and his officials employed underhanded methods of information gathering, especially during the infamous "Jacobin Trials" of 1794 and the repression of the *Carbonari* in the 1820s.[16] Despite such instances of abuse and their subsequent historical infamy, the Austrian state increasingly accommodated far-ranging police powers in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, establishing the police as a critical tool of foreign and domestic politics. In Central Europe, then, policing agencies emerged as a firmly entrenched institution functioning within the state and mostly within legal bounds, not as a rogue body enacting its own policy.

Following recent scholarship, the first three chapters argue for the relevance of the "security state."[17] The term better captures the full range of repressive tactics available to state officials in this period than "police state," but it also points to the state's

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[16] On the Habsburg comment to the *Rechtsstaat* see, Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2016). Judson's claims are based on, David Laven, "Law and Order in Habsburg Venetia, 1814-1835," *The Historical Journal* 39 (1996): 383-403.

[17] Brown, "Special Tribunals"; idem., *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006).

growing administrative capacity to manage society. As the following chapters show, Central European officials relied on preventive policing through surveillance and censorship, though never quite on the level of the French Ministry of Police under Fouché.[18] But, as Chapters Three and Four demonstrate, the system officials developed between 1780 and 1815 relied on state institutions designed to regulate changing economies and societies, thereby increasing the state's reach into their subjects' everyday lives. Despite the increased elaboration of such institutions in Central Europe, state security was neither total nor were these agencies' numbers all that significant, at least not until the 1850s.

Driven largely by international-relations scholar Beatrice de Graaf, a recent trend in post-Napoleonic studies utilizes the concept of "security culture."[19] Focusing on the period following Napoleon's final defeat and the immediate post-Congress years, de Graaf illustrates how Europe's great statesmen, most importantly Metternich and Lord Castlereagh, together sought a secure international order through the policing of radicals, securing indemnities from France, and the building of strategic fortifications. A recent edited volume by de Graaf, Ido de Haan, and Brian Vick extends the concept into the

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[18] For a re-examination of the popular depictions of Fouché and policing at the turn of the nineteenth century see, Howard Brown, "Tips, Traps and Tropes: Catching Thieves in Post-Revolutionary Paris," in *Police Detectives in History, 1750-1950*, eds. Clive Emsley and Haia Shpayer-Makov (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 33-60.

[19] See her recent book, *Fighting Terror after Napoleon*.

realms of international finance and trade as well as piracy and international policing.[20] De Graaf's work has gained significant international attention, and rightfully so. Yet the concept of security culture, while useful for diplomatic historians and international-relations scholars, breaks down when viewed from the level of actual policing of individuals or entire secret societies such as the *Carbonari* in Italy. Here, Brown's concept of the security state has the added benefit of analyzing security measures from the ground up, focusing as he does on the wide-spread use of military tribunals in the years prior to the French First Empire. As we will see, Central European statesmen faced significant difficulties policing political participation throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and attempts to make Europe more secure often backfired or proved ultimately counterproductive, thereby making Europe less secure in the process.

Brown's work is again applicable here, as it stresses the growing "apparatus of rule," rather than a system developed and overseen by one individual, such as Napoleon or Metternich. This dissertation also focuses on a network of individuals – from police ministers to postmasters, and police and military officers to questionable informants – that performed the central functions of the political police. Certainly, the personality of individual rulers remained important. But the system of information gathering developed in Habsburg territory and, later, in the German states, necessitated a consensus among

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[20] De Graaf, Ido de Haan, and Brian Vick, eds., *Securing Europe*.

political elites as well as the participation of numerous middling provincial officials, informants, civil servants.

By focusing on an apparatus of rule, this dissertation entwines two themes. First, by stressing a growing apparatus of surveillance prior to 1815, this study argues that Central European authorities institutionalized the administrative mechanisms that made possible the system of political repression that Metternich enacted with the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819. A host of practices antedated Metternich's arrival as Minister of Foreign Affairs: the censorship of objectionable material; the surveillance of foreigners and suspected radicals; the use international relations and cross-border cooperation in policing revolutionaries; control over movement and communication; the use of armed force; and, finally, the establishment of special tribunals and investigative committees in the provinces. Second, the dissertation also captures the mutually reinforcing process of state building and surveillance. As the first two chapters show, policing agencies relied heavily on their ability to monitor correspondence and movement, which entailed the streamlining and increased centralization of the postal service as well as increasingly strict passport regulations. These surveillance practices continued well into the nineteenth century as the monitoring of travel and communication between suspect individuals became the *sin qua non* of political policing.

But if the control over movement and correspondence remained cornerstones of state surveillance in the early nineteenth century, they no longer delimited the functions of political policing. By the turn of the century, the secret police accomplished their work through four, mutually supportive methods: control of movement (especially foreigners); control over communication; increased control over printed material; and, by

the turn of the century, the control over economic and housing development in major urban areas. This, in turn, created regional court systems and investigative agencies to monitor the effect that war and economic dislocation had on certain populations' willingness to engage in revolutionary activity. Prior to the Congress of Vienna, Austria's Ministry of Police and other powerful institutions had articulated a rudimentary social theory of revolution. Taking the violence of the Parisian masses as his example, Pergen drew an immediate causal relationship between changing economies, urban density, and violent, radical behavior. Austrian officials also established investigative commissions, charged with monitoring revolutionary activity that eventually generated extensive reports on suspect individuals and their connections throughout Europe. Recourse to these special investigative commissions began with the Jacobin Trials in 1794, but grew to encompass Habsburg's eastern territories, where Vienna monitored revolutionary activity in Poland and Galicia. This tendency to appoint investigative commissions reached its zenith with the development of commissions in Mainz (1819) and Milan (1820).

As Wolfram Siemann has argued, the Habsburgs pioneered important aspects of political policing; however, other Central European states followed shortly thereafter.[21] Conceived in broad comparative terms, this dissertation addresses developments in Prussia, Bavaria, and Austria, as well as in territories ruled by each. Prior work has

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[21] Despite Siemann's insight here, he dedicates seven pages of an almost five-hundred-page work to Austrian policing prior to 1815. See, Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 41-8.

mostly interpreted state-security practices within strict national boundaries.[22] By contrast, this dissertation depicts the flow of ideas, people, and administrative practice across borders, offering a critical new international sightline in the history of state security and civil society in Central Europe. As Chapter Two shows, both Prussia and Bavaria followed a similar model as the Habsburgs, though they did so under different historical and political circumstances. In response to an emerging and increasingly engaged civil society (Freemasons, Illuminati, and other secret societies) as well as the unique pressures of French occupation, statesmen in both Prussia and Bavaria developed policing and state censorship agencies as well as centralized institutions designed to monitor correspondence and movement. By 1806, institutionally and conceptually, these two states had made the transition from traditional, cameralist notions of *Polizei* to policing agencies designed to defend state security.

This dissertation also considers the development of similar institutions across Europe, most notably France and England but also the Papal States and other, post-Napoleonic kingdoms of southern Italy. In so doing, it acknowledges these institutions as pan-European in scope and documents important moments of cross-border cooperation among these repressive state agencies. Historians and social scientists generally date the arrival of "international cooperation" of policing forces to the second half of the nineteenth century. Recently, however, some scholars suggest that the period

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[22] Evans, *Rereading German History*, 65-9.

immediately following 1815 is a more accurate date, pointing to the establishment of similar methods and agencies designed to collect information throughout most of Europe.[23] But, as Chapter Three shows, numerous instances of cross-border cooperation in the policing of political radicals date back at least to the turn of the nineteenth century. This dissertation thus argues that concerns over "European security" long pre-date the Congress of Vienna and even Metternich's arrival as the Minster of Foreign Affairs in 1810.

Chapter Five builds on these themes, addressing the central role Italy played in establishing Metternich's "system" of European security more generally. Historians of Central Europe tend to gloss over the subject, and neither Pieter Judson nor Steven Beller discuss the re-establishment of Habsburg authority in Lombardy-Venetia after 1814.[24] Building on themes developed in Chapters Three and Four, the fifth chapter argues that Habsburg control of the Italian peninsula became particularly important for the security of the post-Napoleonic order in Europe. From their administrative centers in Milan and Venice, Austrian officials maintained surveillance on Napoleon and his supporters. In fact, as Chapters Four and Five show, Bonapartist machinations proved to be the most

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[23] For example, see, Ido de Haan and Jeroen van Zanten, "Constructing an International Conspiracy: Revolution Concertation and Police Neworks in the European Restoration," in, *Securing Europe*, 171-92, here, 184.

[24] Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*; Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 26. Though ending in 1815, Charles Ingrao's classic survey mentions Austrian Italy in one sentence at the very end of the book. Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1994]), 239.

pressing concern for the victorious allies between 1814 and 1821. After Napoleon's escape from the island of Elba the peninsula emerged as a hotbed of revolutionary activity. Consequently, between 1815 and 1821, Italy received far more attention than the German states. The Austrian state codified and strengthened its investigatory powers in Central Europe after the Carlsbad Decrees, but the policing of political participation in the German Confederation remained, at least until the mid-1820s, a secondary theater of concern. Metternich's infamous decrees, then, were one piece of a larger puzzle of European security. Long-considered part of Europe's "periphery," the Italian peninsula was central to Metternich's plan for European security.

This study also considers the relationship between surveillance regimes and an emerging civil society in Central Europe. Previous scholarship on the political police revealed the extent of its jurisdiction and organizational structure but has overlooked the effect of political policing on public life.[25] This is a conspicuous historiographical absence. This dissertation corrects this flaw by locating an active and engaged Central European public sphere during a period traditionally characterized as reactionary and deeply authoritarian. This aspect of the dissertation is twofold. First, it argues that the authorities responsible for these agencies – this includes police ministers throughout Central Europe as well as powerful statesmen – were keener observers of their societies than historians have allowed. The period witnessed no shortage of adventurers or overly

[25] Emblematic here is, Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*."

ambitious civil servants hoping to secure money, titles, or better appointments. But the files of the various police ministries under investigation here are replete with careful consideration of important cases. Statesmen clearly recognized the power of revolutionary ideals and the likelihood that it would resonate among various strata of society. This becomes clear throughout the entire period of this study. As such, the police did not follow all reports of wide-spread conspiracy or rampant Freemasonry. In fact, some individuals seeking the attention of the authorities faced imprisonment and exile over false claims or for their general scheming. It is true that paranoia often took the helm and could lead to abuses and counterproductive policing methods; this is especially the case during the Jacobin Trials and the investigations into secret societies in Habsburg Italy. Despite the difficulties police agencies faced in monitoring political participation, the dense correspondence reveals a politically active and engaged society in a period historians once deemed stagnant.

Second, this dissertation offers a brief sketch of how a Central European public sphere understood and discussed the issue of political and secret police agencies. It thereby captures an early liberal critique of heightened forms of policing. Journals, such as Johann Friedrich Cotta's weekly, *Allgemeine Deutsche Justiz-, Kameral- Und Polizeifama*, published widely on arbitrary rule (*Willkür*), state corruption, and the lack of transparency in government throughout Europe. Not only did Cotta publish this paper in the 1820s, a period of supposed political quiescence and strict press limitations, this journal evinces an important transition in the history of liberal political ideas. Rather than viewing ideologies as arriving fully formed after 1789, historians now stress the

fluidity of concepts such as liberalism and conservatism.[26] Through a close reading of Cotta's journals, Chapter Four views the 1820s as a critical decade in the hardening of political positions as an early vision of economic liberalism melded with a larger, liberal political agenda. It thereby sheds some light on the history of liberal political thinking and democratic practice in Central Europe prior to 1848.

While a growing and increasingly literate and engaged civil society is an important throughout, the dissertation foregrounds the birth and further development of conservative state practice in Central Europe. Central here is the monumental work of Klaus Epstein, who located the "genesis" of German conservativism in the growing anti-Enlightenment and the subsequent anti-Revolutionary reaction in the years between 1770 and 1806. Epstein's work is ambitious, and the evidence he marshals is overwhelming. But Epstein never managed to put flesh on his conservative skeleton, avoiding as he did any discussion on the development of conservative institutions among Central European state governments. If Epstein's conservative intellectuals helped conceptualize the threat of a politicized civil society in the late-eighteenth century, state institutions followed closely behind. Addressing both the conceptual changes in the concept of *Polizei* and the increased institutionalization of repressive measures, the dissertation seeks to understand how such bodies evolved within political cultures increasingly hostile to political change.

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[26] Matthew Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

As such, it argues that an institutional sclerosis developed prior to 1815. The continued reliance on premodern security practices hindered governments' ability to address evolving political grievances, undermining the legitimacy of restored governance in a foundational period for modern politics.

Chapter 1

SECRET POLICE, SURVEILLANCE, AND STATE SECURITY IN HABSBURG TERRITORY, 1770-1794

On 19 June 1790, Prince Kaunitz, State Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, received a report from the Imperial Minister in Coblenz, the center of French *émigré* activity in Europe after 1789. The letter addressed an international conspiracy on the part of French "agents" and members of the "democratic party" centered in Paris, who, by establishing a *club de propagande*, were "actively plotting" international revolution via *émigré* networks. One month later, Kaunitz received a similar letter from the Austrian ambassador in Turin.[27] While Kaunitz initially dismissed these reports, Count Kollowrat, the Supreme Chancellor, took notice, immediately informing provincial governors of their duty to register all foreigners, while notifying Count Johann von Pergen, the head of the Ministry of Police, to maintain surveillance on outsiders, especially those French and Italians already in Habsburg territory.[28] Thus began a prolonged struggle on the part of the Austrian monarchy to manage the threat of revolutionary machinations both home and abroad.

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[27] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 62-3.

[28] Kolowrat to Pergen, 9 Sept. 1790, AVA Inneres Pol. *PA*, 22/1.

But if the motivation to monitor individuals took on a new ideological dimension in the wake of the French Revolution, the apparatus Pergen utilized in 1790 had evolved over four decades and dated back to the reformist era of Maria Theresa. Also, if certain organizational or administrative developments predated 1789, so too did the *raison d'être* of the monarchy's policing agencies, especially its secret police. By the outbreak of revolution, the monarchy's police, developed by Count Pergen between 1782-1790,[29] long premised its existence on the ability to secure the safety of the ruler and his government. Over the course of the late eighteenth century, the police evolved to manage discontent and criticism. This meant the use of both a secret and public police force; extensive surveillance of suspect individuals; the reading of private correspondence; the monitoring of public opinion; and an increased watch over the movement of foreigners. The spread of revolutionary ideas certainly offered new challenges to the security of the monarchy, as the increased reliance on the secret police attests. But that spread of those concepts served to intensify and entrench a system developed a decade prior. What

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[29] For Pergen's early career as imperial envoy to Mainz (1753-1766) see, T.C.W. Blanning, *Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743-1803* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 58, 136-45. Though Pergen was moderately successful as envoy, the years after his recall from Mainz were somewhat precarious, as he had fallen out of favor with Joseph II. However, Pergen spent the next decade as Kaunitz's deputy foreign minister, and governor of the newly acquired Polish territories from 1772 to 1774. After his appointment as *Landsmarschall* for Lower Austria in 1775, he was responsible for developing a standardized and simplified form of worship that Joseph immediately imposed in all churches in Vienna and Lower Austria. This is an important moment, and not just for church reform: this success opened the door for Pergen to revamp neglected bodies responsible for maintaining law and order in both Vienna and the provinces. For this period see, Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State,* 115-21.

changed after 1790, and especially after 1793, was the scope of perceived threats to the monarchy, which in turn justified the use of secret and often extra-legal means to defend the monarchy.

As this chapter argues, between 1782 and 1794, reformers within the Habsburg monarchy developed critical aspects of a security state to control public opinion, surveil society, and manage threats to the monarchy. These decades are too often overlooked by historians of the Habsburg monarchy and have yet to be tied fully to post-Napoleonic trends in political repression.[30] This chapter addresses that issue by examining administrative reforms in policing that pre-dated the outbreak of revolution in 1789 but were affected by the success and eventual spread of war and revolution in critical ways. By the end of the eighteenth century, Pergen and his closest ministers not only redefined the meaning of state security but also developed the institutions necessary to defend it.

Policing Reform in Habsburg Territory

Historians of the Habsburg eighteenth century have long argued that this period marks the death of the reform movements of Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II. This

[30] For example, Ernst Wangermann's study on the Jacobin Trials ends in 1794, though, in an added epilogue of a second edition, he does argue the trials signal the beginning of the Austrian *Vormärz*. idem, *Joseph II*. Likewise, Donald Emerson's 1968 work does not address the years between 1794 and 1815, claiming only that the period was the most "moderate." Idem, *Metternich*, 29-30. Wolfram Siemann takes seven pages to discuss the founding of the secret police under Joseph II and nine for Prussia; however, the period between 1789-1815 is not addressed. Idem., "*Deutschlands Ruhe*."

argument is most closely associated with Ernst Wangermann,[31] but dates to the late-nineteenth century, when liberal commentators lamented the "Chinese Wall" of police spies, censorship, and repression that isolated Austria and stunted its political, social, and economic development.[32] For Wangermann and others, the Habsburg monarchy after Joseph's death chose a path of repression – rather than continued, measured reform – in which the police played a critical, if ironic, role: developed as a tool to carry out reform, emperors after Joseph II used the police to scale back the scope of those reforms. This chapter argues, that from their inception under Pergen, and long before the so-called Jacobin Trials of 1794, the monarchy's policing agencies embraced the defense of state security as their defining characteristic. While the events associated with the French Revolution and the spread of Revolutionary War are critical for understanding how the security state developed in Habsburg territory, security measures were largely in place before 1789, at least in some form. Far from ending an era of reform, the years between 1782 and 1794 witness the birth of a modern security state, designed above all to monitor its subjects' behavior and defend the security of the monarchy.

The reforms that eventually gave birth to Pergen's police system date to the Austrian loss of Silesia to Prussia during the Wars of Austrian Succession (1740-1748). This loss demonstrated to Marie Theresa and Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz,

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[31] Wangermann, *Joseph II.*

[32] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 106.

her reform minister and Supreme Chancellor, the need for increased control over Habsburg territory and its resources. Taking her cue from the Prussians, Maria Theresa began a process of overhauling and centralizing administrative bodies, subordinating local authorities to agents of the central government, and limiting the role of provincial diets by assigning increased supervisory powers to various bureaus in Vienna. This institutional policy of centralization and territorial integration received a new cultural and patriotic justification,[33] while promoting economic, religious, and educational reform.[34] Yet, far from being informed by a philosophical commitment to enlightened rule, these reforms – ultimately responsible for the early development of Austria's policing forces – were a response to practical and, at times, urgent necessities.

As a defining concept of Central European cameralism, "*Polizei*" signified the state's desire both to monitor behavior and to regulate society for the good of its subjects. The term itself dates to the sixteenth century, perhaps even finding its roots in medieval

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[33] For the best-known example, see Joseph von Sonnenfels, *Ueber die Liebe des Vaterlandes* (Vienna: Kurzböck, 1771). Here he ties Austrians' civic responsibility to a heightened, patriotic love of "the Fatherland." For a broader discussion on the matter, see, Ernst Wangermann, "Deutscher Patriotismus und österreichische Reformbewegung im Zeitalter Josephs II," in *Österreich und die deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. Heinrich Lutz and Helmut Rumpler, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1982), 60-72, here 63.

[34] Friedrich Walter, *Die Geschichte der oesterreichischen Zentralverwaltung in der Zeit Maria Theresias, 1740-1780* (Vienna: Holzhausen, 1938), esp. 242-3; Richard Evans, *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Essays on Central Europe, 1600-1867* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 61; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 28-36.

rulers' twin responsibilities of meting out justice and preserving the peace.[35] By the mid eighteenth century, the concept of *Polizeiwissenschaft* ("public policy") was certainly in use, even being taught in Vienna's universities, thanks largely to the work of Joseph von Sonnenfels and Johann Justi.[36] Despite its usage in academic and governmental circles, the concept remained nebulous and encompassed responsibilities so diffuse that no single body could effectively manage all areas of administration. In a letter to Maria Theresa in 1786, the government of Lower Austria still defined policing in very broad terms that included both "welfare" and "security." In that letter, the government developed a "System" that distinguished eight areas of police competency: population policy (health, marriage records, births and deaths, and the movement of foreigners); religion and morals (including the censorship of printed material, the policing of schismatics, and the protection of Vienna's Jewish population); supply of victuals (*Viktualien*); supervision of markets; industry (including education, the promotion of the liberal arts and sciences, and soil conservation); poor relief (*Armenpflege*); construction (*Bausachen*); and security

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[35] Hans Boldt, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte politische Strukturen und ihr Wandel.* Vol. 1, *Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des älteren deutschen Reiches 1806* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), esp. 48-59.

[36] See, Joseph von Sonnenfels, *Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung und Finanzwissenschaft,* 3 vols. (Vienna: Kurzböck, 1771-1773) and J.H.G. Justi, *Grundsätze der Polizeywissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1759). For the development of *Polizeiwissenschaft* in seventeenth-century Germany see, Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State.* For Austria see, Karl-Heinz Osterloh, *Joseph von Sonnenfels und die österreichische Reformbewegung im Zeitalter des aufgeklärten Absolutismus* (Lübeck: Matthiesen Verlag, 1970), 49-79; Axtmann, "'Police' and the Formation of the Modern State."

(*Sicherheitswesen*).[37] Much of this system – or, policing in the broad sense – continued to define policing in German-speaking countries throughout the nineteenth century.

While Maria Theresa's reforms initially addressed the issue of policing, both in Vienna and the provinces, the reality of those reforms rarely met expectations. As Paul Bernard argues, the neglect of policing agencies in this period was not due to authorities' "laziness," but, rather, because the maintenance of law and order "never seemed to be a matter of great urgency."[38] In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Vienna floated a population of roughly 200,000, well behind the major metropolises of London or Paris, whose populations hovered around half a million. In addition, a substantial proportion of Vienna's inhabitants were servants in nobles' households, the heads of which were responsible for the behavior of their charges. Vienna had not yet developed a sizeable middle-class wealthy enough to require protection. And finally, by the mid-eighteenth century, there had been no sustained drive to establish a functional constabulary such as in France and England.[39] Even in the Austrian countryside, law enforcement stood under the purview of the estates and was financed by a tax on the nobility.[40]

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[37] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 212-13.

[38] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 119.

[39] Beattie, *The First English Detectives*, 1-13, 25-51.

[40] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 120.

Between 1750 and 1780, attempts to reform and streamline the management of Austria's policing agencies found few successes, and largely remained on paper. Despite its impressive title, the *Polizei-Hofkommission*, established by Count Haugwitz to police the capital in 1750, took years to staff. Haugwitz coupled this new commission with the equally grandiose, *Kommission für Sicherheits-, Armen-, Verpflegsachen*, which he designed to coordinate policing of the countryside with provincial governments. While each body was duly staffed, no functioning police force materialized, an oversight not addressed until 1753 when Haugwitz established a new administrative body, the *Unterkommission aus der Wiener Bürgerschaft*. By the 1760s, Vienna could count 188 officers, spread over six administrative districts. Overwhelmed at its inception, Maria Theresa tasked her police with maintaining control over the city's large itinerant population, monitoring foreigners and Vienna's Jewish quarters, and with suppressing prostitution and "general immorality."[41] In 1767, the *Staatsrat* considered the establishment of a police directory for the whole of Vienna. The conservative *Hofkanzlei* blocked this effort, however, arguing that it sheltered the capital from the authority of the estates. This prompted Maria Theresa to instruct Sonnenfels and Justi to develop a new plan to organize police activities, the fruits of which eventually proved to be unworkable

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[41] Benna "Organisierung," 198-9; Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 12; Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 199-224. On the development of Vienna's various policing agencies, see Josef Kallbrunner, "Die Wiener Polizei im Zeitalter Maria Theresias," *Monatsblatt des Altertumsvereines zu Wien* 11 (1911): 235-39.

and ultimately shelved.[42] Yet their work was not entirely a failure. It led to the creation of the *Polizeiamt*, a supervisory agency with 250 men and an undisclosed number of secret agents. Not unlike the Parisian *mouchard*, Maria Theresa charged Vienna's secret agents to report on "general unrest," especially among the city's foreign population.[43] Little evidence exists to suggest that these new policing forces were adequate to fulfill their intended role. Reports from the Court Chancellery (*Hofkanzlei*) throughout the 1770s reveal the consternation of city authorities that the government failed to protect property and to maintain security and welfare.[44] Most historians tend to dismiss these early police agencies, writing them off as "ill-paid, unreliable, and unpopular," and perhaps too fond of the pub.[45] While this certainly rings true – stories of the besotted,

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[42] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 122. Maria Theresa was impressed by the Parisian police, so much so that she directed sixteen questions on regular police activity to Antoine Raymond de Sartine, Lieutenant General of Police. The resulting inquiry returned in the form of Jean-Baptiste Le Maire's, "La Police de Paris en 1770: Mémoire sur l'Adminstration de la Police en France Contenant les éclaircissements demandés à ce sujet par M. l'Ambassadeur de Vienne, de la part de LL. MM. impériles et royales à M. de Sartine, Conseiller d'État, Lieutenant-general de police de la ville de Paris." Complaints that the French system was too expensive and ran contrary to common decency limited the report's impact. On this see, Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 233.

[43] Kallbrunner, "Wiener Polizei," 239-40.

[44] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 217.

[45] Emblematic here is, Derek Beales, *Joseph II.* Vol. 2, *Against the World, 1780-1790* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 552-4.

derelict nightwatchman and, later, policeman, abound throughout the period – the agencies' exact purpose and the extent of their jurisdiction remains unclear.[46]

Despite a strong mix of financial, political, and institutional barriers limiting the development of a more streamlined policing agency, and despite the shortcomings of early attempts at reform, two critical administrative developments emerged in this period. In 1755, authorities established a city-wide "registration system," making it mandatory for all urban (and immediate suburban) residents to file their address with the police. Similarly, all guests and housekeepers were required to register with local authorities, a requirement that both residents and the authorities found tedious in the extreme.[47] Nevertheless, these regulations included the development of a rudimentary passport system, which over the decades extended to the whole of the Empire. Each successive wave of reform strengthened this policy, increasingly extending the reach of the government into the provinces, despite some hostility from local elites.[48] The second, critical administrative development arrived in the wake of those alarmist reports of the early 1770s. In 1773, new reforms made the government of Lower Austria solely responsible for the policing of Vienna. This specific administrative reshuffling not only

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[46] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 83.

[47] "Instrukzion für die sowohl in der Stadt, als auf den gesammten Vorstadtsgründen angestellten Polizeiunterkommissarien," Vienna 26 June, 1754. See Ignatz Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*. Vol. 1, *1740-1792* (Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagner'schen Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1896), 84-7.

[48] Beidtel, *österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*, 88.

formalized a long-standing, de facto practice but also shaped Vienna's policing agencies for the next seven decades. The reforms broke the city itself down into four districts, and the surrounding suburbs into eight, each with their own overseer (*Bezirksaufseher*) responsible for maintaining public safety, order, and a watch over the movement of foreigners.[49] The *Polizeiamt* received a military-style overhaul, with two senior officials (*Oberbeamten*), twelve direct subordinates (*Unterbeamten*), and eight transcribers (*Protokollisten*).[50] In addition, the reforms granted the *Polizeiamt* a supervisory role over the traditionally independent municipal courts (who oversaw the city guard), as well as the mayor's court (*Magistrat*). Finally, and most importantly for the eventual development of the Ministry of Police, the governor of Lower Austria was now responsible for appointing the director of Vienna's *Polizeiamt*, who now reported directly to the governor.[51]

With Maria Theresa's death on 29 November 1780, after forty years on the throne, it became clear, especially to the politically ambitious, that reforms were on the immediate horizon. Immediately upon her death, Joseph II, co-regent and Holy Roman

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[49] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 220-2. Each overseer was responsible for maintaining order and security day and night, but they also managed a fire brigade; were responsible for cleaning streets; oversaw commerce in their districts; and were charged with making daily reports along with monthly summaries.

[50] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 220.

[51] At the time, the governor of Lower Austria was Count Pergen. A position he would leverage in the 1780s to assert control over the monarchy's growing body of police agencies. Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 220-1; Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 128.

Emperor since 1765, and now absolute ruler of the whole of the Austrian Monarchy and the Empire, attained a level of authority and freedom to act that his mother never enjoyed.[52] His reign, however, elicited mixed emotions from contemporaries. Some, like the poet Herder, hoped Joseph's reign would announce the birth of a (legally and linguistically) unified "German fatherland," while others, such as the Grand Duke Leopold, his brother and future heir, wrote of the "dread" and lack of trust that Joseph's future rule inspired.[53] Foreign diplomats and astute travelers alike recognized in Joseph a strange mix of enlightened ruler and "despotic potentate," a confounding combination of political attitudes that would be applied to Napoleon some twenty years later. Regardless of their hopes or fears, most who commented on Joseph's impending reign could at least agree with Frederick the Great when he claimed that Joseph's accession augured "an entirely new order of things."[54]

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[52] Maria Theresa made Joseph her co-regent in 1765, when he succeeded his father Francis Stephen, co-regent and Holy Roman Emperor since 1745. With Maria Theresa's death, the separation between Empire and Monarchy, established with her accession to the throne in 1740, ended. See Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth Century Europe* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), esp. Chap. 7. To give some sense of Joseph's new-found freedom of action, in 1780 Maria Theresa issued eighty-two decrees for her non-Hungarian territories. In 1781, Joseph published 402 decrees for the same regions. These numbers come from, Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 63.

[53] Derek Beales, *Joseph II.* Vol. I, *In the Shadow of Maria Theresa, 1741-1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 132-3. See also, Beales, *Joseph II*, II: 15, 18.

[54] As quoted in Beales, *Joseph II*, II: 15.

That sentiment proved accurate. In the ten years that Joseph reigned, his reforms reordered the relationship between the monarchy and its subjects. His deep and wide-ranging – though not always successful – transformations ranged in scope from church reform; the assimilation of Jews and Protestants through a policy of toleration; an overhaul of the military; promotion of an ever-growing (middle class) bureaucracy; the abolition of torture; the reduction of peasant obligations; the writing of a Civic Code (*Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*); and the imposition of a new administrative language throughout Habsburg territories.[55] This flood of reform also brought with it a reorganization of the monarchy's policing agencies, and not just in its organizational structure. After April 1782, and through the tireless efforts of Count Pergen, reforms of the police fundamentally altered what it meant to "police": by separating "welfare" and "security" functions once and for all, Austria's state police became a "preventive force," concerned with the maintenance of law-and-order, the supervision and management of public opinion, and the ferreting out of threats to the monarchy. While it is unlikely that either Pergen or Joseph fully grasped the implications of their decision to separate law-and-order policies from the broader understanding of *Polizeiwissenschaft*, the reforms nonetheless advanced the development of the Habsburg security state. Regardless of

[55] While some older treaties were critical of Joseph II, criticizing him for strangling a nascent public sphere in its cradle, and for his handling of political dissent, more recent accounts are far more favorable, counting Joseph as one of Europe's most innovative sovereigns. Emblematic of the former is, Wangermann, *Joseph II*, the latter, Beales, *Joseph II*, II: esp. 687-90.

either's awareness, by the end of the 1780s, Pergen managed to develop an autonomous police ministry (complete with a secret body of agents under his command), responsible only to the emperor, that spread throughout all major urban centers in the monarchy, and, in its centralization, rivaled all other police agencies in Europe.

Pergen and the Secret Police

The course of Pergen's reforms and the growing administrative development of the police throughout the 1780s and 1790s are well-known.[56] By the mid-1770s, Count Pergen was a career bureaucrat; however, as a one-time envoy to Mainz and a recalled provincial governor of Galicia, Pergen could count few major successes. In 1775, Maria Theresa appointed Pergen *Landmarschall* of Lower Austria, a role in which he immediately proved unpopular. Though he drew a considerable state salary and sizeable pension, Pergen's position kept him far from the centers of power in Vienna. A chance for promotion arrived in 1780, when Maria Theresa awarded him the post of Governor of the Austrian Netherlands. That appointment proved illusory, as Joseph, with whom Pergen enjoyed little confidence, instead granted Prince Starhemberg, an old rival, the appointment. As Pergen's biographer, Paul Bernard, points out, Pergen was not ideally placed to gain the attention of the emperor as a provincial governor. Yet Pergen made

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[56] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*; Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:47ff; Benna, "Organisierung,"; Emerson, *Metternich*, Chap. 1; Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, Chap. 5; Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 41-8.

the most of his time in the "wilderness of provincial government," immersing himself into the business of police work.[57]

As governor of Lower Austria, Pergen was nominally responsible for Vienna's policing. Between 1775 and 1782, Pergen found few practical successes, other than presiding over the city's administrative reorganization mentioned above. For reasons mostly financial, Pergen found little support for his police reforms among political elites. But he did hit on one critical idea of potential interest: surveillance of the population. While the conservative Court Chancellery deemed his plans for a French-inspired body of clandestine agents an affront to civic liberty (*bürgerliche Freiheit*), and too expensive, Pergen did not jettison the idea.[58] In fact, Pergen repackaged the idea to great success only a few years later. In April 1782, the government of Lower Austria merged the estates with the provincial government, awarding Pergen authority over the new body and the title of *Regierungspräsident.* Secure in his new position, and with years of preparation, Pergen captured the attention of Joseph after submitting a report that outlined his vision for a new policing agency, one that abandoned administrative overlap, so that security of the state could be better maintained.[59]

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[57] Bernand, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 115-27; Emerson, *Metternich*, 8-9; Walter, "Die Organisierung," 25-7; Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 42.

[58] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 223; Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 123-4.

[59] As a number of historians point out, Pergen took verbatim a report from Franz Anton von Beer, titled "Entwurfe zur Verbesserung der allgemeinen Polizey und Sicherheit." Von Beer was involved with the Vienna police since 1765. See Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 227-

Pergen's initial plan relied on three interrelated developments. First, Pergen argued that to maintain security, the police required a tripartite division, the heads of which would stand under his control. As a separately managed arm, police work in the narrow sense of providing security, became the responsibility of the *Polizei-Direktion* under the aegis of Franz Anton von Beer in November 1782. This agency then divided itself between "public" and "secret," the latter of which was controlled by Pergen himself (with only the emperor to answer to). The second development here is Pergen's insistence on further strengthening Vienna's registration system, and the spread of that system throughout the monarchy. He furthered argued that a secret police (*geheime Polizei*), whose responsibility it was to monitor foreigners and suspected spies, could not function without a proper system to track individuals' movement. Finally, in 1784 Pergen pressed Joseph to extend his authority over police matters to major urban areas, in the hopes of creating a centralized and uniform web of police and secret agents, no longer answerable to the governors, as tradition dictated, but to Pergen.[60] As far as Pergen and Beer were concerned, policing was the very foundation upon which good government rested, and which guaranteed the livelihood of the state and emperor. And it appears that

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80; Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:49; Benna, "Organisierung," 110; Emerson, *Metternich*, 10 n.30.

[60] Perhaps the most useful sketch of the development of Austria's secret police is, August Fournier, "Entstehung und Entwicklung des 'geheimen Dienstes' in Oesterreich," in his, *Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wienerkongress*, 1-12. See also, Walter "Die Organisierung," 32-33.

Joseph was amenable to their position, as he was growing increasingly concerned about the spread of hostile public opinion, especially the opinion of the monarchy's political elite.[61] While Pergen and Beer received pushback from the Court Chancellery, by 1787 Joseph extended police directorates to six cities throughout the monarchy: Prague and Brno (16 March 1785), the provincial seats of Bohemia and Moravia; Pressburg and Ofen in Hungary; Troppau in Silesia; and Graz in Styria (1786/7). Innsbruck, Linz, Milan, Hermannstadt, and Pest would follow later in 1787.[62]

With such rapid growth of Pergen's new system after 1784, Pergen produced a secret set of instructions designed to establish and train a secret police service, and to "remind" provincial authorities how critical policing was for good government.[63] Pergen's "secret instructions" addressed the growing threat of public opinion, the primacy placed on the political oversight of all classes, as well as authorities' need to

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[61] Part I, Paragraph 2 of the *Geheime Instuktion*, (1786), states: "unobtrusively to investigate what the general public is saying about the emperor and his government, how public opinion is developing in this respect, whether among the upper or lower classes there are any malcontents or perhaps even agitator coming to the fore." A copy of Pergen's "Secret Instructions" can be found in HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 2-19, here Bl. 6. Parts are reproduced in, August Fournier, "Kaiser Joseph II. und der 'geheime Dienst'," in his, *Historische Studien und Skizzen*, 3rd. ed. (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1912), 11.

[62] Lemberg, Triest, and Brüssels already had police agencies (*Polizeianstalten*). Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:50; Walter, "Die Organisierung," 33-6; Emerson, *Metternich*, 11.

[63] Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 12.

identify "machinations" before they develop.[64] Distributed in 1786, these instructions detailed how a "public" police (*öffentliche Polizei*) and a secret police functioned in relation to one another, and outlined a hierarchy of targets. Arguing that uniformity and coherence in supervision were twin pillars of state security, Pergen continued by saying "only the police are responsible in the exposure, through unobserved searches, of all matter of dangerous tendencies before they become mature. Only the police . . . counteract the secret enemies of the state . . . [who] protect themselves from the public view and cannot know they are watched secretly."[65] In so doing, it was the job of the public police to "disguise" the means through which the secret police gathered information. Pergen also suggested that the police be used for political purposes: "the state gains very much," he argued, if it "learns reliably" the opinions of its subjects and acts both to "discover and eradicate" those threats to "internal security which undermine it."[66]

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[64] For the growth of the "Fourth Estate" in Austria and Joseph II's response to it see, Wangermann, *Joseph II*, esp. 25-35. For the French case, and building on the pioneering work of Roger Chartier, see, Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Rosemary Morris (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007 [1994]).

[65] As quoted in Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, II:170. See also, Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 7.

[66] As quoted in Emerson, *Metternich*, 13. See also, Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 234; Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, II: 170.

Chief among Pergen's suggested targets were Austria's civil servants. In her study of the growing bureaucracy after 1780, Waltraud Heindl argues that Austrian government officials formed a distinct middle-class milieu, hostile to aristocratic privilege, and who promoted the era's great reforms.[67] By mid-decade, dissatisfaction among Austria's elites (who were once reluctant allies of Joseph's "enlightened despotism") with the flood of levelling reforms compelled Joseph to put a halt on those that might alienate the estates, especially in territories ruled from afar.[68] However, this growing army of civil servants, who were swept into positions of influence in government precisely due to these reforms, were not inclined to legislate against their own interests.[69] To gauge dissatisfaction among all levels of society, Pergen insisted that second only to surveillance of government officials was the policing of public opinion. This second instruction, he argued, followed from the first. The police, Pergen claimed, must "secretly investigate what the public says about the monarch and his government

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[67] Waltraud Heindl, *Gehorsame Rebellen: Bürokratie und Beamte in Österreich, 1780 bis 1848* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1991).

[68] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 49-55.

[69] Pergen suggested the secret police should read the private correspondence of "unfaithful civil servants," but to do so in a way that did not damage the "reputation of the mail or civil liberties." See "Geheime Instruktion," sect. I, para. V and VIII, and sect. II, para. V, quoted in Fournier "'geheime Dienst'," 12, 14. These beneficiaries of Enlightened reformed proved to be quite a menace, so much so that Pergen could write to the king in 1790 that, among the King's servants "discontent and mistrust have taken the place of patriotism and attachment to the Sovereign." Pergen to Joseph, 16 January 1790, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 1-2, 21.

from time to time."[70] This meant both a careful watch over printed material and private correspondence, a tactic that Central European police would make great use of in the coming decades. Finally, Pergen included additional information concerning sections of society he deemed likely to manifest signs of dissatisfaction, and, thus, in need of "secret observation." This included the clergy, foreigners (especially those without a residence), false advertisers and fraudulent merchants, suspected spies, money forgers, and "sects and errors" (*Sekten und Irrthümer*), all of whom threatened the "gullible mob."[71]

At the heart of Pergen's secret police was the registration system. Developed in the 1750s, Pergen revamped this unpopular police practice to check the movement of suspected foreign agents, as well as any other "dangerous persons." Pergen charged provincial governors, especially those whose territories neighbored foreign countries, with maintaining lists of foreign travelers, while developing cross-border contacts to track spies and "disloyal officials." In addition, Pergen suggested that provincial police agencies draw up and circulate lists of suspects among the provincial governments and, in turn, report "confidentially" back to Pergen. In view of his distrust of civil servants, Pergen saw the reading of government officials' mail as an important tool in the secret police's arsenal, but Pergen allowed for the reading of all private, foreign correspondence as a feature of his registration system.[72] Pergen argued that the success or failure of this

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[70] "Geheime Intruktion," sect. I, para. II, quoted in Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 11.

[71] Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 12-13.

registration system – and any subsequent investigations leading from it – turned on the ability to maintain strict secrecy among those involved; only the head of the local secret police and the individual conducting the secret investigation should have knowledge of events. Too many contacts and public knowledge, Pergen noted, undermined the system. While the public police could act as the face of the state, its essential role was to conceal the work of the secret police. As such, only the most skilled individuals were considered for the secret police, as their charge was no less than the security of the emperor and his government.[73] With these instructions, Pergen and Beer, now director of the police in Vienna, took the first, critical administrative steps in turning the monarchy's gaze inward towards its subjects and their politics, all in the name of state security.

Pergen and Beer's insistence on secretive methods and the necessity of the registration system encountered challenges. Chief among the detractors was the great Austrian jurist, novelist, and natural law advocate, Joseph von Sonnenfels. As with other commentators, Sonnenfels did not take issue with the police per se; he, like many enlightened thinkers viewed the police as the "hand-maiden of the law" and necessary for the practice of good government.[74] Rather, he took issue with the methods and aims of

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[72] Again, if done in a way that did not violate the "Kredit des Instituts und der Bürgerliche Freiheit." See Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 13-6.

[73] Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 16. See Franz Anton von Beer, "Amtsinstriktion" 17 November 1786, reproduced in Oberhummer, II:165-8. Walter, "Die Organisierung," 37.

the secret police. Sonnenfels long held that all citizens had the right to know the full extent of public authorities' power and demanded that the jurisdiction of public authority rest upon agreed norms, grounded in public law. In addition, he argued that police procedure must adhere to "publicly known regulations" and that every citizen should be afforded the protection of the law, even if under arrest or investigation. Such concerns, from the monarchy's most well-known proponent of the *Rechtsstaat*, clearly ran contrary to the *modus operandi* of Pergen's secret police. According to Pergen, the fate of those arrested were in the hands of the emperor, who alone decided whether to try or investigate a subject. Because neither Pergen nor Beer ever published guidelines regarding methods of investigation and establishing proof of guilt, anyone subject to a secret police investigation stood at the mercy of Pergen or von Beer outside the protection of law.

As Ernst Wangermann argues, these legal discrepancies and perhaps purposeful oversights, were not merely theoretical concerns, but, rather, actual threats to the security and welfare of the monarchy's subjects.[75] Two cases in particular, both *causes célèbres* of their time, have attracted historians' attention. The first entails the arrest of a Josepha Willias, a known consort of military officers stationed along the Croatian border, who

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[74] Wangermenn, *Joseph II*, 38. See also, Werner Ogris, "Joseph von Sonnenfels als Rechtsreformer," in *Joseph von Sonnenfels*, ed. Helmut Reinalter (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1988), 11-96, esp. 77-86.

[75] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 38-43.

attempted to deliver sensitive military secrets to a Prussian named Jacobi during the poorly managed war against the Turks (1788-91). Police arrested Willias and imprisoned her without a criminal trial, subjecting her to all the hardships of arrest and the "tempers" of police officials for the entire duration of the war. Despite Willias's oft-stated defense that she never knew the contents of the delivered packet, and that the officer she received it from had abused her trust –important extenuating circumstance in a criminal trial – Willias was never officially charged with a crime and never tried. Suffering numerous breakdowns over the two years she was in police custody, Willias emerged during Leopold II's reign (1790-1792) as a symbol of both the excess of Joseph's police and his disdain for natural law.[76]

The second case concerned the Viennese book seller, Georg Philipp Wucherer. While Wucherer exploited the lack of copyright laws, gaining him few friends within the literary world, he caught the eye of the secret police for another reason: the selling of cheap, salacious pamphlets (*Schmähschriften*) critical of the government. According to Pergen, Wucherer's bookshop was likely responsible for a major uptick in the sale of blacklisted books, and, therefore, a target of singular importance. When Karl Friedrich Bahrdt, a prominent middle-class religious radical, established a secret society called the German Union, Wucherer agreed to act as its head (*Diozesan*) in Vienna, putting Wucherer in Joseph II's sights. At the emperor's insistence, Pergen instructed secret

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[76] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 39-40

agents to act as *agents provocateurs*, in the hopes Wucherer would sell blacklisted material. The police failed twice in enticing Wucherer to sell, but proved successful on the third attempt, when an agent in disguise as a foreigner leaving Habsburg territory bought a series of pamphlets. According to the police report, they were unable to prove Wucherer had ever sold banned material to anyone else, and, thus, a fine of 50 florians was all the law required. But Joseph II ordered the police to search Wucherer's establishment for incriminating *corpora delicti*, despite the fact Wucherer had done nothing (from the standpoint of the law) to justify such a search. The search itself turned up little except prohibited books, and a subsequent police investigation and examination failed to lead to a criminal trial. Nevertheless, Joseph ordered Wucherer's expulsion from Habsburg lands, the pulping of his stock of uncensored material, and a further fine of 1,000 florians.[77]

While such flagrant abuse of the judicial system did indeed exist, cases such as Willias's – who was caught red handed – were few. During the 1780s, Joseph, with Pergen's assistance, developed a category of criminal who were treated outside legal norms. These were the so-called political or state criminals (*Staatsverbrecher*): persons whose acts were deemed so serious a threat to society, or whose trial might shed unwanted light on sensitive information, that normal legal procedure could be bypassed.

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[77] For details of Wucherer's life and career, as well as the police case against him, see, Michael Winter, "Georg Philipp Wucherer (1734-1805): Handler und Verleger," *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens* 37 (1992): 1-97, esp. 58-75.

Such a term has serious implications and could easily lead to abuse, a point Sonnenfels hit upon repeatedly in his criticism of Pergen's secret police. But there are not overwhelming instances of abuse. Between 1782 and 1788 only six cases (including Willias's) were adjudicated in this arbitrary manner. And all were caught red-handed engaging in some form of espionage. The secret police arrested and condemned a further seven individuals between 1788 and 1789, with another dozen between 1789 and 1799.[78]

Resistance also emerged from provincial elites who were jealous of their traditional rights to mete out justice, and who took Pergen's intrusion as a significant affront. Others, such as provincial governors, defended their control over their own policing agencies. Still others, such as the Hungarian nobility, refused to incorporate Pergen's registration system within their territories.[79] By mid-1786, the traditionally conservative Court Chancellery, with Count Kollowrat at its head, voiced its reservations about Pergen's burgeoning police agency. Keenly aware of growing backlash, Pergen countered these concerns with a simple question: how would the Viennese police track a dangerous individual when they could simply leave Pergen's jurisdiction? In the end, Pergen's insistence was all for naught, as the sheer weight of the opposition forced

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[78] For the concept of *Staatsverbrecher*, see Joseph to Pergen, 2 December 1788, HHStA KA *Handbillete* Akten 1, Bl. 10. All files relating to the cases between 1782 and 1790 are located in AVA Inneres Pol. *PA*, 7. All files for 1790 to 1799 are located in AVA Inneres Pol. *PA*, 8. These numbers do *not* include those arrested in the lead up to the Jacobin trials in 1794.

[79] Emerson, *Metternich*, 14.

Joseph to curtail Pergen's gains. A typical compromise followed on 20 September 1786: Pergen maintained control of the secret police, free of interference from provincial governors, while police ministers, if there were any, reported directly to the governors.[80] It was left to municipal administrators to maintain the registration system and its lists of suspicious individuals. This was a far cry from Pergen's vision of an unfettered, seamless web of police agencies, but he never fully jettisoned the idea.[81]

In fact, Pergen predicted the erosion of these new arrangements, and within a few short years, circumstances proved him correct. Amid the war against the Turks, the turning of public opinion against Joseph's policies, and the threat of revolt in Belgium and the Austrian Netherlands, Joseph established a Ministry of Police (*Polizeihofstelle*) in February 1789. Pergen, who had steadfastly advocated for such a system since 1782, achieved his long-standing goal of exercising centralized control over the monarchy's police. In this position, Pergen answered to Joseph alone and received direct access to the emperor without the request of an audience.[82] Despite continued hostility, especially from provincial governors, Pergen moved quickly to consolidate control over the new ministry through familiar means. In a set of "general instructions" dated 23 March 1789, Pergen directed all district commissioners to extend the registration beyond urban

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[80] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 135-6.

[81] Emerson, *Metternich*, 12-4.

[82] Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 2.

centers, and to maintain surveillance on suspicious foreigners, state servants, and the clergy.[83] Within a year, Pergen reported to the emperor that a public and secret police were active throughout most of Habsburg territory.[84] On 30 July 1789, Pergen, as police minister, made his first report to Joseph, stating that the police in Hermannstadt opened an investigation into a Joseph Lorenz Ponnenberg, a professor of medicine who openly supported Prussian rule in Hungary.[85]

Between July 1789 and March 1792, the Ministry of Police received only twenty reports on the movement of suspect foreigners and other disaffected individuals throughout Habsburg territory.[86] This modest number falls within Pergen's stated parameters for the Ministry of Police, but it has led historians to argue that the ministry was ineffectual.[87] But an examination of these reports suggests otherwise. While the early iteration of the police did want for resources, reports arriving from Copenhagen (Dec. 1789), Prague (Jan. 1790), Carlsbad and Teplice (Aug. 1790), Genoa and Parma (Jan. 1791), and Lauenau (Mar. 1792) point to the growing acceptance of Pergen's

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[83] Fournier, "'geheime Dienst'," 3.

[84] Note Pergen, 5 February 1790, AVA Inneres Pol. *PA*, 10/3, Bl. 97.

[85] Pergen to Joseph, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 1. The final report on Ponnenberg came on 1 December, 1789, HHStA StK *NaP* 1 Bl. 5. Pergen supported banishment from Habsburg territory, but Ponnenberg's fate is unclear.

[86] All reports are located in, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 5-20.

[87] Derek Beales gives the Ministry of Police two pages of coverage in a two-volume study of the period. Beales, *Joseph II*, II:552-4.

system, especially his registration system. These reports also suggest a certain amount of cross-border cooperation. In late 1789, Prussian authorities assisted the Habsburg police for six months in tracking the movement of two individuals, with the surnames of Bevenna and Marza, as they traveled from Copenhagen to St. Petersburg. In August 1790, Prussians once again assisted the Austrians in tracking the movement of a Johann August Thielmann for three weeks as he traveled from Carlsbad to Teplice. And, in March 1792, the Graf von Balassa in Hungary alerted both the Ministry of Police in Vienna, and police commissaire in Lauenau (in Lower Saxony), about the travels of Alexander Leitsch. These twenty reports by no means suggest the rise of an overbearing police state, as later critics contended. But the details of each case, and the extent of police cooperation across borders, certainly does not evidence the paper tiger that later historians suggest.

The language and targets of these specific investigations fit comfortably within the pre-revolutionary model of police activity. Authorities referred to these individuals as "malcontents," or intellectuals, openly critical of Joseph II's reign; no report speaks of a revolutionary threat. Working with Pergen's personal papers, Paul Bernard argues that the Ministry of Police was late in grasping the full weight of the revolution and would not do so until 1793/4.[88] This fits with Paul Schroeder's argument that the Revolution did not make international waves until after the royal family's execution.[89] But it also brings

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[88] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State,* esp. 160-1.

us back to the diplomatic correspondence that opened this chapter. By warning against French agents and active democratic plots, Austrian authorities were clearly aware of the Revolution's potential to spill across borders. Joseph also allowed French *émigrés* to settle in Vienna, despite being aware that foreign ideas would likely travel with them.[90] And finally, in a letter from Pergen to Joseph, one month before the latter's death, Pergen warned that "general ferment" and "revolution" was imminent in the Netherlands and likely to develop in Hungary, as "mistrust (*méfiance*) replaced patriotism and an attachment to the Sovereign."[91] Although the watershed of 1793 has validity, this periodization should not obscure the point that Austrian authorities perceived revolutionary threats in 1790 and organized against them.

Pergen's stunning success in establishing such a system in under a decade, continued to worry some, most notably the new emperor, Leopold II (1790-1792), who rebuffed Pergen's wishes to extend the powers of the police, and his plans for a gendarmerie. The records are quite clear on this: Leopold's reign brought a measurable lull in police activity, especially that of the secret police, who were all but abandoned in

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[89] Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), esp. 67-74.

[90] By 1793, Pergen ordered the surveillance of all French *émigrés* in Vienna. Note Pergen, 12 February 1793, HHStA Stk *NaP* 1, Bl. 12-13. By 1794, Vienna rivaled London and Coblenz as a center of *émigré* activity, an issue of near constant concern for the Ministry of Police into the first decade of the nineteenth century.

[91] Pergen to Joseph, 16 January 1790, HHStA StK, *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 1-2.

these two years. The period similarly brought stinging rebukes from Sonnenfels, who drafted a proposal for Leopold that would end the Ministry of Police's prized autonomy and force it to adhere to the rule of law. In fact, Leopold took significant steps to establish his own network of informants, outside the control of Pergen's Ministry. With this last affront, Pergen offered his resignation on 3 March 1791, claiming, "at my age I am no longer able to endure insults without completely destroying my health."[92]

Shortly before resigning, however, Pergen delivered an extensive, anonymous report to Leopold outlining an international conspiracy among secret societies dedicated to inciting revolt among commoners.[93] The report traced a conspiratorial thread from the American War of Independence to the overthrow of the French Monarchy, warning that emissaries of these secret societies had made rebellion a European concern. Far worse, averred the report, membership in such sects hailed from society's most influential, educated, and respectable individuals, not disreputable outsiders. The report warned that a heavy-handed response could turn these individuals against the government; it would be much more advantageous, the author argued, to turn members of such societies into witting or unwitting agents of the state. In his report to Leopold, Pergen similarly concluded that members of Vienna's Masonic lodge, *Zur gekrönten Hoffnung* (who had

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[92] Pergen, as quoted in Walter, "Die Organisierung," 52. See also, Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 94-5.

[93] *Über geheime Gesellschaften im Staate* (1791). This document is cited by Paul Bernard, though his citation is confusing, and the document's actual archival location is unclear. See his, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 180-1, 195 n.1.

recently proved their loyalty by reporting a communication from a radicalized lodge in Bordeaux), could be a crucial source of information on international intrigue. The Masons, Pergen argued, would also offer insight into even more secretive groups – such as the Theosophists, Eclectics, Illuminati, and the Rosicrucians – to which Pergen's police had yet to gain access.[94]

Leopold chose to ignore this report and denied Pergen an audience to plead his case. With Pergen out of the picture by March 1791, and the activities of the secret police effectively curtailed, Leopold set about reshaping the Ministry of Police in his image. Despite his criticisms of the Josephinian police, Leopold recognized the potential benefits of a state police, especially in its ability to monitor public opinion.[95] Leopold's approach, however, differed considerably from his brother Joseph's, and stood in stark contrast to the future reign of his brother. In the wake of Pergen's "retirement," police administration once again became the remit of Count Sauer, the governor of Lower Austria. Leopold allowed Sauer to maintain correspondence with provincial governors in

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[94] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 181.

[95] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 261-3; Benna, "Organisierung," 210-13; Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 96-100. This has led to some confusion among early commentators that it was, in fact, Leopold II who developed Austria's Ministry of Police. It is true that Leopold relied on spies during his earlier reign as the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Rumors at the time also suggested that Leopold employed thousands of spies throughout Vienna. In Donald Emerson's judicious opinion, this confusion dates to a contemporary source, Franz Xaver Huber's, *Beytrag zur Characteristik und Regierungsgeschichte der Kaiser Joseph II. Leopold II. und Franz II* (Paris: Deferrieres, 1800), esp. 98-9, 102-5, 218-20. For Emerson's critique of older scholarship see his, *Metternich*, 13 n.42, 19-20.

matters concerning the police, and continued the tradition of direct correspondence between the police and the emperor.[96] Relying on Sonnenfels to establish the Ministry of Police on a more public and legal footing, Leopold focused on the "public" tasks of the police, which found some favor among the "Fourth Estate."[97] While Leopold was concerned with negative public opinion, denounced simply as *Schwindelgeist*, the threat of radicalized supporters of the French Revolution possibly operating in Austrian territory was of less concern. Despite pleas from his sister Marie Antoinette and French *émigrés* in Vienna, combating the Revolution internationally, whether through covert means or through aggressive military action, similarly received little attention from the emperor.[98] But before Leopold's plans could take effect, he died suddenly in March 1792, leaving the throne to his eldest son, Francis II.[99]

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[96] F. Walter, "Die Organisierung," 51-3.

[97] This meant, as Ernst Wangermann points out, the "maintenance of good order and the prevention of crime." Both quotes come from, Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 95.

[98] Only when news reached Vienna of the French royal family's flight to Luxemburg in June 1791, which proved false, did Leopold consider intervention to restore order (and not the old regime) in France. Paul Schroeder praises Leopold as a "great statesman," who "united Europe in masterly inactivity," citing war with the Turks as an example of the threat of general war. He sees Leopold's international maneuvering as a "programme [sic] of counter-reform instead of counter-revolution." Schroeder, *Transformation*, 83-99, quotes from 88, 90. Cf Tim Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London: Longman, 1999 [1986]), esp. Chapters 3 and 4.

[99] Francis II ruled as the last Holy Roman Emperor from 1792 to1806. In 1804 he established the Austrian Empire, which he ruled between 1804 and 1832 as Francis I.

Once again, circumstances and the attitude of the new emperor led to the intensification and further entrenchment of Pergen's system. It also led to the development of a new justification of the monarchy's security forces. As previously mentioned, Leopold did not appoint Pergen's successor, granting police administration to the government of Lower Austria. Those who had formally worked under Pergen – most notably his secretaries Friedrich von Schilling and Joseph von Mährenthal – were likewise transferred to the Lower Austrian government. During his "retirement," it appears that Pergen, through consistent contact with Schilling and Mährenthal, busied himself with undermining Leopold's new system. Pergen's scheming proved successful, as they soon convinced Count Sauer of the need to rebuild the Ministry of Police. In June 1792, Sauer detached the registration department from regular administration and made both himself and Beer (Pergen's old deputy) its heads. In this new arrangement, Mährenthal assisted Beer exclusively, while Schilling became Sauer's deputy in all matters concerning the police. This administrative *coup* not only reunited Pergen's closest associates; it also allowed for a unified front in the attack on Sonnenfels's policing agency, which, at the time, was only six months old. In separate reports, both Sauer and Schilling (in June and August respectively) lamented the disorganization of the police and the lack of clear leadership. They once again stressed the need for total autonomy in the new fight against "French emissaries" and their Austrian sympathizers,

while arguing that the "highly critical period in which we are living" demanded strict surveillance of outsiders under the direction of a single, well-informed individual.[100]

If a vocal, administrative core of Pergen's ex-associates clustered around Sauer by mid-1792, Francis's closest advisors similarly pressed for a centralized Ministry of Police, against the express wishes of Sonnenfels and Count Kaunitz. Already by 5 September, the emperor himself, convinced of the need of a secret police, contacted Pergen, asking for a "suggestion as to how this institution, so necessary and conducive to the welfare of the state, could be re-established." In perhaps a calculated move, Pergen declared himself unable to offer his services, citing his ignorance of Leopold's new system, while also condemning it for overloading officials with paperwork and occupying "its officials with writing rather than action."[101] However, in the wake of the French victory over a combined Prusso-Austrian force at Valmy on 20 September 1792, and the ensuing French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, the push for the old Josephinian system intensified. In October, Francis's top advisor, Count Colloredo, delivered two short reports regarding the secret police. On 27 October, Colloredo first suggested the need for an autonomous ministry – whose head was answerable to the Emperor only – and the need to establish a secret police force in every major city and provincial town in the empire.[102] Rather than detail his own vision for this ministry, Colloredo simply

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[100] Sauer and Schilling, as quoted by Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 122, 123.

[101] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 124-5.

attached a copy of Pergen's 1786 "Secret Instructions."[103] In a second report, from 29 October 1792, Colloredo reiterated his support for a secret police, adding that such a force must be allowed to act "quickly, calmly, and without overseers (*ohne Aufseher*), with all possible modesty and disguise (*Bescheidenheit und Verschleierung*)."[104]

The language of Colloredo's reports, and the earlier broadsides from Sauer and Schilling, suggest Pergen's continued influence. Or, at the very least, it suggests the current resonance of such a system, especially as the Revolution took an increasingly radical and international turn. What is less clear, however, is whether Pergen's ex-associates influenced Colloredo in any meaningful way. As Ernst Wangermann argues (based on a 5 November report from Sauer), Sauer drew the new emperor's attention to the Ministry of Police in the hopes that he would be considered as its head. But Pergen balked once again, declining to offer his expertise to any other minister. It seems, then, that it was Colloredo (who advocated for Pergen's return in October), rather than Pergen's ex-associates, who eventually won Francis's attention on the matter.[105] Pergen's gamble that Francis would not undertake to reform police administration

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[102] Report Colloredo, 27 October 1792, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 32-3.

[103] For a copy of Pergen's "Secret Instructions" see, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 2-19.

[104] Report Colloredo, 29 October 1792, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 20-22.

[105] Report Colloredo, 27 October 1792.

without his co-operation paid off. Opting for experience, Francis ordered Sauer to hand over the Ministry of Police to Pergen.

On 3 January 1793, the sixty-seven-year-old Pergen returned as head of the Ministry of Police, with a new mandate to combat "the ideas of 1789" through a centralized police system that emphasized the use of secret police to defend the security of the state.[106] In February, two reports laid bare the extent of the French menace. On 19 February, Baron Anton von Baldacci, one of Francis's top advisors, reported that three "secret posts" arrived detailing the Jacobin plot to establish a "democratic revolution" in Switzerland. He warned the emperor that Swiss regiments returned from Paris with ideas of "equality and freedom," as well as 30,000 national cockades they distributed throughout the Breisgau. If revolution had not already started, Baldacci warned, it would soon unless the government could develop and execute a coherent "war plan" (*Hauptkriegsplan*) to combat "republican forces."[107] On 24 February, Pergen warned Graf Cobenzl, the Vice Chancellor, that Jacobins had likely reached Habsburg territory, including Vienna.[108] With characteristic flair, Pergen wrote to Francis in April that, "[i]n

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[106] Francis to Pergen, as quoted in Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 272-3. Pergen remained at his post until his final retirement in 1804. See also, "Präsidialschreiben des obersten Direktorialministers vom 4. Januar 1793," *Sammlung der Gesetze* . . . 25 vols. (Wien, 1793-1808), II:22, Nr. 526.

[107] Baldacci to Francis, 19 February 1793, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 1, Bl. 3-14.

[108] Pergen to Cobenzl, 24 February 1793, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 23-4.

the present conditions when the freedom swindle [*Freiheitsschwindel*] has gained so much ground and all monarchical governments face great unrest . . . the ordinary arrangements for peace and security are inadequate. Every government must secretly set all forces in motion for the good of the state."[109] It is unclear whether or not Pergen and Francis ever considered a program of preventive reform designed to inoculate the monarchy's subjects against revolution. But the steps taken in the following months, along with the range of authority Francis offered Pergen, clearly demonstrate that the response to revolution was to be repression in the defense of state security.

It was a potent and reinforcing combination, then, of an objective, external threat in the form of revolutionary war and fear of revolt at home that drove the development of these security measures. Building on initiatives established by Sauer in the waning days of his tenure, Pergen and his new deputy, Count Saurau, returned to targeting foreigners, as well as to the spread of hostile public opinion. In February 1793, Francis issued instructions to all governors outlining their twin responsibilities: suppressing revolutionary literature while promoting anti-revolutionary measures.[110] His instructions demanded that governors shut down all secret organizations; maintain surveillance over all foreigners; strictly enforce censorship regulations regarding printed material favorable

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[109] Pergen to Joseph, 5 April 1793, reproduced in Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:86-7.

[110] As an example, Francis held up England with its voluntary anti-Jacobin committees. See, Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 129.

to the French Revolution; offer "suitable reward" to authors and journalists who publish material favorable to the monarchy; and suppress private printing presses.[111] Pergen's first case, inherited from Sauer, was that of a Joseph Polz, who stood accused of making speeches celebrating the actions of the French revolutionaries. In an awkward correspondence, Pergen wrote to Cobenzl asking for instruction on Polz's arrest, leading Cobenzl – who had initially proclaimed that all those who spoke favorably about the Revolution be remanded immediately to a dungeon – to backtrack, saying only that such decisions were the provenance of the police.[112] This was followed by the case, originating under Sauer, of two ex-secret agents, Stieber and Rühle, who were arrested for making utterances bordering on incitement to rebellion. Despite calls for leniency by Pergen, Francis sentenced them to indefinite confinement in the fortress of Kufstein. Shortly thereafter, came the arrest of a Count Rottenhan, denounced at a dinner party as a "complete Jacobin" for having expressed a favorable opinion of the revolutionaries. Rottenhan, too, was sent to Kufstein without trial or a hearing. By mid-1793, the police investigated and imprisoned at least four men on counts of expressing "ideas dangerous to the state" (*staatsgefährliche Gesinnung*), while condemning two others of high treason for having expressed "democratic statements" and maintaining correspondence with

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[111] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 129-30.

[112] Pergen to Cobenzl, 15 January 1793, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 14. In Cobenzl's reply he stated that he had merely hastily expressed a "popular opinion" on the matter. Cobenzl to Pergen, 18 January 1793, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 1-2.

French radicals. Pergen also learned that in Prague, the police had found graffiti in the form of freedom wreaths with the words *liberté, égalité* woven into them. This outrage caused Pergen to demand shows of loyalty in the form of redoubled efforts.[113]

While Pergen's initial haul was poor in terms of numbers or significant targets, he used these arrests as a springboard to claim authority, all under the guise of defending "internal security." By mid-1793, Pergen enjoyed a level of authority and room to act not seen since the end of Joseph II's reign. But, despite his recourse to indefinite detention, and the apparent support Pergen received from Francis and Cobenzl, Pergen was eventually blocked in his attempt to remove all legal oversight of police action. On 16 June 1793, Francis reminded Pergen (to remind his subordinates) of Leopold's *habeas corpus* decree of 1791 and questioned him regarding the use of arbitrary arrest. But Pergen would not go quietly. He used a case where a woman arrested for prostitution was summarily given *consilium abeundi*, to rail against the Supreme Judiciary, stating

> It is truly amazing how certain fashionable theorists and agitators take every opportunity to shift the demarcation line between Judiciary and Police. The Judiciary is competent only in cases involving a [third party]; but in cases involving mere disciplinary measures, a public nuisance, or any kind of danger to the State, it has been left to the police to act, without consideration of person[114]

Still, Pergen could not act on his own authority to check the movement of Habsburg subjects he believed were a "danger to the state." But Francis was never willing, as Ernst Wangermann points out, to give him *carte blanche* in combatting the spread of ideas,

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[113] Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 132-3; Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 189-90.

[114] Pergen, 12 December 1793, as quoted in Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 135.

despite his repeated support for indefinite detention. Francis preferred to weigh each case on the "nature and seriousness of the offence," rather than propose a blanket sentence on those found expressing "pernicious principles."[115]

As Pieter Judson points out, this was a critical aspect in the development of the Habsburg security apparatus.[116] Despite Pergen's growing power and petty acts of suppression, he was never fully able to develop a monolithic police state. This was not for want of trying, nor was it for lack of support. In May, Saurau reported to the new foreign minister, Baron Franz Thugut, that four Jacobins, including the French Deputy Hérault de Séchelles, were recruiting in Passau, leading to their arrest a month later.[117] Between June and December 1793, Saurau issued over a dozen charges, mostly against intellectuals, lawyers, booksellers, and those with Protestant sympathies. Saurau defended his agent's reports, adding simply that anyone suspected of Jacobin sympathy must be kept under surveillance.[118] In September, the once deferential Cobenzl offered a series of denunciations against a Baron O'Cahill, a veteran of the American War of Independence, now living in Venice. Cobenzl suggested strict surveillance of O'Cahill,

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[115] Pergen to Francis, 2 December 1793, as quoted in Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 136.

[116] Judson's evidence for such a claim comes from a 1996 David Laven article dealing with the new Habsburg regime in Venice after 1814. See Judson's, *The Habsburg Empire*, 106-7.

[117] Saurau to Thugut, 23 May 1793 and 10 June 1793, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 53-5, here, 54.

[118] Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 193.

including the interception of his mail (that included letters from Duke of Württemberg and the King of Prussia).[119] In this atmosphere of denunciation, Pergen once again attempted to extend the reach of the Ministry of Police, writing to Francis that censorship of subversive materials was critical to the security of the state, and thus, should fall under the authority of the police. But the Chancellery (recently renamed the *Directorium*), which oversaw the state censor, resisted Pergen's advances, as did a majority of the *Staatsrat*, leading Francis to confirm the subordination of the police to ministerial authority, although the police were to be informed when necessary.[120]

But if Francis's sense of justice stymied Pergen's plans for a legally unfettered police, Pergen found more success with surveilling foreigners. In fact, as we will see, the perceived threat of foreigners and the spread of foreign ideas, was intimately tied to perhaps the most infamous outburst of state repression during the period: the arrest, trial, and execution of the Jacobins. With the outbreak of war against France, and as reports of the spread of French radicalism grew, *émigrés* increasingly fell under the eye of the police. While the Austrian State Chancellery ruled in November 1792 that all immigrants must obtain a passport, on 5 January 1793, police permits became a requirement for all individuals seeking residence.[121] In December 1792, Sauer presided over the arrest of

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[119] Cobenzl to Saurau, 13 September 1793, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 5. The investigation of O'Cahill began on 14 September 1793 and continued until 2 December 1793. See also, 14 September, 22 October, 2 December 1793, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 58, 25-30, 33-6.

[120] Benna, "Organisierung," 212.

