VERBLESS IMPERATIVES

by

Michael Donovan

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gratia quod menti quolibet ire licet.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abl Ablative Case

Acc Accusative Case

Adv Adverbial Marker

Agt Agentive Case

Aloc Allocutive Agreement

Aux Auxiliary Verb

Cl Classifier

Comp Complementizer

Cond Conditional Mood

Cop Copular Verb

Dat Dative Case

Decl Used to indicate a declarative clause

Excl Exclusive

Erg Ergative Case

Fam Familiar Register - Used in Informal Speech Situations

Fem Feminine

Form Formal Register - Used in Formal Speech Situations

Fut Future Tense

Gen Genitive Case

Imp Imperative Morpheme - Used to indicate that the clause is an Imperative

Inf Infinitive

Loc Locative Case

Masc Masculine

Neg Negation

Nmz Nominalizer

Nom Nominative Case

Obj Objective Case

Par Partitive Case

Pl Plural

Pln Plain Register - Used to indicate nothing specific about the register

Pol Polite Register - Used to indicate politeness

Poss Possessive

Prf Perfect Tense

Prs Present Tense

Pst Past Tense

Q Question Particle

Rel Relative Clause

Sg Singular

Subj Subjunctive

Top Topic Marker

Vprt Verbal Particle

Voc Vocative Case

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation discusses a series of constructions that possess imperative-like force but lack overt verbs. Two main constructions are investigated: general prohibitives (i.e., "No smoking!") and goal commands (i.e., "Feet on the floor!"). For general prohibitives, it is argued that imperative force is not obligatorily paired with an imperative verb or traditional imperative features, as has often previously been assumed. Instead it is argued that there is an imperative operator that is separable from traditional imperative features such as being fixed to an addressee subject. The consequences of this approach are that certain properties that have been attributed to imperatives traditionally, such as not having accessible truth values, are instead analyzed as arising via an interaction between the imperative operator and a modal specific to traditional imperatives with verbs. As for goal commands, they are analyzed as being derived from traditional imperatives via an unusual process of edge deletion. This edge deletion process is not unique to English, but is iterated across several different languages: Japanese, Korean, Greek, Turkish, Igbo. It is argued that this edge deletion is conditioned by the presence of a feature which is associated with urgent commands. It is shown in the dissertation that the ellipsis processes necessary to form verbless imperatives are unlike other more commonly discussed forms of ellipsis, and as such different mechanisms are needed to derive the ellipsis in verbless imperatives.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no class of expressions across natural languages is more typically associated with concision than the *imperative*. The form of an imperative is often morphologically impoverished, commonly appearing as a bare form even in languages where declaratives and interrogatives employ rich morphology. Imperative subjects are often not required, even in languages where subjects are otherwise obligatory. As linguists, we therefore tend to associate imperatives with fragmentation and truncation. However, significantly more material can be truncated while retaining imperative functionality than has been traditionally understood or discussed. This dissertation is therefore meant to be an examination not only of traditional imperative clauses, but of imperative clauses that additionally truncate the verb and the relationship between them. Examining imperatives through this lens requires a re-examination of what exactly it means to be an imperative, how linguists should classify imperatives, and what the relationship between fragments and imperatives is.

1.1 Introducing Verbless Imperatives

The central aim of this dissertation is to study the principles governing both imperative clause type and imperative modality; focusing on a particular type of imperative that has historically been ignored; those without overt verbs. The primary motivation for this thesis is the existence of fragment utterances like (1) below, which appear to possess imperative-like force, while lacking an overt verb.

(1) Out of my sight!

An utterance like (1) is notable for several reasons. Like a traditional imperative, it does not have an overt subject, yet its subject is interpreted as the addressee. Unlike a traditional imperative, however, the only overt material in (1) is a prepositional phrase, with

no overt subject or verb. It also seems to have nearly identical meaning and prosody to an utterance like (2) below.

(2) Get out of my sight!

This dissertation will pursue the idea that there is a close connection between utterances like (1) and (2). Because of that, this dissertation will draw a constant analogy between imperatives with verbs and those without. I will utilize the following nomenclature to describe imperatives with verbs, and those without.

(3) a. Put the books on the shelf! (Traditional Imperative)

b. Books on the shelf! (Verbless Imperative)

I will describe utterances like those in (3b), as well as other fragment utterances that can have imperative-like force but lack an overt verb, as "verbless imperatives." To differentiate this class of expressions from what is typically referred to as an "imperative," I will use the term "traditional imperative" to refer to imperatives with overt verbs like (3a) above. One of the fundamental methods of argumentation that will be utilized in this thesis will be to analogize traditional imperatives and verbless imperatives.

Far from being a phenomenon restricted to English, or even the Germanic language family, verbless imperatives are common in many languages and language families (Donovan 2021). Below are a few examples of verbless imperatives from a variety of families.[1]

(4) a. Ton anaptira, parakalo!
the.Acc lighter.Acc please
'Lighter, please.' (Greek)

b. Lichi-ta refrigeradura-pi!
milk-Acc fridge-Loc
'Milk into the fridge!' (Quechua)

[1] All judgments from non-English languages presented in this dissertation were done with consultation with native speaker linguists unless otherwise noted. Given that this thesis constitutes the first serious treatment of verbless imperatives, there are essentially no examples in the literature to draw from. When discussing traditional imperatives, I will draw from the literature.

c. coyong-hi!
quiet-Adv
'Quiet!' Lit. 'Quietly!' (Korean)

d. Jim-lik!
silent-Nmz
'Silence!' (Uzbek)

I will motivate the use of the term "verbless imperative" in this thesis based on the existence of such forms as in (1) and (4). This thesis will investigate two major types of verbless imperative. Chapter 2 investigates the properties of English *general prohibitives*, a type of universal directive that by default is interpreted as a rule, often printed on a sign. The following are some examples of general prohibitives in English.

(5) a. No delivery trucks beyond this point!

b. No dogs allowed on school grounds!

c. Residents only!

The main contribution of Chapter 2 will be to show that general prohibitives simultaneously provide a DECLARATIVE-like speech-act update and an IMPERATIVE-like speech-act update. Most notably, general prohibitives have accessible truth values despite patterning with imperatives (which typically do not have accessible truth values) in many relevant respects. This observation fits in nicely with the program developed by Kaufmann (2012) in which imperative clauses semantically represent propositions, though there remain many important differences between general prohibitives and the traditional imperatives that were Kaufmann's object of study. I analyze general prohibitives as containing an imperative operator, essentially the one argued to exist by Kaufmann (2012), but separated from an environment that has traditionally been associated with "imperative" morphosyntax. This analysis, in which the imperative operator is separated from imperative morphosyntax, is the first of its kind.

The second major type of verbless imperative will be introduced in Chapter 3, which I call *goal commands*. Goal commands are fragmentary imperatives, limited to commanding, which minimally possess a goal. The following are some examples of goal commands in English.

(6) a. Books onto the shelf!

b. Under the sofa! Now!

c. Children onto the bus!

The main contribution of Chapter 3 will be to show that English goal commands are derived from traditional imperatives with *put-type* verbs via a process of left-edge ellipsis. The evidence for this ellipsis will be the unavailability of an overt subject, negation, and adverbs, all available to traditional imperatives on the left-edge. This unusual ellipsis is not licensed by the conditions that license more commonly studied versions of ellipsis, such as the VP ellipsis in Lobeck (1995) and Merchant (2001). I will argue that the mechanism that licenses the edge ellipsis in goal commands is a feature that is associated with adding urgency to command prosody and put-type verbs.

Chapter 4 will extend the analysis developed for English goal commands to eight additional languages: Japanese, Korean, Greek, Turkish, Uzbek, Quechua, Bengali, and Igbo. The primary goal of Chapter 4 will be to attempt to apply the analysis developed for English to the sample languages. The main contribution of Chapter 4 will be to show that goal commands are limited to the speech act COMMAND in each language from the sample, with special COMMAND prosody. In addition, I will show that the edge effects present in English are not unique to English, but are common on the left and right edges of many languages in the sample. An analysis of case marking is also given for each language that marks case overtly in the sample. The important finding from gathering case data is that case marking is often idiosyncratic and does not always appear to be based on the case that a put-type object would receive.

An interesting issue that arises when beginning an investigation of this topic is what counts as an "imperative." Verbless imperatives tend to lack any morpheme that identifies the utterance as an imperative, or indeed any clause-type at all. Korean, for example, has a dedicated position at the clause periphery that marks clauses as either declarative, interrogative, imperative, exhortative, or promissive (Sohn 2001; Pak 2008).[2] In traditional

[2] The exact number of distinct clause types in the language has been debated to be as many as 11. Sohn (2001) and Pak (2008) both argue that there are 5 distinct types.

imperatives, this marker can be suffixed onto the verb and provides information about the clause type (imperative in the instances provided here) and the general formality of the context. Because this is a verbal morpheme, however, it is ungrammatical in a verbless imperative. (4c) cannot be modified to include the speech-style particle, it can only surface attached to a verb.[3]

(7) a. coyong-hi!
quiet-Adv
'Quiet!' Lit. 'Quietly!'

b. *coyong-hi-la!
quiet-Adv-Imp
Intended: 'Quiet!'

c. coyong-hi hay-la!
quiet-Adv do-Imp
'Be quiet!' (Korean)

If we define the category of "imperative" in Korean as possessing an imperative speech-style particle, then (7a) is not an imperative because it cannot host a speech-style particle. Defining imperatives in this way necessarily restricts the class of imperatives to clauses with verbs, at least in Korean. Although this approach may be tempting because of its simplicity, this will not be the route taken in this dissertation, as suggested by the title.

If, however, we believe that (7a) *should* be classified as an imperative, this amounts to saying that verbless imperatives do not require the availability of an imperative morpheme in terms of either verbal morphology or a speech-style particle. Although this route may be slightly more difficult to establish, it is the route this dissertation will attempt to forge. The primary motivation for this decision is the similarities in use between the traditional form and the verbless form.

Kaufmann (2012) argues that it is undesirable to utilize either a purely functional set of features or a formal set of features to define clause types because of the substantial amount of cross-linguistic variation that may be associated with "imperative" clauses

[3] The Korean verb "ha(y)" is a light verb, see Han and Rambow (2000) for details of its distribution.

language-to-language. Because of this, the only hope from the perspective of a generative linguist is to analyze both the form and function of an utterance in attempting to assign it the moniker "imperative." Removing the verb from the equation makes this potentially even more difficult. As the problem highlighted in (7) illustrates, when the verb is not present, certain morphological markers that are associated with imperatives may also be obligatorily omitted. As a general principle, the more material that is omitted from an utterance, the more difficult it will be to assign a clause type to that utterance. If we rely on these markers to determine what is and is not an imperative, we may struggle to do so. If we instead argue that the traditional understanding of what constitutes an "imperative" should be expanded to include such forms, we will have to make use of the form and function that remains in the fragment.

By choosing to expand our understanding of what constitutes an imperative, we must abandon the idea that verbal morphology itself is responsible for providing imperative meaning. Of course, to this point forms with verbs like the one below have been the primary focus of study in the literature on imperatives.[4]

(8) Paint these walls!

There is a tradition within generative grammar of treating forms like (8) above the sole object of study when investigating imperative clause type (Portner 2007; Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Bolinger 1967; Davies 1986; Han 1998, among many others). The decision to call an utterance like (8) an "imperative," is therefore unlikely to be seen by most linguists as controversial. The decision to call utterances like the ones used in (1) and (4) as "imperatives," on the other hand, will require some justification. In order to provide this justification, I would like to briefly overview the previous work on

[4] In many languages, English being among them, the imperative morpheme is minimally inflected, or null (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Aikhenvald 2010). Languages often do mark imperatives with an overt morpheme, however, as in (1) below.

(1) minyma panti-**ma**
still sit-Imp
'Sit still!' Panyjima (Dench 1991)

clause-type systems to situate verbless imperatives within previously existing theories of how imperatives fit in to clause-type systems.[5]

1.1.1 Clause-Type Systems

Lyons (1977) classifies natural language clauses into three basic forms: declarative, interrogative, and imperative. Sadock and Zwicky (1985) classify sentence types along the same lines, additionally arguing that each sentence can be a member of only one sentence type. Sentences can therefore differ from one another minimally by belonging to a different type only. Thus, for English, each of the DECLARATIVE, INTERROGATIVE, and IMPERATIVE clause types have distinct morphosyntactic properties, typified below in (9) for the English clause-type system.

(9) a. You caught the speckled geese. (Declarative)

b. Did you catch the speckled geese? (Interrogative)

c. Catch the speckled geese! (Imperative) (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; their (23))

Each clause type is distinguished from the other by a set of morphosyntactic features associated with each type. In the case of the declarative, tense can combine directly with the verb, and the verb bears past tense morphology ("caught"). In the case of the interrogative, the auxiliary verb "do" is inserted, bears tense, and precedes the subject. In the case of the imperative, the subject can be omitted and the verb bears no overt morphology.

One crucial property of this clause-type system is that it is a *closed* system, in the sense that each sentence can be a member of one and only one sentence type. Sadock and Zwicky (1985) assert this explicitly, stating, "There is no sentence that is simultaneously of the declarative type and of the imperative type, or of the yes-no question type and of the imperative type." Though Sadock and Zwicky do not spell out how this is achieved syntactically, subsequent accounts such as Han (1998) typically derive this effect from an operator in a clause peripheral position that carries clause-typing features. Because there is only one position available, clauses can only be typed with one sentence type.

[5] See Portner (2004) for an in-depth discussion on the typology of clause-type systems.

The purpose of the different morphosyntactic sentence forms seems to be at least partially in order to disambiguate strings of words by associating them with the appropriate illocutionary force. Speakers of languages become familiar with the sentence form paradigms of their language and use these morphosyntactic cues to assign illocutionary forces. It is well-known, however, that sentence type alone cannot determine illocutionary force. Searle (1975) famously shows that there is not a direct mapping from sentence form to illocutionary force. For example, the following utterance in (10) cannot be interpreted in normal contexts as a question, but rather as a request.

(10) Can you pass the salt?

Under a system like the one described in (9), (10) is a member of the interrogative clause type. There must be some interrogative element in a clause-typing position that effects specific morphosyntactic changes. In the case of English, this is subject-auxiliary inversion. Other languages may utilize a dedicated morpheme to indicate that the utterance is a question, while others may rely solely on prosody. Because (10) inverts its subject and auxiliary, it is initially interpreted as a question, which is the prototypical function of interrogative clauses. However, given standard contexts, an utterance like (10) cannot be interpreted as a legitimate inquiry for information. As such, it receives the additional interpretation of a request, by method of CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE (Searle 1975). This conception of the grammar means that every utterance has a sentence type, which assigns a primary illocutionary force associated with that sentence type, but that secondary illocutionary forces can be achieved via context.

1.1.2 Verbless Imperatives and Sentence Type

Verbless imperatives provide some interesting challenges for the clause-type system approaches exemplified in (9). Because verbs are often the bearers of clause-type information, their removal means there is nothing remaining that conveys that information. Because they are fragments, there is significantly less overt material to provide the interlocutors with information about the morphosyntactic form of the utterance. As such, when considering the importance of form and function, we might expect that the function of the utterance

must be given more importance in evaluating verbless imperatives. This is because as overt material is deleted, function becomes the only available dimension for evaluation.

An example may be illustrative. Assuming that English has at least the clause types DECLARATIVE, INTERROGATIVE, and IMPERATIVE available in the language, it is unclear what clause type to assign to an utterance like the following:[6]

(11) No selfies in the bathroom!

In the absence of an overt verb, we are given a slightly more difficult decision when assigning a clause type to an utterance. The reader may guess that I will eventually assign utterances like (11) at least partially into the category of "imperative," given the title of the dissertation. This may strike linguistics as a philosophical style approach to language. Though it is uncommon in linguistics, there is a tradition within philosophy of valuing function over form in evaluating "imperatives." Hamblin (1987), for example, operating in the philosophical approach, defines "imperative" broadly, suggesting that imperatives have both a canonical grammatical form and function, but insists that there are exceptions and expressions related to imperatives and that imperatives can only be understood properly by evaluating their function. Though such an evaluation may seem natural to philosophers, linguists typically assume that grammatical form is important in determining the potential uses of an expression.

Hamblin suggests the term *"para-imperative"* as a catch-all for all imperative-like expressions. Verbless imperatives, therefore, fall under the term "para-imperative" that Hamblin had in mind. Hamblin's conception of "para-imperative," however, is a purely functional conception. All and any expressions associated with the typical function of imperatives should, under this view, count as a "para-imperative." This view is unsatisfying to most linguists, including the author, because it admits expressions like the following into the category of "para-imperative."

(12) I ask you to turn your books to page 37.

[6] Not every language is limited to these three clause types. See Zanuttini and Portner (2003) for discussion of the status of exclamative clauses, for example.

Given that the function of such an utterance in (12) is that the speaker is requesting the addressees to change their course of action, the philosophical approach would consider this to be a type of imperative. There are important differences in form between an utterance like (12) and the one in (8), however. For example, the utterance in (12) is compatible with 3rd person subjects, whereas the imperative in (8) is not. An utterance like (12) also has different sentence-level prosody than (8). Hamblin's approach is typically rejected by linguists, therefore, because it is considered to overemphasize *function* and ignore form.

However, we have already seen the pitfalls of overemphasizing the importance of form when it comes to *conversational implicatures*. Natural language simply does not make use of a 1:1 mapping between forms and function. In the spirit typically pursued in generative grammar, therefore, I will utilize both form and function in determining what counts as an "imperative." However, this will result in determining that an utterance like (11) is an imperative, despite the fact that it does not have the typical morphosyntactic properties of one. As such, I am probably giving slightly more credibility to the "function" side of things in this dissertation, though I will take care not to give too much.

This is not to say that there are not essential ingredients that serve as the *form* of an imperative. There are two ingredients that will remain consistent in all versions of imperatives, both verbless and traditional, that will be presented in this thesis.

The first is a prosodic feature that is associated with imperatives. Imperatives can be distinguished from declaratives and interrogatives based on sentence-level prosodic features (Nespor and Vogel 2012). Even when the form of an utterance has been greatly reduced, the sentence level prosody remains. This means that prosody will be an important factor in determining, and eventually licensing in my conception, the distribution of verbless imperatives.

The second ingredient is an imperative operator, which, following Han (1998), is a set of morphosyntactic features. Following Kaufmann (2012), this operator also is accompanied by a series of presuppositions. The purpose of the imperative operator is to ensure that the utterance is sufficiently performative. This is to capture the intuition that imperatives are associated with expressing a desire about what the world should be like, whereas declaratives and interrogatives are by default associated with how the world actually is. As such,

imperatives obligate their speakers and addressee(s) in ways not required by declaratives and interrogatives. This is achieved via the presuppositions of the operator.

Some imperatives will possess other ingredients. Traditional imperatives, for example, restrict the syntactic subject of the imperative to being some subset of the addressee(s). As such, this will need to be achieved somehow. Indeed, some verbless imperatives also seem to restrict their syntactic subjects in the same way. However, we will see that not all verbless imperatives restrict their syntactic subject in this way. As such, it is necessary to separate the mechanism that restricts the syntactic subject from the imperative operator.

There is a rich tradition of connecting the possible functions of imperative clauses to what imperatives mean. In the next section, I will discuss some prior approaches in linguistics to determining the meaning of imperatives.

1.2 Background on Imperative Meaning

Before analyzing various types of verbless imperatives, I would like to first briefly discuss discuss some of the approaches that have been taken to determine what exactly imperatives mean. I will ultimately adopt an approach with an operator in the syntax, similar to the type advocated by Schwager (2006), Kaufmann (2012), Oikonomou (2016) and Keshet and Medeiros (2019).

1.2.1 Imperative Denotata

One common approach in studies of imperatives is to utilize a speech act operator that combines with a proposition to derive the meaning of the imperative (Han 1998; Platzack and Rosengren 1997). The denotation of this operator is difficult to pin down, given the range of uses available to imperatives. This group of uses is of great theoretical interest precisely because they display what is known as *functional inhomogeneity* (Kaufmann 2012; Haida and Repp 2012). Commands are broadly related to necessity (Han 1998; Kaufmann 2012), whereas permission is broadly related to possibility (Lewis 1979; Davies 1986; Platzack and Rosengren 1997). The necessary quantificational elements for computing the necessity and possibility uses of imperatives are the following. Following conventions in modal logic, $\Box$ expresses necessity and $\Diamond$ expresses possibility.

(13) Get out of my sight!

□ get out(addressee, my sight)

(14) Take a cookie.

◊ take(addressee, cookie)

The inhomogeneity of this group of functions associated with imperatives has been taken as a serious challenge for imperative clause evaluation (Kaufmann 2012; Portner 2007; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016; Haida and Repp 2012). This section will very briefly review some of the recent influential treatments of how to handle imperative meaning, and how these issues relate to verbless imperatives.

1.2.1.1 Condoravdi and Lauer 2012

Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) argue that directive uses of imperatives bring about the following three meanings, two of which (II and III below) could plausibly be assigned to either the semantic or pragmatic component of the grammar.

(15) a. Leave!

b. (I) expresses: The addressee leaves; (content)

(II) conveys that the speaker wants the addressee to leave; (speaker desire)

(III) acts as an inducement for the addressee to leave. (addressee inducement)

Certain types of imperatives (for example, wishes with no addressee) can clearly lack some of these (III), but this provides the general framework for understanding theories of imperative meaning. (I) must be assigned by the semantic component, and every theory of semantic composition that I know of will assign this to the semantics. However, theories differ as to whether or not one or both of (II) and (III) are placed in the semantic denotation of imperatives when they are present, or whether they arise from imperative-specific discourse principles. Theories of imperative denotations can be divided into "strong" theories and "minimal" theories, corresponding to how much work the semantics is doing in a given theory. Strong theories (such as Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016) derive imperative meanings from a modal present in the semantics of the imperative. As such, imperatives are essentially a type of modal expression for theories of imperative

denotata. The discourse principles in strong theories tend to be very general, such as the mechanism that assigns a given utterance a speech act, rather than anything specific to imperatives. Minimal theories, on the other hand, tend to assign non-modal objects as the denotation of imperatives, and instead rely on discourse principles that are specific to imperatives (Portner 2004, 2007).

Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) utilize a theory of effective preference structures to derive the meaning and range of uses available to imperatives. The basic function of this preference structure is to update the ordering of the speaker's preferences in accordance with the content of the imperative. As Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) state, "We take imperatives to commit the speaker to a particular kind of preference, and to be bounded by a condition that limits his active involvement in making the content true."

(16) A preference structure relative to an information state W is a pair ⟨P,⟩, where P (W) and is a partial order on P. (Condoravdi and Lauer 2012)

The support given for this proposal is reliant on the fact that imperatives are incompatible with subsequent expressions indicating disapproval of fulfilling the content of the imperative, and that imperatives cannot be followed with accusations of untruthfulness.

(17) a. #Call him at home! I don't want you to but he is fine with that.
(Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; p.42, their 17)

b. A: Give me an aspirin!
B: #You are lying, you don't want me to give you one.

c. A: Give me an aspirin!
B: # I don't believe you, you don't really want me to give you one.
(Schwager 2006; p.160)

When applied to verbless imperatives, Condoravdi and Lauer's proposal shows some promise. Subsequent expressions of speaker disapproval are also infelicitous in certain verbless imperatives.

(18) a. #Hands up! I don't care if you put them up, but he does!

b. A: Magazines onto the table!

B:#I don't believe you, you don't really want them on the table.

This proposal is not without its flaws, however. One immediate challenge for this proposal that I can see is that there appear to be a wide variety of imperatives that are uttered without being in accordance with the effective preference structure of the speaker. In actual speech, individuals frequently utter imperatives that are not in accordance with what they actually prefer. The specific case that is banned, per Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) is when something explicitly contradictory is said, as in (17a). Other instances of imperatives that are not in accordance with the speaker's preferences are perfectly acceptable.

(19) a. A: How do I get to Harlem? (advice)

B: Take the A-Train. (speaker doesn't care what addressee does)

b. Go left, go right. I don't care. (from Von Fintel and Iatridou 2017; disinterest)

Furthermore, in these cases where speaker desire is not associated with the imperative, follow-ups expressing disapproval with fulfilling the content of the imperative become significantly improved.

(20) A: What is the first step in roasting potatoes?

B: Turn the oven to 450, but I really wish you wouldn't right now.

Their proposal, as stated literally, argues that felicitous imperatives merely *commit* the speaker publicly to an effective preference. The proposal argues that successful imperatives are therefore an update to the common ground that supplies the information that the speaker prefers the content of the imperative being fulfilled to not being fulfilled. Nevertheless, in actual usage, some imperatives do not commit the speaker to preferring that the content of the imperative they uttered comes true.

I will not make use of effective preference structures *per se* in the analyses presented in this dissertation. I do believe, however, that a proponent of this style of analysis could find compatibility in Condoravdi and Lauer's theory and the generalizations about verbless imperatives presented herein.