French residents in Vienna, all of whom were suspected of supporting the French war effort.[122] In the wake of these arrests, Francis wrote to Pergen declaring his support for the increased investigation of "French influence in Vienna."[123] That same day, Pergen received orders to confiscate the publications of societies.[124] In February of 1793, the Emperor once again wrote to Pergen demanding surveillance on all *émigrés*, suggesting that the police gather and inspect all their incoming and outgoing mail.[125] This same letter warned that "politically active French" may arrive under the guise of *émigrés*; any suspected individuals were to be referred to the "political authorities" (*politische Behörden*) for investigation.[126]

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[121] Note Pergen, 18 January 1793, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 1-2. See also, "Hofdekret," 5 Januar 1793, *Sammlung der Gesetze*, II: 23, Nr. 529; "Hofdekret," 17 Februar 1793 *Sammlung der Gesetze*, 168, Bl. 625. See also, Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 262.

[122] Sauer to Pergen, 1 December 1792, a quoted in Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 128. This was the police's largest political round-up to date and led to the jailing and deportation of half those arrested, despite no formal charges being brought.

[123] Francis to Pergen, 18 January 1793, HHStA Stk *NaP* 1, Bl. 1-2. These files were not made available to Dr. Karl Glossy and are labeled "nicht mitzuteilen." From this point forward, such files will be labeled (NM).

[124] Note Pergen, 18 January 1793, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 2-3.

[125] Note Pergen, 12 February 1793, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 12-13.

[126] Ibid. The first French *émigrés* to garner significant attention was the Abbé Dubois, who had spent time in the Netherlands and had published an anonymous pamphlet on the Revolution. Gherardini to Pergen, 9 February 1793, HHSta StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 9-11.

Managing the influx of *émigrés* became of central concern for the newly established Ministry of Police. Vienna had long been home to exiled nobility and their courtiers, many of whom rose to great positions of power in the Habsburg court.[127] And with the marriage of Marie Antoinette to the Dauphin in 1770, the union established ties between Vienna and Versailles. But if political exile to Vienna had a long history, the *émigrés* were a creation of the French Revolution. As is well-known, the outbreak of revolution in 1789, sparked a wave of emigration from France, most notably to Coblenz and London, but also Vienna, Prussia, Hungary, and even the United States.[128] Their numbers increased steadily, especially after 1793, and would continue to do so until 1799 when the Consulate officially closed their list of *émigrés*, leading to the return of thousands to France. But the *émigrés* proved to be a problem for those governments that allowed them to settle; the original *casus belli* in 1791-1792, heads of state soon found grounds for suspicion and irritation in émigré presence.[129]

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[127] This includes Prince Clemens von Metternich, whose family lost their ancestral home on the left bank of the Rhine in the 1790s. In fact, Metternich, the future chancellor and foreign minister, would not step foot in Vienna until his twentieth birthday. Other notable *émigrés* include, Metternich's predecessor, Count Stadion; Metternich's protégé and diplomat, Count Bombelles, born at Versailles; Count Latour, from Luxembourg, and War Minister in 1848; and Count Colloredo's wife, Victorine Folliot de Crenneville, the "Princess of Lorraine." See William Godsey, "'*La société était au fond légitimiste'*: Émigrés, Aristocracy, and the Court at Vienna, 1789–1848," *European History Quarterly* 35 (2005): 63-95.

[128] See the essays in, Karen Carpenter and Philip Mansel, eds., *The French* Émigrés *in Europe and the Struggle against Revolution, 1789–1814* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1999).

This was no less the case in Vienna. At Pergen's behest, the emperor ordered surveillance on all French emigrants for fear that "Jacobins" may slip into Austrian territory under the guise of an emigrant. Requests for passports, made through the State Chancellery, were now transferred to the Ministry of Police for approval.[130] Pergen required that such applicants undergo "political vetting" (*politische Voraussetzungen*); provide examples of either their military or civil service; provide a full list of family members and "domestics"; and to acquire a letter of recommendation, which spoke to their past and current allegiance to a monarch.[131] While the Ministry of Police cleared dozens of applications for passports or residency, certain applicants were subject to a thorough investigation. In February 1793, the Marquis de Limon, Intendant of Finance for the Duc d'Orléans, and his brother, the Abbé de Limon, applied for a short residency in Vienna, ultimately hoping to settle in Pressburg (Bratislava). Because of their close contact with an Abbé Dubois, an "enlightened cleric" and a French missionary to India, the brothers were put under "strict secret observation."[132] While Pergen did not report

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[129] See William Doyle's "Introduction" to, *The French* Émigrés, xv-xxii. For the Austrian case see, Maria Pawlik, "Emigranten der Französischen Revolution in Österreich. (1789–1814)," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 77 (1969): 78-127, esp. 109-27.

[130] Entry routes to the city were heavily guarded, and all information, including names of travelers, time of arrival, place of origin, destination, and status were documented and sent to the police. For an example, see the list in HHStA MdÄ IB *Polizeiberichte* 1, Bl. 46.

[131] Note Pergen, 18 January 1793, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 2-3.

directly to the emperor regarding matters of emigration, the Limon brothers' case aroused such suspicion that Pergen sought the Francis's opinion on the matter.[133] A letter from the Limons clearly suggests the immediacy of their situation, as they claimed to be unable to answer Pergen and Cobenzl's questions, complaining of "malicious interpretations" regarding their "affiliation" with the Abbé Dubois. They asked only that the Duc d'Polignac – in exile since 1789 – speak on their behalf. While he did not officially lead the exiled French government in Vienna, Polignac's word held considerable weight in these matters, as he sat at the center of an *émigrés* network in Habsburg territory. Not only did he assist in locating accommodations, but he also wrote on behalf of almost all French *émigrés* between 1793 and 1800. On 18 February, eleven days after Pergen first ordered secret police observation on the Limons, Polignac secured them passes to settle in Habsburg land.[134]

But problems with the *émigrés* grew as their numbers increased. And by December 1793, there were demands to end emigration entirely.[135] Not only did the monarchy risk aggravating the new Republic, which had amassed unprecedented military

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[132] Pergen to Cobenzl, 7 February 1793, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 17-18. Pergen to Cobenzl, 18 February 1793, Nr. 27-30.

[133] Pergen to Cobenzl, 10 February 1793, HHStA StK *NvP*, 21-2, Bl. 25.

[134] Pergen to Cobenzl, 18 February 1793, HHStA StK *NvP*, 21-2, Bl. 27-30. This file also contains the letter from the Limons written on 16 February 1793.

[135] Pawlik, "Emigranten," 115.

power, but police ministers argued that emigration inevitably led to "revolutionary unrest."[136] This was especially the case in Pressburg, where in August 1794 local authorities uncovered two revolutionary societies: the "Societas Reformatorum" and the "Society of Freedom and Equality" (*Gesellschaften der Freiheit und Gleichheit*), both of which Ignác Martinovics, a radicalized Hungarian (and spy during Leopld II's reign), established. Because of this, Martinovics soon found himself at the center of the Jacobin "conspiracy." By the end of August, at the height of the Jacobin trials, Francis announced that all French domestics and, more importantly, all tutors were no longer allowed to settle in Hungary or Transylvania. And, finally, in 1795, Francis forbade unauthorized entry by those attempting to settle in Habsburg lands – especially in Hungary – under threat of detention. All requests for passes were to be made through provincial state councils (*Landesstelle*), which subsequently allowed for increased police surveillance.[137]

The anxiety over French radicalism soon boiled over, leading to one of Central Europe's most notorious events: the trial and execution of Austrian and Hungarian "Jacobins." The trials themselves have received significant attention, though over the last forty years, interest in these events has significantly waned.[138] Ernst Wangermann,

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[136] Note Saurau, 26 May 1794 HHStA StK *NvP*, 21-2, Bl. 126.

[137] "Hofdekret," 23 January 1795, *Sammlung der Gesetze*, III:53, Nr. 1705.

[138] A recent, though quite short, effort to study the intellectual and political texts that both informed and emerged from the Jacobins in Central and Eastern Europe is, Lucian M.

writing in the 1950s, argued that the Jacobin Trials were the "gravedigger of enlightened despotism in Austria" and the end of *Josephinismus* and its most vocal supporters. This led, he claimed, to Austria's emergence as the China of Europe, a distinction it held until 1848. Wangermann's analysis has largely carried the day, though with some slight modifications. Others, such as Denis Silagi and Donald Emerson agree with Wangermann regarding the scope of the monarchy's reaction but do not view the trials as such a watershed moment.[139] Wangermann's observation is correct in that the trials and the failed war effort against France more firmly entrenched a deeply reactionary mindset among Habsburg officials. Yet he does not extend his analysis into the nineteenth century in any meaningful way. As this chapter argues, the trials were not in themselves such decisive events; rather, they were symptom of a growing fear of the spread of French radicalism. When viewing the development of Austrian security agencies over the course of two decades, the trials emerge as a convenient but misleading watershed for historians.

As we have already seen, Habsburg officials had long warned of the spread of French ideas. Leopold Hoffmann, conspiracy monger and editor of the *Wiener Zeitschrift*, a propaganda arm of the monarchy, had long published articles on the threat

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Röthlisberger, *Die Jakobiner in Österreich Verfassungsdiskussionen in der Habsburgermonarchie zur Zeit der Französischen Revolution* (Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang, 2013).

[139] Denis Silagi, *Jakobiner in der Habsburger-Monarchie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des aufgeklärten Absolutismus in Österreich* (Vienna: Herold Verlag, 1962).

of "Illuminism," Masonry, enlightened philosophy, and the existence of Jacobins in Habsburg lands.[140] Pergen and his associates saw revolution in even the most benign utterances of disillusioned subjects. But by 1794, the international situation had turned drastically against Austria. In the Spring of 1794, French forces were victorious in Belgium. Although it lost Brabant, Austria remained as the only significant continental power to check a French advance. A revolt in Poland, led by Tadeusz Kościuszko, seemed, by the summer of 1794, on the brink of success. In fact, by June and July, Habsburg authorities in Poland were sending dire warnings to Vienna, not only about the successes of Kościuszko's army but also about the spread of secret societies dedicated to freedom and equality and other revolutionary conspiracies. Jacobin "conspiracies" similarly turned up in London, Naples, and Turin that same summer.[141] It was this combination of the success of the French war effort, the apparent spread of revolution to all corners of Europe, and a small but dedicated political opposition to Francis's government that led to the Jacobin Trials in Vienna and Hungary.

The details of the arrests and trials are well-known. In Vienna, few radical organizations existed, those that did revolved around the Baron Andreas Riedel, Franz Hebenstreit, and Dr. Wollstein, a Professor of Veterinary Medicine. Both Riedel and

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[140] For more on Hoffmann and the *Wiener Zeitschrift*, see Epstein, *German Conservatism*, 517-35.

[141] For example, see Note Saurau, 17 June 1794 and 30 June 1794, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 43-6, 47. Also, Note Saurau, 9 June 1794 and 16 June 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 130-1, 136-7.

Hebenstreit published pamphlets that mixed Enlightenment philosophy, democratic propaganda, and a Babeuvian-inspired notion of common ownership, and they often hosted foreign guests at dinner parties to discuss current events.[142] While most of these men were guilty of little more than distributing Paine's *Rights of Man*,[143] Hebenstreit became embroiled in intrigue that eventually cost him his life. This began when an emissary of Kościuszko, Count Soltyk, arrived in Vienna in July seeking support for the revolution in Poland.[144] Hebenstreit, an amateur engineer, had developed an anti-cavalry device, the designs of which he gave to Soltyk, who subsequently paid a Protestant pastor (and close confidant of Riedel), Karl Held, to deliver this war machine to France. Their plans won the support of a General Schérer, who allowed them to travel through to Paris in early May. However, the Committee of Public Safety had Held and his entourage arrested before they could address the Committee in person. An appeal in writing finally won them their freedom, but only after being imprisoned for three months. Hebenstreit also fell victim to the work of an *agent provocateur*, bookseller Joseph Vinzenz Degen,

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[142] Andreas Riedel's, "Aufruf an alle Deutsche" and Franz Hebenstreit's, "*Homo homnibus*" are reprinted in, *Die Wiener Jakobiner*, ed. Alfred Körner, (Tübingen: J.B. Metzler, 1972), 18-29, 53-71.

[143] Copies of Paine's work was distributed in French, a reminder that such circulated literature was hardly aimed at the lower classes. Hebenstreit's "*Homo hominibus*" was published in Latin. See R.R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 497.

[144] Regarding Soltyk's arrival and the confiscation of his mail, see Saurau to Thugut, 15 July 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Nr. 37.

who had frequented these democratic gatherings and who had been working with Saurau since May 1794. On 21 July, Degen met with Hebenstreit, who, after consuming "a whole mug of beer," outlined his vision for the creation of a union of democratically inclined Austrians. Degen's plan worked, and on 24 July, Saurau arrested Hebenstreit and his associates, including Riedel.[145]

The situation in Hungary was more complicated. The conspiracy had much deeper roots and the extent of the democratic "conspiracies" far outweighed those in any other territory of the Habsburg monarchy. In Vienna, the "conspiracies" revolved around small groups of upper-class individuals, who held the peasantry in poor regard, and who never shared a political vision as clear as the Hungarians. The movement in Hungary, then, was wide-spread and cross-class: nobles and estranged aristocrats who resisted Habsburg centralization; groups of professionals, placed into positions of authority by Joseph II and now openly supportive of the Revolution and equally hostile to Francis's government; and a growing mass of anti-aristocratic individuals who formed the basis of new clubs and reading societies. All these groups, then, formed an incipient, if somewhat diverse, "party of independence."[146] Perhaps the most well-known Hungarian revolutionary was the previously mentioned Ignaz Martinovics, a retired Professor of Physics at the University of Lemberg, and ex-Leopoldine police spy. Claiming to be in

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[145] For the lead up to the trials, see Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 137-56.

[146] Palmer, *Democratic Revolution*, 497-8.

contact with the Committee of Public Safety and hinting at the prospect of French aid (all of which historians argue was false), Martinovics impressed his Hungarian compatriots and soon assumed leadership of the nascent democratic movement.

Arrests began in June and July and continued into September. After the arrests began, Francis appointed a commission (*Untersuchungshofkommission*) to investigate those the police had already arrested or had already suspected of involvement. As we have seen, the Hungarian conspiracy was fully revealed when the police moved to check emigration to Hungary, leading to Martinovics's confession and the arrest of his associates. This commission also turned up information on Held and his trip to Paris and obtained Riedel's confession to authoring the *Aufruf an alle Deutschen*. With Saurau at its head, the commission secured indictments against almost all those the police had previously arrested. On 2 October 1794, preliminary hearings began via an *ad hoc* tribunal, built around the investigative commission. But after a spirited intervention and defense of Austrian legal norms by Karl Anton von Martini, a "veteran" of the Austrian School of Natural Law, Francis revoked his order of 2 October, effectively handing the conspirators over to the Vienna Criminal Court.[147] Despite Martini's stand against the special tribunal, he could not save those who were subject to Hungarian courts or whose profession made them subject to military law, both of which punished high treason with death. The indictments brought by the *Untersuchungshofkommission* and the work of the

[147] Wangermann captures Martini's defense well, 163-3.

military tribunal, however, were all upheld by the Vienna Criminal Court and confirmed by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Judiciary; those found guilty of *lèse-majesté* and high treason were charged under the Criminal Code of 1787. All told, the military tribunal sentenced two men (Gilovsky and Hebenstreit) to death by hanging, and others to various terms of *Festungsarrest* ranging from five months to ten years. The Hungarian courts sentenced eighteen to death and sixteen more to various terms of imprisonment: seven executions (including Martinovics) were carried out in May 1795. In Vienna, Riedel, despite significant protest regarding Saurau's methods, was sentenced to sixty years *langwierig schweren Festungsarrest*, with fifteen more men sentenced to terms ranging between twenty and thirty-five years.[148]

Wangermann argues that Francis's introduction of secretive and "all-powerful" special and military tribunals effectively circumvented the regular criminal courts and the Council of State, thereby undermining *Rechtsstaat*. In addition, he argues correctly that the period after 1794 saw an increased use of censorship and secretive police work. Less convincing is Wangermann's argument that the Jacobin Trials mark the true beginning of the *Vormärz*. On the one hand, Wangermann plays down the fact that many of those arrested were, in fact, aiding both revolutionaries and the enemy during war time. On the other hand, while other countries, such as England, witnessed similar Jacobin trials and

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[148] See the relevant material related to the trials and sentencing in, Körber, *Wiener Jakobiner*, esp. Section III. On the special and military tribunals see, Wangermann, *Joseph II* and Kálmán Benda, "Die Ungarischen Jakobiner," in *Maximilien Robespierre, 1758-1794*, ed. Walter Markov (Berlin: Rutten and Loening, 1958), 447-68.

even flirted with the suspension of *habeus corpus*, this event was very much a Habsburg, rather than German, event and was the product of a particularly potent set of international circumstances. Despite some significant abuses and the continued reliance on a secretive police force, the rule of law held in this instance.

Conclusion

By the 1780s, Habsburg authorities, led by Anton von Pergen, hit upon a new conceptual understanding of what it meant to "police." In so doing, Pergen and his associates grounded the legitimacy of the police in its absolute centrality to the security of the state and the monarch. It is this vague but powerful formulation, then, that allowed Pergen to gain institutional ground in such a short period of time. More importantly, it also opened the space for the state's increased monitoring of its subjects' behavior. After 1789, the monitoring of behavior took on a new political connotation and soon a new international dimension; thus, a whole new series of threats to the monarchy's security emerged. But "state security" could also mean checking the movement of foreigners and domestic inhabitants alike, as well as the state management of urban growth and economic expansion. What this period witnesses, then, is not the end of enlightened despotism, but the birth of the modern security state that employed secret police, special tribunals, and special missions designed to measure social development and political attitudes outside of the capital. The Jacobin Trials were an egregious outburst of official paranoia and wartime expediencies, but they did not drastically affect the development of Austrian state security agencies. What is left to understand is how this security state

developed in Central Europe in the face of continued war, occupation, international realignments, and the growing (and homegrown) liberal-nationalist movement.

Chapter 2

POLICING CIVIL SOCIETY IN PRUSSIA AND BAVARIA, 1780-1816

On 20 October 1798, in the interest of "peace, security, and order," Friedrich Wilhelm III announced his "Edict for the Prevention and Punishment of Secret Societies."[149] This proclamation, based on Joseph II's 1785 *Freimauererpatent*,[150] required members of any society within Prussian territory to register its "purpose and subject" with the authorities.[151] Friedrich Wilhelm's edict did not outlaw secret societies per se; some, such as the three "mother lodges" of the Freemasons,[152] were tolerated,

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[149] "Edikt wegen Verhütung und Bestrafung geheimer Verbindungen," 20 October 1798. *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten* (Berlin: Georg Decker, 1798), 2-7.

[150] Joseph's edict limiting the extent of Freemason activity in Austria only "developed its full effect" after the Jacobin Trials. On this and the relationship between Friedrich and Joseph's edicts, see, Helmut Reinalter, "Die Freimaurerei zwischen Josephinismus und frühfranziszeischer Reaktion. Zur gesellschaften Rolle und indirekt politischen Macht der Geheimbünde im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Freimaurer und Geheimbünde im 18. Jahrhundert in Mitteleuropa*, ed. Helmut Reinalter (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1983), 35-84, here 48, 67-70.

[151] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 50160, p. 34. For the legal basis of Friedrich Wilhelm's proclamation, see Section II, Titel 20 § 184 and 185 of the *Allgemeine Landrechts*.

[152] This includes The Grand Mother Lodge of the Three Globes (*Mutter-Loge zu den drei Weltkugeln*); The Grand Landlodge of the Freemasons (*Die große Landes-Loge*); and the Royal York Grand Lodge (*Loge Royal l'Amitié*/*Große Loge Royal York zur Freundschaft*), as well as their "daughter lodges."

despite their penchant for secrecy and their use of "mystic and hieroglyphic Forms." What Friedrich did condemn were societies that supported "change in the constitution or in the administration of the State" and ones that demanded "unconditional obedience" beyond the state.[153] Other societies that required complete secrecy among its members, or those that engaged in quasi-mystical rites, were similarly outlawed. Anyone attempting to establish or maintain a secret order after the publishing of the edict, received ten years confinement in a Prussian fortress, while members were subject to six. The punishment for membership in any society that supported treasonous action was death or lifetime imprisonment.

On 19 January 1816, Friedrich Wilhelm announced new restrictions against secret societies in Prussia territory, including those regions acquired after the Congress of Vienna.[154] This ruling relied on the same language and legal basis as the 1798 edict – which it specifically referenced – but added a significant financial penalty and even corporal punishment. Friedrich Wilhelm justified the renewed attention to secret societies based on the spread of a "partisan spirit" among Prussian subjects and the continued resonance of "national sentiment." Now that peace had come in Europe, the edict stated patriotic organizations and the *Tugendbund*, created in 1808 as a means to

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[153] See, "Edikt," Section 2, Nr. 1-3.

[154] "Verordnung wegen der angeblichen geheimen Gesellschaften," 16 January 1816. *Gesetz-Sammlung*, Nr. 2, 5-6.

revive Prussian patriotism after the crushing defeats of 1806, were no longer needed.[155] The edict also stated that a new law was necessary after authorities confiscated a "constitutional document" critical of Prussian rule and its "political situation." The edict's strident language announced a new mood. Whereas previous secret societies stressed obedience to institutions outside the state, these new organizations advocated constitutional reform and popular nationalism, movements that threatened Germany's monarchical order.

Friedrich Wilhelm's twin edicts became the legal foundation upon which all investigations of secret societies and nationalist organizations stood. Despite such critical legal and institutional developments and the establishment of a political police in 1806 under the auspices of Justus Gruner, the study of Prussian state security practices between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the issuing of the Carlsbad Decrees (1819) remains understudied. Wolfram Siemann's landmark work, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*

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[155] For a wider discussion on the Prussian political and military response to defeat in 1806, see, Karen Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture, and Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chap. 1 and 2, esp. 47-8, n.4 and 5. See also, Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006), Chap. 9 and 10. On the uniformity of the response to the defeats of 1806 under the governments of Baron vom Stein and Burggrave zu Dohna-Schlobitten (1808-10) and Baron von Hardenberg (1810-1822) see, Paul Nolte, *Staatsbildung als Gesellschaftsreform: Politische Reformen in Preußen und den süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820* (Frankfurt a/M: Campus, 1990). On the unique political response of each government see, Barbara Vogel, *Allgemeine Gewerbefreiheit: Die Reformpolitik des preussischen Staatskanzlers Hardenberg, 1810-1820* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983).

Sicherheit, und Ordnung," dedicates just nine pages to the topic.[156] Even Klaus Epstein's tome, *The Genesis of German Conservatism*, which covers the decades between 1770 and 1806, has little to say regarding the form of repressive policy advocated by conservatives. George Williamson hews closely to Epstein's approach, as it is concerned with how Prussian jurists, public intellectuals, and even state officials understood the threat posed by secret societies and revolutionary organizations.[157] While Williamson focuses on the years between 1819 and 1828, he nonetheless recognizes the importance of certain legal and intellectual developments prior to 1819. The conservative response to the Illuminati controversies of 1785-1788, he argues, not only informed Friedrich Wilhelm's edict of 1798 but also provided a "template" for the "antirevolutionary conspiracy theories" that swirled among conservative Prussian thinkers after 1789, and again after 1819.[158] Yet the essay sheds no further light on institutional developments or policing practices prior to 1819.

This chapter investigates the decades between 1780 and 1816 and the security measures that German states established prior to the Carlsbad Decrees. It compares Prussia and Bavaria's particular circumstances – both internal and external – that shaped the policy evolution in each state. Such practices include these states' growing capacity

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[156] Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 61-71.

[157] Williamson, "'Revolutionary Machinations'."

[158] Williamson, "'Revolutionary Machinations'," 292-3.

to monitor pre-published material (preventive censorship) and control the flow of foreign-language literature; the increased monitoring of secret societies; and the introduction of a secret and political police apparatus. In addition, by comparing Prussia and Bavaria to one another, as well as against other European states, the chapter addresses larger European trends in the policing of people and ideas during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Finally, a focus on the development of state security practices sharpens our understanding of Central Europe's political landscape in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. By detailing how statesmen came to support reformist projects while relying upon restrictive press laws and secret police agencies, this chapter addresses the wide array of political positions available to statesmen in Europe's revolutionary period.

Metternich designed the Carlsbad Decrees to counteract the constitutionalism of certain states by standardizing the German Confederation's response to politicized threats, in print and through clandestine organizations. The decrees partially fulfilled – albeit negatively – the integrationist tendencies of the Federal Acts (*Bundesakte*) laid out during the Congress of Vienna. Whereas various Federal Acts guaranteed "consistent regulations," the creation of an administrative body with standardized law, and the granting of *landständische Verfassung* throughout Germany,[159] the Carlsbad Decrees

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[159] For example, Articles 13 and 18d guaranteed that "all members of the German Confederation will have *landständische Verfassung*" and that "When it convenes for the first time, the Federal Assembly will engage in the drafting of consistent regulations regarding freedom of the press" respectively. Those guarantees were delayed. Only in

reversed those reformist guarantees, offering instead a vision of a confederation based on mutual defense against the forces of nationalism and constitutionalism. But the growth of those institutions that Metternich sought to make uniform after 1819 have a longer history. Their individual threads merit attention in order to gauge the importance of the Carlsbad Decrees on the development of state security practices.

Society and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Germany

Aufklärung and Secret Associations

The idea that Central Europe suffered from political and economic "underdevelopment" enjoyed a rather lengthy career. Liberal and Marxist commentators lamented the nineteenth century's perceived lack of revolutionary momentum, the late growth of political parties, and the slow process of constitutional development. Modernization theorists and political scientists of the post-1945 era judged Germany's transition to "modernity" a deviation when compared to Western liberal democracies. But if the nineteenth century appeared to later historians and commentators as economically backward and apolitical, they assign equally poor marks to the eighteenth

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1818 did the Federal Assembly order a report on the various regulations of member states, especially regarding censorship. See, Ludwig Gieske, "Günther Heinrich von Berg und der Frankfurter Urheberrechtsentwurf von 1819" *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens* 56 (2002): 163-78; Von Ulrich Eisenhardt, "Die Garantie der Pressefreiheit in der Bundesakte von 1815" *Der Staat* 10 (1971): 339-56. For a discussion on the constitutional debate of 1814 and 1815 see, Markus Prutsch, *Making Sense of Constitutional Monarchy in Post-Napoleonic France and Germany* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), esp. 61-73.

century and the German Enlightenment. Derided by nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal and Marxist commentators as thin, derivative, and conservative; Conservatives likewise dismissed the period in an effort to distance Germany from the Enlightenment's more radical and cosmopolitan components, as well as its supposed insistence on the primacy of cold, hard reason. When scholars did discuss the era and the "reading revolution" that accompanied the period, Germans often appeared as having lived vicariously through the deeds of others and having merely "thought what other peoples had done."[160]

Newer research, beginning in the 1970s, uncovered a complex, native, and "active" Enlightenment that shared connections with other European intellectual and cultural trends.[161] While the complexity of Germany's Enlightenment has frustrated any

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[160] This criticism comes from Karl Marx, and is cited in David Blackbourn, *History of Germany, 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2003), 31. Similar criticisms also come from Rolf Engelsing, who credited Germany with having experienced a mere "reading revolution," a paltry achievement when compared to the industrial and political revolutions in England and France, respectively. See his, *Der Bürger als Leser: Lesergeschichte in Deutschland, 1500-1800* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974), 256-67.

[161] For the German Enlightenment, see Horst Stuke, "Aufklärung," in *Geschichtliche Grudbegriffe*, eds. Otto Bruner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972), I:243-342. The literature on the German eighteenth century is massive. Cf. Peter Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975); Rudolf Vierhaus, "Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert: soziales Gefüge, politische Verfassung, geistige Bewegung," in *Aufklärung, Absolutismus, und Bürgertum in Deutschland*, ed. Franklin Kopitzsch (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1976), 173-91; idem., "Zur historischen Deutung der Aufklärung: Probleme und Perspektiven," *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung* 4 (1977): 39-54; idem., ed., *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*

"synthetic interpretation," as Isabel Hull points out, this density of form reflects the extent to which alternate visions of civil society had evolved by the end of the eighteenth century.[162] Propelling the spread of enlightened thought was the expansion of a new reading public and the increased accessibility of books and periodicals. Combined with an adjacent rise in bookshops, reading societies, and "literary entrepreneurs," Germans developed what Hans-Uhlrich Wehler argues was a new "horizon of thought and social coexistence" (*Horizonte des Denkens und sozialen Zusammenleben*).[163] Historians estimate that in the first half of the eighteenth century, the reading public in Germany made up 10 per cent of the adult population. By 1800, that number more than doubled, to roughly 25 per cent, among which were "many hundreds of thousands" who developed strong "reading habits."[164] Alongside the new flowering of German as a literary

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(Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider Verlag, 1981); Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongreß* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981), esp. 51-65, 212-9; Ulrich Im Hof, *Das gesellige Jahrhundert: Gesellschaft und Gesellschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1982); Hans Erich Bödecker and Ulrich Hermann, eds., *Aufklärung als Politisierung – Politisierung der Aufklärung* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987); Hull, *Civil Society in Germany*; Levinger, *Enlightened Natioinalism*, 19-39. For the Enlightenment in Central Europe and the conservative response see Epstein, *German Conservatism*, esp. 29-83.

[162] Hull, *Sexuality*, 200.

[163] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte.* Vol. I, *Vom Feudalismus des Alten Reiches bis zur Defensiven Modernisierung der Reformära, 1700-1815* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1987), 304.

[164] Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, I:303. See also, Engelsing, *Der Bürger*, 182-276, here, 182-90.

language, the late Enlightenment in Central Europe produced a growing demand for French and English titles, a trend that continued well into the nineteenth century.[165]

While the work of the high Enlightenment in German-speaking Europe made little room for revolutionary change, voluntary associations dedicated to *Aufklärung* found a welcome home in Germany. In their critique of traditional authority, religion, and social hierarchy, these new societies also aroused considerable apprehension on the part of conservative-minded statesman and rulers. The most well-known and widespread of such societies in Germany were the Freemasons. Established in England in 1717 as a loosely organized and "simple system" of lodges, the early Freemasons had no explicit aim to challenge Europe's social hierarchies.[166] This model proved to be influential: in 1737, the first German lodge, *Absalon*, opened in Hamburg, citing these early English lodges as its inspiration.[167] Hamburg as the first site of Freemasonry in Germany was not coincidental. The cosmopolitan port city teemed with travelers and outsiders but also

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[165] James Brophy, "The Second Wave: Franco-German Translation and the Transfer of Political Knowledge, 1815-1850," *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens* 71 (2016): 83-116, here, 83n.4, 84, and the graphs on, 88. See also, Jeffery Freedman, *Books Without Borders in Enlightenment Europe: French Cosmopolitanism and German Literary Markets* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

[166] Epstein, *Genesis*, 84-5. The English "model" entailed a three-tiered system of apprentice, journeyman, and master and promoted "rationalist," humanitarian ends such as tolerance and free inquiry. These early lodges had not yet embraced the occultism and "irrationality" that defined them in the second half of the eighteenth century.

[167] Rudolf Vierhaus, "Aufklärung und Freimaurerei in Deutschland," *Freimaurer und Geheimbünde*, 115-139, here 116-7.

enjoyed long-standing ties to England. On 13 September 1740, Frederick the Great (a Freemason himself since 1738) approved the opening of Berlin's first lodge, *Zu den drei Weltkugeln*, which attained the status of a Grand Lodge in 1744.

The spread of cosmopolitan societies, committed to the "brotherhood of man," soon caught the attention of a similarly oriented institution: the Catholic Church. After an investigation into an Italian lodge in 1737, Pope Clement XII issued his *In eminenti apostolates* in 1738, the first canonical prohibition against Masonic lodges. A series of anti-Masonic papal bulls followed, all of which cited the Masons' contentment "with a form of natural virtue," their penchant for secrecy, and their threat to both spiritual and secular authority.[168] This, however, did not stop the spread of Masonic lodges throughout Germany; in the same year as Clement's first bull, the Masons established a lodge in Dresden. Lodges appeared in Leipzig and Breslau (immediately after Frederick the Great's annexation of Silesia) in 1741 and Frankfurt am Main in 1742. Within a decade, lodges opened in Cologne, Königsberg, Munich, Münster, and Göttingen – by the end of the century, virtually all German cities had at least one lodge, while some had four or

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[168] The Vatican issued eleven anti-Masonic bulls before the turn of the twentieth century: Benedict XIV (1751), Pius VII (1821), Leo XII (1825), Pius VIII (1829), Gregory XVI (1832), Pius IX (1846, 1849, 1864, 1865, 1869, 1876). The bulls from 1738-1825 comprise almost all Catholic anti-Masonic legislation, much of which survived until 1983. The conflict between the Church and Masonry (up until 1917) is first covered in, Franz Alfred Six, *Studien zur Geistesgeschichte der Freimaurer* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1942). See also, Manfred Agethen, "Aufklärungsgesellschaften, Freimaurer, Geheime Gesellschaften," *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 14 (1987): 439-63; Hoffmann, *Freemasonry*, esp. Chap. 1.

more. By 1800, German Masons established 450 lodges, with an estimated 27,000 members.[169] As Klaus Epstein argued, the popularity of such societies hinged on two (cultural) preconditions. On the one hand, Masonic ideals resonated due to a certain Anglophilia amongst Germany's elite, especially in the age of sentimentalism associated with Richardson and Stern. On the other hand, Epstein suggests that the "spirit" of Masonic brotherhood met a "genuine German need," as it mixed well with the pre-romantic "cult of friendship" that characterized the age of *Sturm und Drang*. For many Germans of this era, court life proved too stiff and formal to fulfill their "emotional needs"; the French-style *salon,* Epstein notes, was far too rare in a country not noted for "either its wit or frivolity"; and voluntary political and religious associations were unknown in lands ruled by "petty despots."[170] Epstein's reliance on a vague notion of German peculiarity notwithstanding, the Masons' "rationalist" and humanitarian ideals of tolerance, brotherhood, and free inquiry attracted the great intellectual and political figures of the day. This list included Friedrich the Great (1738), Johann Gottfried Herder (1766), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, (1771), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Prussian field marshal Count Blücher (1780), Johann Fichte (1794), and numerous aristocrats and ascendant *Bürger*. In 1788, Baron Adolph von Knigge (1752-1796), author, Freemason

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[169] This number is compared to France, were, by 1789, 500 lodges with 20,000 members existed. See, Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte,* I:322-4; Hoffmann, *Sociability*, 19-20.

[170] Epstein, *Genesis*, 85.

(1772), Hanoverian aristocrat, and then head of the Illuminati, claimed "There are few people possessing an eminent degree of ability and activity . . . who being actuated by a desire for knowledge, or by sociability, curiosity, or restlessness of temper, have not been for some time at least members of secret associations."[171]

Despite the considerable research on Freemasonry, its impact on the development of state security measures is still unclear. In Reinhart Koselleck's pioneering 1959 study of the Enlightenment's "social milieu," he argued that the moral activity of the Masons – undoing the evils of the "State" – inevitably thrust them into the world of politics. Such secret societies as the Masons and the Illuminati, Koselleck argues, placed an inner, personal morality in institutions outside the state, thus drawing clear "battle lines" between the (absolutist) "State" and a new elite, bourgeois "society." For Koselleck, this "inescapable" dialectic between state and society eroded the foundations of the absolutist state and made way for a moral, cosmopolitan, and decidedly *bourgeois* political order based on universal reason.[172] It is in Lessing – and in the later, more radical secret societies that built upon Lessing's insights – that Koselleck first located the tensions that fueled the crisis of the late eighteenth century. For Koselleck and others, Masonic lodges

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[171] Adolph von Knigge, *Practical Philosophy of Social Life; Or, the Art of Conversing with Men*, trans. Peter Will (Lansingburgh: Penniman and Bliss, 1805), 325-326. See also, Hoffmann, *Freemasonry*, 20.

[172] Reinhart Koselleck, "The Political Function of the Lodges and the Plans of the Illuminati" in idem., *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Oxford: Berg, 1988 [1959]): 86-97.

appeared as "communicative spaces" for the ascendant yet politically powerless bourgeoisie. In their reading, "civil society" is the offspring of Freemasonry, and the Enlightenment unfolds as a bourgeois "ideology of emancipation."[173]

Recent work has challenged aspects of this position. While maintaining the importance of the lodges as sites of sociability and as a precursor to an emerging, eighteenth-century civil society, these studies upended traditional assumptions of pre-Revolutionary lodges' social makeup.[174] In these accounts, Freemasonry's significance

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[173] This historiography grew largely out of the post-World War II period in Germany and Austria, as historians searched for early forms of radical and democratic practice and association in Central Europe. This is covered well, if somewhat briefly, in Helmut Reinalter's "Introduction" to his edited, *Freimaurer und Geheimbünde*, esp. 9-17. For the connection between "civil society" and Freemasonry in Lessing, see, *Lessing's Masonic Dialogues* (London: Baskerville Press, 1927), 26.

[174] Renewed interest in Freemasonry, and secret societies in general, in Central Europe stemmed from three international conferences held in 1976. This is again covered in Helmut Reinalter's "Introduction," *Freimaurer und Geheimbünde,* 9. The historiography on Masonic lodges is massive, and an extended bibliography can be found in, ibid., 365-404. Important here is, Winfried Dotzauer, *Freimaurergesellschaften am Rhein*: *Aufgeklärte Sozietäten auf dem linken Rheinufer vom Ausgang des Ancien Regime bis zum Ende der napoleonischen Herrschaft* (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1977); Peter Christian Ludz, ed., *Geheime Gesellschaften* (Heidelberg: Lambert Scheider, 1979); Agethen, "Aufklärungsgesellschaften"; idem., *Geheimbund und Utopie: Illuminaten, Freimaurer und deutschen Spätaufklärung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1984); Reinalter, ed., *Freimaurer und Geheimbünde*; idem., ed., *Aufklärung und Geheimgesellschaften: Zur politischen Funktion und Sozialstruktur der Freimaurerlogen im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989). For France, see, Michel Espagne, "Welches sind die Bestandteile der Aufklärung? Aus dem Pariser Nachlaβ eines Wetzlarer Freimaurers," *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 32 (1988): 28-50; Ran Halévi, *Les Loges maçonniques dans la France d'Ancien Régime: Aux origines de la sociabilité démocratique* (Paris: Colin, 1984); Daniel Roche, *Les républicains des lettres: Gens de culture et Lumières au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1988). For North America, see, Steven Bullock, *Revolutionary Brotherhood: Freemasonry and the Transformation of the*

lies precisely in its appeal to both bourgeois and aristocratic elites. The social structure of these lodges differed from lodge to lodge and from town to town: in Berlin, Königsberg, and Breslau, aristocrats and military officers predominated, while in the large port and trading cities of Hamburg, Leipzig, and Frankfurt, their numbers were significantly lower.[175] But, as Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann points out in his study of the growing embourgeoisement and exclusivity of Freemasonry in the latter-half of the nineteenth century, the social milieu of the lodges was not "an enlightened counterelite," standing opposed to a traditional, corporate society. Rather, and following Daniel Roche, Hoffmann argues that Masonic lodges formed zones of "social compromise," where aristocratic culture merged with a new "civic culture" comprised of "enlightened aristocrats *and* ascendant Bürger."[176]

Freemasonry's role in Central European political development is, then, ambiguous. While the lodges acted as sites where civil society could evolve,[177] most

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American Social Order, 1730-1840 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). For a comparative study, see, Margaret Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For the issue of Freemasonry in the "Atlantic World" see, Jessica Harland-Jacobs, et. al, "The Fraternal Atlantic: An Introduction," *Atlantic Studies* 16 (2019): 283-93.

[175] Hoffmann, *Sociability*, 20. See also, K.H. Gerlach, "Zur Sozialstruktur der Groβen National-Mutterloge 'Zu den drei Weltkugel' 1775-1805 in Berlin," *Quator Coronati Jahrbuch* 28 (1991): 105-24; and Karl Demeter, *Die Frankfurter Loge zur Einigkeit 1742-1966* (Frankfurt a/M: Kramer, 1967), 51-3.

[176] Hoffmann, *Sociability*, 21.

expressed a deep loyalty to the state, and few expressed outright hostility toward existing social divisions. In fact, Lessing himself warned that the removal of traditional divisions would lead inevitably to the destruction of the state.[178] But how, then, do we explain their eventual Empire-wide bans beginning in the 1780s? And what measures did states take to enforce those bans? Historians of these lodges have recognized their increased politicization by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, as well as their combination of rational and universalist aims with a secretive and irrational mysticism.[179] But few

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[177] For the connections between eighteenth-century Freemasonry and the development of a wide-spread, German associational life in the nineteenth century, see, Wolfgang Hardtwig, "Strukturmerkmale und Entwicklungstendenzen des Vereinswesens in Deutschland, 1789-1848," in *Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Dann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1984), 11-57. See also, Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert," in *Geschichtswissenschaft und Vereinswesen im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hartmut Boockmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 1-44.

[178] Hoffmann, *Sociability*, 28.

[179] Epstein is contemptuous of this "degeneration" (from rationalism to obscurantism), but does offer some insight into its appeal, suggesting that such a combination of the rational and irrational met the "needs of eighteenth-century man." See his, *Genesis*, 85, 87. Many lodges were dedicated to mysticism and ritual as an end in itself. For them, service to humanity was not the "secret" of Masonry; rather, it was the possession of occult secrets. Perhaps the most well-known strain was so-called "Strict Observance." It demanded unconditional obedience to "unknown superiors" and stood out for its elaborate initiation rituals and aristocratic appeal. Organized in the mid-eighteenth century by Freiherrn von Hund und Altengrottkau (under the name *Eques ab Ense*), they claimed to possess secret knowledge and texts handed down to them from the old Templar Order suppressed in 1314 by Philip the Fair of France. These lodges first opened in Berlin, Prague, Dresden, and Hamburg, and were important in the eventual rise of the Illuminati. See Renate Endler, *Die Freimaurerbestände im Geheimen Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz* (Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang, 1994), 17-19.

studies have connected states' responses to secret societies with larger trends in state security practices. And while recent studies recognize the importance of Friedrich Wilhelm's proclamation of 1798 for the history of political policing after 1819, none have grappled with the changing perception of secret societies before and after the outbreak of revolution in France.

By the mid-1770s, the character of Germany's secret lodges began to change. These changes were not in their social makeup – that would come later – but in their acceptance of reformist policies and, later of radical, international revolution. Influenced by the American War of Independence, the radical Enlightenment, and the spirit of German Classicism and Romanticism, membership in lodges swelled with Germany's leading political, cultural, and intellectual luminaries. Historians of German Freemasonry generally view the period between 1780 and 1815 as the society's heyday, when it could count among its members individuals such as Stein and Hardenberg, Montgelas, Mozart, Fichte, Wieland, Arndt, among others.[180] But the acceptance of radical ideas among certain members of secret societies made membership a liability for others; and, as the Revolution spread beyond France's ever-growing boundaries, increased state surveillance intensified the threat of secret societies in the minds of Central European statesmen. The acceptance of radical, late-Enlightenment ideas by hundreds of Masons and the rush by conservative statesmen to denounce and surveil

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[180] Endler, *Freimaurerbestände*, 23.

these societies, polarized elite sectors of German society at the end of the eighteenth century. This crisis of enlightened absolutism, coupled with the eventual spread of Revolution into Central Europe, inspired significant repercussions for Central European political culture well into the nineteenth century.

The most well-known example of a radicalized, German secret society is that of the Illuminati. In the mid-1770s, an ideological vacuum grew among Germany's Freemasons as "Strict Observance" increasingly lost its hold as Freemasonry's the premier organizing principle. This breakdown and rapid decentralization allowed the far more cohesive Illuminati to assume leadership. Established in 1776 by Adam Weishaupt (1748-1830), Professor of Law at the University of Ingolstadt and bitter foe of the Jesuits, the Illuminati spread rapidly from its birthplace.[181] In 1778, a *Studentenorder* in Ingolstadt opened; and by 1779 the entire order could count sixty members residing in most major cities and towns, including Munich.[182] Their expansion quickened and took on pan-European importance after Knigge initiated an aggressive organizational

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[181] Weishaupt's 1790 autobiography is helpful for gleaning important details about his life. However, in casting himself as a tragic Greek hero, Weishaupt's narrative proves somewhat unreliable. Adam Weishaupt, *Pythagoras oder Betrachtungen über die geheime Welt- und Regierungs-Kunst* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1790). He would continue to portray himself as such well into the 1790s. See, *Die neuesten Arbeiten des Spartacus und Philo in dem Illuminatenorden* (Frankfurt, 1793). Here, Weishaupt is Spartacus and Philo is von Knigge.

[182] Norbert Schindler, "Der Geheimbund der Illumination – Aufklärung, Geheimnis und Politik," in Reinalter, ed., *Freimaurer und Geheimbunde*: 284-318, here, 286.

campaign after joining in 1781.[183] Through Knigge's "indefatigable missionary labor," the Illuminati won numerous converts, mainly among aristocrats, most of whom had held previous positions as heads of various Masonic societies.[184]

While Strict Observance lent the Illuminati their ritualized ceremony and hierarchical organization, the Illuminati stripped their society of the quasi-mystical ritual and "pseudo-medieval Catholicism" that so defined the more "obscurantist" branches of Freemasonry.[185] Despite such surface similarities, the Illuminati held to a deeply reformist agenda – of both its members and of society – that accorded with the "principles of *Aufklärung*." As the Order's general statutes claim, "the Order declares

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[183] "Zur Geschichte der Illuminaten" *Erlanger Real-Zeitung*, 27 November 1786, Nr. 93. This special edition of the *Real-Zeitung* covers the history of the Illuminati and other "patriotic societies" in Prussia, France, Austria, and Holland.

[184] Epstein, *Genesis*, 87-8, 93. It is difficult to find exact numbers of Illuminati members. One reason being, that members often camouflaged themselves as legitimate *Lesegesellschaft*. We do, however, have the names of 120 Illuminists in the Rhineland for the year 1784: Mainz, 50, including Bishop Dalberg, the future head of the Confederation of the Rhine; Neuwied, 29, headed by Count zu Stolberg-Rössla; Aachen, 18; Bonn, 11; Cologne, 4; and Koblenz 2, including the future Prince Klemens von Metternich's father. See Josef Hansen, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Rheinlands in Zeitalter der französischen Revolution, 1780-1801*, 4 vols. (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1931-1939), I:41-74. Hans Ulrich-Wehler suggests, rather vaguely, that "in an incredibly short period of time" the Illuminati reached between 600 and 700 members. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, I: 324. The Order could also count among its members Josef von Sonnenfels and Montgelas, who the Elector Charles Theodor exiled for his association with the Order.

[185] For the "operation" of the Order and the "function of the Secret," see, Adam Weishaupt, *Das verbesserte System der Illuminaten mit allen seinen Einrichtung und Graden* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1787), 296.

that it has no purpose or actions that are detrimental to the state, religion, and morality" and seeks "to make improvements of its members' moral character interesting and necessary; to instill a humane and social outlook; to prevent malicious intentions; to assist Virtue whenever it is oppressed by Vice; to consider the promotion of worthy people; and to spread knowledge."[186] This milquetoast combination of cosmopolitanism and early Enlightenment optimism, however, hid a far more radical proposal. As Koselleck reminds us, "education, training, propaganda, and enlightenment" were not enough to fulfill the Illuminists' "moral objective." By side-stepping the princes' support altogether, the Illuminati viewed themselves as opponents of the absolutist state and sought the infiltration of the state by "zealous members of the order."[187] As with many of the great minds of the French Enlightenment, the Illuminists viewed existing religion and society as a degeneration; thus, they proposed a utopian vision of "natural" society and religion that stressed the power of civil society, equality, and hostility toward superstition and tyranny.[188]

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[186] "General Stautes of the Order" is reprinted in, Leopold Engel, *Geschichte des Illuminatenordens* (Berlin: Bermühler, 1908), 97. For the development of the individual within the larger world of the Order see, Weishaupt, *Das verbesserte System der Illuminaten,* 26-52.

[187] Koselleck, "The Political Function of the Lodges," 93.

[188] Adam Weishaupt, *Apologie der Illumination* (Frankfurt and Leipzig: Grattenauerischen Buchhandlung, 1786).

The deism and cosmopolitanism of the Illuminati quickly aroused the conspiratorial fears of conservative intellectuals and statesmen. Charged at times with atheism and naturalism, as "coin clippers, poisoners, and wicked men,"[189] the Illuminati constituted for many an organized threat to existing society. Others, such as Ernst August von Göchhausen (1740-1824), author and official of the Weimar government, deliberately conflated the Illuminati (and Freemasons in general) with the Jesuits.[190] This conspiratorial union between the Illuminati and the Jesuits is a transparent piece of Protestant propaganda. Protestant Pastors entered the ranks of the Illuminati,[191] and the architect of the Order's eventual suppression was none other than Elector Karl Theodor's chief advisor, Ignaz Frank, himself a Jesuit. Even the Order's great organizer, Knigge,

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[189] "Money-cutter" or "money-changer" is someone who illegally trims silver and gold coins. See, "Zur Geschichte der Illuminatenorden," 813.

[190] See his, *Enthüllung des Systems der Weltbürger-Republik* (Rome, 1786). Here, Göchhausen claims "Think of Rome when you think of the Church; of Caesarist universal monarchy when of Rome; of cosmopolitanism when of Catholicism; of Jesuits when of cosmopolitans; and of Masons when of Jesuits. That will provide you with the true key to Masonry." This is quoted in Epstein, *Genesis*, 99. As Epstein points out, Göchhausen was not the only one to recognize this kinship between the Jesuits and the Masons. As Göchhausen and others saw it, the spread of *Aufklärung* would undermine Protestantism as it led inevitably toward skepticism; the collapse of Protestantism would leave a vacuum which would be filled once again by Catholicism; thus, the alliance between the Masons and Jesuits, who both longed for a prelapsarian past. See also, J.C. Bode, *Die Jesuiten vertrieben aus der Freymaurerei und ihr Dolch zerbrochen durch die Freymaurer* (Leipzig, 1787).

[191] The arrest of Erhard Puβ, a Lutheran pastor, even made news in Vienna. Information on Puβ, including his dramatic defense of his good name, is found in a police report detailing the spread of Illuminism to Italy in the 1820s. HHStA StK *NaP* Ad Polizei 55-4, Bl. 195.

condemned the Jesuits along with the Rosicrucians, an anti-Enlightenment, obscurantist society dedicated to promoting the order and mysteries of the Catholic Church.[192] But this tenuous logic connecting Jesuits to the Illuminati speaks to a larger issue regarding the era's political landscape, one that Klaus Epstein obliquely pointed up almost fifty years ago. Such wild conspiracies suggest that "conservatives" were bewildered by the new world they faced in the 1780s, a testament to the diversity of eighteenth-century German civil society. But the inability to identify threats accurately suggests just how roughly drawn political antagonisms were in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These ready-made labels of "conservative" and "liberal" are indeed more a product of later generations' uncritical treatment of the era's complex and shifting political boundaries. Capturing the array of political positions available to leading statesmen remains a desideratum of current research.

Such conspiratorial fears, however, soon grabbed Karl Theodor's, the Elector of Bavaria (1777-1799), attention. A decade after its founding, and a few short years after its rise to prominence, the Order disbanded, and its members were left to publish apologetics in relative anonymity. In 1784, the publishing of Joseph Maria Babo's, *On*

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[192] Adolphe von Knigge, *Über Jesuiten, Freimaurer, und deutschen Rosenkreuzer* (Leipzig, 1781), 70-8, 95-129. See also, Robert Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung: Korruption und bürokratische Reformen in Bayern und Prueßen, 1780-1820* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), esp. 103-10. The Rosicrucians counted among their members King Frederick William II. Due to their flirtations with magic and mysticism, the Rosicrucians also attracted those interested in the fantastic: alchemy, sorcery, thaumaturgy, necromancy, and astrology was all practiced under the banner of Rosicrucianism. This would include Franz Mesmer, the found of hypnotism.

the Freemasons: A First Warning (*Über Freymauerer. Erste Warnung*), first called the Illuminist conspiracy to public attention.[193] Two weeks later, with Karl Theodor's blessing, Ignaz Frank, the elector's Jesuit confessor, appointed Privy Counselor Johann von Lippert as the head of a special commission (*Specialcommission in gelben Zimmer des Schlosses*) to investigate the Illuminati and mete out justice. When Munich's authorities identified the Lodge *Theodor vom Guten Rat* as the center of Illuminati activity and detailed the extent to which Illuminists had infiltrated the government, Karl Theodor dissolved the Order on 22 June 1784. When evidence emerged that the Illuminati had yet to heed the elector's edict, a further proclamation followed on 16 August 1785.[194] In it, Karl Theodor demanded all "Freethinkers and Illuminati" to repent and register with the government. While many Illuminists took the elector's offer of clemency, many others – including its founder, Adam Weishaupt and the future minister Montgelas[195] – chose exile; those who stayed and refused to register suffered intense interrogations at the hands of Lippert's *Specialcommission*. By late 1785, the Bavarian

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[193] Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*, 107.

[194] A copy of that proclamation can be found in, HHStA StK *NaP* Ad Polizei 55-4, Bl. 201.

[195] This investigation and his promotion of two "dangerous works" of Biblical criticism, drove Weishaupt from his professorship at Ingolstadt, leading to his exile in the Free City of Regensburg. Further hounding by the Bavarian government led Weishaupt to escape kidnapping by fleeing to the city of Gotha where he spent the rest of his life penning Illuminati apologetics, many of which are covered above. Montgelas fled to Zweibrücken where he eventually served as the future King of Bavaria's private secretary. Epstein, *Genesis*, 100-04.

Illuminati were crushed and "released from their duties" by Count Stollberg-Rössla, the Order's *Nationalober*. Others involved in Masonic or Illuminati circles felt compelled to leave Munich. This included Joseph Milbiller, a priest suspected of Illuminati sympathies for certain publications as well as his association with Peter Adoph Winkopp, author, Illuminst, and publisher of *Der deutsche Zuschauer* (Fig. 1).[196] A similar edict outlawing Vienna's Illuminati arrived on 11 December.[197] But the continued fear of secret societies and the 1786 publication of the sworn affidavits of four ex-members drove Karl Theodor to issue two further edicts against the Illuminati: the first (16 August 1787) threatened death to those engaged in recruitment; and a second (15 November 1790) disqualified past or current Illuminists from holding government or Church positions.[198]

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[196] For Milbiller and Winkopp's denunciations see, "Münchner Kabinetts Justizstücke," August 1785. A copy is located in, HHStA StK *Polziehofstelle* Ad Polizei 55, Bl. 201. In 1785, Milbiller left Munich and, in 1786, received a position as Professor of History at the University of Passau. In 1794 he was expelled for his continued Illuminati associations. He settled in Vienna and later ran afoul of the state censor. Winkopp was also the target of Vienna's censor with three titles eventually banned in Habsburg territory. Norbert Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur in Österreich von 1751 bis 1848* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2017), 84.

[197] *Münchner Zeitung* 27 December 1785.

[198] The affidavits were published in, *Grosse Absichten des Ordens der Illuminaten, dem patriotischen Publikum vorgelegt von vier ehemaligen Mitgliedern* (Munich, 1786). See also, Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*, 110-15; Epstein, *Genesis*, 102-3.



Münchner Cabinets Justitzstücke:

Erstes Stück.

August 1785.

I.

An den Stadt Magistrat.

Serenissimus Elector. Der innere Stadt Rath von Delling soll sich nicht nur über die Churfürstl. Verordnung in Betreff des gewesenen Ingolstädtischen Stadt Ober Richters Fischer, seines ehemaligen Kostgebers, auf eine so frätzische als ungebührliche Weise herausgelassen haben, sondern auch verschiedene Milbillerische und Winkoppische Druckschriften an ihn eingeloffen, und aus seiner in mehr andere Hände communicationsweise gegangen seyn.

Der Magistrat hat demnach diesen ohnehin sehr renomirten Freigeist und Illuminaten sogleich zur Verantwortung hierüber zu ziehen, und solche mit seinem Bericht förderlich anhero einzusenden. München den 17ten Aug. 1785.

Carl Theodor.

Ant. Freiher von Kreitmaier.
Ad mandatum Sm. Dni. Electoris pprium.
GG. Dumhoff.

II.

Constitutum

so gehalten worden den 22ten August 1785.

Præsentes.
Herr Burgermeister und Stadt Ober Richter von Bärth;
Herr Burgermeister von Hepp; Herr von Mair;
Stadtsyndikus von Stoitner.

Man hat dieser nicht ermangelt, Tit. den innern Herrn Stadt Rath Johann Nepomuck von Delling vor eine Raths Commission vorzurufen, und ihm das gnädigste Rescript vom 17ten dieß zu publiciren, sofort von ihm gleichwohl die gebührende Verantwortung abzufordern, worauf sich selber über die in obbesagtem Rescripte enthaltenen 3 Gegenstände nachfolgenderweise geäussert, und selbst ad Protocollum gegeben:

Soviel die erste Beschuldigung, die mir zur Last gelegt wird, betrift, daß ich nemlich über die Absetzung des gewesten Stadt Ober Richters Fischer mich auf eine frätzische und ungebührliche Weise herausgelassen haben soll, so weis ich mich keines andern zu erinnern, als meine Verwunderung über eine so plötzliche ungnädigste Amotion bezeigt, und gesagt zu haben, wie es mir unbegreiflich wäre, daß besagter Stadt Ober Richter Fischer, ein Mann, dessen Character mir durch 25jährigen Umgang von einer sehr schätzbaren Seite in vielen Fällen bekannt geworden sey, nunmehr Verbrechen solcher Art habe begehen können, daß Se. Churfürstl. Durchl. sich genöthigt gesehen haben, ihn mit einer der empfindlichsten Strafen, mit der Entsetzung seines Amts, zu bestrafen. Auf diese und keine andere Weise habe ich diesen Vorfall beurtheilt, niemal aber mich eines Ausdruks bedient, oder eine Ausserachtsetzung der Ehrfurcht und des Respects, welchen jeder treue und gehorsame Untertan Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. schuldig ist, hätte anzeigen, ja mir ahnden lassen können. Vielmehr habe ich, wenn von dieser Entsetzung die Rede war, öfters beygesetzt, daß Se. Churfürstl. Durchl. doch wohl höchstdringende Ursachen, die zur Zeit nur noch dem Publikum unbekannt wären, und unumstösliche erlaubte Beweise eines von Fischern verübten Verbrechens haben müßten, wenn Sie einen mit Weib und Kindern versehenen Mann so unerwartet und schnell dredlos machten, ihn folglich dem Schicksale überliessen und dem Hohn und der Verachtung seiner Mitbürger Preis gäben. Anderer Reden oder Beurteilungen bin ich mir so sehr unbewuß, daß ich mir getraue, jedem vor die Augen zu treten, der solche anders vorbringt, und ihn solange einen Verläumder zu scheiten, bis er seine Behauptungen beweiset, welches er sicher nicht im Stande seyn wird.

In Betref der 2ten Beschuldigung, daß ich nemlich Milbillerische und Winkoppsche Druckschriften erhalten, und in mehrere Hände verbreitet hätte, gestehe ich gerne, daß ich den Winkoppschen T. Zuschauer gekauft und gelesen habe. Ich konnte kein Bedenken tragen dies zu thun, da mir keine Churfürstl. Verordnung bekannt wäre, welche die Beschaffung und Lesung besagten Journals verbietet. Noch weniger glaubt ich Anlas hadurch zu geben, daß zur zugerechnet werden könnte, als billige ich auch zugleich alles das, was solche Winkoppische Schrift enthält, da nichts härter wäre, als wenn der Schlus hätte, man heiße dies oder jenes Buch, folglich habe man dieselbe Meinung und Gedenkungsart. Auf solche Weise könnte es gleich bei mir eintreffen, daß ich der Stantlerischen und Frohlichschen Philosophie, welche beide Männer doch heftige Gegner sind, zugleich anhänge, weil ich beide Schriften besitze. Indessen aber werd ich von nun an, weil ich gegenwärtig erfahre, daß Se. Churfürstl. Durchl. darob ein ungnädigstes Mißfallen tragen, besagtes Winkoppsches Journal, welche einzige Schrift ich von diesem Schriftsteller gekauft, weder kommen lassen, noch lesen.

Endlich drittens kann es mir nicht anders als höchstbedenklich auffallen, daß man mich höchster Orten als einen sehr renomirten Freigeist und Illuminaten ansehe, da ich doch in keinem Falle unterlassen habe, das zu thun, und bei mehreren Gelegenheiten öffentlich zu zeigen, was immer von einem Christen, der sich gerne zu der Religion, in den er gebohren worden ist, bekennt, gefordert werden mag. Daß ich ein Mitglied der hiesigen Freimaurer Loge gewesen bin, läugne ich gar nicht. Ich bin es zu derjenigen Zeit geworden, als ich billig vermuten konnte, Se. Churfürstl. Durchl. würden, wie mehrere Fürsten Teutschlands, eine Loge in Dero Landen tolerieren. Man versichere mich bei meiner Aufnahme in dieselbe, daß darinn weder die Religion noch der Staat, noch der Landesfürst, beleidigt würde, und ich muß zur Steuer der Wahrheit bekennen, niemals etwas gegen einen dieser Gegenstände anstößiges gesehen oder gehört zu haben, wovon Se. Churfürstl. Durchl. sehr sich werden überzeugen können, wenn Sie die Beschuldigungen, welche der Loge aus was immer für Privat Ursachen und nebsätzigen Absichten jetzt gemacht werden, nunmehr mit aller Schärfe und Genauigkeit, wie ich es von der bekannten Gerechtigkeitsliebe Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. nicht anders erwarten kann, untersuchen lassen haben werden.

Nachdem Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. Ihre Gesinnungen gegen alle geheime Verbindungen durch die Verordnung vorigen Jahres öffentlich an Tag gegeben haben, so habe ich auch nichts gesäumt, mich der gnädigsten Verordnung zu fügen, und den mit der Loge vorher gehabten nexum aufzuheben, und hiedurch den gnädigsten Befehle und der Pflicht eines gehorsamen Unterthans vollkommen Genüge geleistet.

Womit man gegenwärtiges Protokoll beschlossen und von Herrn Deponenten unterzeichnen lassen.

Joh. Nepom. von Delling innerer Stadt Rath.

III.

Gnädigster Herr Herr! Gemäß gnädigsten Rescripts d. d. 17. & præs. 22. dieß haben wir nicht ermangelt, unsern Stadt Rath Joh. Nep. von Delling auf den ihm gemachten Vorhalt ordentlich ad protocollum zu vernehmen. Was nun der für eine Verantwortung hierüber gegeben hat, ist aus der adnexirten Abschrift des mehreren gnädigst zu ersehen. Welche wir also Ew. Churfürstl. Durchl. zur gnädigsten Einsicht hiemit gehorsamst communiciren, sohin aus u. s. w. München den 22ten Aug. 1785.

Ew. Churfürstl. Durchlaucht

u. g. Burgermeister und Räthe.

IV.

Serenissimus Elector. Daß der hiesige innere Stadt Rath Joh. Nepomuck von Delling nicht nur die Churfürstl. Verordnung in Betref des Ingolstädtischen Stadt Ober Richters Fischer zu eräutiren, sondern auch die Milbillerische und Winkoppische Schandschriften und Pasquille aufhebe, sich zu beingen und andern untzutheilen unterstanden hat, ist eine doppelt vermessene That, wovon die letztere nach dem General-Mandat vom 23. Dec. a. p. exemplarisch und um so schärfer gestraft zu werden verdient, als sie von einer städtischen Person verübt worden ist. Man hat ihn daher nicht nur mit einem scharfen Verweis und empfindlicheren Strafe, wenn er sich weiter mit verbrechwidrigen Reden gegen Churfürstl. höchste Verordnungen oder mit Beschaffung, Bewahr- oder Verbreitung verbotener Schriften bereiten lassen würde, sondern auch mit der Cassation zu bestrafen, und zu cassiren, auch in Zukunft wegen des schon auf sich geladenen Verdachts von Zeit zu Zeit unversehene Visitation bei ihm vorzunehmen. München den 24ten Aug. 1785.

Carl Theodor

Ant. Freiher von Kreitmair.
Ad mandatum Sm. Elect. pprium.
G. G. Dumhoff.

V.

Se. Churfürstl. Durchl. beharren auf der in Betref des cassirten innern Stadt Raths von Delling ergangenen Resolutions vom 24ten Aug. und wollen weder von dem bürgerlichen Stadt Magistrat, noch sonst jemand mit weiterer Vorstellung oder Fürbitte hierinfalls behelligt seyn. München den 17ten September 1785.

Carl Theodor

Ant. Freiher von Kreitmair.
Ad mandatum Sm. Dni. Elect. ppriom.
G. G. Dumhoff.

Fig. 1 The denunciations of Milbiller and Winkopp, August 1785 (HHStA StK *Polziehofstelle* Ad Polizei 55, Bl. 201).

The Bavarian government applied these restrictions in its newly acquired territory in 1806 and 1810. While Masonic lodges were outlawed in Electoral Bavaria after 1785, Elector Maximilian IV (1799-1806, King Maximilian I after 1806) placed all lodges in Nuremberg and Bayreuth under state supervision.[199] He placed others still, such as those

in Salzburg, under heavy police scrutiny. After 1798, the Prussians followed suit, outlawing all but three lodges, which the King similarly placed under strict state supervision. By the turn of the century, a critical transformation was underway across Central Europe.

This transformation, between the 1780s and 1815, has gone virtually unstudied. Although historians have uncovered the social and intellectual makeup of secret associations in this period, few works trace the state's changing perception of such societies. Indeed, no study has yet to connect German states' response to secret societies in this period with those of the post-1819 era. Once sites of polite sociability and *Aufklärung*, secret societies soon became the focus of conservative fears prior to the outbreak of Revolution. As with other institutions of an emerging civil society, the Revolution cast clandestine organizations as a new threat. Conservative minds viewed them as the seedbed of organized, international revolution. This transformation was underway by 1806 and largely complete with the issuing of Friedrich Wilhelm's 1816 edict. Thereafter, the struggle against secret associations fundamentally framed the manner in which states investigated radical activity.

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[199] Hoffmann, *Sociability*, 36. The Bavarians were not the first to outlaw the Masons – lodges were closed in Württemberg in 1784.

The Mainz Republic

On 21 October 1792, French forces, under the command of Citizen-General Custine, entered the city of Mainz peacefully. Within days of the French arrival, those sympathetic to the Revolution opened a series of clubs dedicated to the spread of revolutionary ideals. Chief among them was "The Society of the Friends of Liberty and Equality" (*Gesellschaft der Freunde der Freiheit und Gleichheit*), a Jacobin club headed by Anton Dorsch and supported by university students and professors as well as by numerous city officials.[200] In February of 1793, by order of the French National Convention, the city welcomed representatives from 130 towns throughout the French-controlled Rhineland. Representatives voted for the first democratically elected parliament in German history, the Rhenish-German National Convention (*Rheinisch-Deutscher Nationalkonvent*), which first met on 17 March 1793. One day later, the Convention declared the territory to be free, independent, and democratic, with laws "based on liberty" and whose "only sovereign was the people."[201] But within one month of the Republic's founding, its fate was sealed by a combined Austro-Prussian siege. French troops defended the city from 17 April to 23 July, when they signed the terms of capitulation and exited the city leaving 6,000 dead and 1,000 wounded.

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[200] The *Mainzer Erkanzler Archiv* in Vienna lists 472 names of men with diverse backgrounds covering virtually all backgrounds and professions. A similar list exists for Würzburg which lists the names of 255 citizens arrested after the city was retaken. See, Blanning, *Reform and Revolution*, 95-6, 295 n.4.

[201] Blanning, *Mainz*, 300.

Putting aside the allied military action, Tim Blanning has pointed out that the "Clubists" also met with some local resistance. That the nobility and clergy would flee the Electorate *en masse* is not surprising. But their departure left significant economic disruption in its wake, made all the worse by the Clubists' insistence on abolishing local guilds. The young republic also suffered from a severe case of Francophobia, as many local "patriots" disliked the French for their "cosmopolitanism" and their "fanaticism," which they compared to German restraint, discipline, and industriousness. Anti-revolutionary activists also waged a war in print, arguing that "liberty" and "freedom" remained mere abstractions; "true liberty" was found in the enlightened, just rule of the German princes who had created a more worthy freedom – "moral freedom."[202]

Clubists met, Blanning argues, with overwhelming rejection from the townspeople and the peasantry, whose general dissatisfaction the Clubists confused for political radicalism. After the expulsion of the French, most Clubists retreated in disguise; those who stayed were hounded and physically assaulted by crowds. But in correcting the older Marxist-Leninist histories of the Republic, Blanning swings the pendulum back too far in the other direction. The founding of the Republic came three years after the fall of the Bastille sparked insurrection throughout the Rhineland. In Mainz and Aschaffenburg, riots erupted that brought university students and journeymen into the streets donning tricolor cockades and shouting revolutionary slogans. A flood of

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[202] Blanning, *Mainz*, 287-95.

revolutionary propaganda similarly coursed through German cities. Rhineland intellectuals viewed the outbreak of Revolution as a great triumph for humanity and for philosophy in general. Although the region was not a hotbed of revolution, especially when revolutionary sympathizers rarely received support from the upper classes, the outbreak of revolt in 1789 and the founding of the Republic of Mainz three years later suggests that ordinary Germans encountered revolutionary ideas and translated them to their own ends. The era politicized a wide swath of German society, at least in the Rhineland.

Conservative statesmen took note. While their response to such increased politicization was often confused and counterproductive, historians should not dismiss their concerns. As we will see, Bavarian statesmen warned the Austrians and Prussians just how prone to revolt their Rhenish population was. Bavarian diplomats even presaged the Republic of Mainz, arguing to Vienna that, with time and French support, radicals would quickly entrench themselves in positions of power. After requiring military aid to quell the unrest of 1789-1790, Friedrich Karl, the Elector of Mainz, lobbied the *Reichstag* to adopt Empire-wide restrictions on press freedoms and anti-clericalism.[203] While Friedrich Karl's response to unrest was heavy-handed, his deep distrust of "enlightened intellectuals" and the Revolution was perhaps well founded as the Empire's premier ecclesiastical figure. The first target of the French occupation, and later the Republic,

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[203] Blanning, *Mainz*, 273.

was the Electorate's Roman Catholic clergy. These responses to the nascent revolutionary era underscore the crucial point that security measures were a reaction to the spread of new doctrines of participatory politics.