1.2.1.2 Schwager 2006, Kaufmann 2012

Kaufmann 2012 (and her previous dissertation, Schwager 2006) analyzes imperatives as being fundamentally modal necessity statements (shown below) with the same ability to update the context as indicatives (contrasting with the influential analysis by Portner 2004, in which imperatives introduce a fundamentally different context-change effect, the "To-Do List."). In this work she analyzes imperatives as being equivalent to PERFORMATIVE USES of modals and explicit performatives. Explicit performatives serve to "change the world" by bringing out necessity, as seen below in (21). Thus, imperatives are essentially on par with performative declaratives with "should/must."

(21) a. Open the door now!

b. You must open the door now!

c. I hereby command you to open the door. (Kaufmann 2012; p.33 her 1a-c)

The intuition is that the context change effect of the utterances in (21) are similar enough to one another to motivate a similar semantic treatment for each. Focusing on the interpretation of modals, it has been known that the same lexical item can be either *deontic* or *epistemic*, and this generalization holds across many languages (Kamp 1978; Kratzer 1981). The following examples from Kratzer (1977) highlight the deontic and epistemic uses available to the modal *must*.

(22) a. All Maori children *must* learn the names of their ancestors. (deontic)

b. The ancestors of the Maoris *must* have arrived from Tahiti. (epistemic)

There are two possible strategies for dealing with these multiple uses. The first to take the position that modals are systematically ambiguous between the deontic and epistemic meanings. The other strategy is to take the position that the modals mean the same thing across both uses, and that the differences in interpretation are triggered by context. Kratzer (1981) famously argues for the second approach, in her influential proposal introducing the *modal base* and *ordering source*.

Kaufmann argues that modal utterances are assertions of modal propositions and that they are obligatorily performative because they are only felicitously uttered under certain contextual conditions, such as the speaker having authority over the addressee, etc. Most importantly, she consolidates imperatives under the analysis of modal propositions. She proposes that imperatives are subject to several presuppositions that must be true at utterance time for imperatives to be felicitous. The argument is that in a context where these conditions are satisfied, both modal propositions and imperatives obligatorily update the context identically (e.g., issuing a command or permission, etc.) Because imperatives are obligatorily accompanied by these presuppositions, their truth values are inaccessible. This means that follow-ups like *"That's not true!"* if preceded by an imperative, are unaccepted if preceded by an imperative. This is not because imperatives lack truth values, however. Under Kaufmann's conception, imperatives have truth values, but they are obfuscated by a series of performative presuppositions that obligatorily accompany felicitous imperatives.

One very convincing argument that imperatives do actually represent propositions that do have truth values (under certain conditions) is that imperatives can serve as the answer to a modal question. In a language like German that unambiguously marks imperatives, we can see that the form being used in a question answer is the imperative.

(23) a. Q:Was soll ich machen?
what should I do
'What should I do?'

b. A:Ruf deine Schwester an!
call.Imp.Sg your sister Vprt
'Call your sister!' (Kaufmann 2012; p68, eg. 52)

Given that imperatives can serve as reasonable semantic answers to questions (in the regular sense, e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984)), she reasons that they must have truth values which are obscured in their typical usage.

There are challenges to arguing that imperatives denote propositions that have their meanings derived from modals, however. Unlike standard modals, imperatives can never be used to express epistemic meanings.

(24) a. Leave! $\neq$ You must be leaving.

b. Have left! ≠ You must have left.

I will utilize the presuppositions that were argued to exist in (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012) in my analysis of verbless imperatives, and argue that the imperative operator bring with it that series of presuppositions. Very briefly, I would like to highlight how an analysis designed to account for traditional imperatives could plausibly be extended to a verbless construction. An interesting issue for a modal operator analysis of imperatives is commands like (11), reprinted as (25) below.

(25) No selfies in the bathroom!

An utterance like (25) is subject to a requirement of *speaker endorsement*, similar to what is described by Condoravdi and Lauer. This makes sequences like the following infelicitous.

(26) #No selfies in the bathroom, though I don't care if you take them or not.

Despite patterning with traditional imperatives in many respects, utterances like (25) *can* felicitously be followed with "*That's (not) true!*" even though they are performative. If we imagine a scenario in which speaker B is aware of some change to the rules/law, they can correct the original pronouncement in a way that is impossible in a traditional imperative.

(27) A: Don't smoke in here!
B: #That's not true! / #You're lying! They changed the rules!

(28) A: No smoking in here!
B: That's not true! / You're lying! They changed the rules!

This case, and the computation of the truth conditions of the modalized expression necessary to derive expressions like "No dogs!" under Kaufmann's conception of imperative modality, will be discussed in great detail in Chapter 2. Ultimately, I will argue that it is easier to capture the dual speech-act update utilizing an imperative operator than utilizing a closed clause-type system, which would necessitate that imperatives do not carry truth-conditions, to explain the instance of traditional imperatives. This essentially amounts to arguing that the ingredients that block truth values are different between traditional imperatives and general prohibitives, but that both expressions have truth values underlyingly.

1.2.1.3 Portner 2004, 2007

Portner (2004, 2007) has an understanding of imperative clauses in which imperatives update a separate storage site for information. Thus, in this system, there is the *Common Ground* for declaratives, the *Question Set* for interrogatives, and the *To-Do List* for imperatives. In this system, imperatives do not represent propositions, but rather properties, and these properties go on the *To-Do List* of the addressee. Thus, a felicitous command will cause the addressee to add the relevant property to her To-Do List. Each individual keeps track of her own obligations over a discourse. The basic course of events that takes place in Portner's system is shown below. w* is the world of evaluation, and c is the discourse context.

(29) Leave!

(30) $[\![\text{Leave!}]\!]^{w*,c} = [\lambda w \lambda x : x = \text{addressee}(c) \; . \; x \text{ leaves in } w]$

The To-Do List conception of imperative denotation is a reasonable conception of COMMANDS, which involve necessity. But, as was shown earlier, imperatives can also be used as PERMISSIONS, which involve possibility. If someone utters a permission imperative in (31), it is not the case that the addressee is obligated to make the content of the imperative happen.

(31) Take a cookie, if you like.

Portner, of course, is well-aware of this and addresses the issue thoroughly in (Portner 2012). A serious methodological issue, however, is that the To-Do List as a component of the grammar is supposed to be triggered by the presence of an imperative morpheme. As such, the To-Do List is meant to explain utterances of imperative clause type, and only that clause type. This potentially makes it challenging to explain why certain modalized declaratives appear to provide an identical pragmatic update to the update provided by imperatives.[7]

[7] Benjamin Bruening, p.c., points out that it may be possible to analyze embedded infinitives as imperative clauses. The basis for this analysis is that certain idioms that are limited to being imperatives can appear as embedded infinitives.

(1) a. Break a leg!

(32) a. Open the door now!

b. You must open the door now!

c. I hereby command you to open the door. (Kaufmann 2012; p.33 her 1a-c)

In some circumstances, it seems as though the pragmatic effect of uttering (32b) is identical to the imperative in (32a). Tying the To-Do List to imperative form makes this fact difficult to explain.

These issues also come to bear on the fate of verbless imperatives. An interesting issue for the theory presented in Portner (2004) is that certain verbless imperatives seem very difficult to translate into a property that can be predicated of the addressee. When the verb is overt, we have a straightforward way of adding the property to the addressee's To-Do List (30). Certain verbless imperatives do not seem particularly amenable to any obvious proposition, however, like (33) below.

(33) No dogs in the pool!

The pragmatic update after an utterance like (33) seems intuitively more like an update to the Common Ground than an update to the To-Do List. The type of update that an example like (33) provides is something like "Dogs are not allowed in the pool." Nevertheless, the utterance in (33) can be shown to have a variety of imperative-like properties, such as resisting embedding and committing the speaker to believing it is the best course of action. As far as I can tell, this makes it a serious challenge to this conception of the grammar. If we label (33) as a declarative, we cannot add it to the To-Do List. This seems incorrect, however, because an utterance like (33) does add an obligation to the addressee, and commits the speaker to having some preference about the future state of the world. In other words, there is something that the addressee "must (not) do" upon an utterance of (33). If we label (33) as an imperative, it is unclear what the property is that is added to the To-Do

b. I broke a leg. (*idiomatic)

c. She told me to break a leg.

List. I will ultimately conclude that Portner's theory is not well equipped to deal with some verbless imperatives, but adjustments could potentially be made that save it.[8]

1.3 Linguistic Framework

This section will serve to establish the basic theory of imperatives that I will be using in this dissertation. There are several properties that are essential to determining what counts as an imperative, which become even more important when material is omitted.

The first element of the framework that will be used in this dissertation is a formal projection that contains sentence-level prosodic information. There is a Prosodic Head that heads a Prosody Phrase, and it can contain features within it like "Command" and "Assert." These features determine the sentence-level melody. The basic intuition behind this is that there is a morpheme in the syntax that is associated with the prosodic contour of the entire utterance. Analyses that view prosody as a type of pronounced element which can contribute to the form have become increasingly common in recent years (Cheng and Rooryck 2000; Davis 2009; Duguine and Irurtzun 2020, among many others). Adding to this, this dissertation will discover several instances in which a morphosyntactic operation appears to be limited to a specific sentence-level prosodic contour. Because of this, I will represent different prosodies with their intended speech acts, and have that Prosodic Head be capable of effecting syntactic operations, placed in the left periphery.

There are two benefits to including an interpretational morpheme that includes the sentence prosody. The first benefit is purely conceptual. Because verbless imperatives can involve a massive truncation of the traditional clause structure, it is useful to list out explicitly the remaining information. Because sentence-level prosodic information is not deleted in a verbless imperative, representing it overtly in the structure makes it clear how verbless imperatives are appropriately interpreted as imperatives.

The second benefit of having an overt Prosodic Head will become clear in Chapter 3, where I argue that it is the presence of COMMAND prosody, with an additional feature,

[8] Note that Portner's theory *does* allow for negative obligations to be added to the To-Do List. What is potentially problematic here is the assertoric meaning component.

α, that adds urgency that causes the edge deletion in *goal commands*. I use COMMAND to represent the specific prosody that it used for commands.

(34)



The idea here is that the deletion of the subject, verb, and determiner is dependent on the presence of COMMAND prosody, which in turn is only compatible with the speech act COMMAND. This means that there is a necessary connection between the sentence level prosody and a specific morphosyntactic process, in this case edge deletion. The account will be fully fleshed out in Chapters 3 and 4.

The second component of the analysis that will be utilized here is an imperative operator. The imperative operator takes two arguments, the modal base and the ordering source (f and g respectively), over which imperatives are evaluated. In addition, Kaufmann (2012) argues that felicitous utterances of imperatives carry the following four presuppositions along with them.

(35) a. Non-Past Constraint The time at which p takes place must not be entirely in the past. (Kaufmann 2012: Sect. 3.2.2)

b. Authority Condition The speaker must be in a privileged position with respect to the truth of $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ \text{f}\ \text{g}\ ]\!]$, either as an authority figure or as a knowledgeable expert. (Kaufmann 2012: Section 4.2.2)

c. Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint It is unknown whether *p(w)* is true or false before the imperative is uttered. (Kaufmann 2012: Section 4.2.3)

d. Ordering Source Restriction The imperative must address a salient decision problem *D*, and the speaker and addressee must consider *g* to be the relevant ordering source for resolving *D*. (Kaufmann 2012: Section 4.2.3)

Following Han and Rambow (2000), Kaufmann (2012), and Oikonomou (2016), I will place the imperative operator on C^0. Combined with a Prosody Phrase, this looks like the following.

(36)



This structure ensures not only that the utterances carries COMMAND prosody, but that it is sufficiently performative. The imperative operator carries along with it the presuppositions in (35), which means that its inclusion requires each of the presuppositions to be true at utterance time. That is to say, when the imperative operator is present, those presuppositions are also present.

The final component of the analysis that needs to be mentioned is a dedicated phrase that restricts the syntactic subject of the clause to being the addressee. I call this phrase the Addressee Phrase (AddrP). Functionally, this Phrase fulfills a somewhat similar role to the Jussive Phrase originally proposed by Zanuttini (2008) and Zanuttini et al. (2012), but without any association with a specific pragmatic storage site, as was argued for in the originals. The motivation for this phrase comes from the fact that certain types of verbless imperatives appear to be fixed to having their subjects be some subset of the addressee(s), in a way similar to traditional imperatives. This projection is intended to formalize the Addressee Restriction that exists on the syntactic subjects of traditional imperative clauses, by entering the derivation with a 2nd person feature that binds the lower covert subject.[9] The semantic denotation of the Addressee Operator is the following.

[9] In Zanuttini et al. (2012), arguments are presented that the Jussive Phrase can come in different persons, and that this can cause the similarity between imperatives, exhortatives, and promissives. The AddrP is more limited, and designed specifically for 2nd person imperative effects.

(37) OP_{Addr}: [λx : x = addressee(c).]

In essence, what this means is that presence of the addressee operator will require the syntactic subject of the clause it attaches to the be some subset of the addressee(s). A structure of this is presented below in (38).

(38)



The Addressee Operator in (38) restricts the syntactic subject of the TP that it takes to being restricted to some subset of the addressee(s). Some way of restricting the addressee of an imperative clause is typically necessary, given that normal syntactic structure for declaratives permits any person to be the subject. Not all verbless imperatives involve addressee restriction, and therefore the above structure will be used only when directly motivated. Given that some verbless imperatives also appear to display this Addressee Restriction, I will employ a similar device to the one used to explain the restriction in traditional imperatives. Because verbless imperatives are often restricted in expressing this subject overtly, secondary methods of determining the syntactic subject are necessary, such as examination of the binding facts.

These devices are all we need to start analyzing. And now, to the data!

Chapter 2

GENERAL PROHIBITION

2.1 Introduction

The first *verbless imperative* that this thesis will investigate is the *general prohibitive* (GP). The term *prohibitive* was originally intended to describe certain varieties of negative imperatives Zanuttini (1997), Kahrel and Van den Berg (1994), Aikhenvald (1999), and Xrakovski (2001), among others). I will extend the original intent to constructions like those in (39) below. GPs are most commonly used, in speech and in writing, as prohibitions such as on warning signs, public notices and street signs (Donovan 2018).

(39) a. No jumping on the sofa!

b. No petting the animals!

c. No spoilers in this thread!

d. Visitors before 10 P.M. only!

It is likely that every language has some way of roughly expressing the prohibitions in (39). When paired with no, as in (39a)-(39c), the prohibited item/activity is the complement of "no." In the case of (39d), a set of focus alternatives is prohibited, namely the set of visitors that arrive after 10 P.M. Below is a small sample of some cross-linguistic constructions that appear to be performing a similar function to GPs.[1,2]

(40) Pas de fumage
Neg of smoke
'No smoking!' (French)

[1] See Iatridou (2021) for an in-depth discussion of several cross-linguistic GPs (as she calls them, Negation Licensed Commands)

[2] Thanks to Justin Rill and Jennifer Legault for the French judgment, Karoliina Lohiniva for the Finnish judgment, and Shakhlo Nematova for the Uzbek judgment.

(41) Ei tupakointia
Neg smoking.Par
'No smoking!' (Finnish)

(42) Chek-ish mumkin e-mas!
smoke-Nmz possible e-Neg
'No smoking allowed!' (Uzbek)

Kaufmann (2012) discusses the possibility of construing "prohibitive" as a separate clause type from imperative. Doing so would amount to analyzing the following utterances as members of different clause types, the positive form as an order, and the negative form as a prohibition.

(43) a. Pet Saria!

b. Don't pet Saria!

Such a view is rejected by Kaufmann (2012), and by Sadock and Zwicky (1985) earlier for declaratives. This is on the basis that each positive form is compatible with negation, and that negation does not fundamentally alter the meaning of the clauses outside of contributing its standard meaning. However, separating imperatives and prohibitives into separate clause types is initially plausible when looking at GPs. This is because, unlike traditional imperatives, GPs only appear in the presence of negation (Iatridou 2021).

(44) a. No jumping on the sofa!

b. *Jumping on the sofa!

A system that has PROHIBITIVE as a distinct clause type from IMPERATIVE can explain the distribution in (44) with no additional stipulations. If prohibitives form a distinct clause type, we would expect certain constructions to be limited to certain clause types. In this case, we could stipulate that GPs are restricted to appear in PROHIBITIVE clause type and that an inherent feature of PROHIBITIVES is that they require negation. It is far from trivial to explain this distribution in a system that lacks PROHIBITIVE as a separate clause type from IMPERATIVE, but that is what I will partially attempt to do here.

In Section 1.1.1., I introduced the notion of a tripartite clause-type system, with a three-way split between DECLARATIVE, INTERROGATIVE, and IMPERATIVE. I also introduced the notion of a *closed* clause-type system. In a closed clause-type system, each sentence must be a member of one and only one clause type. Thus, in a formal sense, a closed clause-type system forbids a single sentence from being simultaneously a member of multiple clause types, for example, simultaneously DECLARATIVE and INTERROGATIVE. In this way, there can be a conventionalization between form and function that corresponds to the various clause type. For example, DECLARATIVE clause type is conventionally associated with the speech-act ASSERT, INTERROGATIVE clause type with the speech-act QUESTION, and IMPERATIVE clause type with the speech act COMMAND.

GPs initially seem to provide a direct counterexample to the *closed* clause-type systems argued for by Sadock and Zwicky (1985), by being capable of simultaneously providing the speech acts ASSERT and REQUEST. Following Keshet and Medeiros (2019), I will argue that the imperative operator is capable of selecting a lower modal, and that different modals provide different outcomes with respect to the accessibility of truth values. I will ultimately conclude that it is the combination of the imperative operator with a priority modal that blocks accessible truth values. Because traditional imperatives always combine with a priority modal under normal circumstances, their truth values are obscured. GPs combined with the modal "allowed," and therefore have accessible truth values.

I will also show that the syntactic subject of GPs is not restricted to being a subset of the addressee(s). Because of this, I will argue that the imperative operator is in principle free to appear in clauses that lack the Addressee Restriction that is well-known to traditional imperatives. In essence, this amounts to arguing that imperative meaning does not require imperative morphosyntax.

2.1.1 Defining General Prohibitives

In English, "General Prohibitive" (GP) refers to an expression like those in (39) that contains "no" followed by a noun, or a noun followed by "only." This noun can be a gerund, and often is, but is free to be a variety of nouns. A crucial property of GPs is that they are typically interpreted as being *general*, or *universal*. The interpretation of a GP is that the

content of the prohibition is a violation of a rule or ordinance - and anyone who violates it is in violation of the rule. Thus, an utterance like "No jumping on the sofa!" receives the interpretation that no one is allowed to jump on the sofa, and anyone who jumps on the sofa is violating this rule. It is not necessary for the "rule" to be a literal law, merely something in a given context that is not allowed. Outside of function, I limit the form of a GP to be "No + NP (allowed)!" or " NP only (allowed)!" Doing so excludes traditional imperatives which may also be used to prohibit, like (45) below.

(45) Don't jump on the sofa!

I do not intend (45) to be considered a "general prohibitive" even if used in a general context to prohibit something. For example, we can imagine a sofa at an art gallery where (45) is taped to the wall as an instruction for anyone who enters the room. In this sense, (45) is acting as a universal prohibition, but I do not mean to invoke it with the name "general prohibitive." As we will see, there are important differences between forms like (45) and the GPs in (39).

It is worth noting that each of the strings in (39) can also be used with an existential interpretation.[3] The existential usage is disambiguated from the prohibitive usage in normal speech by prosody.

(46) A: Can you please check each room to see if any dogs are inside?
B: (Checks room) No dogs in here.

We will not consider responses like the one given by B in (46) to be GPs, because it does not prohibit anything, but merely notes the lack of existence of dogs. A distinction must therefore be made between GP and negative existentials. The two forms are distinguished in normal speech by prosody. The focus of this section will therefore be on forms that prohibit,

[3] The existential usage of gerunds is admittedly odd, but it is possible with the right context.

(1) A: Check each room and see if someone is laughing inside.
B: (Checks room) No laughing in here...

Given that it is somewhat difficult to get the existential reading with gerunds, I will avoid using them in existential constructions.

and I will mention the existential forms only in direct comparison to the prohibitive forms. Nevertheless, I consider the existence of the existential form to be very important. My analysis will ultimately be informed by the fact that a similar form can be used in negative existential constructions.

As we will see in the course of this chapter, GPs possess a highly unusual combination of properties. At first glance, it is unclear whether GPs are a member of the clause type DECLARATIVE or IMPERATIVE. What I will ultimately argue is that all imperatives have truth values underlyingly, but that these truth values are blocked in the case of traditional imperatives. Because the contextual constellation is different for GPs, their truth values are accessible.

The format of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 will describe the basic properties of GPs. It will conclude that the overt content of a GP is nominal, and that "no" is a determiner in the construction. Section 3 will investigate the morphosyntactic properties of GPs. It will conclude that most of their properties are more typical of declarative clauses than traditional imperatives. Section 4 will investigate the semantic/pragmatic update associated with GPs, and determine that it is quite similar to the update associated with traditional imperatives. Section 5 will provide an analysis that combines declarative and imperative properties, based on the observations from Sections 2-4.

2.2 Basic Properties of English General Prohibitives

This section will focus on some of the basic syntactic properties of GPs. It will show that their overt material is nominal, but that there is a covert VP with the content "allowed."

2.2.1 *No* in General Prohibitives

Before addressing the mixed declarative and imperative properties of GPs, it is necessary to establish that their overt content is nominal, not verbal. GPs most typically conjoin "no" and a noun. When GPs have been discussed in the literature, the construction has been mostly considered to be limited to gerunds (Seiss et al. 2008; Hudson 2003; Iatridou 2019).

Thus, the object of study, to the limited extent that this construction has been observed, has typically been constructions with gerunds like in (47) below.[4]

(47) No jumping on the bed!

It is not correct, however, to limit the scope of discussion to examples with gerunds like (47). GPs are quite permissive in terms of what type of nouns can participate outside of gerunds. Basic nouns, eventive nouns, derived nouns, mass nouns, compounds, nouns with complements, and nouns with relative clauses are all grammatical in GPs.

(48) a. No swimming!

b. No dolphins!

c. No horseplay!

d. No destruction!

e. No coffee!

f. No soap operas!

g. No theories that the world is ending right now!

h. No dogs that just drank from the toilet in the kitchen!

It is therefore incorrect to suppose that GPs have any special relationship with gerunds, given that they appear with a broad class of nouns. Gerunds are well-known to be nominal in their external distribution (Abney 1987), and so I suggest here that they are one example among many of nominals that can appear in GPs.

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[4] Many languages utilize an *infinitival* rather than a gerund. For example, the title of the children's book, *No Jumping on the Bed!*, is translated into Spanish as the following.

(1) No salta-r en la cama!
no jump-Inf in the.Fem bed
'No jumping on the bed!'

See Iatridou (2021) for discussion of the cross-linguistic properties of similar constructions.

The class of nouns that can grammatically appear in GPs is not completely unrestricted, however. Proper names, pronouns, and nouns with determiners are all impossible.[5]

(49) a. *No Gordon Ramsay in my basement!

b. *No you in my house!

c. *No these dogs at work!

d. *No some students in my office after 6 P.M.!

e. *No Satoshi's dogs in my office!

These restrictions are straightforward if the "no" in GPs is analyzed as a determiner. Given that "no" is well-known to be a determiner in English (Swart 2000; Huddleston and Pullum 2002), the most reasonable analysis of GPs is that "no" is a determiner in the construction, which is flexible in the type of N it can take. For the case of (49a) and (49b), determiners in English cannot combine with proper names or pronouns. For (49c) and (49d), there cannot be multiple determiners associated with the same noun. For (49e), a possessed noun cannot have a determiner in English. In light of the data in (48) and (49), I propose that the overt material present in GPs is simply a *traditional noun phrase* with the prohibited item as the head.[6] A simple structure of this NP can be seen below.

(50)



[5] The pluralized version sounds much better, but of course refers to any individual with that name, and not a specific individual.

(1) ?No Gordon Ramsays in my basement!

[6] By traditional noun phrase, I mean that it can either be an NP or DP, as an atheoretical notion of the nominal projection. I will use *NP* throughout this chapter.

One straightforward reason to think that the overt material present in a GP is a traditional noun phrase is the possibility of adjectival modification, even of gerunds.

(51) a. No more *quick* thinking!

b. No *pink* dolphins!

Gerunds and underived simple nouns act the same with regard to adjectival modification. Of course, adverbial modification of gerunds is also possible, whereas this is not possible for underived nouns like in (52b).

(52) a. No singing loudly!

b. *No dogs loudly!

The most straightforward explanation of this asymmetry is that there is a verb phrase in gerunds that is embedded inside a noun phrase, and that verbal element can be modified by adverbs. This type of nominalized gerund structure has been explicitly proposed before (Reuland 1983; Abney 1987; Baker 2005), and has been indirectly assumed in other work. I posit that the structure for gerunds must be something like the following in (53), with a VP embedded somewhere under an NP, without arguing for any specific analysis of the structure for English gerunds.[7]

[7] Within the generative tradition of analyzing gerunds, there has traditionally been a distinction between three types of English gerunds.

i. John's running marathons got him in shape. (POSS-ing)
ii. John running marathons got him in shape. (ACC-ing)
iii. John's running of marathons got him in shape. (ing-of)

Although it's impossible to go into all the issues surrounding gerunds here, I will note that gerundal GPs can take either direct objects or prepositional phrases with no obvious change in meaning (could be ACC-ing or ing-of).

i. No singing of operas!
ii. No singing operas!