Despite the existence of radicalized secret societies, the short-lived Mainz Republic, and the sobering experience with revolutionary war, German states did not immediately erect a centralized, policing apparatus – as did Austria and France – at least, not until after 1806. While the strength of a combined Prussian and Austrian siege was required to crush the Mainz Jacobins (despite their general unpopularity), German states, with the obvious exception of Bavaria, were comparatively lenient throughout the 1790s, opting simply to extend state supervision rather than investigate, jail, or execute revolutionaries in the same extreme form as the Austrians. German statesmen also recognized revolutionary sympathies in their territories before and after 1789. But if Prussian and Bavarian officials perceived secret societies, support for revolutionary France, and a growing oppositional press as existential threats, they did not fully address those concerns until Napoleon forced their hand. And while similar concerns informed and shaped the development and institutional character of German state security agencies, such practices evolved under unique circumstances brought on by Napoleonic war and occupation. If Central European states had flirted with repressive forms of censorship and policing prior to 1806, Napoleonic occupation turned that brief flirtation into a full embrace. The Bavarian and Prussian state responded to events between 1806 and 1815 differently, but these years fundamentally shaped their internal security measures, thus marking a critical moment in the birth of Central European conservativism.

Censorship in Bavaria

At the turn of the nineteenth century and during the Napoleonic Wars, both the Bavarian and Prussian state developed a security apparatus on par with the Austrians. Despite similar concerns regarding the spread of revolution into their territory throughout the 1790s, neither state policed their populations aggressively until the turn of the century. While historians such as Wolfram Siemann have sketched its most basic contours, the history of political policing in the period between the mid-1780s and 1815 has gone largely unstudied, especially for the German states. The following section, then, addresses the early development of politicized policing prior to 1819 and how statesmen and jurists viewed the threat posed by clandestine organizations and a growing oppositional press at home and abroad.

Save for the Rhineland, no other German state experienced the political and territorial upheavals of 1789-1815 quite like Bavaria. In 1792, French forces overran the Palatinate. Three years later, en route to Austria, the French army invaded Bavaria, encircled Munich by early September 1796, and demanded a heavy indemnity for not shelling the city. The Elector, Karl Theodor, had done little to resist the coming of war, opting for an official stance of neutrality, and even fleeing to Saxony as French troops drew closer to the capital. By the outbreak of war with France, Bavaria had fallen into the Habsburg orbit, turning to Vienna for defense of their territorial sovereignty.[204] But

the failure of the Austrians to defend the Rhineland, and their subsequent embarrassment at the hands of Napoleon during peace negotiations in 1797, Bavaria (along with Württemberg) gravitated toward France.[205]

Traditional accounts of the era argue that Karl Theodor took the official position of "benign neutrality" towards revolutionary France.[206] But diplomatic correspondence between Munich and Vienna in the closing months of the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) suggest a more complicated picture. As French armies threatened their

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[204] This relationship was strengthened during the Seven Years War and was put into action when Austria presided over the incorporation of the Palatinate, after the failure of the senior Wittelsbach line in 1777. Despite Joseph's flirt with a partition of Bavaria - or its wholesale incorporation in exchange for Habsburg lands in Tuscany or the Austrian Netherlands - Joseph considered elevating the Electorship to a kingdom, establishing Bavaria as a centerpiece of a larger, unified German state. The "Bavarian Exchange" was sidelined due to the fact that both Prussian and Russia vehemently opposed it and because the partition of Poland and war with the Turks took precedence. The changing relationship between Bavaria and Austria is covered in Paul Bernard's excellent study, *Joseph II and Bavaria: Two Eighteenth Century Attempts at German Unification* (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1965).

[205] Schroeder, *Transformation*, 165, 167-72.

[206] For example, see, George S. Werner, *Bavaria in the German Confederation, 1820-1848* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses Inc., 1977), 11-2. When Bavaria is discussed at all, their interests tend to be subsumed under those of the Holy Roman Empire. This, of course, makes sense, as France and the Holy Roman Empire attempted to negotiate a peace at the Second Congress of Rastatt in November 1797. Bavaria sent delegates to this congress, but the outbreak of war in 1799 rendered the congress moot. See, John Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 188-9; Karl A Roider, *Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. Chap. VIII and IX. The preparation for Ratstatt and the concerns of the Bavarian delegation is covered well in, Eberhard Weis, *Montgelas, 1759-1799: Zwischen Revolution und Reform* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1971), 360-70.

territory on the Rhine, Bavarian officials moved to defend their holdings on both sides of the Rhine. In September 1797, five months after the Austrians signed a preliminary peace with France at Leoben, Franz von Hertling (1780-1844), the Bavarian Minister of War, wrote a series of letters warning that French occupation would have "dubious repercussions" for the Empire. After circulating a copy of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen," complete with annotations and popular French songs,[207] Hertling warned the Bavarian diplomat in Vienna, Freiherrn von Reichlin, of the "rebellious attitudes" (*aufrührisches Gesinnungen*) of Bavarian subjects in occupied territory.[208] Hertling claimed that given time – and through the protection of French soldiers, authorities, and institutions – French ideas would take root, and these rebellious subjects would have the social space to organize and defend themselves. Despite Vienna's rather cool response,[209] Hertling continued to press his case, demanding that Thugut, the embattled Austrian diplomat, consider Bavaria's situation more closely as they lacked the strength to manage France on their own. Hertling once again returned to the twin theme of the "machinations of evil-minded people" and the army of "French commissars and

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[207] This copy is located in, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 940.

[208] Hartling to Reichlin, 11 September, 1797, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 941.

[209] In an unsigned letter addressed to the Elector, Vienna offered its sympathies, but claimed that Austrian support in combatting revolution in occupied territory was simply not available. Controlling the influence of "demagogues," the letter claimed, relied on the "energy" of the Bavarians themselves. This letter is dated 20 September 1797, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 941. See also a copy of a letter sent from the Habsburg's State Chancellery to Karl Theodor, 27 September 1797, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 941.

emissaries" supporting the revolutionary activity of Bavarian subjects.[210] On 27 September, Karl Theodor himself wrote to Francis.[211] This was not enough, however, to garner significant Austrian support. A final letter from Vienna on 7 October – one week before the French and the Austrians signed the Treaty of Campo Formio – officially put Bavarian appeals on the backburner. The "concerns over revolutionary statements in the Rhine" were noted and conveyed to the State Chancellery.[212]

Whether these secret appeals to Vienna, wrapped in the language of concern for the political security of the Empire, were designed to maintain Austrian military pressure against the French for Bavaria's benefit is hard to tell. This period is important, however, for international and domestic reasons. On the one hand, Bavaria exploited the general instability caused by Revolutionary War to its own benefit. When the Austrians failed to defend Imperial territory, and when war resumed in 1799, Maximilian IV, the new elector, began to look toward France as the guarantor of its territorial claims. In the short term, this plan worked well for Bavaria. After the signing of the Treaty of Lunéville on 7 February 1801, which signaled Austrian defeat, Maximilian openly sided with Napoleon. This support paid off, when, in 1803, Francis – under pressure from Napoleon – ratified

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[210] Hertling to Reichlin, 23 September 1797, BayHStA, Gesandtschaft Wien 941.

[211] Hertling's letter to Reichlin on 23 September was a summation of Karl Theodore's letter on 27 September 1797.

[212] Reichlein to Hertling, 4 October and 7 October 1797, BayHStA, Gesandtschaft Wien 941.

the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss*, which compensated Bavarian loses on the left bank of the Rhine with newly secularized ecclesiastical lands on the right bank.[213] France and Bavaria fully cemented their alliance after the French and Austrians signed the Treaty of Pressburg in December 1805, ending the War of the Third Coalition.[214] France rewarded Bavaria with new territory, which increased Bavaria's position vis-à-vis Prussia and allowed the Elector Maximilian IV to crown himself King Maximilian I on 1 January 1806.[215]

On the other hand, the overrunning of Bavarian territory on the Rhine in the mid-1790s marked the moment when Bavarian statesmen first acknowledged the potential threat of revolution. A critical dimension of the Bavarian state's response was a streamlining of its censorship apparatus, a project which had roots in the late 1770s. In

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[213] Ulrich Hufeld, ed., *Der Reichsdeputationshauptschluss von 1803: Eine Dokumentation zum Untergang der Alten Reich* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), 67-191. For detailed views of the process of secularization and mediatization, see, Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, Vol. II: *The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648-1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 614-35; Klaus-Peter Schroeder, *Das Alte Reich und seine Städte: Untergang und Neubeginn: Die Mediatisierung er oberdeutschen Reichsstädt in Gefolge des Reichsdeputationshauptschlusses, 1802/03* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991). The process of secularization that followed after 1803, fulfilled a decade-long goal of Montgelas', Bavaria's great reform minister. By the beginning of the 1790s, Montgelas pressed the Elector Karl Theodor to secularize and centralize ecclesiastical holdings as part of a larger plan of reform. This often put Montgelas at odds with the Elector, who once accused Montgelas of being a Jacobin. See, Weis, *Monteglas*, 81-102, 332-41, 360ff.

[214] In fact, in 1801, Bavaria supplied France with 28,000 soldiers during the war.

[215] Werner, *Bavaria*, 12.

1778, a body of three individuals – the Finance Minister Karl Theodor, Franz von Hompesch, and Ignaz Graf Arco – announced an ambitious reform project, seeking to secularize Church lands, overturn feudal law, and to enact financial reforms, including an overhaul of Bavaria's outdated tax system.[216] Despite the later charges of Jacobinism these men faced, this project, while wide-ranging, was not especially radical and fit comfortably with other reformist tendencies of the period, especially with that of Joseph II. While this reform project saw little, immediate success, it did lay the groundwork for a future state censor, one which built on its early modern predecessor by extending the reach of the censor outside of Munich.

In 1792, the committee circulated a document titled, "Provision for an Orderly Future Book Censor," which was based on an institutional study of the Habsburg's system of censorship in their German and Hungarian territories. The document detailed how Austrian censorship functioned in the provinces and smaller towns throughout the Empire and suggested that the Bavarian state develop a series of new, centralized institutional bodies, complete with a more clearly articulated sense of each institution's jurisdiction. Most important among these new offices was a roaming "inquisitor," who monitored the publication and sale of books and journals outside of Munich, and a commission charged with maintaining and circulating a list of banned material. The

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[216] At the time, Montgelas was 19 and working for the state censor. As Eberhard Weis argues, this early reform period played a critical role in Montgelas's reformist agenda after 1796, and more so after 1799. Weis, *Montegelas*, 293-301.

author of the report nonetheless stressed "toleration" (mostly regarding Protestant literature) and argued that the censor must find a healthy medium between "too much and too little pressure" and must recognize what is "truly harmful and what is harmless."[217]

The 1792 document had little to say about "political" material, noting only that the censors' focus "must change" as "political circumstances" change. But if the 1792 "Provision" was concerned almost exclusively with the publishing of works of "religion and morals," the establishment of a new censorship commission in 1797 increased state control over a wider swath of material. A document circulated in 1797 outlined several critical institutional developments that shaped censorship in Bavaria for decades.[218] Perhaps most importantly was the increased "secularization" of state censorship, a process which had deep roots.[219] The practice of both pre- and post-publication censorship now fell entirely under the jurisdiction of the department of "Spiritual Affairs" (*Departments des geistlichen Angelegenheiten*) and was subject to court decrees alone.[220]

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[217] "Zur Bestimmung einer ordentlichen künftigen Büchen-Zensor," 18 January 1792. A copy can be found in, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 958-2.

[218] "Büchen-Zensur, 1797" BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 958-2.

[219] Theodor Bitterauf, "Die Zensur der politischen Zeitungen in Bayern, 1799-1825," in *Riezler-Festschrift: Beiträge zur Bayerischen Geschichte*, ed. Karl von Müller (Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 1913), 305-51, here 306.

[220] The secularization of censorship was a process underway throughout Europe by the eighteenth century. For information on the gradual shift from church control over censorship to more secular control, see, Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Ostensibly motivated by a concern for toleration and the proper state response to objectionable religious material, this new commission of 1797 simultaneously widened its investigatory powers, extending state censorship over university professors, foreign newspapers, and the purchasing of banned material.[221] It also authorized increased surveillance and control over publishers that sought to "manipulate" the censor.[222] While the bulk of the document details the development of a fully centralized and more streamlined state-run censorship, it did recommend one other critical change: censors were now tasked with communicating "their opinions on political subjects" and referring those opinions to the proper court.

By the end of 1797, the institutional framework of the Bavarian state censor was largely complete. But a series of ministerial conferences, held between February and August of 1799, further clarified the extent of the censors' jurisdiction and authority. On 25 February, a ministerial commission, which included Montgelas (one week into his tenure as the top advisor to Maximilian I) ruled that the censorship of published material

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2001), 103-4, 117. See also, Mogens Lærke's "Introduction" to his, ed., *The Use of Censorship in the Enlightenment* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), esp. 13-4.

[221] It is important to note just how fluid themes and subjects were in the late-eighteenth century. It is often arbitrary and anachronistic, then, to disassociate "religious" writings from "political" writings. In 1797, the Bavarian state did not recognize such a distinction, and clearly conflated "spiritual matters" (the control of morals) with the security of the monarchy. For a discussion on the fluidity of subject and theme, see Brophy, "The Second Wave," 89-90.

[222] What was meant by "manipulation of the censor" here is left vague, perhaps purposefully so.

was “not merely a police matter.” Censorship was, they claimed, “a matter affecting national opinion and, consequently, popular instruction,” and, thus, censorship of works of science, religion, morals, as well as literary works, fell to the Department of Spiritual Affairs, the nominal heads of “national education.” This, of course, did not significantly alter the jurisdictional refinements of 1797 discussed above. But, in April, under the influence of Montgelas and through the work of Theodor von Morawitzky, the Minister of Justice and head of Spiritual Affairs, the commission ruled that the older censorship committee (*Bücherzensurkollegium*) was “detrimental to the liberal course of science.” Morawitzky then announced the founding of a new body, the Special Commission on Book Censorship (*Bücherzensur-Special-Kommission*) and charged the commission with “spreading the sciences and maintaining liberties” so long as those “liberties” did not cause overt harm to “religion, state, and morals.”[223]

Scholars tout the Bavarian state’s “liberal” censorship as an achievement of Montgelas’s enlightened reformist tendencies. But reforms in 1799 also brought increased state censorship and police surveillance to bear on works deemed to be “political,” especially journals and pamphlets, but also foreign material. At a state conference in August 1799, Karl von Gravenreuth, the Elector’s chief advisor, stated "Pamphlets and journals have little in common with the education of Man. They are closer to real actions than to the true works of contemplation and learning, [and are]

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[223] The most pertinent rulings and opinions of these commissions are reprinted in, Bitterauf, “Die Zensur,” here, 305-7.

usually the echo of one or another faction in the country, who never intend the good of the state, but their own private interest." As such, Gravenreuth argued that the censorship of political material fell to the "higher state police" and not the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs, who would only intervene to guarantee that "the spirit of publicity never gave rise to a harmful war of opinions."[224] Finally, Gravenreuth concluded that "political journals" were dangerous as "they contain little of the interior, but occupy their readers with the political events and objects concerning relations with and to the foreign states." Because they are often authored by outsiders, Gravenreuth complained, such journals allow "outsiders to judge the mood of the government" in ways far too often hostile and necessarily subjective. The censorship of political journals and all foreign material, then, fell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who would assist the police in controlling the spread of political material.[225]

In an edict announced on 6 September 1799, Gravenreuth's plan largely fell into place. To stem the flow of negative political opinions into Bavaria, while still allowing for a "healthy" public discussion about European politics, all political newspapers or "periodical magazines" published in Bavaria had to apply for "Electoral Permission" (*kurfürstliche Spezialerlaubnis*). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the certificate, and they were subject to police oversight. As the edict states, in Munich, a censor –

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[224]"[*D*]*ass der Geist der Publizität nie zu einem schädlichen Meinungskrieg Anlaß geben möge*."

[225] Gravenreuth's report is reprinted in, Bitterauf, "Die Zensur," 307-8.

whose opinion was final and absolute – could be appointed "at any time" before a newspaper was released to the public. In the provinces, the heads of the "political state offices" (*politische Landesstellen*) appointed representatives as censors. While Gravenreuth and Montgelas stressed good judgement in the censorship of published material, there were concerns they agreed required no leniency. First, the "use of harsh expression and curse words that will arouse hatred and vindictiveness without benefit and prevent the peaceful comparison between opposing opinions so necessary for humanity at such a critical time." And second, opinions overtly hostile to the French; it was critical, Gravenreuth argued, "to convince the French nation that we are not interested in a war of opinion with her."[226] Thus, in order to circumvent "political discussions" of those with "partisan intentions," Gravenreuth and Montgelas ordered that all reports on the events in France be issued by the government via newspapers which had received permission to publish.[227] While Gravenreuth and Montgelas maintained differences of opinion regarding the censorship of political material,[228] they laid the foundation for the practice of preventive censorship in Bavarian territory. Censorship as a police matter – rather

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[226] Reprinted in, Bitterauf, "Die Zensur," 310. Gravenreuth continued saying, "we are ready at all times to offer our hands peacefully for reconciliation [with France] as soon as their government voluntarily gives up revolutionary principles and conquering intentions, which unfortunately threaten to overturn our existing constitution."

[227] Bitterrauf, "Die Zensur," 310-11.

[228] Most notably, Montgelas hoped that authors would self-censor, while Gravenreuth wanted to produce an exhaustive set of instructions for the censor. This question would plague the Bavarian state censor until 8 March 1836. Bitterauf, "Die Zensur," 313.

than one to be adjudicated by the courts – continued through Bavaria's "liberal period" of 1815-1819 and into the late 1840s, when new rounds of reform increased police control over published material.

Police Reform in the German States

Bavaria

The creation of a secret political police in Bavaria in 1807 – seven years into Montgelas's tenure as the top advisor to the king – appears paradoxical. The once-exiled member of the Illuminati, champion of increased press freedoms, and author of the most wide-ranging reform program of his age, Montgelas presided over the development and spread of a security apparatus as centralized and as intrusive as their Austrian neighbors. And much like its neighbors to the south, Bavaria's political police developed as a response to perceived threats to exigent political events. These threats included most notably that of secret societies and the growing international ties and politicization of its intellectuals, especially its academics. While the Bavarians never articulated the relationship between secret policing and state security to the extent that the Austrians did, it nonetheless shares important founding impulses. In addition, the development of Montgelas's security apparatus cannot be divorced from his larger project of building a modern, centralized state. This connection is perhaps made most clearly in Montgelas's use of the postal service to surveil suspect individuals. Coupled with the need to integrate and secure the new territories France awarded Bavaria between 1803 and 1809, the new reforms spurred the need for heightened forms of security. A potent mixture of foreign war and internal division, similar to the creation of Austria's political police

decades earlier, drove the development of Bavaria's first political police force – all under the aegis and satisfaction of the great reformer, Montgelas.

Napoleon's redrawing of the map of Central Europe first raised the specter of "inner enemies" in Bavarian territory. Bavaria's benign neutrality towards France soon gave way to outright support in 1803. This decision brought drastic political change, as Montgelas favored a "strictly pro-Napoleonic" foreign policy between 1803 and 1809. Not only had Montgelas firmly hitched Bavaria's wagon to Napoleon, but Napoleon favored Bavaria (and, after 1806, Saxony) as a strong "counterweight" to Prussia and Austria. As such, Napoleon systematically reduced Austrian power in Central Europe to the benefit of Bavaria. At the Treaty of Brno, signed on 10 December 1805, Bavaria gained the Vorarlberg, a state in the westernmost part of present-day Austria. Sixteen days later, the Peace of Pressburg forced the Austrians to acknowledge Bavarian gains and to cede the Tyrol, Brixen, and Trento. Further Austrian territorial losses came in 1809 as part of the Peace of Schönbrunn, when Bavaria gained control of Salzburg and the Innviertel in upper Austria. While this territorial expansion allowed Bavaria to become a sovereign state and declare itself a kingdom in 1806, its newfound international prestige rested solely on French military success, which placed its sovereignty on unsure ground.[229]

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[229] By joining the Confederation of the Rhine on 12 July 1806, Bavaria also received Franconia and Swabia. Prutsch, *Constitutional Monarchism*, 75-6. See also, Axel Kellman and Patricia Drewes, "Die süddeutschen Reformstaaten (Bayern, Württemberg, Baden)," in *Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert:*

The process of building a centralized policing agency began in mid-1805, when Montgelas wrote to Karl von Gravenreuth, the Bavarian ambassador in Vienna, regarding the "establishment and constitution" of the Habsburg police.[230] Montgelas instructed Gravenreuth to "get acquainted" with the police agencies not only in Vienna but also in "the most distinguished capitals" throughout Habsburg territory. This required Gravenreuth to familiarize himself with the "performance of policing" as well as with the basic question of how to establish such agencies. Montgelas followed this letter with a note to Cobenzl, asking for "details on the organization and instruction" of Vienna's various policing agencies.[231] It is unclear whether Cobenzl accommodated Montgelas's request for additional information, but Gravenreuth's inquiry was a success: in June 1807, Gravenreuth, the *Generalkommissär* of Swabia, established the monarchy's first secret police in Ulm. Gravenreuth did so with Montgelas's full support and to his complete satisfaction. In Montgelas's first words to Gravenreuth, he charged the secret police with maintaining "inner peace" while paying special attention to "troublemakers" (*Unruhestifter*) and "distributors of false rumors." Montegelas also ordered

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Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel. Vol.I: *Um 1800*, eds. Peter Brandt et.al (Berlin: Dietz, 2006), 714-84, here. 714-6.

[230] Montgelas to Gravenreuth, 27 May 1805, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 935, Nr. 2149. Montgelas sent a similar letter to François de Bray, the Bavarian ambassador to Berlin (1801-1807). Montgelas to de Bray, 27 March 1805, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Berlin 691, Nr. 5.

[231] Montgelas to Cobenzl, 19 June 1805, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 935, Nr. 2369.

"surveillance" on both domestic and foreign correspondence, especially mail sent to and from Austria.[232]

To surveil its new populations, Gravenreuth and Montgelas overhauled the kingdom's postal service. Control over the post at once became a police matter, as Gravenreuth announced Ulm's police director von Kraft as the supervisor of the post.[233] On 17 February 1808, Montgelas, with assistance from Karl Josef von Drechsel, the Bavarian state treasurer, oversaw the Bavarian state's takeover of the post, a position traditionally held by the Princes of Thurn and Taxis.[234] As described by Gravenreuth, police control over the post fulfilled two goals: to maintain organizational secrecy and to act on information gleaned from opened correspondence. Montgelas further ordered officials to withhold the delivery of correspondence to addresses that the police registered at regional post offices (*Oberpostämter*).[235] However, protest from post office officials,

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[232] Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 49.

[233] Gravenreuth to Montgelas, 17 June 1807, BayHStA MA 9593.

[234] This material is located in, BayHStA MA 108570. For losing the right to control the post, the Prince of Thurn and Taxis demanded significant compensation, a matter that dragged on until 1815. Much of this material is found in, BayHStA MA 3107. They even took their case to Napoleon in Paris, where, between 1809 and 1811, they attempted to defend their right to control the mail in the Rhinebund. BayHStA MA 108574. For the conclusion of the "Postal agreement" (*Postverträge*) in 1815 between Bavaria and the prince, see BayHStA MA 108576.

[235] Montgelas "Ministerial Edict" 14 June 1809, BayHStA MInn 45576, Nr. 327B. For a brief history on the development of the *Oberpostamt* and a defense of the state's monopoly on collection and transportation of the post, see, Michael Wankel, *Send-Schreiben eines Ober-Post-Beamten* (Munich, 1819), esp. 14-24.

who sought to maintain the secrecy of the post, was widespread,[236] a problem Gravenreuth foresaw in his 1807 letter to Montgelas. Both Drechsel and Montgelas parried these challenges by claiming that the "welfare of the state" (*Staatswohlfahrt*) trumped any previous standards of professional ethos among officials.[237]

By 1812, Drechsel and Montgelas developed a centralized post system through most of Bavarian territory, with post offices in thirteen cities and towns.[238] They also concluded postal agreements with Rome,[239] Switzerland,[240] Austria, Baden,[241] and, Prussia.[242] As with similar bureaucratic developments emerging out of early police

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[236] In an 1812 letter, Drechsel, the then *Generalpostdirektor*, outlined the extent of the administrative backlash against the opening of mail. Drechsel to Montgelas 24 April 1812, BayHStA MA 9597. See also, Otto Veh, "Die geheime Postüberwachung im Königreich Bayern, 1806-1817," *Archiv für Postgeschichte in Bayern* 11 (1935): 185-98, here. 190.

[237] Veh, "geheime Postüberwachung," 190. See also the series of "semi-official" letters between Drechsel and Ernst von Axthelm, the post master in Nuremberg. Here, Axthelm denounces "correspondence surveillance" and argues for its cancellation, which appears to have been successful for the years 1807-1810. Axthelm sent all previously withheld mail to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. BayHStA MA 108920.

[238] This included *Oberpostmeister* in Salzburg, Nuremberg, Regensburg, and Bayreuth; *Postmeister* in Bamberg, Innsbruck, Lindau, Hof, Landshut, Passau, and Brixen; and a royal councilman in Munich. Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 54 n.44.

[239] BayHStA MA 108896

[240] BayHStA MA 108876

[241] BayHStA MA 108831.

reforms, Bavaria's postal agreements played a dual role. On the one hand, they allowed for strict control over all mail, whether suspicion was justified or not. It also allowed police authorities to pinpoint centers of unrest, as Drechsel did in 1811 for the Tirol, while also tracking the movement of individuals of interest.[243] Drechsel's system was hardly seamless or entirely effective: complaints of missing mail and claims of illegal openings dogged the kingdom's post offices.[244] The centralization of Bavaria's post service continued throughout the century as routes became better defined and more efficient – a brief glance at the records of Bavaria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs will attest to its importance. But if the relationship between state surveillance and a centralized post was still in its infancy between 1808 and 1815, the connection was forged and, after 1819, provided the Mainz Central Investigative Committee with the majority of its information on Central Europe's suspected radicals.

If Bavaria's post played a role in surveilling the population and in checking the flow of foreign press, it also, quite simply, eased the transfer of information. Alongside post roads, the state increasingly invested in the maintenance of stalls and the health of its

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[242] Negotiations between Prussia and Bavaria began in 1815 and were concluded on 4 May 1816. Negotiations continued, however, until 1824 as the Carlsbad Decrees required additional amendments to the original series of agreements. BayHStA MA 108811.

[243] Drechsel "Über Volksstimmung in Tirol" 1811, BayHStA MA 385.

[244] For the claims of missing mail between 1807-1815, see BayHStA MA 3750. A Freiherr von Leyden in Zumarshausen was charged with the illegal opening of "postal parcels" in 1807. The outcome of this case is unclear. The report is located in, BayHStA MA 108919.

horses. The state gifted post-riders, now attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as well as the police, the courts of first instance, and customs and tolls), official uniforms – light blue wool pants and jackets, with black velvet cuffs and high collars, and embroidered "postal horns" on their coat tails. They complimented the uniform with scarves and a two-pointed hat with a blue and white cockade – the colors of the kingdom. Postmen's hair was to be combed "à la Titus" and worn with wide sideburns. The king also allowed post riders to wear silver epaulets, buttons, and tassels, while upper-level officials could wear gold.[245] While such details are perhaps of little significance in themselves, post riders were now official representatives of the state, and, thus, *represented* the state. However, these reforms became increasingly important for the smooth running of internal and international affairs. Couriers, as representatives of the state, were given special status as well as special visas that allowed them unhindered passage across territories.[246] Finally, postal reform was significant in that it allowed for

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[245] Michael Henker, Margot Hamm, and Evamaria Brockhoff, ed., *Bayern entsteht. Montgelas und sein Ansbacher Mémoire von 1796: Katalog zur Ausstellung des Hauses der Bayerischen Geschichte in Ansbach und München* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1996), 162-64.

[246] For example, see, "Königl. Preuβisches allgemeine Paβ-Reglement" 20 March 1813 (Breslau, 1813). A copy is found in, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Nr. 79-82. Bavaria also established agreements with Paris and London, streamlining the visa process for state officials while tightening the requirements for those traveling to and from Bavarian territories. For France, see, Montgelas to (Bavarian diplomat to Paris) von Cetto, 1 July 1807, and Montgelas to Cetto, 1 March 1812, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Paris 4769. For London, see Montgelas to Grafen von Haslang, 18 April 1814, BayHStA Gensandtschaft London 563, Nr. 2253.

information to travel rapidly between various state ministries. While historians of the period have quite rightly focused on the great economic and military reforms of the period, rationalizing the flow of correspondence (whether regional, intra-state, or "international") was equally important.[247]

But correspondence was not the only concern of Bavaria's new secret police. They also monitored the output of intellectuals as well as illicit secret societies, especially those in newly acquired territory. The impetus to surveil intellectuals was twofold. On 26 August 1806, Napoleon ordered Johann Phillip Palm, a bookseller in Nuremberg (recently acquired by Bavaria), to be shot for publishing and distributing an anonymous, anti-French pamphlet, *Germany in its Deepest Humiliation* (*Deutschland in seiner tiefsten Erniedrigung*). Prior to Palm's trial and execution, Napoleon announced that in all French-controlled regions – which Bavaria was at the time – the publishing of anti-French material was subject to military justice and immediate execution. Under pressure from Louis-Alexandre Berthier, Napoleon's Chief of Staff, now located in Munich, local police raided bookstores in Augsburg and Nuremburg. While the police did not find copies of the work, they did find a letter from Palm's assistant which suggested Palm himself published the pamphlet. On 25 August, an Extraordinary Military Commission, a

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[247] Examples are legion, but, see (Secretary of War) Kunowki to Dohna 19 April 1810, in Heinrich Scheel and Doris Schmidt, eds., *Von Stein zu Hardenberg: Dokumente aus dem Interimsministerium Altenstein/Dohna* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1986), 652-53. This letter addresses Johann von Seegebarth, the Prussian General Post Master, and is concerned with the flow of correspondence between the Ministry of the Interior and the king's Cabinet.

fundamental feature of Directory-era and Napoleonic France, found Palm and four other book sellers guilty. The king granted all but Palm mercy, who was shot the following afternoon. This led to an explosion in anti-French material and new rounds of censorship and police surveillance.[248]

French pressure to control the publication and sale of "salacious" material, coupled with Montgelas's dismissive attitude and mistrust of intellectuals, then, brought increased police scrutiny of Bavaria's academics.[249] Principal among Montgelas's targets was Dr. Johann Michael Sailer, an ex-Jesuit and professor of Theology at the University of Landshut. Sailer's case, covered well by Wolfram Siemann, offers a clear example of the relationship between the growing politicization of Central European society and the state's response in the form of political policing. Sailer not only undercut the state's authority over the Church, but also led a group of both German and Swiss academics who met in secret. Montgelas ordered Anton von Chrimar, the head of the police (*Polizeidirektor*) in Ulm, to maintain surveillance on Sailer for one year. This included the opening of his correspondence and the use of secret agents to infiltrate his circle. Two years of investigation turned up a "secret association of academics" who had formed

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[248] Leighton S. James, *Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 168.

[249] Wolfram Siemann quotes Montgelas as claiming derisively that intellectuals had "a decisive influence on public opinion in northern Germany." Montgelas also claimed that intellectuals' frequent travels and cross-border correspondence made them "particularly suspicious." Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 52.

a "political relationship" which had far-reaching consequences and connections. Following this investigation, Montgelas ordered the "strict surveillance of all local academics [engaged in] political matters" in May 1813. Further reports from Chrimar finally forced King Maximilian to comment that Sailer's "connections in Switzerland, and his countless partisans" made Sailer "suspect" both to him and the police in Paris.[250]

After Karl Theodor wiped out the Illuminati, he also outlawed all secret societies, the policing of which continued after Bavaria acquired new territory. The most notable instance is the investigation into secret societies in Salzburg, a territory the French awarded Bavarian in 1809. In May 1810, Count Carl von Pressing, the *Generalkommissar* in Salzburg, produced a list of eight city officials, five professors, and eight others who, he claimed, "secretly maintained an association" that engaged in "political matters." Pressing included a short history of the "association," dating its organization back to 1803.[251] In December, Pressing wrote to Montgelas with news of this "secret society," claiming that police surveillance was necessary because certain members had already caught the attention of police in Passau.[252] Eight days later, Montgelas ordered that all information concerning the "purpose and principles of this

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[250] These reports are located in, Hubert Schiel, *Johann Michael Sailer: Leben und Briefe*, 2 vols. (Regensburg: Gregorius Verlag, 1945), here I:454-85. See, Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 52-3.

[251] Report from Carl von Pressing, 23 May 1810, BayHStA MInn 45733.

[252] Pressing to Montgelas, 2 December 1810, BayHStA MInn 45733.

society" be uncovered as soon as possible. To do so, Montgelas suggested the use of a "trusted individual [who] has access to the society." This informant, Montgelas claimed, could uncover the true nature of the society, allowing the government to weigh an appropriate response. Montgelas also ordered Drechsel to place "all individuals on the list under surveillance."[253]

Despite the state's growing reliance on its surveillance apparatus, a new generation of post-Napoleonic statesmen dismantled much of Montgelas's system. In 1817, a powerful coalition of the Crown Prince Ludwig and Field Marshal von Wrede convinced the King to dismiss Montgelas in favor of Alois von Rechberg. In the post-Napoleonic period, Montgelas represented an older style of governing, that of the enlightened absolutist, vehemently opposed to any representative form of government. Those who had conspired against him saw Montgelas as a vestige of an older generation and an obstacle in the way of a Bavarian constitution. With his downfall, Rechberg, the new Minister of State, dismantled certain aspects of Montgelas's surveillance apparatus. First to be jettisoned was police surveillance over correspondence. In June 1817, Rechberg ordered post officials to cease the opening of letters, going so far as to recall all the instruments used to open mail and for post masters to alert those who had been spied

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[253] Montgelas to Pressing and Drechsel, 9 December 1810, BayHStA MInn 45733. If the society was found to be Freemasonry, "only police supervision" was necessary. If, as Pressing claimed, the society was "political," Montgelas suggested somewhat vaguely that Pressing respond in "an appropriate manner."

on.[254] But if the spirit of liberal-style transformation had hit the post-Montgelas government – culminating in the Bavarian constitution of 1818 and its first bicameral parliament – making certain aspects of Montgelas's surveillance system untenable, the system itself did not disappear. Despite such efforts, the period between 1815 and 1819 did not sweep away denunciations and secret investigations. The control over political participation similarly continued, especially after the Wartburg festival in 1817.[255] And if Bavaria was a reluctant partner in Metternich's German Confederation after 1819, it still put its old repressive machinery to work well into the nineteenth century.

Prussia

The administrative development of an independent political police in Prussia is well-known, being the subject of one dissertation and a short, but exhaustive, study.[256] Prior to 1795, policing in Berlin was a municipal matter. In January 1795, however, the Prussians established their first police directorate, a body administered collegially and run

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[254] Rechberg to (Postmaster) Kleudgen, 3 June 1817, BayHStA MA 673. See also, Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 56.

[255] Rechberg to (Minster of the Interior) Thürheim, 29 May 1817, BayHStA MInn 45646. Here, Rechberg initiated an investigation into a certain Louis David Guttmann, an exile from Brussels who, Rechberg claimed, had connections to "secret society" in Augsburg. While Rechberg did not recommend surveilling Guttmann's correspondence, he did suggest that this "denounced person" should be monitored.

[256] Ursula Veit "Justus Gruner als Schöpfer der Geheimen Preuβischen Staatspolizei," (PhD diss., University of Rostock, 1937); Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*.

by a sole "Police Director," Friedrich Philipp Eisenberg with 60 officials at his call. Unlike prior heads of Berlin's police, Eisenberg was subject to the ultimate authority of the secret State Council, who sought to "avoid all illusion of arbitrariness." It was only in instances of immediate threat that the Police Director could act independently; even then, his decisions required the Minister of Justice's approval within twenty-four hours.[257] After 1795, then, policing in Berlin increasingly meant policing criminality. But policing criminality remained a vague category. In August 1796, the police began investigating a certain Playet Empaytaz, a French merchant living in the "French colony" in Magdeburg, who was selling the French National Cockade. In a letter to the king, the police directorate asked whether distribution of the cockade should be generally outlawed (and investigated) or should Empaytaz alone suffer the consequences.[258] The king's reply focused on the question of whether Prussian law trumped French law (which governed "French nationals") in this instance. The king ultimately ruled that, in this instance, Prussian law took precedence and that displaying the French National Cockade was forbidden.[259]

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[257] "Polizei Reglement" BLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 30 Berlin A, Tit. 28, Nr. 733, Bl.1.

[258] Polizeidirektorium to Friedrich Wilhelm II, 5 August 1796, BLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 30 Berlin A, Tit. 385, Bl. 3.

[259] "Mandate" Friedrich Wilhelm, 12 August 1796, BLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 30 Berlin A, Tit. 385, Bl. 4-5.

Policing criminals increasingly dragged the state further into normal Prussians' lives. In May 1796, Eisenberg launched an investigation into a series of suicides, the most troubling of which were three men – a Lacombe, Lieske, and Krüger – who served in the same artillery division.[260] Berlin's police also helped maintain gender roles. In February 1795, Berlin police opened an investigation into the Bososcheck family, native Bohemians, whose daughter had often worn men's clothes to conduct business.[261] The matter continued until March 1796, when the police warned the family and officially outlawed women from disguising themselves in mens' clothes while conducting business of any kind.[262] This increased police presence, coupled with the policing of other criminal activity (such as theft and acts deemed to be a threat to "public safety"), overwhelmed the new police directory. According to Walter Obenaus's study, Prussia's jails were overflowing by 1798. In February 1799, Berlin's police directorate expanded to cover all the area within five miles of the city, a move which entailed a similar expansion of its personnel.[263]

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[260] Report Eisenberg, 9 May 1796, BLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 30 Berlin A, Tit. 395, Nr. 617, Bl. 1.

[261] 4 February 1795, BLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 30 Berlin A, Tit. 394, Bl. 2.

[262] (Regional Director) von Reck to the Polizeidirectorium, 2 March 1796, BLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 30 Berlin A, Tit. 394, Bl. 4.

[263] Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 55-9.

It is from this early police directorate, which increasingly sought to extend its powers of surveillance over all "dangerous persons," that Prussia's political police first emerged. While 1809 marks the official birth of an independent, secret political police, the Prussians had flirted with the idea prior to 1800. On 20 April 1798, soon after the accession of Frederick William III, the creation of a secret police force fell to Count von der Schulenberg, General Lieutenant and State Minister. As the State Ministry informed Schulenburg, this "important part of the local police forces left much to be desired," as it called for increased police control over censorship, most notably the prohibition of foreign newspapers. The State Ministry charged Schulenburg's secret police with controlling those foreign newspapers that "have set themselves the goal of preaching the doctrines of revolutionary insurrection, stirring up distrust between the estates [*Stände gegen Stände*]" while painting "the political system of the Prussian monarchy in a false and hateful light, and to attack its civil servants in the most blatant manner."[264] To facilitate the control of the foreign press and surveil the movement of suspect individuals, the State Ministry instructed Count von Haugwitz to notify Schulenburg of all relevant information collected by the Department of Foreign Affairs.[265]

The extent to which Schulenburg and his small cadre of officials (including civilians) were successful in fulfilling their lofty aims is unclear. Walter Obenaus, first

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[264] Quoted from a 20 April 1798 letter in Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 62.

[265] Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 62.

commenting on the subject in 1940, claims this iteration of the secret police acquitted themselves with great zeal and "energy," as they stood alone against the growing tide of criminals who "turned criminality into a passion." All panegyrics on secret policing aside, to date there is no significant study on the topic, and even Obenaus does not offer any specifics. Evidence of its use, however, comes in two reports, one from September 1800 and another in a circular from August 1811. In the wake of Friedrich Wilhelm III's 1798 edict against secret societies, the Prussians opened investigations into secret and political societies in Königsberg, especially those that attracted younger membership. The police recruited five individuals – Professor Lehmann, Major von Both, a Vellhagen, Rector Chiflard, and Heinrich Bardeleben, a Minister of Justice in Königsberg – to investigate and report on such organizations.[266] In 1799, Schulenburg also monitored the Royal York, a mother lodge of the Freemasons that Friedrich Wilhelm allowed to remain open. On 19 January 1799, Schulenburg ordered the observation of the Royal York and ordered the Count von Haugwitz to maintain strict surveillance of its leadership.[267]

Whether or not Schulenburg and his secret police had much impact, they are symptomatic of a growing impulse among Central European states to monitor political participation. But in the wake of Prussia's crushing defeats at Jena and Auerstadt in

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[266] Stein to Schulenburg, 28 September 1800, GStA PK, I. HA Rep.77 Tit.17 Nr. 1 ½, Bl. 2. These investigations appear to have made little headway immediately. A report on the spread of secret societies did not arrive until November 1809.

[267] This information is found in a later report. See the letters from 5, 15, and 16 August 1811, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr.1 Bd. 1, Bl. 14, 15, 16.

1806, and the great reforms which followed, the Prussians established a new policing body – Prussia's first *Polizeipräsidium* – complete with a fully autonomous political police force. On 27 October 1806, French forces occupied Berlin and assumed control of the city's policing agencies. The French instituted a "bureau de révision des lettres," overseen by a Professor Bourgnet and staffed by French officials. Their function was twofold: first, they controlled the flow of correspondence and opened mail to monitor public opinion and, more specifically, to control the spread of news from Italy and Spain.[268] Second, working with Berlin's police, the bureau sent reports to Paris regarding public opinion in Berlin.[269] These reports suggest a population that chafed under French occupation. In December 1807, the French defeated and arrested August von Wedel, the leader of a band of Prussian partisans. Wedel's subsequent interrogation uncovered an international network of officers committed to maintaining their "liberty."[270] In a series of reports dated 7 December 1808 to 16 January 1809, the French secret police uncovered a startlingly high level of support among Berliners for Ferdinand von Schill, a Prussian

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[268] For example, see Agenten-Bericht to Marshal Soult, 12 September 1808. This letter details the arrival of political newspapers from Bamberg and Altona and is reprinted in, Herman Granier, ed., *Berichte aus der Berliner Franzosenzeit, 1807-1809: Nach den Akten des Berliner Geheimen Staatsarchiv und des Pariser Kriegsarchivs* (Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1969), 298-299.

[269] Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 66. Napoleon selected General Bignon to be the head of Berlin's police. Bignon was under the immediate control of the Governor of Berlin, Marschall Victor.

[270] (Police Commandant) General Lauer to Major General Berthier, 14 December 1807. Reprinted in, *Berliner Franzosenzeit*, 84.

major who led an unsuccessful revolt against the French in 1808/9.[271] The Prussian police, likewise, secretly monitored public opinion among Berliners. The first report arrived on 28 December 1807, which detailed a population concerned with the financial burdens but confident that the occupation would soon end, and that the reins of government would be returned to the Prussians.[272] Such weekly reports throughout 1808 portrayed a population still loyal to the king but growing increasingly frustrated with the occupation.

But when the French finally evacuated Berlin in December 1808, they left a power vacuum into which stepped Justus Gruner, who oversaw Pomerania's state administration in Treptow an der Rega. On 24 March 1809, via Cabinet Order, Gruner became Prussia's first Police Chief (*Polizeipräsident*).[273] The establishment of Prussia's secret police began, however, with a dramatic shakeup at the highest levels of the Prussian State Ministry. In 1807, the king removed Baron von Stein from service after Stein refused the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. While the king recalled

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[271] See the secret police reports from 7, 14, 23, 25, 30 December and 19 January. Reprinted in, *Berliner Franzosenzeit*, 320-321.

[272] "Zeitungs Bericht der Immediat-Friedens-Vollziehungs-Kommission," 28 December 1807. Reprinted, *Berliner Franzosenzeit*, 93.

[273] Gruner's initial force was 130 men strong. As part of the Cabinet Order, police agencies were opened in Potsdam, Brandenburg, Frankfurt a/O, Landsberg, Stettin, Anklam, Demmin, Stagard, Stolp, Kolberg, Königsberg, Memel, Elbing, Breslau, Schweidnitz, Neiβe, Kosel, Brieg, Liegnitz, Glogau, and Hirschberg. In all other Prussian towns, the mayor managed policing. See, Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 68, 68n.1.

Stein after the Peace of Tilsit, Stein was once again forced to resign in 1808 after Napoleon's secret police uncovered a damning letter outlining plans for a pan-German insurrection.[274] This event made plain the need for Prussian counterintelligence. After Stein's resignation, Gruner seized the opportunity to establish a secret police,[275] which he controlled as an autonomous agency, separate from the general police administration. Gruner staffed his department with three fully informed officials, while leaving dozens of officers unaware of the context of their activities. Gruner eventually broke down the activity of the secret police into three bureaucratic channels. First, the Police Department (*Polizeipräsidium*), fell under the supervision of Carl Friedrich von Nagler, the Prussian postmaster and head of Foreign Affairs. Gruner forwarded these reports to the Ministry of the Interior or Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Königsberg. Second, the Ministry of the Interior, now headed by Graf von Dohna (Stein's replacement), presided over foreign spies, French counterintelligence, and public agitators. Third, the Ministry of Foreign

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[274] In December 1808, Napoleon wrote from Madrid, "le nommé Stein, cherchant à exciter des troubles en Allemagne, est declaré ennemi de la France et de la confédération du Rhin." As quoted in, Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 63. According to French secret police report to Marshall Davout on 16 January 1809, "The military, the reasonable and tranquil inhabitants, as well as the whole bourgeois middle class, quite frankly say that Mr. Stein has received what he deserved by his weaving intrigues and conspiracies, directing an insurrection by the [Prussian] King against the French, and by his carelessness." Letter reprinted in, *Berliner Franzosenzeit*, 321.

[275] Gruner had long worked on the reforming and streamlining of Prussia's *Sicherheitspolizei* as well as Prussia's criminal law prior to the French occupation. See his, "Organisation des Kriminalwesens: Verbesserung und Entwurf" January 1802, GStA PK, I. HA. Rep. 96A Nr. 60B, Bl.29-32.

Affairs, under the control of Nagler, handled cases regarding correspondence, passport control, and outlawed foreign newspapers and journals. Nagler reported directly to Dohna in Berlin or the king in Königsberg.[276]

In 1808, shortly before Gruner's founding of the secret police, reports arrived in Berlin regarding the continued spread of secret societies in Prussian territory. The first report, dated 20 December 1808, reported that roughly 500 new secret organizations opened in the decade since Friedrich Wilhelm's 1798 edict.[277] Acting on these reports, Karl Friedrich Beyme,[278] Minister of Justice, suggested that the Prussian secret police expand their investigation of these secret societies. Not only should the police widen their search geographically – extending their inquiries into Breslau, Marienwede, Stettin, and Cölberg[279] – Beyme argued that the police had to adopt new tactics. According to Beyme, these secret societies were sites of "culture" and of "political education," and, as such, the state needed to "respond publicly in kind" with their own form of "education" (*Ausbildung*).[280] In a subsequent series of letters, Beyme suggested that while the police

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[276] Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 63-4; Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 92-4.

[277] "Report" 20 December 1808, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 11.

[278] Von Beyme after 1816.

[279] This integration was completed one month later. See, "Circulare" Beyme, 7 January 1810, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 104-107. Here, Beyme also suggests that the military may need to assist Gruner's police in managing the situation in rural towns.

could not be expected to limit all these organizations' journals, they should focus on collecting and confiscating those deemed "intellectual."[281] Throughout the year, Beyme continued to press the *Polizeipräsidium* to extend its influence throughout Prussian territory, while also codifying extradition treaties between Königsberg and other Prussian provinces.[282]

The policing of secret societies, then, was not only responsible for increased reliance on Gruner's secret police (as well as Gruner's many paid informants), but also for its spread throughout Prussian territory. As previously mentioned, in 1799, Schulenberg ordered the investigation into Berlin's "secret and political organizations," headed by Heinrich Bardeleben, a Minister of Justice in Konigsberg. Bardeleben's report arrived on November 1809. In it, he detailed the spread of societies to places outside of Berlin. Bardeleben claimed politically inclined Berliners were traveling outside the city and opening "daughter lodges" in towns that escaped the eyes of Berlin's police. He estimated that such organizations could count 15,000 men as members, including many professors, low-tier ministers, and wealthy bankers.[283] In a significant report from 31

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[280] Beyme to Dohna, 4 October 1809 and 18 December 1809, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 92 and 97-99. In his December letter, Beyme warned Dohna that numerous government officials and jurists belonged to these societies.

[281] Beyme to Dohna, 25 January and 20 February 1810, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 143 and 144-145.

[282] Beyme to (Minister of Justice) Hollatz, 17 April 1810, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 155-156.

July 1811, Johann Anton Sack, state minister and one-time civil governor of Berlin during the French occupation, suggested an investigation into the secret society titled "Constitution," led by a man named Karl Follen, a name that would become very well-known in the coming decade. Sack also suggested the surveillance of a Lieutenant Orloft who, since 7 April 1787, had been writing and editing the newspaper *Qualität*.[284]

In the summer of 1810, Gruner's department underwent yet another round of reform. With the appointment of Karl August von Hardenberg to the position of State Chancellor in June 1810, Gruner once again justified the secret police's existence to the new, reform-minded Chancellor. On 6 June, Gruner defended his department by comparing the French police state to his judicious use of secret police methods:

> I do not think a secret police such as the French have is useful, and [I] consider it harmful. My police have in no way been allowed to manage inner state affairs. I have had clubs, cafes, and playhouses observed, but never state offices (*Büros*); probably suspicious strangers, disruptive popular speakers, suggestive writers, players, and similar people, but never quiet citizens or civil servants.[285]

Hardenberg allowed Gruner's continued use of spying but made himself Gruner's immediate superior.[286] In October, Gruner completed his final report for a new, more

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[283] Bardeleben to Dohna, 1 November 1809, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 112-117.

[284] Sack to *Polizeipräsidium* 31 July 1811, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 20.

[285] Gruner to Hardenberg, 13 June 1810, reproduced in, Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 92-3.

[286] In 1810, the King dismissed Nagler from office and pressured Dohna to relinquish his control of the secret police in favor of Hardenberg.

centralized, and independent secret political police; or, what became known as the "Higher State Police" (*der höheren Polizei*). This report, titled "On the Organization and Administration of the Higher State Police," arrived on 26 October. Here, Gruner argued that in order to function effectively, his department must be answerable only to the State Chancellor and the king. He also sought to expand the capabilities of the secret police, suggesting new powers to defend Prussia from foreign and domestic threats. To his growing list of duties, Gruner added that of passport and correspondence control (including a department dedicated to opening mail) for the entire kingdom; strict watch over foreign offices and individuals; and, for the first time, "control over the proper behavior of authorities" within the state. In his own words, Gruner – much like Anton von Pergen declared some three decades prior – desired the capacity "to monitor all dangerous and suspect individuals," to ensure "public safety and peacefulness," and to observe "public opinion, rumors, and moods as they relate to the inner peace and security of the state."[287]

Gruner's new powers went into effect February 1811, when Hardenberg appointed him head of the state police according to his own suggestions. In this position, the Higher State Police was directly subordinate to the State Chancellor. Now institutionally detached, well-staffed, and funded (8500 thaler for political police purposes), Gruner's department rivaled that of the Habsburg's. Gruner's position also

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[287] Gruner's report is reprinted in, Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 95-7.

authorized him to instruct Johann von Seegebarth, the Postmaster General, as well as the heads of provincial post offices, regarding the monitoring of correspondence.[288] Gruner's success, however, soon caught Napoleon's attention. On 27 October 1811, the French ambassador pressed the Prussians for Gruner's removal. Five months later, with Napoleon presiding over most of Europe and in alliance with Prussia, Hardenberg dismissed Gruner, assuring him that he would be reassigned when the situation had changed, and that the king would still pay him "for the time being."[289]

Wolfram Siemann interprets Gruner's removal, and the succession of Prince Wilhelm zu Sayn-Wittgenstein to the head of the Higher State Police, as a major shift in policy.[290] He is correct in so far as that, under Hardenberg, Wittgenstein effectively split the *Polizeipräsidium* into two tiers, both of which were under his immediate authority: policing "in the narrow sense" of providing security formed the first tier, while the second, "higher" tier referred to that which "secures the aim and system of

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[288] Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 66-7.

[289] Hardenberg to Gruner, 16 February 1812, letter reprinted in, Obenaus, *Preusisschen Sicherheitspolizei*, 159.

[290] For Wittgenstein's appointment, see, "Kabinettsorder" 24 April 1812, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 6 Gen. Nr. 17, Bl. 116. This order also named August Wilhelm Bülow as a Deputy Representative and named Karl Heinrich von Kamptz as the head of Berlin's police. Bülow recruited the help assistance of a Falkenberg as well as two voluntary officers, a Müller and a von Heilegenstaedt as his assistants in Berlin proper and Spandau respectively. See, Bülow to Falkenberg, 14 August 1812, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 6 Gen. Nr. 17.

government."[291] But Siemann is mistaken in his claim that only now, with the appointment of Wittgenstein, did the secret police target "enemy insiders" and their "political associations." The investigation of the "machinations" of secret societies was always a fundamental concern of Gruner's police agency. Many of the very same investigations Gruner ordered in 1809-1810 continued, while other societies increasingly came under police surveillance. For example, in January 1814, Wittgenstein ordered the Royal York to remain under surveillance.[292] In March, Wittgenstein ordered an investigation into the Rosicrucians, with the help of two spies, Gottlieb W.T. Göda and a Johann Maximilian Lindler.[293] This investigation, which identified 15,000 well-funded Germans to be practicing Rosicrucians, expanded into Dresden, and even received assistance from the *bureau d'espionage* in Paris.[294]

If Siemann's stress on the importance of institutional change is somewhat misplaced, he is correct in suggesting that these investigations "anticipated the formulation of 'revolutionary machinations and demagogic associations" that informed

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[291] Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 69.

[292] Schuckmann to Wittgenstein, 15 January 1814, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 23.

[293] "Report" Wittgenstein, 15 March 1814, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 24.

[294] Here, the Prussians benefited from the work of the "employé Meyer" as well as a German named von den Pforte. See Müchler to Wittgenstein, 22 May 1814, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 34-5.

the future Mainz Commission's investigations and their subsequent *Demagogenverfolgung*.[295] The final piece came in May 1814, when reports of the spread of secret societies into Poland, Switzerland, and Italy arrived in Berlin. The report detailed a new Polish society, run by a Charles Piontkowski, a Polish revolutionary and confidant of Napoleon, who, the report claimed, also had the ear of the King Frederick Augustus III (King in Saxony, and Duke of the Duchy of Warsaw). The report also claimed that Germans had organized revolutionary societies in Switzerland, Venice, and in Italy, where the French had allowed such societies to proliferate.[296] For the first time, Prussian authorities tied such societies to the threat of renewed international revolution.

Conclusion

By the end of the eighteenth century, Germans increasingly encountered new forms of political discourse. In doing so, they participated in an emerging civil society that, by the last quarter of the century, turned hostile to princely rule. When revolution came, statesmen recognized that the ideals of 1789 could resonate with their populations. What followed was a string of edicts designed to control the flow of information – especially across borders – and check participation in societies that actively promoted new sites of authority outside the absolutist state. But it took the spread of revolution and the

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[295] Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe,*" 70.

[296] Müchler to Wittgenstein, May 1814, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 36.

experience of Napoleonic occupation in both Bavaria and Prussia for statesmen to break with their enlightened absolutism and develop new security practices designed to control revolutionary ideas. Such practices included the growing capacity to monitor pre-published material, control the flow of foreign-language literature, surveil secret societies, and erect a secret political police apparatus. Equally important, German statesmen increasingly financed and staffed these new agencies. Often inseparable from the centralizing tendencies associated with the era's reform projects, these security agencies were often the product of larger state-building projects.

This chapter presents the decades prior to the Carlsbad Decrees as a formational moment for political surveillance. Between 1806 and 1815, both Prussian and Bavarian statesmen not only identified a revolutionary threat conceptually, but also developed the institutional means of defending the state against those threats. By 1815, then, the location of revolutionary activity and the means to combat it was largely in place. After 1806, the process was uneven and showed variability from state to state. But the institutions that eventually served as the backbone of the Mainz Commission's investigations after 1819 were in place and displayed important uniform functions across most of Central Europe.

Klaus Epstein locates the "genesis" of German conservatism in the growing anti-Enlightenment and the subsequent anti-revolutionary reaction in the years between 1770 and 1806. From an intellectual historian's standpoint, he is correct; his evidence is overwhelming, and his analysis of that material is sharp and well contextualized. But Epstein does not seek to put flesh on his conservative skeleton, avoiding as he did any discussion on the development of conservative institutions among Central European state

governments. As this chapter argues, by 1806 – the year Epstein's work ends – Prussian and Bavarian statesmen began building these institutions. But while Epstein's conservative intellectuals may have helped conceptualize (to varying degrees of success) the threat of a politicized civil society, it was the pressures of Napoleonic war and occupation that drove the impulse to monitor their populations through increasingly sophisticated and bureaucratic means. It is the decade between 1806 and 1816, then, that marks the genesis of German conservative state practice.

Chapter 3

POLICING EUROPE: THE ORIGINS OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY NETWORK, 1794-1810

In March 1803, Anton von Pergen, eight months before his second and final resignation, wrote to Emperor Francis outlining his new vision for the Ministry of Police. According to Pergen, the state police must, "in the present Epoch, direct attention not only to Habsburg lands but also to the ruling spirit throughout Europe." In the decade following the Jacobin Trials, Pergen found that "secret philanthropic societies are active now more than ever," and while scattered throughout Europe, they were "working together" and "changing their tactics according to time and circumstance." Pergen argued that it was the duty of the Habsburg state police to surveil and defend all of Europe against those who "direct their efforts to shatter the foundations of the Christian religion and the monarchical constitution."[297] Baron Franz von Hager, Pergen's successor in 1804, shared this position. What began in the 1770s as an attempt to limit the effect of Josephinian reform and to defend Austrian subjects against the "harmful influence of secret societies" within Habsburg territory, grew to incorporate radical

[297] Pergen to Franz I, 21 March 1803, as quoted in Fournier, *Geheimpolizei*, 7.

organizations in all corners of Europe by the second decade of the nineteenth century.[298] A decade prior to Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo, the Habsburgs positioned themselves as Europe's policemen, a role that increasingly came to dominate both foreign and domestic decision making.

As this chapter argues, the Habsburg agenda of securing Europe against the threat of renewed international revolution was not a byproduct of the post-Congress of Vienna settlement. Even as Europe's statesmen first arrived in Vienna in September 1814,[299] Metternich had turned his attention elsewhere. Confident that Austria had contained its own radicals, and that public opinion had turned against French-inspired radicalism, Metternich was free to combat revolution abroad and to erase gains made by anti-monarchical forces during the Bonapartes' rule over the continent. But if Napoleon's retreat to France increasingly freed Metternich's hand to monitor Europe, Metternich relied upon a police and intelligence-gathering apparatus that long had extended into territory beyond Habsburg borders. This only intensified after 1815, leading to the

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[298] Fournier, *Geheimpolizei*, 7.

[299] Prior to the arrival of Europe's delegations in Vienna, von Hager instituted an intense program of spying. Not only did the Police Ministry record the travels of foreign diplomats prior to the Congress, they also intercepted correspondence and maintained strict surveillance of the daily activities of foreign delegations while in Vienna. The secret police produced a mountain of paperwork, which still stands as the most extensive, readily available source on the activities of Habsburg police. See Fournier, *Geheimpolizei*, esp. 12-29; Maurice-Henri Weil, *Les Dessous du Congrès de Vienne d'après les documents originaux du ministère impérial et royal de l'intérieur à Vienne,* 2 vols. (Pairs: Payot, 1917). Emerson, *Metternich*, 33.

establishment of investigative commissions in Italy, collaborations with French secret police, and increased supervision over the German states.

Historians and political scientists have turned their attention to the development of a so-called European "security culture" between 1815 and 1914. Their analysis includes the establishment of European-wide policing networks, as well as the critical role played by diplomats, ministers, and bankers in the grounding of European peace.[300] While their various actors and institutions are often treated in isolation, there are significant merits to their approach. There are, however, some significant flaws as well; most notably, in their insistence on establishing Metternich as the great architect of conservative Europe's struggle against revolutionary conspiracies. As previous chapters argue, the development of Central Europe's security forces required the work of a wide array of individuals. This included kings and emperors, as well as ambitious men like Pergen, Gruner, and, later, Metternich. But it also required the willing assistance of judges, postmasters, all ranks of state ministers, and a body of agents and paid informants. Subsequent chapters will assess Metternich's role in further "internationalizing" security, both as the Austrian Empire's Foreign Minister and, later, as Chancellor. But, by stressing the growing apparatus of security, this chapter questions the concept of the "Metternichian System." It does so by tracing the growing reliance on foreign intervention prior to 1815 and by expanding the scope of inquiry into other forms

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[300] Beatrice de Graaf, et. al, eds., *Securing Europe after Napoleon*.

of state surveillance.[301] While the use of secret policing agencies, the control of communication, and censorship over both the foreign and domestic press remained the state's first line of defense, authorities in this period extended their surveillance capabilities into other potentially disruptive areas. Not content to stamp out revolutionary activity wherever it reared its head, Austrian authorities investigated the effects that war, occupation, and changing economies had on their subjects' willingness to engage in revolutionary behavior.

Policing after the Jacobin Trials

When the period between 1794 and 1815 receives scrutiny from historians, it does so for two reasons.[302] First, it is mined purely for the power-political developments of the age. This includes continued Revolutionary and, later, Napoleonic war, occupation, and the Great Power politics that shaped Europe's international arena for a century.[303]

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[301] Wolfram Siemann, in his recent biography of Metternich, pays lip service to this idea. Refering to the fact that the emperor ultimately had control over investigations, Siemann argues, "Diese auch an anderen Punkten immer wieder zu beobachtende Tatsache macht die simple Rede vom allgegenwärtigen 'System Metternich' problematisch." See idem., *Metternich: Stratege und Visionär* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), 107.

[302] The historiography on the Habsburg eighteenth century generally falls into six, interrelated subjects, or the six "pillars" of the Habsburg state: dynasty, aristocracy, and the Catholic church were joined (by the end of the eighteenth century) by the army, bureaucracy, and the managed economy. For a succinct discussion of this historiography see the "Preface" to Richard Evans, *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Essays on Central Europe, 1683-1867* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Historians of these epoch-defining events, however, have never fully investigated the relationship between warfare and domestic politics,[304] despite some work on the impact of Napoleonic war on both French and German society and culture.[305] This chapter, then, unpacks the relationship between the foreign and domestic concerns of the Habsburgs regarding state security.

Second, these two decades emerge as era of national awakenings across Central Europe as well as East-Central Europe. The spark of cultural and popular nationalisms,

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[303] This historiography is massive but is currently most closely associated with Paul Schroeder's now-classic, *Transformation*; H.M. Scott, *The Birth of a Great Power System, 1740-1815* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

[304] One example of such a study is, Gunther Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982). Rothenberg's work, however, stands more as a social history of the Austrian armies, rather than a discussion on how warfare affected large segments of the Empire or its impact on domestic politics.

[305] See, Roger Dufraisse, "Les Populations de la rive gauche du Rhin et le service militaire à la fin de l'Ancien Régime et à l'Époque Révolutionnaire*," Revue Historique* 231 (1964): 103-40; Geoffrey Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982); Isser Woloch, *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789-1820s* (New York: Norton, 1994), esp. 380-426. For Germany see, Holger Böning, ed., *Französische Revolution und deutsche Öffentlichkeit: Wandlungen in Presse und Alltagskultur am Ende des 18.Jahrhunderts* (Munich: de Gruyter, 1992), esp. Section I; Blanning, *Reform and Revolutio*n; Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. 158-92. For seminal essays on the German experience of the Napoleonic Wars, see, Katherine Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, eds., "Collaboration, Resistance, and Reform: Experiences and Historiographies of the Napoleonic Wars in Central Europe," Special issue of *Central European History* 39 (2006). See also the growing list of publications in the series, *War, Culture, and Society, 1750-1850*.

periodically given oxygen by the experience of Napoleonic occupation and war, and the transmission of radical ideas across borders, is a defining aspect of the age, and one which historians have addressed for generations.[306] Despite the extent of the available research, scholars have not aligned these expressions of popular nationalisms and demands for written constitutions with larger studies of state practice. Consequently, we need a fuller, more synthetic account of how radical threats reconfigured the machinery of state surveillance, especially within the Habsburg state.

The form and function of state security practices between 1795 and 1815, then, is unclear. Where Donald Emerson saw a period of relative "mildness" between 1803 and 1815, Joseph Wangermann viewed the period as a victory for an anti-Enlightenment party and the birth of the *Vormärz*.[307] However, neither offer any extended analysis or

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[306] For Germany, see, Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Traditionale Gesellschaft und revolutionäres Recht: Die Einführung des Code Napoléon in den Rheinbundstaaten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1974); Tim Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792-1802* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Dann, "Geheime Organisierung"; Karl Wegert, *German Radicals Confront the Common People: Revolutionary Politics and Popular Politics, 1789-1849* (Mainz: Verlag von Zahben, 1992); Dieter Düding, *Organisierter gesellschaftlicher Nationalismus in Deutschland, 1808-1847: Bedeutung und Funktion der Tuner- und Sänger-Vereine für deutsche Nationalbewegung* (Munich: de Gruyter, 1994); Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*; James Brophy, *Popular Culture and the Public Sphere in the Rhineland, 1800-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Karen Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*.

[307] In Wangermann's second edition to his classic study on the Jacobin Trials, he includes four areas of government policy that further eroded the enlightened reforms associated with Joseph II. This includes changes in criminal law that reintroduced capital punishment for high treason as well as imprisonment for "impudent criticism" of the state; the surrendering of censorship to the police; police influence over economic

substantial archival material to support their general assertions about these critical decades. In fact, there are precious few studies of the growth of the Ministry of Police between the end of the Jacobin Trials and the arrival of Josef von Sedlnitzky as its head in 1816.[308] This is a glaring omission. Not only did Pergen's ministry emerge from the Jacobin Trials with increased prestige and reach, but the period also witnessed a significant expansion of Habsburg administrative and surveillance capabilities: first, to Poland, Greece, and Italy and, later, into the German states. Almost a decade prior to Pergen's 1803 appeal to the Emperor Francis, Habsburg investigative agencies began a protracted creep into territory outside of their crown lands. An increasingly aggressive France, the loss of prestige in Central Europe, and near-constant war is often used as a shorthand explanation for the growth of what Charles Ingrao refers to as, a "Franciscan reaction."[309] But the argument that this reaction was a necessary response to the

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development; and a reforging of a Church and State alliance to reform education. Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 173-77.

[308] Important institution developments of the period are covered in both volumes of Oberhummer's, *Die Wiener Polizei*, and Benna, "Organisierung," 221-26. Sedlnitzky was both the head of the Ministry of Police as well as the Censor and is perhaps the most-notorious Habsburg Police Minister; no doubt due to his association with Metternich. He remained in this post until he was deposed in 1848. However, the two decades between the Jacobin Trials and Sedlnitzky's arrival are unstudied, and receive no mention in the most recent, and otherwise excellent, work on policing in Habsburg territory. See, Michal Chvohka, *Josef Graf Sedlnitzky als Präsident der Polizei- und Zensurhofstelle in Wien* (Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang 2010).

[309] This, of course, refers to Emperor Francis, not the mendicant order. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 230-34.

"circumstances" misses one critical point: many of the central and longest-lasting developments in Habsburg security practices came during peacetime, both between 1801 and 1805 and again after 1815. The struggle to monitor and control public opinion and to establish an adequate level of domestic tranquility is a common feature of Western countries during wartime and has led to significant abuse.[310] This is no less the case in Central Europe during the Napoleonic Wars. But the extension of those institutions during periods of peace complicates Ingrao's interpretation that the immediacies of war were responsible for the spread of repressive institutions.

That is not to say, however, that war did not play a central role in this process. In the wake of the Jacobin Trials in 1794, Pergen's secret police continued to gain institutional ground. Despite powerful opponents set against expanded police powers, including Baron Thugut, the Habsburg Foreign Minister, war and the threat of espionage in Habsburg territory guaranteed these agency's continuity. In 1796, Count Leopold von Clary, the President of the Supreme Judiciary, argued that the Ministry of Police should incorporate the state censor, claiming "the Secret Police, this essential pillar of the Throne and of our general security, should be entrusted with the task of looking after the spiritual and moral welfare of our citizens, too."[311] By 1798, Pergen had enlarged his

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[310] For the United States during the Quasi-War with France, see Terri Halperin, *The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798: Testing the Constitution* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2016). For the American Civil War, see William C. Harris, *Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), esp. Chap. 2.

higher state police (*Staatssicherheitspolizei*) from three to eight officials, including himself. As head of the Vienna police directorate, he also counted a staff of forty-eight plus a "military police-watch" of 354 men. That same year, Pergen's ministry began publishing a daily report on public opinion in Vienna.[312] After Austria signed an uneasy peace with Napoleon at Lunéville on 9 February 1801, Emperor Francis personally transferred control over the censorship of foreign publications to the Ministry of Police on 1 September.[313]

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[311] Vortrag Clary, 23 February 1796, as quoted in Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 175. Despite Pergen's wishes, the Police Ministry's control over censorship was a creeping affair and would not become total until 1801/2. However, in February 1795, the Foreign Ministry enlisted the Police Ministry in surveying "suspicious publications." This also included the publication of a 1795 ordinance collecting and streamlining past censorship regulations. This led to the censorship of Vienna's official newspaper, the *Wiener Zeitung.* Vienna's theaters were also a target of surveillance and censorship. See Glossy, "Wiener Theatercensur." The first instance of Police censorship of foreign publications came in March 1796, and concerns a "Broschüre" titled, *Ein Stent über die Ewigkeiten, und über des Königtum Ludwig des XVI*. The document was originally published in Leipzig; however, J.G. Fleischer – a bookseller from Preβberg – fell under police surveillance for selling foreign literature. After an investigation, Fleischer fled Preβberg, leading the Police Ministry to label Fleischer a "staatsgefährlich Flüchheisten" in September of that year. Pergen to Thugut, 20 March 1796, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 54-5 and Saurau to Thugut, 14 September 1796, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 64-5. After a 1793 court decree, newspapers from France, especially the *Moniteur* and the *Journal de Paris*, were only allowed to be read only with special permission from the courts. For the strengthening of censorship under Pergen, see, Norbert Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur in Österreich von 1751 bis 1848* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2017), 94-6.