However, the case presented here is a tricky one - as gerunds with determiners are supposed to be unable to take accusative objects (Wasow and Roeper 1972; Abney 1987). Hudson (2003) proposes that we need a 4th type of gerund to accommodate these facts ("No-DETing"); Iatridou (2019) reaches a similar conclusion. These proposals seem reasonable to me.

(53)



This structure allows gerunds to possess mixed nominal and verbal properties while allowing their syntactic distribution to be NP-like.[8] This is essential for capturing the generalization that gerundal GPs act identically to bare noun GPs, which are uncontroversially nominal. Therefore, both gerunds and simple nouns occur under the same syntactic node (NP), and can have the same syntactic distribution.

This analysis makes the case of gerunds unexceptional; they are nouns, and are therefore available to be the complement of the determiner "no." Interestingly, as discussed by Iatridou (2021) for "not" and "never," other forms of negation are not possible in forming GPs.

(54) a. No dolphins!

b. *Don't dolphins!

c. (#Prohibitive) Not dolphins!

d. *None of dolphins!

e. (#Prohibitive) Never dolphins!

f. *Non-dolphins!

Although (54c) and (54e) are grammatical fragments, they are not felicitous in the same context as (54a). (54c), for example, is possible as an exclamation.

(55) A: I heard dolphins are going extinct.

B: Not dolphins!

[8] Since "no" is a determiner based on the size of NPs that it can combine with, these NPs should lack a case projection KP. This prediction is hitherto untested, as I am unaware of any language that was available to me that both has negative determiners and overt case marking. Thanks to Rebecca Tollan for pointing this out and making this prediction clearer to me.

Crucially for the purposes of analyzing GPs, (54c) cannot be used as a command that means "Dolphins are not allowed." It is therefore not a GP and not the subject of inquiry here.

It is worth pointing out that, unlike standard imperatives in English, the negation is mandatory to produce a GP. There is no corresponding construction *general permissive* or *universal obligation* in the absence of negation. Thus, "positive" versions of GPs are simply ungrammatical.

(56) a. *Dolphins!

b. *Swimming in the pool!

Iatridou (2019, 2021) refers to the phenomenon in (56) as being one example of what she terms a "Negation-Licensed Command." Given this view that it is negation licensing the command, it is not just that "no" is the only form of negation that is compatible with GPs, but that GPs require "no." The next subsection will show that GPs can also be formed with "only," and will explain that "no" and "only" both form items that decomposes into a negative component and an existential component. The only difference between them is that the existential component of "only" involves evaluation over alternatives, as is well known (Horn 1969; Rooth 1992).

There is additional evidence outside of English that the negation is forming a constituent with the noun. In German, the determiner *kein(e)* must obligatorily agree with the noun it modifies. Note that "kein(e)" is only a determiner and cannot be used as sentential negation or the negation present in short answers (Curme 1905; Jäger 2008). In German GPs, there is agreement present between *kein(e)* and the noun. A count noun must bear plural marking on both the determiner and noun, while a mass noun will bear neither.[9]

(57) a. Kein-e Hund-e im Badezimmer!
no-Pl dog-Pl in.the bathroom
"No dogs in the bathroom!"

b. Kein Alkohol im Badezimmer!
no alcohol in.the bathroom
"No alcohol in the bathroom!" (German)

[9] Thanks to Solveig Bosse and Janina Böcher (p.c.) for their judgments on German.

Taken in combination with the English data, the fact that German "kein(e)" must agree with the head noun in an analogous construction suggests to me that they are forming a constituent. Gerunds can participate in the construction and be modified by the determiner "no," because they are nouns and can participate in the full range of expressions that are available to nouns throughout the language, but the construction is not limited to gerunds in any way.

2.2.1.1 *Only* in General Prohibitives

Although GPs appear to be highly limited in the form of the negation that they are compatible with, an analogous construction to "no GPs" can be found with "only." All of the noun phrases that were previously possible with "no" are also possible with "only."

(58) a. Swimming only!

b. Dolphins only!

c. Horseplay only!

d. Destruction only!

e. Coffee only!

f. Soap operas only!

g. Theories that the world is ending only!

h. Dogs that just drank from the toilet only!

The distribution of NPs that are compatible with "only" is not exactly equivalent to the distribution of NPs compatible with "no," however. Some of the restrictions on "no GPs" are not present with "only GPs." For example, proper names are possible with "only," but not with "no." If we imagine a scenario in which Artemis, Demeter, and Aphrodite are about to enter a bank, (59a) can be felicitously uttered to prohibit the alternatives, but (59b) cannot be used to prohibit specifically Artemis.

(59) a. Artemis only!

b. *No Artemis!

Rather than taking the data in (59) to show that we are dealing with two fundamentally different constructions, it is clear that the distributional difference is due to the fact that "no" and "only" are different parts of speech. Namely, "no" is a determiner, and "only" is not. "Only" appears much more naturally after the noun, rather than before.[10]

(60) a. Artemis only!

b. ??Only Artemis!

Given that "only" can appear after the noun, it seems unlikely to be a determiner in this construction, given that English determiners precede the nouns they are associated with.[11] Several positions of "only" with "allowed" are acceptable.[12]

(61) a. Only Artemis allowed!

b. ???Artemis only allowed!

c. ?Artemis allowed only!

Determiners can actually appear in "only" GPs, given the right context. If the NP that appears in the "only" GP is salient in the context, or was given explicitly prior in the discourse, an exchange like (62) below becomes possible.

(62) A: Which of these are allowed in? (of dogs, cats, giraffes)

B: The dogs only!

B: You two only!

---

[10] Thanks to Satoshi Tomioka, p.c., for pointing this out.

[11] Ezra Keshet, p.c., offers the following contrast in which the phonological weight of the NP involved may affect the position of "only."

(1) a. Only Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge!

b. ?Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge only!

This judgment is not entirely clear, however. Some speakers seem to prefer (b) above. Phonological weight may therefore be having a different effect depending on the speaker.

[12] Some speakers seem to find the version with "only" after the noun and before "allowed" totally unacceptable.

An analysis of the correct attachment position of "only" is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it seems clear based on the data in (60), (61), and (62) that it cannot be a determiner, and is most likely an adverb. Given that "only" is not a determiner, why can it appear in GPs at all? Iatridou (2019, 2021) argues that the relevant factor in licensing GPs is the negation. Von Fintel and Iatridou (2007) argues that "only" decomposes semantically into a negative component and an existential meaning component. If we follow this line of thinking, "no" and "only" are nearly identical in terms of their meaning contribution. The difference between them is that "only" introduces alternatives whereas "no" does not. In the case of "only," it generates a set of focus alternatives based on the noun it co-occurs with and then rules those focus alternatives out (Rooth 1992). Thus, an utterance of (59a) will produce the following set of negated focus alternatives.[13]

(63) Artemis only! → {Demeter is not allowed, Aphrodite is not allowed, etc.}

I will treat "no" and "only" therefore as decomposing into essentially the same elements, and that the negative element is required in GPs. This is essentially adopted from Iatridou (2021), who suggests that negation is the crucial element in licensing GPs. I will utilize the phrase NegP in the derivation of GPs, and suggest that it must be filled in order for a GP to surface.

The only real relevant difference between "no" GPs and "only" GPs is just the part of speech that English uses for each lexical item. "No" is a determiner, and "only" is not. This requirement on negation somewhat mysteriously means that GPs can only ever be used to *prohibit*, and never to *permit*.

2.2.2 The Covert VP

In the previous section, we established that the overt material of GPs is a noun phrase, that can appear with "no" or "only." A reasonable starting hypothesis would therefore be

[13] Note that the focus alternatives are still generated even though their explicit grammatical form is actually not a possible GP.

(1) *No Demeter!

This serves as evidence that generated focus alternatives do not themselves have to be valid possible utterances.

that GPs consist only of a noun phrase. There is evidence, however, that there is a VP in the structure of GPs. In the following examples, a temporal modifier adjacent to the NP is acceptable.

(64) a. No dogs *until I say so*!

b. No cell phones *before noon*!

It is not plausible that these temporal modifiers could be modifying the NP directly because the NPs in (64) could not possibly be interpreted as eventive. The temporal modifiers in (64) are not capable of modifying the same NPs in other constructions.

(65) a. *No dogs *until I say so* are worth putting in the kennel.

b. *No cell phones *before noon* were seen.

There is evidence, therefore, for covert structure in (64) that is absent in (65), and evidence that the adverbial modifiers modify this covert structure. A reasonable explanation is that the temporal modifiers in (64) are modifying VP structure that is absent in (65). What then, is the material of this VP, given that it does not appear overtly? There are very good reasons to believe the content of the VP is "allowed." One intuitive and appealing reason to analyze GPs as containing this predicate is that they can add the word "allowed" without changing their meaning.[14]

(66) a. No dolphins allowed!

b. No smoking allowed!

Informants consistently report that they cannot perceive a difference in meaning between "No dolphins!" and "No dolphins allowed!" To English speakers, the two expressions seem equivalent in every way. The examples in (66) can be restated with the adverbial modifiers present, again with no change in meaning.

[14] Synonyms of "allowed" can also appear here, though I will stick to "allowed" throughout.

(1) a. No dolphins permitted!

(67) a. No dogs allowed *until I say so*!

b. No cell phones allowed *before noon*!

Note that the semantics seems to derive a meaning in which the prohibition is restricted by the time specified in the temporal modifier. Thus, the meaning of an utterance like (67b) is that before noon, cell phones are not allowed. At times outside of what is specified, we have no explicit information. This meaning is derived both for the GP that has "allowed" as an explicit element (67b) and the GP that does not (64b). This predicate can be modified by temporal adjuncts, and its presence explains why GPs seem to mean the content of the GP is forbidden, whether or not the word "allowed" is expressed overtly.

The question remains as to why "allowed" can be optionally added or removed with no obvious change in meaning or force. Because its meaning seems to always be present, I will place it in the derivation even when it is not pronounced. It has been claimed in the literature that there is a distributional difference between GPs without "allowed" and with "allowed" with regards to the ability of a gerund inside the GP to take an object. Iatridou (2019) argues that gerundal GPs with "allowed" cannot take direct objects, but can take PPs. The following contrast is argued for in that paper.

(68) a. No playing piano!

b. No playing of piano!

c. No playing of piano allowed!

d. *No playing piano allowed!

For her, when "allowed" is absent, gerunds can freely take objects or PP complements. When "allowed" is present, however, gerunds must take a PP complement. Or at least, that is the judgment that is reported. Every English speaker that I asked found (68c) above significantly worse than (68d). Many speakers find (68d) perfectly acceptable, and examples like (68d) can be found on the internet.

(69) No taking photos allowed (https://www.tcbsbm.net/events/tasa-tasb/)

If there are speakers who find (68d) unacceptable, what may be happening is that they generally find Acc-ing gerunds unacceptable with modifiers. One speaker who found (68d) marginal also found other modifiers to be marginal.

(70) a. ??Buying tickets mandatory.

b. ???Authenticating documents required.

Contra Iatridou, therefore, I consider "allowed" to be present in the derivation of all GPs. When no modifier is specified, however, GPs are limited to be interpreted as containing "allowed." Any string of "No + X" uttered as a command will always receive the interpretation of "not allowed," despite the existence of other theoretically possible meanings.

(71) No coffee! ≠ No coffee is required, No coffee was found, No coffee was seen, etc.

I take this as evidence that "No + NP" can act like a normal NP in the syntax, but only the predicate "allowed" can be dropped. Thus, when "No + NP" strings are pronounced without an overt predicate, the interpretation is obligatorily "allowed" and not another theoretically possible predicate. This predicate is always present in GPs and is available for modification, even when not overtly pronounced. It is also fixed in the passive, the active meaning is not possible.

(72) No prison guards! ≠ No prison guards allow...

The proper analysis of GPs must therefore not only involve a VP with "allowed", but involve a VP that is fixed in the passive. This passive VP will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5 of this chapter.

To summarize so far, "no N" forms an NP in the syntax. The evidence points to this NP being the subject of the passive VP "be allowed," which is elided.

2.2.3 Syntactic Subject

The previous section established that GPs have a VP that is sometimes unpronounced, but is present syntactically. The purpose of this section will be to establish that the subject of GPs is the expletive subject *"there."*[15] This is in contrast to what we would expect if

[15] Thanks to Ezra Keshet and Hadil Karawani, p.c., for suggesting the possibility of an existential subject.

GPs possessed an Addressee Phrase or a Jussive Phrase, of the type typically argued to exist in traditional imperative clauses, as traditional imperatives cannot have existential subjects and are well-known to be restricted to having the addressee as a syntactic subject (Zanuttini 2008; Potsdam 2017).

It may initially be tempting to try to analyze GPs as covert imperative clauses. The pragmatic update between the following traditional imperative and GP seem roughly equivalent.

(73) a. No smoking!

b. Don't smoke!

While (73a) may be more appropriate for a general audience, and (73b) may be more appropriate targeted at a specific individual, their meaning does not appear wildly divergent. Despite the superficial similarity that GPs have to traditional imperatives, there are some important differences. Traditional imperative clauses are well-known to require that their subject be some subset of the addressees. Zanuttini (2008) shows that imperatives can bind 2nd person pronouns even with 3rd person subjects (74), an option which is not possible in declaratives or interrogatives (75).

(74) a. Everyone$_i$ raise (his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$)/your$_i$ hand!

b. Someone$_i$ raise (his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$)/your$_i$ hand!

(75) a. Everyone$_i$ should raise his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$/*your$_i$ hand.

b. Should everyone$_i$ raise his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$/*your$_i$ hand? (Zanuttini 2008)

Zwicky (1988) establishes that tag questions and binding can be used to demonstrate underlying subjecthood of traditional imperatives. When applied to traditional imperatives, these tests invariably demonstrate a 2nd person subject.

(76) a. Give me a hand with this penguin, won't you / *he?

b. Make yourself / *ourselves a drink! (Zwicky 1988)

It is standardly argued that the material in a tag in English must match whatever is present in Spec-TP and T^0 (Culicover 1992; Bruening 2016). As such, 2nd person tags

are taken to indicate that the subject must also be 2nd person for traditional imperatives. Zanuttini (2008) introduces a dedicated syntactic projection, the Jussive Phrase, that is capable of binding 2nd person subject features in imperative clauses.

(77)



For Zanuttini, the operator in Spec-JussP limits the subject in Spec-TP to be some subset of the addressee(s). It might initially seem promising to posit that a projection like JussiveP is present in the derivation of GPs as well, given that 2nd person reflexives are grammatical in GPs (78).

(78) No hitting yourself!

Although initially promising, it is clear that the bound 2nd person reflexive pronoun in (78) can refer to an impersonal 'you' which is the subject of the gerund rather than a true addressee-restricted subject like in imperatives. For instance, 'oneself' is also possible in GPs in the same situation as (78), whereas it is never possible in standard imperatives, or declaratives with a potential 2nd person binder.

(79) a. No hitting oneself!

b. *Make oneself a drink!

c. *You saw oneself.

Additionally, it is possible to adjoin 'for' phrases to GPs, yet when a 2nd person non-reflexive pronoun is part of the adjoined phrase, this is not a binding violation. When a reflexive pronoun is adjoined, it is a Condition A violation. A Condition B violation is incurred in a declarative with an overt 2nd person subject and a traditional imperative, however.

(80) a. No candy for you / *yourself!

b. You brought candy for *you / yourself.

c. Don't bring candy for *you / yourself!

Portner et al. (2019) argue that the subject of constructions like those in (79a) is a non-specific addressee. Given that "you" is capable of being generic in English, the non-specific addressee is capable of binding either "yourself" or "oneself." While I am sympathetic toward the goals espoused by Portner et al. (2019) to understand the morphosyntactic manifestations of the addressee feature, it is doubtful that such a non-specific addressee could be the subject of GPs. 1st and 3rd person reflexives are available to GPs in the right context, neither of which are ever available to standard imperatives in English.[16]

(81) a. "OK, so no making myself scarce" ("Soothing Music for Stray Cats" by Jayne Joso)

b. "No making himself withstand something too strong, no requiring himself to break through or tough it out." (http://archive.skoll.org/2011/03/15/expanding-your-window-of-tolerance-increasing-effectiveness-by-staying-present-in-the-moment/)

c. "...No making themselves comfortable in their house..." (www.desperatelyseekingsomething.com/, The Apprentice - Season 1)

d. *Don't sell myself short! (Talking to self in mirror)

These facts lead to the conclusion that the subject binding this range of reflexive pronouns is uncontrolled PRO. This uncontrolled PRO is most naturally the subject of the gerund itself within the NP.[17]

[16] See Potsdam (2017) for 3rd person subjects and binding possibilities in English imperatives.

[17] See Akkuş (2021) for more arguments that the subject of this construction is arbitrary PRO in English, Turkish, and Sason Arabic.

(82)



It is not plausible, however, that PRO could be the syntactic subject of GPs that lack gerunds. There is no possibility of binding reflexives in "for" phrases in GPs that lack gerunds. Non-reflexive pronouns are acceptable across all person values.

(83) a. *No dogs for myself/yourself/himself/ourselves!

b. No dogs for me / you / him / us!

If the addressee cannot be the subject of a GP, nor can PRO, then what can be? Evidence from tags shows that the subject of GPs is likely to be the existential *"there."* There is a clear contrast between a tag containing "there" and possible alternatives. This is true even in the cases where a gerund binds a reflexive within the GP (84c).

(84) a. No smoking allowed! Actually, is there? / *are you? / *is it?

b. No trucks allowed! Actually, are there? / *are you? / *is it?

c. No hitting yourself! Actually, is there? / *are you? / *is it?

d. Three passengers only allowed in the cockpit! Actually, are there? / *are you? / *is it?

Given that tags are standardly assumed to match the material in Spec-TP and T^0, the most reasonable conclusion is that the subject of this clause is in fact *"there,"* and that the verb is *"is/are."*[18]

[18] Note that tags on "only" GPs seem much worse without a numeral. (Thanks to Ezra

Existential subjects are possible in declaratives and interrogatives. However, *"there"* is never a possible subject in traditional imperatives.

(85) a. *There be light!

b. *There (not) be dancing!

Traditional imperatives require that their syntactic subject is some subset of the addressee(s). Because it does not seem possible that an existential subject could plausibly be the addressee, existential subjects are not allowed in traditional imperatives.

My explanation for this fact is that traditional imperatives have a projection, AddrP, which restricts the possible syntactic subjects of the clause it combines with to being some subset of the addressee(s). Following this line of logic, GPs must lack AddrP, since they have a subject that is not limited to being a subset of the addressee(s).

Crucially, the fact that the subject is existential has consequences for the interpretation of GPs. Traditional imperatives exhort the addressee to take action because the addressee is the syntactic subject of the imperative. The obligation on the addressee is left more vague when a GP is uttered. Consider the following scenario. There is a rule in the bar against smoking. However, some of the patrons break the rule late at night, but the wait staff never breaks the rule. The owner can felicitously utter (86a), but not (86b), to the wait staff.

(86) a. Remember, no smoking in here.

b. #Remember, don't smoke in here.

In the case of a traditional imperative, the syntax requires that the addressee is the subject of the imperative. The semantic update of an imperative, therefore, is that the addressee must make the content of the imperative become true. An imperative like

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Keshet, p.c., for pointing out the fact that not all tags of "only" are ungrammatical, by providing the grammatical example (84d).

(1) Crocodiles only! Actually, *aren't there? / *are there? / *is it? / *isn't it? / *aren't they?

(86b) is therefore infelicitous, because the addressee never smokes, and therefore cannot be felicitously commanded not to smoke. They similarly cannot be commanded to stop someone else smoking in this way.

In the case of a GP, the semantic update provides the addressee with a much more vague update. Upon a successful utterance of (86a), the wait staff is obligated to *enforce* the rule, rather than merely follow it. There are many obligations that could come along with enforcing the rule, for example the wait staff may speak with the patron, or they might call law enforcement. This multiplicity of possible interpretations is a desirable result. As we will see in Section 5, an utterance of (86a) amounts to the speaker committing themself to a preference for smoking to not be allowed. Because this is the update, it can be uttered felicitously to individuals who are not themselves smoking in a way that an imperative cannot.

To recap, we have concluded that there is a covert predicate "is allowed" and a covert "there" in GPs. This must mean that the structure of GPs is something like the following, where the existential subject, verb, and "allowed" are all deleted.

(87)



On its face, this seems like an incredibly unusual, not to mention discontinuous ellipsis process. In the next section, I will argue that there are in fact two ellipsis processes happening simultaneously.

2.2.4 Two Ellipsis Processes

Iatridou (2019, 2021) argues that it is undesirable for ellipsis to derive a string like "No smoking!" because the ellipsis process needed to derive such a string does not delete

a constituent, and is otherwise not attested in English. It involves both obligatory non-constituent deletion of the subject and verb, along with an optional deletion of the adjectival passive "allowed." However, the fact that the ellipsis of the subject and verb is mandatory while the ellipsis of "allowed" is optional strongly suggests that the ellipsis processes must be distinct from one another. I will show here that both ellipsis processes occur in English independently in environments outside of GPs, meaning that it may not be so implausible that GPs could have both processes happening at the same time.

There is an ellipsis process in English that deletes an auxiliary and a subject in informal questions.

(88) a. ~~Have you~~ ever been to Paris?

b. ~~Are you~~ going up?

English, therefore, is capable of deleting strings of a subject and an auxiliary, at least in some configurations. Deletion of the subject and auxiliary is also possible in existential declarative uses of "No + X" strings, which are disambiguated from GPs in spoken language by prosody, and could not add "allowed" without significantly changing the meaning. For (89), we can imagine a person going around room to room, who has been tasked with seeing if there is any dog inside.

(89) (Checks room) Hm, ~~there are~~ no dogs in here.

The meaning of an utterance like (89) in normal dialog can never mean that dogs are not allowed, but rather that there are no dogs. An existential usage like in (89) can also be followed by an existential tag.

(90) (Checks room) Hm, no dogs in here. Actually, were there? / *is it? / *are you / *were they?

The deletion in (90) is particularly striking, as it appears to be the exact material that is deleted to form a GP. It seems, therefore, that the ellipsis process that deletes a subject and auxiliary can sometimes apply to existential subjects and auxiliaries as well. The major difference between the ellipsis in (89) and the ellipsis in GPs is that the ellipsis

in GPs is mandatory to achieve the performative effect that typifies GPs. When the subject is pronounced, the utterance is no longer performative.

(91) a. There's no smoking (allowed) past 9 P.M, but I don't care if you do it.

b. #No smoking past 9 P.M. (allowed), but I don't care if you do it.

There is a connection between the deletion of the existential subject and the verb and the performativity of the utterance. When the subject and verb are overt, the utterance need not be interpreted as performative, but when the subject and verb are deleted, it must be interpreted as performative. I take this to mean that whatever is forcing the deletion must also be making the utterance performative.

As for the optional deletion of the main predicate, this ellipsis seems to be a general process of predicate ellipsis that exists in English. Under normal conditions of VP ellipsis, adjectival predicates can be elided.

(92) a. Smoking is allowed, and vaping is ~~allowed~~ too.

b. Tickets will be required, and ID will be ~~required~~ as well.

c. Shirts are mandatory, and shoes are ~~mandatory~~ also.

The only difference between the ellipsis in (92) and the ellipsis in GPs is that are subject to different licensing conditions. Otherwise, they are structurally identical. The conditions under which the VP is elided in GPs do not seem to be the normal conditions under which VP ellipsis applies. VP ellipsis is typically subject to a givenness constraint, according to which the deleted VP must find some antecedent in the discourse (Johnson 2001; Merchant 2001; Lobeck 1995). GPs do not seem to be subject to any such constraint and are felicitous even when "allowed" has not previously been mentioned in the discourse. Regardless of what licenses the ellipsis in GPs, the ellipsis is licensed without requiring an antecedent that explicitly mentions "allowed."

What is unusual about the ellipsis process in GPs, therefore, is not necessarily the ellipsis itself, but the concatenation of the ellipses processes and the environment in which they appear to be taking place. Both subject-auxiliary ellipsis and VP ellipsis are attested in several environments in English, and occur independently. The licensing of this ellipsis

is what seems to be atypical, in the sense that it is not constrained by the typical licensing requirements on ellipsis in English (Merchant 2001). While the nature of this ellipsis is not completely understood, it is clear that neither subject-auxiliary deletion nor VP ellipsis is unique to GPs.

2.2.5 Be-Deletion

Given that "allowed" is optional in GPs, there is a close similarity between a GP like in (93a) and tensed statements of prohibition like in (93b) and (93c).

(93) a. No jumping allowed on the sofa!

b. No jumping is allowed on the sofa.

c. There is no jumping allowed on the sofa.