[312] *Hof- und Staats-Schematismus der röm. kaiserl. auch kaiserl. königl. und erzherzoglichen Haupt- und Residenz-Stadt Wien* . . . (Vienna: Gerold, 1798), 121-4. Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:85.

[313]"Seine Majestät haben das zensurwesen dem polizeyminister Grafen von Pergen und dem, unter seiner Leitung stehenden, vizepräsidenten der polizeihofstelle, Freiherr von

When Austria declared war against revolutionary France in 1792, Austria's military immediately became an organ of the state police. Chapter 1 discussed the use of the military and military courts during the Jacobin Trials, but the extent of the military's involvement in combatting security threats after the trials is unknown. Pergen's higher state police were still responsible for maintaining security within Austrian territory, but the defense against outside threats also fell within the military's jurisdiction. State security thus became a matter of diplomacy and constituted an increasingly important aspect of the military's duty (*Militärverfassung*).[314] Through the military, then, the state police increased their ability to surveil local populations, to control the movement of people and printed material, and to report on the war's effects on the popular mood. Cooperation between the military and the Austrian state police in monitoring public opinion continued during peace time, which Metternich promoted during his reign as Chancellor. This close relationship between the police and the military forms a critical moment of this period, one that characterized the state's response to social unrest for the next half century.

Sumerau, zu übertragen geruht; hiervon werden die länderstellen verständigt und zugleich angewiesen künftig ihre Berichte in zensurangelegenheiten dorthin zu erstatten." With this decree from the Emperor, the Ministry of Police became the "Polizei- und Zensurhofstelle." See, Joseph Kropatscheck, ed., *Sammlung der Gesetze, welche unter der glorreichsten Regierung des Kaiser Franz des II in den sämmtlichen K.K. Erblanden erschienen sind*, 25 vols. (Vienna: Möβle, 1793-1808), XXVI: 157. See also, Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:176 and Benna,"Organisierung," 225.

[314] Bibl, *Wiener Polizei*, 270.

The Jacobin Trials in the summer of 1794 did not bring an end to the Jacobins' supposed threat to the state. Nor did the trials and the rebuke of the state's extra-legal means of information gathering stymie the growth of Pergen's secret police. In fact, Pergen emerged from the trials more emboldened and suggested that the state police help dictate state policy, especially in matters concerning state security. In June 1794, Pergen wrote to Francis, suggesting that the secret police should no longer be content merely to uncover and neutralize security threats; rather, the secret police, he argued, must work in conjunction with the state to identify the conditions that led to general unrest. This meant control over the monarchy's growing urban and propertyless populations, who, especially in France, had proved susceptible to Jacobin conspiracies.[315] Pergen urged the emperor to reduce swelling populations by reversing those economic policies that drove emigration to the cities and by forcefully expelling anyone without proof of regular employment. The emperor submitted Pergen's proposal to the Chancellery, where it met with some resistance by Count Carl von Zinzendorf, a vocal opponent of the state's extra-legal information gathering prior to the Jacobin Trials and a promoter of economic liberalism.[316] Despite such opposition, the Chancellery recommended Pergen's

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[315] Pergen to Francis, 23 June, 1794, as quoted in, Johann Sloker, *Geschichte der österreichischen Industrie und ihrer Förderung unter Franz I* (Vienna: G. Freytag, 1914), 16-7.

[316] Friedrich von Eger, a member of the Court Chancellery and President of the Commission for Tax Reform and Commutation of Labor Services, also weighed in, arguing that expanding economies did not necessarily represent internal threats; rather

proposition, suggesting three areas of reform: restricting factories in the city; limiting the promotion of journeymen to masters; and expelling all foreigners not engaged in regular trade. Francis ignored Zinzendorf's pleas and, on 9 January 1795, sanctioned the Chancellery's proposals, enacting an economic policy that the state pursued until 1848.[317]

Historians such as Paul Bernard and Ernst Wangermann argue that police involvement in the development of Austrian industry – as a matter of state security – is evidence of a creeping police state. The extent to which Francis and his successors employed the police to monitor economic growth, however, remains unclear. Between 1791 and 1800, Vienna's population rose from 209,231 to 232,637, most of whom came to work in the city's factories.[318] To manage the influx of working poor, and to limit future emigration, the police offered three proposals, which amounted to a new, distinctly modern form of population control. The police suggested that the government make

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"frustration, unemployment, and poverty" was far more dangerous a matter. See, Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 176.

[317] Sloker, *Österreichischen Industrie*, 17-20; Wangermann, *Joseph II*, 176. In 1806, Hofrat Ratschky mirrored Pergen's previous sentiments, arguing that Austria was fundamentally "an agricultural state and not in a position ever to become a trading State of any importance." Ratschky, among other physiocrats of his time, appealed to "moral considerations," suggesting that urban, industrial life led to "moral corruption" and "soft living." As quoted in, C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 161, n.1.

[318] Sloker, *Österreichischen Industrie*, 36. As far as this author can tell, this number does not include *émigrés*. Vienna's population rose to 242,523 by 1807. See also, Maren Seliger and Karl Ucakar, *Wien Politische Geschichte, 1740-1934. Entwicklung und Bestimmungskräfte großstädtischer Politik*, 2 vols. (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1985), I:165-6; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 90-1.

residency more difficult for foreigners and Austrian subjects alike; limit marriage licenses for lower classes (*Volksklassen*); and restrict the building of new suburbs.[319] New restrictions followed in 1801 and again in early 1802, after 250 families arrived in Vienna with no lodgings and no means to support themselves. In January 1803, the Chancellery announced a commission consisting of fourteen high-ranking state ministers, including Friedrich von Schilling, Pergen's secretary and a key figure in the Jacobin Trials. Schilling was a smart fit for the commission; not only had Pergen recommended him for promotion after the trials, Schilling had experience monitoring the popular mood concerning war and its effects on the local economy in Prague.[320]

Yet, even with Schilling's participation with this commission and its stated policy of surveilling factory workers, it is not clear what resources the police brought to bear on the matter. Despite the state's attempt to control the pace of economic liberalization and industrial development, those forces proved too powerful.[321] Much like other areas of Central Europe after 1811, Napoleon's Continental System jumpstarted local industry as

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[319] Ibid., 36.

[320] Central here was the effect of removing silver from circulation, which the state had done after 1797. Report to Schilling, 19 July 1800, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 131-6.

[321] John Komlos, *Nutrition and Economic Development in the Eighteenth-Century Habsburg Monarchy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); David Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), esp. Chaps. I and II; Jean Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918*, trans. by C.A. Simpson (London: Longman, 1997 [1990]), 148-55.

English goods because increasingly difficult to procure.[322] This eventually led to a series of other commissions, such as the State Commission on Commerce (*Kommerzhofkommission*, 1816-1826), designed to coordinate development, oversee customs, promote industry in the provinces, and to establish a national system of credit.[323] While state supervision of industry had its roots in concerns over state security, claims of the growing police state should be tempered as available research does not suggest an overbearing police presence. Nor does it suggest that the Austrian Empire was out of step with most of Europe at the time. Yet the presence of high-ranking police functionaries in powerful state commissions and the coordination of state and police policy attests the Habsburg's growing preoccupation with changing economies and its relation to state security.

Despite the growing importance of surveillance, the years after the Jacobin Trials saw a reduction in the use of the term "danger to the state" (*Staatsgefangene*). With the emperor's begrudging acceptance, Pergen and the Ministry of Police previously utilized this designation to subvert normal legal procedure for individuals deemed too serious a threat to the state. Between 1789 and 1794, the Ministry designated roughly a dozen individuals as such. In early 1798, however, after war with France had come to a pause,

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[322] Sloker, *Österreichischen Industrie*, 64. See also, Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 91. Despite such profits, many civil servants fell into deep poverty. See, Heindl, *Gehorsame Rebellen*, 266.

[323] Sloker, *Österreichischen Industrie*, 66-104.

Francis requested that Pergen revisit these cases and report on whether the designation and practice was a necessity.[324] Between 1795 and 1798 only six individuals held this title, two of which, a Friedrich Rühle and Franz von Spaun, Francis and Pergen had designated as such prior to the trials. Two other men, the Frenchman Peter Franz Colombat, majordomo of Prince Colloredo's estate, and Franz Hanke, an Austrian physician accused of high treason in 1795 and held indefinitely, were joined by Johann Baptist Müller and J.G. Fleischer, book sellers from Preβberg and Leipzig respectively, both of whom the police labeled as dangers to the state, but who had already fled Austria.[325] Despite the institution's waning significance, Pergen chose to defend the institution, arguing that only one individual, Franz Hanke, could safely be released, on account of his old age and poor health. In his biography of Pergen, Paul Bernard argues that the low numbers of those held indefinitely – and without trial – as threats to the state does not "constitute a concentration camp state."[326] While Bernard's qualification is no longer helpful,[327] Pergen's defense accords with his concern for state security, regardless of whether it ran counter to the principles of the *Rechtsstaat*.

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[324] Bernard, *Enlightenment*, 228.

[325] For Müller's case and his activities after having fled to Venice, see Pergen to Thugut, 25 March 1795, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 17-20. For Fleischer, see n.6.

[326] Bernard, *Englightenment to the Police State*, 228-9; Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 225.

[327] The work of post-war historians, such as Bernard, Donald Emerson, and, to a lesser extent, Ernst Wangermann are concerned with the origins of the Nazi "police state," and,

Pergen did suffer one clear defeat in the State Chancellery. In the same June 1794 letter, Pergen pleaded with the emperor to allow the state police to judge matters concerning crimes against the state. According to Pergen, the police were in a better position than the courts – with their formalities and concern for proper, legal procedure – to judge the truth in certain cases, especially when no legally valid proof was available. Pergen effectively argued for emergency, wartime powers by placing the state police above judicial review in matters deemed a threat to the state – a still-vague formulation and one open to abuse.[328] Pergen's proposition, however, failed as the Chancellery refused to make the police formally independent of the courts. Despite Pergen tipping his hand by requesting a level of authority the police had not enjoyed since Joseph II, Pergen maintained his powerful position, while securing promotions for his immediate subordinates. Ironically, the Jacobin Trials, for all their apparent abuses and subsequent historical infamy, both expanded the reach and influence of the Ministry of Police while placing strict limits on its authority. The police, then, emerged as a firmly entrenched institution functioning within the state and mostly (but not always) within legal bounds, not as a rogue body enacting its own policy. This further suggests that charges of a creeping "police state," an anachronistic and heavily loaded term, are unhelpful. Despite

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thus, they turn to the abuses of the Jacobin Trials and especially the era of Metternich as the trial run for the Gestapo. The term police state, as previously discussed, is not helpful, especially in the period prior to the 1820s.

[328] Here, Pergen argued that abuse was impossible as the emperor had access to reports and interrogations. Bernard, *Enlightenment to the Police State*, 224.

some continued abuse of the legal standards of the era, the higher state police became increasingly integrated within the Austrian state. This not only gave the police – along with its methods of acquiring information – a veneer of legality but also guaranteed the police's institutional longevity.

But Pergen's defense of illegal activity, however, should give historians some pause. In his article on Habsburg rule in Venetia (1814-1832), David Laven argues that Habsburg legal machinery in post-Napoleonic Italy was "scrupulous in the extreme."[329] While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address Laven's claims more fully, Pieter Judson quotes Laven's essay somewhat deceptively to defend a larger point concerning the Habsburg state's commitment to legality. If the Ministry of Police now controlled censorship and if the state employed secret police to monitor the popular mood or the political participation of its subjects, it did so, Judson argues, legally and "according to recognized procedure."[330] But Judson does not address the continued use of indefinite detention, nor does he account for the growing relationship between the state police and the Austrian military, a relationship that only increased during peace time, especially after 1801. But too strong a focus on "legality" whitewashes a critical aspect of Central European history, especially in the decades under discussion. As revolution ignited popular imaginations across Europe, Central European states quickly made Faustian pacts

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[329] David Laven, "Law and Order in Habsburg Venetia, 1814-1835" *The Historical Journal* 39 (1996): 383-406, here 403.

[330] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 106-7.

with the forces of political repression.[331] The increased recourse to repressive measures, and the grounding of these institutions within the legal framework of the state, further expanded the reach of the Ministry of Police and led to a certain institutional sclerosis. Whether repression was carried out legally or otherwise, this pact made Central European states incapable of successfully managing their changing societies. Thus, the question should not be one about legality, but how repressive institutions functioned and grew within a state – such as the Austrian Empire – fundamentally opposed to constitutional reform.

Policing the Empire, 1794-1806

In the immediate wake of the Jacobin Trials, the Police Ministry turned its attention to the movement of foreigners. Since its inception, surveillance on the comings and goings of foreigners was a critical aspect of the Habsburg security state. But by the end of the 1790s, Pergen's ministry monitored the continued flow of *émigrés* with greater intensity. Between 1 January 1794 and October 1798, 441 French, Swiss, and Dutch *émigrés* either settled in Vienna or passed through the city en route elsewhere. Among the *émigrés* arriving in 1798 was Princess Maria Theresa of Savoy, the exiled wife of

[331] This language is indebted to the work of Howard Brown. Brown's work, however, is concerned with the challenges that "transitional" liberal regimes faced (and continue to face), especially in the years during and immediately after the Directory. The contemporary Central European context differs, of course, in that there was no attempt to ground state legitimacy within a constitutional framework. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution.*

Charles Philippe, the Count of Artois and – as Charles X – the future King of France. With the princess was her young son Charles Ferdinand, the future Duke of Berry and the target of a successful assassination in 1820 by Bonapartists in Paris.[332] As it had in the past, the state's control over movement entailed the surveillance of "suspect" individuals. In December of 1794, months after the Jacobin trials, a Dr. Pagoβen first garnered police attention for his alleged "Jacobinism."[333] Despite Pagoβen's possible association with Jacobinism, which only months earlier carried the death penalty, the higher state police granted him a pass to travel throughout Italy.[334] Permission to travel, however, did not preclude significant surveillance of his movements. Three years after the police granted Pagoβen's request, the higher state police reported on his travel from Rome to Naples, where he eventually settled.[335]

If it is true that imperial criminal courts became increasingly lenient after the Jacobin Trial,[336] or that suspect individuals were rarely brought to trial, this does not

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[332] Graf Stampach to Pergen, 16 September 1798, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 134-161. This report contains the list of all 441 names of these European *émigrés*, including their dependents.

[333] To Pergen, 20 December 1794, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 17.

[334] The higher state police originally received Pagoβen's request to travel in October 1794. Saurau to Thugut, 20 October 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 200-201.

[335] Pergen to Thugut, 15 March 1797, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 77.

[336] The case for overall leniency in sentencing is made by Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 232. This point, discussed above, is also echoed in Pieter Judson's recent survey.

mean those arrested received humane treatment while incarcerated. While some, such as Justus von Gruner, the once head of the Prussian Ministry of Police, whom Metternich eventually had arrested and imprisoned in Peterwardein Fortress in 1812 as a Russian agent, could maintain correspondence, others were not so fortunate.[337] In 1794, the police director in Wieden arrested a certain Konrad Wohlnapp, who, according to the report, frequented a particular inn and promoted the slogan of "*Auf Freiheit und Gleichheit.*" Not only had Wohlnapp supported the slogan, but he also gave "passionate speeches against monarchical government and praised the French Constitution." Wohlnapp, the report claimed, belonged to a "sect" of "patriotic middleclass" (*patriotischen Bürgersmännern*) individuals, whose illegal speeches caught the attention of police, leading to investigations, arrests, and criminal charges. Wohlnapp's case, however, is of particular interest, as he died while locked in a "special room," the function and necessity of which is not made clear.[338]

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[337] In 1812, Gruner convinced Alexander I of the need for anti-Napoleonic espionage in French-held territory. After receiving funds from the Czar, Gruner settled in Prague and began developing a network of agents designed to disrupt French military activity. That same year, however, Prussian state ministers loyal to the French convinced the Austrians to arrest Gruner as a Russian spy. At the behest of Metternich, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in March 1812 had concluded an alliance with Napoleon, the police in Prague arrested Gruner. He was imprisoned from August 1812 until late 1813. For details, see Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 20 February 1820, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 218-219 (NM).

[338] Note Saurau, 6 August 1794, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 265.

By the mid-1790s, the monarchy's control over movement extended beyond Austrian territory. The Ministry of Police increasingly followed French *émigrés* in German cities and even elicited reports regarding the extent of their public political engagement. These reports often included the seemingly banal. In November 1793, the police issued a pass to Yusuf Agâg Efendi, the first Turkish Foreign Minister in London, to travel through Vienna en route to England.[339] In 1799, Louis Auerweck, a German *négociant*, who had left Vienna to settle in Baden (via Rastatt), attained permission to embark from Hamburg to Philadelphia (fig. 2). Auerweck was fleeing Baden and claiming certain questionable pamphlets written by a "*Citoyen* Louis d'Auerweck" were not "in whole or in part" his doing, and that he did not know any other Auerweck besides himself. Claiming this was defense enough, and that, in any case, he had no time to defend himself further, Auerweck suggested the Ministry of Police contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where his name was "widely peddled."[340] Others, such as the Baron von Schellersheim, a Prussian state minister, applied to the Ministry of Police in order to travel from Paris to Florence (still then under Austrian control) where he hoped to attain a position as a diplomat.[341] There was, however, a continued sense that French subjects in the empire were a source of unrest, especially those who had "first-hand experience with

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[339] Note Saurau, 19 November 1793, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 66-67.

[340] Note Pergen, 1799, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 252-257. Auerweck, perhaps as a parting shot at the Austrian police, dated his letter "15 Thermidor, Année VI."

[341] Note Pergen, 24 December 1799, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 251-260.

the French Republic." A report from the State Chancellery in 1802, suggested that increased monitoring of both newly arriving French subjects and those who had been in the empire since 1793 must be a priority of the Ministry of Police, even during peacetime.[342]


RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE.
AU NOM DE LA LOI.

DÉPARTEMENT DU PAS-DE-CALAIS.
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITÉ DE CALAIS.

N°. 6635

LAISSEZ passer le Citoyen Louis Auerweck, négociant allemand, patriote américain, venant domicilié à Adilum en Pensylvanie District d Département d âgé de Vingt Sept ans, taille de Cinq pieds trois pouces Cheveux Sourcils Châtains clairs, Yeux bleus, Nez moyen, Bouche assez grande, Menton rond, Front élevé, Visage ovale. Allant à Paris passant par St Omer, Aire, Béthune, Lillers, Bethune, Arras, Douai, Bouchain, Valenciennes, Mons, Bruxelles et Anvers et prêtez lui aide et assistance en cas de besoin.

Délivré en la Maison Commune le quatre Frimaire l'an 4.e de la République française, une et indivisible.

Officier Municipal

Secrétaire

Signalement.

Le dit Louis Schelheim d'Auerweck est agé de 27 ans, haut de cinq pieds huit pouces (anglais) Yeux Bleu Bouche Moyenne Nez Bien fait Front Large Menton Court Teint Blanc Cheveux et Sourcils Châtain et Visage Bien fait.

Louis Allen Deas.

Le Sous-signé Ministre plénipotentiaire des Etats Unis de l'amerique près de la République française certifie que la signature de William Allen Deas chargé des affaires des Etats Unis de l'amerique près sa Majesté Britannique souscrite a la pièce ci-jointe et celle du dit William Allen Deas. En foi de quoi j'ai délivré le present certificat et y ai fait apposer mon cachet ordinaire a Paris le 4 Pluviose 1796 (15 Pluviose l'an 4e de la République française et 20e de la République americaine

Jas Monroe

Municipalité du Domaine arrondissement de Paris

Vendôse an 5e de la République française une et indivisible. Passeport pour retourner a Hambourg

Le Clerc

Fig. 2 Auerweck's travel pass to Pennsylvania, 1796, singed by James Monroe, Minister to France and future US President (HHStA StK NvP 21-2, Bl. 252)

Police reports, however, were not concerned solely with the movement of foreigners. The Habsburg state police also received insight into how a growing book

[342] To Sumerau, 8 July 1802, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 45.

trade and the influx of new "philosophies" shaped southern Germans' political opinions and associations. According to the author of one such report, after Joseph II granted Protestants the right to publish and sell books throughout the empire, Protestant booksellers had gained a "monopoly" in the book trade. This not only cut off a significant revenue stream for the state, but the author argues, these sellers abused their privileges by introducing dangerous, anti-Catholic and anti-monarchical ideas. These "liberal booksellers," through their "journals, literary magazines, libraries, and critical reviews" organized "disparate activities of opposition parties" into what the author referred to as "Institutes." These "Institutes," thus, became the unified, public voice of liberal, anti-Catholic opposition. But, the author warned, when it was not publicly advantageous to "confess their true intentions" these "Institutes can only be established through secret negotiations."[343] Despite the author's attempt at offering insight into southern German politicization, it is unclear if this report is accurate or if it is the work of a disgruntled Catholic bookseller or overzealous administrator. This report does demonstrate, however, a growing tendency among authorities in this period to conflate Enlightenment ideas with "liberalism."[344] It also shows – whether it is an honest depiction of events or not – that its author recognized and employed a language that would garner attention from authorities, thus suggesting a reciprocal process of

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[343] Unnamed and undated, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 34-36.

[344] On this process see, Franz Fillafer, "Whose Enlightenment?" *Austrian History Yearbook* 48 (2017): 111-125.

politicization among early conservatives. Whatever the case, memoranda of local political culture and economy increased during this period, as the Austrian state police turned to questions of why and how radical ideas gained resonance among disparate populations.

But reports also arrived from southern Germany that were more immediately threatening. In the spring of 1799, Pergen received a series of reports from a Bannwarth in Augsburg and, later, in Munich. While Bannwarth's official position and relationship to the Austrian military or Ministry of Police is unclear, his reports arrived at a critical time as French forces were pushing east through Bavarian territory. Bannwarth's initial concern was with city-wide confusion when the von Fuggers – the well-known international banking family centered in Augsburg – had fled the city anticipating a costly French occupation. Far more troubling was the presence of a French emigrant, a man possibly named Menko, who not only was likely traveling under a false name, but was responsible, Bannwarth claimed, for organizing revolution in Switzerland. Bannwarth believed Menko had started and presided over a "club" in Augsburg whose membership counted a Wohnelich, a cotton manufacturer, and a Crismar, a city assessor. Bannwarth promised an "orderly effort" both to find Menko and a discover the extent of membership in his club.[345] Nine days later, on 25 March, Bannwarth's promised report arrived. Not only had Bannwarth discovered Menko's real name (Mengaud), but

[345] Bannwarth to Pergen, 16 March 1799, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 282-283.

membership in his club was far more extensive than he originally believed and included two doctors of medicine, two city assessors, a prominent manufacturer, and many Germans who had previously served as volunteers in the French army and who had openly worn the French cockade.[346]

More news arrived later in May, when Bannwarth, now traveling with the Austrian army, reported from Munich. According to this report, Menguad's club was part of a much larger network that connected French *émigrés* throughout southern Germany. Bannwarth also warned that "disparate Illuminati," including Montgelas, were a potential threat to the rule of Maximilian IV, whose reign as prince-elector began just two months prior. Bannwarth claimed that the new elector initially enjoyed a warm reception from the public as well as the Prussian court, who, Bannwarth noted, were especially pleased that Bavaria's soldiers were "uniformed after the Prussian style." But that reception had cooled between February and May on account of what Bannwarth concluded were "intrigues" among the elector's court. Here, Bannwarth offers a classic trope of the era with a local twist: the well-meaning prince was being led astray by "an evil-minded Minister" and member of the Illuminati (Montgelas), who sought to fill all government positions with "foreigners" and once-exiled Illuminists, and who wanted to rewrite Bavarian law according to radical principles. Bannwarth describes, then, a distrustful, if not conspiratorial, public, wary of Montgelas's influence and upset with the

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[346] Bannwarth to Pergen, 25 March 1799, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 284-287.

incoming administration over the secularization of church land, which, in the public's estimation, had only enriched the already wealthy.[347]

Bannwarth's letter also revealed one final event critical to the course of continued war between Austria and France: the murder of two French diplomats and the attempt on another's life at the Congress of Rastatt. Despite the Austrian Archduke Charles's victories in Germany against the armies of generals Jean-Baptist Jourdan and Jean Victor Moreau in 1796, the First Coalition collapsed a year later after Napoleon's successful conquest of northern Italy. The resulting truce, the Treaty of Campo Formio, signed on 17 October 1797, marked the beginning of the end of Austrian imperial power in Germany. Not only did Napoleon force the emperor to acknowledge French expansion to the Rhine, but he also promised other German states, including Prussia, future compensation within the Empire. In November, French plenipotentiaries met with a ten-member imperial delegation at the town of Rastatt to negotiate a peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire and to discuss compensation for those princes who lost territory on the Rhine. Deliberations dragged on into the spring of 1799, when, on 25 April, the French delegation announced its intent to leave Rastatt for Strasbourg. On the evening of 28 April, amidst some general confusion, French diplomats Jean Debry, Antoine Bonnier d'Alco, and Claude Roberjot and his wife, left Rastatt without a proper

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[347] Bannwarth to Pergen, 25 May 1799, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 319-324. On Mongelas's increasingly close relationship to revolutionary France and specifically *Citoyen* Alquier, the French ambassador in Munich see, Weis, *Montgelas,* 386-94. On the process of "secularization," see, ibid., 419-31.

escort. After traveling for only a half an hour, a group of men, dressed as Hungarian hussars, attacked each of their wagons, murdering Roberjot and Bonnier and threatening Roberjot's wife. Debry, who was also wounded in the attack, survived only by crawling into a nearby ditch and, fortunately, into the gardens of Graf von Görz, a Prussian diplomat.

News of the attack traveled quickly and spelled the end of the Congress of Rastatt and any attempt at peace. By September, Austria had declared war on France, thus beginning the wars of the Second Coalition. Theories regarding the assailants' identity and motive likewise proliferated in the wake of the murders. France initially placed blamed on Thugut, claiming that Thugut hoped to seize diplomatic papers proving that the Elector of Bavaria was secretly in league with the French. Headed by Görz, the Prussians, likewise, blamed the Austrians, citing the curious circumstances surrounding the unceremonious evacuation of the French plenipotentiaries and the fact that the assassins only confiscated potentially embarrassing diplomatic papers and spared the lives of the French "domestics." The Archduke Charles, Francis's brother, convened two military commissions: the first blamed French *émigrés* and cleared Austrian diplomatic and military personnel of all wrongdoing; the second announced Austrian intention to drop the matter entirely from public discussion.[348]

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[348] For a contemporary take on the event see, *The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature of the Year 1799* (London: T. Burton, 1801), 253-258. The author of this section highlights an important aspect of French Revolutionary history: the purposeful provocation of their hosts by French diplomats through ostentatious and

Bannwarth's report, once again, offers insight, not only describing the bloody event and its aftermath, but also pointing to the power of rumor and statesmens' willingness to stoke and harness it for their own ends.[349] Upon arriving in Munich

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aggressive displays of revolutionary symbols. In this instance, the author highlights the unannounced arrival of General Bernadotte in Vienna as the French ambassador in April 1796, and his general "insolence" during his short stay. This included Bernadotte's demands that he and his officers be quartered at Vienna's expense; that all Frenchmen in Vienna be subject to his authority alone; and the final, most egregious act: the flying of the French tricolor flag on the balcony of Bernadotte's hotel on an evening of "civil pomp and religious solemnity" celebrating the popular defense of the city against the threat of French attack in spring 1796. This led to popular unrest, the destruction of the French flag and flagpole, damage to the hotel, and the (seemingly ritualized) public destruction of Bernadotte's two coaches outside of the Hofburg. Exchange between Thugut, Francis, and Bernadotte was contemptuous, and Bernadotte's subsequent demands bordered on the absurd. Francis and Thugut summarily dismissed Bernadotte's demands, leading to Bernadotte's exit after one month as the French ambassador. This event led to the establishment of a secret congress, separate from the proceedings at Rastatt and held in the town of Seltz on the opposite side of the Rhine. The congress at Seltz was presided over by Cobenzel and François de Neufchâteau, the then Minister of the Interior. This, too, broke down when neither side accepted the other's impossible demands. The author of the above section argues that this breakdown at Seltz was the cause of the stalemate at Rastatt, which both Austria and France deemed a "farce" to begin with. Even Metternich complained of French ostentation at Rastatt – while dining with Jean Baptiste Treilhard, minister plenipotentiary and future Chair of the Directory, Metternich complained of pastries decorated with "enormous tri-colored flags." Metternich recounted to his wife, "I declare I quite lost my appetite at the sight of these execrable colors." Prince Clemens von Metternich, *Memoires*, ed. Prince Richard Metternich, trans. Alexander Napier (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1880), 7 April 1797, I: 368. On the purposeful French diplomatic alienation of their *ancien régime* counterparts, see, Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "'The Reign of the Charlatans is Over': The French Revolutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice," *The Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993): 706-44.

[349] The power of "rumor" has attracted historians of the French Revolution, including Bronislaw Baczko, Antoine de Baecque, and Timothy Tackett. For a recent treatment on the subject, see Lindsay Porter, *Popular Rumor in Revolutionary Paris, 1792-1794* (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017).

alongside Count Rechberg, the Bavarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Görz immediately pressed a case against the Austrians, claiming that Austria had secret designs on Bavarian territory. This pronouncement of Austrian guilt came prior to any investigation and, according to Bannwarth's report, incensed the people of Munich. Rumor spread throughout Munich's "coffee houses, promenades, and taverns" that Francis had given orders to the French to remove the elector "within twenty-four hours" of France's imminent arrival. Bannwarth described the city as being "fully vendetted [sic]" so much so, that an evening walk was "unpleasant and impossible." While the Austrians certainly did not avail themselves in any notable way after the event, it is certainly likely that the Prussians used the occasion of these murders to further alienate Austria within a now-truncated Holy Roman Empire. It is also likely that Rechberg and the elector allowed these rumors to proliferate to bolster support among a wary populace. Whatever the case, Austria lost critical support and influence within the empire, a goal that served Prussian and, even more so, French interests.

If Austria entered the War of the Second Coalition (1799-1801) from a weakened and relatively isolated position, they exited it in a worse one. Campo Formio forced Francis to surrender Belgium and accept an end to over three centuries of Habsburg rule over peninsular Italy. Though the treaty compensated the Habsburgs with the former republic of Venice, this, even when coupled with their new Polish province of West Galicia (and over a million new subjects), hardly made up for their loss of influence

within the Holy Roman Empire.[350] In the hopes of erasing French gains at Campo Formio, Thugut took advantage of renewed French aggression to cobble together a new coalition that included Great Britain and Russia. The Second Coalition crumbled as inter-alliance clashes hobbled the war effort, which ended abruptly with the Coalition defeats at Marengo in June and Hohenlinden seven months later. By July, Francis had already appealed to his subjects to show "uncompromising loyalty to their beloved rulers" as they sought an "affordable peace."[351] With a French army advancing on Vienna, Francis had precious few options; on 9 February 1801, he signed the Treaty of Lunéville, thus guaranteeing that the Campo Formio settlement remained permanent. While the Habsburgs retained control of Venetia and the Dalmatian coast and received the bishoprics of Passau, Brixen, and Trent, Habsburg princes lost control of Tuscany and Modena and Francis consigned the entire Rhineland to French control. As a result, Thugut, who had lost favor with the public and the confidence of the emperor, resigned and eventually fled Vienna under public and official pressure.[352] The resulting territorial realignment and a new Protestant majority among the empire's electors all but signaled

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[350] As Charles Ingrao argued, the larger German states, such as Prussia, Bavaria, and Württemberg, were now "beholden to France" and not to the emperor. Not only was the emperor isolated, he lost three critical buffer states to French aggression. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 228.

[351] Circular Saurau, 10 July 1800, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 123.

[352] Roider, *Baron Thugut*. On the disasters of the First and Second Coalition, see, Chap. 12. For Thugut's forced retirement, see, Chap. 13.

the end of the Holy Roman Empire. Yet the outcome of the wars would have significant repercussions for the growth of Habsburg security networks in territory outside of the empire. These developments are addressed more fully below.

In the immediate wake of Lunéville, Pergen leveraged the peace to increase the state's capacity to monitor the movement of foreigners in Habsburg lands. In a new order issued on 25 March 1801, Pergen warned that peace would bring an influx of foreigners, leading to a housing shortage and an increase in the price of food; and not just in Vienna, but in all major provincial cities. The new law required that all foreign travelers acquire proper passports, a process which differed depending on the nature of one's intentions and social standing. For example, those attending seasonal markets had only to contact the local magistrate, while those "particularly distinguished by their rank" could rely on the word of "credible people." The law, however, subjected "professionals and journeymen" to a far stricter set of procedures. This included proper passports, complete with physical descriptions and details of the "march route," as well as the signatures of all authorities along that route. In addition, the law required incoming laborers to surrender their passports to the police (in return for a special "ticket") and to report immediately to a "guild hostel" where their names would be entered into a "craft log" (*Handwerksprotokoll*). While the law guaranteed that those who followed these police regulations would enjoy the "protection and enjoyment of their civil liberties," those who could not find lodging within fourteen days would be considered "vagabonds and

ambiguous people" (*zweideutiger Mensch*) and subject to punishment.[353] In 1804, Vienna established its first "work house" in the district of Laimgrube, designed to hold these very individuals, or those "who, due to their inactive way of life, are in danger of relying on criminal offenses . . . namely, idlers, beggars, work-shy people, and those who cannot make an honest living." Not only would these individuals be put to socially useful work, but they would be "instructed in religion and the duties of a man and citizen" and would be housed until they could provide evidence of their becoming "useful members of society."[354]

Fig. 3 Work and travel permit, 1804 (HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 146).

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[353] Circular Pergen, 25 March 1801, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl.103-104.

[354] *Wiener Zeitung*, 22 September 1804, Nr. 76, Bl. 3851-3852.

The control of movement was, of course, not a new tactic, neither for the Habsburgs nor for the other German states discussed in previous chapters. Much like in Bavaria, this had clear state-building implications, as the law both enlarged and streamlined those agencies designed to issue travel permits, all while increasingly incorporating those agencies under police supervision. In 1805, officials in Vienna reorganized the postal system of all Habsburg lands, a process coordinated with the Ministry of Police.[355] These are familiar tactics of state building and state surveillance, but there is a clear shift in emphasis, especially in the new passport regulations, consistent with changing concerns of the state. Whereas previous regulations stressed the threat of agitation from outsiders, especially the French, this law targeted the growing urban, laboring classes, which the state now identified as the most likely source of unrest. These new regulations, coupled with the police oversight of economic expansion, suggest, then, that changing social and economic relations increasingly animated decisions concerning state security. The growing antagonism between social classes framed Metternich's thinking on social revolution. By the 1830s, Metternich claimed that behind all ideological conflict lay "the campaign which the ambitious and the

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[355] A copy of this, "Post-Bericht" and the accompanying report, is found in, 10 Novemeber 1805, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 73-75. In 1806, an anonymous report addressed to Stadion arrived at the Ministry of Foreign affairs. In it, the author suggests not only that the Higher State Police concern themselves with the business of foreign affairs, but that it must control Vienna's main dispatch (*Postwagon Haupt-Expedition*) and be granted full access to incoming and outgoing mail. See, "Memoire an der Herrn Minister Grafen von Stadion . . .," 28 February 1806, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 8, Bl. 1-29.

proletarians wage against the peaceful owners of property; it is the struggle of those who wish to possess against those who already do so."[356]

Nro. 14.

Wilhelm Anton Franz, Freyherr von Fetz, der römisch-kaiserlichen, auch zu Ungarn und Böhmen königlichen apostolischen Majestät wirklicher Hofrath, außerordentlicher Gesandter und bevollmächtigter Minister bey der batavischen Republik.

Reisepaß

für Adrien de Laboissiere
Karakter Courier
Dieser ist von Perpignan gebürtig,
26. Jahren,
mittel Statur,
lang von Gesichte,
Brunne Haaren,
braune Augen,
mittel Nase,

Mit diesem reiset Johann Baptist Jungfer
Maria Anna, 25. Jahre alt.

Eigenhändige Unterschrift: Adrien de Laboissiere

selber reiset von Dusseldorf über Dusseldorf, Frankfurt &
nach Wien

Dieser Paß ist gültig auf sechs Wochen

Es werden demnach alle Zivil- und Militärbehörden dienstfreundlichst ersucht, Dem Vorzeiger dieses aller Orten frey und ungehindert reisen, auch demselben nöthigen Falls allen Vorschub angedeihen zu lassen.

Im Haag den 28. März 1804.

Gratis.

Auf Befehl des Herrn bevollmächtigten Ministers

Fetz

Fig. 4Travel pass for an Adrien de Laboissiere, March 1804. Physical description as well as "march route" (Dusseldorf, to Frankfurt, to Vienna) is included (HHStA StK *NaP* 1).

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[356] Metternich to Charles von Hügel, 16 July 1833, as quoted in, Guillame de Bertier de Sauvigny, *Metternich and His Times*, trans. Peter Ryde (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1962), 53.

The threat of revolutionary activity, however, did not disappear, even after general peace in 1801. In 1799, the Baron von Kronthal, an Austrian diplomat, and the Major General von Auffenberg arrested a man named Martin Trepp in Graubunden, Switzerland. After a two-year investigation, a court commission designed to try state or political criminals (*Staatsverbrecher*) found that Trepp was not only a native Frenchman who strongly sympathized with the revolution, but that he had "knowingly betrayed the Austrian party in Graubunden to the French." In an extract of a larger report to Francis, Pergen was unclear if Trepp, who had spent two years imprisoned in the fortress of Olmütz, should be released or deported back to France.[357] Despite Trepp's ambiguous future, this report gives insight into two important aspects in the spread of security practices, and not just in Habsburg territory but throughout Europe. On the one hand, it clearly shows that the vague legal concept of "state" or "political" criminals (*Staatsverbrecher*), a term used with some frequency during the 1780s,[358] was still part of the Habsburg legal repertoire. The use of such a quasi-legal term complicates the rosy picture historians such as Pieter Judson have painted regarding Habsburg respect for legality. On the other hand, Trepp's case and subsequent imprisonment evidences the extent to which Habsburg security networks and legal machinery had spread by the

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[357] Note Pergen, 11 April 1801, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 203-204.

[358] Pergen employed this concept often during the reign of Joseph II to denote persons whose acts were deemed so serious a threat to society, or whose trial might shed unwanted light on sensitive information, that normal legal procedure could be bypassed.

beginning of the nineteenth century: Trepp was a Frenchman living in a Swiss canton, arrested by Austrian diplomats, and imprisoned in a fortress in Bohemia. The war-time context does help to explain why Austrian delegates in Switzerland arrested Trepp while labeling him a significant threat to the state. But Trepp's multi-year imprisonment without trial and possible banishment during peace time is a reminder that the Austrians were willing to sidestep their commitment to the rule of law whenever necessary.

The almost four years of peace between the end of the Second Coalition (1801/02)[359] and the beginning of the Third Coalition (1805) did not significantly limit the reach of the Ministry of Police. In fact, the period witnessed significant changes within the ministry itself. In August 1801, the monarchy saw its first permanent, mounted military police. Since 1618, a section of Vienna's city guard (*Stadtguardia*) was mounted; however, in 1801, a new body, consisting of a constable (*Wachtmeister*), three corporals, and twenty-four mounted men, helped police the city and its surroundings. Despite Francis's misgivings,[360] the military police grew in number and significance: by 1821, they added one corporal and another eighteen men on foot. By 1848, there were 1,323 military police operating in Vienna and its hinterland, policing a

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[359] The Treaty of Amiens (1802), a peace signed by France and England, officially ended the Second Coalition. By 1803, France and England were once again at war, which eventually lead to England assembling the Third Coalition in 1805.

[360] In 1804, Francis questioned the president of the Ministry of Police "ob die berittene Polizeiwache nicht ganze, so doch größtenteils unnütz sei." According to Walter Oberhummer, "Wer dem Kaiser diese Meinung beibrachte, ist nicht ersichtlich." Oberhummer, *Die Weiner Polizei*, I:124.

population estimated at 412,000.[361] In 1802, the emperor, much to Pergen's frustration, announced a separation of policing functions within the Ministry of Police. Under these new guidelines, matters of "state policy" remained in the hands of the "secret and higher state police" and the various "political authorities" throughout Habsburg territory. Public police affairs, or what Pergen called "*Gaßenpolizei*," now fell to the government of Lower Austria, and included those services traditionally included in the term *Polizei*.[362] Perhaps the most momentous change arrived in 1804, when Pergen, the architect of the Habsburg Ministry of Police, retired for the second and final time. The emperor replaced Pergen with Joseph von Sumerau, the vice-president of the Ministry of Police and, after August 1802, the President of Lower Austria. Sumerau maintained the position as the head of Ministry of Police until 1808, when Francis replaced him with Franz von Hager.[363]

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[361] Oberhummer, *Die Weiner Polizei*, I:124-5.

[362] Francis to Pergen, 22 August 1802, reproduced in, Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:96. Francis instructed Pergen to submit a plan for the separation of policing powers, which included the necessary staff and accompanying salaries. Pergen considered this a great "irritation," and wrote critically of the emperor's decision, arguing, "Ohne öffentliche Polizei kann die Staats-Polizey nicht einen Schritt vorwärts thun, und sie müβte nebstbei in der Meinung des Publikums zu einer bloβen Spionnerie herabsinken." This letter is reproduced in, idem., I:97.

[363] Pergen retired but continued to author treaties on the financial policies of the Austrian Empire. He died in 1814 at the age of 90. In 1897, artist Josef Kassin completed a stone sculpture of Pergen, erected outside of the then Lower Austrian Government building, which is now the Austrian Foreign Ministry and across the square from the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv.

By 1802, much of what had once passed across Pergen's desk was now in the hands of Sumerau. As discussed above, this included control of the mail as well as the role of state censor after September 1801.[364] In the years from 1792 to 1803, the number of censors fluctuated between eight and ten, growing to thirteen by 1804, and included professors and jurists as well as civil servants and authors of fiction and scientific treaties.[365] Upon Sumerau's arrival, the censors tackled the collected works of Caesar Beccaria. As the report suggests, Beccaria's works required reconsideration as they proved so influential to intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic.[366] The review of Beccaria's works was a sign of things to come. The banning of Beccaria's collected writings predated by one year the establishment of a committee that revisited Joseph II's

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[364] From the beginning of Austria's Counter-Reformation until 1752, censorship was in the hands of the Jesuits. In 1752, Maria Theresa created the so-called "Book Revisions Commission," which, by 1759, was headed by Gerhard van Swieten, Maria Theresa's personal physician and director of the court library. This effectively put censorship in the hands of secular authorities. In 1782, van Swieten's son, Godfried van Swieten assumed the role. Oberhummmer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:176. For a far more in-depth discussion on censorship and administrative developments during Maria Theresa's reign, see, Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur*, 49-58.

[365] As Bachleitner points out, "Die Doppelrolle von Autoren und zensierenden Beamten brachte diese Gruppe der staatstreuen und angepassten Schriftsteller in Konflikt mit den die Freiheit des Wortes verteidigenden Kollegen, was zu einer Dauerkontroverse zwischen Konservativen und Liberalen und psychologischen Verwerfungen bei den Zensoren führte." Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur*, 97-100, quote from, 99; Waltrud Heindl, "Zensur und Zensoren, 1750–1850. Literarische Zensur und staatsbürgerliche Mentalität in Zentraleuropa. Das Problem Zensur in Zentraleuropa," in *Libri Prohibiti: La censure dans l'espace habsbourgeois, 1650-1850*, eds. Marie-Elizabeth Ducreux and Martin Svatoš (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2005): 27-37.

[366] To Sumerau, 10 April 1802, HHStA StK *NvP* 1, Bl. 30.

"prohibition catalogue." Between 1803 and 1805, this committee banned 2,552 previously permitted works, claiming that Joseph's "enlightened" policies had not only allowed publishers and affordable copies of printed material to proliferate; it also led to the debasing of Austria's "intellectual culture."[367] Censorship remained a regionally specific and somewhat porous, incomplete, and often arbitrary practice, and authors became skilled at masking their criticism in order to get published. There were some authors, however, that did not mince words and who often paid dearly for their trenchant critiques of Central European governments. One such author was Professor Joseph Milbiller, a professor and author of numerous studies of German history. At least one title, *Ideal einer Geschichte der deutschen Nation: In philosophischer Hinsicht*,[368] proved controversial. In the text, Milbiller argued that the "monarchical system" that governed Germany and Austria was "inherently illegitimate," and that Europe's "political strivings" should seek to ape only the French and the English model of constitutional monarchy. For this, the Ministry of Police forbade Milbiller's book from being sold in Habsburg territory. The report also indicated that a two-volume work by a Johann Chas

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[367] Pergen, as quoted in, Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur*, 101.

[368] Joseph Milbiller, *Ideal einer Geschichte der deutschen Nation: In philosophischer Hinsicht* (Ingolstadt: Krüll, 1800). Milbiller was born in Munich and taught History at the University of Passau until 1794 when the University summarily dismissed him. Between 1795 and 1799 he resided in Vienna he edited and authored two volumes of J.M. Schmidt's, *Geschichte der Teutschen*. In 1799, he took a position teaching history at the University of Ingolstadt. Franz Xavier Wegele, "Milbiller, Joseph," *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 21 (1885): 728-729

titled, *Bonaparte als Mensch, Held, und Staatsmann,* which spoke of Napoleon as a "great man . . . endowed with wisdom, determination, and virtue" was also banned.[369]

Chas and Milbiller's generous opinion of Napoleon were by no means an isolated cases. In 1802, a curious report arrived at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Friedrich von Schilling concerning a certain Joseph Freiherr von Retzer, a well-known author, editor, translator, and book censor from 1783 to 1824 and a book, *L'Histoire de Bonaparte*. Retzer's story is worth recounting in some detail. In 1783, Joseph II appointed Retzer, himself an outspoken critic and defender of increased freedoms (*Freiheitsrufer*), as censor out of spite for Retzer's love of the "French Academy."[370] Joseph even appointed Retzer specifically as the censor of foreign-language literature. Retzer used his position as censor to enrich himself – and his friends – through his contacts within the literary world, including access to censored and often partially banned material.[371] In 1802, Retzer ran afoul of the Ministry of Police precisely for those

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[369] Note Sumerau, 4 July 1802, HHStA StK *NvP* 1, Bl. 43-44. J. Chas, *Bonaparte als Mensch, Held, und Staatsmann,* 2 vols. (Leipzig: Johann Conrad Hinrichs, 1802).

[370] This language is from Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur*, 65.

[371] Retzer farmed out work to a close friend, Joseph Richter, claiming he was not only helping a friend financially, but following a long-standing tradition among censors. This was not the first time Retzer employed an assistant – he previously worked with Feldkreigkanzlisten Mayer, a recommendation from the Prince of Württemberg, Joseph II's brother-in-law, who also wanted access to censored and banned material. See, Thomas Olechowski, "Die österreichische Zensur im Vormärz," in *Zensur im Vormärz. Pressefreiheit und Informationskontrolle in Europa*, ed., Gabriele B. Clemens (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2013): 139–152. As Norbet Bachleitner argues, the fact that

reasons that Joseph appointed him censor in the first place. Schilling's report stated that Retzer both disparaged the monarchy and "continued to entertain . . . correspondence with foreign journalists and writers of fiction (*schönegeister*)" and that he "shows himself absolutely not to be a man attached to his monarch or fatherland." Worse, however, was Retzer's apparent abuse of his position as censor. According to Schilling, Retzer found the book, *L'Histoire de Bonaparte*, to be "mild" and "well-written," despite the fact that it celebrated Napoleon's rise to First Consul and included a section arguing that, "the Emperor [Francis] acted in bad faith, and sought to gain time by Machiavellian diversions." Schilling's note suggested that Retzer purposefully made no report, implying that Retzer agreed with the author's statement. Schilling asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to "remind" Retzer that the Ministry of Police now controlled censorship, and that the censor's work would be "carefully checked." In addition, Schilling asked that Retzer also be reminded that his role as censor included only foreign *belle lettres* (*Schöne Wissenschaft*) and not books of "political content."[372]

The monarchy did engage in other, more popular methods of managing public opinion. On 11 August 1804, Francis proclaimed the founding of the Austrian Empire in response to Napoleon crowning himself Emperor of the French. In so doing, Francis took

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Retzer and others passed on work "proves" the position of censor was unpopular. Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur*, 100.

[372] Report Schilling, 13 October 1802, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 117-118. This is not the last time Retzer's work would raise eyebrows. In 1819, Retzer was suspended as censor for labeling a work of his own as "admittitur." See, Olechowski, "Die österreichische Zensur," 143; Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur,* 100 n.27.

the hereditary title of Emperor of Austria, thereby uniting all Habsburg dominions under one crown.[373] As Europe's monarchs would often do, Francis used public ceremonies and events to project a positive image of his new position to his subjects. In late September 1804, the monarchy held a week of public ceremonies throughout the empire, designed to celebrate his "imperial dignity" (*Kaiserwürde*). The emperor "solemnly announced to his pleased subjects" these events, which began in Brünn on 17 September and ended in Trieste on 25 September.[374] As with similar events, the festivities included military parades, the flying of flags, the playing of "festive music," the singing of Te Deums, public speeches, special theater performances, "loud games," and nightly public balls with wine, bread, and meat provided at no cost.[375] These were highly choreographed and public events that projected the dignity of Francis's new title but also Habsburg military strength. Equally important, however, these urban spectacles always included displays of "noblesse" in the form of public appearances and donations by leading statesmen and aristocratic women.[376] Around the same time, both foreign and

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[373] By 1804, Francis was "torn" between his traditional role as Holy Roman Empire and the pressure to remove himself from German affairs and focus his attention eastward. The latter is illustrated by Francis's increased intervention in southern German affairs. The former is exemplified by Francis taking the title "Emperor of Austria." See, Michael Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon, 1799-1815* (London: Arnold, 1996), 40.

[374] *Wiener Zeitung*, 22 September 1804.

[375] *Wiener Zeitung*, 6 October 1804, Nr. 80, Bl. 4063-4066

domestic newspapers printed articles under the general heading: "Improving Public Opinion on State Administration." According to a report, while the monarchy originally welcomed the public's response to this question, the Ministry of Police questioned whether foreign opinions were necessary. The State Chancellery, however, deemed this too dangerous and warned the Ministry of Police to monitor and censor newspapers running articles on the subject.[377] While this proactive attempt at courting public opinion proved to be a nonstarter, it demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Austrian state (though, not the police) to engage with its public, albeit on the state's terms.

Peace for Austria, however, soon came to an end. Napoleon's ambitions in Germany and Italy, coupled with the need for allies, once again dragged the Austrians into war. The War of the Third Coalition began in 1805, and saw Austria allied with the Russians and the British against the French and their German allies. The war brought immediate setbacks for the Austrians. On 20 October 1805, Napoleon captured General Mack's entire army of 60,000 at Ulm. On 12 November, Napoleon himself entered Vienna, the first foreign enemy to do so for 320 years. Three weeks later, on 2 December, Napoleon won his finest victory over a combined Russo-Austrian army at Austerlitz, forcing Francis to sign the Peace of Pressburg on 24 December.[378] The peace

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[376] On the role of aristocratic women in public ceremony see, Jean Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813-1916* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

[377] Note to Sumerau, 14 October 1804, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 65.

granted the monarchy Salzburg, but transferred control of Venice to Italy, the Swabian lands to Württemberg, and the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and the bishoprics of Passau, Brixen, and Trent to Bavaria.[379]

It is difficult to downplay the historic importance of the following year for the history of Central Europe. Not only was Napoleon's power at its zenith on the continent in 1806/1807, but the year also marks a major caesura in the political history of Central Europe.[380] The defeats at Ulm and Austerlitz drove Napoleon deep into Central European territory. In November 1805, French troops marched triumphantly throughout Vienna and forced the indemnities that allowed Napoleon's armies to winter in Germany. The presence of French troops became a source of significant concern for the Ministry of Police. In January 1806, the State Chancellery ordered Sumerau to monitor French soldiers and any of their "allies" in Austrian territory.[381] Two months later, Sumerau

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[378] The negotiation of peace was set to take place in the town of Nikolsburg. In late 1805, the destination was changed to Brünn. However, there was an outbreak of a "Contagious Disorder" among Brünn's 23 hospitals. The peace negotiations were then sent to Pressburg. Paget to Lord Mulgrave, 25 December 1805, in *The Paget Papers*, ed. Augustus B. Paget, 2 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896) II:260.

[379] Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 227-8.

[380] For a recent treatment on the importance of the year 1806 for subsequent German history, see, Katherine Aaslestad and Karin Hagemann, "1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in German Central European Historiography" *Central European History* 39 (2006): 547-579. See also, Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon*,41-4.

wrote to Graf Stadion, warning that French troops were, in fact, making contacts with Austrian soldiers. The letter warned that public opinion would turn against the monarchy, both in the cities and among the military whose "young men feel a particular comradery with French ideas."[382] Desertion loomed as a significant problem. Later in the year, Sumerau reported that members of the French National Institute were traveling and settling – in this case, in Teplitz – abroad while organizing "institutes" of their own.[383]

On 12 July 1806, Napoleon united sixteen of his German satellite states into the new Confederation of the Rhine and took the hereditary title of "Protector of the Confederation." Two weeks later, those states officially seceded, and on 6 August 1806, Francis II officially dissolved the then 1,006-year-old Holy Roman Empire, continuing to rule the Austrian Empire as Francis I. Two months later, on 14 October 1806, twin French victories at Jena and Auerstädt destroyed the poorly prepared Prussian army and,

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[381] To Sumerau, 12 January 1806, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 127. This letter was regarding an investigation into the Baron Arthur Paget, a career diplomat and head of the Mission to the Court of Austria in Vienna from 1801 to 1806.

[382] Stadion to Sumerau, 6 March 1806, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 133-135.

[383] Sumerau to Stadion, 1 September 1806, HHStA StK *NvP* 24, Bl. 346. While refugees and emigrants remained a constant concern for the Ministry of Police, in February 1807, Francis received word from the French government that "in the future *émigrés* and refugees will not serve in any capacity or conduct missions in" Austrian hereditary lands. Francis ordered Sumerau to maintain surveillance on individuals traveling through Galicia, to be done so "according to the law." Francis to Sumerau, 28 February 1807, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 1, Bl. 85-6.

with it, the reputation of the Prussian military. This at once made Napoleon master of Central Europe. Weeks later, Napoleon marched his armies east into Poland, where he found an "indigenous" revolt that had long gestated.[384] As for the Austrian Empire, French victory over the Russians in 1807 and the treaty of Tilsit once again reshuffled the deck. The Treaty of Tilsit recognized Napoleon's conquests farther west, stripped Prussia of its Polish land, and established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with the newly minted King of Saxony as its head.[385] This put Napoleon on Austria's doorstep permanently and cemented France's rise from a regional to a continental power.

Poland/West Galicia

Despite increasing calls for peace throughout the empire by 1793, Prince Colloredo, in charge of empire affairs for Austria, continued to press for war for the "common cause." Colloredo's "victory" against the peace party, however, proved fleeting. Not only did Prussia – which was advocating for a League of Princes as a "weapon" against Austrian – take the reins of the peace movement, it also lost Austria important allies who also called for peace.[386] On the home front, war with France

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[384] Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon*, 44.

[385] The Treaty of Posen, signed after the *Doppelschlacht* at Jena and Auerstädt, carved off Prussian territory to enlarge Saxony, while raising the status of the Elector to that of King. The administration of ex-Prussian territory, fell to the "Committee of Government," a group of pro-Napoleonic Polish aristocrats. Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon*, 44.

renewed Jacobin conspiracies, even well after the trials concluded.[387] The whereabouts of French *émigrés* remained a pressing issue for the Ministry of Police. But war also pulled Austria's attention east and forced the Habsburgs to scramble for allies and for compensation for the war effort in the west. The necessity to maintain a Russo-Austrian alliance compelled the Habsburgs to accept the Second Partition (1793) and to agree to a third, and final, partition in October 1795. While this final partition secured Austria's position in the empire vis-à-vis a now-isolated Prussia – which dropped out of the war against France in March 1795 – it proved a critical step in the development of a Habsburg security network. Historians such as Paul Schroeder have recognized the importance of the partition for Austria's "general security, rank, and prestige" in Germany and in a Europe dominated by balance-of-power politics.[388] But power-political considerations were not the sole motivator of Austrian expansion into Poland, nor was Poland the only country the Austrians increasingly interfered in. A closer look at reports from the period

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[386] Schroeder, *Transformation*, 141-45.

[387] In 1801, the Ministry of Police warned that the "notorious" Hofrat Reischel, who, "according to reliable sources was the most brazen and active Jacobin," had been expelled from Bavaria. According to this report, Reischel traveled throughout Germany, attempting to enter powerful government positions. While he was unsuccessful in Berlin, he entered Bavarian service during the second French occupation (1800) and openly declared the court in Dresden "to be French" and "favored the progress of the enemy in the Empire." Reischel was known to spend time with Antoine Lavallette (Count after 1808), the French ambassador, as well as Munich's Jacobins. The report claimed it was likely that Reischel would attempt to enter Austrian territory and state service. Report Sumerau, 3 September 1801, HHStA StK *NvP* 22, Bl. 29-30.

[388] Schroeder, *Transformation*, 149-50.

suggest that Austria was pulled farther east not simply to maintain parity with its allies, but also to counter the spread of popular nationalist movements.

A full year prior to Poland's Third Partition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a series of secret reports on a "National Council" (*Nationalrat*) that convened in Warsaw in May 1794. In July, the Ministry of Police received a detailed report on the extent of this "municipal intrigue" as well as information on eighteen of the council's ranking members. The report included four areas of interest for the police: the relationship of the council to Kościuszko; the level of support among council members for King Stanisław II, the last king of Poland; the relationship between Kościuszko and Prince Józef Poniatowski, the nephew of the king and ex-colonel in the Austrian army;[389] and the publication of pro-French literature, most notably a memoire confiscated in Vienna along with letters from Count Soltyk, a Jacobin sympathizer, and Ignaz Potocki, a well-known Polish author, Freemason, and stateman, who had drawn up the Constitution of 1791 and who was in exile in Leipzig. On the first three points, the report was clear. The author claimed with certainty that a "conspiracy" existed between the National Council and Kościuszko, who was "dictating" the council's action from afar. As to the

[389] The Austrians exiled Prince Piontkowski to Vienna (his birthplace) and confiscated his land for his support of the Kościuszko Uprising. He would go on to reorganize the Polish army and fight successfully against Austrian armies as the Commander in Chief of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1809. He became a strong ally of Napoleon, fighting with him in Russia and at Leipzig, where he was wounded multiple times and drowned in the Elster River while covering the French retreat. In 1816, his remains were returned to Poland. He is buried next to Kościuszko and Jan II Sobieski in Warsaw.

second point, the author uncovered a circular, dated 29 May, that read "the Supreme National Council agrees with the King in all matters." Even more troubling was the king's declaration of support for the council. In a "public letter" the king thanked Kościuszko, thereby openly announcing his support for the "principles of the insurrection." Regarding the relationship between the Poniatowski and Kościuszko, the author claimed that Poniatowski, a great noble, was somewhat of a liability to the insurrection. Worried that Poniatowski was not "viewed well by the common man," Kościuszko sent him to Warsaw, where Poniatowski eventually organized and led the city's defense. Despite his departure from Kościuszko's "camp," the prince was now unquestionably in league with the insurrection.[390]

Finally, the National Council posed a significant threat in their overtures to the French. In Vienna, the police intercepted a memoir, sent by a certain Woyna to Count Soltyk, who had come to Vienna at the behest of Kościuszko to rally support for the Polish cause.[391] In considering Poland's current "situation," the author of the memoire laid out a case for openly welcoming an alliance with France, while simultaneously supporting the Prussian cause against Austria. According to the report, not only did the

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[390] "Secret Report on Poland," 17 July 1794, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 43-45.

[391] Count Soltyk was in contact with Franz Hebenstreit (executed as a Jacobin) and Karl Held (arrested in Paris), whose ill-fated journey to Paris was bankrolled by Soltyk. Palmer, *Democratic Revolutions*, 497. On Soltyk's arrival and the confiscation of his mail see, Saurau to Thugut, 15 July 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 37.

author of the memoire support Prussia over both Russia and Austria, the National Council preferred to be "under the hand" of the Prussians, who had welcomed the establishment of the Polish Republic in 1793.[392] In his response, Soltyk claimed the author was "entirely right in his opinion," but that he – in the words of the author – did not "find spirits suitably disposed to accept such impressions."[393] It remains unclear precisely who the author believed was not suitably disposed to the pro-French and anti-Habsburg platform of the National Council. Yet, despite the report's ambiguity, the existence of such sentiments among the Polish elite, arriving as they did during wartime and at the height of the Jacobin Trials, was clearly a matter of significant concern for the monarchy. The signing of a Polish constitution in May 1791, the establishment of the Polish Republic, and subsequent Polish-Russian War of 1792 gathered the attention of the Austrians, who were engaged in their own war with the Ottomans until the end of 1792. In the years between 1792 and 1794, the French rally and eventual offensive dramatically reshaped both the domestic and foreign affairs concerns of the Habsburgs. Thus, as the Third Partition loomed and as paranoia reigned in Vienna, not only did this report come as proof of a European revolutionary conspiracy that tied Paris to the Polish insurrection; it also inaugurated Austrian intervention eastward for the purpose of European security.

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[392] For Prussian involvement in Poland during the early 1790s, see, Amadeus Kaiser, *Geschichte der Polnischen Revolution vom Jahre 1794* (Leipzig: Literarisches Museum, 1838), 15.

[393] "Secret Report on Poland," Bl. 44-45.

Included in the "Secret Report" to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were directions for the District Chief von Laum in Podgórze to confiscate mail. These instructions warned about the use of a secret code amongst Polish revolutionaries and members of other secret societies.[394] As a critical component of information gathering, the Ministry of Police had long confiscated mail; however, it was only during the summer of 1794 that officials began reading and reporting on mail concerning Poland. In June 1794, the police reported on the correspondence between a certain Samuel de Lancet-Marian, a Frenchman residing in Switzerland, and the Count von Batowski, a highly decorated Polish noble, then en route to Carlsbad via Vienna.[395] In one intercepted letter, which captures well the anxiety of a European aristocracy in the midst of nationalist revolutions, Lancet-Marian lamented that his "old friend" had "abandoned the ideas of tranquility and happiness . . . for the intrigues of revolution" and that the once "cosmopolitan

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[394] This included a "secret investigation" against a certain von César, a Prussian resident living in Vienna, as well as those he "surrounded himself with," all of whom, the report claimed, were either members of or in contact with the "Polish insurgency." Note Saurau, 9 June 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 130-131 (NM). For a secret police investigation of French "agents" and other "dangerously minded people" in Venice which also involved the French police, see, Saurau to Thugut, 18 July 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 152-153. For a good example of a cipher used by a German named Batz, see (Police Director) von Ley, 22 February 1800, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 61-63. Erhard von Ley, originally from Würzburg, took the position of Chief of Police (*Polizei-Oberdirektor*) after Franz Anton Beer's death in 1796. Ley held the position until 1808, when he was transferred to the Court Chancellery and replaced by Josef von Schüller, the first Bohemian to head the Ministry of Police. See, Oberhummer, *Die Wiener Polizei*, I:74.

[395] Despite his French connections, the Ministry of Police allowed Batowski to stay in Vienna in the home of Josef Krupp, who, according to police, maintained a "stable home." Note Saurau, 16 June 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 136-137.

philosopher had been replaced by the Polish patriot."[396] Two days later, a second confiscated letter, this time between Batowski and a Madame Hoffmann, further fueled Austrian fears of a pan-European revolutionary conspiracy. In the letter, Batowski claimed that, "I imagine that if things should go badly in Poland, we can recuperate in Italy." According to the report, Batowski's admission was proof that if Kościuszko's army was defeated in Poland, they would actively support the "French cause against the King of Sardinia."[397] The police also intercepted letters sent directly from Kościuszko to Paris. In June, the police stopped a courier in Vienna who had not applied for a proper passport and who was carrying mail from Kościuszko to the Prince Józef Lubomirski, a Polish noble who had supported the Constitution of 1791 and who was in exile in Paris. The courier did, however, have a pass to Switzerland, signed by a certain Lempicki, a lower-ranking Polish ambassador (*Geschäftsträger*) in Vienna. This pass allowed the courier to travel around Vienna to St. Pöhlen, where the police minister was to maintain surveillance on the currier's whereabouts.[398]

In April 1795, Pergen received a detailed report on the public mood in both Galicia and Poland. The letter addressed the political situation in each region since 1789,

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[396] A copy of Lancet-Marian's letter can be found in a series of reports sent from Saurau to Thugut, 15 July 1794 HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 37-50, here Bl. 38-40 (NM).

[397] Saurau to Thugut, 17 July 1794, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 42-49 (NM). The King of Sardinia was leading Piedmontese forces against Revolutionary France.

[398] Saurau to Francis, 7 June 1794, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 3, Bl. 277-278.

and further detailed a struggle for influence in the east that pitted Austria, Russia, Prussia, France, and even England against one another. At the center of this regional imbroglio was the question of regional politics and allegiances, as well as the influence of certain individuals in Galician and Polish cities. According to the report, demands for democratic-style government – "like that in England" – were strong in the countryside while the presence of "German Jacobins" and other *Schwindelköpfe* in cities such as Cracow, Sendomierz, Lublin, and Chelm threatened Habsburg control over the regions. War in the east between the Russians and the armies of Kościuszko put further strains on the region, as did the Russians' almost complete lack of resources. These strains, coupled with war and shifting allegiances, amplified the voices of "revolutionaries" and their "intrigues," thus weakening Habsburg claims to authority. The author suggested immediate action on two fronts. On the one hand, a military intervention into Galicia to shore up Austrian rule. On the other hand, the author advised police surveillance, assisted "in secret" by the military, into several individuals, including the Abbé Kolontay, two state ministers, the postmaster of Cracow named Hach, a German named Schützen living in Lemberg, a librarian, and a certain Professor Umlauf.[399]

Pergen's report to Francis arrived two weeks later. In it, Pergen supported the initial report's findings, claiming that the "frank assessment" of the situation was indeed reliable. The "changed circumstances" in Galicia, he argued, no longer guaranteed the

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[399] Pergen to Francis, 15 April 1795, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 1, Bl. 53-56.

continuation of Habsburg hegemony in the region.[400] The problem, in Pergen's reckoning, was both a political and a military matter. In order to prevent a "formal plot" from developing in Galicia, Pergen recommended increasing Austrian military presence as well as strengthening key governmental positions. Pergen warned the emperor that the threat of an "insurgent war" in border regions was significant and that overwhelming show of force was necessary. In addition, Pergen suggested strengthening the political relationship between Galicia and Vienna by filling state positions with loyal and capable servants. The situation in Poland, however, was different. The threat of a military insurrection – such as the Kościuszko-led uprisings – against Habsburg rule does not seem to have figured into Pergen's calculation. Rather, the problems Poland posed were more ideological than military, and, according to Pergen, "Poland's fate was not so bad." Pergen praised the initial report's findings, claiming that surveillance of the Abbé Kolontay had uncovered his various "connections." Austrian authorities had already placed several revolutionary sympathizers, including the Prince Czatoryaska and the Princess Kossakofska, under house arrest. Pergen did, however, warn the emperor that

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[400] In 1795, Galicia had only been under Habsburg rule for twenty-three years, coming under Habsburg control after the first Partition of Poland in 1772. Galicia remained the largest and most populous region of the Austrian Empire until the First World War. For the relationship between Galicia and the Empire, see Larry Wolf, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2010).

Polish "revolutionary generals"[401] threatened the region, and that all police efforts should focus on investigating their influence in both Poland and Galicia.[402]

Despite Pergen's sanguine opinion, the issue of Polish insurrection and the spread of revolutionaries continued to occupy the Ministry of Police. In March 1795, Pergen received a report from the Chevalier d'Winiawzsky, the Police commandant of Cracow, now under Prussian control, regarding the emigration of two Polish men to Vienna. The men in question were Stanislas Poloki and his son, the Abbé Piatoli, who had published a pamphlet that openly demanded a "new constitution for Poland" and who maintained an extensive correspondence with "insurrectionaries."[403] Their situation was by no means peculiar, nor is the attention they received from the state police; there are numerous reports to the Ministry of Police regarding the movement of Polish emigrants. But Polish emigration was not Pergen's only fear: emigration *to* Poland, especially by French and Italian emigrants, was similarly cause for concern. Their mere proximity to radical ideas made French emigrants suspect, regardless of what social milieu they belonged to. In early 1799, the police recorded the names of 150 French and Italians who had settled in

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[401] These included a Haumann, Prince Orlovsky Sapicha, a Lynoffsky, and a Kolkofsky

[402] Pergen to Francis, 29 April 1795, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 1, Bl. 41-43, 57.

[403] To Pergen, 28 March 1795, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 8-12. The report noted that Piatoli could settle because his writings pointed to Russia, and not Austria, as the cause of Polish insurrection. Piatoli wrote, "l'insurrection des polonaises n'est pas partielle mas général, et absolument nationale, provoqué par l'oppression de militaires russes," thus reaffirming the report Pergen received only one month prior.

Cracow. This report came with the troubling news that several Frenchmen, who had moved to the city, could no longer be accounted for, and authorities in Cracow were unsure whether these men had been banished or left "according to their own will."[404] As discussed above, the system designed to monitor foreigners' movement will grow increasingly sophisticated. But this system was never absolute – especially not in Cracow in 1799 – and the available police records clearly attest to authorities' preoccupation and frustration with current methods of surveilling foreigners.