The superficial difference between the two seems to be the pronunciation of a verb ("is"). Despite (93a), (93b), and (93c) being truth-conditionally equivalent (as far I can tell), the utterances differ in their performativity related to the expression of tense marking. The verbless one is performative, whereas the version with a tensed verb is not.

(94) a. #No jumping allowed on the sofa, but I don't care if you jump on it.

b. No jumping is allowed on the sofa, but I don't care if you jump on it.

c. There is no jumping allowed on the sofa, but I don't care if you jump on it.

What this shows is that there is a link between lacking the main verb and the performativity of the utterance. More specifically, it seems that there is a co-occurrence restriction between expressing T^0 overtly, and features of imperative clause type. Platzack and Rosengren (1997) argue that the bare form of imperatives surfaces in imperatives because the syntactic structure of imperatives is impoverished and cannot license tense. Potsdam (2007) argues that the fact that English allows null subjects in imperatives is related to the fact that they lack an overt tense projection. Zanuttini et al. (2012) argue that the addressee restriction present in traditional imperatives is derived from T^0 having irregular features in imperative (or jussive) clauses. Each of these analyses is employing some version of an Addressee Restriction on the subject, which has also been argued to be the morphosyntax of "Imperative Clause Type."

Previous conceptions of this restriction have linked the lack of a tense feature to some imperative clause-typing mechanism (Platzack and Rosengren 1997).[19] In the next section, we will see that GPs appear to have an imperative-like meaning component alongside a declarative-like meaning component.

2.2.6 Truth Values of General Prohibitives

One property of GPs that is highly unusual for an "imperative" is that they have accessible truth values. Imperatives are often considered to lack truth values entirely (Han 1998; Portner 2007) or to have those truth values rendered inaccessible through a variety of presuppositions (Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016; Keshet and Medeiros 2019). A reply of *"That's (not) true!"* is possible with a declarative, but never with a traditional imperative.

(95) a. A: It's raining outside! B: That's (not) true!

b. A: Don't smoke in this bar! B: #That's (not) true!

GPs pattern with declaratives, and not imperatives, in allowing felicitous replies of *"That's (not) true!"*

(96) A: No smoking in this bar! B: That's (not) true!

Kaufmann (2012) discusses the *"That's (not) true!"* test at length and describes why the failure of an utterance to be followed by *"That's (not) true!"* does not necessarily mean the utterance is non-propositional. For example, sincere promises are quite difficult to felicitously follow with *"That's (not) true!"* despite clearly being declaratives and expressing a proposition.

(97) A: I promise to be there on time. B: #That's (not) true!

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[19] It is still mysterious why an untensed verb is also impossible in GPs. If we delete the existential subject, we might expect the following to be grammatical.

(1) *~~There~~ Be no smoking allowed!

Given that 'be' in imperatives triggers do-support and has been argued not to move (Potsdam 2017), we might expect such an utterance to be possible.

The reasoning that Kaufmann utilizes is that (97) is a performative statement, and the truth values of performative statements are difficult to question, particularly when they deal with questioning the original speaker's desires. The reverse logic does not hold, however. Any utterance that can be felicitously followed by *"That's (not) true!"* must contain some truth value.

This is particularly curious with respect to GPs. GPs seem to have both the propositional meaning component associated with declaratives, which can be targeted by *"That's (not) true!"*, and a performative meaning component which cannot. Thus, the interpretation that B's reply in (96) receives is that A was mistaken about there being a rule prohibiting smoking in the bar. There is no possible interpretation questioning the speaker's desires. Follow-ups invoking speaker desire are therefore infelicitous (98b).

(98) a. A: No smoking in this bar! B: That's not true, they changed the rule!

b. A: No smoking in this bar! B: #That's not true, you don't mean that!

B's reply in (98a) is acting exactly like it would it a declarative. B's reply in (98b) is acting exactly as it would in an imperative. I take this to mean that there must be two meaning components to a GP. The propositional meaning component of a GP like the one uttered in (96) is equivalent to "There is no smoking allowed in this bar." This proposition can be targeted by a follow-up of *"That's (not) true!"* There is also a performative meaning component, more analogous to the one in imperatives, which cannot be questioned.

If GPs were equivalent to imperatives, then they would never be felicitously followed with *"That's (not) true!"* In conjunction with the facts about the subject, this leads to the conclusion that an analysis with GPs being covert members of imperative-clause type is on the wrong track. Nevertheless, we will see in the next section that GPs do share many properties with imperatives. This will lead me to conclude that some aspect of imperative meaning should be present in a GP.

2.2.7 General Prohibitive Morphosyntax Summary

In this section, I have shown that the subject of GPs cannot possibly be addressee-restricted in the way that traditional imperatives are, and are best analyzed as having a

covert existential subject. GPs also have accessible truth values, despite being performative. Given that this construction does not act like an imperative, and could not plausibly be interrogative, it seems that it patterns best with declaratives with respect to its morphosyntax.

2.3 The Semantic/Pragmatic Update of General Prohibitives

This section will focus on the semantic and pragmatic update provided by GPs. I will ultimately conclude that GPs pattern with traditional imperatives in most respects regarding their semantic/pragmatic update.

2.3.1 Identical Range of Uses

Imperatives are well-known to participate in a range of uses outside of their canonical use as commands (Schmerling 1982; Davies 1986; Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012). Any semantic denotation of imperatives, therefore, needs to be flexible enough to capture this range of uses. Schmerling (1982) originally observed that English imperatives participate in a range of uses, such as wishes, permissions, and advice, in addition to their canonical command use.

(99) a. Get out of my sight! (Command)

b. Take a cookie, if you like. (Permission)

c. Please don't rain tomorrow! (Wish)

d. Take two in the morning and one before bed. (Advice)

Some of these uses (such as command) seem broadly related to necessity, and others (such as permission) seem broadly related to possibility. Thus, reasonable paraphrases of (99a) and (99b) could be given with the necessity modal "must" and possibility modal "can" respectively.

(100) a. You must get out of my sight!

b. You can take a cookie, if you like.

This range of uses related to both possibility and necessity has informed theories of imperative denotata greatly (see Kaufmann (2012) and Condoravdi and Lauer (2012)

for extensive discussion). This range of uses is notable for being relatively robust cross-linguistically, and indeed is often used for diagnosing whether or not a construction is an imperative. Of note is that an identical range of uses is available to both imperatives and GPs.[20]

(101) a. No smoking in the pool room! (Command / Warning)

b. Fine, no washing your hands before dinner then. (Permission)

c. Please no raining tomorrow! (Wish)

d. No rubbing the infected area. (Advice)

There is a good deal of debate in the semantic literature on imperatives as to the best way to capture this range of uses, which seems relatively consistent across languages (see Kaufmann 2012; Portner 2007; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016 for some recent analyses). Regardless of which theory one supports, the similarity in the range of uses between imperatives and GPs is striking, as both participate in necessity and possibility uses.

Given that this range of uses is shared by both constructions, the simplest explanation is that both constructions derive their meaning from the same source. I utilize an imperative operator in the structure of GPs, analogous to the kind argued to exist in imperative clauses by Kaufmann (2012); Condoravdi and Lauer (2012); Keshet and Medeiros (2019).

[20] There seems to be some speaker variation in the acceptability of *concession* GPs (101b). The intended context for an utterance like (101b) is something like the following.

(1) A: Remember to wash your hands before dinner!
B: I don't need to, they aren't dirty!
A: Fine no washing your hands then, see if I care when you get sick!

Ezra Keshet, p.c., points out, however, that "allowed" seems significantly degraded in this environment.

(2) ??Fine no washing your hands allowed then...

Kaufmann (2012) and Oikonomou (2016) argue that the imperative operator is underlyingly existential, which is exhaustified to derive universal readings (= the only possibility is X). What could be happening here, therefore, is that "allowed" forces exhaustification of the imperative operator to be interpreted as universal, barring permission/concession readings.

In principle, the generalizations could also be applied to a non-operatic analysis, such as the one developed by Portner (2004, 2007), if the range of uses is accounted for.

2.3.2 Performativity

Another argument in favor of a uniform semantic treatment for both imperatives and GPs is that both utterances are performative in identical ways.[21] The sense in which I describe both traditional imperatives and GPs as "performative" in that they do more than simply describe the state of the world, but serve to actively change it. A hallmark property of performative utterances in imperatives is that the speaker must be committed to the addressee acting upon the content of the performative. Both imperatives and GPs are equally infelicitous with follow-ups that deny speaker commitment.

(102) a. #Don't enter my office! Though, I don't care if you enter.

b. #No jumping on the sofa! Though, I don't care if you jump on it.

Kaufmann (2012) argues that imperatives are obligatorily performative because there is a series of presuppositions that must hold for imperatives to be felicitously uttered. One presupposition that she argues for is that imperatives are required to be not entirely contained in the past. This causes past-oriented temporal modifiers to fail, but present and future tense modifiers to succeed. This effect is identical for both traditional imperatives and GPs.

(103) a. #No parking last year!

b. No parking right now!

c. No parking next week!

(104) a. #Don't park last year!

b. Don't park right now!

c. Don't park next week!

[21] By "performative" here, I do not mean to implicate the "performative hypothesis" of imperatives, espoused originally by Ross (1967), in which imperatives were argued to be strings like "I order you to X" underlyingly.

Performative utterances are obligatorily contained at least partially in the non-past because addressees are unable to influence past events. Because imperatives and GPs are performative, they cannot be modified by modifiers like "last year." Thus, both GPs and traditional imperatives are performative in an identical way.

It is worth pointing out that the temporal parameter for imperatives has been argued by Kaufmann (2012) to not be entirely non-past, and imperatives can involve evaluation of times before the utterance time. Take the following example from Kaufmann (2012).

(105) Don't call Cécile more than three times while she is in Greece. (Ch. 3, pg. 97)

If imperatives were obligatorily evaluated for non-past from the time of the utterance, then (105) could only mean that the addressee should not call Cécile three times after the utterance of the imperative. It does not get this interpretation, however, and in the event that the addressee has already called Cécile twice, then the addressee is only allowed one more call. The parameter for temporal evaluation appears to be identical for GPs in that the event must not be entirely contained in the past, but can evaluate times before the utterance time.

(106) No calling Cécile more than three times while she is in Greece.

The fact that imperatives and GPs act identically with respect to temporal evaluation strongly suggests that they are evaluated with respect to the same parameters. I take this as additional evidence that whatever is responsible for the semantic/pragmatic update present in imperatives is also present in GPs. A presupposition like the non-past temporal parameter is therefore present in both constructions.

Also related to performativity is the possibility of embedding either construction. Traditional imperatives are well known to be difficult to embed cross-linguistically (Kaufmann 2012). Han (1998) argues convincingly that the restrictions on embedding imperatives are related to the performativity of the semantic object they represent.[22] GPs pattern with

[22] It is currently an open question whether or not the restrictions that forbid imperatives from appearing in embedded positions are based on syntax or semantics. See Rivero and Terzi (1995) for syntactic arguments on the restrictions of this embedding operation. Regardless of the source of the restriction, GPs act more like imperatives than declaratives with respect to embedding.

traditional imperatives in being unembeddable, at least in English.

(107) a. *Sosthene requested (that) stop!

b. *I implored Alyssa (that) finish her meal!

(108) a. *Sosthene requested (that) no dogs here!

b. *I implored Alyssa (that) no more pigs!

Performative utterances in general are well-known to be difficult to embed, presumably due to the pragmatic update that they associate with being associated with main clauses rather than subordinate clauses. Despite this, there appears to be an environment, even in English, where imperatives are capable of being embedded. Crnič and Trinh (2009) argue convincingly that imperatives can be embedded in English under exactly one verb, "to say." Both GPs and traditional imperatives are embeddable under "say."

(109) a. Mom said no jumping on the couch!

b. Mom said don't leave yet!

Crnič and Trinh (2009) present several arguments that the embedded material in (109b) is a true embedding and not a quote. For example, binding is possible into the embedded clause, which would not be possible in a quote.

(110) a. Veronica$_1$ said call her$_1$ mom.

b. #Veronica$_1$ said, "Hey, call her$_1$ mom."

GPs demonstrate the same binding possibilities under "say." Following Crnič and Trinh's analysis, this counts as evidence that they are truly embedded.

(111) a. Veronica said no calling her$_1$ mom!

b. #Veronica$_1$ said, "Hey, no calling her$_1$ mom!"

The mechanics of how imperatives are embedded, and why this embedding appears to be limited to a single verb, are outside the scope of this dissertation. The point is simply that GPs and traditional imperatives pattern identically with respect to their embedding possibilities. Given that the restrictions on embedding traditional imperatives have been

argued to be derived from the performative object they represent, the similarity in embedding patterns suggests that both GPs and traditional imperatives represent a similar, performative semantic object.

2.4 Analysis

GPs seem more like declarative clauses in the sense that they have an existential subject and accessible truth values. They seem more like imperatives, however, in terms of their semantic and pragmatic update. Rather than favoring either the declarative or imperative properties as more basic, I will argue that they possess an imperative operator, but in a configuration that does not block truth values. To my knowledge, this is the first time it has been noticed that an utterance can simultaneously be used to ASSERT and REQUEST. Following Rivero and Terzi (1995) and Han (1998), I place the imperative operator on C^0. In choosing to place an operator in the syntax, I am siding with the modal operator view of the semantics of imperatives argued for by Han (1998); Kaufmann (2012); Oikonomou (2016); Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) and against the non-operatic approach argued for by Portner (2004, 2007). I will also follow the analysis provided by Keshet and Medeiros (2019) in which the imperative operator can select a lower ModP. In this case, that ModP is fulfilled by the modal "allowed," which moves to Mod^0 at LF to fulfill the requirement that ModP contains a modal element. NegP will always be filled with a negative element, as both "no" and "only" decompose into a negation and an existential, fulfilling the requirement described by Iatridou (2021) that GPs must have a negation. This remaining existential causes the existential subject to delete under redundancy. TP selects PassP, because this construction is fixed in the passive, and "no smoking" originates as the object of "allow" and moves to Spec-VoiceP. Below is the complete derivation for the GP "No smoking!"

(112)



The imperative operator placed on C^0 in (112) is intended to be an identical operator to the one in traditional imperatives, consolidating both GPs and traditional imperatives under the same conditions of use. This operator provides a series of presuppositions, originally provided in (35), and selects for a ModP complement. The head of this phrase, Mod^0, must be filled by a modal element in order for this derivation to succeed. I will use a slightly modified set of presuppositions as (113) below, based on the operator used by Keshet and Medeiros (2019).

(113) $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ g\ p\ ]\!]^w = 1$, when defined, iff every best world *w'* as ordered by *g(w)*, is such that $p(w') = 1$. $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ g\ p\ ]\!]^w$ is defined when the following presuppositions are met:

a. Decision constraint The imperative must (directly) answer a salient decision problem D = ⟨A, g⟩, agreed upon by speaker and hearer.

b. Authority condition The speaker must be in a privileged position with respect to resolving D, either as an authority figure or as a knowledgeable expert.

(114) Constraints on any decision problem ⟨A, g⟩ in world w:

a. Non-past constraint The time at which each $a \in A$ takes place must not be entirely in the past.

b. Epistemic uncertainty constraint It is unknown whether $a(w)$ is true or false for each $a \in A$.

Using the same operator in both traditional imperatives and GPs causes the meaning of both constructions to be derived from a single source. I consider this to be a desirable result given that the range of available uses and performative presuppositions is nearly identical between traditional imperatives and GPs.

Allowing an imperative operator to combine with a clause that lacks an Addressee Restriction like in (112) above violates assumptions that are typically made about its morphosyntactic distribution. If we were to suppose that the imperative operator is equivalent to a clause-typing mechanism that forces its complement to have all imperative properties, then it should not be able to combine with the existential subject TP in (112). However, recent work (Oikonomou 2016; Keshet and Medeiros 2019) has separated the modal contribution of imperatives from the operator itself. If we follow the conclusions presented in those works, and an imperative operator provides only a series of presuppositions, then it is at least possible that the operator does not determine that the clause it combines with restricts its subject. Of course, this operator will still appear in morphological imperatives, but it may appear with other constructions as well. I will utilize a version of the operator that is purely presuppositional, and that the modal contribution necessary for imperatives will be provided by "allowed."

2.4.1 Semantics of the Imperative Operator

There is a debate in the literature on imperatives as to whether or not they are best represented with a modal operator. Oikonomou (2016) argues that the only way to make sense of focus interactions in Greek is if a covert modal is present in the syntax. On the basis of examples like those shown below, and given that overt movement resolves scopal ambiguities in Greek (Tsimpli 1995), she argues that the word "only," as well as other quantifiers, can scope over the imperative operator. Additionally, they must scope over it if a phrase containing "only" is moved to the left periphery.

Context A: You've asked me to paint those tables but I'm really tired and don't feel like doing something really useful today.

Context B: Oh, I feel like doing something really useful today. I think I'll paint the tables over there.

(115) a. Vapse [mono to strogilo trapezi].
paint only the round table.
→ OK in Context A: ◊ > only
→ OK in Context B: only > ◊

b. [mono to strogilo trapezi] vapse.
only the round table paint.
→ Bad in Context A: *◊ > only
→ OK in Context B: only > ◊ (Oikonomou 2016, p.41)

(115a) is the default word order for imperatives in Greek, where the imperativized verb is initial in the clause. When this is the word order, the meaning of the expression is ambiguous between a reading in which the addressee is permitted to only paint the round table (◊ > only; other tables are permitted) and a reading in which the addressee is only permitted to paint the round table (only > ◊; other tables are not permitted). In the case of the (only > ◊) reading, Oikonomou (2016) argues that the quantifier moves at LF to take scope over the imperative operator. When the quantified phrase moves overtly to focus position, as in (115b), the interpretation where the addressee is permitted to only paint the round table is removed. The sole reading available is one in which the quantifier scopes over the permission, and the reading is that the addressee can only paint the round table.

Oikonomou (2016) takes this as strong evidence in favor of the existence of an operator in the syntax, and I find it convincing as well. Given that it seems we need an operator to explain scope in traditional imperatives, it makes sense to use an operator in our structure for imperatives. However, at first glance, the structure provided in (112) runs into a serious problem. Oikonomou (2016) provides the following denotation for the semantics of OP_{IMP}.[23]

(116) $[\![\ \textit{Imp}\ ]\!]^{w,c} = \lambda q \in D_{\langle st \rangle}.\ \exists w' \in W$ such that S_c's desires in w with respect to the A_c's actions are satisfied in w' & $q(w') = 1$ (Oikonomou 2016)

Following Condoravdi and Lauer (2012), Oikonomou (2016) argues that the fundamental meaning of imperatives is *speaker bouletic* and that imperatives are successfully followed to the extent that the addressee makes the propositional content of the imperative become true. However, if we try to apply this meaning to GPs, it appears to run into a serious interpretational problem. The derivation of the sentence in (112) would be the following.

(117) ($[\![$ Imp $]\!]^{w,c}$) (No smoking allowed!)

$[\![\ \textit{Imp}\ ]\!]^{w,c} = \lambda q \in D_{\langle st \rangle}.\ \exists w' \in W$ such that S_c's desires in w with respect to A_c's actions are satisfied in w' & (No smoking allowed!) $= 1$

This derives the wrong meaning. The meaning that we get from such a derivation is that the speaker considers all the best worlds to be the worlds in which the addressee brings it about that smoking is not allowed. The fundamental problem with this is that it puts "allowed" under the scope of the addressee's obligations, which does not make sense. After a successful utterance of a GP, the addressee is under an obligation to follow the rule, but can never be obligated to make a rule come into existence where it didn't previously by the utterance of a GP. The structure in (112) solves this problem by obligatorily raising the modal element "allowed" out of the lower TP to the Mod^0.

Keshet and Medeiros (2019) conceive of the imperative operator as being only a series of presuppositions, which must subsequently combine with some modal element. This means

[23] Due to technical issues dealing with modification by anti-exhaustifiers such as "for example," Oikonomou analyzes the modal as being existential, but with exhaustification. See Chapter 5 of (Kaufmann 2012) and Chapter 2 of (Oikonomou 2016) for extensive discussion.

that the imperative operator does not have any semantic meaning associated with it. By including it in the derivation of GPs, then, I am attempting to describe the performative component of GPs. This amounts to arguing that the meaning of GPs is just the meaning of an assertoric declarative, but uttered under the discourse conditions that are required for traditional imperatives. In the next subsection, I will investigate whether or not GPs are subject to the presuppositions argued to exist by Keshet and Medeiros (2019), and find that they are.

Before we analyze the specific presuppositions however, I would like to say a word about the scope in the tree utilized in (112). There are three important elements in the clause periphery that are in a fixed scope relationship with one another. These three elements are NEG, OP_{IMP}, and "allowed." Following the analysis provided by Keshet and Medeiros (2019), OP_{IMP} selects for ModP. This means that, ideally, OP_{IMP} and ModP should be local to one another. This means that there are only two places for negation, before OP_{IMP}, or after ModP. Neither location is perfect, but as the tree in (112) shows, I have chosen to represent Negation as being higher than both the operator and the modal. This decision was taken in order to derive the correct scope between the negative element and the modal, which will be discussed in more detail shortly. This decision goes directly against the order that is argued for by Han (1998), in which she argues that it is not possible for negation to scope over the imperative operator, and that this drives the use of alternative morphology in negative imperatives in many languages. The conception of the operator provided here is quite different from the one that Han (1998) was arguing for, however, and I think it is more important to have negation scope over the modal, and for the relationship between the operator and the ModP to be local.

2.4.2 Imperative Operator Presuppositions

Imperatives lack the reportative uses that modalized declaratives possess. To account for this, Keshet and Medeiros (2019) argue for the existence of the following four presuppositions, directly inspired by the presuppositions argued to originally accompany imperatives in (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012), that must be true for imperatives to be felicitously

uttered. g is the *ordering source*, an algorithm that ranks accessible worlds, originally introduced by Kratzer (1977).

(118) $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ \text{g}\ \text{p}\ ]\!]^w = 1$, when defined, iff every best world *w'* as ordered by *g(w)*, is such that *p(w')* = 1. $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ \text{g}\ \text{p}\ ]\!]^w$ is defined when the following presuppositions are met:

a. Decision constraint The imperative must (directly) answer a salient decision problem D = ⟨A, *g*⟩, agreed upon by speaker and hearer.

b. Authority condition The speaker must be in a privileged position with respect to resolving *D*, either as an authority figure or as a knowledgeable expert.

(119) Constraints on any decision problem ⟨A, *g*⟩ in world *w*:

a. Non-past constraint The time at which each $a \in A$ takes place must not be entirely in the past.

b. Epistemic uncertainty constraint It is unknown whether *a(w)* is true or false for each $a \in A$.

I will address each of these presuppositions in turn and show that they are applicable to GPs. This shows that the meaning of GPs and traditional imperatives is best described as deriving from the same source. This will lead to me including an imperative operator in the structure of GPs, despite the fact that they are not Addressee Restricted.

2.4.2.1 Decision Constraint

The decision constraint is meant to restrict felicitous imperatives to contexts in which the speaker is committed at the time of utterance to the belief that the content of the imperative constitutes a reasonable answer to a salient decision problem *D*. Upon commanding the addressee, the addressee also becomes committed to this belief. In essence, the decision constraint ensures that the speaker and addressee are committed to believing that the propositional content of the imperative constitutes a possible answer to the best course of events. Thus, sequences like (120) below, in which the speaker denies that the content is the best course of events, are infelicitous for traditional imperatives.

(120) Call Melli! #But I don't want you to call her. (Kaufmann 2012: pg. 158)

The line of reasoning pursued by Kaufmann is that traditional imperatives are subject to the decision constraint, and therefore speakers must be committed to endorsing the content of their imperative utterance. GPs are subject to an identical constraint; the speaker must endorse the content of the rule being followed.

(121) a. #No jumping on the sofa, but I don't care if you do.

b. #No jumping on the sofa, but I want you to jump on it.

In the case of GPs, the relevant *decision problem* is often something to do with what the best course of action is, given that there are rules. Thus, we can imagine the following sequence.

(122) No smoking in the bar! (when addressee is smoking in the bar)

In the case of an utterance like (122), the salient decision problem (in this case, whether or not anyone smokes in the bar) is given a decisive answer by the bar owner. If the GP is successful, the addressee will add the information that smoking is not allowed in the bar to their knowledge. Presumably, this will affect the addressee's future behavior, which was the purpose of the speaker's utterance in the first place. Note, however, that (122) is also perfectly felicitous when said by a patron another patron. In that context, it may be that the speaker is conveying to the addressee that the best course of action is to follow the rules, and by uttering (122), is informing the addressee of the rule. This can be true even if the speaker themself would not necessarily prefer one way or the other if the addressee changes their behavior, but they assume that the addressee wants to follow the rules.

2.4.2.2 Authority Condition

The authority condition was originally proposed by Kaufmann (2012) to ensure that the speaker is in an epistemically privileged position with regard to the at-issue content of imperatives. In essence, the authority condition ensures that the speaker cannot be mistaken about their own desires, nor can they fail to be an authority about the propositional content of the imperative they endorse. Thus, sequences like the following (123) are infelicitous.

(123) #I don't know how to get to Harlem, but take the A-Train!

(Keshet and Medeiros 2019; p. 896)

(123) is infelicitous because it expresses two incompatible states of affairs. The traditional imperative presupposes that the speaker is an authority in answering how to get to Harlem, but the speaker explicitly denies that they are an expert in the prejacent.

GPs do not seem to presuppose the authority of their speaker in the same way. As we have already seen, speakers cannot be considered "wrong" about the content of the traditional imperative they utter, but they can for GPs.

(124) a. A: Don't smoke in this bar!
B: #You're wrong!

b. A: No smoking in this bar!
B: You're wrong!

In contexts where it seems possible that A could be mistaken about the content of a rule, then B's reply can call them out for being wrong. Thus, it seems that GPs lack the Authority Condition. Does this mean their analysis cannot be consolidated under our analysis of imperatives?

There are two directions we could take at this junction. The first would be to say that GPs and Traditional Imperatives involve two different operators. This would amount to saying that Traditional Imperatives presuppose that their speakers are authorities about the best course of action, but that GPs do not, and that information is contained in the different operators that are present in each construction. Although that may be tempting, it ultimately strikes me as being quite similar to Construction Grammar, by saying that each construction is *ad hoc* licensed by different operators, which happen to overlap tremendously in their speech-act updates.

The second direction we can go is to say that the difference in Epistemic Authority between the constructions is a difference in the type of modal that each operator takes as its complement. Doing so amounts to arguing against the Authority Condition being a presupposition in the operator itself, but instead of a requirement on the combination of the operator and the modal. This essentially amounts to arguing against the proposals

by Kaufmann (2012) and Keshet and Medeiros (2019) about the content of the imperative operator. I will provide arguments in favor of this approach shortly in Section 2.3. For now, I will briefly mention that the other presuppositions appear to be present in the GPs, as they are in Traditional Imperatives.

2.4.2.3 Non-Past Constraint

As was already shown previously, both GPs and imperatives involve evaluation over an identical temporal parameter. Kaufmann (2012) originally argues that imperatives are not compatible with times contained entirely in the past. Keshet and Medeiros (2019) argue that the non-past constraint is a property of all decision problems. This property is present in an identical way in both GPs and imperatives.

(125) a. #No parking last year!

b. No parking right now!

c. No calling Cécile more than three times while she is in Greece.

The non-past constraint is an obligatory constraint over decision problems because of the nature of decision problems. Because decision problems are questions about the best course of action, they cannot be contained entirely in the past, because the participants have no control over past events.

2.4.2.4 Epistemic Uncertainty

The EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY constraint is meant to explain why imperatives are infelicitous in environments where the addressee has no control over making the outcome of the imperative become true, or when the outcome of the imperative is inevitable regardless of the actions of the addressee. The following example shows the incompatibility of imperatives with situations where the outcome is perceived by the speaker to be inevitable.

(126) a. #I know you will do this no matter what, so do it also.

b. #I know you won't be able to do this, but do it anyway.

(adapted from Kaufmann (2012))

Because the speaker is certain about whether or not the action will be completed, it is infelicitous to command the addressee to complete the action.

It is unclear to me whether all instances of imperatives are subject to epistemic uncertainty. Imperatives can be used as *exhortations*, in which the speaker has no reasonable expectation that both $[\![\phi]\!]^c$ and $[\![\neg\phi]\!]^c$ are possible. Imagine the following scenario, where the speaker is watching a horse race, and watching a jockey who never falls off his horse.

(127) (watching the jockey turn the corner) Yeah! Ride that horse!

In this case, it doesn't seem to be a requirement that the speaker believes both riding the horse and not riding the horse are possible in order to utter (127). Following Condoravdi and Lauer (2012), it seems the speaker merely expresses a preference for the addressee's continued riding of the horse. In cases where the continued riding is inevitable, this comes across as an exhortation.

Regardless, the EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY constraint is typically argued for or assumed in analyses of imperatives (Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016; Keshet and Medeiros 2019). When applied to GPs, what becomes uncertain is the addressee's actions in a context, given that there is a regulation against a certain behavior. Crucially, it cannot mean that the speaker is uncertain about the status of the rules. In order for this interpretation to be achieved, it is necessary that "allowed" excavate the VP under evaluation in GPs.

Given that Keshet and Medeiros (2019) argue that the imperative operator must select for a modal, a natural pair for the operator is the modal "allowed" which I have already argued is present in the derivation of GPs. I placed "allowed" as the modal element that the imperative operator selected in (112), in which it moves at LF to Mod^0.

One reason to think that it is plausible that the modal is excavating the lower TP in GPs is that the covert modal that is selected for by IMP in traditional imperative clauses is outside the domain for epistemic uncertainty.

(128) [OP_{IMP} f g] [ModP] Leave! → You should leave!

Speaker is uncertain about whether A will or will not leave.

NOT: Speaker is uncertain about whether A should or should not leave.

Epistemic Uncertainty seems to apply only to the proposition embedded under ModP in (128). The case with GPs is analogous if we omit the modal "allowed" from the lower clause. This is achieved if the modal moves at LF movement to ModP.[24]

(129) [OP_{IMP} f g] [ModP allowed] No smoking! → There should be no smoking ~~allowed~~!
Speaker is uncertain about whether there will or will not be smoking.
NOT: Speaker is uncertain about whether smoking will or will not be allowed.

I take the symmetry between traditional imperatives and GPs with respect to the interpretation of modality to be a favorable outcome. If both GPs and imperative involve analogous processes where the modal element that is selected for by IMP is placed in ModP, it would follow that neither modal is available for evaluation at the level that Epistemic Uncertainty applies.

Another possibility, that is not mutually exclusive with LF movement of "allowed" presented directly above, is that Epistemic Uncertainty may be more abstract than was previously thought. Following the previous subsection about the *Ordering Source Restriction*, it is possible that Epistemic Uncertainty simply refers to the resolution of the addressee's action with respect to the salient decision problem D. That is to say, when an imperative or GP ϕ is uttered, it is felicitous only to the extent that it elucidates in some way the best course of action for the addressee moving forward. Epistemic Uncertainty, then, may not take the literal propositional content of the imperative, as it is often conceived, but rather is just a pragmatic constraint on the speaker's uncertainty about the addressee's action relative to solving the decision problem D. When an addressee's actions are certain, imperatives are generally infelicitous. I will leave open which possibility is correct here, but in any case, GPs are compatible with our current understanding of Epistemic Uncertainty.

2.4.3 Accounting for the Dual Speech-Act of General Prohibitives

In this subsection, I will show that it is actually expected that GPs would have accessible truth values, and that the presence of an imperative operator does not always

[24] Note that given the nature of Epistemic Uncertainty's evaluation of $[\![\phi]\!]^c$ and $[\![\neg\phi]\!]^c$, it is irrelevant whether negation is evaluated as within the TP or outside it.

block accessibility to truth conditions. I will conclude that only a priority modal combined with the imperative operator blocks truth conditions.

2.4.3.1 Truth Values of Imperative Constructions

To this point, I have attempted to show that it is plausible that GPs could carry the imperative operator, even though traditional imperatives differ from GPs with respect to presupposing the authority of their speakers. In answering this question, I will also attempt to answer why GPs provide a propositional meaning component that is targetable by follow-ups mentioning truth and falsity. The following utterance has a propositional meaning component that appears to be unaffected by the performativity of the utterance and seems to act like a normal declarative.

(130) No smoking allowed in Dayton after 10 P.M.!

→ There is a rule such that smoking is not allowed in Dayton after 10 P.M.

Traditional imperatives do not project an analogous accessible truth value. The discourse effect of uttering something like (130) seems to be that the speaker is asserting that a rule exists, and is simultaneously compelling the addressee(s) to act in accordance with this fact.

Kaufmann (2012) originally proposed that the series of presuppositions associated with the imperative operator block access to truth values of imperatives. The analysis presented here makes use of that operator, yet GPs project an accessible truth value. This means that, if my account is on the right track, it cannot be the case that the presuppositions alone block the accessibility of truth values. Fortunately, there is evidence from another non-traditional imperative construction that this is the case. Keshet and Medeiros (2019) argue that in the case of Imperative and Declarative Conjunctions (IaDs), the imperative operator selects for a future-oriented modal rather than a priority modal. Their analysis of IaD conjunctions can be seen below in (131).

(131) OP_{IMP} MOD_{future} [Take the A Train, and you'll be there after dark.]

(Keshet and Medeiros 2019; their 78)

One fact about IaDs that Keshet and Medeiros do not make note of, and to my knowledge no one else has either, is that IaD conjunctions like in (131) have accessible truth values that are analogous to normal conditionals. Follow-ups to truth and falsity can target the declarative portion of an IaD.

(132) a. A: Take the A Train, and you'll be there after dark. (IaD)
B: That's not true, I'll never get there taking the A train!

b. A: If you take the A train, you'll be there after dark. (Conditional)
B: That's not true, I'll never get there taking the A train!

Von Fintel and Iatridou (2017) propose that we should distinguish two types of IaDs, those where the speaker endorses the content of the imperative clause in the conditional, and those where the speaker does not endorse the content. Both types of IaDs seem to act identically with respect to allowing truth values, however, and I see no need to separate them for our purposes here.

(133) a. A: Invest in this company and you will become rich! (endorsing IaD)
B: That's not true, that company will lead me to ruin!

b. A: Touch that cake and you're dead meat! (non-endorsing IaD)
B: That's not true, you'd never harm me!

These facts are difficult to explain if the imperative operator by itself blocks the accessibility of truth conditions. When viewed in this way, it seems that traditional imperatives are the exception when it comes to accessibility of truth values. Given that Keshet and Medeiros argue that IaDs do contain the imperative operator, we either have to abandon their analysis or explain the accessibility of truth values in another way. There is a lot their analysis does explain, however, so I do not believe we should abandon their approach entirely.

What then, blocks the truth values of traditional imperatives? I propose that it is combination of the imperative operator with the priority modal present in traditional imperatives that blocks accessible truth values. Per the analysis presented by Keshet and Medeiros (2019), the imperative operator comes with a restriction that it must combine with

a modal. In the case of GPs, it combines with the modal "allowed." In the case of IaDs, it combines with a covert future-oriented modal. Neither "allowed" nor the future modal block truth conditions. Thus, it is only in the case of traditional imperatives, with a covert priority modal, that truth values are inaccessible. This is shown in (134) below.

(134) a. OP_{IMP} [ModP allowed][TP There is no smoking!] (TVs accessible)

b. OP_{IMP} [ModP MOD_{future}][TP Take the A train, and you'll be there after dark.] (TVs accessible)

c. OP_{IMP} [ModP $\text{MOD}_{priority}$][TP Paint these walls!] (TVs inaccessible)

What (134) shows is that it is only the combination of a priority modal and the imperative operator that blocks truth values. A priority modal on its own in a standard declarative does not automatically block truth values, as discussed in great detail by Kaufmann (2012).

(135) A: You should paint these walls.
B: That's not true, I shouldn't!

Under this conception of the operator, it will select a covert priority modal in the case of traditional imperatives, and this combination of the priority modal and the imperative operator blocks accessibility to truth and falsity. I propose that this is because of the semantics of the priority modal itself that obligatorily accompanies traditional imperatives. The priority modal is a universal modal, and f is the modal base.

(136) $[\![$ Paint these walls! $]\!]^w = \forall$w' $\in \cap$f(w) [Addr paints these walls in w']

When this priority modal is present, the modal base is interpreted obligatorily as being the speaker's desires. What this means is that, in all speaker-preferred worlds, the Addressee paints these walls. This is because the modal base that the priority modal selects is one in which the speaker's desires are questioned. Follow-ups referencing truth and falsity are therefore obligatorily interpreted as targeting the speaker's desires. Because this conversational move is not considered valid, traditional imperatives are regarded as not having truth values.

IaDs and GPs, on the other hand, can have accessible truth values because they lack this priority modal. This means that the Authority Condition requires re-analysis in

our system. It is not that the imperative operator inherently involves Epistemic Authority on behalf of the speaker. As such, I re-analyze the imperative operator as containing the following presuppositions, by removing the Authority Condition.

(137) $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ \text{g}\ \text{p}\ ]\!]^w = 1$, when defined, iff every best world *w'* as ordered by *g(w)*, is such that *p(w')* = 1. $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ \text{g}\ \text{p}\ ]\!]^w$ is defined when the following presuppositions are met:

a. Decision constraint The imperative must (directly) answer a salient decision problem D = ⟨A, *g*⟩, agreed upon by speaker and hearer.

(138) Constraints on any decision problem ⟨A, *g*⟩ in world *w*:

a. Non-past constraint The time at which each $a \in A$ takes place must not be entirely in the past.

b. Epistemic uncertainty constraint It is unknown whether *a(w)* is true or false for each $a \in A$.

This argument amounts to saying that clauses with an imperative operator do not automatically presuppose that the speaker is authority over the best course of events, but that some imperatives obligatorily evaluate over a speaker-bouletic modal base, and that under these conditions, the speaker's authority cannot be questioned. Given that both GPs and IaDs have accessible truth values, this seems to be on the right track.

Evaluation over speaker desire actually gives rise to an interesting effect: GPs only have accessible truth values when the content of the utterance can reasonably be interpreted as not originating from the speaker's desires. When the content of the GP does not represent an actual rule, but merely the speaker's desires, follow-ups referencing truth and falsity are infelicitous.

(139) A: No touching me!

B: #That's not true!

(140) A: No smoking in this bar! (said by the bar's owner)

B: #That's not true!

It is infelicitous to question the truth or falsity of a speaker's desires. In traditional imperatives, the priority modal base is always interpreted as prioritizing the speaker's desires. This means that follow-ups regarding truth and falsity are infelicitous. GPs do not automatically utilize a speaker-bouletic modal base, which means that their speaker's can be questioned in some contexts. However, when context makes it clear that the content of the GP is in fact the speaker's desires, then follow-ups referencing truth and falsity are again infelitous.

Ezra Keshet, p.c., suggests that another possible solution to this problem is that IaDs and GPs can indirectly resolve decision problems, whereas traditional imperatives can only directly resolve decision problems. Given that traditional imperatives directly state the best solution to the decision problem, they are inaccessible to truth values, because any follow-ups that reference truth and falsity are questioning the speaker's authority on the decision problem. Since traditional imperatives presuppose that the speaker is an authority on the relevant decision problem, this exchange is infelicitous. In the case of IaDs and GPs, there may be some wiggle room. For example, it may be the case that a speaker is an authority with respect to their desire that the addressee not smoke, but could be unaware of the actual rules. I will leave the question of which analysis is best aside here - the important point is that the imperative operator does not exclude the possibility of having accessible truth conditions.

2.4.3.2 Putting the Pieces Together

In the previous subsections, I argued that the imperative operator, as conceived by Keshet and Medeiros (2019), did not explain the accessibility of truth conditions in GPs and IaDs. As such, I have moved the Authority Condition, originally conceived of as being part of the operator, as instead arising via an effect of the operator and a priority modal, which will only arise in traditional imperatives. There is an assertoric meaning component that is part of the standard, propositional meaning of traditional imperatives (as conceived by Kaufmann (2012)), and the performative update is provided by the operator.

Below, in (141), is a derivation combining the assertoric component of a GP with the presuppositions of the imperative operator of Kaufmann (2012) and Keshet and Medeiros

(2019). It also involves LF movement of "allowed" to Mod^0 and a negative element in Neg^0.

(141) a. [OP_{IMP}] [NegP ¬ [ModP allowed] [TP ~~There is~~ any smoking ~~allowed~~!]
ASSERT: It is not the case that there is any smoking allowed.
REQUEST: Speaker endorses that there is no smoking allowed.

b. Presuppositions:

i. Decision Constraint: Both Speaker and Addressee agree that *There is no smoking allowed* constitutes an answer to a salient decision problem *D*.

ii. Authority Condition: Speaker is in a privileged position with respect to the truth of *There is no smoking allowed*.

iii. Non-Past Constraint: *There is no smoking allowed* must take place not entirely in the past.

iv. Epistemic Uncertainty: Speaker believes that both *There is smoking* and ¬*There is smoking* are possible.

GPs have an assertoric meaning component because imperatives generally have an assertoric meaning underlyingly, and GPs do not block this component from being realized on the surface. There is also a performative meaning component that is associated with the operator. I have provided a series of pieces of evidence in favor of both an *assert* and *request* component associated with imperatives thus far. One simple additional piece of evidence is offered now in the form of GPs being compatible with both "unfortunately" and "please." Quirk et al. (1985) state that imperatives do not occur with "comment disjuncts" such as "unfortunately," and offer the following example.

(142) *Unfortunately, pay your rent now!

Unfortunately cannot modify requests, even under an interpretation where the speaker finds it unfortunate that they must request something. It is perfectly acceptable with statements.

(143) a. *Unfortunately*, Scott lied.

b. #*Unfortunately*, could you pass the salt?

Unfortunately cannot target the speech act REQUEST. It is possible modifying a GP, despite the fact that GPs provide a REQUEST meaning. I take this to show that there must be an assertoric meaning component associated with a GP as well.[25]

(144) *Unfortunately*, no dogs in the arena.

Follow-ups regarding truth and falsity can target the *assert* portion of the utterance, while leaving the *request* portion of the utterance fully performative. Interestingly, GPs are also compatible with *please*, which is limited to appearing with *requests*.

(145) a. Could you pass the salt *please*?

b. #It's raining please.

c. No smoking, please.

GPs therefore have both an assertoric meaning component and a performative requesting one. I find this combination of illocutionary forces particularly troubling for Portner's To-Do List analysis. Presumably, certain types of lexical items are specified in the grammar as being able to appear with illocutionary forces and clause types. In this case, the only construction that I am aware of that can be modified by both *please* and *unfortunately* is a GP. If each utterance is specified as being a member of one and only one clause type, we should not see this type of distribution.

There is still the matter of the obligatory deletion of the subject and auxiliary. As we have already seen, there is a process of optional subject/auxiliary deletion of an existential subject, with no difference in meaning.

(146) a. Hm. (There are) no dogs in here.

The question is therefore: Why is existential deletion optional in statements like (146a) but obligatory in GPs? That is to say, as we have already seen, GPs are obligatorily performative, and their performativity is dependent on the deletion of the existential subject and the verb. I propose that the deletion is conditioned by movement of the negative particle to NegP in GPs. Since Jacobs (1980), it has become standard to analyze negative determiners as capable of decomposing into two elements, negation and an existential quantifier.

[25] Thanks to Julie Anne Legate, p.c., for pointing this out to me.

(147) no = NEG + $\exists$

This negative meaning component can only be interpreted as taking scope over the modal "allowed." GPs have fixed scope in which negation scopes over "allowed." The only possible interpretation of a GP is that the content of the GP is not allowed, never that it is allowed to not do something.

(148) No dancing!

$\rightarrow$ Dancing is not allowed. ($\neg >$ allowed)

$\neq$ You are allowed to not dance. (allowed $> \neg$)

Under the conception of the imperative operator presented here, the imperative operator obligatorily selects the projection ModP, which must be headed by some modal element. In GPs, that means that the modal element which fulfills this requirement is "allowed." In the case of traditional imperatives, the operator selects a covert priority modal. In IaDs, it selects a covert future modal. However, in the case of GPs, it is selecting the modal "allowed," which can be overtly expressed. Furthermore, the position of this modal is not adjacent to the imperative operator in the left periphery, and it cannot be pronounced in this position.

In order to fill Mod^0, therefore, I propose that "allowed" moves at LF. The following is a sketch of the Modal element "allowed" moving to the head of Mod^0 to fulfill the requirement that the imperative operator places on selecting a modal. In order to have negation scope over "allowed," negation moves at LF to the Neg^0, leaving behind an existential.

(149)



This configuration is crucial to deleting the existential subject. "Allowed" must raise to Mod^0 to fulfill the requirement on the imperative operator to select a modal. Neg must raise about Mod^0 to derive the correct interpretation. I propose that, in a configuration like (149), the existential subject is obligatorily deleted in a process of deletion under redundancy. When the negative element raises to Neg^0, it leaves behind an existential. This means that there are multiple, adjacent existentials. Under such a configuration, I propose that the first existential will always be deleted when the negative element in "no" raises, leaving two adjacent existentials.

This analysis is not meant to be specific to GPs. We have already seen that deletion of

the existential subject and verb can happen in other constructions as well. This analysis can also explain the deletion in those constructions. The negative determiner "no" is generally capable of decomposing into NEG and ∃. The idea here is that - if negation decomposes and leaves adjacent existentials, then the existential subject will delete.

This explains a variety of constructions with "no" in which there is no explicitly pronounced subject. Each involves, under this conception, decomposition of "no" and deletion of the existential subject under redundancy of adjacent existentials. Below are some examples.

(150) a. ~~There are~~ No tickets required.

b. ~~There is~~ No appointment necessary.

c. ~~There is~~ No experience needed.

d. ~~There are~~ No rooms available.

e. ~~There are~~ No experts wanted.

In each of these sentences, deletion of the existential object and verb is optional. I propose that this optionality is due to the optionality of moving NEG to a higher projection. If NEG moves, it will leave an existential, forcing deletion under redundancy. If NEG does not move, then it intervenes between the existential subject and the existential element in "no." This means that the existential subject is pronounced. It is also worth pointing out that the same tag-question tests that showed an existential subject for GPs also show an existential subject for the sentences in (150), providing additional evidence that the existential subject is really being deleted.

(151) a. No tickets required, are there?

b. No appointment necessary, is there?

c. No experience needed, is there?

d. No rooms available, are there?

e. No experts wanted, are there?

This analysis can also explain the lack of deletion in the analogous non-performative sentence "There is no smoking allowed." Because there is no imperative operator, there is no ModP. This means that the negative element in "no" is not forced to move to Neg^0 at

LF. If it does not move, the existential subject will be pronounced. Because negation scopes over "allowed" in both its base position and its moved position, there is no interpretation difference between the instance in which Neg moves and the instance in which it does not. Thus, "No dogs allowed in here." and "There are no dogs allowed in here." mean the same thing.

Let us see several derivations of how this works. For a standard declarative with "allowed", the following structure is proposed.

(152) There is no smoking allowed.

(153)



In (153) above, no ellipsis happens. This is because there is no imperative operator, which means that the utterance is not performative. Thus, (153) is quite similar to a GP, but it is technically not a GP because it is not performative. For instance, an utterance of (152) does not commit the speaker to endorsing that the addressee act in accordance with its content.

(154) There is no smoking allowed, but I don't care if you do.

When we add the imperative operator to the structure in (153), this adds an extra projection, ModP. ModP must be filled with a modal in order to satisfy the subcategorization requirements of the imperative operator. Because the modal "allowed" must move to ModP to fulfill this requirement, negation must move to Neg^0 in all GPs in order to scope over the modal.

(155) No smoking allowed!

(156)



The same analysis applies to existential constructions that lack a modal, such as "(There are) no dogs in here." This structure lacks a ModP, because there is no Imperative

Operator. Nevertheless, there is optional movement of the negative component in "no" to Neg^0. If this negative component moves, it will leave adjacent existentials, which will cause the existential subject to delete. If the negative component does not move, the existential subject will be pronounced. The following shows the posited difference between Neg raising and Neg staying in its base position.

(157) No dogs in here.

(158)



(159) There are no dogs in here.

(160)



This analysis explains why deletion of the existential subject is optional in declaratives but obligatory in GPs, because NEG raising is obligatory in GPs but optional in declaratives.

If our analysis here is on the right track, then the deletion of the existential subject in these types of sentences is due to deletion under redundancy of adjacent existential features. This deletion is obligatory in GPs because negation will always move, leaving adjacent existentials. This deletion is optional in all other constructions because the raising of NEG is optional.

2.4.4 One Phrase for Both *No* and *Only*

In the previous section, we saw that negation had to move to a higher projection in order to take scope over "allowed" to derive the correct interpretation. However, we have already seen that GPs can also take the lexical item "only." "Only" must also obligatorily take scope over "allowed," it can never take scope under it.

(161) Cats only!

= It is only allowed to have cats.

≠ It is allowed to only have cats.

What this means is that "only" is working exactly like negation, in obligatorily taking scope over "allowed." Why is it that "no" and "only" act together in licensing GPs? Von Fintel and Iatridou (2007) offer a potential solution, by arguing that "only" decomposes into negation and an existential *other than* component. This makes it quite similar to "no," which decomposes into negation and an existential. If we adopt this analysis of "only," then GPs with "no" and "only" are nearly identical. I use the notation ∃OT to indicate that there exists some alternative, following the notation established by Von Fintel and Iatridou (2007) of "∃ other than."

(162) Only dogs allowed!

(163)



It is worth pointing out that this analysis is perfectly in line with the findings of Iatridou (2021), in which she describes negation as being the crucial licensing element for GPs. Because both "no" and "only" decompose into a negative element and an existential element, which means that both can license GPs.