Continued concerns over the public mood and the spread of insurrection in Poland eventually led to the establishment of a rudimentary investigative commission in 1799. This so-called "Trilateral Commission" was the work of a Bachmann, an Austrian state councilman headquartered in Warsaw, and was supported by Pergen. The commission's administrative and jurisdictional details are unclear, and reports of its activity are sketchy at best. Yet Bachmann outlined the commission's objectives in his initial report. The commission sought to monitor the combustible situation in Poland and to investigate and punish those accused of harboring revolutionary sympathies. It was Bachmann's stated plan, then, to root out "insurrectionaries" by locating pockets of "revolutionary approval" within urban centers. This commission, or so Bachmann envisioned, would operate in both Austrian and Prussian territory, and would take regular "soundings of popular opinion." Bachmann also suggested the commission be granted the authority to collect

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[404] HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 251-260. For a list of all 150 names see, "Verzeichnis" HHStA StK *NvP*, 21-2 Bl. 156-233.

mail and monitor the movement of foreigners.[405] Although little information on the commission's activity exists, its array and function suggest this Trilateral Commission was an important forerunner of those established in Italy and Germany in the 1820s.

To be sure, these expanding security networks experienced some growing pains. In 1801, the Ministry of Police received a detailed report concerning Freemasonry in the province of Galicia. This report was the work of Anton Feldhofer, the governor's secretary, who sought to clarify the "system of these secret societies" through an investigation of published material. Feldhofer produced a six-page report on three titles,[406] a journal,[407] and several newspapers and even a French-language dictionary.[408] What Feldhofer lacked in sampling size, he made up for in the sheer exhaustive nature of his report. Not only is it complete with page numbers and translations of the French and Latin, but it is also cross-referenced with a larger, twenty-two-page report explaining

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[405] To Pergen, 27 January 1799, HHStA StK *NaP* 1, Bl. 20-21.

[406] This consisted of *Der Lehrbuch Der Mauer, Information übereinge Mauerer-Pflichten*, and *Der Erläuterung der Freymaurerey*.

[407] Here, Feldhofer offered a selection of a five-year run of the journal, *Aus dem Reiche der Todten.*

[408] This journal was part of a series of "conversations with the dead," a tradition dating back to biblical times, but extremely popular in eighteenth-century Central Europe after Leipzig author David Fassmann popularized the genre. Between the first decade of the eighteenth century and 1810, over 500 collections of these stories were published. By Fassmann's death in 1740, these 500 collections accounted for more than 20,000 pages. Fassmann, himself, wrote 240 of these conversations. See, Stephanie Dreyfürst, *Stimmen aus dem Jenseits: David Fassmanns historisch-politisches Journal "Gespräche in dem Reiche der Todten," 1718-1740* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014), esp. Chap. 1.

Feldhofer's methodology and his general conclusions. Feldhofer's report argued that Masonic texts often combined biblical passages and lesser-known religious figures with current legal concepts to create a "secret language," through which Masons could communicate humanist and politically radical ideas. Others, Feldhofer claimed, used "symbols" and "hieroglyphs" to embed humanist ideas into otherwise religious texts or events. Feldhofer insisted that his special knowledge of these secrets "informed his own work" and allowed him to investigate better those who "had submitted to the catechism of freedom and equality." For example, in a published sermon from 22 April 1802, Feldhofer underlined a quote, taken from the apostle St. Phillip, that announced "Each of you should look not only to your own interests, but to those of others." This key passage, according to Feldhofer, unlocked the deeper meaning of the sermon, which, he claimed, preached a radical and "humanist" message of equality, even though the sermon ostensibly celebrated Austrian service during wartime.[409] Thus, common platitudes such as the "righteous subjects of Austria," "civic virtue," "the public good," and "[to] promote the cause of truth, morals, and religion," read through St. Phillip's quote, become code for something far more dangerous.[410]

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[409] The title of the sermon is, *Predigt bei Gelegenheit der Gedächtnißfeier des österreichischen Aufgebothes*.

[410] For the report to Francis, as well as Feldhofer's entire report and a selection of Freemason literature, see, Hager to Francis, 23 June 1801, HHStA MdÄ IB StK *Polizeiberichte* 8, Bl. 1-82.

With this sermon in particular, Feldhofer clearly found what he was looking for. Other samples of these texts, however, were far less vague. In a March 1797 edition of *Der Lehrbuch der Mauer,* Feldhofer highlighted the sentence, "The Revolution is the final judgement. Crime and Virtue both dream of its nakedness,"[411] and at least two of the "conversations" were critical of the Austrian war effort in Germany. Other samples from the *Lehrbuch* and *Der Erläuterung* were standard boilerplate Masonic ideas. In a section from the *Lehrbuch* titled, "The Holy Friendship of the Masons," Feldhofer noted that "true love of the fatherland springs only from the best and most unselfish virtues: liberty and courage," a source of loyalty that ran counter to the monarchical principle. If Feldhofer's citations appear somewhat flimsy at times, he is on solid ground suggesting that religious and political language was fluid and often intertwined, a fact authorities would encounter with the Wartburg Festival in 1817.[412] Yet, despite Feldhofer's extensive study, Hager's report to the king argued that Feldhofer was indeed "absurd" and "unreasonable," and that the report was a "self-indulgent swindle . . . to use the power of the law . . . to gain favor" with Francis. While Hager acknowledged the possible existence of Freemason "resistance" in Galicia, he advised the king not to allow Feldhofer's opportunistic report to "effect any investigation, knowledge, and any disclosure about Masonic activity." Feldhofer is, of course, just one example of an

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[411] The quote is a translation of "*La Revolution est le dernier jugement; le crime et la vertu y sont dans la nudite*."

[412] The intersection of genres is discussed in, Brophy, "The Second Wave," 89-90.

ambitious man willing to game the system for personal gain; there was likely no shortage of overzealous statesmen who embellished their reports in the hopes of receiving attention. It is also telling that Feldhofer chose the theme of secret societies, as it suggests he knew precisely what language to employ to ensure his report got noticed. But that Hager recognized Feldhofer's attempted ruse for what it was is noteworthy. While Feldhofer's use of secret societies indicates their continued threat, Hager's complete dismissal shows a measured state response and a Ministry of Police generally concerned with the quality of the evidence presented.[413]

Greece

The Greek War of Independence that began in 1821 and the romantic Philhellenism it inspired has a significant historiography, and the era has long caught the attention of those scholars concerned with European popular nationalisms and revolutionary movements of the "long nineteenth century."[414] Less studied among

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[413] This was not the first time Anton Feldhofer ran afoul of the state. In 1789, Joseph II allowed Feldhofer, who at one point held a government position, and his wife an imperial audience. According to a report to Pergen, Feldhofer begged to be reinstated. The Feldhofer's display, however, upset Joseph who found them guilty of "unseemly conduct" and a lack of reverence. Joseph punished this impudence with three days in the *Polizeihaus*. This began, what appears to be, a rather inglorious decade for the Feldhofers. See, Paul Bernard, *The Limits of Enlightenment: Joseph II and the Law* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 67.

[414] Thus, Europe's "peripheries" are increasingly becoming central to our understanding of the long nineteenth century. For classic studies of the Greek independence movement see, William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) and C.M. Woodhouse,

Anglo-American scholars is the earliest stirrings of modern Greek nationalism.[415] While 1821 looms large in the history of Greek national liberation, the development of a Greek national consciousness has much deeper, pre-Enlightenment roots and was the product of Greeks living outside the Ottoman Empire. Among diaspora Greeks spread throughout the Balkans, "deep (though hard to measure) currents" of history, culture, and religion slowly coalesced into a common national consciousness, as they increasingly came into contact with Western European ideas.[416] While this initially remained the product of an isolated, literary elite, it was spurred by the Enlightenment and then advanced during the French Revolution. In 1797-1798, French republican forces occupied the Ionian Islands, thus offering a "stimulus to political participation," culminating with inflammatory writings of poet Rigas Pheraios (1757-1798).[417] Writing to both a Greek and Turkish audience, Rigas denounced Ottoman "tyranny," demanding equality, freedom, and

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Capodistria: The Founder of Greek Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). For more recent treatments see, David Brewer, *The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence, 1821-1833* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Richard Stites, *The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Chap. IV.

[415] For the "intellectual" origins of Greek nationalism, see, Catherine Koumarianou, "The Contribution of the Intelligentsia Toward the Greek Independence Movement, 1798-1821," in *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1973), 67-86.

[416] Koumarianou, "Contribution of the Intelligentsia," 70-1; Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, 189.

[417] Koumarianou, "Contribution of the Intelligentsia," 73.

human rights for Greeks, while calling for religious toleration; increased press freedoms; universal education; the creation of a republic with a parliament; and the rule of law.

Rigas's revolution failed to materialize. In 1798, Austrian authorities arrested him in Trieste and turned him over to Ottoman officials in Belgrade, where his guards subsequently murdered him. His death, at the age of forty, closed the first chapter in the story of Greek independence. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Rigas acquired an almost-mythic status, and remains an important figure in Greek political life. This narrative, with its strong focus on the late eighteenth century and the life of Rigas, is dominant among scholars of the period. But reading Rigas's arrest and interrogation, summed up by Johann Baptist Renner, the investigative commissioner in Vienna, reshapes that narrative. The report both expands our view of Rigas's intellectual output and depicts a dense network of European intellectuals, publishers, and booksellers, while pointing to a more rich, *Greek* intellectual life. Riga's deposition broadens our perspective not just on Austrian policing in the late eighteenth-century, but also on the early Greek independence movement and on a European public sphere more generally.

What Renner's report immediately makes clear, is that Rigas had long been a person of interest for the Ministry of Police. By 1794, Rigas was living in Vienna among a sizeable Greek population and was engaging with a wider, European public sphere. According to the report, Rigas admitted that he was responsible for publishing maps of Greece, which consisted of twelve sections with over 122 pages in total. Rigas also readily confessed the names of two other men: Franz Müller, a "local" who engraved the copperplates, and Jakob Nitsch, who resided in the district of Josephstadt and published

the maps.[418] Rigas also admitted to authorities that he was responsible for editing and translating a fourth volume of the ancient orator Anacharsis. In translating from the French, Rigas claimed that he received assistance from a young man named Sacellarious, a Greek-speaking student of medicine who also edited and translated the first three volumes of Anacharsis's collected works. According to the report, this four-volume collection, published in 1797 by Anton Pichler in Vienna, had an initial run of 1,000 copies.[419] Rigas's other literary output that caught the authorities' attention was an edited volume, titled, *Die moralisch Dreifuß*, which included Greek translations of the Italian Abbate Metastasio, shepherds from the Alpine mountains, and the French author Jean-François Marmontel. This title, according to the report, enjoyed an initial run of 900 copies. While the musings of Alpine shepherds initially appear somewhat out of synch with the anti-Turkish essays of Marmontel and Metastasio, Rigas designed the volume to "enlighten his nation about a dream situation."[420]

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[418] Austrian authorities found 634 copies of the maps with a man named Eustratio Argenti, who was en route to the Greek city of Smyrna.

[419] This four-volume edition, however, spread quite far. The same Argenti bore the cost of 1,000 krone for an additional run of 200 copies to be printed in Trieste. A publisher named Georg Michaeli, a Romanian from the city of Jassy, brought another 500 copies of the text into Vienna.

[420] Report Johann Baptist Renner, 3 April 1798, HHStA StK *NvP* 21-2, Bl. 84-101. A merchant from Greece named Pilizaski bought 120 copies of the *Dreifuß*, while a man named Avrami, a merchant from Bucharest, bought an additional 300 copies, all of which they intended to sell in Greece.

In 1797, while in exile in Trieste, Rigas composed his most popular work, the revolutionary hymn "Thourios." At once both a compendium of revolutionary martyrs and a call for a pan-Balkan revolt against Turkish rule, Rigas wrote the poem to be accompanied by the flute and to be simple enough in its verse so that it could be sung aloud and understood by popular crowds. Rigas's interrogation, however, adds a twist to this story, and not an altogether flattering one for Rigas. As the report states, Rigas gave a copy of the poem to an Anton Coronio, himself a young revolutionary, who traveled with Rigas from Casino to Trieste. Later, Rigas insisted that he was not fully responsible for the poem, and that he dictated verses to a man named Peter Petrovitsch, who, Rigas stated, penned the hymn. Rigas changed his story one final time under questioning from authorities, stating that he was not, in fact, the author of the famous poem, despite his previous admission to Coronio that he was. Of course, Rigas's distancing himself from his "revolutionary poem" under police scrutiny does not necessarily discount him as the author, especially if threatened with being turned over to the Ottomans.[421] But the authorities in Trieste and Vienna both took Rigas at his word and opened an investigation into the student Sacellarious as well as Peter Petrovitsch.

The charges against Rigas continued, and his deposition offers us insight into two major themes of this chapter: the spread of European letters by the end of the eighteenth

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[421] Although, as Richard Stites points out, "An oath, enfolded in the hymn, promised a fight against tyranny and mandated being burnt to a crisp by the sun in the event of betrayal." Stites, *The Four Horsemen,* 190.

century and the slow growth of Austrian security networks. Rigas, with the help of publisher Müller and the coppersmith Nitsch, had Greek-language copies of his maps sent to the Princes Ypsilanti and Kalimachi in Moldova and Wallachia.[422] In July of 1797, Rigas and Coronio wrote to the French consul in Trieste, not only openly declaring their intention to overthrow the "yoke of Turkish tyranny," but asking for assistance from the French army in Italy. The French consul shared this letter with Austrian authorities, meaning the Austrians had direct, hand-written evidence of their revolutionary intentions. For the Greeks in Preveza, Rigas, with the assistance of a Laurentio Aliandro, printed copies of the well-known French Revolutionary song "Carmagnole." In the port city of Palio, the publisher Christophoro Haggi Basili, Rigas's one-time travel companion, printed 1,000 Greek-language copies of the war manual (*Kriegsregeln Handbuch*) titled *The Marshall Khevenhüller*. Finally, Rigas, with the help of four other Greek individuals, distributed a "proclamation" titled *The Greek Nation*, which Rigas based on the French constitution of 1793. Before leaving for Trieste, Rigas had 3,000 copies of this proclamation printed, copies of which he distributed in the once-Venetian-controlled Kingdom of Morea.[423] The deposition ends with the names of twenty of Rigas's associates, all Greeks, residing in cities such as Jassy, Bucharest, and Pest, and all of

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[422] The report suggest that Rigas was involved in speculation with the princes. Though one of the two denied that charge, leading Renner to claim the charge was likely untrue.

[423] This region of Greece, once home to Sparta, had fallen under Ottoman control in the early eighteenth century and remained so until 1821.

whom were either publishers or merchants who willingly transported this material throughout the Mediterranean and the Ottoman world.

While Regas's deposition assumed pride of place in Renner's report, the report includes the depositions of nine other individuals, all of whom had some contact with Rigas. A few are already familiar, such as Eustratio Argenti, a merchant from Smyrna, who paid for the publication of over a thousand copies of the four-volume edition of Anacharis's collected work, and 800 of Rigas's maps of Greece. Argenti was similarly in contact with publishers in Trieste and Preveza, such as Anton Nicoti and the previously mentioned Laurentio Aliandro. In September 1796, Argenti was in contact with numerous publishers and merchants throughout the Ottoman Empire, including a Turkish merchant named Haggi Ničoglu, with whom Argenti admitted to having "sung aloud the revolutionary hymn while playing the flute." Argenti further admitted that he and his fellow merchants would support the "revolution if it came to Greece," and that they truly believed that "revolutionary sentiment" was strong enough for it to happen. Others, such as Demeter Nicolides, a Doctor of Medicine, also supported the publishing and spread of the Anacharsis volumes and had maintained correspondence with Rigas, which discussed the Greek empire left behind by Alexander the Great. Nicolides also maintained correspondence with others in his profession, with whom he spoke positively of the French *philosophe* Mably, especially his *Observations on the Greeks*, where Mably recounts Greek leaders' attempts to maintain their "liberty." The brothers Pajanot and Johann Emanuel, from the Macedonian city of Kastoria, a bookkeeper in the employ of Argenti and a student of medicine respectively, also gave depositions regarding their relationship to Rigas and their knowledge of the "Thourios." Johann, for his part,

admitted to traveling with a man named Pulio in order to spread "revolutionary plans." The report concludes with the interrogation of five more men: the previously mentioned Coronio, Theochar Georg Torunzia, Johann Karaza, and Andrea Machutti, all of whom were either students or wealthy Greek merchants living abroad.

Such a lengthy and detailed report is significant to this study for several reasons. First, it sheds light on an international relationship that drew Austria, France, and the Ottoman Empire together to combat the spread of clandestine revolutionary movements. This was not altogether novel for French officials, who, four years prior, jailed Austrian Jacobins who traveled to Paris to seek an audience with the National Convention.[424] But Austrian officials in Italy, with the help of the French consul, arrested Rigas and his associates, and conducted a lengthy investigation into at least ten other individuals at the behest of the Ottomans. This case, and Rigas's in particular, illustrates cooperation across borders to control the spread of revolution. Second, this report gives a clear sense of the social makeup of these early Greek nationalists. The ages of those interrogated ranged from 26 to 40 and they were all either well-educated or members of a wealthy, urban middle class (mostly merchants). All these men had some contact, whether through their studies or their occupation, with Western letters. That an educated and urban financial elite were at the vanguard of Greek nationalism conforms to a general

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[424] By 1808, this situation had changed, as the French were actively attempting to provoke Greeks in Bosnia and Albania to revolt against the Ottomans. See, Hager to Stadion, 1 September 1808, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 72-75.

trend throughout Europe. But that it would take only two decades for a truly popular, Greek revolutionary movement to develop among a scattered, landless, and overwhelmingly rural people, however, is without precedent. Finally, this report reveals a network of intellectuals, merchants, publishers, and booksellers, as well as their ties to countless others throughout the Mediterranean and Ottoman world. Not only that, but their output also evinces a keen familiarity with Western European ideas and events, which they molded to fit their own historical circumstances. Even though this report may deflate the mythical status of Rigas Pheraios, it clearly shows a European "periphery" in-tune, engaged with, and, thus, tied to Europe's "center," and an Habsburg police network intent on monitoring such activity.

Italy

Prior to the French occupation of formerly Austrian land in Italy, there is little mention of the region in the records of the Ministry of Police. This changed in the years after 1805 as the region became increasingly volatile, especially after 1815. In fact, popular revolt in Italy throughout the 1820s became one of Europe's most vexing issues, testing the resolve of Metternich's Congress System. Austrian involvement in Italy during the 1820s is a well-known topic, having received new life through Richard Stites's final monograph. But the period prior to 1815 has received little attention from Habsburg scholars, even though the Austrians surveilled the region and actively worked with the

French to round up disparate revolutionaries.[425] While the years between 1805 and 1815 would not witness any systematic attempt to control popular opinion in Italy, the Austrians nevertheless maintained a watch over their old lands.

Italy makes its first, significant appearance in the police records with Austrian defeats at the Battle of Marengo in June 1800. This loss, coupled with the Austrian defeat at Hohenlinden, ended the Second Coalition and made Napoleon both secure in his position as Consul and master of Italy. Records suggest that confusion reigned in northern Italy well into 1801. In a letter from Pergen to Francis, Pergen first broached the topic of policing Italian provinces during the French occupation. The letter claims that the French liquidated the local policing apparatuses, and that the presence of French, Russian, and Austrian armies had severely disrupted local economies. It was left to the Prince Welsperg, Pergen continued, to manage widespread banditry with a force of roughly 6,000 regular army. Welsperg had asked for an additional 700 passports for a mounted force to be made available immediately, a proposition Pergen endorsed.[426] The French occupation of Trieste in 1805 also led to headaches for Austrian authorities. In late 1806, the governor of Trieste and police authorities in Venice alerted Vienna that in the previous year, French soldiers had distributed in secret an "advertisement" (*Werbung*)

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[425] French policing of their new Italian territories is covered, however briefly, in, Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796-1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), esp. 132-147.

[426] Pergen to Francis, 25 May 1801, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 1, Bl. 75-82.

that implored Italian soldiers to desert and join the French. Baron von Rosetti, the then governor of Venice, complained that the occupation led to a massive "retirement" among the Ministry of Police there, and, further, that French consuls gave "agents" the "protection" (*Rüstung*) they needed to spread these pamphlets. In his report, Sumerau told the State Chancellery that a secret investigation, aided by the Austrian military, was underway, and that the agents responsible for spreading pro-French propaganda would eventually be uncovered.[427]

By 1807, Austrian officials were increasingly concerned about the effect the French occupation had on local populations. While the French had encountered stiff resistance in the countryside, owing to their anti-clericalism,[428] Austrian officials were aware that many Italians, as well as Austrians still residing in northern Italy, had "managed to join certain organizations." Sumerau handed the matter over to the "political authorities" who, he told Rosetti, would both assist in investigations and help "clarify those institutions" designed "to monitor such organizations."[429] Yet, this flow of information often traveled one way, or served French, rather than Austrian, interests. But the relationship between France and Austria in Italy did provide both countries significant information and provides a clear example of policing across national borders. After

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[427] Sumerau to Stadion, 20 September 1806, HHStA StK *NvP* 24, Bl. 377-8.

[428] The French did, however, have significant support among local elites in their "capacity to protect property." See, Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy*, 133,

[429] Stadion to Sumerau, 3 March 1807, HHStA StK *NaP* 2, Bl. 32-35.

Austerlitz, Austria ceded control of the Dalmatian coast to France, which, in 1808, amalgamated the once-neutral Republic of Ragusa within the Kingdom of Italy. In the same year, Marshal Marmont claimed for himself the new title of Duke of Ragusa. Prior to the French occupation, Austrian authorities in Dalmatia had begun surveillance on the Baron Malia for his role in the "revolutionizing of Dalmatia." According to the report, an Austrian diplomat named Andreosky passed this information on to the incoming French occupiers. Hager, the author of the report, indicted to Stadion that surveillance was being continued through a man named Sebastianovich, with whom Hager corresponded. There was, however, a third party involved: Prussia. Hager's report includes a strongly worded letter from the Baron von Hardenberg, demanding an end to the Austrian surveillance of the Baron Malia. It seems the Prussians, and Hardenberg specifically, supported plans to arm locals and promote a revolt in Dalmatia against French rule. Now, despite Hardenberg's protestations, this potentially deeply incriminating information was in the hands of the French via Austrian informants.[430]

A chance for cooperation between French and Austrian authorities emerged once again late in 1808. In December, the Ministry of Police received a request from the French embassy to arrest and deport a man named Rossée. According to the report, Rossée escaped French detention in Italy and was heading north into Austrian territory, carrying a bounty of 3,000 francs. Hager immediately alerted police authorities in Graz

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[430] Hager to Stadion, 16 November 1808, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 93-97. Hardenberg's note is included in this report.

and wrote to the French embassy in Vienna of their "hopes" to locate Rossée and transport him to Vienna. But Hager saw in this request an "opportunity for reciprocity." In his report to Stadion, Hager requested that the French similarly locate a Johann von Klein, a rogue minister from Styria, now thought to be living in the Kingdom of Italy. Hager also hinted that, should both Saurau and Stadion agree, they might return Rossée's 3,000-franc bounty, provided the French returned Klein successfully to Vienna.[431] One month later, in January 1809, French authorities arrested Klein attempting to flee Udine for Württemberg. According to the report, the French transported him to Graz, where he awaited further transportation to Vienna.[432]

France

Continued war between France and Austria did not preclude cooperation between the two states through other means. After Napoleon exiled Madame de Staël in October 1803 without trial, she began her famous travels throughout Europe, first in Germany, and then in Italy, Russia, and, in 1808, to Vienna and Prague. Upon arriving in Vienna, great statesmen, artists, and intellectuals warmly welcomed de Staël. Despite such a warm welcome, the Ministry of Police maintained a strict surveillance over her daily activities as well as her travel from Vienna to Prague.[433] As her biographers suggest,

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[431] Hager to Stadion, 22 December 1808, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 111-112.

[432] Hager to Stadion, 25 January 1809, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 131-132.

Austrian surveillance merely substituted that of the French. In one sense, that is true; the police observed de Staël's activity, noted her guests, and collected her correspondence. But her surveillance was done at the behest of the French, a fact her biographers have missed. In September 1808, for example, the French pressed the Austrians to maintain surveillance on the correspondence between Friedrich von Gentz, the famous anti-revolutionary polemicist and ardent German nationalist, and de Staël.[434] The Austrians complied and collected de Staël's correspondence for the entirety of her stay in Vienna as well as in Prague.

In late 1809, an investigation into Madame von Wallenburg[435] once again connected French, Austrian, and Ottoman authorities. In October of 1809, the Ministry of Police alerted the State Chancellery that Wallenburg, through a secret correspondence with a Turkish "agent" named Agiropolo and his "comrade" Nicolaus Rota, was transporting contraband goods from Constantinople. The Austrians were alerted to this illicit trade via a French spy named Don Niccola.[436] The Wallenburgs had close ties with

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[433] Georges Solovieff, "Madame de Staël et la police autrichienne," *Cahiers Staëliens* 41 (1989-1990): 13-54.

[434] Hager to Stadion, 6 September 1808, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 80-1 (NM).

[435] Madame von Wallenburg was the wife of Jakob von Wallenburg, an "Orientalist" who was renowned for his translations of Greek, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic literature into the French. He spent many years traveling in the near east and served as Joseph II's lead interrupter the Turkish Wars. In 1802, he settled in Vienna and, in 1806, was awarded a position as a member of the State Chancellery.

[436] Hager to Metternich, 14 October 1809, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 189-190.

the Porte, but, in 1809, three years after Napoleon's Berlin Decrees, illicit trade became a serious, international matter. With the French already involved, Hager wrote to Metternich, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the "quarantine" of Wallenburg. According to Franz von Dombay, an Austrian Dragoman and translator of Turkish prose,[437] Wallenburg's treatment was far too harsh, and that she was "dying, due to the suspicions that had fallen upon her." In Hager's letter to Metternich, Hager claimed that while that may be true, French interests outweighed the matter, and announced an investigation into Agriopolo and Rota and the confiscation of any further correspondence.[438]

Any sense of cooperation between France and Austria ended with the Wars of the Fifth Coalition and the disastrous Treaty of Schönbrunn signed in late 1809. This led to a second occupation, the loss of 20 percent of Austria's pre-war population, and a crippling indemnity of eighty million francs. But while Napoleon was still master of Europe, this last round of war produced the first visible cracks in his rule. By 1810, France was financially exhausted from pressing Napoleon's blockade of British goods. In Spain, Napoleon placed his brother Joseph on the throne of a new client kingdom. If the French still held Castile in 1810, their grip on the countryside was slipping as guerrilla activity steadily increased. Revolts in the Tyrol and in the Kingdom of Westphalia signaled

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[437] See, Jan Schmidt, "Franz von Dombay: Austrian Dragoman at the Bosnian Border, 1792-1800," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 90 (2000): 75-168.

[438] Hager to Metternich, 20 October 1809, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 191-193.

German unrest as did the attempted assassination of Napoleon by Friedrich Staps outside of Schönbrunn. In the wake of these wars, the tenor of Austrian security concerns changed. After 1810, the French, whether through rapacious occupation or by popular example, let loose the genie of European nationalisms. From this point forward, Central European states became increasingly concerned with the popular mood and politics of their subjects as well as their neighbors'.

Conclusion

The growth of Habsburg policing institutions between the Jacobin Trials (1794) and the Congress of Vienna (1815) has not received significant attention beyond the organizational developments of the period. As such, our understanding of the impact that war and concerns over state security had on Habsburg foreign and domestic politics in the first two decades of the nineteenth century is limited. This historiographical gap has also led to too strong a focus on the role Metternich played as the architect of European political repression, especially after 1815. As this chapter has argued, the legal, ideological, and administrative apparatuses that Metternich relied upon were largely birthed in this period, as was the impulse to police political participation beyond traditional Habsburg borders.

It is in this period, then, that the outlines of a unique Central European security state first became visible. Control of movement and communication and the censorship of foreign and domestic press – tactics developed prior to 1794 – remained emblematic of the Habsburg security system. But, by the end of the eighteenth century, they were no longer the totality of it. The system of state security that emerged between 1794 and

1800 included the increased administrative surveillance of possible sites of revolutionary unrest; the formation of special investigative commissions and increased policing presence in foreign territory; growing ties between the Ministry of Police and the military; and an overall growth in the state's policing capacity. If war was the initial catalyst in this development, peacetime advances were equally long-lasting, a fact that suggests Habsburg authorities found them expedient and – mostly – in keeping with their commitment to the *Rechtsstaat*. How the Habsburg security state continued to unfold in the post-Napoleonic world and the role played by Metternich in furthering its spread is the focus of subsequent chapters.

This increased repressive capacity of the Habsburgs is in keeping with its Western European neighbors. As historian Howard Brown has shown, the French First Republic, despite its stated commitments to constitutionality, routinely employed exceptional measures in the defense of state security. But here is where historical comparisons break down. The French security state developed within a unique legal and historical context, and it did so with widespread support among politically active subjects. As Brown argues, these "repressive mechanisms" created in the years 1797 to 1802 generated a "liberal authoritarianism" that characterized the state's response to social unrest throughout the nineteenth century.[439] But where France was able to rein in some of its worst abuses through reform prior to Napoleon's imperial dictatorship, the Habsburg

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[439] Brown, "Special Tribunals," 80.

state was neither tethered to constitutional principles nor to the sensibilities of revolutionaries. What social and political forces shaped the growing Habsburg security state and its response to its subjects' demands in the first half of the nineteenth century thus remains an important, though still open, question.

Chapter 4

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST EUROPEAN REVOLUTION, 1810-1820

In June 1815, a lengthy report on the "revolutionary regeneration of Germany" landed on Anton von Baldaccis's desk. According to Baron von Hager's report, the Habsburg police were monitoring the "connections and aims" between "secret Prussian agents" and German national associations, specifically the *Tugendbund,* a patriotic and Masonic secret society designed to frustrate the French occupation of Prussia and revive Prussian nationalist spirit.[440] In this report, the police identified the *Tugendbund*'s most "aggressive" and active members, noting their propensity for infighting and the threat of splinter groups. Derided as the "German spinning heads" (*Deutschen Schwindelköpfe*), the list of known members included popular authors, such as Ernst Moritz Arndt and

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[440] Established in 1808, the *Tugendbund* was a union of three Masonic lodges from Konigsberg designed to revive the national spirit of the Prussians after their defeat in 1806. It included Major Ferdinand von Schill, who, in 1809, led a failed, though popular, uprising against the French, leading to his death later that year. The *Tugendbund* was actively engaged in an anti-French struggle, and its members were in contact with August von Gneisenau and Wilhelm von Scharnhorst. The *Tugendbund* initially received the blessing of Friedrich Wilhelm III, but was condemned by Stein, who, as we have seen, had his own plans for a Prussian uprising. A Napoleonic decree banned the secret society, forcing Friedrich to follow suite in late 1809. See, Sam Mustafa, *The Long Ride of Major von Schill: A Journey through German History and Memory* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), esp. Chap. 3.

Friedrich Jahn, as well as numerous nobles, prominent Prussian and Bavarian statesmen, and professors.[441] Hager also noted a split within the Prussian cabinet, which pitted "the more peaceful and long-lived party" against the "tempestuous party" (*sturmlustigen Partei*) whose "democratic tendencies" Hager found particularly "troublesome." Despite their rifts, Hager was quick to claim that these parties were united in their goal of German unification. The report also suggested a close relationship between the Prusso-nationalist organizations and south German statesmen as well as German publishers and book sellers, include Johann Friedrich Cotta, the well-known publisher. The report claims that these Prussian agents, seeking to extend Prussian influence in the south of Germany, approached Cotta to publish a monthly, pro-Prussian journal. Though there is no evidence Cotta followed through, Hager claimed that the very meeting marked the "definite beginning of cooperation between *Bundesglieder*, and, at the same time, the realization of their plans": "German rebirth" through "German unity" under the sway of the Hohenzollerns to the exclusion of the Habsburgs.[442]

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[441] This 1815 report counts fifteen individuals as active members of the Prussian *Tugendbund*. In 1828, the Central Investigative Committee in Mainz upped that number to thirty, but estimated the *Tugendbund's* numbers at, roughly, 140. "Total-Uebersicht der gesamten Resultate der Central-Untersuchung-Commission," Ite Periode, Ier Band. Cited hereafter as "Total-Uebersicht." A copy is available in, BArch Berlin, DB/7/4, Bl. 32-34. Among these names was Alexander Lips, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Erlangen, whose work had long been censored in Austria. See, to Hager, 5 October 1814, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 104. This report concerned Lips's, *Der Wiener Kongreß, oder was muss geschehen, um Deutschland von Seinem Untergang zu retten, und das Interesse alle Fürsten und Nation daselbst zu vereinigen* (Erlangen: Hayder, 1814).

By 1815, the Habsburgs had investigated revolutionary activity in Central Europe for a quarter century. But this report represents a critical shift in the history of Central European state security practices for two important reasons. First, whereas previous Habsburg investigations into German radicalism were often sporadic and localized, this report inaugurated the first fully sustained investigation into German intellectuals and their output. Confident that Austria's own *Schwindleköpfe* posed little threat to the state, the Ministry of Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – increasingly intertwined after 1810 – trained their sights on political participation throughout the newly minted German Confederation.[443] As the previous chapter showed, the push to monitor foreign territory pre-dated Metternich's appointment as Foreign Minister. But after his return to Vienna in late 1810, Metternich immediately enmeshed himself within the daily activity of the Habsburg police, especially as it pertained to France and the German states. Yet during this period, Metternich's control over both policing and foreign affairs was never total, as

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[442] Hager to Francis, 14 June 1815, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 470-474.

[443] Previous scholarship tended to date the emergence of police cooperation across borders in the latter-half of the nineteenth century. Mathieu Deflem, *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Collaboration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chap. 1. Some scholars, however, have stressed similar developments throughout Europe in the post-Congress of Vienna period. See, Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); Ido de Haan and Jeroen van Zanten, "Constructing an International Conspiracy: Revolutionary Concertation and Police Networks in the European Restoration," in de Graaf et al., *Securing Europe*, 171-92, esp. 184-5. This chapter, as well as this dissertation more generally, argues that the development of policing agencies and the push to police across borders pre-dates the Congress of Vienna by two decades.

other Austrian statesmen vied for Francis's attention. Second, this report roughly coincides with other investigations into German intellectuals and political radicalism, especially in Prussia. Between 1814 and 1819, Prussian authorities similarly began detailed investigations into their own homegrown associations, which produced mountains of state paper, compiled in multi-volume reports. By the end of the decade, these separate, though clearly related, investigations into German political participation merged under Austrian auspices, as Metternich successfully instrumentalized renewed political violence to reestablish Austrian authority – codified in the Vienna Final Act (1820) – over the German states and to secure his own power and influence as foreign minister.

When the victorious allied powers met in Vienna, a patriotic discourse on German freedom and national unity had permeated Central Europe's public sphere for a decade. This was evident not only in the work of German authors, painters, and intellectuals, but also in more "popular" forms of communication such as pamphlet literature, calendars, and ballads that exposed common classes to the "political tenets of bourgeois civil society."[444] Historians have captured well the emergence of this German nationalist language,[445] and the subject is the topic of recent monographs from two of the era's

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[444] Brophy, *Popular Culture*, 21.

[445] Düding, *Organisierter gesellschaftlicher*; Karin Luys, *Die Anfänge der deutschen Nationalbewegung von 1815 bis 1819* (Münster: Nodus Publication, 1994); Jörg Echternkamp, *Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus, 1770-1840* (Frankfurt a/M: Campus Verlag, 1998); Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*.

leading scholars.[446] That the defeat at Jena in 1806 ushered in a new and distinctly "nationalist mode" of thinking among a small cadre of German intellectuals is now irrefutable. What began in 1806 as a small trickle among a handful of authors, burst into a flood in the following decade, as hundreds of young authors produced panegyrics to "national renewal" through the expansion of political rights and the granting of constitutions.[447] Alongside this early liberal strain of German nationalism grew a "Christian-conservative regional patriotism," fostered by territorial elites and which focused on the state and its "monarchical ruler."[448] The development of competing visions of German nationalism – one liberal, the other Christian-conservative – after the wars of 1813-1815, stands perhaps as the central insight in Karen Hagemann's most recent book.[449]

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[446] Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars* and Helmut Walser Smith, *Germany: A Nation in Its Time: Before, During, and After Nationalism, 1500-2000* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2020), esp. 150-90.

[447] Smith, *Germany*, 171.

[448] Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, 4-5; cf. Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*.

[449] Central to Hagemann's assessment of German nationalism is the effect of warfare and occupation. This is a fundamental presupposition of almost two decades of scholarship, which has spawned a ground-breaking series, *War, Culture, and Society, 1750-1850*, of which Hagemann has long served as a series editor. Helmut Smith's recent book, however, complicates that assumption, arguing that while 1806 and 1813-1815 are watershed moments for the development of German nationalism, peacetime equally shaped the contours of nationalist discourse.

But if historians have teased out these threads of nationalist thought, how authorities articulated their own understanding of these new ideas is not clear. While nationalism, as opposed to terms such as "patriotism" and "cosmopolitanism," became a new framework for intellectuals and statesmen after 1806,[450] so too did other such ideas as "republicanism,"[451] "liberalism," "democracy," and "constitutionalism." While birthed during the American and French Revolutions, German intellectuals, such as Arndt and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, borrowed these concepts and molded them to fit their own historical circumstances.[452] In the period following the Congress of Vienna, statesmen

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[450] Smith, *Germany*, 170-1.

[451] There is, of course, a long history of "republican" thought in Europe. While the term was often described ambiguously by contemporaries and has defied unifying explanations by scholars, German Central Europe nonetheless evidenced a republican tradition and a civic politics driven by service to the "common good" bolstered by civic virtues that stressed moral public service. See, Hans Erich Bödecker, "The Concept of the Republic in Eighteenth-Century German Thought," in *Republicanism and Liberalism in American and the German State, 1750-1850*, ed. Jürgen Heideking and James Henretta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 35-52.

[452] For the reception of the American Revolution among Central European intellectuals see, Elisa Douglas, "German Intellectuals and the American Revolution" *The William and Mary Quarterly* 2 (1960): 200-218; Horst Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution, 1770–1800: A Sociohistorical Investigation of Late Eighteenth-Century Political Thinking*, trans. Bernhard Uhlendorf (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1976); Anna Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views of American Independence* (Vienna: Federal Press Service, 1976); Willi Paul Adams, *Die Amerikanische Revolution Und Die Verfassung, 1754-1791* (Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch, 1987). The scholarship on the reception of the French Revolution in Germany is extensive. For a succinct discussion see, Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 35-68 and, more recently, Smith, *Germany*, Chap. 6.

grappled with these concepts but did not always do so in meaningful or precise ways.[453] Reports often used the terms interchangeably and authorities were either unable or unwilling to decouple these ideas from the violence and war associated with revolution. Metternich himself employed a panoply of contradictory metaphors for such concepts after 1813, likening them to a slow, cancerous growth while simultaneously conjuring up violent images of volcanos and earthquakes.[454] Friedrich von Gentz, Metternich's close confidant and *Hofrat* after 1813, similarly spoke of "the great sickness and danger of the times" while condemning the "hatred of revolutionaries" that had long simmered, exploding in violence after 1819.[455]

This chapter, then, investigates the events that helped shape Central European authorities' evolving attitudes toward these revolutionary concepts in the years between

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[453] For the fluid nature of these ideas and their role at the Congress of Vienna see, Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna,* esp. Chap. 6.

[454] Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 173.

[455] Gentz to Metternich, 1 April 1819, in Hans von Eckardt, ed. *Friedrich von Gentz: Staatschriften und Briefe*, 2 vols. (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921), II:113-4. This language of sickness and violence reversely mirrored the metaphors used by the French Revolutionaries themselves in justifying their own actions. The sickness of the *ancien régime* thus becomes the sickness of the *Burschenschaft* as well as "democracy" and representative constitutions; the liberating violence of revolution becomes the threat of renewed terrorism and anarchy; the republican fear of invasion and conspiracy becomes the conservative fear of pan-European revolution and secret societies. For the classic study on the "language" of the French Revolution see, François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 [1978]). For a study of revolutionary fears and violent conservative metaphors of revolution in France see, Antoine de Baecque, *Glory and Terror: Seven Deaths Under the French Revolution*, trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Routledge, 2001).

1810 and 1819/20. It argues that the conservatism that framed the murder of August von Kotzebue in March 1819 as an act of terror, and which codified the Carlsbad Decrees six months later, was the product of long-held assumptions about secret societies and European revolutionary conspiracies, dating back to the late-eighteenth century. That the murder of Kotzebue served as the immediate pretext for the signing of the restrictive decrees is indisputable; the correspondence between Gentz and Metternich after March 1819 attests its singular importance.[456] Kotzebue's murder – and the attempt on Wellington's life a year prior – reintroduced the threat of politicized violence, acts increasingly categorized as "terrorism."[457] But Metternich and his decrees addressed issues beyond renewed political violence in 1818/19. Police files suggest that Napoleon, even in his exile, cast a long shadow, spurring Metternich and his police ministers as well as other prominent European statesmen to view events in France, Germany, and Italy after 1814 as a comprehensive political entity. Scholars of Central Europe overlook the European scope or marginalize it in favor of the months following Kotzebue's murder.[458]

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[456] Eberhard Büssem argued that to question the legal basis of the Carlsbad Decrees, "bourgeois historiography" had played down the central importance of the murder. According to Büssem any attempt to criticize the "politics of reaction" must contend with "the readiness for violent, revolutionary change" and the "violent bourgeois opposition." See his, *Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse,* 155.

[457] Williamson, "Revolutionary Machinations'," 287.

[458] This is not to say that scholars have not recognized the international scope of Metternich's thinking after 1814/5. For recent examples see, Büssem, *Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse,* 8-25; Alan Sked, "The Metternich System, 1815-1848" in *Europe's Balance of Power, 1815-1848,* ed. Alan Sked (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), 98-121.

But, as this chapter argues, the Carlsbad Decrees were not merely a reaction to political violence in Central Europe, but, rather, a response to a broader vision about international revolution. This period witnesses a growing connection between European diplomacy and the policing of radical political activity. While the decrees mark a watershed moment in Central Europe, systematizing the repressive measures that evolved over the previous four decades, they were one part of a larger security program for Europe.

Toward the Congress of Vienna, 1809-1815

In the wake of Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign and his defeat in October 1813 at the Battle of Leipzig, the Sixth Coalition faced the daunting task of securing European peace.[459] But if victory against Napoleon at last appeared possible, there was little consensus among the principal allied powers about what victory should ultimately look like. The signing of the final armistice on 3 July 1815 was still two long years away, and the winding path from Leipzig to the Convention of Saint-Cloud in Paris allowed the allies to clash over the shape of what European peace should take.[460] After Napoleon's check in Russia, members of the Coalition, as well as France, all pressed for

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[459] The Sixth Coalition included Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria as its principal members. In December 1812, after the collapse of Napoleon's Russian campaign, Prussian, Russia, and Austria signed a series of peace accords, vowing to maintain peace among the three powers.

[460] The route from Leipzig to Paris has recently been admirably covered by Beatrice de Graaf. See her, *Fighting Terror After Napoleon*, esp. Chap. 2.

their own vision of peace. Where Napoleon desired only to win in order to maintain French hegemony, Britain, Prussia, and Russia all hoped to press war for their own ends, while all had their own vision of Continental peace. Austria stood in "active neutrality," seeking peace only to gain a favorable position among the allies as well as leverage over a still-aggressive France.[461] In December 1812, after his defection from Napoleon's army, General Ludwig Yorck, pressured by his soldiers, signed an armistice with Russia, via the Convention of Tauroggen, without consent or support from the resentful Prussian king.[462] Yorck's defection and triumphant return to Berlin, marked a crucial, if only

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[461] Paul Schroeder and Wolfram Siemann largely agree that by early 1813, European leaders, above all Metternich and Lord Castlereagh, were intent on European cooperation. But, according to Siemann, Metternich was laboring according to a "general plan" for the ally's military efforts against Napoleon. Siemann is, thus, critical of Schroeder's insistence that Metternich's desire for peace between January and August 1813 was authentic. Siemann argues, rather, that Metternich was a "realist" who knew full well that Napoleon would not accept a return to France's 1792 borders without war. Metternich fully anticipated war, Siemann argues, and used his time to forge a lasting coalition, a feat that was nothing short of a "diplomatic revolution." For the lead-up to Leipzig see Siemann, *Metternich*, 376-439. Cf. Alan Sked, *Metternich and Austria: An Evaluation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), esp. Chap. 2; Enno Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, Vol. I: *The Contest with Napoleon, 1799-1814* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), esp. Chap. 6. Both Sked and Kraehe put Metternich at the center of the allied diplomatic effort prior to Leipzig.

[462] The Prusso-Russian alliance would not be formalized until 27 February when they signed the Treaty of Kalisz. This officially ended Prussia's alliance with France while announcing Prussia's intentions to join the allies. Prussia did not declare war on France until 17 March 1813, the day Tsar Alexander I arrived in Berlin. See Sheehan, *German History*, 312-14. For a debate on whether Tauroggen was an act of insubordination see, Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 59 n.1. For a criticism of the Prussian myths of the Wars of Liberation see Helmut Berding, "Das geschichtliche Problem der Freiheitskriege, 1813-1814," in *Historismus und moderne Geschichtswissenschaft: Europe zwischen Revolution und*

symbolic, step toward renewed Prussian war against France. On 24 January 1813, and following Yorck's defection, Emperor Francis unilaterally ordered a "temporary truce" with Russia, thus breaking the Austrian Empire's "contract" with Napoleon. By early February, Metternich, taking a position of "active neutrality," began his push to serve as mediator for the other great powers, all of whom, by mid-March, were at war with France.[463]

On 3 March 1813, Francis made Metternich the Grand-Chancellor of the Order of Maria Theresa, the highest military honor in the Austrian Empire, placing Metternich second only to the emperor in military matters.[464] In his recent landmark biography of Metternich, Wolfram Siemann, argues that from this point forward, Metternich was free to act according to his own vision for European cooperation in an upcoming war against Napoleon. This is not entirely the case, however. After Francis took the decisive step to withdraw from his alliance with Napoleon in February, he announced that he would welcome "public opinion" on the "current political situation" (*politische Zeitverhältnisse*). Public opinion in this instance did not refer to the wider public, but, rather, to statesmen and heads of regional governments. In April, Hager, who one month

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Restauration, 1791-1815, ed. Karl Otmar von Aretin and Gerhard Ritter (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1987), 201-215. For a criticism from an Austrian perspective see Alan Sked, "Austria, Prussia, and the Wars of Liberation, 1813-1814," *Austrian History Yearbook* 45 (2014): 89-114.

[463] Siemann, *Metternich*, 377-78.

[464] Siemann, *Metternich*, 381.

prior had succeeded Count von Saurau as President of the Ministry of Police, submitted a report to the king including, roughly, fifteen letters (many anonymous) from all parts of the Austrian Empire. While no single report stands out for its deep tactical insight, they reveal a wide range of opinion about war and Austria's place in European politics more generally in early 1813. Common themes appear, most notably the desire for Austria to act as an independent, sovereign power as well as a general mistrust of Russia. Those interests, however, could conflict; for example, one letter from a syndic in Linz, suggested that the emperor renegotiate an alliance with France to protect against a Russian advance.[465] Other letters point to a growing weariness with war. One author called outright for a complete end to Austrian involvement, while others suggested a more modest contribution to the allied war effort. One letter, from a syndic in the town of Wels, presaged to some degree Metternich's diplomatic maneuvering in the months between late March and August. The anonymous syndic argued that peace in Germany was of central importance and, moreover, that the population's "wish for a future of peace and quiet" was unthinkable so long as Napoleon ruled there. Only an alliance with Russia and Prussia against Napoleon, the author continued, would bring peace, and restore Austria's "influence" in Germany.[466]

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[465] Central to Eno Kraehe's account of this period is Metternich's twin fear of France and Russia. French victory over Russia would leave France with no rivals on the Continent and the possibility of a new Tilsit. Russian victory, or so Metternich thought, would lead to Russian hegemony in eastern Europe. This fear, Kraehe argues, led Metternich to support a continued alliance with Napoleon. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, 152-3.

It is not clear whether any of these reports directly influenced Metternich's diplomatic strategy in the first half of 1813. Siemann notes that an anonymous letter crossed Metternich's desk in early February, to which Metternich responded by stating the letter simply reiterated what "had already begun and been partly executed."[467] But Siemann's insistence that, by March 1813, Metternich was proceeding according to his own vision is a problem which lies at the heart of his book's biographical approach. By spring 1813, Metternich had clearly positioned himself as the leader of a European coalition and mediator between Napoleon and the allies. Historians have long recognized this. He was not, however, acting in a diplomatic vacuum, and even as late as June, after Napoleon's victories at Lützen and Bautzen in May, it was still unclear if Napoleon could or should be deposed militarily.[468] It is likely that Metternich's thinking evolved in

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[466] Hager to Francis, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 1-35. Hager's report also mentions Prince Alexander Kurakin, the Russian ambassador to Vienna from 1801 to 1806 and a Russian ambassador to France from 1808 to 1812. He resigned his position after Napoleon invaded Russia but continued to live a famously ostentatious lifestyle in Paris. According to the report, while in Vienna and Paris, Kurakin was under heavy "police observation." Hager suggested to Francis that Kurakin's police detail be ended as both the "confidant who is in police pay is now at his service" and that the prince's "movements" had long been known.

[467] Metternich, as quoted in, Siemman, *Metternich*, 378.

[468] On 4 June 1813, after Blücher's defeat at Bautzen, Napoleon and Metternich agreed to a nine-week armistice, the so-called Truce of Pläswitz. In February 1814, looking back on the truce while negotiating another, Napoleon would claim the June 1813 cease-fire as "'the dumbest decision of my life'." Quoted in Sked, "Wars of Liberation," 112. See also, Michael Leggiere, *Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in Northern Germany* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); de Savigny, *Metternich and his Times*, 153.

relation to other allied statesmen as well as competing visions for the Austrian Empire's future, including powerful Austrian statesman such as Count Zichy, Baldacci, Hager, who maintained correspondence with Baldacci until his retirement, and, later the field marshal Schwarzenberg, who led the allied armies after Leipzig. It is also possible that Metternich's diplomacy was far more flexible than Siemann allows, and that he developed at least two viable and equally acceptable outcomes: peace with Napoleonic France reduced to its 1792 borders or its total military defeat. Whatever the case, it is telling that the emperor actively sought input from all corners of the Austrian Empire as late as April, and that the responses evince, to varying degrees, some familiarity with the complexity of the new international situation in late 1812 and early 1813.

In February 1813, revolt in the Tyrol immediately threatened to unravel any progress the allies had made while seriously jeopardizing future diplomatic work. The revolt also risked the possibility of French troops once again driving deep into Habsburg territory. These twin threats provided the immediate justification for Metternich to arrest its members, many of whom were high-ranking Austrian statesmen, including the Archduke Johann, Francis's brother. The extent of Metternich's involvement and the international dimension of the revolt's suppression, however, is not fully understood, just as the connections between the Tyrolean rebellions of 1809 and 1813 have not been fully investigated.[469] These events are worth returning to for two other reasons. First, they

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[469] As late as 2006, Karen Hagemann could still argue that the only outcome of the Tyrolean uprising of 1809 was the spread "of resignation and a sense of powerlessness"

show just how closely knit diplomacy and policing had become by the first decade of the nineteenth century, especially as it pertained to radical or patriotic-nationalist organizations. The cross-border pursuit of Tyrolean rebels also highlights the very real limits Central European policing agencies faced when tracking individuals or groups outside of the cities. Second, in contrast to Karen Hagemann's claim that the events of 1809 reverberated little outside of the cities, a closer look suggests wide-spread, cross-class support that reached deep into the Tyrolean countryside. In the immediate aftermath of the uprising, the Austrians deported rebels and numerous Bavarian civil servants east into Habsburg territory, an event that became a major diplomatic and policing affair which in turn shaped how Austrian statesmen viewed nationalist uprisings.

In 1809, the Tyrol was the site of a successful uprising, when Andreas Hofer led a peasant army against a Franco-Bavarian army.[470] Hofer's victories against a combined Franco-Bavarian force in August 1809 led to a brief period of Tyrolean independence,

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and had no "great resonance outside of the city centers." If there is any connection in Hagemann's essay between the "patriotic-nationalist" rhetoric of 1809 that inspired the uprising and 1813, it is found in her claim for the lack of enthusiasm for renewed war. This, as shown above, was not the case in 1813, as opinion varied widely regarding war. What did not vary, however, was the overwhelmingly negative opinion of subservience to Napoleon. Hagemann's evidence for the pessimistic mood in Vienna comes from an 1893 article. This is compared to the "popular reaction in Prussia" in 1813/1814, the real subject of her essay. See, Karen Hagemann, "'Be Proud and Firm Citizens of Austria!' Patriotism and Masculinity in Texts of the 'Political Romantics' Written during Austria's Anti-Napoleonic Wars," *German Studies Review* 29 (2006): 41-62, here, 52.

[470] After the Austrian defeat at Marengo, and the signing of the Peace of Pressburg (1805), the French ceded the now Kingdom of Bavaria control of the Tyrol on 11 February 1806.

until Francis renounced any claim to the Tyrol at Schönbrunn two months later. In November, French troops defeated the remaining rebels, leading to the arrest and execution of Hofer in January 1810.[471] The aftermath of the rebellion left entire areas in ruins and over one thousand dead, including twenty-five rebels executed by the French.[472] Francis, often criticized by later historians for his "betrayal,"[473] did, in fact, offer to resettle families in eastern Hungary and pressed England for financial support,[474] which arrived a year later. Following the Archduke Charles's defeat at Wagram (5-6 July) and Znaim (10-11 July), Francis also extended support to Hofer's widow[475] and, later, allowed Hofer's son, Johann, to settle in Vienna.[476]

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[471] F. Gunter Eyck, *Loyal Rebels: Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), esp. Chap XI.

[472] Estimates from Count Aloys von Tannenberg, the governor of the Tyrol, set the total damage to 128,000 francs. This estimate is included in a report from (General Kommisar) von Lerchfeld to Rechberg, 9 January 1811, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

[473] In a final chapter, Eyck covers the German-nationalist, Bavarian, Austrian, Italian, and French historiographies of the event. See, Eyck, *Loyal Rebels,* Chap. XII.

[474] On Francis pressing for British support see, Freiherrn Johann Hablmann (Innsbruck) to Rechberg, 4 February 1810, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807. In January, the Bavarian government had already distributed 4708 francs – "collected from abroad" – to those still suffering from the devastation. One year later, the Bavarian government received English funds, distributed by the "Commission on Tyrolean Affairs." See, (Oberlieutenant) Johann von Moosthal to Rechberg, 29 May 1811, Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

[475] For Hofer's widow's passport negotiations see, Montgelas to Rechberg, 18 April 1812, Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

But investigations of those involved continued well into 1811 and, in some instances, until the end of the decade. In March 1810, Hager wrote to Metternich, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the deportation of the Baron Johann von Ehrenfeld, a member of the Order of Maria Theresa and the Habsburg trade consul (*Handlungs-Konsul*) in Tyrol. He was also a major *à la Suite* in the Bavarian army and commander of the *Bürgergard* in Bozen (Bolsano). As such, Ehrenfeld held conflicting allegiances – to Bavaria and, by default, France on one side, and Austria on the other. After being deported following a court martial, Ehrenfeld published a short pamphlet that openly questioned the Austrian government's decision to deport him despite his good standing and history of military service and his stated commitment to the Austrian Empire. According to Ehrenfeld, he was the victim of a conspiracy among his "enemies" in the region, whom he referred to as a "Chinese faction" of local elites with connections to powerful men in Vienna. Ehrenfeld strongly implied that the Baron von Hormayr, a privy counselor, who presided over Ehrenfeld's court martial, and a Baron von Roschmann, a reginal commissioner, who relayed intimate details of Ehrenfeld's situation to a family friend while still in Vienna, played the central roles in this conspiracy.[477] While there may, in fact, have been a party of Tyrolean leaders hostile to

[476] On the settlement of Andres Hofer in Vienna see, Montgelas to Rechberg, 17 February 1811, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807. The Hofer family estate became the property of the General Kommissariat of the Innkreis. Montgelas to Rechberg, 23 July 1811, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807. Francis maintained significant support for the Hofer family, granting Andreas's brother, Johann, a noble title in 1818, while purchasing land and businesses for the family in 1834 and 1838. See, Eyck, *Loyal Rebels*, 205-6.

Ehrenfeld, it is far more likely that Francis agreed to his deportation to appease the French.[478] However, in his official announcement, Francis – quoted by Hager – claimed Ehrenfeld's deportation was done "out of consideration for his own preservation." But in his letter to Metternich, Hager went a step further, demanding that Ehrenfeld, who "had such a wild character, loose morality, and who showed dangerous tendencies toward Austria," be stripped of his decorations.[479]

The rebellion and the drama surrounding Ehrenfeld's deportation had a significant impact on the course of diplomatic relations in 1813 as well as Metternich's thinking on the meaning and viability of "national" revolts. At Schönbrunn, Napoleon ceded the Tyrol to Bavaria, though, due to the rebellion, he forced Bavaria to cede land, including the Southern Tyrol, to the newly formed Illyrian Provinces. Ostensibly enemies, Bavaria

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[477] Baron Johann von Ehrenfeld, *Geschichte der Deportierung des Johann Graf Baron von Ehrenfeld* (Munich, 1809). Ehrenfeld also accused Hormayr of expressing his wish of Ehrenfeld's violent death to high-ranking Bavarian officers. Hormayr is quoted as saying "Morgen fahre ich nach Bozen, und hoffe da den Graf Baron von Ehrenfeld von den Bauern todtgeschlagen anzutreffen [sic]."

[478] There is some support for this in a letter from a Dr. von Hellrigl, a district judge in the Tyrol. In it, Hellrigl asks rhetorically why no one had come forward to the courts with complaints against Ehrenfeld. This even though the Austrians had publicly encouraged individuals to approach the courts with either "complaints or compliments." In the same letter, Hellrigl quotes Ehrenfeld, who asks "If no one has complained, why have I been declared a poisoner? Why, then, was my cellar broken into and my wine stolen?" See, Joseph August Schultes, *Geschichte der Deportierung der königlich baierischen Civilbeamten* . . . 2 vols (Munich: Lentner, 1810), II:140-1.

[479] Hager to Metternich, 27 March 1810, HHStA StK *NvP* 26, unpag. In this report, Hager suggests that von Ehrenfeld forged Francis's *Handbillets* concerning his deportation.

and Austria were now engaged in a long process of diplomatic negotiations concerning the region. In the above-mentioned letter to Metternich, Hager once again cited Francis who wished to see Ehrenfeld's position as trade consul to Bavaria filled to "protect Austrian trade and Austrian subjects." A row developed over the granting of passports to refugees as well as informants and ex-insurgents crossing the Bavarian-Austrian border. In one instance, Montgelas demanded that a certain Johann Holzknecht, an "insurgent" from Passen exiled by the French, be allowed to return, despite being held at the border by Austrian police.[480] The property of displaced Tyroleans, however, became perhaps the most contentious diplomatic issue between Bavaria and Austria. Francis allowed the families of rebel leaders to settle in Habsburg land, but others, such as Agatha and Jacob Torger, left the Tyrol without a proper passport. In Torger's case, they left behind "uneducated children" as well as property worth 17,000 francs and significant debts. To support the children, the Bavarian government sold the Torger estate and allowed Agatha Torger to return to the Bavarian Innkreis in 1812 after three years in exile. Despite Austrian insistence that the entire family be reunited, Montgelas barred Jacob Torger – who had acquired a small home outside of Vienna – from ever returning to the Tyrol.[481]

The events of the 1809 rebellion roughly coincided with Metternich's return to Vienna from Paris in November and his elevation to the position of Minister of Foreign

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[480] Montgelas to Rechberg, 23 July 1811, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

[481] Montgelas to Rechberg, 9 February 1812, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

Affairs. Count Stadion had resigned, and Francis announced his intention to award Metternich the position on 8 July.[482] Metternich did not officially assume the role until Francis, with little choice in the matter, signed the Peace of Vienna in October. In his autobiography, Metternich claims that while all Austria, the emperor included, recognized Napoleon as an "irresistible power," his "thoughts soared higher."[483] While some exaggeration in autobiography is to be expected, Metternich's actions as Foreign Minister in 1809 and 1810 suggest he was certainly willing to do Napoleon's bidding. In October, a month before returning to Vienna, Metternich had already ordered the censorship of anti-French newspapers in Hungary and Czernowitz (Bukovina).[484] In January 1810, the French demanded that Metternich clamp down on the number of "patriotic" pamphlets that promoted a "general uprising against the peace." The first victim of this new crackdown against German-language authors and publishers was the Chevalier Horn, a proponent of absolute press freedoms and an outspoken supporter of

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[482] The Prince Liechtenstein was left to manage negotiations with the French. After Wagram, Napoleon unilaterally moved peace talks from Altenberg to Vienna, and forced Liechtenstein to accept a peace he dictated via the Duke of Bassano (Huges-Bernard Maret) and a Count Champagny. As Metternich recounts in his autobiography, Liechtenstein signed what he thought were "Preliminaries" on 14 October. Liechtenstein and Francis were then forced to accept the signed preliminary as the actual peace agreement as Napoleon and his retinue had left Schönbrunn early on 15 October. Clemens von Metternich, *The Autobiography, 1773-1815* (Welwyn Garden City, UK: Ravenhall Books, 2004), 103-14.

[483] Metternich, *Autobiography*, 116.

[484] Metternich to Hager, 17 October 1809, HHStA StK *NaP* 2, Bl. 56 and Metternich to Hager, 9 October 1809, HHStA StK *NaP* 2, Bl. 62.

the "power of the public" and its rights to stay informed. Horn's ideas attracted the attention of Stadion, who had him placed under police observation while he still resided in Linz. After leaving Linz for Prague, Metternich ordered Graf Josef von Wallis, the city's governor, to confiscate copies of Horn's published material.[485] French demands also extended to individuals, including "English agents" and a Scottish priest, whom the Ministry of Police sought to have exiled.[486]

With his ascension to the post of Foreign Minister, Metternich was already deeply involved with police matters of the Austrian Empire, especially as it related to the relationship between France and Austria.[487] This is not surprising. As the previous

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[485] Hager to Metternich, 6 January 1810, *NvP* 26, unpag., and Hager to Metternich, 14 January 1810, HHStA StK *NvP* 26, unpag. This report includes a note from July 1809 concerning the publication of Horn's work, *Über der Urgrund der von so vielen deutschen Schriftstellere und Journalisten gewagten Behauptung* . . .. Also disrupted was the printing of various "*vaterländischen Blättern*", which the state had printed for three decades. Designed as a propaganda tool of the state, authors and editors were given unprecedented access to "sources" in the hopes of presenting a "correctly formulated and unified publication" that celebrated the achievements of the Empire while promoting "patriotic public education" and the "common good". They also provided foreign newspapers with a controlled and pro-Habsburg message that would form the basis of their reports on the Empire. Hager to Metternich, 14 March 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 26, unpag.

[486] Hager to Metternich, 21 April 1810, HHStA StK *NvP* 26, unpag.

[487] Metternich's dealings with the French were not always matters of state security. In March, the police forced a Marius Gaillard, a French *Restaurateur* in Vienna, to close his restaurant despite it being "to the satisfaction of all the Lords and the High Nobility." Count Louis-Guillaume Otto, the French ambassador to Vienna, blamed the closure on Vienna's "*Traiteurs Bourgeois*" who petitioned the police to remove Gaillard from the city. The police, however, would not return his papers, and he was unable to leave and

chapter showed, the Austrian Empire collaborated with other countries, France especially, to stifle rebellion throughout occupied Europe. But the rebellion of 1809 and the subsequent events of 1813 added a new layer to Metternich's thinking on revolution and nationalist-inspired uprisings. The events of 1809 were in direct response to Francis's call for patriotic war and the mustering of *Landwehr*. The propaganda effort that followed the imperial patent of 9 June 1808 proved wildly successive, as *Landwehr* troops made up roughly 25 percent of the almost 600,000-strong Austrian army, the overwhelming majority of who were educated noble and middle-class men.[488] In his autobiography, Metternich argued that the "rising of Austria" and the Peace of Vienna had proved a disaster for the Austrian Empire, doing little but encircling "the kingdom with a ring of iron."[489] In 1811, fearing that nationalist revolts would again spring up in the region, Metternich claimed such revolts were not simply the product of dangerous and naïve ideas, but inevitably led to little more than "sacrificial" loss of life.[490] At their meeting in Dresden on 26 June 1813, Napoleon himself even lectured Metternich on the failure of 1809 and the folly of nationalist wars.[491]

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was staying at an inn (*l'Auberge*) at "great personal expense." Hager to Metternich, 1 March 1810, HHStA StK *NvP* 26, unpag.

[488] Ernst Zehetbauer, *Die Landwehr gegen Napoleon: Österreichs erste Miliz und der Nationalkrieg von 1809* (Vienna: Öbv & Hpt, 1999). On the massive propaganda effort see, Hagemann, "Patriotism and Masculinity."

[489] Metternich, *Autobiography*, 116.

[490] Metternich, 7 January 1811, HHStA StK *Vorträge* 193, Bl. 32.

The most intriguing connections between 1809 and 1813 are among the characters involved. At the center of the foiled 1813 rebellion was the Archduke Johann, Francis's brother, who, in late 1812, developed a plan to instigate a revolt that would spark a larger, pan-German conflagration, and bring the Tyrol back under "Austria's scepter." After Austria ended its alliance with Napoleon, both English and Austrian agents began reaching out to local Tyroleans, many of whom were eager to rise against a now-weakened France. Among the Archduke's cast of conspirators was the Baron von Hormayr, privy councilor and then-director of the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv* in Vienna. This was the same Hormayr who headed the previously mentioned court martial of Ehrenfeld in 1809. In addition, the same Anton von Roschmann, who had let slip sensitive information about Ehrenfeld's case, was also involved. It was Roschmann, a privy councilor, who now betrayed the Archduke's and Hormayr's confidence by bringing the matter to the police. On 8 March 1813, Hager had an Anton Schneider (privy councilor at Vienna's court of appeals), Hormayr,[492] and Roschmann ("as cover") arrested, after intercepted letters laid bare the full scope of the proposed rebellion. Not only was the Archduke involved, but the confiscated dispatches also pointed to a larger, Russo-English conspiracy that included Viscount Cathcart, the British ambassador to

[491] Metternich, *Autobiography*, 187.

[492] For the connection between Hormayr and Caroline Pichler, author and anti-Napoleonic *salonnière*, including their continued correspondence after Hormayr's arrest and internal exile, see, Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 135-6.

Vienna, Lord Horatio Walpole, then encamped with the Russians, and even Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign minister.[493]

The fallout from the events of 1809 and 1813 continued well after these arrests. In mid-1813, the "chief insurgent," Franz Fidel Jubele, smuggled himself and several accomplices – including local functionaries – out of the Tyrol and through the Vorarlberg. Though the police were at times close behind, Jubele and his accomplices moved freely through the border, and often paid long visits to friends sympathetic to the revolt. Jubele's path suggests a dense network of supporters and willing collaborators, many of whom were middling local bureaucrats or from local notable families. It also reminds us just how porous borders were, and the difficulties policing agencies faced in apprehending suspects.[494] This is made clear in the Bavarian attempts to apprehend

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[493] (Privy councilor) Von Roschmann to (Archduke) Johann, 28 February 1813, HHStA StK *Acta secreta* 1-13. See also, Siemann, *Metternich*, 379-81. All matter pertaining to the arrests or any subsequent reports concerning Hormayer and Roschmann were kept in strict secrecy and are filed under "Acta secreta" 1 and 2. In 1817, Hormayer attempted, against the wishes of his estranged wife, to take custody of their two daughters. Hormayer's wife wrote to Hager claiming Hormayer "abducted" the children. In a report to Metternich, the Freiherrn von Siber sided with Hormayer against his wife, citing her "lack of moral judgement" as well as other reports concerning Hormayer's reputation. That this unfortunate family squabble, which did involve the Prince Bishop of St. Polten, was kept in strict secrecy suggests just how damaging 1813 could have been. Siber to Metternich, 4 April 1817, HHStA StK *Acta secreta* 2-52, Bl. 6-9. Similarly, in 1819, Roschmann wrote to Metternich announcing his wish to "withdraw from public life while retaining his full salary." Roschmann thought himself worthy of this due to service in the Tyrol in 1813, his 19 years of service, and because of the "accusations made against him . . . [and] the attack of Baron von Hormayr on him" which resulted in "inconvenience and the compromise of his position." Roschmann to Metternich, 5 January 1819, HHStA StK *Acta secreta* 2-99, Bl. 7-12.

Jubele in the first half of 1814. In January 1814, Montgelas received word that Jubele would attempt to return home.[495] On 17 January 1814, notices for Jubele's arrest, including a physical description, appeared in local newspapers.[496] One month later, Count Carl von Preising, the *Generalkommissar* of the Salzachkreis, announced that the king had rescinded the order for Jubele's arrest, following an apology from Jubele.[497] By April, Jubele appears to have once again eluded the police. After arriving in Feldkirch on 8 April, he disappeared, leaving Franz von Stichaner, the *Generalkommissar* of the Illkreis, to announce his intention to arrest Jubele.[498] Shifting borders, the redrawing of jurisdictions, conflicting orders, and Jubele's knowledge of the region help explain the general confusion regarding his whereabouts. This issue haunted Central European policing agencies during the entire period this of study. At the same time, however,

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[494] Ferdinand Hirn, "Vorarlberg vor dem Heimfalle an Österreich" *Archiv für Geschichte und Landeskunde Vorarlbergs* 11 (1915): 1-19.

[495] Montgelas to Rechberg, 11 January 1814, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

[496] *Salzach-Kreis-Blatt*, 17 January 1814, no.5.