2.4.5 Syntax of the Imperative Operator

This analysis presents a radical departure from what is standardly assumed in the literature on the imperative operator. The presence of the imperative operator is typically argued to restrict the person values of the clause it combines with. The restriction of imperative clauses to addressee subjects has been a topic of recent investigation (Platzack

and Rosengren 1997; Portner 2004; Potsdam 2007; Zanuttini 2008; Oikonomou 2016). The addressee restriction is nearly universally argued to be syntactic, and separated from the directive force associated with imperatives. Other directives are not restricted to having a syntactic subject that is some subset of the addressee(s). For example, Oikonomou (2016) shows that subjunctives in Greek can be used as directives, but are compatible with any person feature.

(164) a. Avrio, na fig-o (1st person)

b. Avrio, na fig-o (2nd person)

c. Avrio, na fig-i o Petros. (3rd person)
tomorrow SUBJ leave.1/2/3P the Peter

'Tomorrow, may I/you/Peter leave!' (Oikonomou 2016; pg. 151, her 8a-c)

Imperatives are typically argued to be unique in the sense that they are limited to having addressee subjects. Despite this, the analysis presented in the previous section argues that the imperative operator is capable of combining with propositions that do not have an addressee subject. Does this mean that the analysis presented here is necessarily at odds with the previous work? I don't think so.

In a series of works, Zanuttini (2008); Zanuttini et al. (2012) develop a theory analyzing the 2nd person restriction in imperatives as being due to a head present in imperatives, the *jussive* head, which hosts 2nd person features and transmits them to the subject.

(165) (Zanuttini 2008)



The account provided by Zanuttini, shown in (165), explains the addressee restriction on the subject by assuming that the jussive head has special properties which restrict the

domain of possible subjects to those including the addressee. Crucially, the operator itself does not contain the syntactic feature, it is the jussive head. This predicts that, if the operator can appear in constructions outside of JussiveP, we would not expect an obligatory addressee subject. Although Zanuttini does not consider such cases, this is exactly what I have argued in the case of GPs. In Section 1, I introduced an Addressee Phrase, which limits the syntactic subject of the phrase it combines with to being some subset of the addressee(s), but without any reference to a To-Do List.

Traditional imperatives always seem to pair the imperative operator and an Addressee Restriction. Both seem to be required for an analysis of a traditional imperative. I see no reason to argue against the existence of the Addressee Restriction in traditional imperatives, as traditional imperatives really do seem to be restricted in the type of syntactic subject they can take. This section merely proposes that the imperative operator can appear in constructions outside of addressee-restricted ones. In (166) below, previously given as (112), the full structure I propose here can be seen.

(166)



The structure above in (166) does not contain any projection that limits the syntactic subject, unlike traditional imperatives. This is necessary, given that it is implausible that "There" could be the addressee. The addressee is still induced to action because the semantics of the imperative operator require the addressee to act in accordance with the proposition that is selected.

It remains an open question as to why, exactly, the imperative operator can combine with TPs like the one in (166) and not others. One possibility is that the semantic object composed by "¬allowed" is compatible with the imperative operator, to the exclusion of other types of semantic objects. Given that "only" produces a negation in its set of focus

alternatives, it can satisfy the semantic requirement of "¬allowed." If we suppose, following Iatridou (2019), that negation forms a crucial element in forming a GP, this could be the reason why "¬allowed" can form a GP but "allowed" on its own cannot. This also explains why "only" can form a GP, "only" is capable of decomposing into a negation and an existential.

2.4.6 Extending The Idea to Whimperatives

If this analysis of an imperative operator not blocking truth values and not determining the syntactic subject of the clause it combines with is on the right track, then there are some important implications of our current understanding of clause-type systems.

If we do not include the notion of morphosyntactic clause-typing operators in our system, then the imperative operator is not necessarily bound to appear with imperative morphology. This reflects a growing consensus that clause-types have to be built compositionally, out of multiple parts (Isac 2015; Portner 2018). If we separate these components from one another, then this operator could appear in sentences that have, for example, interrogative wh-words, if that syntactic and semantic combination is permitted within a given language. Classical Latin provides what I consider to be an example of this: imperative morphology can co-occur with the interrogative word *quin*, which is a contraction of *qui non*, and means "why not."

(167) a. quin omitt-e me!
why.not let.go-Imp me.Acc
'Why don't you leave me alone?' (Terence, Phormio, Act 3)

b. quin tu aud-i!
why.not you.Nom listen-Imp
'Why don't you listen?' (Plautus, Bacchides, Act 2, Sc. 3)

c. quin ego hunc agred-ior de ill-a?
why.not 1sg.Nom he.Acc confront-1sg about her-Abl
'Why don't I confront him about her?' (Plautus, Mercator, Act 2, Sc. 3)

Under a closed theory of clause types, such as the kind argued for by Sadock and Zwicky (1985) and Portner (2004), interrogative elements should never be able to mix with imperative morphology. Under the conception of the grammar presented in this chapter, however, this type of combination is in principle possible. In fact, I am optimistic that such

an approach can help solve a long-standing mystery regarding *do-support* and the verb "be" in certain questions in English. Questions like the following have been traditionally referred to as "whimperatives" since Sadock (1970). Green (1975) points out that an utterance like the following typically can only be interpreted as a type of command. This construction also seems possible with "how about."[26]

(168) a. Why don't you be quiet!

b. How about don't knock on my door!

I would like to take the portmanteau "whimperative" seriously, perhaps even more seriously than those who originally used the term. It is typically assumed that the form of (168a) is interrogative because it has a wh-element. Curiously, however, *do-support* is triggered, even with the verb "to be," when it is normally not. (168a) does not have the same meaning as (169) below.

(169) Why aren't you quiet?

It is well-known that "to be" triggers do-support in imperatives, but not in non-imperatives (Beukema and Coopmans 1989; Potsdam 2007; Han 1998). Potsdam (2017) argues that this is because V^0 to T^0 raising in English is highly limited, appearing only in finite clauses. If we follow this line of thinking, this means that (168a) is non-finite, while (169) is finite. This seems correct.

If we take this proposal seriously, then we can allow for a combination that would not be possible under other approaches, where a wh-element directly associates with a clause with an imperative verb. Below is a derivation of what this structure might look like. There is a [+wh] feature in Spec-CP, which drives movement of "why' to Spec-CP. Following Potsdam (2017), I argue that *do* in imperatives is inserted on T^0, and that "be" stays on V^0, because

[26] For some reason, whimperatives with "How about" allow omission of the subject, but whimperatives with "Why" do not.

(1) *Why don't be quiet!

the clause is non-finite. I leave the modal element required in imperatives unspecified here, for the sake of simplicity.

(170)



Do is inserted because (170) is non-finite, V^0 to T^0 movement is not allowed in non-finite clauses, including imperatives. *Do* contracts with *not* and moves to C^0, following Potsdam (2017). *Why* moves to the [+wh] feature situated in Spec-CP. The verb remains uninflected because *do* is inserted, obligatory in English non-finite clauses.

One thing to notice about the structure in (170) is that it does not restrict its subject to be some subset of the addressees. This is because whimperatives are actually not limited to 2nd person subjects. 1st and 3rd person subjects also acceptable, with the same meaning of providing a suggestion.

(171) a. Why doesn't he just be quiet?

b. Why don't they leave already?

c. Why don't I be your sponsor? (Desperate Housewives, Season 2, Episode 20)

By separating the imperative operator from imperative morphosyntax, the existence of such a clause type is straightforward in this system, given that operators may be able to combine, and both can affect the morphosyntax. The derivation of whimperatives can be straightforwardly explained via features that already exist in other configurations. Although the discussion here on clause-type mixing is necessarily limited, I am optimistic that this view of the grammar can lead to insights about the nature of the syntax that have previously gone unnoticed.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has identified both the morphosyntactic and semantic/pragmatic properties of a novel construction, termed herein "general prohibition." In addition, an analysis was posited that involves an imperative operator with partially accessible truth values. The restrictions on the distribution of GPs fall out from restrictions on the operator, and the morphosyntax of declarative clauses. The operator contributes imperative pragmatics to GPs, providing the same range of uses as imperatives. The ability of the imperative operator to combine with a clause that does not have an addressee-restricted subject has interesting implications for theories of clause types.

There are still a few unanswered questions that will have to be pushed into the future as a result of the investigation in this chapter. The most natural question that remains is "What is the nature of the requirement for negation in GPs?" This requirement for some negative element is not yet well understood. As we will see in the next chapter, there are several types of verbless imperative that are not restricted to requiring negation. This question simply must be left for further research.

Another question that naturally arises is "Are there any restrictions on the appearance of the imperative operator?" Intuitively, the answer feels like it should be yes, that there must be some restriction on the type of clause that the imperative operator can combine with. The clauses that we have argued possess an imperative operator in this chapter have been highly restricted in terms of the constellation of properties that they must have in order to surface. GPs, for example, can only host an imperative operator in the presence of negation, not in all configurations. Because this is the first work that proposes separating the

imperative operator from "imperative" morphosyntax in this way, it is perhaps unsurprising that these questions have not been thoroughly addressed in the literature. Nevertheless, a more complete understanding of the operator should include predictions about where it can and cannot appear.

Chapter 3

GOAL COMMANDS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is comprised of a thorough investigation of another type of verbless imperative, the GOAL COMMAND (GoalC). Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the properties of this construction in English, while Chapter 4 examines and analyzes their properties across a sample of other languages. The motivating observation behind this chapter and the next is the existence of commands that overtly contain only a theme and a goal, while lacking any overt verb, accompanied by COMMAND prosody, as in (172) below.

(172) Books onto the shelf!

Despite being a fragment, (172) appears to fulfill a similar pragmatic function to a traditional imperative sentence with the verb "put." Like a traditional imperative sentence, it commits both the speaker and addressee to a state of affairs related to the content of the utterance. In the case of (172), it commits the speaker to having a preference that the addressee puts the books on the shelf, and it commits the addressee to putting the books on the shelf, assuming the speaker has the relevant authority to command the addressee (Kaufmann 2012). If imperatives receive their force from features that are associated with full imperative sentences, then it is reasonable to suppose that (172) is derived from a full imperative sentence. Going back to at least Morgan (1973), there has been significant generative work carried out on analyzing fragments as derived from full sentences. Despite this, none of this work precisely captures the properties of a fragment like (172). Though it may initially appear uncomplicated, the fragment in (172) has a number of very interesting and uncommon linguistic properties. This chapter will therefore address three main research questions with respect to linguistic properties of fragments like (172). First, what is the

syntactic structure of these expressions? Second, what are the use conditions of these expressions? Third, what is an analysis that can consolidate existing theories of fragments and ellipsis with new data that seems to contradict previous accounts?

In order to investigate the syntactic structure, I will show that GoalCs share many properties with traditional imperatives. I will therefore analyze GoalCs as being derived from traditional imperative sentences, with features such as an imperative operator and AddrP, providing the appropriate performative update and restricting the syntactic subject to a subset of the addressees. The deleted verb is a *put-type verb*, a class of verbs that subcategorize for a complement of a theme and a goal. I will then systematically show that it is not the case that GoalCs merely omit their verbs, but in fact involve deletion of all material to the left of their themes. Because the English imperative verb is placed to the left of its theme, this edge deletion also includes the verb. I will show that currently existing theories of ellipsis cannot, and typically do not even attempt to, explain this type of ellipsis. I will therefore propose an analysis in which edge deletion can be conditioned by a feature, $[+\alpha]$, which can be carried on the Prosody Head COMMAND and put-type verbs. Agreeing elements that are in the complement of the put-type verb can receive this $[+\alpha]$ feature, which causes them to be pronounced rather than deleted. This feature is associated pragmatically with adding urgency to commands, which means that GoalCs are pragmatically limited to being used as urgent commands.

3.1.1 Defining the notion *GoalC*

Under normal circumstances, a starting point for analyzing a construction is to compile all previous accounts, both direct and indirect, of that construction. To my knowledge, however, there exist no formal analyses and very few offhand mentions of the properties of this construction in the literature on generative grammar. Therefore, I will attempt to first define the parameters of study for this construction, both for analysis in this dissertation and for use by anyone who attempts to analyze this construction in the future. I delimit the class of GoalCs based on the empirical observation that there exists a class of linguistic objects that behave in a similar way.

This class of expressions has three defining characteristics: it must 1) contain a *goal*,

2) be limited to COMMAND prosody, and 3) lack an overt verb. This means that some putative GoalCs are not true members of the class, as they possess different properties. This means that we must exclude some verbless directives of the kind described by Huddleston and Pullum (2002) like (173) below.

(173) Two coffees, please!

Despite the fact that (173) lacks an overt verb, and appears to be usable as a command, it is not limited to COMMAND prosody. Certain overt modifiers, such as "if you don't mind" or "if you like," are not generally compatible with command speech acts or prosody.

(174) a. #Hand me that pen if you don't mind! (COMMAND)

b. #Take a cookie if you like! (COMMAND)

It is possible to weaken (173) to a request, using overt modifiers like "If you don't mind," but this is not possible with true GoalCs. (175a) and (175b) do not receive COMMAND prosody.

(175) a. Two coffees, when you get a chance!

b. Two coffees, if you don't mind!

c. #Books on the shelf, when you get a chance!

d. #Books on the shelf, if you don't mind!

I take the difference in available illocutionary forces to be indicative that the two constructions are distinct. GoalCs require COMMAND prosody, which can only accompany the speech act of commanding. Modifiers that weaken the request are incompatible with this prosody. In addition, requests like (173) appear to be compatible with negation, but GoalCs are not.

(176) a. A: We offer two packages: the regular and the deluxe.
B: Not the deluxe, please.

b. (*Not) books on the shelf!

I take this difference in possible force and prosody to indicate that the constructions are distinct. Another contender for a GoalC is what I term a "scalpel command," typically consisting of only a noun, evocative of a context in which a surgeon is commanding an assistant to hand them something, stereotypically a scalpel.

(177) a. Scalpel!

b. Sponge!

c. Ticket, please!

At first glance, scalpel commands appear to make excellent candidates for GoalCs. They appear to be limited to command or request use and lack overt verbs. Although they also lack overt goals, in each scalpel command in (177), the goal can plausibly be interpreted as "to me." If this is the case, a possible analysis of the fragments in (177) is that they are GoalCs with null goals. In Chapter 4, I will eventually analyze scalpel commands as involving movement to a higher projection, combined with a [+telegraphic] feature which can optionally delete or include determiners. I will provide a couple of preliminary reasons to exclude them as counting as true GoalCs here.

One reason is that scalpel commands permit articles must more easily than GoalCs. There is a strong contrast between the acceptability of articles in the following.

(178) a. The scalpel, please.

b. *The books on the shelf!

The argument presented in this chapter will be that there is an edge deletion process that deletes determiners that is present in GoalCs. If scalpel commands were GoalCs, we would expect them to also delete their determiners. Additionally, the scalpel command in (178a) is compatible with negation, unlike a GoalC.

(179) a. Not the scalpel, please.

b. *Not (the) books on the shelf!

Again, edge deletion will be argued to delete negation. If the same edge deletion was occurring in scalpel commands, we should not be able to have negation. This compatibility with negation also differentiates GoalCs from commands like the following.

(180) a. Not another word!

b. Not one more step!

I will provide additional evidence in Chapter 4 that cross-linguistically, the case marking requirements for GoalC themes and scalpel NPs do not always align. For example, in Japanese, GoalC themes are limited to bearing overt accusative case, whereas scalpel themes can express no case marker.

(181) a. Hon-**o**/*∅ tana-ni!
book-**Acc**-**Null** shelf-Loc
'Books onto the shelf!'

b. Mesu-**o**/∅.
scalpel-**Acc/Null**
'Scalpel.' (Japanese)

Because of these facts, I will exclude scalpel commands from the discussion here of GoalCs, and mention them in more detail in Chapter 4. Another promising candidate for a GoalC is a "silence command," which is also a bare noun, but with a different interpretation than a scalpel command.

(182) a. Silence!

b. Patience, friend.

Although (182a) does appear in normal circumstances to be restricted to command usage, (182b) is certainly not. In fact, it is incredibly odd as a command. The most natural reading for (182b) is as advice, a reading not available to GoalCs. Additionally, not all nouns can appear in this type of command. There is a significant contrast between bare nouns in the following.

(183) a. Mercy, please!

b. ?Sympathy, please!

c. ???Generosity, please!

I am not entirely sure of the right analysis of "Silence" type commands, but their lack of productivity leads me to believe it may be a fixed construction, conventionalized to a few

nouns, unlike GoalCs which are productive. I leave them aside here. Additionally, GoalCs appear to require goals. This definition rules out non-goal locations like the following.

(184) #Books in Rome!

An utterance like (184) is infelicitous on the reading that the speaker is commanding the addressee to retrieve books that are in Rome. It is felicitous, however, when used to require that the addressee move the books to Rome. That is to say, the location phrase *in Rome* can only be interpreted as a goal, and not merely a location, for a GoalC to be possible. This subcategorization requirement is identical to the one placed on the verb "put."

(185) I put the books in Rome.
→ Acceptable: I moved the books to Rome. / Unacceptable: I did book-putting in Rome.

If the prepositional phrase is not interpreted as a goal, it cannot be interpreted as a command.

Another property of the construction is that it is limited to commanding. This manifests as requiring the prosody of a command. Traditional imperatives, on the other hand, have a range of uses available to them, such as WISH (Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Kaufmann 2012; Davies 1986), but GoalCs do not. Thus, (186a) below can serve as a command from a speaker to an addressee commanding them to place the package in the mailbox. (186b) is incoherent, however, if used wishing that the package is in the mailbox. This exact sentiment can be expressed with the verb overtly expressed (186c).

(186) a. Package in the mailbox! (Command)
b. #Package in the mailbox! (Wish)
c. Please be in the mailbox! (Wish)

This also excludes certain types of verbless imperatives which may contain a goal but can be used for other purposes. General prohibitives, for example, do not count as GoalCs, even when containing a goal, because they have accessible truth values (See Chapter 2).

(187) No books onto the shelf!

An utterance like (172) can only function as an urgent command, entreating the addressee to put books that are salient within a given context onto a shelf within that same context. (187) on the other hand, can provide information about a rule. (187) also acts partially like a declarative in allowing follow-ups such as "That's (not) true!." This is never possible for GoalCs.

(188) a. A: No books onto the shelf!
B: That's not true, we are allowed to put them there now.

b. A: Books onto the shelf!
B: #That's not true, we aren't allowed to put them there.

GoalCs are acting more like traditional imperatives in not projecting accessible truth values. This means that GPs are a distinct linguistic class from GoalCs.

The third property of GoalCs is that they are verbless. Thus, traditional imperatives like the following can never be considered GoalCs, because they express the imperative verb overtly.

(189) Put the books on the shelf!

Following the terminology already established in this dissertation, I will use the term *traditional imperative* to refer to linguistic objects like (189). This leaves one serious candidate for a GoalC, which is commands like the following, which appear to be sequences of prepositional phrases, the second of which is headed by "with.'

(190) a. Into the van with you!

b. Off with her head!

c. Beside the bed with that desk!

These putative GoalCs more or less match the properties of GoalCs, though with the theme placed in a prepositional phrase headed by "with." I will show later in this chapter that binding data strongly suggests that these commands are not GoalCs, though their similarity is striking.

Although this definition of GoalCs places relatively strict restrictions on which utterances count as GoalCs, there is still some variation within the class of GoalCs. Each of the

following in (191) counts as an example of a GoalC, despite differing from each other. Each contains a goal, and some (191e) contain only a goal.

(191) a. Feet on the floor, now!

b. Hands where I can see them!

c. Hands up!

d. Everybody out of the chunnel!

e. Out of my sight!

Using (191a) as a guide, I will use the terminology "theme" to refer to the argument in the position of *feet*, and the terminology "goal" to refer to the material in the position of *on the floor*. Rather than being restricted to a specific syntactic category, the goal argument can be filled by several different phrases that specify a semantic goal. In (191a), the goal is a PP, whereas in (191b) it appears to be a CP, and in (191c) it is a particle. In (191d), the theme can also be interpreted as agentive, which is not a possible interpretation of (191a). In (191e), there is no overt theme at all, the only overt material is the PP goal and the addressee is interpreted as the theme.

3.1.2 Chapter Overview

Section 3.2 gives a thorough and atheoretical (as much as possible) description of the prosodic, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of English GoalCs. The basic finding will be that GoalCs pattern with traditional imperatives in all relevant ways, which leads me to borrow several properties from previous analyses of traditional imperatives. Section 3.3 considers several possibilities for analyzing the ellipsis necessary to derive GoalCs, before settling on an obligatory in-situ edge ellipsis account. As theories of ellipsis typically rely on some notion of semantic givenness to license their ellipsis, GoalCs provide an interesting challenge in that they are felicitous without being semantically given. This process of ellipsis is highly unusual, and this chapter provides one of the first large scale investigations into the syntactic configurations that make edge ellipsis available. Section 3.4 provides a formal analysis that accounts for the prosodic, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of GoalCs, analyzing GoalCs as being underlyingly traditional imperatives that are truncated.

This will fit GoalCs into previously existing theories of imperatives, but with an added process of edge ellipsis. This process of edge ellipsis is tied to a feature that adds urgency to the command. Section 3.5 describes some outstanding properties of GoalCs that the analysis presented in Section 3.4 does not straightforwardly capture.

3.2 Properties of English Goal Commands

This section will discuss the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and prosodic properties of GoalCs in English. The conclusion will be that GoalCs are identical to traditional command imperatives in every way, except that GoalCs involve an additional process of left-edge deletion. This fact leads me to conclude that GoalCs are truncated imperatives, albeit derived via an unusual process, edge ellipsis.

3.2.1 Syntactic Subject

Unlike declaratives and interrogatives, imperative clauses are well-known to be restricted with respect to their possible subjects (Bolinger 1967; Potsdam 2017; Zanuttini 2008). Below are some possibilities for overt subjects for traditional imperatives in English, adapted from Potsdam (2017) (pg 163, his 1a-d).[1]

(192) a. Don't *you* tell me what to do!

b. *Everybody* look at your hands!

c. *Someone* call an ambulance!

d. *Those in front* step away from the barricade!

e. *Nobody* move!

Unlike the subjects of declaratives and interrogatives, imperative subjects are limited to be some subset of the addressee(s). Thus, the subject in (192e) above cannot be reasonably interpreted as "nobody in the world," an option that is available in declaratives and interrogatives, but only ever as "none of the addressees." Zanuttini (2008) shows that this has syntactic consequences, and traditional imperatives can bind 2nd person pronouns

[1] See Potsdam (2017) for arguments against the imperative noun phrases listed here being vocatives.

even with subjects which appear to be 3rd person (193), an option which is not possible in declaratives or interrogatives (194).

(193) a. Everyone$_i$ raise his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$/your$_i$ hand!

b. Someone$_i$ raise his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$/your$_i$ hand!

(194) a. Everyone$_i$ should raise his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$/*your$_i$ hand.

b. Should everyone$_i$ raise his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$/*your$_i$ hand? (Zanuttini 2008)

Despite the variety of possible overt subjects, it is more common to associate traditional imperative sentences with the possibility of not overtly expressing a subject. It is typologically unusual for languages to require the expression of the imperative subject (Aikhenvald 2010). Each of the imperatives in (192) is grammatical with a null subject.

(195) a. Don't tell me what to do!

b. Look at your hands!

c. Call an ambulance!

d. Step away from the barricade!

e. Move!

The possibility of null subjects is striking and is of great theoretical importance, given that null subjects are very commonly allowed in imperatives regardless of the presence of null subjects more generally in a given language (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Aikhenvald 2010). In Chapter 2, we discussed the projection AddrP, which limits the syntactic subject to some subset of the addressee(s) and rejected it for an analysis of General Prohibitives. At first glance, it is unclear whether or not GoalCs have addressee-restricted subjects. A possible preliminary analysis of the GoalCs in (196) below is that *books* and *feet* are the subjects of each respective utterance, NPs that could not plausibly the addressee.

(196) a. **Books** onto the shelf!

b. **Feet** on the floor!

I have already taken a stance on the status of NPs such as *books* and *feet* by choosing to call them themes. Nevertheless, although NPs like *books* and *feet* are not generally

acceptable as the subjects of traditional imperatives, it could be possible to analyze them as the subjects of (196a) and (196b) respectively. In the previous chapter, there was strong syntactic evidence that GPs, which were imperative-like in some respects, could nevertheless have an existential non-addressee-restricted subject. The evidence in the case of GoalCs falls in the other direction, however, and I will therefore argue that the utterances in (196) have covert addressee-restricted subjects and that their subjects are not respectively "books" and "feet." As such, they are analogous to the traditional imperatives that lack overt subjects in (195).

The most intuitive reason to analyze GoalCs as having an addressee-restricted subject analogous to traditional imperatives is that the semantic/pragmatic update between the two constructions is identical. Imperative clauses are well-known to be *directive*, in the sense that they obligate the addressee to do something in the real world when felicitously uttered (Searle 1975). When a traditional imperative is felicitously uttered, the addressee typically has an obligation to make the content of the imperative true.[2]

(197) Grab that pen!

→ The addressee is obligated to grab the pen.

A successful utterance of (197) will obligate the addressee to grab the pen. For imperatives, "successful" means that there are certain real-world requirements on the context, such as the speaker having the authority to command the addressee, the speaker correctly judging that the addressee is capable of grabbing the pen, etc. Kaufmann (2012) argues that these requirements are present in imperatives via presuppositions associated with the operator that occurs in imperative clauses, which we saw in Chapter 2. Zanuttini et al. (2012) derive this pragmatic effect by arguing for a syntactic projection that can have syntactic effects on the subject of the clause it combines with, and updates the *To-Do List*.

GoalCs are also restricted to addressee subject interpretation. Much like traditional imperatives, the addressee becomes obligated to make the content of a GoalC true when felicitously uttered.

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[2] This is an oversimplification, see Kaufmann (2012) and Oikonomou (2016) for derivations of wish interpretations of traditional imperatives that lack addressees.

(198) Books off the shelf!

→ The addressee is obligated to make the books be off the shelf.

Note that it is incorrect to say that the books in (198) have any obligation whatsoever. Given that books are inanimate, it is not clear what any sort of obligation placed onto the books could be. Instead, the obligation is always placed on the addressee, despite the fact that the addressee argument is not overtly present in the utterance. Thus, the semantic subject of a GoalC appears to be the same as a traditional imperative, the addressee.

There is also direct syntactic evidence of a null addressee-restricted subject in GoalCs, of the type that Zanuttini et al. (2012) argue to exist in traditional imperatives. For traditional imperatives, Zwicky (1988) uses data from reflexives to show that null subjects must bear second-person features. Only reflexive pronouns with second-person features are licensed in traditional imperatives.

(199) a. Make yourself / yourselves a drink!

b. Make each other a drink!

c. *Make ourselves a drink!

d. *Make themselves a drink! (Zwicky 1988)

In (199), only the 2nd person and reciprocal reflexive pronouns are possible, 1st and 3rd person reflexives are ungrammatical. This is perfectly mirrored in GoalCs. 1st and 3rd person reflexive pronouns violate Condition A (200c), (200d), but 2nd person reflexives and reciprocals are grammatical.

(200) a. Hands off yourself / yourselves!

b. Hands off each other!

c. *Hands off ourselves!

d. *Hands off themselves!

I take the fact that 1st and 3rd person reflexive pronouns cannot be bound, but that 2nd person reflexive pronouns can be bound as evidence that there must be a covert 2nd person subject present to bind only 2nd person reflexive pronouns. It is important to point

out that just the possibility of reflexive pronouns and reciprocals in a construction does not inherently prove that there is an antecedent argument for that reflexive. Napoli (1982), following Yanofsky (1978), argues that fragments like the following can have a reflexive pronoun without a structural antecedent.

(201) (Situation: Two parents look at each other as their daughter serves them the first dinner she's ever cooked alone. One says to the other)
All by herself, too.

The important point about GoalCs, therefore, is not merely that 2nd person reflexives and reciprocals are grammatical. If there is a covert 2nd person subject in imperatives, we should see not only grammatical reflexive 2nd person pronouns but also ungrammatical non-reflexive 2nd person pronouns. This pattern is exactly what is seen in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs.

(202) a. *Make you a drink!
b. *Hands off you!
c. Hands off me/him/them!
d. Out of my/*your way!

Taken in concert, I cannot see an explanation for the data in (200) and (202) without appealing to a covert addressee-restricted subject. Given that the reflexives in GoalCs match traditional imperatives, and traditional imperatives are universally considered to have an addressee-restricted subject, the most reasonable explanation is that both constructions share the same subject. As I state in the introduction, I will use AddrP to provide this restriction. AddrP is a projection that contains an operator that binds the person value of the lower subject to be some subset of the addressee(s). The subject is IMPPRO, the unpronounced subject that is possible in imperatives. The semantics of the operator are listed below.

(203)



(204) OP$_{Addr}$: [λx : x = addressee(c).]

Additional data in support of a 2nd person addressee-restricted subject comes from tag questions. Tag questions are possible in both GoalCs and traditional imperatives. The material in English tags is standardly argued to obligatorily match the subject and auxiliary (Culicover 1992; Bruening 2016). The verb expressed in English imperative tags has a variety of possibilities, given that the modal seems to be syntactically underspecified (Bolinger 1967). The effect is identical for traditional imperatives (205a) and GoalCs (205b).

(205) a. Hand me that pen, could / will / won't you?

b. Hands off the table, could / will / won't you?

In GoalCs, the subject in the tag is always restricted to "you," and never matches the overtly expressed theme, 1st or 3rd person, or expletive subjects.

(206) a. Hands off the table, won't you?

b. *Hands off the table, won't they?

c. *Hands off the table, won't I/he/us?

d. *Hands off the table, isn't there/it?

This tag evidence strikes me as very convincing for both traditional imperatives and GoalCs that there is a covert addressee-restricted subject. The only overt argument, "hands," is ungrammatical as the tag, showing it cannot be the subject (206b). Other possibilities, such as existentials, are also ruled out. All the data therefore point to the underlying subject of GoalCs being the same one that is in traditional imperatives. This falls out if GoalCs possess a Addressee Phrase, which limits the syntactic subject to being restricted to the addressee(s).

GoalCs and traditional imperatives differ with respect to the overt expression of this addressee-restricted subject, however. Traditional imperatives optionally allow pronunciation of the second person subject "you" in imperatives with no prosodic break, but also allow its omission.

(207) a. Erase the board!

b. *You* erase the board!

Sadock and Zwicky (1985) point out that nearly every language allows the null subject imperative exemplified in (207a). Including the subject overtly, as in (207b), typically has the pragmatic effect of emphasizing the addressee in English, though the cross-linguistic effects differ substantially (Aikhenvald 2010), with many languages banning overt subjects in traditional imperatives altogether. If GoalCs were to pattern identically with traditional imperatives, we would expect the expression of the subject to be optional. In actuality, the overt expression of the second-person subject is ungrammatical.

(208) a. (*You) Feet on the floor!

b. (*You) Hands where I can see them!

We have already seen that it is possible to bind second-person reflexives and have tags with second-person subjects in GoalCs, but the overt inclusion of the second-person subject is ungrammatical. Cross-linguistically, it is not uncommon for languages to require omission of the subject in imperatives. More notable is the contrast in acceptability between traditional imperative subjects and GoalC subjects. Note also that these subjects could not plausibly be vocatives. Potsdam (2017) shows in great detail that the imperative subject is distinct from the vocative and that there are certain imperative subjects that cannot be vocatives. The following contrast indicates the difference between the imperative subject and a vocative for the non-referring subject "nobody."

(209) a. Nobody move!

b. #Nobody, you should move.

"Nobody" makes an acceptable imperative subject in English, because it is interpreted as "none of the addressees." Vocatives, on the other hand, are more restricted and must pick

out a specific individual or group of individuals. Vocatives in English require a prosodic break, whereas imperative subjects do not.[3]

Vocatives are possible in GoalCs with a prosodic break between the vocative phrase and the theme.

(210) a. *Bill*, feet on the floor!

b. *Blockhead*, hands off the table!

c. *You with the glasses*, out of my sight!

d. *Mr. President*, into the saferoom!

e. *You*, hands where I can see them!

Some of these vocatives (e.g., "Blockhead," "Mr. President") do not make acceptable imperative subjects.

(211) a. *Bill hand over that book!

b. *Blockhead get your hands off the table!

c. *Mr. President go into the saferoom!

What this means is that there is a dependency between pronouncing the verb and pronouncing the imperative subject. When the verb is omitted, so too must the subject be omitted. Vocatives are not subjects and are therefore simply governed by different rules. Before moving on, I would like to briefly address proper names in traditional imperatives. Proper names in traditional imperatives have an interesting distribution; they become significantly more acceptable when they are part of a contrastive list.

(212) Spence head into the pool room, Claudia turn off the lights, and Sree get the cake out of the oven!

[3] It is possible for languages to mark vocative case overtly, though English does not do so. The following example from Classical Latin demonstrates overt vocative case on *friend*.

(1) O amic-e, salve, atque aequalis.
oh friend-Voc hello and equal
'Greetings, my friend and equal!' (Plautus, Trinummus, Act 1, Sc. 2)

As noted by Mauck and Zanuttini (2005), (212) is grammatical only if each subject is overtly expressed as part of a contrastive list. Focus alone is not enough to license imperative subjects.

(213) *ANNA come!

To my knowledge, this property of imperatives requiring lists is not well understood. We will see throughout this chapter and the next that the property of requiring a contrastive list is not unique to English traditional imperatives, but is in fact a common property, albeit a mysterious one, in imperative constructions.

The impossibility of an overt subject in GoalCs is mysterious if GoalCs only involve deleting the verb. We have already shown that there is a large amount of evidence in favor of an addressee-restricted subject in GoalCs, the same one that is present in traditional imperatives. If we believe that GoalCs are fragments derived from full imperative sentences, and traditional imperatives allow their subjects to be overtly expressed, then we might expect GoalCs to be able to express their subjects as well. This might lead us to posit that GoalCs are not imperatives, despite appearing very similar to imperatives and sharing a number of properties.

On the other hand, if the GoalC subject is inexpressible for another reason, present in GoalCs but absent in traditional imperatives, then it can be maintained that GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives. This is exactly what I will argue in the next subsection. I will show that subjects are not unique in not being expressible in GoalCs. In fact, all material is banned from appearing to the left of the GoalC theme. Negation, adverbs, and determiners are all similarly restricted in this position. In this respect, the impossibility of subjects is therefore due to syntactic properties of GoalCs, and subjects are remarkable only in the sense that they are one instance in a class of unpronounceable left-edge material.

3.2.2 Living on the (Left) Edge

In this subsection, I will show that there are significant restrictions on what can be pronounced to the left of the GoalC theme. This fact leads me to conclude that the normal addressee-restricted imperative subject is present underlyingly in GoalCs, but cannot be pronounced because of a deletion process that is unique to GoalCs. The crucial takeaway

is that this deletion does not specifically target the subject but indiscriminately deletes all material to the left of the theme. I propose the following restriction as a starting point.

(214) GoalC Left-Edge Restriction:

No overt material can precede the head of the theme in a GoalC.

The GoalC Left-Edge Restriction is stated here as a simple description of the facts without necessarily arguing for or against any particular analysis. Eventually, I will argue for a PF deletion process that removes material to the left of the head of the theme that is conditioned by a feature associated with urgent command prosody and put-type verbs. The remainder of this subsection will be a systematic investigation of all material that could potentially appear to the left of the GoalC theme but does not.

3.2.2.1 Negation

English allows traditional imperatives to be directly negated through the addition of "do not," or the contracted form "don't." Negating an imperative does not change the verbal morphology in English, it remains a bare form in both the positive and negative.

(215) a. Catch the bouquet!

b. Don't catch the bouquet!

It is often claimed that many languages do not allow negative imperatives, in the sense that the imperative form that is used in a positive imperative is not possible in a negative imperative. Spanish is an example of such a language.

(216) a. ¡Habl-a!
speak-Imp
'Speak!'

b. ¡No habl-es!
no speak-2Sg.Subj
'Don't speak!'

c. *¡No habl-a!
no speak-Imp
Intended: 'Don't speak!' (Spanish)

Han (1998) categorizes languages like Spanish, which require subjunctive morphology in negative imperatives as lacking "true negative imperatives." It is common for languages to require a distinct form in negative imperatives, either by requiring alternative verbal morphology, or a suppletive form of negation (Han 1998; Aikhenvald 2010).

At a conceptual level, however, the negative form in (216b) is still an imperative in the paradigmatic sense. Han (1998) argues that there are syntactic reasons why a suppletive form is required because of the inability for negation to take scope over the imperative operator in these languages. Despite the common requirement for suppletion in many languages, there is always some way to negate a traditional imperative, either through changing the verbal morphology to a subjunctive or an infinitive or by changing the form of negation. As far as I am aware, languages that lack any option for negating traditional imperatives in the paradigmatic sense are completely unattested.

Despite the fact that "don't" serves as a negative marker in traditional imperatives, there is no way to directly negate a GoalC. Every negative word fails when applied to a GoalC like in (217a) below.[4]

(217) a. Hands off the table!

b. **Don't* hands off the table!

c. **Not* hands off the table!

d. **Do not* hands off the table!

e. **Never* hands off the table!

[4] Magdalena Kaufmann, p.c., provides the following contrast for German GoalCs, in which the word for never "nie" can appear in a German GoalC, but the regular negation cannot.

(1) a. Hände nie vom Tisch.
hands never from.the table
'Hands never off the table!'

b. Hände nicht vom Tisch.
hands not from.the table
'Hands not off the table!'

It is not clear to me how to analyze this asymmetry, but it does not appear that it could plausibly be edge deletion, given that "hands" precedes the negative word in both instances.

f. *No* hands off the table!

(217f) may, at first, appear to be a counterexample to the generalization that GoalCs cannot host negative markers on the left. However, as discussed at length in Chapter 2, (217f) is actually a general prohibitive. For example, (217f) can be felicitously uttered to someone whose responsibility it is to make sure no one's hands ever leave the table. Imagine a scenario where person A is a supervisor who makes the rules, and person B is in charge of monitoring person C, who is not allowed to remove their hands from the table. In such an instance, such a discourse is possible.

(218) (A to B): Hey, no hands off the table!

This is because general prohibitives are capable of being uttered in instances of *indirect obligation*, which shows that their interpreted subjects do not have to include the addressee. The counterpart GoalC can never be used in the same circumstance, however.

(219) (A to B): #Hey, hands on the table!

I take the difference in available forces to indicate that "no" is not compatible with GoalCs, but by coincidence appears to be. If this is the case, this means that no negative marker is truly compatible with GoalCs in English. It is hard to see why negation is incompatible with the GoalC in (217a). It seems very unlikely that semantic incompatibility is the culprit. To the extent that (217a) adds an obligation to the addressee to make sure that their hands are off the table, we can easily imagine the reverse of this obligation being relevant. In fact, it is possible to reverse the preposition, without using negation, to get this meaning.

(220) Hands on the table!

(220) is felicitous in at least two situations. The first is that the addressee's hands are not on the table, and (220) works as an entreaty towards the addressee for them to put their hands on the table. The second is that the addressee's hands are already on the table, and (220) works as a reminder towards the addressee to *keep* their hands on the table. As far as I can tell, this second meaning is equivalent semantically to negating (217a). Although this

meaning is semantically available through a different preposition, an actual negative marker is ungrammatical if applied to (217a). So it seems highly unlikely that negation is somehow semantically incompatible. If we restate the GoalC in (217a) as a traditional imperative with "get," the result is perfectly compatible with negation (221b).

(221) a. Get your hands off the table!

b. Don't get your hands off the table!

The question is then the following: Why is (221a) compatible with negation in the predictable way, whereas (217a) is not? The answer that I will pursue here is that traditional imperatives do not involve any edge deletion, and have an available position for negation, so negation is acceptable. GoalCs delete on their left edge, and all possible positions for negation lie in the path of this deletion, meaning negation cannot be pronounced in GoalCs. If the only available positions for negation would be to the left of the theme, then negation cannot be expressed due to the restriction. It is common to argue that the markers of sentential negation are functional heads that project to NegP (Pollock 1989; Zanuttini 1997). Given that the posited position of NegP in English is standardly posited to be between TP/IP and vP, this position would be impossible to pronounce in a GoalC. There is of course no such left-edge restriction in traditional imperatives, explaining the grammaticality of (221b). Intermediate and clause-final positions are also impossible for negation, presumably due to a restriction on the possible locations for NegP.

(222) a. *Hands don't off the table!

b. *Hands off the table don't!

c. ??Hands not off the table!

Potsdam (2017) argues that "do" in imperatives is an inflectional head that moves to C^0 in imperatives, deriving a word order in which "Do(n't)" precedes an overt subject. The following demonstrates that the auxiliary precedes the overt subject (Potsdam 2017 pg.258 eg. 3c, 4d).

(223) a. Do someone give him the money before he uses that gun!

b. Don't you mention it further!

Because the positions for the subject and negation obligatorily precede the theme in the underlying structure, and those positions are deleted, then it follows that these items cannot be overtly expressed.

Negation is marginally acceptable in (222c), but this is clearly an instance of constituent negation of the PP rather than a negation of the GoalC itself, given that "not" is the form used for constituent negation in English (Huddleston and Pullum 2002). This position is completely ungrammatical with "don't" (222a), which is used for negation in imperatives.

3.2.2.2 Adverbs

The position of adverbs is relatively unrestricted in traditional imperatives. Positions are available at the beginning and end of the sentences, and also between the theme and goal.[5]

(224) a. *Immediately* put your feet on the floor!

b. Put your feet *immediately* on the floor!

c. Put your feet on the floor *immediately*!

By default assumption, we would expect all of these positions to be available for adverbs in GoalCs as well. The position of adverbs is significantly more restricted in GoalCs, however, in the same way that subjects and negation are restricted. Adverbs are acceptable at the end of the sentence, and between the theme and goal, but they cannot appear utterance-initially (225a).

(225) a. **Immediately* feet on the floor!

b. Feet *immediately* on the floor!

c. Feet on the floor *immediately*!

The contrast in acceptability between the left edge and right edge is striking. Recall that this data was used to argue against a movement analysis of GoalCs. The same contrast

[5] Of course, not all adverbs have an identical syntactic distribution. I will stick to the adverbs "immediately" and "quickly" here. For more on adverb positions, see Cinque (1999) and Payne (2018).

can be seen with "quickly." A traditional imperative with the verb overtly pronounced can have an adverb at the beginning of the clause (226a), but a GoalC cannot (227a).

(226) a. *Quickly* put your feet on the floor!

b. Put your feet *quickly* on the floor!

c. Put your feet on the floor *quickly*!

(227) a. **Quickly* feet on the floor!

b. Books *quickly* feet on the floor!

c. Feet on the floor *quickly*!

Given the left-edge restriction in (214), we expect any overt material to the left of the theme within the clause to be ungrammatical, and adverbs are no exception. Similar to vocatives, adverbs are allowed with a heavy prosodic break before the theme, indicating they are part of a separate clause and therefore a separate prosodic phrase.

(228) a. Quickly, books off the shelf!

b. Immediately, into my car!

It is unclear whether or not this "heavy prosodic break" is really a prosodic break between prosodic constituents within the same clause or different clauses. I could have very easily written the punctuation for (228a) as "Quickly! Books off the shelf!" for example, in which case the prosodic break is unsurprising across multiple sentences. Nevertheless, I will utilize the comma notation throughout to indicate items that are separated by a prosodic break.

It is difficult to see any reason why adverbs like *immediately* and *quickly* would be unable to precede the theme of a GoalC if such a position were made generally available for adverbs. Adverbs are grammatical with GoalCs in certain positions, showing that it is not the case that GoalCs are semantically incompatible with adverbs for some reason. If GoalCs are deleting material on their left edge, then the asymmetry between traditional imperatives and GoalCs falls out.

3.2.2.3 Determiners

Imperative subjects, negation, and adverbs are all external to the NP theme. Determiners, however, surface inside the NP.[6] The Left-Edge Restriction in (214) is stated in terms of the "head" of the theme. As we will see, some material can be marginally acceptable to the left of the head of the theme within the NP. This section surveys the acceptability of a variety of determiners, and will show that determiners do not all pattern alike, with some being more acceptable than others.

Starting with articles, both indefinite and definite articles are completely ungrammatical in GoalCs in all circumstances.

(229) a. Books off the shelf!

b. *The books off the shelf!

c. *A book off the shelf!

d. *The book off the shelf!

Articles are acting exactly like subjects, negation, and adverbs - they are unacceptable to the left of the GoalC theme. There are no restrictions on articles in traditional imperatives - all combinations of articles, including no article, are possible in traditional imperatives with both singular and plural NPs.[7]

(230) a. Take books off the shelf!

b. Take the books off the shelf!

c. Take a book off the shelf!

d. Take the book off the shelf!

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[6] Keeping with the convention used in this dissertation to this point, I will use "NP" as a neutral term without making any claims about the theoretical categories of NP and DP.

[7] There is, of course, a restriction in English against bare singulars in object positions, a restriction that is presumably orthogonal to our concerns here, not being related to imperatives *per se*.

(1) *Take book off the shelf!

Looking only at articles, they look identical to imperative subjects, negation, and adverbs - they are all possible to the left of the theme argument in traditional imperatives but never in GoalCs. Other material can surface in this position, however. Demonstratives are significantly more acceptable than articles in GoalCs, though not totally acceptable.

(231) a. ??Those books off the shelf!

b. ??These packages into my trunk!

Informants are relatively variable when giving judgments about sentences like those in (231), but all informants agreed that they are more acceptable than the articles in (229). Demonstratives also improve even further if they are contrastively focused. Imagine that, for the following contrastive focus scenario, the addressee began moving books other than those that were originally intended by the speaker.

(232) A: Books off the shelf!
B: (Begins task)
A: No, *those* books off the shelf!

A's response with a demonstrative is nearly perfect in (232). This leads to a preliminary generalization; contrastive focus can improve the acceptability of some determiners in GoalCs. Possessive pronouns show the same distribution, highly unacceptable without contrastive focus but improving significantly with contrastive focus.

(233) a. ???Your books off the shelf!

b. ???Your hands where I can see them!

c. A: Books off the shelf!
B: (Begins task)
A: No, *your* books off the shelf!

Both demonstratives and possessive pronouns are marginal out of the blue but improve significantly when they are contrastively focused. Articles typically require a linguistic antecedent in order to be focused.[8]

[8] Thanks to Benjamin Bruening, p.c., for pointing this out.

(234) A: Which maestro?

B: *The* maestro.

(235) A: Did you buy the book?

B: I bought *a* book.

GoalCs are typically uttered out of the blue, not requiring a direct linguistic antecedent. Attempts to contrastively focus articles in contexts like those that worked for demonstratives and possessive pronouns are difficult to even interpret.

(236) a. A: Books off the shelf!

B: (Begins task)

A: #No, *the* books off the shelf!

Articles are simply impossible in the construction. Pronouns act similarly to demonstratives, marginal without contrastive focus, significantly improved with contrastive focus.

(237) a. ???Him into my car!

b. ?Him into my car, her across the river!

c. *Us beneath the tables!

d. ??Us beneath the tables, and them into the closet!

It is important at this juncture to reanalyze the material previously shown to be unacceptable to the left of the GoalC theme. Imperative subjects, negation, and adverbs have all been shown to be unacceptable to the left of the GoalC theme. Do they also improve under conditions of contrastive focus? The answer appears to be a resounding no, none of these can surface even in situations of contrastive focus. Imagine for the following scenario that there are three individuals, A, B, and C. A commands C to take the books off the shelf, but B mistakenly interprets the command for herself.

(238) A: Books off the shelf!

B: (Begins task)

A: (pointing at C) *No, *you* books off the shelf!

The imperative subject "you" cannot surface in a GoalC even under situations of contrastive focus. "You" is perfectly grammatical in an analogous traditional imperative construction with contrastive focus.

(239) A: Hand me that pen!
B: (reaches for pen)
A: (pointing at C) No, *you* hand me that pen!

Taking stock of what we have learned, contrastive focus improves demonstratives in GoalCs but never subjects, despite the fact that contrastive focus can improve subjects in traditional imperatives. The same is true of negation and adverbs, they cannot be improved in GoalCs under conditions of contrastive focus.

(240) a. A: Books off the shelf!
B: (puts books <u>on</u> the shelf)
A: *No, *don't / not / no* books on the shelf!

b. A: Books off the shelf!
B: (takes books off, but slowly)
A: *No, *quickly* books off the shelf!

The generalization is therefore the following: contrastive focus improves demonstratives and possessive pronouns within GoalCs but never subjects, negation, adverbs, or articles.

Before moving on, it is worth noting that there cannot simply be a telegraphic constraint on GoalCs that accounts for the determiner data on the left edge. If GoalCs were deleting their determiners by virtue of some constraint associated with telegraphic speech, we would not expect to find determiners inside the PP of GoalCs. Instead, determiners are subject to their ordinary distribution within the PP, meaning they can modify the noun they are associated with, with the normal meaning.

(241) Books on *(the) shelf!

Genuine instances of telegraphic speech are capable of deleting determiners regardless of their position within the clause.

(242) a. Giant Warehouse Fire Ravages City Street
(Evening Chronicle, Newcastle, August 17, 1959)

b. Headless Body in Topless Bar (New York Post, April 15, 1983)

c. Men Walk on Moon (New York Times, July 21, 1969)

GoalCs do not delete their determiners due to being an instance of telegraphic speech. Telegraphic speech deletes determiners indiscriminately, not the pattern seen in GoalCs. A left-edge deletion process explains the facts, whereas positing that GoalCs are telegraphic cannot explain the distribution.

3.2.2.4 Adjectives, Numerals, and Quantifiers

This section will discuss the acceptability of material inside the NP that is not a determiner. The data will show that adjectives, numerals, and quantifiers are marginally acceptable, supporting the generalization that NP-internal material is more acceptable than NP-external material when it is to the left of the GoalC theme. We will see, however, that not all quantifiers are created equally in terms of their acceptability in GoalCs.