[497] *Salzach-Kreis-Blatt*, 21 February 1814, no.15. Jubele received an official passport on 7 February and was set to leave on 26 February. Montgelas to Rechberg, 7 February 1814, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807.

[498] See, Montgelas to Rechberg, 21 March 1814, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807 and Montgelas to Rechberg, 13 April 1814, BayHStA Gesandtschaft Wien 1807. In 1798, Franz von Stichaner organized Munich's first Ministry of Police and was the city's first police commissioner. In 1806 the king appointed him to the newly founded Ministry of the Interior. He became the governor of the Illkreis in 1813, and, in 1814, was charged with returning the Vorarlberg to Austria. For his role in policing during the 1813 revolt see, Hirn, "Voralberg," 3ff.

Jubele's case, confusing as it was, is a good example of cross-border police cooperation in the name of combatting popular insurrection and showcases the growing relationship between diplomacy and policing.

By the spring of 1813, the Habsburgs were already testing the "public mood" in recently liberated territory, showing a particular concern for the German states. These reports, sent from Hager directly to Francis (via Anton von Baldacci) between 1813 and 1815,[499] again offer some evidence that Habsburg foreign affairs could circumvent Metternich and suggest that the reins of the state police were not solely in his hands, even after the end of the Congress. In April, Hager prepared a "secret report," regarding the publication of Madame de Stäel's, *De l'Allemagne.* According to Hager, de Stäel's book was to be published in London and was set to be printed in Paris; however, due to the "high praise" it gave to "the Germans," the French army demanded it not be printed. As Hager notes, two copies of the book were in Austrian hands, one owned by Graf O'Donnell, the other by Prince de Ligne (a close friend of de Stäel). Because the book was "still unknown in the book trade," Hager noted that immediate censorship would bring little "attention" to the title.[500]

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[499] After 1815, letters to Francis (via Baldacci) came from Sedlnitzky and continued until 1837.

[500] "Einen geheimen Rapporte," Hager to Baldacci, 3 April 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 48-49.

Other reports issued directly from Hager to Francis followed in April. While such reports could often appear relatively anodyne, between spring 1813 and November 1814, Hager personally issued hundreds of reports to the emperor regarding the "political situation" and the popular mood of formally occupied territories. For example, Hager included daily reports on public opinion in Vienna;[501] secret police surveillance of a Turlet, a French merchant suspected of being a spy;[502] reports from the city of Leipzig;[503] reports from Prague and Galizia;[504] and from Hamburg concerning a patriotic society and a pamphlet, "*Wünsche für das Waffenglück Frankreich*."[505] In early 1814, the city government and police in Prague warned Vienna of an influx of Russian "secret agents," an issue the police combatted by hiring secret agents of their own to collect information and monitor correspondence.[506] This line of correspondence Hager established with the emperor, via Baldacci, is, again, an important corrective for the study of policing in this

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[501] Hager to Francis, 11 April 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 130-136. This report also included a proclamation regarding desertion in the Austrian army.

[502] Hager to Francis, 30 April 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 266-271. Hager alerted Francis that the police arrested and confined Turlet in the fortress of Leopoldstadt.

[503] Hager to Francis, 17 May 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 348-349.

[504] Hager to Francis, 16 May 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 441-452.

[505] Hager to Francis, 6 May 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 4, Bl. 445-447.

[506] Hager to Francis, 25 February 1814, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 166-176.

period. As stated above, these reports bypassed Metternich, even though they had clear foreign policy implications. Donald Emerson's study of Metternich's control over Austria's secret police does not cite this material and, thus, offers a limited view of the extent of police activity after the Vienna Congress.

If the accounts of Napoleon's and Metternich's meeting in Dresden are to be believed, it ended in distrust and mutual recrimination as neither side spoke a language of diplomacy the other could comprehend. On 27 June, one day after the "Dresden interview," Russian, Prussia, and Austria signed a similarly historic agreement in the town of Reichenbach. While often glossed over, this agreement represents a critical moment not just in the war against Napoleon, but for the future of European security. The Reichenbach agreement marks the first time the eastern powers fully accepted that France was not, nor had it always been, the sole barrier to European peace. As Paul Schroeder has argued, the Reichenbach agreement presumed that once Napoleon was contained, security would be guaranteed only through "durable cooperation" among the eastern powers. It was agreed at Reichenbach, then, that a lasting, European peace would not come simply from defeating France militarily but would rest on the eastern powers' ability to pacify Central and Eastern Europe under the "aegis of their own alliance."[507] The relationship between European security and an independent Germany was not necessarily a novel concept in 1813. As early as 1808, Gentz declared that, "a salvific

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[507] Schroeder, *Transformation*, 473.

(*heilebrigende*) plan that secures Germany's independence corresponds to every interest in Europe . . . [t]he independence of Germany is the first political need, and the highest common interest in Europe."[508] Despite Metternich's attempt at negotiation, by early August, Russia and Prussia were successful in dragging Austria into war. On 11 August, Austria declared war against France, and on 9 September the three continental powers signed treaties at Teplitz to declare a commitment to mutual defense after war.[509] Two months later, on 8 October, Metternich signed the Treaty of Ried with Bavaria, successfully negotiating Bavaria's defection, while simultaneously creating a model for other middle-sized states to defect with the promise of guaranteed sovereignty and

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[508] As quoted in, Eckardt, *Friedrich von Gentz*, I:xi, 349. In September 1813, Francis awarded Gentz the title of *Hofrat*, a title Gentz had hope to receive as early as 1809. In a letter to Metternich, Gentz claimed that, if awarded a title, he would "use all my means and strengths to defend the social order" and that he was "the only German writer who had stayed true from the beginning to the end" to the cause of German independence. Gentz to Metternich, 23 October 1809, in Eckardt, *Friedrich von Gentz*, I: 313-14. For Gentz, Germany was only a "political concept" and never a reality. By 1812 and 1813, Gentz, now *Hofrat* and close confidant of Metternich, was pressing for a renewal of the "old empire," won through British support and established under Austrian auspices.

[509] While the Teplitz treaties offered no vision of a post-war settlement in regard to Napoleonic France, it did address important aims for post-war Germany: the return of Austria its pre-1805 status, thereby erasing the crushing treaties of Pressburg and Schönnbrun; the abolishing of the Rheinbund; the future independence of territories along the Rhine; and the future partitioning of the Duchy of Warsaw. Schroeder, *Transformation*, 478.

independence.[510] On 16 September, Baldacci announced to Francis that the Bavarians sent a 40,000-strong army to join the coalition against Napoleon.[511]

The Teplitz and Ried treaties, together with the general conflict between Metternich and Stein, produced the first answers to the "German Question" that would animate much of the Vienna Congress.[512] But if the Congress was still some months away, victory at Leipzig fundamentally reordered the international arena. By late-November, the allies had liberated Spain and the Netherlands, which became a critical avenue for increased British involvement on the continent.[513] While French generals remained (overly) confident that the allies would not dare push beyond the Rhine, on 1 December the allies announced their intention to dethrone Napoleon, allowing France to

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[510] Bavaria's defection, and the subsequent promises to respect its independence, served as both a model for German and other middle-sized states throughout Europe. It also allowed Metternich to check Prussian expansion into Southern Germany, while placing Bavaria – an old Austria enemy – at the center of an Austrian-led bloc in the region. Metternich signed the Treaty of Fulda with Württemberg on 2 November as well as other treaties on 20-23 November with Hesse-Darmstadt, Bade, Nassau, Saxe-Coburg, and Hesse-Kassel in Frankfurt. This further frustrated the plans of Baron von Stein, who, as head of the Central Administrative Council, developed blueprints by late 1812 for organizing insurrections and governing a liberated Germany. Schroeder, *Transformation*, 454-5, 483-5; Sheehan, *German History*, 322.

[511] Baldacci to Francis, 16 September 1813, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 82-3.

[512] Siemann, *Metternich*, 437-9.

[513] For the importance of "second-tier" diplomacy see, Beatrice de Graaf, "Second-tier Diplomacy: Hans von Gagern and William I in their Quest for an Alternative European Order, 1813-1818," *Journal of Modern European History* 12 (2014): 546-66.

maintain its 1792 borders. With Napoleon still sitting defiant in Paris, the allies crossed the Rhine between 21 December 1813 and 1 January 1814. On 7 January 1814, Viscount Castlereagh landed in the Netherlands and arrived at allied headquarters in Basel on 18 January where he met Metternich for the first time. While a unified vision of the post-war order had not yet fully solidified, all the pieces were in place. By mid-January, it was clear that an extended military occupation of France was necessary, and that occupied territory must be subject to a civil administration. This project fell to the Prussians who had already established an Allied Central Administration (ACA) following the Battle of Leipzig.[514]

As the allies prepared the military and administrative logistics for occupying France, authorities at home increasingly began monitoring their own populations. In 1814, Prussian authorities produced their first significant report on the growth of "secret societies," dating back to 1808. The report includes the names of hundreds of individuals who had joined secret societies in Königsberg (the birthplace of the *Tugendbund*), Breslau, Marienwerder, Stettin, and Cölberg despite their suppression.[515] Among the mass of reports are two anonymous letters, both of which are critical of the role secret societies played in developing Prussian patriotism and "national feeling" after 1814.

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[514] De Graaf, *Fighting Terror*, 42-8.

[515] "Geheimes Verbindungen" (1814) 1-228. For instance, see the series of letters from (Minister of Justice) Karl Friedrich Beyme to (Minister of the Interior) Graf Friedrich zu Dohna, Bl. 104-56. For the history of the suppression of secret societies in Prussia, see Chap. 2 in this dissertation.

While both authors took aim at secret societies more generally, the real target of both polemics was the recently dissolved (1810) *Tugendbund*. The letters firmly rejected the secretive nature of such organizations, which, the authors argued, eroded a "free and open society." One author referred to the organization as an unwanted holdover from the Middle Ages, while the other criticized it for its "promotion of bourgeois virtues" that spoke only to "bourgeois youth" who demanded the removal of the "princehood (*Fürsterei*) from almost all branches of administration." The author of the first letter did not denounce the reformist principles of the *Tugendbund* per se but argued only that "reform and reconstitution" of the Prussian state should be guided by "public administration" and not by "secret committees." Both the state and the "public constitution" were strong enough, the author claimed, that they could engage with one another *publicly* for Prussia's "regeneration."[516] This criticism of the *Tugendbund* as well as any other society that functioned outside of the state, played on long-established fears of secret organizations.

The investigation of Dr. Carl Hoffmann, a lawyer and politician turned German patriot during the wars against Napoleon, highlights how quickly that mistrust returned after 1814. In 1813, Stein recruited Hoffmann to join the ACA where he was responsible for organizing the draft (*Landsturm*) in Fulda and Aschaffenburg, even being promoted to colonel, and given control of the draft in the Duchy of Frankfurt. But German patriotism,

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[516] Anonymous, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 1 ½, Bl. 33 and 34.

often stoked by Prussian reformers, after 1814 became a political liability, especially if popular expressions of German nationalism were not, as Matthew Levinger put it, "in harmony with the will of the king."[517] While Levinger's insight here is valid, Hoffmann's case complicates this picture. In 1814, Hoffmann, along with Wilhelm Snell, established the *Teutsche Gesellschaft* as a successor to the *Tugendbund* to gin up support among Prussians in support of the Stein-Hardenberg reform agenda. The *Teutsche Gesellschaft* also received the approval of Prussian statesmen, including Justus Gruner, the then governor of the Rhine district of Berg. At the behest of Gruner, who also hoped to see a united Germany under one king, Hoffmann and Hardenberg began a secret correspondence in the hopes of promoting Hoffmann's organization.[518] In a letter dated December 1814, Hoffmann described the role of the "patriot" as approaching something almost evangelical: the patriot sought only to educate Germans in their "duties and their rights" which they had "paid for so dearly." To that end, he asked all other patriotic-minded Germans "to spread the word" to their countrymen – "that pious, virtuous, courageous and valiant people" – and to fulfill "what the Lord God so clearly revealed and proclaimed." Hoffmann claimed that it was in Ernst Moritz Arndt's 1814 work, *Fantasies for a Future Germany*, that all Germans could recognize their unique

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[517] Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 5.

[518] Gruner to Hardenberg, 25 March 1815, quoted in, Justus von Gruner, "Justus Gruner und die Hoffmannsche Bund," *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 19 (1906): 485-507, here 491-2.

historical calling. In was in Arndt's work, Hoffman proclaimed, that "even the coldest is filled with warmth" as "the German clearly learns to recognize his high honor" while taking "first place among all peoples."[519]

Despite Hoffmann's record of work for the Prussians, and despite his tepid nationalism, so shot through with religious motifs and entirely in keeping with the language of Prussian reformers as well as the king,[520] Hoffmann later became a target of the Mainz Commission. In September 1815, Hoffmann claimed he cut ties with the *Teutsche Gesellschaft* because "democratic revolutionaries" had taken over leadership. On 23 July 1819, after the Prussians arrested and imprisoned Jahn (14 July) and nine other students from the University of Jena,[521] Hoffmann announced via print that he

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[519] Dr. Carl Hoffmann, 13 December 1814, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 Nr. 14, Bl. 30.

[520] Compare Hoffmann's language to that of Stein's "Nassauer Denkschrift" of June 1807: "the reawakening of a spirit of community and civic pride, the employment of dormant or misapplied energies and of unused knowledge, harmony between the views and desires of the nation and those of the administrative authorities of the state, the revival of patriotism and of the desire for national honor and independence." Quoted by Walter Simon, "Variations in Nationalism during the Great Reform Period in Prussia," *Historical Review* 2 (1954): 305-21, here, 305.

[521] This arrest was precipitated by Carl Löning's assassination attempt against Carl Friedrich von Ibell, a statesman from Nassau. Löning was a pharmacist in the town of Idstein and a member of a local German society. He was in contact with Carl and Wilhelm Snell and was influenced by Sand's assassination as well as by men like Karl Follen and the politics of the *Carbonari*. He was also a devoutly religious man, citing Moses Mendelsohn's *Phädon* and the work of Schiller as important texts. Löning's failed attempt led to his imprisonment and his eventual suicide by swallowing glass. See, A Genth, "Carl Löning's meuchelmörderischer Anfall auf den Regierungspräsidenten Ibell aus Wiesbaden (1 Juli 1819)," *Nassauische Annalen* 13 (1874): 1–18.

would now financially support Jahn's wife and children (he was godfather to Jahn's eldest). Hoffmann invited all Germans to "contribute as much as possible" financially in support of Jahn's family, promising to "receive these gifts, record them precisely, acknowledge them in public papers, then arrange for their most appropriate use."[522] Throughout the 1820s, the Mainz Commission hounded Hoffmann, claiming he had embezzled 150,000 gulden, an allegation that was never proven and which led to Hoffmann's eventual suicide in 1829.[523]

Other German patriotic societies came under attack in the period immediately before and after the Congress of Vienna. In July 1821, Friedrich von Kircheisen, appointed by Hardenberg as Minister of Justice after the establishment of the Prussian State Chancellery in 1810, wrote to E.T.A. Hoffmann – author and critic of the Prussian police – concerning a state investigation into his work and his involvement in another society, *Der deutsche Bund*.[524] The *Bund* had been under investigation since 1812, when a member, Johann Ernst Janke, Prince Radziwill's tutor and member of the State Chancellery, began a secret correspondence with Hardenberg.[525] In Janke's first report,

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[522] A copy can be found in, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 (Gen) Nr. 21 Bd. 1, Bl. 243.

[523] Wolfgang Klötzer, "Hoffmann, Karl," *NDB* 9 (1972): 431.

[524] Kircheisen to Hoffmann, 17 July 1821, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 (Gen) Nr. 21 Bd. 2, Bl. 1. The organization, established in Berlin, dated back to 1810(-1812) and included Friedrich Jahn and Friedrich Friesen, a teacher and member of Jahn's *Turnverein*. For the investigation of the *Der deutsche Bund*, which lasted from 1819 to 1826, see, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 (Gen) Nr. 21 Bd. 1 and 2, Bl. 1-273 and 1-46.

he claimed that a "secret political organization in Berlin under the name *Der deutsche Bund*" had, since 1812, sought the "spread of republicanism throughout all Germany" and demanded "constitutions" while celebrating Napoleon's rule over Central Europe. Despite Janke's claim that men such as Jahn and Friesen were part of Gruner's anti-French organization and ardent German nationalists, he also suggests that, in their demands for "French-style constitutionalism," they had sworn allegiance to the French Republic.[526] Janke appears as somewhat of an opportunist, but remained an important figure in this period, writing to Frederick Wilhelm in 1815 regarding the threat of continued conspiracies,[527] working officially with Hardenberg in the investigation of Jahn's connections,[528] and, after July 1819, working with the Prussian Investigative

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[525] Nolte, *Demagogen*, 270. Janke had joined Justus Gruner, the once head of the Prussian State Police, in a conspiratorial organization designed to disrupt the French occupation in 1812. In Prague, the Prussian and Austria police broke up Gruner's organization and arrested its principal members, most of whom, were members of the *Tugendbund*. Janke was likely feeding Hardenberg information about Gruner's plans. On behalf of von Bülow, the interim head of Prussian's Higher State Police who led the Prussian investigation into Gruner, Janke was sent as part of a delegation to Austria. While perhaps only coincidental, Janke was in Vienna when Austrian police arrested Gruner. See, Obenaus, *Sicherheitspolizei*, 103. For von Bülow's investigation into Gruner as well as Jahn, Friesen,a Lange, and a Preusse see his letters from, 17 October 1812 and 25 October 1812, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 (Gen) Nr. 21 Bd. 1, Bl. 55 and 56-57. These letters also suggest a connection between the organization in Berlin and those in Cölberg, Stargard, Gransee, Wertheim, Königsberg, and Charlottenburg.

[526] Janke to Hardenberg, no date, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 (Gen) Nr. 21 Bd. 1, Bl. 3-8.

[527] Janke to Friedrich Wilhelm, 19 August 1815, GStA Rep. 77 Tit. 25 K Lit. J Nr. 1 Bd. 1, Bl. 25-30.

Committee (*Immediat-Untersuchungs-Kommission*) in investigating the now-defunct *Deutsche Bund*.[529]

While investigations into Prussian nationalist societies ramped up, so too did the allied war effort. By early March 1814, encamped at Chaumont, just 125 miles from Paris, the allies officially announced their aims: "an end to the miseries of Europe, of securing its future repose, by reestablishing a just balance of power."[530] To this end, the allies pledged their defense of a new vision of European peace, based on the reduction of France to its 1792 borders; an independent Switzerland; an Italy divided into independent states; Bourbon ascension in Spain; the creation of a federative union of the German states; and a twenty-year military commitment against future French aggression.[531] On 19 March, the allies officially ended negotiations with Caulaincourt at Châtillon,

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[528] (E.T.A.) Hoffmann to Hardenberg, 16 November 1816, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 17 (Gen) Nr. 21 Bd. 1, Bl. 12.

[529] While his insight was important, according to Jakob Nolte, Janke was never "professionally set up to spy on member of the political opposition." Nolte, *Demagogen*, 271.

[530] Treaty of Chaumont, dated 1 March 1814 (signed 9 March 1814), as quoted in, de Graaf, *Fighting Terror*, 54.

[531] Schroeder, *Transformation*, 501-5. The Treaty of Chaumont, Schroeder argues, is "everywhere recognized" as a "special British achievement and laid the foundation for victory, peace, and post-war security." Here, Kraehe also gives Castlereagh the victory, claiming that Metternich himself recognized the power of Castlereagh's vision. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, I: 302-10. Siemann, on the other hand, is not so generous, arguing that "anyone who celebrates the treaty as a solely 'British Triumph' misjudges Metternich's achievements in the course of its preparation." Siemann, *Metternich*, 458-60.

considering their demands "unfulfilled." The following day, Prince Schwarzenberg repelled an attack by Napoleon at Bar-sur-Aube and, on 25 March, was victorious at the Battle of Fère-Champenoise. On 30 March, the allies defeated the French at the Battle of Paris. On the same day, Marshal Marmont signed the Treaty of Paris and handed the city over to the allies, allowing Schwarzenberg, Tsar Alexander, and King Friedrich Wilhelm III to enter. Between 1 and 11 April, the allies negotiated with Talleyrand the terms for Napoleon's surrender and the return of a Bourbon to the throne of France. On 11 April, Napoleon signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which gave Napoleon the island of Elba, now elevated to a sovereign principality, and allowed his family, including the Empress Marie Louise (now the Duchess of Parma), to maintain their titles. Between September and October 1814, Europe's delegations arrived in Vienna with the task of nothing short of rebuilding Europe from the ground up.

To the Carlsbad Decrees, 1814/5-1820

The years between the Congress of Vienna and the issuing of Metternich's Carlsbad Decrees are critical events in the path of Central European political development. Issued on 20 September 1819, the decrees consisted of four laws, designed to systematize the German Confederation's response to "revolutionary machinations and demagogic associations." This included a "university law" that prohibited student associations (*Burschenschaften*) and established state plenipotentiaries to regulate universities and punish students and professors; a "press law" that gave the Confederation the legal backing to censor published material; a law that created the Central Investigative Commission in Mainz (*Mainzer Zentraluntersuchungscommission*) which

inquired into the history and spread of these demagogic associations; and a final executive order that gave the German Confederation the authority to compel individual states to comply with all future agreed upon decrees. While it took some time to build the organizational structure, and for all member states to coordinate,[532] the Carlsbad Decrees, in conjuncture with the Vienna Final Act of 1820 and building upon almost four decades of Habsburg repressive institutions, eventually established a system that, according to George Williamson, "would define the parameters of political and intellectual life in Germany for three decades."[533]

Despite the importance of the years before the decrees, current historiography is divided on fundamental questions: was the threat of renewed revolution real or were renewed outbreaks of political violence used by Metternich and others as a cynical pretext to justify reactionary measures? Recently, Matthias Schulz placed Metternich and his "anti-revolutionary dogma" as the driving force behind a European reaction,[534] while Beatrice de Graaf has pointed to the role played by both Metternich and Castlereagh in the establishment of European security after 1815. Wolfram Siemann, on the other hand, is critical of this "Metternichian System," arguing that security against renewed

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[532] For instance, Württemberg, who had eliminated censorship altogether in 1817, had to quickly reinstate a state censor.

[533] Williamson, "Revolutionary Machinations," 286.

[534] Matthias Schulz, *Normen und Praxis: Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815-1860* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009).

revolution was of interest to all European states and statesmen of the time.[535] But Siemann is simultaneously working on two separate, though related, analytical levels, which allows him to pull a sleight of hand. Throughout his narrative, Siemann places Metternich front and center in an increasingly unified Europe; however, with the establishment of the Carlsbad Decrees, Siemann claims Metternich was merely conforming to larger trends. This allows Siemann to question the adequacy of this "system" he himself painstakingly detailed for the years after 1813. Siemann's analysis of the lead up to the Decrees, then, is two-fold. First, Siemann focuses on Central Europe, where the Wartburg Festival and the murder of Kotzebue play the defining roles in Metternich's decrees. Here, the "Metternichian System" remains, as Siemann details the route carefully plotted by Metternich and Gentz between March and September 1819. Second, Siemann broadens his scope to include all of Europe. As Siemann claims, Metternich's system emerges as but one of many, as renewed political violence – especially the murder of the Duc de Berry – and revolutionary intrigue prodded all European leaders to respond with repressive measures.

Even though Metternich did not allow Kotzebue's murder to interrupt his travels through Italy, the murder still functions as the immediate backdrop for the Carlsbad Decrees. This allows Siemann to establish Metternich as simply conforming to

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[535] Siemann, *Metternich*, Chap. 11, here, 652-653. This position of Metternich as the mastermind of a European reaction, Siemann argues, presumes a dichotomy between the "reactionary east" and "progressive west." It is Seimann's contention, then, that concerns regarding security were typical of all post-Napoleonic states.

reasonable and general European-wide trends.[536] Siemann does acknowledge Metternich's long-standing and well-known revulsion to those ideas he considered antithetical to the monarchical principle. But, for Siemann, Metternich above all feared targeted violent attacks and not revolution per se; thus, the fear of terror becomes the key to understanding Metternich's "method for dealing with 'the revolution' after 1815."[537] To make that case, Siemann questionably cites correspondence from 1833 between Metternich and the Prince von Wrede.

Despite the attention Metternich has received from generations of scholars, the period after his return to Vienna in 1810 is never fully incorporated into histories of the Carlsbad Decrees. Most work on the period tends to open with the Congress of Vienna, detailing the steps Metternich took to rebuild an exhausted Europe after two decades of warfare.[538] This chapter suggests a much broader perspective, arguing that the decade prior to 1819 was critical in developing both conservative attitudes towards revolution and the diplomatic and policing apparatus necessary to check the flow of people and ideas across borders. While the decrees represent an important moment in the history of

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[536] Cf. de Graaf, *Fighting Terror*, 258.

[537] Siemann, *Metternich*, 647.

[538] Emblematic here is Büssem's landmark study, *Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse* and Emerson, *Metternich*, Chap. 3ff. For a recent essay, see Luigi Migliorini, "Metternich-Kissinger: Interpreting the Restoration," in *A History of the European Restorations.* Vol I, *Government, States, and Monarchy*, eds. Michael Broers and Ambrogio Caiani (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 289-296.

Central European political conservativism, they were European in scope and part of a much longer trend. As shown above, the Tyrolean uprisings proved to Metternich the danger associated with nationalism's unnecessary violence. Consequently, investigations into German nationalist organizations were already underway before the end of the Vienna Congress. This section, however brief, utilizes police files to recreate the international situation after 1813. In so doing, it offers a more well-rounded picture of the immediate post-war environment, arguing that events in Germany, France, and Italy[539] were inextricably linked and shaped the field in which Metternich maneuvered after 1815. To this end, it seeks a synthesis of Siemann's two positions by placing the lead up to the Carlsbad Decrees in a wider, European-wide context, while arguing that the decrees mark a critical moment in Metternich's struggle for influence in Francis's court.

Surveillance of allied diplomats during the Congress of Vienna is perhaps the higher state police's crowning achievement. To date, the material produced by the Habsburg secret police during the Congress represents the most readily available sources of their activity.[540] But if the police were busy monitoring the comings and goings of diplomats and their guests, they also had more immediate concerns: the whereabouts of and correspondence between Napoleon, his family, and their supporters, the so-called

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[539] One could reasonably include Poland and Greece here.

[540] See Fournier, *Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wienerkongress* and Weil, *Les Dessous du Congrès de Vienne*.

Bonapartists.[541] Even in defeat and exile, Napoleon still cast a long and frightening shadow. To this end, Metternich increasingly sought cross-border contacts to manage the spread of revolutionary ideas and contact between exiled Bonapartists. In the immediate wake of the Congress, Italy emerged as Metternich's most pressing concern, but he soon sought assistance from other European states. Beginning with France in 1816, Metternich also strengthened ties with Prussia and, later, Russia, which he pressured to assist in combatting European revolution into the 1820s.[542]

Confident that threats to the monarchy were low, Metternich allowed these Bonapartists to settle in larger cities in Habsburg territory, bragging later that nowhere else could they be watched so carefully.[543] The tenor changed after Napoleon's Hundred Days (20 March to 8 July 1815), as allied powers increasingly demanded that Napoleon's proscribed supporters be settled outside of France. By early 1816, the Ministry of Police

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[541] The monitoring of Napoleon's communication began in early 1815. See, Report to Hager, 29 January 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 15. By March, the Ministry of Police was regularly collected the communication of Napoleon's private security. See, Report to Hager, 27 March 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 60. The police also began monitoring the communication of Napoleon's siblings. See, Report to Hager, 13 July 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 165. For the collection of Princess Charlotte's (Napoleon's sister) and her correspondence, see Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 4 November 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 216-227. The Ministry of Police also collected the communication between Jerome Bonaparte (in Gratz) and others, especially Maret. See the collected reports in, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 14 August 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 156-161, esp. Bl. 158 and 160.

[542] Emerson, *Metternich*, 52-3.

[543] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 16 December 1818, HHStA StK *NvP* 8, Bl. 261-2.

in Vienna began the near-constant monitoring of the correspondence between Napoleon's supporters and current and former French ministers. In the years between 1816 and 1819, reports both to and from the Habsburg police regarding confiscated mail number in the hundreds, and continued well into the 1820s.[544] The initial targets of this surveillance were: Antoine Thibaudeau, a regicide who settled in Prague and later Vienna; Hugues-Bernard Maret, the duc de Bassano, a regicide who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1811-1813 and Napoleon's personal secretary, exiled to Graz;[545] Fouché; M. Durbach a liberal minister after 1815;[546] and, finally, a Jean Françoise DeJean a general and Peer of France.[547] The Ministry of Police even confiscated the communication of German ex-statesmen. In September 1816, the police produced a report on the lengthy, three-way communication between a Baron Freiberg, Montgelas, and Fouché.[548] These reports, located in the files of the Ministry of Police, represent only a fraction of the surveillance

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[544] These reports make up the bulk of what Dr. Carl Glossy was not allowed access to by the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*. Why this is the case is not made clear in the files.

[545] Police surveillance of Maret, beyond the confiscation of his mail, began in July 1816. Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 12 July 1816, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 122. This report also announced the police's interest in the Baroness von Curlano, a Jordan, a Prussian *Legationsrat*, and a Friedländer, a teacher in Berlin.

[546] The State Chancellery allowed Durbach to settle in Graz. There, Sedlnitzky claimed, his connection to Thibaudeau could be better monitored and the "political principles" of each investigated. See, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 3 January and 7 January 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 1 and 6-7.

[547] This reports arrived, at least, weekly, and often daily after March 1816.

[548] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 25 September 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 175.

carried out against the Bonapartes and their allies. Material deposited in the State Chancellery under "Acta Secreta" shows that Habsburg information gathering was far more extensive than previously thought. Located in a file titled, "Concerning the Bonaparte Family," and dating from 1815-1820, are hundreds of reports detailing the travel and communication of Thibaudeau, Maret, Durbach, Fouché, and others including General Savary, the Duke of Rovigo who had escaped imprisonment in Malta,[549] the Montesquieu family, and Piontkowski, the Polish revolutionary who visited Napoleon on St. Helena and who the police would later interrogate and imprison in the fortress of Josephstadt.[550]

Concern over Napoleon's supporters led Metternich to establish a line of communication with Paris, drawing on Austria's previous collaboration with the French police. As early as 1810, Metternich offered Habsburg assistance in surveilling the Chevalier Louis d'Andigné, a royalist and "chief *Chouan*," who had escaped French imprisonment on several occasions, the final instance coming in 1809 when he fled to Frankfurt.[551] But with the Bourbon Restoration secure, Metternich immediately sought

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[549] In early October 1817, the journal *Kronos* published an article, "Justification de la conduit politique Général Savary," where Savary attempted to distance himself from the other Bonapartists, especially Fouché and Thibaudeau, while defending his service to the French government. For a report on the article and some context see, (Governor of Bohemia) Bourgrain to Kolowrat, 20 September 1817, HHStA StK *Acta Secreta* 2, Bl. 27-29.

[550] "Die Familie Bonaparte betrffend," HHStA StK *Acta Secreta* 2-109, Bl. 1-132.

the assistance of the French state police, swapping information on European radicals and Bonapartists with Decazes, the Minister of Police in Paris. Between 1816 and 1819, the two police ministries shared information concerning the Bonapartes, especially as it pertained to their settlement in Italy.[552] Many of the secret reports originated not only in Paris but in larger southern cities such as Lyon and Toulouse. As Donald Emerson notes, it is not likely that Louis XVIII's government was as "apprehensive" as Vienna about revolutionary activity in Italy or the correspondence of Napoleon's sisters.[553] The extent of Paris's apprehension about Italy is unclear from police reports. What is clear, however, was that information readily flowed both ways and that the French police, especially in southern cities, were interested in the correspondence French statesmen had with the Bonapartists.[554]

While information on confiscated correspondence represents the majority of this cooperation, Metternich received other secret reports from Paris. In March 1818, Eugène

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[551] Hager to Metternich, 29 April 1810, HHStA StK *NvP* 26, unpag. On the *Chouans* see, Donald Sutherland, *The Chouans: The Social Origins of Popular Counter-Revolution in Upper Brittany, 1770-1796* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

[552] For example, see, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 12 December 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 313; Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 14 December 1816, HHStA StK *NvP* 32 (NM); Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 6 March 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 145.

[553] Emerson, *Metternich*, 52.

[554] In 1817, Austria paid 1.2 million francs to the city of Naples to maintain surveillance on Eugène de Beauharnais, Maret, and Napoleon. A further 1 million francs was to be paid between February 1817 and 7 January 1819 for information on the "relationship between Napoleon and the French nation." To Metternich, 12 November 1817, HHStA StK *Acta Secreta* 2, Bl. 1-4.

François d'Arnauld, the Baron de'Vitrolles and royalist minister, sent Metternich a lengthy report detailing the "situation in France" and the likelihood of violent revolution. The Baron condemned the "current course of French government," claiming that revolutionaries had long found a home in the king's cabinet, and, through the defense of the Charter of 1814 and the "constitutional regime," desired a "return to despotism." Revolution, according to the Baron, was not simply a vague threat; he claimed that should the government continue to exist, it would lead to revolution's "certain triumph." Further violence and "the spilling of blood," the Baron argued, could only be halted with a new military occupation and the establishment of a new monarchical regime, based on "principles of the old order." Should a "constitutional form" of the state and the power of liberal ministers over the monarchy be allowed to continue, the Baron warned, the very "legitimacy" and "inviolability" – the "pillars of the European edifice" (*les colonnes de l'édifice européen*) – of the French throne would suffer, eventually "infecting all of Europe."[555] The threat of a liberal ministry was not only a concern for French royalists, it also affected Austrian diplomats. In December 1819, Carl von Vincent, the Habsburg envoy to Paris, wrote to Metternich concerning a von Hummelauer, the embassy commissioner in Paris, suggesting Hummelauer be transferred due to "repeated, very careless statements in a liberal sense . . . especially against the repressive measures prepared in Carlsbad." According to Vincent, Hummerlauer got "caught up" in "bad

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[555] Baron de'Vitrolles to Metternich, 15 May 1818, HHStA StK *Acta secreta* 2-74, Bl. 29-61.

society" and, thus, his transfer was "justified."[556] There appears to be some lapse in this cross-border cooperation between 1819-1821.[557] After Austrian military intervention in Spain and Italy, Metternich again moved to secure support from France in investigations of radical activity. This began in January 1822 when Vincent asked the Habsburg police to confiscate letters from Hercules de Serre, French ambassador to Naples, and Charlotte Maret (Bonaparte), the Countess of Lipona.[558] Metternich also involved the Habsburg Ministry of Police in the monitoring of European secret societies. This included an investigation into practitioners of The Rite of Misraïm, a mystical and alchemical branch of Freemasonry developed by the Giuseppe Balsamo, the Italian occultist better known as Cagliostro,[559] and the radical Parisian secret organization, *Compagnie Européenne*.[560] This cross-border cooperation was not without its problems. In September 1824, Guy Delavau, the Paris Prefect of Police, pressed the police in Dresden to arrest Victor Cousin at the behest of the Prussians (who had received their information from the "unscrupulous adventurer" Johann Witt-Dörring). That the French government used a German informant to arrest French citizens led to a significant scandal

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[556] Vincent to Metternich, 9 December 1819, HHStA StK *Acta secreta* 2-104, Bl. 105-6.

[557] This is also noted by Emerson, *Metternich*, 52.

[558] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 12 January 1822, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 8 (NM).

[559] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 21 and 24 February 1823, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 13-14 and 15-16.

[560] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 17 April 1824, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 19.

in Paris, eventually limiting the information the French government chose to share. Metternich, however, flaunted his relationship with the Paris police throughout the decade, claiming Delavau never hesitated to dispatch reports to Vienna.[561]

If collaboration with the French remained more a goal than reality, the Habsburg relationship with Prussia became a centerpiece of European diplomacy after 1815. Histories of this increasingly important relationship traditionally begin in 1817, as news concerning the granting of formal constitutions (modeled after Louis XVIII's Charter) in Baden, Bavaria, Nassau, and Saxe-Weimar reached Vienna.[562] While Metternich and Sedlnitzky remained convinced that the impact of the political situation in Southern Germany could be controlled by increased press censorship (especially of Rhenish and

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[561] Emerson, *Metternich*, 52-3. There is an entire file dedicated to the information given by Witt-Dörring to the Habsburg Ministry of Police. Witt-Dörring was a student and a radical, who studied and the universities of Kiel and Jena, before fleeing to London and then to Paris and Switzerland in 1820, joining revolutionary groups in 1821. In 1824, he was arrested in Bayreuth and cooperated with the police, giving testimony regarding the connection between revolutionary movements in Italy, France, Germany, and Switzerland. He even confessed not only to having knowledge of Sand's intent to assassination Kotzebue, but that he personally funded Sand's travel. Later that year, he was transferred to Berlin and interrogated by Johann Falkenberg. It is during these interrogations that Witt-Dörring denounced Karl Follen and Victor Cousin as key instigators. At the behest of Metternich, Witt-Dörring was extradited to Vienna in late 1824, where he remained in prison until December 1825. For notes on this interrogation see, Witt-Dörring to Bubna, 1822, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* 54, unpag.; Witt-Dörring to Mercy, 22 September 1823, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* 54, Bl. 55-58. While in Austrian custody, Witt-Dörring continued to give testimony on the Carbonari and their spread into Germany. To Metternich, 27 April 1825, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* 54, Bl. 736-753.

[562] On the "transfer" and reception of the Charter in Germany see, Prutsch, *Constitutional Monarchism*, esp. Chap. 4.

northern German papers), the Wartburg Festival in October 1817 shook Vienna out of its naivety.[563] Traditionally, these events – as well as the Conference of Aachen in September 1819 and the meeting between Metternich, Wittgenstein, and Friedrich Wilhelm at Teplitz on 27 July to 2 August – form the backdrop of a growing Prusso-Austrian alliance against revolution.[564] Thus, prior to the three weeks the eleven state ministers met in secret at Carlsbad (6-31 August), plans for increased press and university supervision had long-gestated and most of the major pieces were in place. Writing to Francis at the end of August, Metternich claimed he was pleased with the outcome of the conference, noting the text was "strictly scrutinized and calculated to fit not only the situation in Germany, but in Europe."[565]

Because Metternich designed these decrees to be exported, historians of Central Europe should expand their timeline as well as their analysis to incorporate other areas of concern, most notably France and Italy. Beatrice de Graaf recently expanded

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[563] Emerson, *Metternich*, 109-10; Siemann, *Metternich*, 662-5. On the connection between the Wartburg Festival and the Carlsbad Decrees see, Williamson, "Revolutionary Machinations," 288-90.

[564] Siemann, *Metternich*, 665-8, 691. At Aachen, Europe's major powers agreed on an alliance against renewed revolution. The Russians also first suggested at Aachen strict control over Germany's universities and its press. At the same conference, Wittgenstein also provided the allies with a troubling pamphlet, *Teutsche Jugend an die teutsche Menge*, ascribed to Karl Follen, which championed a crude, aggressive nationalism wrapped in trite, quasi-Apocalyptic
language.

[565] Metternich to Francis, 1 September 1819, as quoted in, Siemann, *Metternich*, 698.

Metternich's gaze to include Belgium and the Netherlands as "hotbeds" of revolutionary activity.[566] The decrees' exportable nature also suggests that behind the issuing of the decrees lay a larger project of expanding Austrian influence in the German Confederation. By early 1815, the Habsburg Ministry of Police had already initiated investigations of German societies. In late 1816, Charles W. Stewart, the British ambassador to Vienna, wrote to Castlereagh claiming that Metternich – who, according to Stewart had never fully enjoyed the confidence of the Austrian state – increasingly moved to establish Austrian authority in Germany and "build for himself an imperishable Pillar of Fame."[567] By mid-1817, Stewart lamented that the Austrian state was now so intractably dependent on Metternich, that all diplomatic affairs were forwarded to him during his stay in Italy.[568] In October 1817, at the Ambassador's Conference in Paris, Metternich first broached the issue of establishing a "Central Police." The Conference itself, Metternich hoped, would act as a center for the collection of police reports from all over Europe. Metternich used the arrival of an American ship at Civitavecchia with no

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[566] De Graaf, *Fighting Terror*, esp. Chap. 6.

[567] Stewart to Castlereagh, 14 December 1816, in Sabine Freitag and Peter Wende, eds., *British Envoys to Germany, 1816-1866* 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), I:471-72.

[568] Stewart to Castlereagh, 24 June 1817, *British Envoys*, I:473-4. Metternich appears to have made the entire Foreign Office dependent on him. Stewart claimed that during Metternich's stay in Italy, all other members of the office traveled with him, leaving Joseph von Wayna as the only individual in Vienna left manning the office. Stewart himself even considered leaving Vienna to join Metternich in Italy.

cargo and no intention of securing any, as a need for international cooperation. After an investigation, the police determined that the vessel's sole purpose was to deliver letters to the Bonapartes from "Europe and other notorious characters adhering to [them]."[569]

In June 1818, Metternich consulted with the Prussians regarding future arrangements should Louis XVIII die of natural causes or be executed. In a letter from Hardenberg to Friedrich von Krusemarck, a Prussian envoy in Vienna, Hardenberg claimed Metternich was in the process of sourcing information concerning a "party" of ministers that plotted the king's demise. What is more, Castlereagh had recently contacted Hardenberg and Metternich concerning Gaspard Gourgaud, a French soldier who had accompanied Napoleon to Saint Helena along with Las Cases and Montholon. Tiring of a life in exile, and eventually coming to odds (and almost to blows) with his exiled companions, Gourgaud left the island and headed for London. During Gourgaud's interrogation – which, according to Hardenberg, was "filled with inconsistencies and contradictions" – he announced that Napoleon was not, in fact, ill and that he, with the help of both European and American radicals, planned a second escape. Gourgaud, perhaps in a vindictive mood, "made no difficulty in compromising" Eugène de Beauharnais, the once-Arch-Chancellor of the French Empire and Duke of Leuchtenberg, claiming Beauharnais had sailed from Spain with large sums of money for the "ex-emperor." This became a significant diplomatic issue as, at the behest of the King

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[569] Stewart to Castlereagh, 2 October 1817, *British Envoys*, I:474-5.

Maximilian I, Beauharnais had settled in Munich in 1814; thus, the matter must, according to Hardenberg, be settled by the Bavarian king. Hardenberg expressed some frustration with the British (Napoleon's jailors at the time) who, he claimed, showed a certain "indulgence . . . toward the emissaries Napoleon sends throughout Europe." "Here," Hardenberg stated referring to Gourgaud, "is the third who in sixth months arrives to us from the island and we let them travel and intrigue however they see fit without bothering to quarantine them or place them under surveillance."[570] This small episode, filed under "Acta Secreta," tied England, Prussia, and Austria together with Bavaria in investigating a plot between Napoleon, radicals on both sides of the Atlantic, and ex-French statesmen to overthrow the French monarchy.

Between 1818 and the issuing of the Carlsbad Decrees, Metternich increasingly courted the Prussians in combatting revolution in Germany while anxiously overseeing the work of the German Confederation's Federal Assembly. By January, Hardenberg had already met with Metternich to discuss the "spirit of Jacobinism" and to agree upon a unified approach for establishing the "tranquility of Germany." The two ministers also discussed the nature of the German Confederation and its Federal Assembly seated in Frankfurt. Established by the 9th Act (German Confederal Act) of the Congress of Vienna on 8 June 1815, the Confederation and its Assembly were engaged in producing a

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[570] Hardenberg to Krusemarck, 20 June 1818, HHStA StK *Acta secreta* 2-77, Bl. 71-72. Gougaud eventually returned to the Continent in January 1819 to settle in Prague. See, Report to Sedlnitzky, 28 January 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 19. See also in this dissertation, Chapter 5, n.36.

constitution for all 39 member states. In order to protect the Assembly from the "Spirit which is already grown so formidable to the aristocratic Governments in Germany [sic]" Metternich sought to shape the proceedings so that only heads of the German states constituted the legislative and executive body of the Assembly, and not the ministers "whose character," Stewart pointed out, "is simply and wholly representative."[571] Metternich became increasingly concerned when the Assembly entrusted Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt with organizing the Confederation's constitution. This, despite a long history of correspondence between both men. According to Sir Robert Gordon, another British diplomat in Vienna, the Prussian army was a breeding ground for the "Jacobin spirit." Metternich feared that von Humboldt, who headed the Prussian army's civil administration, would come to sympathize with the soldiers, a subject of "serious apprehension."[572]

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[571] Stewart to Castlereagh, 19 January 1818, *British Envoys*, I:475-6.

[572] Gordon to Castlereagh, 11 February 1819, *British Envoys*, I:484. Humboldt, who joined the ministry of state in August 1819, was openly hostile to Hardenberg's "capitulation" to Metternich at Teplitz and Carlsbad. In this "full-scale attack" on Hardenberg and the rest of the "reactionary members" of the Prussian ministry, Humboldt was joined by Herrmann von Boyen, Field Marshal and Minister of War from 1811-1813 and Carl Beyme, the Minister of Justice. All three had not only supported the *Landwehr*, a position that became politically suspect after 1819, but they were all openly critical of the Prusso-Austrian alliance established via the Carlsbad Decrees. By late 1819, Hardenburg and Wittgenstein had successfully alienated all three, most importantly in the eyes of Friedrich Wilhelm. In December, Hardenberg forced the resignation of all three men, thus sweeping away the last of the Prussian reformers. From this point forward, the Prussian liberals no longer viewed the army as a site of nationalist feeling. After 1819, following from the works of Karl von Rotteck, Prussian liberals viewed a standing army no longer as a means of defense against foreign invaders but as a weapon

The murder of Kotzebue reinforced Metternich and Gentz's long-held suspicions about German radicals and their ties to the universities. According to Gentz, it had always been Germany, and not France, where the "sickness and dangers of our time" gestated; the "excess of the Wartburg," was, according to Gentz, evidence enough. In this same letter, Gentz suggested severe press limitations, increased censorship of the "devilish arts" (*teuflicher Kunst*), and investigations into the German universities, which, he argued, was where the "evil spirit is planted and nourished."[573] In May, the Austrian delegation at the Federal Assembly was successful in establishing a commission to reestablish state jurisdiction over Germany's universities, a major step toward instituting Metternich's future decrees. In early July, Metternich announced that the very fate of Germany rested with the conference soon to be held at Carlsbad.[574] After meeting with Wittgenstein and Friedrich Wilhelm at Teplitz in late July, Metternich arrived in Carlsbad on 6 August. In three weeks, eleven German ministers agreed to four draft pieces of legislation, which would be presented to the Federal Assembly.[575] By October, one

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aimed at their own people. See, Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, Chap. 2, esp. 68-81.

[573] Gentz to Metternich, 1 April 1819, reproduced in Eckardt, *Gentz*, 113-8.

[574] Stewart to Castlereagh, 26 May and 12 July 1819, *British Envoys*, I:486-89.

[575] Along with Austria and Prussia, Metternich personally chose nine others, Bavaria, Saxony, Hannover, Württemberg, Baden, Mecklenburg, Nassau, Kurhessen, and Saxony-Weimar. Siemann, *Metternich*, 697.

month after Metternich publicly announced his decrees, Stewart once again reiterated what had already become clear:

> It is too late to recede. The gauntlet is thrown; and Austria is prepared to enforce the measures resolved upon, and thus escape from danger. She acts at the head of the German Confederation, which is personated in the Diet of Francfort. Every law will emanate from thence, and each will be forcibly Maintained by Austria. No remonstrances will be listened to, that come from the Chambers of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, or Baden.

Within the year, the Prussian state launched investigations into every university; thousands of students and their professors suffered arrests and interrogations, many even lost their faculty positions.[576] Others, such as Carl Hoffmann were hounded by the Investigative Commission until their deaths.

Though of clear scholarly importance, the push to "internationalize" security risks two significant problems. First, the argument tends toward the ahistorical, eliding critical differences in the justification and use of repressive measures from state to state. As the last chapter showed, both France and Austria employed such measures, yet the French were able to rein in serious abuse through a commitment to the constitutional principles of the First Republic. National or regional political contexts shaped how such repressive institutions functioned, suggesting that a legitimate comparative approach is necessary when thinking about European policing. Second, the "everyone-does-it" attitude masks real human decisions, normalizes repressive institutions, and confuses institutional sclerosis for a measured state response. Finally, what gets lost in an analysis of

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[576] Much of this material, dating from 1819-1826, is located in, GStA I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 20.

diplomatic and police reports, are the ideas of those individuals Central European statesmen attacked as radicals. What follows is a brief sketch (1817-1825) of a German-language weekly, *Allgemeine deutsche Justiz-, Kameral-, und Polizeifama*. Published by Johann Friedrich Cotta, the journal captures the evolution of liberal thinking both before and after the announcing of the Carlsbad Decrees.

The Public Responds: Transparency, *Willkür*, and the Secret Police

Despite the illiberal tone struck by the Carlsbad Decrees, and the thousands who suffered to varying degrees during the *Demagogenverfolgung*, German intellectuals found public venues to criticize and discuss the relationship between policing and good governance. One such publication was Dr. Theodor Hartleben's weekly, *Allgemeine deutsche Justiz-, Kameral-, und Polizeifama*, published by Johann Friedrich Cotta, from 1802 to 1830. The journal included opinion pieces and book reviews as well as comments on jurisprudence and administrative and police practices.[577] It also served as a

[577] Hartleben received his doctorate in law from the University of Mainz where he taught before moving on to Salzburg after accepting a position offered to him by the Archbishop Graf von Colloredo. As the French approached the city in August 1800, Colloredo fled, leaving Hartleben as governor. During Salzburg's occupation (1800-1801), Hartleben befriended the French General Moreau who appointed Hartleben as the city's police minister, a position he held until the French left the following year. Likely due to his ambitious work for the French – he was even offered a "notable position" with the Paris police – Hartleben ran afoul of powerful interests, including the returning Archbishop. In 1802, Hartleben began work on the *Justiz-, Kameral-, und Polizeifama*. One year later, Colloredo dismissed Hartleben from his faculty position, and Hartleben left for Würzburg where he taught law and political science. In 1819, he returned to Mainz, where he ended his career as Baden's commissioner on the *Rheinschiffahrtskommission*.

mouthpiece for liberal-minded intellectuals and covered topics such as political reform, tax reform, freedom of the press, and free trade. By 1817, however, the journal began to include regular pieces on the use and financing of secret police. The journal published its first article critical of the secret police in January 1817, which came in the (eerily prescient) form of a man speaking from three years in the future. In the short piece, the author warns that a secret police force was "necessary only for despots" and would be used to establish a future (1820) despotism. The future harbinger warned readers that "transparency in government" was the only guarantee against such abuses and pointed to the newly restored Bourbon dynasty as proof. The author took aim specifically at the Vicomte de Castalbajac, ex-*émigrés* and deputy from 1815-1827, renowned as one of the most ardent Ultras during the Bourbon Restoration. Castalbajac was famous for demanding the death penalty for anyone displaying the *tricolore* and opposing laws granting amnesty to past revolutionaries. He was also an outspoken opponent of liberal press freedoms and became synonymous throughout Europe with press limitations. In January 1817, Castalbajac gave his most impassioned speech against the press, subsequently published as a twenty-four-page pamphlet, demanding the continuation of restrictive press laws.[578] Hartleben and his journal's contributors attacked Castalbajac and his ilk, arguing that press freedoms were the best defense in limiting "arbitrary rule (*Willkür*) of the state and censors." Thus, *Willkür* and increased state secrecy became

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[578] The pamphlet is titled, *Opinion de M. le Vicomte de Castalbajac, député du Gers, sur la liberté de la presse* (Paris, 1817).

associated with despotism and the return of the *ancien régime* and a central aspect of the liberal critique of "restored" governments.[579]

The public discussion concerning policing – whether policing crime or political activity – gives support to the growing consensus among historians that liberals of the post-Congress period held a wide-range of opinions. In an article from March 1819, Hartleben argued that German citizens had a "duty to respect" the state's security forces (*Sicherheitspolizei*) and that the police must be "supported" by "all state officials and residents, especially innkeepers and tradesmen." But these same forces had reciprocal responsibilities: they had "to be attentive to individuals and actions, in so far as they are threats to public safety" paying strict attention only to "domestic servants, craftsmen, aliens, and travelers." To support the argument, Hartleben marshaled the statistic that, in 1817, there were 9,646 reported crimes committed in Prussian territory, the vast majority of which were committed by 297 recidivist offenders.[580] The following month, the journal ran an article by the Graf von Soden, playwright, scholar, and statesman, who authored a nine-volume study on national economy, which included two volumes on the state police and "national education."[581] While Soden is not remembered particularly

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[579] *Justiz-, Kameral-, und Polizeifama*, (hereafter cited as *JKP*), January 1817, Nr. 5, Bl. 3-5.

[580] *JKP*, March 1819, No.25, Bl. 97-101, 103.

[581] Gustav Groβ, "Soden, Julius Graf von" *NDB* 34 (1892): 532-37. His biographer argued that Soden "lacked the necessary sharpness of thought and consistency" and,

fondly by his biographer, Soden did openly criticize a secret police, claiming they were "a threat to those who support national projects (such as national economy)." He argued that while a secret police is necessary to "collect information on common criminals" and "to discover fraud," their role must be limited as Germans had "rights to thoughts, opinions, sentiments, and private, friendly thoughts." A "reprehensible" (*Tadelnswürdig*) secret police, Soden vaguely claimed, trampled on individuals' "human rights."[582]



Nahmen.	Ganzjährig Pränumerations Betrag in Einf. Sch. fl.	kr.	Stempel Gebühr in Conv. Münze fl.	kr.
Deutsche.				
* Ergänzungsblätter der Halle'schen Literaturzeitung	36	—	—	—
* Ergänzungsblätter der Jenaer Literaturzeitung	36	—	—	—
* Erhohlungen	54	—	—	—
* Europäische Annalen	32	—	—	—
* Erheiterungen	54	—	—	—
* Freymüthige (der)	64	—	—	—
* Gesellschafter (der)	72	—	—	—
* Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen	46	—	—	—
* Hallische Literaturzeitung	60	—	—	—
Hamburger politisches Journal auf Druckpapier	50	—	—	—
detto auf Schreibpapier	60	—	—	—
* Jenaer Literaturzeitung	60	—	—	—
* Journal für Literatur, Kunst, Luxus und Mode	50	—	—	—
* Justiz- und Polizeyfama	50	—	—	—
* Land- und Hauswirth	30	—	—	—
* Leipziger Kunstblatt	50	—	—	—
* Leipziger Literaturzeitung	60	—	—	—
Leipziger Modenzeitung	48	—	—	—
* Leipziger musikalische Zeitung	44	—	—	—
~~* Literarisches Wochenblatt von Logdus~~	50	—	—	—
* Literaturzeitung für katholische Religionslehrer	40	—	—	—
~~* Medicinische Analyse~~	~~18~~	—	—	—
* Minerva	60	—	—	—
Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände	80	—	—	—
Nürnberger Handlungszeitung	64	—	—	—
* Zeiten von Voß	56	—	—	—
Zeitung für die elegante Welt	56	—	—	—

Nahmen.	Ganzjährig Pränumerations Betrag in Einf. Sch. fl.	kr.	Stempel Gebühr in Conv. Münze fl.	kr.
Inländische politische Zeitungen.				
Beobachter (österreichischer)	44	—	—	—
Bothe aus Tyrol	48	—	—	—
Brünner Zeitung	56	—	—	—
~~Oesterreichische Provinz- oder böhmische Wienerzeitung~~	~~96~~	—	—	—
Ephemerides posonienses politico statisticae	36	—	—	—
Gazetta di Milano	80	—	18	—
Gazetta Veneta	72	—	18	—
Gazetta Lwowska	60	—	—	—
Grätzer Zeitung	32	—	—	—
Klagenfurter Zeitung	28	—	—	—
Laibacher Zeitung	48	—	—	—
Lemberger Zeitung	48	—	—	—
Linzer Zeitung	28	—	—	—
Magyar Kurir	28	—	—	—
Ofner Zeitung (deutsche) mit gemeinnützigen Blättern	30	—	4	—
Osservatore triestino	66	—	—	—
Prager Oberpostamtszeitung	58	—	—	—
Preßburger Zeitung nebst einem Intelligenz- und Unterhaltungsblatt	42	—	—	—
Salzburger Zeitung	58	—	—	—
Serbische Zeitung	40	—	—	—
Siebenbürger Bothe	16	—	2	—
Telegraph in griechischer Sprache	72	—	—	—
Troppauer Zeitung	34	—	—	—
Wanderer (der) ein Volksblatt	32	—	—	—
Wiener Zeitung	50	—	—	—

Nahmen.	Ganzjährig Pränumerations Betrag in Einf. Sch. fl.	kr.	Stempel Gebühr in Conv. Münze fl.	kr.
Inländische literarische Zeitungen, Wochen- und Monathschriften.				
Archiv für Geographie, Historie, Staats- und Kriegskunst	32	—	—	—
* Bibliotheca italiana	64	—	—	—
* Calliope (in griechischer Sprache)	30	—	—	—
Corriere delle dame	32	—	—	—
Eipeldauerbriefe mit Kupfern	18	—	—	—
detto ohne Kupfer	12	—	—	—
Geist der Zeit	26	—	—	—
Hesperus, oder Belehrung und Unterhaltung	38	—	—	—
~~Iris~~	~~36~~	—	—	—
* Logios Hermes (in griechischer Sprache)	40	—	—	—
* Medicinisch-chirurgische Zeitung	68	—	—	—
* Militärische Zeitschrift	30	—	—	—
Musikalische Zeitung, ~~wo~~ wöchentlich zweymahl, mit 12 interessanten musikalischen Beylagen	24	—	—	—
Oekonomische Neuigkeiten und Verhandlungen	38	—	—	—

Nahmen.	Ganzjährig Pränumerations Betrag in Einf. Sch. fl.	kr.	Stempel Gebühr in Conv. Münze fl.	kr.
Portate	44	—	—	—
Prezzo Corrente	44	—	—	—
~~Prometheus oder der Zuschauer~~	~~12~~	—	—	—
Salzburger Amts- und Intelligenzblatt	28	—	—	—
Sammler (der) ein Unterhaltungsblatt	32	—	—	—
Sonntagsblatt für die Jugend mit illuminirten Kupfern	24	—	—	—
~~Steuer-Regulirungs-Zuschauer~~	10	—	—	—
* Spettatore di Milano	60	—	—	—
Theaterzeitung oder Gesellschaftsblatt für Kunst, Literatur, und geselliges Leben	48	—	—	—
Theologische Zeitschrift	10	—	—	—
Vaterländische Blätter nebst der Chronik der österreichischen Literatur	32	—	—	—
Wiener Courszettel	22	—	—	—
Wiener Modenzeitung, nunmehr Wiener Zeitschrift für Kunst, Literatur, Theater und Mode mit 52 vorzüglichen illuminirten Modekupfern	66	—	—	—

Fig. 5 Subscription cost for foreign newspapers and monthly journals in Vienna for the year 1820. A subscription to the *Justiz-, Kameral-, und Polizeifama* (left column) was 50 fl. (HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 451-452).

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while ostensibly a liberal when it came to the economy, was critical of liberal political ideas and advocated "more or less" for a "police state."

[582] *JZP*, April 1819, Nr. 41 and 42, Bl. 174

The debate concerning the use and financing of a secret police was not merely fodder for intellectuals such as Soden; it also engaged statesmen at the highest levels of German government. In May 1819, the *Allgemeine Zeitung* – the most important German-language newspaper in the early nineteenth century – began publishing articles on proposed funding for secret police. The article raised two questions: first, should Munich spend 12,000 florins on its secret police force? Second, and perhaps more important in the context of this chapter, the editors asked whether a secret police is acceptable in a state with a "representative constitution." The editors answered their first question, arguing that the funds should not be apportioned to the police, as the funds were "public" and that "the public" would not benefit significantly from a well-funded secret police.[583] In early June, the paper ran an article written by the Graf von Thürheim, jurist, diplomat, and, after 1817, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior (following Montgelas's ousting). Thürheim scoffed at the proposed cost, claiming that "no one could think of maintaining a secret police with 12,000 florin." However, Thürheim went further, arguing outright that "in legal and constitutional states, secret police are illegal (*Unzulässig*)."[584] Throughout 1819, the paper continued to attack "secret" state institutions, publishing long articles on the growing influence and the power of the Church after 1815, especially in France. These secretive institutions, along with the

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[583] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 May 1819, No. 146.

[584] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 June 1819, Nr. 153.

"tricks and whistles" (*Kniffe und Pfiffe*) of a "*Fouche'sche Polizei*," were, the paper argued, the greatest threat to German liberties.[585]

Thürheim's criticisms of secret policing underscores the relativity of "legality" in a constitutional state. It furthermore provides a reminder that sociopolitical contexts determine the form and function of repressive institutions. A brief glance back at France's First Republic and a forward look to its Third, for example, shows us that constitutional regimes have their own, specific issues concerning policing and the use of force.[586] Based on the previous constitution of 1808, Bavaria adopted a far more liberal constitution in 1818, guaranteeing the king's sworn oath of allegiance to the constitution while establishing a legal system that remained in place for a century.[587] While still adhering to the monarchical principle with all state power unified in the person of the king, the constitution not only allowed for popular representation, but included a list of "general rights and duties," guaranteeing access to office, defense of property and individual freedoms, and freedom of conscience and (limited) press freedoms.[588] Thus,

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[585] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 June 1819, Nr. 97 and 7 July 1819, Nr. 188.

[586] Howard Brown, "Legitimate Force or Domestic State Violence?: Repression from the *Croquants* to the Commune," *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999): 597-622. This issue lies at the center of Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal-constitutional regimes, and their willingness to suspend constitutional protections in defense of those same protections.

[587] Karl Möckl, "Die bayerische Konstitution von 1808," in *Reformen im rheinbündischen Deutschland*, ed. Eberhard Weiss (Munich: Oldenburg, 1984), 151-167.

[588] Andreas Fahrmeir, "Nineteenth-Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration," *The Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 721-752.

Bavaria's constitutional monarchy stood in contrast to Prussia and Austria, and acted as a check against Article 13 of the German Federal Act while frustrating Austria's policy of courting Bavaria to counter Prussian influence.[589] Despite Count Rechberg's readiness to accept the Carlsbad Decrees (and the King's willingness to overthrow his own constitution)[590] four months after Thürheim's article, the essay offers us a compelling glimpse of how a constitutional state might incorporate and employ its policing agencies differently. It also reminds us that policing (here, in the narrow sense of policing criminality) was a defining aspect of Central European statecraft. Throughout the 1820s, the journal continued to investigate the relationship between liberal political ideas and the police. In the journal's first edition of 1820, Hartleben elaborated and systematized his vision of liberal reform, which he presented as: "Wishes of the German People." First, he was, above all else, critical of "renewed attacks on freedom of the press." The inviolable nature of the press, Hartleben claimed, was a concept rooted in "French institutions on the left bank of the Rhine . . . institutions that are forever fortified

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[589] Article 13 of the Federal Act announced the establishment of estate-based constitutions (*Landständische Verfassung*) that, according to the Confederation's member states, was more in line with an *ancien régime* view of constitutions and not designed to promote representation of their citizens. See, Wolf D. Gruner, "The German Confederation: Cornerstone of the New European Security System," in *Securing Europe*, 150-167, here 165; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 600.

[590] Only Baron Wangenheim, the delegate from Württemberg, registered a complaint against the Decrees and their ratification in September 1819. Bavaria, which was able to maintain its constitution despite Metternich's disapproval, registered objections "in principle" to what it argued was an unacceptable extension of the powers of the Bundestag. See, Büssem, *Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse*, 437-58.

and whose rays of light (*Lichtstrahlen*) shone over all of Germany." From there, Hartleben offered eight further positions: the first two, "publicity of the judiciary" and "sworn juries in all criminal matters,"[591] were designed to limit arbitrary rulings of the state (*Willkür*). He also argued for "equality before the law" and the "separation of justice from administration," a position fundamentally at odds with the monarchical principle, even in kingdoms such as Bavaria that maintained their constitutions after 1819. Central also to Hartleben's "wishes" was the economic liberalization and economic unification of Germany. Here, Hartleben argued for "free trade throughout Germany," the "equality of taxes" and the "repeal of feudalism and the tithe" in those places untouched by French-inspired reforms. Finally, and in keeping with his economic liberalism, Hartleben demanded "savings (*Ersparungen*) in the courts and national finances" and the "reduction of the military state," which, he argued, would both limit state expenses and sever the connection between politicians and the military.[592] Later editions elaborated on these positions. In April, the journal published an article on the French secret police, noting that the monarchy spent over two million francs (in direct and indirect taxes) a year, with, roughly, 600,000 agents and 660,000 secret police.[593] In

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[591] This also included the promotion of an "educated and academic culture among judges," and not just those of "the left Rhine, but all judges in Germany" as well as the education of "the public regard procedure."

[592] In regard to the reduction of military state, Hartleben took Bavaria as his example, arguing that Bavaria and achieved this goal due to "public pressure." *JKP*, January 1820, Nr. 1, Bl. 1.

May, the journal published sections from Carl Wilhelm von Drais's work, *Materialen zur Gesetzbebung über die Preßfreiheit der Teutschen*. Drais, a privy councilor and president of the Court of Appeals in Baden, stressed the necessity of maintaining a "strict line between justice and police in matters of the press," arguing that, in defense of civil liberties (*bürgerliche Freiheit*), "excessive intervention" by the police must be curtailed and that "press violations" must not be tried in "criminal or political courts, but in civil courts."[594]

For Hartleben and other contributors, policing, and even a secret police, was not entirely alien to their vision of liberalism, concerned as it was with free trade and the defense of property. In fact, policing was central to this post-war liberalism, provided the state could overcome arbitrary abuses. In May 1820, presaging Weber, Hartleben argued that the "first function of the state is the consolidation and use of physical force (*physischen Kräfts*) . . . but it must attain a certain level of consistency and calmness." In Hartleben's formulation, then, "consistency and calmness" become the antidote to *Willkür*. When the state managed its use of force correctly, policing agencies, in Hartleben's ecstatic telling, could achieve something akin to apotheosis: "a moral, security, and comforting police are the pillars of the temple of civil bliss; a constitutive, administrative, and conservative police are the steps to sanctuary (*Heiligtum*)."[595] But

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[593] *JKP*, April 1820, Nr. 41, Bl. 163.

[594] *JKP*, May 1820, Nr. 49 and 50, Bl. 193 and May 1820, Nr. 51 and 52, Bl. 201-04.

perhaps the most insightful piece to appear in the journal was a review of Maximilian Grävell's *Über Höhere-, Geheime-, und Sicherheitspolizei*.[596] In the glowing review, the author argued the police – "especially a secret one" – occupy "the same place in the moral-political world that poisons maintain in a pharmacy; if there were no sickness in the human body and in social connections, the poisons in the pharmacies and the police in the political apparatus would be thrown out." Grävell insisted that *as is*, the secret police "is the most frightful invention of tyranny, arbitrary governance (*Willkür*) and suspicion." Yet, the article continued, if subjected to a "sense of mercy and impartiality," the secret police could "be well-founded, just, and enlightened: in a word, a secret police as it must be, not as it is."[597]

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[595] *JKP*, May 1820, Nr. 57 and 58, Bl. 225, 230.

[596] Dr. Maximilian K.F.W. Grävell, *Über Höhere-, Geheime-, und Sicherheitspolizei* (Weimar: B.F. Voight, 1820). Grävell was a liberal jurist, historian, Freemason, and delegate to the Frankfurt National Assembly, who wrote extensively on legal practice and supported German unification under Austrian auspices. Albert Tiechmann, "Grävell, Maximilian Karl Friedrich Wilhelm" *NDB* 9 (1879): 613-15.

[597] *JKP*, October 1820, Nr. 109 and 110, Bl. 440-2. Grävell's conditions were three-fold: First, only "proven and trusted officials" were to be employed – no informers, denunciators, or overseers (*Aufpasser*) should not be "rewarded" for their information, and secret agents could not offer "valid or legal testimony in court." Second, the secret police must be limited to collecting "news" and "trac[ing] crime" and "no indictment or security measure which interferes with personal- or property-freedoms can be included on secret statements." Should that happen, Grävell argued, "all evidence must be openly presented to the accused." Three, the secret police should only be employed in "large cities, where it is impossible to know the inhabitants and their comings and goings" and "in extraordinary circumstances" where it is clear secret arrangements were being made against public safety. The author of the article referred to a situation in London in February 1820, known as the Cato Street Conspiracy, where thirteen individuals plotted to murder all members of Parliament. A police spy (a member of the famed Bow Street

Hartleben's journal, then, offers important insights into the early development of German liberalism, specifically in its relationship to proper policing. First, German liberals varied widely on the necessity and, as with Thürheim, even the legality of the state's policing agencies. Whereas Thürheim, a political liberal, argued that the secret police had no place in a constitutional state, Hartleben, an economic liberal, stressed its value in defending free trade. In January 1821, the journal reprinted a brochure written by Jean-Françoise Bellemare, the director-general of the police in Antwerp from 1808-1814 and head of France's secret police from 1814 to May 1815,[598] against Élie Decazes, a liberal member of Louis XVIII cabinet. In 1819, Decazes abolished the secret police claiming it "unnecessary for a regime espousing liberty." Bellemare, by contrast, argued that the secret police were "necessary as a means to protect the safety of the king." Bellemare, in fact, skewered Napoleon for "pretending" he did not need a secret police for his own safety, claiming that Napoleon's "authority was never in question." Again, the journal sides with Bellemare when he claims that "Jacobins are everywhere, and I will hunt them as they do here and there in Germany." The editors echoed the point, stating that "during periods of unrest . . . the higher state police are necessary, and that institutions created [by German statesmen] under Napoleon should not be neglected."

Runners) was used to infiltrate the organization, a tactic which proved effective in stopping the conspiracy, but not before Arthur Thistlewood murdered Richard Smithers, a police officer, during the raid. For a discussion on the event see, *JKP*, May 1820, Nr. 55 and 56, Bl. 220-22.

[598] Antoine Renglet, "Un système policier impérial? Le commissaire général et la police municipale d'Anvers (1808-1814)" *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés* 20 (2016): 107-27.

The problem in France, the journal claimed, was that Decazes merged the Ministry of Police with Ministry of the Interior, thus, erasing the boundary between justice and administration. Once that happened, a self-perpetuating cycle began: "conspiracies emerged everywhere" which served only to fuel the demand for increased policing. This was the warning Hartleben's journal had (in 1821) for German statesmen.[599]

By mid-decade, however, the journal's positions hardened, melding its early vision of economic liberalism with a larger political agenda. In January 1824, an article addressing the "political question" in Germany began by arguing: "[there are] only two sides to the political question: those who want change – the vast majority – and those individuals who are still aligned with the old ways." Because Germans (as well as many Europeans) were at a "low stage of civilization," the numbers only appeared to favor the opponents of "political reform" – the true "mental (or spiritual) preponderance" (g*eistige Übergewicht*) of Germany lay in the project of reform. According to the author, "political improvement is identical to the cause of civilization and the people's happiness" and, thus, all "decisions . . . must work toward the establishment of liberal state institutions" (*liberalen Staatsrichtungen*). Freedom, and the political reform that would guarantee it, the author argued, was inherently tied to the promotion of free trade and industry: "[i]f a government encourages commerce, the arts, and industry – as it must

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[599] *JKP*, 1 January 1821, Nr. 1, Bl. 1-2. This article continues with a discussion of Decazes's increased press censorship, the great bugbear of the journal, as well as the "moral effects of imprisonment."

do for its own good – it also promotes political improvements." If "agriculture, manufacture, and trade are brought progressively together . . . it may be assured that constitutional matters (*Verfassungsangelegenheiten*) will advance more and more," eventually penetrating the areas of Europe "whose people are still too uneducated."[600] An educated, urban elite, then, would act as the vanguard in addressing the German political question, clearing the fog of German particularity through industry and rational economic decision making.

Hartleben's journal highlights several important themes. First, it shows that despite press limitations, German intellectuals, and a new breed of civil servants, found venues to criticize the state and its perceived abuses while publicly advancing the cause of liberal reform. That this journal published articles on topics ranging from the role of a secret police to the need for economic reform throughout the 1820s, also suggests that the decade was not as politically quiescent as it is often depicted. In fact, the journal itself was one of dozens of oppositional periodicals that emerged between 1813 and 1823 when most folded in the face of growing censorship. This short selection shows that the mid-1820s mark a critical period when "liberalism" began to congeal as a coherent ideological force. As historians increasingly note, post-Napoleonic political positions were "fluid and ill-defined," as even most German conservatives of the period recognized the need to adapt to new socio-political realities. But, as the decade progressed, positions hardened

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[600] *JKP*, 1 January 1824, Nr. 1.

and polarized as conservatives, such as Carl Ludwig von Haller, pushed back against the economic and political reform agenda of German liberals.[601] It is unclear whether journals such as Hartleben's helped drive this reform or if it merely captured an already existing *Zeitgeist*. However, if men like von Haller and, later, Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach were publishing so extensively between 1815 and 1848 in defense of traditional order, they clearly felt that order to be under attack.

Conclusion

In July 1814, Anton von Baldaccis received two secret police reports marked "for your hands only" which detailed the "political assessments among the highest circles." The second report captures well a moment when Vienna's elite were vying for influence and power, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. Included here are both sober assessments of the new, post-Napoleonic international arena as well as the petty squabbles that arose within Francis's court. What the report lays bare is that the struggle for influence took on many forms, found many venues, and included entire families and not simply the individual men in question. For example, in July 1814, at an event hosted by the Count Trautmannsdorf to celebrate the birthday of Countess Schönborn-Colloredo, a long-standing rivalry between Count Zichy and Metternich remerged when the Countess Schilton-Zichy was "not very friendly" to the entire Metternich family. The

[601] Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 163ff.

countess went so far as to criticize Metternich openly – who had only two days prior to the report enjoyed a hero's welcome upon his return to Vienna[602] – and his kowtowing to Castlereagh as well as Metternich's decision to allow Prince Schwarzenberg to head the allied offensive. The report also details other powerful cliques that emerged around Trautmannsdorf, and Zichy, whose home became a site of negotiation and discussion between himself and Metternich. Finally, the report summarized foreign policy proposals from Count von Bentzel, an ex-statesmen and harsh critic of the tsar and Russian domination in Poland, and the long-retired Baron Thugut, who was critical of Metternich for not pressing Austrian interests in the German states or reclaiming land in the Netherlands.[603]

As this chapter has argued, despite the claims made in Siemann's landmark biography, Metternich's influence had not yet fully coalesced on the eve of the Congress of Vienna. While the above report congratulates Metternich on his subduing of Bavaria, rendering it a "second order power," Metternich still vied with other powerful Austrian statesmen for Francis's attention. This is mirrored in Metternich's connection to the Ministry of Police. As this chapter has shown, Metternich did oversee a growing relationship between the police and the foreign ministry, thus establishing a critical link between diplomacy and the policing of Europe's radicals. But even here, Metternich

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[602] Migliorini, "Metternich-Kissinger," 289.

[603] Hager to Baldacci, 22 July 1814 HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 276-280.

competed with others for influence, including Hager, who successfully established a direct line of communication with the emperor via Anton von Baldacci. By the end of the decade, however, Metternich successfully established himself as indispensable for the running of Austrian foreign affairs. With the murder of August von Kotzebue in 1819 and the subsequent Carlsbad Decrees, Metternich was similarly successful in reestablishing Austrian authority in Central Europe, a problem first diagnosed in the police report that opened this chapter.

Finally, this chapter sets the Carlsbad Decrees in a much broader perspective, arguing that the decrees themselves were one piece of a larger puzzle of European security. Again, while the murder of Kotzebue was the immediate pretext for the signing of the decrees, the decrees addressed issues that had plagued Europe's monarchs for a generation. Outbreaks of nationalist-inspired revolt in 1809 proved to Metternich the link between nationalism and violence. But 1814 marks a decisive moment in the history of European security. Confident that Austria lacked its own homegrown revolutionary party, Metternich and his police ministers turned their attention outward. As previous chapters show, the threat of international revolution was not new in 1814. But Metternich and the police viewed the growth of patriotic-nationalist organizations (with past ties to the state) in Prussia, the spread of loyal Bonapartists throughout Europe, and the growth of a southern German constitutional movement as intrinsically linked. In the years between 1814 and 1819, the Ministry of Police produced a mountain of state paper concerning the whereabouts of the Bonaparte family and their supporters. Within two years, Italian land ceded to Austria after 1814 would become the most heavily surveilled

territory in Europe, a process the final chapter investigates, and which had its roots in the surveillance of Bonapartes.

This chapter does not seek to reestablish the "Metternichian System" that previous chapters have questioned. Neither does the chapter seek to brush aside Metternich's contributions to the continuation and spread of repressive institutions after 1814. Rather, it suggests a middle ground, arguing that the Carlsbad Decrees were at once both a product of two decades of policing European revolution and a way for Metternich to cement his own authority and influence while reestablishing Austrian dominance (vis-à-vis Prussia) in the German states. But the system Metternich established in 1819 took years and the work of dozens of statesmen to function as intended. It also required the work of multiple policing agencies as well as countless informants. While important histories exist, mostly for Prussia, the spread of the agencies into other German states is still sorely understudied. It is true that the subsequent *Demagogenverfolgung* impacted thousands of students and their professors. But even the repressive atmosphere of the 1820s did not drive oppositional politics fully underground. Liberal intellectuals found outlets for debate and publishers found increasingly creative ways to make radical ideas available. As the Mainz Commission's final report makes clear, even suspected revolutionaries, such as Karl Follen and the Wesselhoeft brothers, freely traveled while maintaining correspondence with other revolutionaries (such as Victor Cousin) throughout Europe. Thus, even in the Mainz Commission's own telling, the 1820s emerge as a critical decade when oppositional politics flourished and began to congeal ideologically within Central Europe and beyond.

In less than a decade after announcement of the Carlsbad Decrees, much of Metternich's work came undone. If Metternich successfully established a system of peace among the Great Powers while guaranteeing Austrian authority in Germany via the decrees and the Vienna Final Act in 1820, Austria became, by 1824, increasingly isolated internationally. Despite Metternich's triumphs at the conferences of Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822), Austrian influence waned as Prussia and the southern German states sought new ways to expand their own independence.[604] At Johannisberg in August 1826, Metternich implored the German states to renew their vigor in tracking revolutionary activity, doubling the financial resources of the Mainz Commission.[605] This met with little success. One year later, the Commission produced its report – the *Total-Uebersicht* – to a committee of the Federal Diet. The report was not presented to the full Diet until March 1831 and was never made public, despite promises to make it so. Thus, the specter of revolution in Central Europe proved illusory.

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[604] This came in the form of new tariff unions, such as the Prussian Zollverein and the South German Union. The establishment of these unions was directly related to the declining fear of revolution, Austrian isolation, and new calls for state's rights and alliances that linked Berlin, Munich, and Stuttgart. Robert Billinger, *Metternich and The German Question: States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820-1834* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1991), Chap. 2.

[605] The Mainz Commission received funding until June 1828, six months after it produced its final report. For the financing for the Mainz Commission see, "Total-Uebersicht," BArch Berlin, DB/7/3. Between 1820 and 1828, the Mainz Commission received 81,000 fl. to complete its work.

It is perhaps unfair to judge Metternich's response to student violence and radicalism on the weak evidence produced in the Mainz Commission's final report. As this chapter argues, the decrees were equally designed to counter Prussian influence in the German states. Yet the report does speak to a fundamental mismanagement and misreading of post-Napoleonic German society, one that combined conservative paranoia with an institutional sclerosis that shaped Central European states' response to growing liberal demands throughout much of the century. The report also does not offer answers to the questions posed above regarding whether the decrees were used cynically. From the vantage point of the post-Vienna Congress years, European revolution still seemed possible. But the *Total-Uebersicht* does offer Central European historians at least one important corrective: revolution was never coming to the German states in the period between 1789 and 1820. What did come in the years after 1806, was a vital and homegrown liberal opposition that increasingly sought connections both at home and abroad.

Chapter 5

BONAPARTIST MACHINATIONS AND SECRET SOCIETIES IN ITALY, 1814-1830

The previous chapter showcased the challenges statesmen faced in securing Europe after the great upheavals of the Napoleonic era. This chapter elaborates on that theme by extending Central European historians' vision of the post-Napoleonic era to include Europe's traditional "peripheries." By 1814, the Austrians had combatted European revolution for a quarter century. Whereas other Central European states developed similar institutions to maintain their own internal security after 1806, the Habsburgs recognized revolution as a European concern in the immediate wake of the French Revolution. As such, the securing of Europe against the spread of radical ideas – both in idea and in practice – predated the Congress of Vienna. But Napoleon's final defeat and the exile of his supporters presented new challenges to Europe's ruling elite. As Europe's great statesmen met in Vienna to rebuild the continent's political foundations, the policing of ideas and peoples became a central preoccupation among the Great Powers. None more so than Metternich, who used the threat of revolution to stabilize the German Confederation and to secure Habsburg imperial interests in the Italian peninsula. But long before the ink dried on the Vienna Final Act (1815), Austria began pressing its security interests in Italy, which became a central site for information gathering on the whereabouts of the Bonapartes and their allies. Elaborating on previous

themes, this chapter focuses on Italy and argues that Europe's peripheries were central to Metternich's vision of European security.

English-language literature on Austria's rule in Italy, especially in the period between 1814/5 and 1830, is comparatively sparse, despite monographs from Reuben John Rath, David Lavin, Lucy Riall, John Davis, Maurizio Isabella, and, most recently, Miroslav Šedivý.[606] One recent survey of the Austrian Empire does not even discuss the

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[606] R. John Rath, "The Austrian Provisional Government in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-1815," *Journal of Central European Affairs* 2 (1942): 305-20; ibid., "The Habsburgs and Public Opinion in Lombardy-Venetia," in *Nationalism and Internationalism: Essays Inscribed to Carlton J.H. Hayes*, ed. E.M. Earle, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 303-35; ibid., *The Provisional Austrian Regime in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-1815* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1969); Emerson, *Metternich*, Chap. III; John C. Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth Century Italy* (London: Palgrave, 1988); Lawrence Sondhaus, *In Service of the Emperor: Italians in the Austrian Armed Forces, 1814-1918* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1990); Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification* (London: Routledge, 1994); David Laven, "Law and Order in Habsburg Venetia, 1814-1835," *Historical Journal* 39 (1996): 383-403; ibid., "Austria's Italian Policy Reconsidered: Revolution and Reform in Restoration Italy," *Modern Italy* 3 (1997): 3-33; ibid., *Venice and Venetia Under the Habsburgs, 1815-1835* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Miroslav Šedivý, *The Decline of the Congress System: Metternich, Italy and European Diplomacy* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2018). For work on Italian regions outside the direct control of the Austrian Empire see, Michael Broers, *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy, 1733-1821* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997); Steven Hughes, *Crime, Disorder, and the Risorgimento: The Politics of Policing Bologna* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Recent edited volumes have included important essays on the period. See the relevant chapters in, John Davis and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John Davis, ed., *Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David Laven and Lucy Riall, eds., *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000); Michael Broers and Ambrogio Caiani, eds., *A History of the European Restorations*, 2 vols. (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).

Austrian Empire's post-Congress acquisition of Italian territory, while a second mentions it only in passing.[607] Even so, there is some work on Austrian policing of their newly restored Italian territories. A single chapter in Donald Emerson's 1968 study examines Metternich's personal role in directing the higher state police in Italy. Casting Napoleon and Metternich as the great forerunners of the Nazi police state, Emerson follows a template of German exceptionalism that does not capture the full justification for the Austrian police presence on the peninsula. For example, Emerson does not investigate fears of Bonapartist machinations which occupied Austrian, British, and French authorities in Italy and elsewhere at least until Napoleon's death. Building on a generation of Italian scholars, Laven's work has done much to upend the "black legend" of Habsburg rule in Italy, arguing that the Habsburg restoration was law-abiding, popular, and even beneficial economically for most Venetians.[608] Both Rath and Laven have

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German-language studies are far more numerous but tend to focus on the post-1848 period. See, Helmut Rumpler, *Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa: Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie, 1804-1918* (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1997); Alvise Zorzi, *Österreichs Venedig: Das Letzte Kapitel der Fremdherrschaft, 1798 bis 1866* (Düsseldorf: Claassen, 1990); Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig, *Österreichischer Verwaltungsstaat und administrative Eliten im Königreich Lombardo-Venetien, 1815-1859* (Munich: Philip von Zaborn, 1993); Rupert Pichler, *Italiener in Österreich, Österreicher in Italien: Einführung in Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, und Verfassung, 1800-1914* (Vienna: Werner Eichbaur Verlag, 2000).

[607] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire* and Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 26, respectively. Though ending in 1815, Charles Ingrao's classic survey mentions Austrian Italy in one sentence at the very end of the book. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 239.

[608] Laven's work is mostly concerned with Venice and Venetia, but he claims that "previously privileged groups" in Lombardy rankled under the Habsburg restoration.

addressed Austrian policing in Lombardy-Venetia, focusing on policing in the broad sense of the term, as well as on the higher state police pursuing sects and anti-Habsburg conspiracies. Laven uses the absence of anti-Habsburg sentiment among politically active citizens in Venetia to further upend the legend of an unpopular Habsburg occupation that informed Italian liberal-nationalist narratives in the latter-half of the nineteenth century.[609]

Yet Laven hints at Vienna's fears of European revolution. In his telling, policing was an administrative concern and a tool of "good government" in Lombardy-Venetia. As such, Italy's position after 1815 – and Austria's policing of the peninsula – is not fully engaged within a broader, European perspective.[610] As this chapter demonstrates, the work of the higher state police in Italy had the complementary dual task of maintaining

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Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 25. Laven is critical of an "older agenda" of *Risorgimento* historiography that emphasizes the struggle against Austrian rule on the continent. For a discussion on this "old agenda" see, Davis and Ginsborg's "Introduction" to their, *Society and Politics*.

[609] Rath's work is limited chronologically, focusing only the years 1814-1815. Rath, *Provisional Austria Regime*, 142ff. Laven's discussion of the higher state police between 1815-1830 is also limited geographically and is discussed only the context of the smooth running of the Habsburg state machinery. See, "Law and Order," esp. 392-403 and idem., *Venice and Venetia*, 202-11.

[610] This is true only in the context of policing. Laven is clear that smaller states, as well as potential rivals (most notably France) shaped imperial policy on the peninsula. See, Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, esp. Chap. III. Laven has also recently returned to the topic, analyzing the restoration of the Papacy as a critical aspect of Europe's collective security after 1815. See his, "The Papacy, Reform and Intervention: International Collective Security in Restoration Italy," in De Graaf et al., eds., *Securing Europe*, 214-230.

bureaucratic efficiency while rooting out anti-Habsburg conspiracy. Undoubtedly, a stable Austrian presence on the Italian peninsula checked French aggression in the south, as Metternich claimed. But the work of information gathering was not limited to those territories under direct Habsburg control; Austrian agents operated across borders, coordinated with authorities from other countries, and monitored conspiracies beyond those that agitated against Habsburg rule or promised Italian unity. As previous chapters argue, Metternich viewed revolutionary upheaval as a European concern, thus linking together events in France, Germany, Belgium,[611] England, Italy, and, later, Greece and other areas under Ottoman control. This was not merely a product of the post-Congress vision of a secure Europe. Indeed, the use of Austria's higher state police to surveil and manage political participation long predates Metternich's rise to power after 1815. Building on the work of previous chapters, the Restoration on the Italian peninsula offers insight into how policing changed after the military defeat of Napoleon. Including Europe's periphery broadens our geographic framework, and thus corrects an over

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[611] Belgium does not figure into this or previous chapter in any significant way. However, the immediate postwar situation in Belgium, especially concerning their "natural" relationship to France and the need for the country "remain within the *Maison d'Autriche*" became a pressing matter. The Archduke Charles, Francis I's nephew, was governor of the region and it seems he had designs on the region. A lengthy report from Hager to the emperor, which includes letters from the archduke, includes a section on Belgian refugees in Vienna. See, Hager to Francis, 26 April 1814, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 221-229. Ghent also became the site of a major scandal concerning a certain Alline von Vical, the city's postmaster, who, according to Baron Karaczay, governor of the city, "maintained secret associations [with the French] and withheld mail." Hager to Metternich, 29 July 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 52-53.

emphasis on Metternich's evolving answer to the "German Question," which was but one part of a larger, European question. Finally, this chapter addresses the usefulness of the concept of "security culture." Attempts to make Europe more secure, it argues, often backfired, leading to increased paranoia and policing, as well as a less secure Europe.

Austrian Rule in Italy

As Europeans fixated on Leipzig, another era-defining event was underway some six-hundred miles due south. In early October 1813, Austrian forces defeated the armies of Eugène Beauharnais, Napoleon's stepson and viceroy, and crossed into Venetia, territory the Habsburgs had held from 1798 to 1806. By February of 1814, Austria controlled the Venetian mainland, entering Venice in April after a prolonged siege by a combined Austro-British force.[612] By November 1813, the Austrians had already established a provisional government. In December, Francis appointed Prince Heinrich von Reuss-Plauen as military governor, instructing Reuss-Plauen to maintain existing "Napoleonic machinery" where possible, while exiling pro-French administrators.[613] After Napoleon's disastrous defeat at Leipzig, Joachim Murat, Napoleon's brother-in-law

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[612] After Beauharnais signed the treaty of Schiarino-Rizzino (16 April 1814) he left Italy for Munich and the court of his father-in-law, King Maximillian I. While he was welcomed in Munich, where he eventually renounced his past allegiances, the Ministry of Police monitored his passage from Turin, into the Tirol, and across Austrian territory. On the granting of Beauharnais's passport and the order to report his movement see, Hagar to Metternich, 5 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 111.

[613] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, Chap. 1; Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 54-5.

and King of Naples (1808-1815), defected, immediately pressing for terms with London and Vienna. Murat was successful in signing treaties with Austria and England in January and February 1814, respectively. In exchange for his crown, Murat pledged to maintain 30,000 soldiers in the field against the French. Whether due to Murat's own ambitions or to weather conditions, the offensive stalled at the Adige River. In April 1814, after the signing of the Schiarino-Rizzino armistice (16 April), it appeared likely that Beauharnais would retain Lombardy. Four days after the armistice, however, Lombardy erupted in revolt, overthrowing its French occupiers in the summer of 1814. Austrian forces under by Heinrich von Bellegarde entered Lombardy shortly thereafter. By July, with the Austrians now settled in Milan, Lombardy-Venetia's fall to the Habsburgs was imminent.[614] The only question was how the Habsburgs would rule their newly returned regions.

As David Laven argues, the chief victory of Francis and Metternich at the Congress of Vienna was the securing of Habsburg hegemony over Italy. Laven's insight, however, has not yet been fully incorporated into the English-language historiography of the post-Napoleonic period. The Habsburgs secured their rule through direct reacquisition of Lombardy and Venetia and by placing a Habsburg on the throne of smaller states: Tuscany went to Francis's younger brother, Ferdinand III (1814-1824) and thereafter to his descendants; Parma, to Francis's daughter and ex-Empress Marie Louise

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[614] Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 53-8.

for life; and Modena, to members of the cadet d'Este branch. The remainder of the peninsula, including Sardinia and Sicily, had no dynastic link to Austria. Victor Emanuel returned to his throne in Piedmont; the Pope maintained control in the Papal States; and the Vienna settlement put a Bourbon on the throne in Naples, which, in 1816, united with Sicily to form the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Though direct dynastic links existed only in northern Italy, the Austrians nonetheless wielded enormous influence in the south. Virtually all states looked to Austria for defense, and a military treaty with Naples placed the Neapolitan army under "de facto" Austrian control.[615] While this entailed its own logistical issues, including a series of military insurrections,[616] it allowed Austrian armies of occupation to remain in place, further extending Austria's information gathering capabilities outside of regions they governed directly.

Like most Restauration-era rulers, Francis sought to cultivate both popular and elite support through a fine balance of maintaining and discarding Napoleonic reforms.

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[615] David Laven, "The Age of Restoration," in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, 51-73, here, 52-3. In addition, Metternich signed secret treaties with Ferdinand I, the King of Naples, that forbid the introduction of "changes" to Neapolitan government. This will become important to the revolutions in 1820 and Metternich's decision to intervene. See, *Paul Schroeder*, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1830* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1962), 41-2.

[616] On the insurrection of marine battalions in Naples and Palermo under the command of a von Steinberg, see Report to Hager, 22 July 1814, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 51. A subsequent report made it clear that von Steinberg had not been given orders to enter Sicilian territory by General Laval Nugent, the Austrian general who had recently defeated Beauharnais and was soon to lead Austrian forces against Maret. Thus, the State Chancellery denied von Steinberg's request for support. Hager to Metternich, 24 July 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 241.

Although this program guaranteed future enemies, Francis and his administrators opted to maintain much of the Napoleonic system, which relied on a mix of Austrians from the Hereditary Lands and local elites to fill the vacuum left by Napoleonic functionaries.[617] The basic structure of rule fell into place quickly after the Habsburgs established the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia on 7 April 1815. With his hold on the region secure, Francis established Lombardy and Venetia as separate territories with their own capitals and major administrative centers in Milan and Venice.[618] Once fully incorporated into the Austrian Empire, the new kingdom served as an important site for conscripts and revenue, but also as a central pillar in the defense of the Empire and a bulwark against French expansion, the *sine que non* of Austrian policy in Italy. Laven has argued that no distinct policy for the kingdom existed outside of the context of imperial policy and that Francis ruled through a "paternalistic conservatism" and limited reform, a combination

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[617] These Austrians, known as "*tedeschi*" (meaning, someone from Germany), did cause some conflict among Venetians. Yet most of them were bilingual natives of the Trentino. Venetians took further umbrage at the fact that Lombards were given precedent when filling powerful Venetian political positions. According to contemporaries, while Venetians were plucky and talented in business, they were "prone to dramatic mood swings" and "obsessed with the pursuit of pleasure." See Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 85-6; Pichler, *Italiener in Österreich*, 35-49.

[618] During the Napoleonic occupation, Milan administered the Kingdom of Italy. This fueled resentment in Venice, which had been relegated to a subservient status. Thus, the decision to maintain the two as separate capitals both limited antagonisms while guaranteeing support for Austrian rule among the Venetian elite. Mazohl-Wallnig, *Österreichischer Verwaltungsstaat*, 210; Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 54-5, 67.

that won him lasting support and, most importantly, shored up the Austrian position in Italy and checked French aggression.[619]

If Francis's rule in Italy from 1815 to his death in 1835 proved popular and moderate, and if Italian nationalism made little inroads among the Venetians, the full impact of Austrian information gathering on the peninsula is unclear. In Laven's telling (limited as it is to Venetia), throughout the duration of Habsburg dominance in Lombardy (1815-1859) and Venetia (1815-1866), the Austrians employed both the carrot and the stick to create good imperial subjects. While success was limited, this included spending on education, opening pathways for the university educated to enter imperial politics, and reinstating the position of Catholicism. It also included heavy-handed censorship of images as well as periodicals and newspapers and a growing military and police presence that maintained surveillance on potentially radical populations as well as civil servants and the clergy.[620] John Davis has traced the censorship regulations of the Napoleonic era in Lombardy-Venetia into the Restoration period, arguing that there was almost "uninterrupted administrative and institutional continuity" and that the revolutions of 1821 only strengthened the imperative to control press freedoms.[621] Steven Hughes has,

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[619] Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 24-5.

[620] Such reports were fairly numerous and detailed. Those located in the files of Ministry of Police in Vienna often deal with a particular individual's service to Napoleon and the Cisalpine Republic. For examples see, Hagar to Metternich, 7 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 362-367 (NM). Laven, "Austria's Italian Policy," 8-10; Laven, *Venice and Venetia*, 208-9.

however briefly, uncovered Metternich's influence on political policing in Bologna,[622] while Michael Broers has also detailed the various forms reactionary government took in Piedmont between 1814 and 1821.[623] Despite such scholarship, the extent of Austrian influence in Italy between 1814-1830 remains underrepresented, especially in the English-language literature.

Beyond maintaining a military presence in various restored states, Metternich sought to expand Austrian influence (and, thereby, European security) by establishing an Italian Confederation under Austrian sway, like that of the German Confederation. The Papal States and Piedmont-Sardinia successfully blocked this defensive league; however, Metternich was successful in extending Austrian authority through means other than purely military. This included managing dynastic marriages, establishing secret treaties with neighboring states, and intervening in the foreign and domestic affairs of other

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[621] John Davis, "Cultures of Interdiction: The Politics of Censorship in Italy from Napoleon to the Restoration," in *Napoleon's Legacy*, 237-56, esp. 244-5. In Lombardy-Venetia, for example, printers and booksellers were obliged to obtain licenses from the police and, after 1817, owners of printshops had to leave a 500 florin deposit with the police as well.

[622] Steven Hughes, *Crime, Disorder, and the Risorgimento*, esp. 75-81.

[623] Save for a few journal articles and one chapter, most of Broers's work deals with Italy's Napoleonic period. See his, "Policing Piedmont: 'The Well-Ordered Police State' in the Age of Revolution, 1794-1821," *Criminal Justice History* 15 (1994): 39-57; *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy*, Chap. IX; "Ideological Change & National Frontiers: From the Fall of the Napoleonic Empire to the Savoyard Restoration in Subalpine Italy, 1814-1821," *European Restorations*, II: 177-87.

restored regimes.[624] But if historians such as Rath and Laven have admirably captured the impact of Habsburg hegemony on Italian political history, we have yet to understand how Italy affected Habsburg policy. What follows, then, is a preliminary sketch of how events on the Italian peninsula influenced Austrian foreign and domestic concerns, especially as it pertained to the continued Napoleonic threat and, later, that of secret societies.

Habsburg Information Gathering in Italy: The Bonapartes

In November 1814, just as Europe's delegates were arriving in Vienna, Emperor Francis received a preliminary report that took the political temperature of post-occupied Europe. The report consisted of five related topics of concern for Austria at the upcoming congress and suggested areas where further investigation was necessary. This included the possibility of a new German General Assembly (*deutsche Volksversammlung*) and the fate of those German princes who either supported French occupation or who worked directly with the occupiers. Would the Austrian Empire continue to support those German princes who served the "Napoleonic system" which affected the lives of one million Germans? If "all German lands" were to send "peoples'

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[624] Metternich's use of soft and hard diplomacy is discussed, however briefly, in Laven, "Austria's Italian Policy," 13-17. Here, Laven offers incredibly valuable insight, but work on these topics is virtually nonexistent in the English-language literature. Laven's discussion of Metternich's diplomatic maneuvers are analyzed almost exclusively in terms of checking French power. Finally, Laven is dismissive of Metternich's fears of revolution and does not discuss concerns about the Bonapartes.

deputies" to "take control over the means of liberation for all Germans" (a plan directed, the author noted, by Baron von Stein), how would the Austrian Empire respond? The report's fourth point, "Comments on the Interests and Politics of Several States," also included the author's thoughts on public opinion – and the "happiness of the peoples of Europe" – in Switzerland, Russia, Prussia, England, Spain and Portugal, Italy, and Germany. While the author gave significant attention to the problems facing each state, he devoted only two sentences on the fractured land of Italy. "The spirit of the old Romans," the author announced, "is not shared between [the kingdoms]." But should that spirit return, the report warned, "they will throw off the iron yoke" of foreign control and "unite in one state."[625] Despite Metternich's and Francis's confidence that their new Italian territories were relatively free of nationalist unrest, the peninsula became one of the most surveilled region of Europe by the end of the decade.

Other allied powers, however, did not share Metternich's sanguine opinion. In early 1814, Sir Robert Wilson, the British attaché to the Austrian army, warned Castlereagh that "Independence is the unequivocal demand of the men of letters, the Army, and the people." In a later letter to Lord Grey, Wilson claimed "The political existence of Italy must be preserved if we wish to . . . prevent the restoration of Bonaparte's influence. The will to be free exists – no power can prevent that will." While Wilson admitted that this "will to be free" was the creation of Napoleon, he also

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[625] Hager to Francis, 14 November 1814, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 36-59.

claimed that, once created, "it possesses the *vis vitae* and will struggle successfully to maturity."[626] As a Whig, Wilson was sympathetic to the cause of Italian independence and unification and may have even been aware of Milanese attempts to secure British support against Habsburg dominance.[627] On 27 April 1814, one week after the revolt that ended Beauharnais's reign in Lombardy, a group of three hundred Milanese presented Lord Bentinck,[628] commander-in-chief of British forces in the Mediterranean, letters demanding Italian independence as well as a draft for a constitution for a Kingdom of Italy. According to one report, which included confiscated mail, the British in Italy had purposefully stoked Italian passions for independence, further leading fifteen Milanese

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[626] Wilson to Lord Grey, 14 May 1814, as quoted in Rath, *The Provisional Austrian Regime*, 169-71. In 1814/5, both Grey and Wilson were members of the Whig party, and generally supported increased middle-class participation in British government. It is likely the case that their general liberalism would likely color their views of allied foreign policy regarding Italy as well as generate sympathy for Italian independence. Wilson would go on to sit as a Whig Member of Parliament from 1818 to 1831, while Grey served as Prime Minister between 1830 and 1834 as a member of the Whig party. See Alan Sykes, *The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism, 1770-1988* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2014), esp. Chap. 1. My thanks to Brian Vick for alerting my attention to Whig interests in Italy.

[627] Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 108-9.

[628] Bentinck had a history of meddling in Italian affairs, drawing up ill-fated constitutions; announcing new republics on his own authority; inciting uprisings against Napoleonic rule; and even being accused of conspiring to set up his own independent kingdom on the Italian peninsula. This was indeed an embarrassment to Britain, and, in May 1814, Castlereagh wrote to Bentinck, urging him to never again "take any steps to encourage the fermentation which at present seems to prevail in Italy, on questions of the government." Lord Liverpool, the British Prime Minister, sharply reduced his scope of action and relieved him of his command in April 1815. See Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 171.

"*gentilshommes*" as well as "numerous" Tuscans to travel to London in the hopes of swaying British opinion in their favor.[629] In the decade to follow, London became an important site for Italian political refugees and for societies dedicated to Italian independence.

An abortive military conspiracy at Brescia and Milan in the fall of 1814 confirmed those general fears that opposition to Austrian rule existed and, with the right conditions, could be successful, possibly leading to French expansion south. R. John Rath has covered the conspiracy in exhaustive detail.[630] Suffice to say that the conspiracy had multiple strands and was supported by "liberal groups" in Lombardy-Venetia – who hoped to gain independence and establish liberal political institutions – as well as the Italian army, resentful for the Austrian reorganization of the imperial army. The conspiracy also had an international dimension. Hager scoffed initially at the possibility of a revolution. His opinion changed, however, when Metternich received word from the Count Bombelles, an Austrian diplomat in Paris, regarding a plot among Italian veterans to rebel against the Austrians. In the spring of 1814, a man named Esquiron de St. Agnan told Bombelles of a revolutionary plot, the details of which, St. Agnan received from a certain Count Comelli in London.[631] Hager instructed Bellegarde

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[629] Hager to Metternich, 16 September 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 310-313.

[630] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, esp. Chap. VI.

[631] Bombelles sent a certain Carlo Altieri, an archivist and pro-Habsburg Italian, from Paris to Milan to maintain surveillance on St. Agnan. Altieri reported to Bellegarde on 7

and Prince Heinrich Reuss-Plauen, the governor of Milan, to monitor Comelli's movements, as well as other pro-French Italians.[632] Little came of this until October, when another plot supporting the return of Beauharnais that involved ex-French imperial officers and soldiers came to light. This conspiracy immediately caught Vienna's attention, and Hager ordered the confiscation of Beauharnais's correspondence.[633] The details of the plot unfolded throughout November and December,[634] as the same St. Agnan, who hoped to receive land in Germany and a generous sum for his services, furnished Bellegarde with further information. Between 3 December 1814 and 1 February 1815, Austrian officials arrested eighteen men involved in the plot while others managed to flee. Francis awarded St. Agnan 4,000 gold francs for his service and a

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December, claiming "For my part, I cooperated, as much as I could, in the good service of the sovereign" and that he was leaving Milan and would contact Bellegarde with a dispatch via Josef von Hudelist, a Councilor of State and Conference and close confidant of Metternich. Hudelist often headed the State Chancellery when Metternich was otherwise disposed. In July 1815, however, Hudelist reported to the Ministry of Police that Altieri had made daily secret reports but produced "nothing of substance." Altieri's 7 December 1814 letter along with Hudelist's report can be found in, Hager to Metternich, 6 July 1815, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 60.

[632] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, Chap. VI, esp. 243-9.

[633] Hager to Metternich, 5 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 111.

[634] Bellegarde's first report to Vienna about the extent of the plot, the arrests, and trials arrived on 27 December. See Hager to Metternich, 27 December 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 486.

lifetime ban from Italy for his scheming.[635] Comelli would reappear in Campagna in March 1816 on his way to the Ottoman Empire,[636] dying in the Dardanelles in October.[637]

This conspiracy failed to materialize in any significant way, but it did have important ramifications. First, it provided Vienna with direct evidence that liberal, pro-French (and, thus, anti-Austrian) elements existed in Lombardy-Venetia. Second, individuals with close ties to Louis XVIII were involved thus tying the French government to Italian independence movements. These French conspirators promised that Louis personally approved the complot and was willing to fund the conspiracy if it would put the Duc de Berry (Louis's nephew and *émigrés* to Vienna) on the throne of an independent and unified Italy. Finally, evidence provided by St. Agnan suggested that a society for Italian independence existed in London. Moreover, the British prince regent was a member and approved the plot, as did Sir William Drake and the Marquis of Wellesley. Not only was the previously mentioned Count Comelli in London promoting the undertaking,[638] three other Italian "malcontents" – a Frederico Confalonieri, Alberto Litta, and Giovanni Somagli – had traveled from Paris to London to gain British support.

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[635] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 271-3.

[636] Report to Hager, 23 March 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 16.

[637] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 273.

[638] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 263-8.

In late October, Hager received word from Bellegarde that these three had returned to Italy and that they were under strict surveillance.[639]

Despite the support – both politically and militarily – for Italian unity or independence among the certain British officials, there is no evidence to suggest that Castlereagh himself supported renewed Bonapartist rule over the peninsula.[640] As R.

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[639] Hager to Metternich, 7 and 29 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 368 and 416. These three "malcontents" were part of the delegation the provisional regime in Lombardy sent to the Allied Powers in Paris. All three would return to Italy and join various secret societies, playing important, public roles in the revolutions of 1820/1. This was especially true of Confalonieri who the Austrian incarcerated in the Spielberg with Silvio Pellico, the Italian author and chronicler of Austrian abuses whose work became a critical rallying point for Italian nationalism in the *Risorgimento*. Heinrich von Srbik, *Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, 2 vols. (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1925), I:481.

[640] Alongside British authorities, British travelers were also a concern for Austrian officials in Italy. None more than Augusto Bozzi Granville, a freemason and translator of Italian correspondence in the British foreign office until May 1814. Granville had published a pamphlet in spring 1814 imploring the Tsar to guarantee Italian unification under Victor Emmanuel I. An Italian edition began to circulate in Lombardy months after Granville's arrival there. Granville's eventual arrest led to a flurry of correspondence between Metternich and Castlereagh regarding the need to surveil Italian Jacobins in England, recall Bentinck from Italy, and suppress the "revolutionary spirit" in Italy. See Rath, *The Provisional Austrian Regime*, 174-77. When writing was translated into Italian, however, it became a matter for the police. For a report on the censoring of British travel writers see, Report to Hager, 27 December 1814, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 144-145. The example that accompanies the larger report is the oddly titled, *Observations sur un écrit initiale: des Bourbons de Naples di un Inglese*, a "pro-Neapolitan" book subject to confiscation. In late 1816, the Ministry of Police confiscated the mail of a Jules Griffiths, another travel writer and confidant of Dr. Jakob Fries in Jena. See Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 25 November 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 277-301. This file contains copies of intercepted mail. Fries also became the target of a significant investigation in late 1816, especially his published work. See Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 4 November 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 216-227.

John Rath points out, Castlereagh issued orders for British officials "not only to have no relations with persons who might show a tendency contrary to the spirt of the Austrian government, but also to support the principles of the Habsburg government."[641] In a report from September 1814, however, the Ministry of Police received word – via a Medici informer who was also the police minister in Florence – that certain unnamed British officials as well as the Russians were, in fact, in correspondence with Murat. The report claimed that Murat was "working more and more" to "convince the heads of Italy" to "resurrect the kingdom of Italy and the Italian nation," despite Murat's previous agreement with the Allies signed in February. The report warned that if "Murat was not dealt with quickly and completely," he would soon be dictating events on the peninsula to the Austrians. The report also announced two other significant pieces of news. First, that, according to Pope Pius VII (via a man named Oppizoni, a brother of a cardinal and confidant of the Pope), Marie Louise, Francis's daughter, had never been "catholicly married to Napoleon," a matter of great embarrassment if true. Second, and according to the same Medici informer, the pope had reinstated the Jesuits, which, the author claimed was a "mortal blow to the philosophy of the century, to the founders of revolution."[642]

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[641] Metternich to Bellegarde, 12 October 1814, as quoted in Rath, *The Provisional Austrian Regime*, 176-77.

[642] "C'est un coup mortel porté a la philosophie du siècle, aux forgeurs de revolutions; mais ils rauront les empêcher de ressasiter dans bien des paÿs (sic)." Hager to Metternich, 6 September 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 74-77. Joseph II suppressed the order in 1773 in an attempt to establish an independent Austrian state-church. Pope Pius restored the order on 7 August 1814. In May and June 1820, Francis allowed Jesuits exiled from

A week later, on 14 September, the Medicis reported once again on Murat's situation. He warned the Austrians that Murat was "arming by force" and doubling his conscription efforts; "all the tailors of Naples," the report claimed, were "occupied" with sewing uniforms. The Neapolitans were growing increasingly agitated with Murat, the report determined; they refused to "allow the return of the old king" and were "ready to rebel." Yet, the Medici informer criticized the Austrians in the region, claiming that "Austrian agents" openly protected "Murat's crown" by dissuading Neapolitans from revolting. Murat blamed instances of revolt on the Prince of Moliterno (despite him being in Rome) "to reduce the effect of the scandal." This Medici informant ended the report claiming that the city of Naples – and Neapolitans in general – welcomed Austria and that the city had not yet revolted against Murat "out of respect for the emperor."[643]

If British efforts to stoke Italian nationalism directly challenged Austrian hegemony on the peninsula, both countries found common ground in their fear of Napoleon's continued influence. A combined Austro-British effort to surveil Napoleon began in late August after the State Chancellery ordered Bellegarde to monitor travel and communication between the Italian coast and Elba.[644] Central to this effort was the

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Russia to settle in Galicia. On 14 August 1820, Francis officially reinstated the order, allowing the Jesuits to establish a college with a gymnasium in the city of Tarnopol. In 1822, however, Francis expressly forbade their return to Vienna. On the Jesuits in the Austrian Empire see, Alan Reinerman, "The Return of the Jesuits to the Austrian Empire and the Decline of Josephinism, 1820-1822," *The Catholic Historical Review* 52 (1966): 372- 390.

[643] Hager to Metternich, 14 September 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 305-307.

Austrian presence in Tuscany as well as British control of the Mediterranean. By the fall of 1814, Austrian troops under the command of General Starhemberg entered the Duchy of Lucca – once part of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany ruled by Elisa Bonaparte between 1809 and 1814 – with a garrison of some 800 soldiers, the maintenance of which cost the Duchy 12,000 gold ducats.[645] With their presence in Italy's western coast established, the Austrians could monitor travel and communication. In late September, the Ministry of Police received a series of reports on ex-Napoleonic officials, including one report that claimed Napoleon sought nothing less than "revolution" and the "independence of all Italy." With the "spirit of Italianism" (*spiritu d'Italianismo*) swaying "back and forth every day," the author claimed this was a matter that demanded the "complete attention of the police." The author also suggested that Napoleon had established a contingent of loyal soldiers on the island and expected an outbreak of revolt in Tuscany to signal his eventual escape. While the author claimed the number of soldiers on Elba was "very small," it was a troubling sign and an "extraordinary excess," made worse by the fact Napoleon had established contacts in Genoa with a certain Advocate Belligrini. To this end, Bellegarde instructed agents in Portoferraio to spy on visitors and those suspected of harboring sympathy for the ex-emperor while ordering the confiscation of mail.[646]

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[644] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 178.

[645] Hager to Metternich, 6 September 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 74-77.

[646] A copy of this letter, dated 22 September 1814, can be found in Hager to Metternich, 7 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 366.

By mid-September, reports began arriving from Italy. The first report regarding visitors to Elba came from Florence via the provisional head of state in the Tyrol. In his letter to the Francis, Hagar expressed some confusion about how this individual obtained such information; however, Hagar clearly found it sufficiently reliable to forward the report to the emperor. The report drew on information from the Major-General Neil Campbell who had escorted Napoleon to Elba in March 1814 and commanded the military detachment on the island. Campbell, who was residing in Livorno, made numerous trips between the mainland and the island. According to Campbell, Napoleon had long suspected that the Allies were sending not just spies but "assassins" (*Sicaires*) to the island and that he had warned his own internal security to "take precautions" against foreigners. Campbell also reported that Napoleon was "sleeping during the day" as well as "during the evening," both of which he "normally did very little" and that he had "lost much of his energy and appeared lean." Despite that, Campbell warned the Austrians that Napoleon was actively "recruiting troops in Corsica and Tuscany" and was looking to "arm the small neighboring states" as well. Considering this, Campbell advised that Napoleon's "French guard" be immediately disbanded and replaced. Finally, Campbell's report suggests that Napoleon had not lost all his *élan*: in October, Campbell learned that Napoleon had "conquered" the small and "almost deserted" island of Pianosa, seven miles south of Elba, where he rebuilt a series of fortifications and settled farmers "with enough corn to subsist upon and even export back to Elba."[647]

By early October 1814, the Ministry of Police began receiving regular reports on the confiscation of mail between Napoleon, his relatives, and their "followers in Italy."[648] This included both contact between Napoleon and his family as well as his siblings' contact with local elites and Italians who had served the Cisalpine Republic. In January, the Austrian police, with the aid of Baron von Strassoldo – one of the chief Austrian officials in Milan – confiscated the correspondence between Elise Bonaparte and Graf von Cassis-Faraone in Tuscany.[649] Mail to and from Elba, however, became Hagar's chief concern and one that increased after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo.[650] During the period between 20 March and 25 June 1815 (Napoleon's One Hundred Days), the confiscation of mail virtually ceased. This is, of course, not surprising. But the Ministry of Police in Vienna did receive reports regarding communication between Napoleon and François Le Lorgne d'Ideville, a member of the Chamber of Deputies and Napoleon's private translator of "northern languages" as well as Polish and Russian. D'Ideville was in Munich, writing to Napoleon (now in Paris) about the general political and military affairs in the German states.[651] After Napoleon's final abdication in June (from

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[647] Hager to Francis, 23 October 1814, HHStA KA KKA *Referate Baldaccis* 6, Bl. 352-354.

[648] Metternich to Hager, 17 October 1814, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 110.

[649] Metternich to Hager, 18 and 24 January 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 10 and 12 (NM).

[650] Metternich to Hager, 29 January 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 15 (NM).

Malmaison), his plea to the French army to continuing fighting, and his attempt to flee to America in July, the surveillance of the Bonaparte sisters' mail resumed almost immediately.[652]

From their headquarters in the Tuscan port city of Livorno, the British, the French, and the Austrians routinely attempted to sneak spies disguised as merchants onto the island. There, authorities maintained a "large network of underground agents" who set about gaining the confidence of Napoleon's allies, both on the island and on the peninsula. In one instance, and on orders from Bellegarde, the police in Milan hired a man name Domenico Ettori, an ex-monk and former French employee, to report on Napoleon's activities as well as on his visitors. Ettori left Milan on 4 October, arrived in Portoferraio on 30 October, and returned to Livorno on 12 November. Ettori's information was already familiar. Napoleon maintained communication with Murat as well as with ex-imperial soldiers, Italian liberals and Freemasons in Bologna, Venice, and Milan, and the "chief marshals of France." According to Ettori, Napoleon was to set sail from the Viareggio, arriving on the peninsula where some fifty thousand soldiers awaited his return. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of Ettori's information or to determine whether men like him were unscrupulous adventurers seeking substantial payouts, a

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[651] Metternich to Hager, 27 March 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 60 (NM).

[652] Metternich to Hager, 13 July 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 165 (NM).

concern often repeated in these reports. Habsburg officials even arrested Ettori, sending him to Vienna for questioning, claiming he was a double agent for Napoleon.[653]

More reports arrived in Vienna in late September. In a series of reports collected by Hager and forwarded to Metternich in early October, one letter warned of Napoleon's growing control over powerful "offices" in Portoferraio. The author reported that a General Jean-Baptiste Bertolosi, "a Corsican" and once the commander of the garrison in the Department and city of Milan, was now commander of the city of Portoferraio and drawing a monthly salary of 200 francs. A Colonel Ordioni, another Corsican, was also in the city, drawing a 100-franc monthly salary. It was necessary, the author claimed, that these names be published in Venetian newspapers to warn the public that Napoleon had well-positioned individuals in his pay. The author also warned that Napoleon's representatives were traveling to Genoa for provisions but made it clear that the British had placed merchants there and were aware of these transactions.[654] Further reports from Livorno suggested that the success of British and Austrian "daily spies" was increasingly limited. Napoleon, the report claimed, "spoke to no one" and anyone claiming to have business with him reported to General Henri-Gatein Bertrand, who had accompanied Napoleon to Elba and who oversaw the ex-emperor's security. Nevertheless, the report did claim that Napoleon would, in fact, command an "invasion."[655] If information from

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[653] Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 179-80.

[654] Hager to Metternich, 7 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 372-374, here, 373.

spies was spotty and subject to certain flourishes – as was likely the case with Ettori – a plot to escape and rally an army nonetheless emerged. It remains unclear if Napoleon's communication with Murat and his return to Italy was merely a feint. However, Napoleon's escape and landing at Golfe-Juan with 1,100 loyal soldiers only six months after these reports began arriving vindicates the intelligence.

The spread of pro-Napoleonic and pro-Italian nationalist literature also aroused concern, especially when that material was published in Italy. On 27 September, Hager wrote to Metternich concerning the spread of a pamphlet titled, *Napoleone il Grande*, which circulated secretly in Genoa, Lombardy, and Vienna after its translation from the Italian into German.[656] Other titles published later in 1814 further fueled suspicion regarding the British interest in a unified Italy. In November, Hager received word regarding the "spread" of book by an individual whose *nom de guerre* was simply "Cittadino." The work titled, *Appello all'Europa di un-Veneto Cittadino* (*An Appeal to Europe from a Venetian Citizen*) was an emotional appeal for unification, and while not overtly anti-Austrian, the intent was clear enough for the work to be confiscated and an investigation into its author initiated.[657] Perhaps the most worrisome title was the short

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[655] Ibid., Bl. 374.

[656] Hagar to Metternich, 27 September 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 345 (NM). Hagar, rather gleefully, included a pamphlet that had recently arrived from Paris titled, *Sur Napoleon et ses Calomniateurs*.

[657] Metternich to Hager, 23 November 1814, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 128.

pamphlet, *l'Italia al Congresso di Vienna: Voto Nazionale*, published in late 1814 by an organization calling themselves, *Confederazione Italia*. The anonymous author praised the work of the Congress as a "sacred assembly," but argued that the establishment of a "federative system" (*sistema federative*) in Italy served not only the interests of Italians but all of Europe. On the one hand, the author argued, giving Italians a "national existence" would allow "them to taste the idea of their dignity, and of their greatness" and would put an end to "periodic revolution."[658] On the other hand, the author was critical of the hollow promises made at the Congress, stating plainly that if France, "which has the ability of amassing so many dangers" and "spreading it across the face of Europe," renewed war, Austria would defend neither Germany nor Italy; rather, the author claimed, Austria would "take care of its own defense" and, thus, an unified Italy was central to Europe's "political equilibrium."[659] Not guaranteeing Italian independence, then, was, at best, simply naked aggression on the part of Austria or, at worst, a tacit admission that lasting peace was unlikely.[660]

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[658] *L'Italia al Congresso di Vienna: Voto Nazionale* (Italia, 1814), 6.

[659] Ibid. 7, 9.

[660] For the report see, Report to Hager, 14 January 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 8. The author claims the *Confederazione Italia* could trace their lineage back to the Illuminati. The author also proposed a rather progressive society, one that respected "Protestants, Lutherans, and Turks" alike and that would promote the study of "science" and the grandeur of Italy's great universities, all tied together by ancient customs, language, art, and religion. Regarding the limited success of the Congress see, Šedivý, *The Decline of the Congress System*, esp. Chap. 1. Šedivý argues that post-Napoleonic statesmen had

While individuals like Murat and his co-conspirators in Italy and Britain continued to irritate the postwar transition, the Austrians were also interested in British, German, and Russian diplomatic correspondence with the French concerning the peninsula. The monitoring of foreign diplomats at Francis's court predated the Congress by a decade. On the recommendation from Count Sumerau to recruit "trusted members of the upper class," Francis issued a resolution in 1805 ordering the state police to supervise ambassadors and other diplomatic personal through a network of well-placed informants. This included placing confidants in inns and taverns, in the personal residences of diplomats disguised as servants, and as trusted advisors. These individuals intercepted mail and rooted through trash and fireplaces for unused drafts of letters (*chiffons*), all of which was sent to the Ministry of Police for reconstruction. Through these informants we learn that Castlereagh kept in shape by dancing, often with his chair when his wife was not available and that the Tsar Alexander rubbed his body down with ice each morning. Such intelligence-gathering methods were well-known among the delegates in Vienna. Indeed, knowledge of this led many delegates to refuse to hire Viennese servants and even birthed a counterespionage network among foreign dignitaries.[661]

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learned little from the wars, pointing to the almost immediate resumption of power politics and war in the 1830s and 1840s. This point is well taken, even if the resumption of international distrust immediately followed the Congress. It does, however, neglect the fact that no general European war on the scale of Napoleon's infected the continent until 1914.

Within a few short weeks of the delegate's arrival in Vienna, the Austrian higher state police had already received reports on those connections as well as individual personalities. This information could often be quite petty. For example, we learn that Lord Stewart, Castlereagh's half-brother and the British Ambassador to Vienna (1814-1823), had within a few short months made an unfortunate name for himself. According to one report, "in his diplomatic routine" Stewart was a "Rochus Pumpernickel," a haughty and belligerent character from a well-known 1811 stage play. But the reports could also be quite substantive and prescient. According to the same report, Castlereagh himself was a "middling talent, who had no popularity and no confidence in Parliament," nor did he enjoy much public support: "the peace," the agent reported, "had changed the entire British public."[662] The same agent discovered a potentially troubling relationship between Talleyrand and Thugut (who had recently returned to Vienna); a continued correspondence between Talleyrand and Frederick I, King of Württemberg, whose title as king – granted to him by Napoleon – and his newly acquired lands required confirmation by the Congress; and the whereabouts of the Madame Borghese (Pauline Napoleon),

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[661] See Hilde Spiel, ed., *The Congress of Vienna: An Eyewitness Account*, trans. Richard Weber (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1968), xxi-xxiv, 146-7.

[662] After Castlereagh's return to Britain in late 1815, he soon became a stand-in at home for the reactionary governments on the continent and came under constant attack from a growing Whig party. Thomas Moore, the popular poet, also mercilessly lampooned Castlereagh upon his return. After 1820, Castlereagh had lost any remaining support from the public while maintaining his position as the head of the Foreign Office as well as the House of Commons. On 12 August 1822, after suffering boats of severe paranoia and exhaustion, Castlereagh cut his own throat. For a sympathetic telling of his final years, see Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, esp. Chap 9.

who, according to the report, had liquidated her assets, sold her home in Paris to the British government, and was preparing to join Napoleon on Elba.[663]

Another concerning diplomatic figure late in 1814 was the Count Friedrich von Rohde, a Prussian serving as the French envoy in Verona. Rohde's case was of interest to Austrian authorities as it wove together French, British, and even German pursuits in Italy. According to the police in Verona, Rohde had "made himself suspicious . . . through a strange and inappropriate affair" which led police to confiscate and examine his papers. Police suspected that Rohde was "working in secret for the benefit of Italian independence" and that he may have made "certain contacts" with the assistance of the British. Should those charges prove false, the report continued, Rohde's papers would nevertheless give the Austrians insight into his "attitudes and desires about Germany's future constitution [and] about his connection with the German knighthood." While it is

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[663] Hager to Metternich, 24 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 142-145. This report arrived at the Ministry of Police from a secret agent whose sign was an encircled "X" with a line through the middle, similar to a wagon-wheel. According to a well-known, "eye-witness" account of the Congress, this specific individual had "access to Vienna's highest level of society," on which he or she reported to Hager every day. On this specific agent see, Spiel, *The Congress of Vienna*, 143. On the character of Rochus Pumpernickel, see Matthäus Stegmeier, *Rochus Pumpernickel* (Vienna: Johann Baptist Wallishausser, 1811). Pauline, Napoleon's only sibling to join him on Elba, made her own escape from the island days after Napoleon fled on 26 February 1815. Arriving in Tuscany in March, an Austrian detachment arrested Pauline at her sister Elisa's villa in Campignano and held her prisoner. She escaped after Waterloo to Rome where she, her two sons, and her mother remained under the protection of the pope. The Duke of Wellington resided in her home in Paris during his time as the British ambassador to France. Today, the British ambassador still resides there. On Pauline's flight, arrest, and communication with her sister after Waterloo, see Metternich to Hager, 13 July 1815, HHStA StK *NaP* 4, Bl. 60-61.

unclear whether Rohde was acting against Austrian interests in Italy, with the assistance of the British and French, Habsburg authorities promptly exiled his from Venetia, forcing him to return to Prussian territory (via the Tyrol).[664]

Despite the extent of the Habsburg information gathering on Napoleon and his supporters in Italy, Britain, and France, it remains unclear if the Austrians could presage Napoleon's landing in southern France in March 1815. As the above reports show, both Hager and Metternich were keen to uncover any lasting relationship between powerful French statesmen and the Bonapartes. If no clear conspiratorial connection emerges in the files of the Ministry of Police, they are dominated by events in Italy, most of which pertain to a supposed plot between Napoleon and Murat. This attests the region's importance for post-war Austrian and European security, as it does to the power Bonapartism still wielded over the Continent, a point only hinted at in recent assessments of the era.[665] Although the Austrians had knowledge of a plot to return Napoleon to the Continent, Major-General Campbell, who had furnished Vienna with reports about Napoleon's plans in September 1814, was nonetheless caught unawares when Napoleon escaped Elba on 26 February.

The Austrians' prior knowledge of Napoleon's escape from Elba, which it did not share, became a minor "affair" after the arrest and interrogation of the previously

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[664] Hager to Metternich, 9 October 1814, HHStA StK *NvP* 30, Bl. 117.

[665] For example, see, de Graaf, *Fighting Terror*, 205-7.

mentioned Domenico Ettori in Switzerland. Among Ettori's confiscated papers was a letter to the British cabinet in Vienna claiming that, despite Lord Castlereagh's claim to Parliament that Napoleon's escape was unforeseeable, Austria had months-long advanced notice "about what was going to be done." In fact, Ettori had previously visited Elba and reported back to the Austrians, a move sanctioned by Bellegarde and a General Airone Steffanini, who commanded Austrian soldiers during the war against Maret and who promised Ettori would be rewarded. Ettori claimed that Bellegarde, in the company of other Austrian officers, had sent a certain Baron de Weingarten to Florence to halt the march of "German soldiers." Ettori even tried to gain an audience with the emperor in Milan to press his case but "gave up" after several attempts. During his interrogation, Ettori claimed Austrian officials had "taken advantage of his services" and, quite damningly, claimed the Austrians "did not dare to communicate to the Congress" the details of Napoleon's planned escape.[666] Ettori joined a long list of adventurers hoping to secure positions and pensions for their service to the emperor. Whether the details of Ettori's story are true, he was almost certainly correct in asserting the Austrian's knowledge of Napoleon's plot. Francis had previously banned Ettori from Italy for his intrigues, but he paid for this final insult with indefinite incarceration, a treatment

[666] The details of this so-called "*L'affaire d'Ettori*" can be found in, Metternich to Hager, 23 July 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 97-99.

reserved only for those deemed too serious a threat to the state. Sedlnitzky, Metternich, and the emperor agreed upon the punishment.[667]

Napoleon's One Hundred Days and his eventual abdication did not end Austrian interest in the Bonapartes or their supporters. On the contrary, between late 1815 and 1821, information gathering on Napoleon, his family, and supporters (especially those who traveled with him to Elba and St. Helena) only intensified, becoming the overwhelming focus of the Ministry of Police. In fact, in mid-1818, Habsburg authorities even suggested that confiscated letters to and from Fouché, who had settled in Linz, showed a concerning use of imperial titles, and that the Bonapartists' continued use of terms such as "*votre Excellence*" and "*Altesse*" were proof that these individuals viewed themselves as simply a "government in exile."[668] And in early 1818, Habsburg authorities still claimed that the "Bonaparte family maintains a secretive connection" to one another.[669] The investigation and eventual persecution of suspected Bonapartists was not only a matter of Austrian concern, other Central European states also ousted

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[667] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 14 September 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 162-169. In January of 1816, the Ministry of Police received a copy of a report titled, "Details about Domenico Ettori," which can be found in, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, 164-166.

[668] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 19 and 23 May 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 181 and 186. As late as July 1818, Marie Louise still signed her correspondence with "*l'Impératrice*". See Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 1 July 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 246.

[669] "*der Bonapartischen Familie in geheimnisvoller Verbindung stehen.*" Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 11 January 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 7.

Napoleon's supporters from important state positions.[670] Chapter IV addressed this lingering fear of Napoleon and his supporters, pointing to hundreds of pages of reports located in the secret files of the State Chancellery, as well as the continued confiscation of the so-called Bonapartists' correspondence. Siemann argues that Napoleon's One Hundred Days inaugurated a "new epoch in European security policy," claiming that Napoleon's reappearance created the "image of a possible crisis."[671] But as this chapter shows, concerns regarding Bonapartist machinations and the renewed threat of revolution pre-dated Napoleon's escape from Elba and only continued after Waterloo.

Italy, however, was no longer the epicenter of a Bonapartist plot, as Metternich demanded the resettlement of Bonapartists in Austrian territory, especially Vienna, Prague, Gratz, and Trieste. This, of course, does not mean Bonapartists abruptly ended their correspondence with supporters in Italy. For example, in October 1817, the Prince Esterhazy, writing from London, alerted Vienna that Charles Piontkowski, the Polish revolutionary who traveled to St. Helena, had maintained correspondence with ex-Bonapartists in Genoa and Livorno as well as in North America and in Britain.[672]

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[670] This de-Bonapartization of Central Europe has not yet found its historian. For the case of Saxony see, Bernhard Lange, *Die öffentliche Meinung in Sachsen von 1813 bis zur Rückkehr des Königs 1815* (Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 1912), esp. 118-21. Here, Lange complies a list of 84 individuals in Dresden alone who maintained allegiance to Napoleon. This list includes the president of the Saxon Ministry of Finance, judges, three military administrators, two Catholic priests, a banker, and even a hotel manager. Similar lists exist for Leipzig, Chemnitz, and several smaller Saxon towns.

[671] Siemann, *Metternich*, 641.

Piontkowski proved to be a thorn in both the British and Austrian's side, smuggling letters from St. Helena to Napoleon's family. Sometime in late 1817, police in Milan arrested Piontkowski, imprisoning him in the fortress of Mantua. There, according to a report from Sedlnitzky in January 1818, the Austrians placed a "confidant as a fellow prisoner" in Piontkowski's cell, hoping to "understand from him the secret orders that might have been announced in St. Helena." Beyond admitting to carrying correspondence, Piontkowski "confess[ed] to nothing." Yet Sedlnitzky reaffirmed what Austrian officials had long since known: "that the secret agents of Bonaparte were primarily in Rome and Livorno right from the start."[673] Later that month, Sedlnitzky reported that Piontkowski would be transferred to the Bohemian fortress of Josephstadt.[674] Prior to Piontkowski's transfer, however, Sedlnitzky ordered officials to question him "confidentially" about the travels of Lucian Bonaparte and a Cardinal Pesche to Vienna. According to the report, Piontkowski, in exchange for being "given some newspapers to read," had told authorities about the planned visit. It appears that Piontkowski was willing to offer further information in exchange for "better treatment of

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[672] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 14 October 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 258.

[673] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 24 January 1818, HHStA StK *NvP* 35, Bl. 13

[674] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 30 January 1818, HHStA StK *NvP* 35, Bl. 18 (NM); Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 16 April 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 99-106.

Napoleon."[675] The entire "*l'affaire d'Piontkowski*" ended in mid-May 1819 when he arrived in Josephstadt and Metternich banished his wife to the United States.[676]

By the end of 1818, however, Austrian officials shifted their focus from port cities in Italy to the cities of London and Hamburg as the central nodes connecting Napoleon on St. Helena and his sympathizers on the Continent.[677] Those who did stay in Italy, such as Caroline Bonaparte, Murat's wife who settled in Naples as the Princess of Lipona,[678] or Elise Bonaparte, who settled in Campignano, remained under strict surveillance.[679] These efforts included Marie Louise, the Duchess of Parma and Francis's daughter, whom the Ministry of Police believed would still organize a "Napoleonic party," should the "party spirit" (*Parthei-Geist*) return to Italy.[680] Control over Napoleon's

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[675] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 13 April 1818, HHStA StK *NvP* 35, Bl. 101 (NM).

[676] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 14 May 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 117-119.

[677] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 22 October 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 324. The previously mentioned Gaspar Gourgaud, a French soldier interrogated by the British in 1818 after leaving St. Helena for London, returned to the Continent, via Hamburg, to settle in Prague. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 28 January 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 19. See also, Chapter 4 of this dissertation, n.131.

[678] Caroline Bonaparte's movements and correspondence was perhaps monitored the most of any of Napoleon's siblings. See Hager to Hudelist, 17 September 1815, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 90-91. The Ministry of Police would continue to monitor her movements until her death in 1832.

[679] These reports are located in, "Die Familie Bonaparte betrffend," HHStA StK *Acta Secreta* 2-109, Bl. 53-54 and 55-56. See also, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 17 and 21 June 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 92-93 and 117.

imprisonment on St. Helena fell out of Austrian hands, as the British jealously guarded access to their most famous prisoner.[681] But if a Napoleonic resurgence in Italy no longer presented itself as a great threat to Europe, as it had before Waterloo, the peninsula soon emerged as a hotbed of revolutionary activity, leading to heightened surveillance, increased collaboration with other European states, and the eventual establishment of an investigative committee in Milan.

Secret Societies and Revolution in Italy

From the Habsburg perspective, the threat of Italian radicalism is confusing and contradictory, which has manifested itself in the secondary literature. For example,

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[680] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 12 June 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 87-88. Marie Louise's relation to suspected Italian revolutionaries continued to be monitored into 1818, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 30 June 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 172-175. In what must be one of history's most bizarre relationships, the General Neipperg, who had fought Murat during the Neapolitan War and was charged with maintaining a watch on Marie Louise, reported that Marie Louise maintained correspondence with Italian revolutionaries, including a certain Rasori. He later reported that even the Princess of Wales was also in contact with Marie Louise and this Rasori. See Neipperg to Sedlnitzky, 21 April and 18 May 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 123 and 167. Despite his long-standing surveillance of the Duchess, Neipperg was almost certainly engaged in a romantic affair with her. In March 1817, *Edler* von Raab, the Police Director of Milan, wrote that "Neipperg is hated . . . We are scandalized by the familiarity he shows in public and in the theater with regards to [Marie Louise]." After Napoleon's death in 1821, the two married. For Raab's letter see, Report to Sedlnitzky, 5 March 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 164.

[681] For this interesting history as well as the methods used by Napoleon and his Continental collaborators to communicate – including hidden missives written in ciphers and published in well-known newspapers – see, Pierre Branda, *Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène* (Paris: Perrin, 2021).

Donald Emerson quotes Metternich as claiming, "the troubled temper of Italy in general necessitates a ceaseless watch on the efforts of agitators," while in the following paragraph suggesting "[Metternich] believed dangers then to be unlikely."[682] In 1819, Metternich wrote, "The Italian makes a lot of noise, but he does not take action" and one year later claimed that Neapolitans were "passionate like the Africans, a people who can neither read nor write and whose last word is the dagger, they make good material for the application of constitutional principles." Metternich was similarly dismissive of Lombards (as anti-Austrian), the Piedmontese (as little more than circus clowns), and the Romagnolo (as "loafers . . comedians and retired singers"). In 1820, Metternich, in a letter to Count Zichy, claimed that Italians are "afraid of the organized gang."[683] Whether this was pure naivety on Metternich's part, or some performative bravura is unclear; [684] the sheer amount of correspondence Metternich produced makes him a contradictory and confusing source, and one must always take his audience into consideration. Metternich's dismissive attitude, however, belies the resources Austria spent in monitoring the peninsula and the infrastructure they developed to do so.

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[682] Emerson, *Metternich*, 60-1.

[683] As quoted in, de Savingy, *Metternich and His Times*, 188 and 189.

[684] Emerson quotes Metternich as claiming in 1816 that, "The sovereign of all Italy could not be received as I am. All the good sort – and there are many – crowd around me. They give me complete confidence and expect their salvation from me alone. The Jacobins hide and consider me a rod which menaces them."

Despite an already significant presence on the peninsula, and over two years of investigations into Bonapartist activity, in his first visit to Italy, Metternich urged authorities to redouble their efforts.[685] Austrian authorities had already successfully closed Masonic lodges in Lombardy and Venetia no later than January 1815, and soon began investigating the connection – both institutionally and ideologically – that local societies had with Masonry as well as with the Illuminati.[686] The failed Brescian-Milanese conspiracy clearly suggested that the demand for Italian independence existed and British meddling on the peninsula remained a concern. What followed Napoleon's final defeat, and what would engage Austrian officials in Italy for several years, was the connection between these secret societies and the demand for Italian independence. The investigation, however, began with a whimper. In February of 1816, the Ministry of Police received its first report on "revolutionaries in Europe, particularly in Italy." Here, the Cardinal Ercole Consalvi,[687] the Papal Secretary of State, warned of a massive

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[685] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 21 February 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 43 (NM). Emerson also quotes this correspondence, noting Metternich's concern for the "troubled temper of Italy." Emerson, *Metternich*, 60.

[686] Already in late 1815, there was some indication that sects existed. These were the *Raggi* who changed their name to *Centri* and distributed circulars claiming, "The Italians demand their independence from the Allied Powers." Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 195, 217-8.

[687] For Consalvi's role at the Congress of Vienna and in post-Napoleonic Italian politics (until his death in 1824) see, Laven, "The Papacy, Reform, and Intervention," esp. 219-24; Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 153-62, 233-4; Roberto Regoli, "Cardinal Consalvi and the Restitution of the Papal States," in *Der Wiener Kongress – Eine*

Turkish invasion of Austria, Russia, and Italy. According to Consalvi, Italian troops in Hungary would mutiny while Turkish soldiers, led by French officers, would be welcomed by a *levée en masse* on the peninsula. The pope in Rome would lose his "secular kingdom" as Italians would establish a constitutional monarchy ruled by the Prince Regent of England, thus establishing Europe's fourth empire, as Britain joined Germany, France, and Russia as a continental power.[688] Consalvi admitted this was a plan "already formed under the auspices of Bonaparte" – he was correct, at least, in that regard. As Consalvi's report was merely a recycled version of a plot both long-known and now discredited, it earned him Metternich's scorn. Despite that, Metternich did recommend to Count Saurau, the Governor of Lombardy and Pergen's deputy during the Jacobin Trials, that measures must be taken to secure the peninsula from revolutionary unrest.[689]

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kirschenpolitische Zäsur?, eds. Heinz Durchhardt and Johannas Wischmayer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013): 113-126.

[688] A copy of this letter can be found in, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 24 February 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 6-7 (NM).

[689] Emerson, *Metternich*, 61. Saurau had a rather distinguished career. He was Pergen's chosen deputy and a major figure in the Jacobin Trials of 1794. In 1801, Saurau became the Minister of Finance. In 1810, Francis made him governor of Lower Austria and in 1814 Governor of Lombardy. In 1817 to 1823, he served as the Supreme Chancellor in Vienna's city government. In 1823, Francis appointed him head of the Austrian Court Chancellery. Wurzbach, *Saurau, Franz Joseph Graf*. In: *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Österreich*, 28, 279-83.

Between 1816 and 1820/1, Habsburg policing agencies in Italy began an intense investigation of their traditional enemy – the "sects." More specifically, Metternich and, after August 1816, Sedlnitzky sought to connect secret societies with a nascent Italian independence movement. The central figure here, however, was Count Saurau, whose "political espionage" in Italy proved mildly successful.[690] Saurau not only uncovered the existence of radical sects in Italy but also forged ties throughout the peninsula, especially with the Papal States. In June, Saurau wrote that he had two agents in his employ, a Captain Parutta and the Chavalier Dumont, the latter of whom Saurau sent south to Rome and, later, Naples, to uncover the existence of a "fraternity" (*Verbrüderung*) known as the *Congregazione Cattolica Apostolica Romana*, a religio-political organization that sought to place the pope at the head of a unified Italy.[691] One week later, Saurau reported to Vienna on Dumont's "secret mission" as well as his "secret service" in Milan. In addition, Saurau alerted Vienna about two other agents in his pay, a Frizzi, who had served in the Austrian *Landwehr* in 1807, and a Pietro Dolce, a Mason who had served General Savary during his tenure as Police Minister. Sedlnitzky was wary of Dumont, claiming he was a "supporter of revolutionary France," and questioned Dolce's

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[690] Emerson, *Metternich*, 62.

[691] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 21 June 1816, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 105-106. Sedlnitzky questioned whether Dumont and Parutta were, in fact, British agents. Parutta had worked for Lord Bentinck, and both were suspected of Whig sympathies. Metternich responded confusingly, reiterating his demand for continued investigations and precise information on this "half-Masonic sect," while adding that Saurau must wait for instructions from Vienna. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 3 July 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 77-78 (NM).

fair-weather allegiance to Italy's new Austrian masters.[692] Yet, despite this suspect group that Saurau assembled, they provided the very first sketches on the activities of secret societies and their ties to revolutionary unrest in Italy.

While the correspondence between the Bonapartists still made up the bulk of the Ministry's reports, by the late summer of 1816, the first reports of unrest began to arrive. These initial reports were largely concerned with specific individuals, as the size and whereabouts of these "sects" were still largely unknown. In late July, police in Bologna reported that an investigation – begun in June – against a certain Francesco Bartoli had uncovered his "*beaucoup activité*" in a secret society and that he had received 67,000 francs from a certain Fronconti to continue this activity.[693] In August, Saurau reported that a Colonel DuChamp, and the entire Swiss canton of Ticino – all "disciples of the Revolution" – were organizing across the border to foment Italian independence and disrupt the "general peace" among the population.[694] Despite Metternich's misgivings about Consalvi's previous information, he did court the Mgr. Tiberio Pacca, the Governor of Rome and head of its police, who, in May 1816, was in Milan. According to a Strassoldo, Pacca had "served Austria's interests well" by turning over information

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[692] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 27 June 1816, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 112.

[693] Metternich to Sedlnitzky 31 July 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 101-105 (NM). This report includes the original 21 June report from Saurau.

[694] Saurau to Sedlnitzky, 5 August 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 108-109. Saurau ordered the confiscation of DuChamps's mail later that month. See Saurau to Sedlnitzky, 23 August 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 130 (NM).

regarding Napoleon and Beauharnais a year prior.[695] Though Pacca's usefulness to Vienna waxed and waned over the following years, in August of 1816, Austrian authorities began increasingly to consider a partnership with the Papal States to investigate secret societies. That month, Pacca provided Saurau with information regarding a certain Mattoi, a Lombard postal official, whose correspondence with a man named Grandi in Ancona contained "revolutionary contents." Despite the tip, Sedlnitzky chose only to maintain surveillance on the two individuals rather than dismiss them straight away.[696]

This investigation, however, did lead to one major detail that would shape Habsburg concerns in Italy for the next decade. Not only did Saurau's spies integrate themselves in the *Congregazione Apostalica*, but they also found evidence of other secret societies in the Papal States, specifically the *San Fedisiti*, the *Philadelphi*, the *Guelfi*, and the notorious *Carbonari*.[697] After September, Saurau's spies assessed the extent of support for these secret organizations. In November, Dumont reported on a Luigi Pellegrini, a member of the *Carbonari* in Ancona. In his report to Sedlnitzky, Metternich suggested that, to strengthen ties to the Papal States, Habsburg officials should begin

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[695] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 15 May 1816, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 85 (NM).

[696] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 8 August 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 112 (NM). Sedlnitzky's reasons for leniency are not made immediately clear. However, both Sedlnitzky and Metternich often reproached Italian authorities for moving too quickly to arrest suspect individuals.

[697] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 29 August 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 145 (NM).

sharing information concerning the *Carbonari* with Consalvi.[698] Metternich feared this connection to Rome might suffer when, in September, Saurau's spies reported that they had established their own network of eight informants in Geneva, Genoa, Livorno, Ancona, Reggio, Bologna, and Rome.[699] Though, Metternich was initially dismissive of Saurau's network, both he Metternich and Sedlnitzky were eager to read the results of Saurau's espionage. In December, Saurau's agents produced a list of eighteen suspected *Carbonari*, including individuals in Ancona and, immediately to the south, the small town of Macerata.[700] By December, Frizzi and Pietro Dolce, after launching their own investigations in Genoa and Rome, estimated that there were 700,000 members of secret societies including those who supported the establishment of an Italian republic.[701]

In January, Metternich addressed doubts concerning Saurau's spies and their relationship to one another and certain problematic individuals, specifically a Ermanigildo Frediani. Frediani, it seems, was a member of the *Guelfi* and suspected of harboring sympathies for British liberals and their plans to unify the country. Despite the

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[698] On Pellegrini see, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 11 November 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 236 (NM).

[699] This network included current and former police ministers, but also merchants and civil servants. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 11 November 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 294-295 (NM) and Metternich to Sedlinitzky, 28 December 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 450 (NM).

[700] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 3 December 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 253-255 (NM).

[701] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 20 December 1816, HHStA StK *NvP* 31, Bl. 345 (NM). Emerson also quotes these same numbers. See, Emerson, *Metternich*, 67.

stated concerns of Baron Sardagna, Saurau's diplomatic consultant (*Legationsrat*) in Milan, about Frediani, both Frizzi and Dolce made contact with him in Rome, using him to infiltrate the *Guelfi*. It was also through Frediani that Saurau's spies were able to report the above estimates of secret society membership.[702] It seems, however, that Metternich and Francis eventually came to see Saurau's agents as useful and – perhaps grudgingly – successful; especially Dumont, who Francis rewarded with the rank and pension of major in the Imperial Army for his service. But as with countless other informants, Dumont's work came with a certain taint. Metternich refused to trust him outside of Italy and even Decazes, the head of the French police, maintained surveillance on Dumont while he visited Paris.[703] In fact, Saurau floated the idea of sending Dumont to England to gather information on a certain Ugo Foscolo.[704] Metternich and Sedlnitzky hesitated, claiming Dumont was of better service to Austria in Italy; his past connections to Whig politicians made him suspect.[705] But when Foscolo returned to Rome in October

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[702] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 4 January 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 1.

[703] Emerson, *Metternich*, 70.

[704] Ugo Foscolo was from an old Venetian family who studied at University of Padua. He served in French Imperial Army and later lectured at the University of Pavia. In 1813, Foscolo emigrated to Switzerland where he produced satirical works aimed at Austrian rule in Italy. In 1816, he left Switzerland for London and continued publishing widely on Italian literature. He died in 1827 in London. In 1870, Foscolo joined other "secular saints" of the new Italian nation and is now buried alongside Machiavelli and Michelangelo in the church of Santa Croce. See, Lucy Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 4 and Chap. IX.

[705] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 19 December 1816, HHStA StK *NaP* 5, Bl. 270-271 (NM).

1817, Consalvi immediately began to monitor his correspondence.[706] In November, Saurau once again called on Dumont to begin an investigation into Foscolo and his travels to the town of Bassano and Venice, where he had, according to Frizzi and Dumont's contacts, been frequenting well-known salons of suspected *Guelfi* proselytizers.[707]

In late-1817, General Bubna, command-in-chief of Austrian forces in Lombardy-Venetia, wrote to Schwarzenberg concerning the peninsula's poor military preparedness and its impact on the spread of Italian independence. The only thing that kept the "spirit of independence" at bay in southern Italy (specifically Murat's Kingdom of Naples), Bubna asserted, was the presence of Austrian troops. Even though Austria was no longer at war, Bubna claimed that should those troops be removed, the entire situation in southern Italy would rapidly change. To check this "spirit," Bubna suggested that the force under Bellegarde's command, a mere 700-man detachment at the time, was not sufficient to stop a "revolutionary outbreak" north of the Po River. Bubna suggested that troops should remain "consolidated" in southern Italy to defend "peace and order," and that Genoa should be made a "bulwark." Hence, reinforcements should be made

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[706] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 15 October 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 260.

[707] Sedlnitzky was dismissive of most of this information which claimed *Guelfi* were now widespread in Venetia. This information came from a Mallet du Pan, Dumont's contact in Geneva; the previously mentioned Frediani; and a Faveggi, a financial director from Ferrara. See, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 20 November 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 80 (NM). For some clarification into this network see Emerson, *Metternich*, 69 n.44. See also, Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, Chap. 5, esp. 230-42.

immediately available to the "marches" that bordered Papal and Austrian territory. To police Italy, "from Calabria to the Po," Bubna ordered three additional infantry regiments to Naples (roughly 2,400 soldiers), two to Lombardy, and a battalion of soldiers from the newly independent Hesse-Homburg to act as reserves. Shoring up Austria's military presence in Italy was, according to Bubna, the most effective way to "observe evil" and limit its influence.[708]

Reports such as Bubna's underscores the point that Austrian security measures in Italy were ineffectual and, as we will see, often backfired, creating an environment of increased insecurity. The reports that flooded the Ministry of Police after 1817 were vague, contradictory, and often derived from sources Habsburg authorities simply did not trust. This led to futile investigations and few arrests but also increased paranoia and new rounds of investigations. In the spring of 1817, Metternich left Italy with a sense that wide-spread dissatisfaction stalked the peninsula. Sedlnitzky echoed that sentiment in May, claiming that "indisputably, the greatest majority of people in Italy are not satisfied with the present situation."[709] Throughout 1817, more details about *Carbonari* influence in the Papal States and Lombardy-Venetia arrived in Vienna, making an already unclear

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[708] Bubna to Schwarzenberg, 22 June 1817, HHStA StK *Acta Secreta* 2-60, Bl. 6-9. Bubna does pause briefly to discuss the possible concerns of flooding Italy with Imperial soldiers. He does not address associated costs (always a concern) or the international implications of mobilizing during peacetime, but concludes "Incidentally, it is the duty of the soldiers to serve with incredible effort, even in peacetime, if the common good demands it; and they are accustomed to doing so in good will."

[709] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 20 May 1817, as quoted in Emerson, *Metternich*, 74.

and turbulent situation worse. February brought new reports of a connection between a *Carbonari* sect in Ascoli and a sect in Milan. Though little came of this investigation, Sedlnitzky feared unrest in Habsburg-dominated territory.[710] In September word arrived from Faveggi about secret societies in Rome[711] and, on the same day, more information on *Carbonari* in Lombardy arrived in Vienna. Once again, the investigations generated scant information and Metternich felt that too little evidence existed to press criminal trials.[712] One month later, Saurau reported that a certain Mallio, a Roman commissioner, claimed that Bologna was now the "central point" of an investigation into its citizens' participation in these sects, especially those who had openly supported the French Revolution. The report also touched on "popular unrest" and a "popular movement" in the small town of Macerata.[713] Shortly thereafter, Pacca and Consalvi advocated for a possible amnesty for members of these sects, an idea Metternich found preposterous, claiming Rome simply had no idea of the numbers involved. In a report dated 8 October 1817, Metternich claimed that in Naples alone there were upwards of 200,000 or more members of these secret societies (including Italians sympathetic to them) than originally

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[710] See (Ambassador to Rome) Count Appony to Sedlnitzky, 17 February 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 77. Emerson, *Metternich*, 74-5.

[711] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 18 September 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 184 (NM). See also, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 22 September 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 200.

[712] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 18 September 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 192-194.

[713] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 4 October 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 53-54 (NM).

thought. Moreover, Pacca suggested a General Gifflenga had brought the *Carbonari* to Piedmont and that Gifflenga may have had significant foreign connections.[714]

These ongoing cross-border investigations also led to a new problem of "political refugees" that would plague authorities on the peninsula in the decade to come. In early 1817, Sedlnitzky received word that a Francesco Merli, a *Carbonari* leader in Rome, had fled to Milan after Consalvi's police arrested *Carbonari* in Ascoli too soon (at least, in Metternich's estimation). The investigation into Merli's whereabouts led to the exposure of a sect in Milan, only Austrian authorities were unable to identify it as *Carbonari* or *Congregazion Apostalica*. However, Merli proved to have either never been in Milan or had already left without a trace by the time Saurau initiated his investigation.[715] While the Papal states moved forward with trials of the Ancoli *Carbonari*, the Habsburgs maintained their "watch and wait" policy. In September, Saurau arrested three gendarmes suspected of having affiliations with *Carbonari* in Ascoli; all three admitted to having once belonged to the *Congregazione Apostolica*.[716] Despite prior praise of Saurau's energetic activities, Metternich admonished him for having moved too soon, allowing the arrested gendarmes' accomplices to evade arrest, a charge Metternich

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[714] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 8 October 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 55-58. (NM).

[715] For Consalvi's letters see, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 10 and 12 February 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 76 and 85. For the reports on Saurau's investigation see, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 23 March 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 160.

[716] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 18 September 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 193-194.

similarly leveled at Consalvi and his police in their handling of the Ascoli sect.[717] Afterwards, Sedlnitzky lamented Austrian efforts to uncover *Carbonari* activity. The police learned little, but in their rush to gather information and make subsequent arrests, Austrian officials also created a confusing and unstable political situation.

The following years brought little order or clarity to Austrian investigations. Whether this was due to confusion on the part of Austrian officials or to secret societies' own attempts to cover their tracks is unclear; it is likely some combination of the two. This is exemplified by a case in mid-1817 where Habsburg authorities were unable to determine the difference between *Guelfi* and *Carbonari*. Sedlnitzky wondered if these sects often changed their name to hide their membership or to gain support outside their traditional bases of operation. Sedlnitzky believed *Carbonari* became *Guelfi* to attract membership outside of Naples, most disturbingly in Milan. Via information from Saurau's informant Faveggi, Sedlnitzky also floated the idea that, quite possibly, *Carbonari* became *Guelfi* according to rankings within Masonic orders. This was complicated by a further connection between French and Italian Masonic lodges who, according to Faveggi, supported these sects but also conspired with them to establish an Italian republic or a constitutional monarchy.[718] Emerson argues that despite Faveggi's connecting the *Guefli* with the *Adelfi* and *Filadelfi* in Piedmont, Sedlnitzky, who

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[717] This is also covered in Emerson, *Metternich*, 73.

[718] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 19 May and 20 July 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 6, Bl. 351 and 460.

considered the existence of these sects "problematical," realized "he needed to find out much about the 'sects' in Italy."[719] After two years of investigation, this was the extent of Sedlnitzky's insight.[720] In November, Pacca reveled that spies existed among Milan's police forces, only exacerbating an already confusing situation.[721] Austrian authorities, then, had failed to gain knowledge of these sects which now infiltrated territory once believed to be immune. The meagre results attest not only to the difficulties of policing across borders while depending on questionable international intriguers; they also suggest that these security measures never functioned as intended and may have led to increased paranoia and insecurity.

Continued investigations between 1818 and 1820 similarly failed to yield any significant information or, as a report stated in January 1818, to understand the "ramifications" of these societies.[722] In February 1818, reports arrived in Vienna with more information on the *Volksbewegung* in Macerata. While Papal police had arrested other suspected *Carbonari*, Metternich's report to Sedlnitzky claimed that evidence for a

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[719] Emerson, *Metternich*, 75.

[720] By the end of 1817, even Metternich had little to offer other suggesting his agents simply maintain vigilance. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 8 October 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 55-58.

[721] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 2 November 1817, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 310 (NM).

[722] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 18 January 1818, HHStA StK *NvP* 35, Bl. 7. In this report, Sedlnitzky refers to two further agents of Saurau, a Spamponi in Rome and a Canciani in Bologna.

"union of all sects in Italy" now existed.[723] In October, Roman courts proceeded with a public trial against those arrested in Macerata, sentencing five men to death and two more to long-term imprisonment.[724] More information on the "activities of the sects in Italy" arrived from a Fossombroni, a Tuscan minister, who now claimed that the *Adelfi* were the public face of the *Guelfi*, and that two individuals – an Allessi in Milan and a Cappadoera-Serera in Livorno – were both suspected *Guelfi* whose correspondence Fossombroni had confiscated.[725] Fossombroni continued to provide the Austrians with information about *Carbonari*[726] and Metternich hoped that Fossombroni would provide further "insights" especially into the possible connection between Italian sects and Russian diplomats. This struck Metternich as a plausible threat as Russia had previously meddled in Italian affairs and he believed Russia would use these sects to gain "influence" on the peninsula. Reports that the Duke of Wellington had offered these Italian sects "suzerainty" over Italy, however, appeared to Metternich as being "quite improbable."[727] Fossombroni would offer his services later in the year, reporting to

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[723] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 24 February 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 44. From the ministerial conference at Aix-le-Chappelle in the fall of 1818, Metternich sent further reports regarding the unrest in Macerata to Sedlnitsky. See, Emerson, *Metternich*, 82-3.

[724] On the trial and its conclusion see, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 6 and 22 October 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 315-316 and 325.

[725] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 25 February 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 51.

[726] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 23 March 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 23.

Saurau that he had uncovered the "constitution" of the *Carbonari* and *Guelfi*, though he failed to add much in the way of detail, suggesting that information was coming.[728] It is unclear if that information ever arrived.

The Ministry of Police made some headway after police in Milan arrested a Castanzo Magliano, imprisoning him for a month in Mantua. Because Magliano was a foreigner, officials in Mantua could only hold him for one month, after which they exiled him from Austrian territory. During his interrogation, Magliano, a suspected member of the *Congregazione Apostolica*, claimed to be a member of the *Societa Delfica*, which Sedlnitzky believed was "undoubtedly one and the same" with the *Filadelfi* in Genoa and *Adlefi* in Piedmont. However, Magliano claimed that the *Societa* originated in France and was only a branch of "reformist Freemasonry" and, thus "not subordinate to any political purpose or secret tendency." The society's only purpose, Sedlnitzky wrote, was "merely cosmopolitan charity and work for humanity." Despite that, Magliano's interrogation led to the arrest and exile of three other men – one, a doctor – in Milan and the arrest and imprisonment of a member of the gendarmerie.[729]

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[727] Metternich also reported here that a certain Consistoriali had furnished reports on a new sect, The Knights of the Black Needle. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 15 April 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 7, Bl. 113-114.

[728] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 15 October 1818, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 315-316.

[729] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 26 April 1818, HHStA StK *NvP* 35, Bl. 120-121 (NM).

Relatively speaking, 1819 was a quiet year, for investigations of secret societies in Italy. In January, Sedlnitzky reported that "sects of the *Carbonari* from Naples" had spread into towns on the Dalmatian coast; that *Guelfi* had moved north in Lombardy; and that a new sect, *Fratelli Signaci Protettori Republicani* had traveled south from France and Lombardy and into the Papal Marches.[730] One week later, Sedlnitzky announced police in the province of Polesine had arrested *Carbonari*, and that further arrests were likely after information emerged to "justify" them.[731] In Naples, police uncovered information about the *Carbonari*, producing the first real documentation of the sect's inner workers (Fig. 6). Rome and Vienna continued to share information, including the arrest of two more *Carbonari* in the Vallasina Valley, north of Milan,[732] while both increasingly pressed the other to heighten surveillance in small, border towns.[733] In August, Faveggi produced the names and nationalities of all eighty-seven individuals arrested and interrogated as *Carbonari* or *Guelfi*.[734] Sedlnitzky also received word from the Count Andreas Mercy, an Austrian diplomat in Rome, that a certain Rossi, who was

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[730] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 22 January 1819, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 14-15 (NM).

[731] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 28 January 1819, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 16-17 (NM).

[732] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 10 April 1819, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 71-72 (NM); Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 20 June 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 171-172.

[733] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 7 May 1819, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 111-112 (NM).

[734] Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 14 August 1819, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 140-142. This report includes Faveggi's list of names all arrested, including "suspected nationals and foreigners belonging to the *Carbonari*."

in the secret employ of the police in Milan in Switerzland and norther Italy, had "liaisons" with Frédéric-César de La Harpe, the tutor of Tsar Alexander and a liberal Swiss politician who was central in the establishment of the Helvetic Republic. According to Mercy's information, La Harpe engaged in some counterespionage of his



Fig. 6 Representation of *Carbonari* "catechism" (HHStA StK NaP 8, unpag.).

own, drafting Rossi's reports to Saurau and feeding the Austrian officials false information.[735] Despite such warnings, the Police in Milan discovered the *Societa Romantica*, a reading society that discussed European philosophy;[736] censored material, including the work of Edmund Burke for its "political sentiments";[737] and even warned Vienna about the (possible) continued "activities of Bonapartist organizations."[738]

Despite these reports, by the end of 1819, both Metternich and Sedlnitzky appeared confident enough to claim that the situation in Italy had calmed and that Austria was well-positioned to crush unrest. In fact, in a trip through Italy with Francis in 1819, Metternich wrote to Esterhazy in London claiming that, while "revolutionary disposition" still existed, internal division, the lack of leadership, and the "natural laziness and timidity" of the Italians made revolution highly unlikely.[739] Reports continued to arrive in Vienna in the early part of 1820, including further reports from Fossombroni

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[735] Mercy to Sedlnitzky, 10 April 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 80-83

[736] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 21 September 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 252-253.

[737] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 4 October 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 266. Strassoldo also censored the work of more British travel writers, especially Richard Rose's, *Letters from the North of Italy*. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 30 September 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 258.

[738] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 18 October 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 284.

[739] Metternich to Esterhazy, 9 July 1819, as quoted in, Schroder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 23-4. For Francis's reception in Rome see, Mercy to Sedlnitzky, 10 April 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 8, Bl. 80-83.

concerning a *Societa Patriotica Europa*, allegedly a branch of the Illuminati.[740] In February, the Austrians received a copy of a letter from a Barthold Niebuhr, an historian of ancient Rome and envoy in the Papal States charged with reorganizing the Catholic Church in Prussia's Rhineland provinces, to Friedrich Wilhelm III alerting the king to hostile public opinion towards the Habsburgs in Lombardy-Venetia. In his letter, Niebuhr claimed that there will be no "spontaneous revolution" without the intervention of a "foreign army,"[741] but warned the king that "hatred grows [in Lombardy] every day" and that "the deliverance of Austria is the wish of all." Niebuhr argued that the Habsburgs had destroyed commerce in their Italian lands, that "revenues are spent as little as possible," and that "enormous sums" were "continually sent to Vienna as money has become increasingly scarce." Niebuhr also claimed that in Austria's heavy-handed response to the spread of foreign news, they had prohibited "even the most insignificant

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[740] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 8 January 1820, HHStA StK *NaP* 9, Bl. 2-3 (NM).

[741] Niebuhr claims that should a foreign army land in Italy, that the Austrians should expect a "Sicilian vespers," an allusion to an event on the island on 30 March 1282 when, after the ringing of vespers, Sicilians massacred a garrison and the supporters of the French king, Charles of Anjou. In six weeks, the rebels murdered roughly 13,000 French men and women. A war lasting twenty years eventually split the ancient Kingdom of Sicily. Emerson incorrectly quotes Boulay de la Meurthe, a member of Napoleon's privy council who had recently returned to France, as having suggested the possible "Sicilian vespers," a fairly minor mistake. See, Emerson, *Metternich*, 86-7. For his part, de la Meurthe, having returned from exile to Paris, claimed that revolutionary and anti-Austrian opinion was far more prevalent in Italy than Germany and that the *Carbonari* were powerful enough to drive Austria out of northern Italy. For letters concerning de la Meurthe's arrest and interrogation in Paris see, Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 16 February 1820, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 29-34.

newspapers," leaving only the single newspaper of Naples as the lone source of information.[742] Niebuhr's criticisms fit well into the "black legend" of Austrian rule that historians have labored to refute. But Niebuhr's letter makes clear that this legend was not merely the creation of mid-nineteenth century Italian nationalists.

When revolt finally arrived on 2 July 1820, it came quickly and, as historians tend to point out, unexpectedly. As Paul Schroeder argued many years ago, "Plainly [Metternich and Francis] had not seen the revolution coming."[743] But does the evidence bear this out? While Austrian attempts to secure Italy were often confused and self-negating, the five years of investigation into Bonapartist machinations and public opinion in Italy plainly showed dissatisfaction as well as an engaged citizenry committed to Italian independence. As reports to Francis showed, even prior to the Congress of Vienna, the Habsburgs recognized the possibility of revolution in the Italian states. Once again, relying uncritically on Metternich's correspondence has led historians to accept a highly crafted version of events. While Metternich could please Francis with promises that the emperor's Italian territories were calm under his watch or feign shock after the outbreak of revolt, another Metternich, the one that appears in the countless police reports, registered his sustained alarm. As the previous chapter showed, between 1815 and 1820, Metternich's position was not fully secure as he jockeyed for position with his

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[742] A copy can be found in, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, HHStA StK *NaP* 9, Bl. 26-27 (NM).

[743] Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 32.

rivals at Francis's court. It would be Metternich's successfully response to the outbreak of revolt that finally won the him emperor's full confidence.

The outbreak of revolution in 1820 in Europe's traditional "peripheries" still occupies the margins of historical narration, though recent work has corrected this bias. Richard Stites's final book, *The Four Horsemen*, is exemplary here. Eschewing the perspectives of Great Power diplomacy Stites examines the "inner dynamic of events on the ground," uncovering both the shared and unique logics of each revolt.[744] Revolt in Italy is well-covered elsewhere, though some details are necessary here. On 1 January 1820, Lieutenant Colonel Rafael del Riego led soldiers disaffected by the Bourbon king Ferdinand VII's reactionary rule to the Spanish town of Cabezas, near Cádiz. That day, Riego issued his famous *pronunciamento* that not only proclaimed the radical 1812 Constitution – itself a product of the resistance to Napoleonic occupation between 1808 and 1814 – but set off a wave of insurgencies that would flow through the Mediterranean and into Russia five years later. Colonel Antonio Quiroga joined Riego the following day, seizing the Isle of León in the harbor of Cádiz, which, by 1819, had become a "hotbed of liberalism." This revolt had a deep history and proved to be both popular and successful, leading to a three-year liberal government (Liberal Triennium) that could

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[744] Stites quite rightly points to the fact that even specialized studies of the period often omit the revolts of the 1820s altogether. For example, see, Jeremy Black, ed., *Revolutions in the Western World, 1775-1825* (Aldershot: Routledge, 2007). Even Broers and Caiani's recent edited two-volume study of the Restoration makes no mention of these events.

boast "Europe's first indigenous liberal government."[745] In Prussia, Hardenberg called for an ambassadorial conference in Paris, while Alexander I called for a conference of the Quadruple Alliance to "meet the danger" and aid Ferdinand who, on 6-9 March 1820, swore allegiance to the constitution and promised to summon the new Cortes. Between January and March, Metternich showed little concern with the uprising; Austria's distance from Spain, he claimed, "rendered them immune."[746] Agreeing privately with Castlereagh's firm rebuff of the tsar that foreign intervention in Spain was a useless pursuit, Metternich followed a policy of "masterly inactivity," hoping the revolt would simply "burn itself out."[747]

If Metternich remained undaunted by events in Spain, using the event to bring Russia and Prussia more firmly under Austrian sway to counter British influence, he could not easily ignore revolt in Naples and Piedmont in 1820 and 1821. On 6 July, General Guglielmo Pepe of the Royal Army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

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[745] Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, 63.

[746] Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 26-7. The uprising in Spain made little waves in the files of the Ministry of Police. In fact, Sedlnitzky, in a report regarding the spread of liberal newspapers in Europe, argued, that "some demagogues in Spain caused revolution unworthy to be discussed." Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 4 April 1820, HHStA StK *NvP* 36, Bl. 74-75.

[747] Castlereagh's dispatch dated 5 May 1820 is covered in, Webster, *Castlereagh*, 235-43. Both Wellington and Castlereagh agreed that the revolt was "essentially military," and that the army was the true authority in Spain. They also both agreed that nowhere else in Europe were foreigners disliked as much as in Spain and, thus, intervention would be counterproductive. On Metternich's desire to stay out of Spain see, Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 23-30, quotes from 29, 30.

(Naples), clearly influenced by events in Spain, issued his own *pronunciamento*, announcing the 1812 Constitution for the Kingdom of Naples. On 9 July, Pepe marched on the city of Naples with 14,000 people. It included members of the regular army; the Sacred Squadron of Nola, a cavalry regiment led by Lieutenants Michele Morelli and Giuseppe Silvati; and roughly 7,000 members of the Nola sect of the *Carbonari*. The procession was a colorful, theatrical, and highly ritualized event well-known in Naples, but it now served liberal revolt.[748] Soldiers sent to stop the revolt refused to fire on the rebels and joined the insurgent ranks. What followed mirrored events in Madrid: King Ferdinand I and his sons swore allegiance to the 1812 Constitution, renounced absolute power, and gained significant popularity in the process.[749] The revolution proved bloodless and popular because of a widespread – if still vague – sense of dissatisfaction and desire for "some sort of change." The provisional junta and, eventually, the new ministry consisted exclusively of constitutional liberals who had served under Murat and steered a moderate course limiting the influence of the more radical *Carbonari*.[750]

The revolt in Naples was the first real threat to Metternich's system developed at Vienna and Carlsbad, and he was forced to act. Not only was Metternich staunchly anti-

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[748] Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, 121-3.

[749] The Neapolitan announcement of the Spanish Constitution is an interesting moment of "cultural transfer." The Spanish Constitution of 1812, thus, appears alongside the French *Charte constitutionnelle* of 1814 as models for constitutional government in the 1820s. On the *Charte* see, Prutsch, *Contitutional Monarchism.*

[750] Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 30-9.

revolutionary, but he also had signed secret treaties with Ferdinand I to combat "innovations" in government. As Schroeder points out, as Austria's "partner" in preventing these "innovations," Naples served a similar role in Italy as Prussia did in the German states. As Schroeder notes, if the revolution were allowed to continue and its architects celebrated as heroes, why, then, would German states limit themselves to monarchical constitutions or continue to discipline their professors and student organizations, especially if *Carbonari* were allowed to thrive? Metternich and Gentz announced their opposition to revolution through military intervention at the Congress of Troppau (23 October 1820). Here, Metternich moved to counter the Russian's proposed policy of "general intervention," while claiming that only the king had the right to organize his territory as he saw fit and that the king alone could call for an allied occupation. But, because the king was not "free of thought and . . . action," Metternich proposed an army of occupation, comprised solely of Austrian troops with the "moral support" of the other powers. In this, Metternich had the immediate and unquestioning support of Prussia. Metternich's finalized this position at the Congress of Laibach (11 January 1821) where he successfully convinced Alexander on the need for unilateral Austrian action, while guaranteeing French neutrality (already announced at Troppau) and offering a plan for the future government of Naples. Despite Castlereagh's stated interests in maintaining a moderate constitution in Naples, Britain remained neutral at Laibach, sending only observers.[751]

Defending the new Neapolitan parliament and its constitution to the last, General Pepe led his poorly trained and armed units against an Austrian army at Rieti on 7 March 1821. As Metternich had suspected, the attack turned almost immediately into a rout, and the Austrians marched into Naples without further bloodshed on 23 March. On 15 May Ferdinand I returned to Naples to reclaim his throne. The outbreak of revolt in Sardinia-Piedmont on 10 March, however, threatened to overshadow the swift Austrian victory in Naples.[752] On the night of 9-10 March, when the King Victor Emmanuel was away, Piedmontese soldiers at the fortress of Alexandria mutinied and proclaimed the Spanish Constitution. Two days later, soldiers seized the citadel of Turin, demanding the constitution and war against Austria. This led to Victor Emmanuel's abdication in favor

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[751] This brief overview of the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach attempts to steer a middle course between Schroeder's and Siemann's reading of events. In Schroeder's telling, Metternich already knew before Troppau he would crush the revolt and demand the return of absolutist monarchy to Naples. Siemann, on the other hand, argues that Metternich sought always to follow international law and that Ferdinand I's approval sealed the decision to intervene. Their real difference of opinion, however, concerns Castlereagh's and Lord Stewert's response to intervention. Schroeder depicts the British position as one of hostility toward intervention. Siemann argues that Castlereagh did not reject intervention categorically; rather, he felt joint intervention should be the Allied recourse only in exception events. As such, he felt that individual interventions were acceptable and that states should generally be left alone to manage their own security, such as the German Confederation. Finally, Schroeder argues that Metternich's chief goal at Troppau, Laibach, and, later, Verona (1822) was to establish an "Eastern bloc" to counter British opposition, while Siemann stresses the centrality of Austrian and Russian disagreement and the importance of the relationship between Castlereagh and Metternich. See, Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, Chaps. 3 and 4; Siemann, *Metternich*, 716-35.

[752] Schroeder insists this was similarly shocking, despite the spread of student unrest and Austrian knowledge of the activities of secret societies. Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 118-9.

of his brother, Charles Felix, leaving Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan and heir-apparent to the Sardinian throne, as regent; both soon fled to Tuscany on 21 March. One week prior, Metternich, still at Laibach, announced an immediate occupation. On 8 April, as Austrian forces approached, the rebel army collapsed, ending the revolution as quickly as it had started, forcing its leaders into exile in France and Switzerland. Despite pressure from Metternich and Francis to reclaim his throne, Victor Emmanuel confirmed his abdication in favor of Charles Felix who, as Metternich had hoped, invited an Austrian army of occupation.[753] After Metternich's return to Vienna in May 1821, he received a surprise letter from Francis. In it, Francis wrote "At the moment which was so decisive for the future preservation of tranquility, I consider it a duty to give you public proof of My satisfaction and My trust in you. I therefore appoint you to the position of My Court Chancellor and Chancellor of State."[754] Between 1820 and 1821, Metternich had secured both Austrian preeminence on the Continent and the emperor's full confidence.

This began a new era of Austrian influence on the peninsula. Metternich crushed the revolts militarily, reinstated monarchical authority, and convinced the same monarchs to invite armies of occupation. This increased military presence, which Bubna had called for in 1817, allowed greater control over the peninsula, including its monarchs. The

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[753] Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy*, 117-23.

[754] This letter is quoted in full in Siemann, *Metternich*, 729-30.

defeat of the Italian revolutions, coupled with Napoleon's death on 5 May 1821, slackened the activity of the higher state police in Italy, as the Austrian gaze increasingly turned north to the German states.[755] However, the early 1820s did see significant *Carbonari* repression which included internal exile and long-term prison sentences. The period also witnessed a significant push to curb the problem of political refugees fleeing repression in Italy for Switzerland and Britain, an issue Metternich addressed at the Congress of Verona in 1822.

Prior to the collapse of Italy's revolutions, authorities in Milan and Venice established the Special Investigative Commission (*Spezial-Untersuchungskommission*). This commission came to life after police uncovered *Carbonari* activity in Polesine, which confirmed the continued anti-Austrian sentiment in Lombardy-Venetia. After wrapping up this investigation, authorities in Milan arrested a Pietro Maroncelli on 6 October 1820 and a Silvio Pellico one week later. Turned over to the investigative commission in Venice, Maroncelli and Pellico's interrogation uncovered wide-spread *Carbonari* activity in Lombardy. The investigation in Polesine led to the arrest of eight men, all charged with high treason and sentenced to death. According to the Austrian State Penal Code issued in 1803, those accused of high treason would not receive the benefit of a public trial or defense counsel. On 10 August 1821, the investigative

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[755] This, of course, does not mean Vienna no longer took interest in the Bonaparte family. Lucian and Charlotte Bonaparte's movements were heavily monitored into the 1820s. For an example, for their travels to the conference in Verona see, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 20 February 1822, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 49-50.

commission found Maroncelli and Pellico guilty of high treason, sentencing them to death. On 21 February 1821, a court in Verona announced the sentences, which the emperor later commuted, sentencing all Lombardy *Carbonari* to twenty-years imprisonment at the infamous Spielberg fortress in Brno.[756] These trials led to more arrests in December 1821 as authorities increasingly moved against liberals and *Carbonari* in Lombardy and, later, Illuminati in Rome.[757] Perhaps the most well-known is the arrest of the previously mentioned Count Confalieri, a young leader of moderate liberals in Lombardy who had traveled to London to secure support for Italian independence and maintained some correspondence with leaders of the Piedmont revolt. For this trial, Francis moved the special investigative commission to Milan, where officials, through "secret procedures," arrested and sentenced sixteen more individuals to death in May 1823. Francis once again commuted these death sentences, sending the accused instead to the Spielberg.[758] Between 1821-1829, Austrian officials in Italy sent twenty-three Italian *Carbonari* to the Spielberg fortress, and a further nineteen more

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[756] Michael Chvojka, "'Whose realm, his law.' The Austrian Repression of Italian Nationalist Movement under the Reign of Francis I (1815-1835)," *West Bohemian Historical Review* 5 (2015): 43-74, here, 57-8.

[757] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 28 June 1822, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* Ad Polizei 55, Bl. 258-259.

[758] For Confalieri's arrest and the history of his relationship to *Carbonari* in Milan see untitled report in, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* Ad Polizei 57, Bl. 1-24, esp. 10-19. This is part of a much larger report on revolutionary and demagogic associations in Italy. Emerson, *Metternich*, 89-90.

between 1833-1835.[759] The fortress became the subject of numerous *Risorgimento* novels and plays, most notably those of the author Silvio Pellico who spent eight years imprisoned there. Throughout the nineteenth century, the fortress remained an icon of Austrian repression.

The arrest and imprisonment of Italian *Carbonari* is certainly well-known; but the work of the investigative commission remains under researched. While historians have rightly pointed to its investigations into secret societies, the commission appears to have had a far broader jurisdiction. For example, in December 1820, the commission investigated the forgery of counterfeit bank notes in Milan. In September, Police in Paris arrested a certain Kraus, the courier to the British cabinet, for smuggling counterfeit bank notes from the Bank of London. During his interrogation, Kraus claimed that a man named Columbo, who resided in Lombardy, had supplied him with the notes. Lord Stewart asked Strassoldo, then, to arrest Columbo and hold him indefinitely.[760] The commission also regulated the spread of foreign newspapers into Italy to manage "public opinion." In November 1822, the commission moved to ban the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which it did the following January.[761]

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[759] Chovjka, "Austrian Repression," 59.

[760] Report to Sedlnitzky, 16 December 1820, HHStA StK *NaP* 9, Bl. 37-38.

[761] Report to Sedlnitzky, 14 November 1822, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 291-292. The Ministry of Police had already censured the newspaper for fear that "demagogues" would use it to spread "political discussions" in the "eastern states." Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 16 April 1820, HHStA StK *NaP* 9, Bl. 82-83. Metternich would increasingly limit the

But the commission's most pressing work was, in fact, the continued investigation of radical sects, especially those that had escaped persecution and settled outside of Austrian territory. If Austria's repression of radical sects in 1820-1821 successfully halted revolt, it introduced a new set of security concerns: the spread of political refugees. In February 1822, the spread of revolutionary clubs throughout Europe (in this case, London), led by Italian exiles, first engaged the investigative commission. In subsequent reports from Milan, officials warned Sedlnitzky that Italian exiles, most notably a Rossarol and a Vincenzo Sisa, were congregating in London. It appears that the commission had already pressured the British to extradite these individuals, though it is unclear if that came to pass.[762] In April, further reports on Italian refugees stated that Italian radicals had landed in Portugal, Spain, France, and, perhaps, most threateningly, Switzerland.[763] At the Congress of Verona (October – December 1822), Metternich launched a diplomatic attack against Switzerland, claiming it had become the "meeting place of all exiled revolutionaries." Metternich attacked Switzerland's claim to neutrality, arguing that the country purposefully gave asylum to known revolutionaries. Metternich's offensive at Verona paid off, as Switzerland committed to closing its

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spread of French- and English-language literary newspapers and magazines, including the *Morning-Journal*, the *Morning-Herald*, and the *Standard*. This also included the German-language paper, the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. See, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 15 September 1828, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag.

[762] Report to Sedlnitzky, 14 February 1822, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 53-44 (NM).

[763] Report to Sedlnitzky, 15 April 1822, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 105-106 (NM).

borders to political refugees and exiling those who had already arrived under threat of armed intervention.[764] By January 1823, the investigative commission in Milan began its work of rooting out revolutionary activity outside of Austria's Italian territories. Strassoldo headed the commission with assistance of a von Schraut who Strassoldo charged with investigating exiles in Switzerland and returning them to Austrian territory where they could be better monitored.[765] Later that year, Schraut's investigation into revolutionary activity in Switzerland uncovered daggers inscribed with revolutionary slogans as well as with death threats to monarchs as "enemies of the people" (Fig. 7 and 7.1). The daggers also included salutes to the assassins Louis Pierre Louvel and Karl Sand. Schraut uncovered these daggers made at the Damur arms factory for a sect knows as *Dolche* and returned a series of drawings of the weapons to Strassoldo. This report came as a grave reminder that the threat of violent revolution still existed and had spread into neighboring countries.[766] In mid-1823, the Milan commission moved into the Tyrol to investigate "revolutionary activities" and the "underlying principles" of that activity, leading to the arrest of a certain Pratti.[767]

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[764] Chvojka, "Austrian Repression," 56-7.

[765] Report to Sedlnitzky, 17 January 1823, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 328-329 (NM). For Schraut's mission in Switzerland see, Report to Sedlnitzky, 4 June 1823, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 423-424 (NM).

[766] Report to Sedlnitzky, 26 August 1823, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 486-495 (NM). This report includes drawings the daggers.

[767] Report to Sedlnitzky, 11 June 1823, HHStA StK *NaP* 10, Bl. 429.



Fig. 7a Dagger uncovered in the Swiss town of Dalmar. The top side reads, “Nights of Universal Liberty condemn these tyrants to death” Just above the hilt, reads “Vivat Louvel” and “Humani Generis Hostis,” a legal term referring to an individual beyond the protection of law. The bottom reads, “Liberty of Death” and condemns Ferdinand VII of Spain to death as a tyrant.



Fig. 7b Another rendition of a dagger found in Dalmar. This dagger hails certain secret societies as well as assassins Louis Pierre Louvel and Karl Sand (HHStA StK NaP 10., unpag.).

The commission also tracked the movement of foreigners who had entered Austrian territory in Italy and who were known members of secret societies or had possible connections to those societies. This included a Spaniard named Bossi in February 1823 and a man named Barrillet, who had traveled to Venice and then on to Switzerland, France, and London.[768] By the mid-1820s, events in Germany had taken clear precedent among the files of the Ministry of Police. As such, the connection between German student organizations and the *Carbonari*, a possibility first broached by the well-known adventurer Witt-Dörring during his interrogation in Vienna, was also of interest to the commission. According to a November 1824 report, there was an increased flow of German students across the border into Italy for reasons the commission had not yet fully established. This concern for German students in Italy after 1824 is a particularly clear example of the growing importance of the investigative work of the Mainz Commission in the German states.[769] The files of the Ministry of Police

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[768] Report to Sedlnitzky, 27 April 1824, HHStA StK *NaP* 10., unpag.

[769] Report to Sedlnitzky, 17 November 1824, HHStA StK *NaP* 11, unpag. It is unclear if the commission in Milan worked with the investigative commission in Mainz. It is clear, however, from the increased concern with activity of secret societies in Germany, that the Ministry of Police in Vienna was. A good example of this comes from April 1824, when Berlin pressed Vienna to investigate student organizations in Austria, and specifically Prague, and their relationship with other "youth organizations" (*Bundes des Junge*). See, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 27 April 1824, HHStA StK *NaP* 11, unpag. For Witt-Dörring's interrogation regarding *Carbonari* in the German states see, Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 27 April 1825, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* 54 Ad-Polizei, Bl. 736-735.

hold numerous, lengthy interrogations of German students[770] and reports on secret organizations in the German states, include a thirty-four-page study of the Russian relationship to the German *Tugendbund*, dating back to 1806.[771]

In 1826, Francis gave Metternich permission to view the reports generated by Milan investigative commission. It is currently still unclear whether Francis managed the workings of the commission in the same way Metternich and Sedlnitzky had attended to the policing of the peninsula between 1815 and 1820/1. However, the extent of the investigation – and the subsequent arrests and imprisonments – of *Carbonari* between 1821 and 1826, shocked Metternich. Together with reports from the Papal States from 1826, the commission's findings suggested to Metternich that Lombardy-Venetia (as well as Central Italy) had only barely escaped its own revolutions. In fact, Metternich claimed that, had the revolution in Naples and Piedmont succeeded, Lombardy-Venetia may have fallen as well. Confident that the sects no longer posed a significant threat, and that their highly regionalized makeup and lack of central direction guaranteed their weakness, Metternich criticized the investigative committee in Milan[772] and even announced its lack

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[770] For example, see the two-month interrogation of an Adolphe Jourdan, a Jewish student from Munich, arrested and questioned concerning the "activities of students in Prague." Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 22 December 1826, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag.

[771] See, "*Parallèle entre l'Union du bien publique et Russie et la Tugendbund*," April 1826, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag.

[772] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 17 June 1826, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag.

of purpose as revolution no longer appeared a significant threat in Italy.[773] In 1827, Pope Leo XII announced his intentions to stamp out, once and for all, revolutionary activity in the Papal States.[774] One year later, Leo established his own investigative commission.[775] Investigations into an uprising of *Philadelfi* in Salerno found influence from Spanish and French revolutionaries, but no Austrian subjects were involved.[776] In October 1828, reports concluded that *Carbonari* had reach Barcelona and Madrid[777] and that Italian and Spanish political refugees had established contact with one another in London.[778]

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[773] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 12 and 23 June 1826, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag. Emerson quotes these reports as well, arguing similarly that Metternich no longer saw the use in the Milan investigative commission. Emerson, *Metternich*, 91.

[774] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 5 August 1827, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag.

[775] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 12 August 1828, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag.

[776] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 20 and 29 August 1828, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag.

[777] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 10 October 1828, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag. Shortly after, Metternich received the names of seven Italians arrested in Barcelona as members of "*Carbonari* clubs." Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 19 October 1819, HHStA StK *NaP* 12, unpag. This file includes the original letter from Manuel González Salmón, the Prime Minister of Spain, to Joaquín de Acosta, a Spanish diplomat in Vienna, dated 26 September 1828.

[778] (Sicilian Diplomat in London) Ludolf to Sedlnitzky, 20 July 1829, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag. In November, Sedlnitzky received word that there was a "reunion" of *Carbonari* in Venice. This report also included information on the London Society for the Propagation of European Liberty, that consisted of "Carbonari refugees who have settled in London with English families who cover their intrigue under the veil of being servants." This report also suggests that radicals in Switzerland as well as François Guizot, a moderate liberal under Louis Philippe's government, were in "constant" contact with this organization. See Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 2 November 1829, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag. See also the investigation into a Giacomo Beer, who had left Italy for London

When France sneezed in 1830, Italy once again caught a cold. In the wake of the July Revolution, Metternich moved to tighten control over correspondence between Lombardy-Venetia, Piedmont, and Ticino in Switzerland, and to curb the flow of French-language newspapers.[779] Despite the higher state police's efforts, revolt broke out in Modena, where Francis IV, a Habsburg of the cadet d'Este branch, sought to extend the borders of his small state with the help of Enrico Misley and Ciro Menotti, both *Carbonari*.[780] The revolt spread to Romagna and soon throughout the Papal States. A hoped-for French army never arrived, and the Austrians used their overwhelming military presence once to reestablish control. What followed was further arrests and imprisonment of *Carbonari* proselytizers, followed by new rounds of political refugees and further police investigations.[781] It seems, however, that after 1830, the *Carbonari* lost their status as new sects took their place and as a new names increasingly filled the pages of the Ministry of Police (Fig. 8).[782]

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and maintained correspondence with a "Potter-Thielemann clique in Italy." Duke Senfft to Sedlnitzky, 10 February, 5 September, and 18 September 1830, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag.

[779] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 27 April 1828, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag.

[780] Menotti, who the Austrian hung in 1821, left behind a memoir of his years involved in the *Carbonari*. A copy of that memoire is located in, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 23 January 1832, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag.

[781] Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 5 and 18 September 1830, HHStA StK *NaP* 13, unpag.

[782] While Mazzini and Young Italy landed in the files of the Ministry of Police immediately in 1831, the first full report on the organization came in March 1834. See,

Conclusion

Metternich's successful answer to the "Italian Question" at the conferences of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona was, as historians have long argued, the "zenith" of his diplomatic career. In this Congress period, his carefully constructed system established Austrian preeminence on the Continent and won him the emperor's confidence, which Metternich did not fully attain before 1820. That Metternich had rivals at court is a point developed in the previous chapter.[783] But if historians know the answer to the "Italian Question," the question itself and the full extent of its origins remain vague. As such, the importance of Austrian control over the peninsula and the spread of information gathering agencies there is still not fully understood.

After the Habsburgs re-established their presence in northern Italy in 1814, the peninsula became particularly important for the security of the post-Napoleonic order in Europe. The re-instatement of Habsburg control of Lombardy-Venetia was Metternich's greatest triumph at the Congress of Vienna; as David Laven argues, Austrian rule over the north of Italy effectively checked French aggression south. But a resurgent France was only one concern for Vienna. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities with

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"*Überblick des bisherigen Ergebnisse Untersuchungs in Mailand gegen die Mitglieder der Sekten giovanne Italia*," March 1834, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* Ad Polizei 57, Bl. 182-208.

[783] For more on this important critique see, Brian Vick, review of, *Metternich: Stratege und Visionär*, by Wolfram Siemann, *Central European History* 49 (2016): 454-461.

Napoleon and his exile to Elba, the peninsula became the central node of allied information gathering because the threat of Bonapartist machinations and a receptive population threatened the Ministry of Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs more than any other concern. Between 1815 and 1821, reports on the movement and correspondence of these Bonapartists make up most of the police files in Vienna. Although Napoleon's One Hundred Days came as a shock to the heads of Europe gathered in Vienna, Austrian and British informants had, in fact, identified the existence of a plot to smuggle Napoleon off the island. When Domenico Ettori publicized this embarrassing point, Francis ordered Ettori's indefinite imprisonment.

After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and his exile to St. Helena, Italy ceased being the center of Bonpartist plots as Metternich forced Napoleon's supporters to settle in Austrian territory. But the threat of upheaval and unrest never disappeared. Central to the conspiracy of a Muratist or Bonapartist resurgence in Italy was an urban population that chafed under Austrian domination and sought Italian independence and unification. Knowledge of Italian demands for unification – inchoate as it was in 1814 – predated Austrian dominance on the peninsula and even the Congress of Vienna itself. Fears of a Bonapartist revival in Italy, then, evolved as secret societies, the enemy *par excellence* of all Central European policing agencies, increasingly became sites of anti-Austrian hostility. Overlooked by historians, this transition led to a series of critical developments. First, Metternich and other authorities in Lombardy-Venetia increasingly sought to cooperate with Rome in the policing of the peninsula. This liaison met with moderate success, but Metternich stressed the need to share information across borders. Second, Austrian security measures and the process of information gathering often made the

peninsula less secure. Policing agencies in Italy were forced to rely on the work of dodgy informants who often sought Habsburg employ for their own ends. Their reports led not only to increased paranoia and further investigations, but also led to confusion as to who or what constituted the real threat. Another example of this instability was the problem of political refugees, who haunted Austrian officials throughout the 1820s.

After his successful crushing of the revolts in Naples and Piedmont, Metternich provided the answer to the "Italian Question" that had troubled Vienna since 1814. After 1821, the Austrian presence on the peninsula had fundamentally changed. Metternich has established the principle of allied intervention and succeeded in having foreign monarchs invite an army of occupation. Despite the establishment of an investigative commission in Milan, the threat of the sects died down as Austrian armies guaranteed a quick response to unrest. The increased presence of Austrian military might and the rapid crackdown on *Carbonari* activity, however, triggered further bouts of insecurity among state officials. Indeed, it is the arrest and imprisonment of such Italian as the poet Silvio Pellico, that established the "black legend" of Habsburg rule, which animated nationalists throughout the nineteenth century. One final outburst of *Carbonari* activity in 1830 and its eventual suppression ended the society's relevance as a legitimate, revolutionary threat. But new organizations with new names took their place. Among them was Giuseppe Mazzini and his Young Italy (Fig. 8) movement who increasingly attracted supporters throughout Italy and, with that support, the renewed attention of Habsburg security agencies.



Verzeichniß

der Individuen vom Civilstande, über welche sich in Mailand hinsichtlich der giovine Italia erhobenen Hochverrathsuntersuchung erstreckt.

Verhaftete.	Verhaftete.	Flüchtige.	Anmerkungen.
Bono Fedele. † 17. April 834.	Marozzi Pietro Landjäger.	Albera Dr. Vitale.	Die mit rothem Tinte unterstrichenen Namen bezeichnen jene Individuen, gegen welche die rechtliche Criminal-Untersuchung wegen Hochverrathes abgeschlossen und verfüllt ist.
Bressanini Rinaldo. l. Emilien.	Piazzoli Giuseppe Advocat.	Carbonera Francesco.	
Borghi Luigi. l. Grand Auditeur.	Carta Giambatta Litterator.	Donesana Antz.	
Guenzati Filippo. l.	Salagé Eugenio Fuchsmüller. l.	Lonati Giuseppe.	
Tinelli Dr. Luigi.	Caggioli Agostino Lehrer. l.	Lucini Giusto.	Seine Majestät geruhten, zur Cab. Z. 69. 834. ohne einer Einleitung des Fremdenamtes Zajotti in dieser Hochverraths-Untersuchung anzubefehlen, über seine Entlassung der Venerat auf Cab. Z. 1082/153 834. Vortrag einzustellen. Aber den 57. zwied. Bericht Cab. Z. 1512/906 834. geruhten Se. Majestät mit A. H. Handschr. v. 26. April 834. dem v. Lichtenberg anzuweisen, diese Individuen, so wie die übrigen in C. Z. 1931/134 834. als Cab. Flüchtige angezeigten Personen der Grenzsperre und Horz zu bringen.
Giuletti Ambrogio. l.	Mozzoni Nobile Carlo.		
Foresti Carlo. l. Advocat.	Battaglia Cristoforo. l.	Custodi Giovani.	
Belgiojoso Conte Antz.	Repossi Davide Emilien. l.	Cerroni Riccardo.	
Piardi Giambatta. l. Student.	Zambelli Giovani Student. l.	Belcredi Dr. Gasparo.	
Cavalleri Andrea. l. Emilien.	Doßena Felice. Dr. l.	Cavallini Giambatta.	
Moscheni Alessandro. Dr. l.	Ferri Carlo. Kaufmann. l.	Ciani Giacomo.	
Rosa Gabriele. Litterator. l.	Cantù Cesare Professor.	Rè Giovani. Sardo.	
Cattaneo Carlo. Privatier. l.	Visconti Antonio. Advocat.	Prevosti Francesco Kaufmann.	
Labar Filippo Handelsm. l.	Prayer Carlo Handelsm. l.	Ferrario Dr. Pompeo.	
Gallarzi Gian Antz. l. Professor.	Suardi Giuseppe Emilien. l.	Bargnani Conte Gaetano.	
Lamberti Dr. Carlo. Advocat. l.	Rossi Eugenio Maler. l.	Marzucchelli Conte Ettore.	Die Untersuchung der mit l. bezeichneten Individuen in Mailand verhaftetem 27. Individuen ist so somit geschlossen, daß sie binnen einigen Monathen wegen Mangel an Beweis, wegen keine neuen Daten hinsichtlich derselben zum Vorschein kommen. 59. zwe. Bericht C. Z. 1929/252 834.
	Antz. Grassi Sohn des Hauptsch.	Dembowsky Carlo.	
	Luciano Martelli l. Brüder.	Mainoni Massimiliano.	
	Gaetano Martelli l.		
	Fogliani Giov. Ingenieur. l.		
	Lucini Fordin. auf Dolmino.		
	Rusconi l.		
	Partesotti Attilio aus Mantua.		
NB.	Meani Eugenio wurde an der schweiz. Grenze mit dem Polizei der giov. Italia aufgegriffen.		10. May 1834.

Fig. 8 Members of Mazzini's "Young Italy" arrested in 1831, including a list of political refugees (HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* Ad Polizei 57, Bl. 181).

CONCLUSION

Sometime in 1824, David Parish settled in Vienna after a short but illustrious career. Born in Hamburg in 1778 to a wealthy family, Parish built his fortune as a land speculator in the United States and, later, as an international financier. In 1819, President James Monroe appointed Parish the US consul to Antwerp, a position he held until 1823, when Monroe recalled him for helping to finance the Austrian intervention in Italy, which contradicted US foreign policy in Europe.[784] One year later – a year before his eventual suicide – Parish relocated to Vienna and, in December, received a letter from his brother

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[784] Parish's story is remarkable and speaks to the close-knit and nepotistic world of international finance. Parish opened his first commercial house in Antwerp in 1803, where he helped broker the Louisiana Purchase, due to his father's connections and the personal patronage of Talleyrand. In 1806, he emigrated to the United States, settling at first in Philadelphia, moving later to northern New York where his family was central in the development of St. Lawrence and Jefferson counties. Between 1806 and 1816, Parish embarked on a lucrative career as an international financier, first as the American agent in the Spanish gold bullion trade that financed Spain's payment of 72,000,000 francs a year to Napoleon. In 1813, along with John Jacob Astor, Parish underwrote a $13,000,000 loan that allowed the United States to continue its war effort against Great Britain. In 1816, he moved back to Hamburg and, in 1819, received his position of consul to Antwerp. In 1825, Parish joined Fries & Company, a newly established banking house in Vienna. Afterward, Parish maintained an opulent home near the Hofburg. It turned out, however, that his new partners were "a group of crooked promoters." Coupled with a banking crisis in 1825, Parish went bankrupt. On 27 April 1826, hoping to spare his family financial ruin, he drowned himself in the Danube. See, Philip G. Walters and Raymond Walters Jr., "The American Careers of David Parish," *The Journal of Economic History* 4 (1944): 149-166.

Robert Parish, who sat on the Hamburg Senate. The letter conveyed troubling political news:

> Last post I wrote you about the arrest of Ugoni, one of the Italian Carbonari. Altho closely watched he has last night contrived to make his escape by filing thro a thick Iron bar – to the great consternation of our Senate. Our police is not up to the tricks of those Italians. I don't doubt that Mutzenbucher's report will exonerate the police and I trust you will assist in assuaging any irritation on the part of the Prince.[785]

Written in English on a small, torn piece of paper, the letter highlights themes of this dissertation. Behind this report about a prison break, we glimpse the growing Central European security apparatus that the Habsburgs developed some four decades prior. In a northern port city of the German Confederation, the police arrested an Italian political refugee at the behest of the Austrians.[786] Ugoni was one of countless political refugees fleeing Austrian or Papal arrest in northern Italy. He was most likely headed for London, where Italian independence organizations flourished and where political refugees had established networks of support and employment among Londoners. The author also knew the "Prince" (i.e., Metternich) would find the prison break concerning. That Ugoni managed to file through iron bars, despite being "watched carefully," suggests that he had accomplices or contacts in Hamburg. Though brief, the letter points to the complex

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[785] To David Parish, 18 December 1824, HHStA StK *Polizeihofstelle* Ad Polizei 57, Bl. 47-48.

[786] On the development of policing as a matter of administration and policy making to the policing criminality in Hamburg see, Mary Lindemann, *Patriots and Paupers: Hamburg, 1712-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 199. As with other German states, French occupation helped Hamburg's transition.

international dimensions of state security agencies in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. It also documents the increased connection between politically active citizens throughout Europe, including its traditional "peripheries."

The security measures that Central European states developed in the late eighteenth century evolved in tandem with an increasingly engaged civil society during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. This evolution entailed a conceptual shift in the meaning of *Polizei*, from the absolutist-era definition of state administration to a narrower conception concerned with the maintenance of internal political security. After 1789, the security needs of states compelled government agencies to centralize information gathering, which grew to encompass all corners of Europe to mobilize multiple layers of state actors long before the Congress of Vienna completed its work. The decades between 1790 and 1815 proved critical for the development of these institutions in both Austria as well as the German states. Largely overlooked by historians yet critical for nineteenth-century political culture in Central Europe, this period witnessed an increasing professionalization of political policing and information-gathering agencies. If Austria led the way, both Prussia and Bavaria gradually followed, though they did so under the pressure of French occupation. Such repressive practices, honed during a period of war and revolutionary upheaval, found full institutionalization in the Mainz Central Investigative Commission (1819-1827) and in the Frankfurt Central Investigative Authority (1833-1847).

For all their elaboration prior to 1848, these policing agencies remained small and continued to rely on traditional methods of information gathering. Ugoni's escape serves as a critical reminder that the security of the post-Napoleonic monarchical order was

never total and attempts to make it so often backfired. While the Great Powers may have sought to rebuild post-Napoleonic Europe on a more secure foundation, their efforts "on the ground" too often proved counterproductive; indeed, these agencies did not stem the tide of nationalism and revolution. This study, then, calls into question the usefulness of Beatrice de Graaf's concept of "security culture" outside the realm of diplomatic history. The attempt to build strong state security apparatuses paradoxically led to increased insecurity; they birthed a new category of political refugee and led to a fundamental mismanagement of changing societies. As Richard Evans has suggested, such policing and "knowledge of [the police's] underhand methods . . . probably . . . strengthened liberals and democrats in their resolve" to overthrow the existing order.[787]

Ugoni is but one of many who escaped certain long-term imprisonment. After the failed November Insurrection (1830-1831) in Poland, the Austrians arrested or monitored numerous individuals accused of "political subversion" fleeing Poland (many with fake French visas) and settling in Spain, Portugal, Germany, and Italy.[788] Other states faced similar issues. The infamous *l'affaire Maubreuil* is one example. Guerry de Maubreuil escaped indefinite imprisonment in France three times between 1814 and 1818. In 1827, Maubreuil returned to Paris and attacked Talleyrand outside the Sanit Denis Basilica. At

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[787] Evans, *Rereading German History*, 69.

[788] For example, a string of reports arrived in Vienna throughout late 1836. Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 24 June and 7, 12, and 14 September 1836, HHStA StK *NaP* 16, Bl. 109, 167-170, 134-174, and 175-178. The Austrian police arrested and interrogated these refuges at the behest of the Russians.

his trial, Maubreuil detailed a plot to assassinate Napoleon and his son in 1814 that implicated the French provisional government as well as the governments of Prussia, Austria, and, most deeply, the Russians.[789] Throughout the entire period problems were rife: borders remained porous; jurisdiction beyond the town gate was often nonexistent; information-gathering techniques were antiquated; and, as Ugoni's escape shows, prisons were not always secure. The difficulties of policing Europe's radicals became readily apparent during the Austrian repression of the Tyrolean revolts in 1809 and 1813 and continued to plague the Austrian higher state police throughout the 1820s and 1830s.

As Wolfram Siemann has shown, it was not until the 1850s that political policing agencies in Central Europe introduced significant reforms, especially in Prussia with the establishment of the *Polizeiverein*, which sought to increase cooperation across

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[789] Maubreuil eventually fled to London in 1818 after being accused of stealing the Princess Catherine of Württemberg's, niece of Tsar Alexander and wife of Jérome Bonaparte, crown jewels. In 1827, Maubreuil returned to Paris and on 20 January, he attacked Talleyrand in public, outside of the Saint Denis Basilica. At his trial, Maubreuil announced that, in 1814, Talleyrand and other powerful members of the provisional government in Paris offered him the title of duke, 200,000 livres annually, and the rank of lieutenant-general to assassinate Napoleon and his son on their way to Elba. Maubreuil's attempted assassination implicated the Prussians and the Austrians. More damning, however, was Maubreuil's testimony that the Tsar Alexander had pledged the unrestricted use of Russian forces to carry out his mission. This is an all but forgotten event which shocked Europe at the time. For his attack on Talleyrand, Maubreuil received five years imprisonment and ten years surveillance by the French police. A history of the entire affair as well as Maubreuil's trial is located in, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, 12 December 1832, HHStA StK *NaP* 15, unpag. The file holds hundreds of pages of documents. The affair is also covered in a review of "Celebrated French Trials" in London's *Monthly Review,* Nov. 1828, Nr. 34, 325-336.

borders.[790] Building on previous scholarship, Anna Ross's recent work points to the post-1848 period in Prussia as a period of significant state building and reform, driven by a new concern for scientific state management, statistical information gathering, and a more moderate (rather than a reactionary) conservatism among Prussian statesmen.[791] Yet the 1850s witnessed a sophistication of political policing and an increase in the workload of these agencies.[792] While Ross points to the sharing of knowledge between Prussia and Austria, further work will have to sharpen our understanding of police practices and the coordination of intelligence across borders. This study highlights a critical formative era in political policing prior to 1848, by connecting practices of surveillance of the late eighteenth century with those of the nineteenth century.

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[790] Wolfram Siemann, ed., *Der* "*Polizeiverein*" *deutscher Staaten: Eine Dokumentation zur überwachung der öffentlichkeit nach der Revolution von 1848/49* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1983).

[791] Anna Ross, *Beyond the Barricades: Government and State-Building in Post-Revolutionary Prussia, 1848–1858* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Günther Grünthal, *Parlamentarismus in Preussen 1848/49-1857/58: Preussicher Konstitutionalismus – Parlament und Regierung in der Reaktionsära* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1982); James Brophy, *Capitalism, Politics, and Railroads in Prussia, 1830-1870* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998); Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2006), esp. 500-9.

[792] For example, under the direction of Ludwig von Hinckeldey, the Prussian General Director of Police in 1848, reports generated by the political police in Berlin increased from 2,927 in 1850 to 7,156 in 1851 and 9,423 in 1852. The number of reports remained at over 5,000 for the next three years and only dipped to under 1,000 by 1862 and only again in 1868 and 1869. See, Siemann, "*Deutschlands Ruhe*," 357; Evans, *Rereading German History*, 70.

This study foregrounds Austria and sets the experience of Bavaria and Prussia in comparative perspective. With the spotlight on Austria, this comparative approach shows that all three states developed similar security or information-gathering agencies for similar reasons but did so under differing circumstances. For example, Pergen established the Ministry of Police in Vienna to monitor foreigners and public opinion in the 1780s, while Justus von Gruner built a political police in Prussia under the pressure of Napoleonic occupation. An emphasis on Austria is warranted, for it set the tone and pace. After 1819, Austrian meddling in the German states only increased and Prussia served as Austria's junior partner in the policing of the new German Confederation. Because the Carlsbad Decrees (1819) loom so large in the history of Central European political development, Prussian repressive state practices have received far more attention. Siemann long ago pointed out that Austria initiated the development of political policing during the reign of Joseph II. But Siemann did not extend his investigation back into the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, choosing instead to focus on the years after 1815. This dissertation builds on Siemann's insight regarding Austria's prominent role in policing political radicals. Focusing on Austrian security practices in the period between 1789 and 1830, it extends our analysis of political repression into territories ruled by the Habsburgs. By taking the first steps in placing three Central European states in conversation with one another, this study reframes our understanding of conservative state practice and argues that state security concerns were central features of foreign and domestic politics during Europe's revolutionary period. In so doing, it also underscores Austria's ability to coordinate policing with England, France, and, later, the Papal States.

By viewing Austria as the center of European political policing both prior to and after 1815, this dissertation also extends our gaze onto Europe's traditional peripheries. Miroslav Šedivý has detailed the importance of the so-called "Eastern Question" for Europe's Great Powers immediately after the Congress of Vienna, beginning with the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821. Šedivý's work confirms Metternich's long-standing concern for the security of the Ottoman Empire and reframes his later interest in the region during the Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841).[793] But as this dissertation shows, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Austrians were increasingly concerned with policing revolutionary activity in Ottoman territory, including early demands for Greek national revival and independence and French anti-Ottoman activity in Bosnia.[794] Austrian control over Lombardy-Venetia in 1814/5 and the extent of the subsequent policing of the peninsula suggest that the German states and renewed French aggression were not always Austria's main concern. Italian independence and unification (as well as British and Russian meddling) also presented itself as a major European security problem before the end of the Napoleonic Wars. But the threat of a Bonapartist revival was the most pressing post-war issue that consumed

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[793] Miroslav Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (Pilsen: University of West Bohemia, 2013).

[794] Hager to Stadion, 1 September 1805, HHStA StK *NvP* 25, Bl. 72-75. This report claims that the French were cajoling Christian populations in Bosnia to revolt against Ottoman rule.

Austria's Ministry of Police, and it fired Metternich's imagination more than any other matter after 1815. And because it did so until well after Napoleon's death, perhaps the Napoleonic period did not end with the Congress of Vienna.

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DB/7: Zentraluntersuchungskommission

BayHSta: Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Munich, DE)
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Innenministerium (MInn)
Gesandtschaft Berlin
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Gesandtschaft Vienna
Gendarmeriekorpskommando (Gen KK)

BLHA: Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (Potsdam, DE)
30 Berlin A
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Rep. 3B/Pol
Rep. 3B/Präs

GStA PK: Geheimes Staatsarchiv preußischer Kulturbesitz Dahlem-Berlin (Berlin, DE)
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HHStA: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna, AU)
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