First off, underived adjectives are marginally acceptable. Below in (243), the adjectives "red" and "heavy" produce somewhat degraded acceptability relative to the adjectiveless counterparts.

(243) a. ?Red books on the shelf!

b. ??Heavy coins into this pouch!

GoalCs with adjectives like those in (243) are somewhat odd if uttered with no surrounding context. However, several informants mentioned unprovoked that GoalCs with adjectives evoke a context where multiple commands are being given. In a list environment, adjectives improve significantly.

(244) Blue books in the front, red books on the shelf, green books in the storeroom.

This is highly reminiscent of the improvement that occurred with contrasted demonstratives and traditional imperative 3rd person subjects. Although the reason for this improvement is mysterious, it is clear that there is a relationship between contrasting elements

in the left periphery of the NP and acceptability in GoalCs, and that this interaction is not somehow unique to demonstratives and possessive pronouns. Derived adjectives also seem to improve under list scenarios in the same way.

(245) a. Shorter children to the front, taller children in the back!

b. Breakable objects on the bottom shelf, durable objects on the top shelf.

This preference for a list reading is somewhat unusual. A list scenario is not required by adjectives in traditional imperatives in the same way. Certain adjectives in traditional imperatives seem to act identically to how they act in declaratives and interrogatives, they suggest that there are reasonable alternatives in the context. An utterance like (246) becomes quite odd if uttered in a context where all of the books are red.

(246) Put the red books onto the shelf!
→ There are other salient books.

Not all adjectives have this effect in traditional imperatives, however. Some adjectives simply state the speaker's attitude about the theme, without implicating alternatives.

(247) Put these very interesting books onto the shelf!
→ Can refer to all books.

Somewhat surprisingly, this reading goes away if used in a GoalC. GoalCs involve obligatory contrast, despite the potential for an adjective to be contrastive in a traditional imperative.

(248) a. Red books on the shelf! → There are other salient books in the context.

b. Interesting books onto the shelf! → There are other salient books in the context.

Although I do not have any definitive answers as to why a list reading improves traditional imperative subjects, adjectives, and demonstratives, they share a few properties in common. Each is an instance of *potentially* deletable material. In the case of traditional imperatives, it is possible to omit the subject. In GoalCs, it is possible to omit material like determiners and adjectives. Being part of a contrastive list allows this potentially deletable

material to surface. Because GoalCs obligatorily involve contrast, material on the left edge that is potentially deletable must be contrastive in order to surface.

It is worth considering whether or not the restriction on adjectives appearing is prosodic in nature. There seems to be a slight contrast between the monosyllabic adjective "red" in (243a) and the multi-syllabic adjective "heavy" in (243b). However, it seems just as possible to stack multiple adjectives as it is to have one, while having COMMAND prosody on the entire utterance. Multiple adjectives seem to evoke the identical list scenario as single adjectives.

(249) Expensive antique vases in the storeroom, cheap antique vases out front!

I take the possibility of stacking multiple adjectives to indicate that there is not some prosodic requirement on adjectives (e.g., adjectives must be monosyllabic). Adjectives appear to be acceptable in GoalCs to the extent that they are part of a contrastive list and not based on anything prosodic.

Numerals appear even further to the left than adjectives, obligatorily preceding adjectives in English. Numerals appear to be roughly as acceptable as adjectives.

(250) a. ??Two packages into the mailbox!

b. ??Ten kids onto the bus!

Combining numerals with adjectives and/or determiners does not improve the acceptability, numerals are equally degraded regardless of the other material.

(251) a. ??Two red packages into the mailbox!

b. ??Ten little coins into this pouch!

c. ??Those seven figurines onto the display floor!

d. ??These twelve eggs into the pot!

Analogous to determiners and adjectives, contrast improves the acceptability of numerals. This adds to our generalization: contrast improves material inside the NP to the left of theme (but not outside the NP).

(252) a. ?Two packages into the mailbox, and three onto the porch!

b. ?Ten kids onto the bus, and two adults into the cabin!

Quantifiers exhibit significantly more unpredictable behavior. The quantifiers "all," "every," "more," and "fewer" are relatively acceptable to the left of the head noun in GoalCs, whereas "no," "some," "many" and "a few" are completely unacceptable.[9]

(253) a. All books onto the shelf!

b. Every book onto the shelf!

c. More books onto the shelf!

d. ?Less/Fewer books onto the shelf!

e. *No books onto the shelf!

f. *Some books onto the shelf!

g. *Many books onto the shelf!

h. *A few books onto the shelf!

The explanation for the contrast between different quantifiers remains somewhat unclear to this point, but the crucial observation relevant to GoalCs is that there is marginal availability for material to the left of the theme within the NP.

There is an important effect that must be highlighted, however. It is not enough to say that certain material to the left of the theme is deleted. The correct generalization is that all material to the left of a certain point within the NP is deleted. Any material to the right of that will not be part of the deletion process. The contrast in the acceptability of an article is shown below.

(254) a. *The students into the auditorium!

b. All the students into the auditorium!

An article is ungrammatical as the leftmost pronounced material in (254a). However, it is perfectly acceptable if a quantifier is pronounced to its left in (254b). If the analysis of

[9] There is, of course, a prescriptive rule that necessitates the use of "fewer" in positions like this. For many English speakers, including myself, "fewer" is essentially never used in such positions. Other speakers use "less" with mass nouns and "fewer" with count nouns.

GoalCs is that articles to the left of the theme are deleted obligatorily, we cannot capture this surprising fact. Instead, it seems that GoalCs will permit determiners if there is another lexical item to their left. This also explains the grammaticality of articles within the PP, deletion can never proceed that far rightward.

The interim conclusion is therefore that material to the left of the NP can never be overtly pronounced in a GoalCs, though there is syntactic evidence of its presence. Material to the left of the head noun within the NP is marginally acceptable and can improve significantly if it is part of a contrastive list.

The next section discusses vocatives, which constitute a putative counterexample, given that they can precede the theme, albeit with a prosodic break.

3.2.2.5 Vocatives

We have already seen that vocatives are distinct from imperative subjects, following Potsdam (2017), both for traditional imperatives and GoalCs. Nevertheless, vocatives constitute a counterexample to the left-edge restriction on GoalCs in (214) as stated. In terms of linear order, we have already seen that vocatives can precede the GoalC theme, coming at the beginning of the sentence.

(255) a. *Bill*, feet on the floor!

b. *Blockhead*, hands off the table!

c. *You with the glasses*, out of my sight!

d. *Mr. President*, into the saferoom!

e. *You*, hands where I can see them!

Vocatives are not limited to appearing at the beginning of the sentence. One of the defining characteristics of vocatives is that they are relatively flexible in terms of their surface position. In GoalCs, they are perfect at the end of the sentence, and marginal sentence medially.

(256) a. Feet on the floor, Bill!

b. ??Feet, Bill, on the floor!

The only strict requirement seems to be that they are separated from the rest of the sentence by a prosodic break. None of the above is acceptable without a prosodic break separating the vocative phrase, regardless of its position.

(257) a. **Bill* feet on the floor!

b. **Blockhead* hands off the table!

c. **You with the glasses* out of my sight!

d. **Mr. President* into the saferoom!

e. **You* hands where I can see them!

f. *Feet on the floor *Bill*!

g. *Feet *Bill* on the floor!

Do vocatives pose a true counterexample to the restriction set out in (214) then? Rather than argue that vocatives constitute a genuine counterexample to the restriction in (214), I will treat vocatives as being outside the domain of ellipsis in GoalCs. If vocatives are not incorporated into the clause at all, then they simply are not in the domain of material that can be elided, much like parentheticals. This is true for sentence-initial and sentence-final vocatives, but also for sentence-medial vocatives. I therefore restate the Left-Edge Restriction as the following.

(258) GoalC Left-Edge Restriction: (Updated)

No overt material can precede the theme in a GoalC within the same clause.

In doing this, I avoid committing to a specific analysis of the position of vocatives, but just claim that they are not incorporated into the main clause. Given that vocatives appear outside the GoalC clause, and necessitate a distinct prosodic phrase inside which they must appear, they do not form a genuine counterexample to our original hypothesis from (258).

To take stock of where we are, we have seen that subjects, negation, and adverbs are universally, and without exception, ungrammatical in GoalCs when preceding the GoalC theme. Material like demonstratives, adjectives, numerals, and quantifiers are marginally acceptable, and improve significantly when contrasted against something else. Vocatives

are part of a separate clause, and therefore do not count as a counterexample. In the next subsection, I will provide examples as to what counts as a valid goal in a GoalC.

3.2.3 Goals

We have already established quite a substantial bit of material that is restricted in appearing to the left of the GoalC theme. Another restriction on GoalCs is that they must possess a *goal*. This section will serve to establish what counts as a valid goal, and what the syntactic distribution of goals is. The types of phrases that will be investigated herein are prepositional phrases, relative clauses headed by "where," and adverbs.

3.2.3.1 Prepositional Phrases

Prepositional phrases can provide a valid goal for GoalCs. We have already seen numerous examples of "into" and "onto" in GoalCs. The following is a non-exhaustive list of prepositions that can serve as goals.

(259) a. Books *above* the shelf!

b. Boats *across* the river!

c. Spikes *around* the barrier!

d. Faces *below* / *beneath* the surface!

e. Hands *between* the cushions!

f. Drinks *in* / *into* / *inside* the fridge!

g. Figurines *off* the shelf!

h. Masks *on* / *onto* the cart!

i. Tables *out of* the basement!

j. Chocolates *to* me!

k. Feet *under* / *underneath* the ice!

l. Everyone *up* the mountain!

Each of these prepositions designates a literal location in the world as part of its lexical meaning. Locations are able to be interpreted as goals, which means that every example in

(259) is compatible with a goal interpretation. There are of course some prepositions that are ambiguous between a goal interpretation and static interpretation, such as "in," but the static interpretation is not available. The most salient interpretation of a GoalC like in (260) below is that it is an entreaty to change the location of the drinks to being in the fridge.

(260) Drinks in the fridge!

→ Drinks are not already in the fridge. ≠ Drinks are already in the fridge.

GoalCs tend to implicate as their default that the content of the GoalC is not true at the time of utterance. In other words, (260) is most typically uttered in a situation where the speaker desires the drinks to be in the fridge (by the hand of the addressee). This situation is most naturally compatible with the drinks not being in the fridge. An analogous effect is seen in traditional imperatives.

(261) Grab the paper!

→ Presupposes that the addressee has not already grabbed the paper.

However, if an alternate action by the addressee becomes salient in the context, then a GoalC like (260) becomes acceptable on the meaning of "keep." Imagine a scenario in which the drinks are already in the fridge, and the addressee is taking them out, against the wishes of the speaker. In such a scenario, an utterance of (260) is perfectly felicitous. This is because an alternative action, taking the drinks out of the fridge, has become contextually salient. Thus, even on this interpretation, it is still a goal.

German offers additional evidence that these are true goals. German disambiguates the difference between static locations and goals through case. Dative case is used for static locations, and accusative case is used for goals. The translation of (260) into German requires accusative case, even in the instance where the drinks are already in the fridge.

(262) a. *Getränke im Kühlschrank!
drinks in.the.Dat fridge
Intended 'Drinks in(to) the fridge!'

b. Getränke (zurück) in den Kühlschrank!
drinks back in the.Acc fridge
'Drinks in(to) the fridge!'

I take this as strong evidence that we do not need to weaken our concept of "goal" to account for the "keep" cases in English.

Prepositions that cannot be interpreted as goal-oriented locations do not make valid goals for GoalCs. Below is a non-exhaustive list of prepositions that cannot appear in GoalCs.[10]

(263) a. #Books *about* Rome!

b. #Students *from* Delaware!

c. #Tables *of* mahogany!

d. #Chocolates *with* wrappers!

e. #Soldiers *in* Rome!

This list of unacceptable prepositions is split into two categories. One type of unacceptable preposition is the non-location category, exemplified by "about." Because these prepositions never designate a location, they are always unacceptable in GoalCs. The other category of unacceptable prepositions is prepositions that denote locations but are not interpreted as goals. For example, "from" can only denote a source, not a goal. That is, an utterance of (263e) may be acceptable as a command to make the soldiers go into Rome, but can never be used to describe soldiers that are already in Rome. Because some prepositions are more compatible with goal interpretation than others, some prepositions are more acceptable in GoalCs.

3.2.3.2 Where-CPs

Although I suspect that prepositional phrases provide the goal for a significant majority of real-world GoalCs, GoalCs do not obligatorily include PPs, but rather the more abstract concept of a *goal*. Another category of phrase that can fulfill this requirement is CPs that are headed by the relative *where*. Other relative pronouns are ungrammatical.

[10] The examples in (263) are acceptable as exclamations, but never as GoalCs. For example, the following is acceptable as an exclamation:

(1) (enters room) A: Oh my gosh, books about Rome!

(264) a. Hands *where* I can see them!

b. *Students *who* left their backpacks behind!

c. *Figures *which* were made in the 18th century!

d. *Drinks *that* were made in Germany!

It is honestly difficult to even assign a possible interpretation to the ungrammatical GoalCs in (264)b-d. Because "who," "which," and "that" are not compatible with a location interpretation, they cannot be interpreted as goal-oriented, meaning they cannot act as a valid goal. "Where," on the other hand, being locative, is obligatorily interpreted as a goal.

3.2.3.3 Locative Adverbs

The final category that can serve as a valid goal for GoalCs is adverbials. The locative adverbs *here* and *there* can serve as valid goals. Other adverbials may be slightly more marked, but still marginally acceptable.

(265) a. Figures over *there*!

b. Signature *here*!

c. ?Children *indoors*!

d. ?Coffee *upstairs*!

Several prepositions can also act as adverbials and not take an NP argument, but appear as a bare particle, and these particles can also serve as valid goals. Although it is possible to analyze these as prepositional phrases with no NP where only the head is expressed, I merely note their acceptability here without offering an analysis.

(266) a. Heads *up*!

b. Everybody *out*!

c. Hands *down*!

In sum, PPs, CPs, and adverbs can all serve as valid goals for GoalCs, if they are sufficiently *goal-oriented*. For PPs and adverbs, this means being locative, and for CPs, this means being headed by "where."

3.2.3.4 Word Order of Goal and Theme

GoalCs consist overtly of a theme and a goal. The word order of these constituents is strict, the theme must precede the goal. The goal-theme order is ungrammatical in English GoalCs.

(267) a. Books onto the shelf!

b. *Onto the shelf (the) books!

This is particularly striking, given that English quite readily allows fronting of PPs, even with put-type verbs.

(268) On the shelf he put some books.

This PP-fronting operation is not available in imperatives, for some reason.

(269) *On the shelf put some books!

There is another construction in which the goal-theme order that is unacceptable in (267b) is acceptable, however. I have already mentioned commands like "Off with her head!" (267b) is perfectly acceptable if the second constituent is changed to a prepositional phrase headed by "with."

(270) Onto the shelf with the books!

This begs the question: Is (270) a GoalC, or somehow transformed from one? I do not have a clear answer to this question, but the answer seems likely to be that the constructions are distinct, but similar. The syntactic binding properties of a construction like (270) do not match the established binding properties of GoalCs. GoalCs are Addressee-Restricted, meaning they cannot host 2nd person non-reflexive pronouns, and must host 2nd person reflexive pronouns.

(271) a. Hands off yourselves!

b. *Hands off you!

Commands like (270) are not subject to the same binding requirements. Both 3rd person and 2nd person reflexive pronouns are unacceptable in the "with PP." [11]

(272) a. Into the car with them!

b. *Into the car with themselves!

c. Away with you!

d. *Away with yourself!

e. Begone with you!

f. *Begone with yourself!

Many conventionalized commands of this form do not have grammatical GoalC counterparts.

(273) a. *You away!

b. *You begone!

c. *Them/They away!

d. *Them/They begone!

Because of this, I will not treat commands like (270) as GoalCs, although they do share a number of properties, and may be used in actual speech where a GoalC would be ungrammatical. Based on this classification, only the theme-goal word order is grammatical in English GoalCs and goal-theme is not acceptable.

3.2.4 GoalC Semantics / Pragmatics

Imperatives are often considered to have COMMAND as their core meaning, and indeed the name of imperative clause type is often derived language-to-language from the word that means "command" in that language (Von Fintel and Iatridou 2017). Kaufmann (2012) argues that the functionally underspecified meaning of imperatives is most easily amenable to a COMMAND context, and that other Speech Acts require additional assumptions about

[11] The part of speech of "begone" is not entirely clear to me, but given that it is a fixed, invariant form, I will treat as not being an actual verb in the syntax.

the context. Below is the sketch made by Kaufmann of a simple Clause-Type System where each clause type is associated with its prototypical use.[12]

(274) Clause-Type System for Prototypical Uses (from Kaufmann 2012)

a. **declarative** := <declarative, ASSERT>

b. **interrogative** := <interrogative, QUESTION>

c. **imperative** := <imperative, COMMAND>

The basic idea behind the notion of such a clause-type system is that there exists a function that maps declarative morphosyntax to the speech-act function ASSERT, interrogative morphosyntax to the speech-act function QUESTION, and imperative morphosyntax to the speech-act function COMMAND. Each clause type is compatible with a variety of uses beyond what is listed in (274), but each is also associated with some "core" meaning. Some of the additional uses of imperative clauses can be seen below in (275).

(275) a. Please don't rain tomorrow! (Wish)

b. Take a cookie if you want. (Permission)

c. Keep your hands to yourself. (Advice)

Since Davies (1986), English imperatives have been well-known to be compatible with at least COMMAND, WISH, ADVICE, and PERMISSION uses. A great deal of work, therefore, lays ahead of any linguist who wishes to explain how imperatives can have COMMAND as their default use, but still participate in this range of uses with relative stability across languages. Such work has been undertaken in significant detail by (Kaufmann 2012; Oikonomou 2016; Von Fintel and Iatridou 2017; Portner 2007, among many others).

In some sense, the great interest concerning the range of uses available to traditional imperatives is only peripherally relevant to the case of GoalCs. This is because, unlike traditional imperatives, GoalCs can only be used as COMMANDS, and are infelicitous when used as wishes, permission, or advice.

(276) a. Books off the shelf! (Command)

[12] Kaufmann uses the term ORDER which I use interchangeably here with COMMAND.

b. Figurines in the mailbox! (#Wish)

c. #Books off the shelf, if you like. (Permission)

d. A: How do I avoid a lawsuit?
   B: Hands to yourself. (#Advice)

Given that they do not participate in the full range of uses available to traditional imperatives, it may be tempting to argue that they are not derived from traditional imperatives, but rather declaratives that converge on imperative-like meaning through other means. There are certain performative declaratives for example, that also obligate the addressee in a way not unlike what command imperatives achieve.

(277) You must serve 30 days in jail.

Under normal circumstances, if (277) is uttered by an individual with the proper authority, then the addressee is obliged to fulfill the content of the utterance, despite the fact that (277) is morphosyntactically a declarative and not an imperative. Despite the possibility of declaratives providing a performative update analogous to the one seen in imperatives, I do not think it is wise to analyze GoalCs as being underlyingly declarative. One important property of GoalCs that we have already seen is that their syntactic subject seems to be restricted to the addressee. Although the subject of GoalCs can never be overtly pronounced for independent reasons, binding conditions show that the subject is always 2nd person and never anything else.

(278) a. Hands off yourselves! / *myself / *themselves!

b. Hands off *you / me / them / us!

Having an addressee-restricted subject is a hallmark feature of imperative clauses, and is never true of declaratives or interrogatives.[13] GoalCs are also performative in the same way as traditional imperatives. Both cannot be felicitously followed by challenges to their truth or falsity. Replies that directly question the speaker's authority, on the other hand, are acceptable.

[13] Not all clauses that have been argued to be imperatives are addressee-restricted (see Aikhenvald 2010 for a full typology). Clauses that are addressee-restricted, however, are universally considered imperatives as far as I am aware.

(279) a. A: Get out of my room!

B: #That's (not) true! / You can't tell me what to do!

b. A: Books off the shelf!

B: #That's (not) true! / You can't tell me what to do!

What this shows is that GoalCs have identical illocutionary forces and conditions of use as command imperatives. Both cannot be judged true or false under normal circumstances. Performative declaratives, can be judged as true or false, even in situations where the original speaker clearly has authority over the addressee (i.e., they are a judge).

(280) A: You must serve 30 days in jail.

B: ?That's not true, you'll never imprison me!

Kaufmann (2012) analyzes the asymmetry in performativity between declaratives and imperatives to be the result of performative presuppositions that obligatorily accompany imperatives but not declaratives, and this accounts for the GoalC data as well. GoalCs also appear to act identically to traditional imperatives in regards to embedding possibilities. Both GoalCs and command imperatives resist embedding in English, except under the verb "say," which acts peculiarly and possibly uniquely with regard to embedding imperatives (Crnič and Trinh 2009).

(281) a. *Nick requested that stop!

b. *Nick requested that books off the shelf!

c. Nick said stop!

d. Nick said books off the shelf!

These similarities lead me to the conclusion that the best treatment of GoalCs is as constituting the same performative object as command imperatives. Indeed, the real-world obligation on the addressee seems to be identical following both a successful utterance of a command imperative or a GoalC. Compare the obligation on the addressee following an utterance of the traditional imperative in (282a) and the GoalC in (282b) below.

(282) a. Get those books off the shelf, now!

b. Books off the shelf, now!

After a successful utterance of either (282a) or (282b), the addressee is obligated to make the books be off the shelf, so long as the context is appropriate (speaker has authority to command the addressee, etc.). This suggests that, given the morphosyntactic similarities between GoalCs and traditional imperatives, the same element(s) should provide force to both. The question that then remains is why GoalCs have a limited range of uses compared to traditional imperatives, given that both received their semantic/pragmatic force from the same element. I will address this in Section 3.4, where I will argue that there is a prosodic feature associated with the deletion in GoalCs that forces a COMMAND interpretation. In the next subsection, I will address various theories of fragments and investigate which is most applicable to GoalCs.

3.3 Fragments

Typically in generative linguistics, utterances are argued to contain a projection or layer of projections in the periphery associated with sentence force (Rizzi 1997). Although there is debate as to what projections are necessary in the periphery, it is typically considered or assumed impossible to receive this force without the appropriate corresponding structure. Indeed, Lemke (2021) points out that, if sentence mood is located in the left periphery, then it is surprising that fragments can be used to perform speech acts identical to full sentences. Nevertheless, speakers do produce fragments with communicative functions that appear identical to full sentences. The following example, from Lemke (2021), shows a fragment/sentence pair that illustrates this effect.

(283) a. [Friends sharing a pizza] Another slice?

b. Would you like another slice?

Both a full sentence and a fragment can be used for questioning. Because of this, it is common to analyze fragments as being underlyingly derived from full sentences (Morgan 1973; Merchant 2005; Reich 2007, among many others). If we define fragments as subsentential utterances that receive the same force as full sentences, then GoalCs appear to make

good candidates. They clearly qualify as fragments and they are used as COMMANDS, which can be used in full sentences as well.

Nevertheless, several accounts pursue an account of fragments in which there is no additional structure. Such efforts have been undertaken in generative grammar occasionally (Yanofsky 1978; Barton and Progovac 2005; Barton 2006). Arguing that fragments lack additional structure requires stipulations about how the syntax can produce sub-sentential outputs, as well as articulating how exactly sub-sentential utterances receive the appropriate sentential force. In a recent book, Lemke (2021) refers to such approaches as *non-sentential* approaches to fragments. If we applied a non-sentential approach to GoalCs, it would essentially amount to arguing that the only structure present in the GoalC was the theme and the goal.

There are several reasons a non-sentential analysis may be appropriate for a particular fragment. For example, verbless pronominal short answers in English are only acceptable in the accusative (284b), whereas the presence of the verb requires nominative (284c).

(284) Who wants pizza?

a. *I/*We/*He*/*She!

b. Me/Us/Him/Her!

c. I/We/He/She do(es)!

d. *Me/*Us/*Him/*Her do(es)!

When T^0 is inactive, the pronoun can only receive accusative case, regardless of whether it is interpreted as a subject or object. Barton and Progovac (2005) argue that the pattern seen in (284) falls out from the fact that accusative is the default case in English. Though default case is not an uncontroversial notion, it is often argued to exist and vary across languages (Marantz 1992; Schütze 2001). When the auxiliary verb is absent, as in (284b), that means that the T^0 head is not present in the derivation. Because T^0 is responsible for assigning nominative case, when it is absent there is no head to assign nominative case. When the auxiliary is present, as in (284c), the subject must be marked as nominative because T^0 assigns nominative. Accusative case does not run into this problem, because it is not reliant on any specific head to assign it, because it is the default case that is assigned

when all other case assignment fails. Therefore, answers that are truncated only to the pronoun must be in the accusative, even if they are interpreted as subjects. Thus, for some constructions, it appears as though there is actually no additional structure in the fragment.

In a sense, a non-sentential analysis of a fragment should be the default analysis, because it is the simplest analysis possible and does not require any deletion or additional projections. It is therefore the responsibility of those who argue in favor of covert structure to show the existence of this covert structure; the default assumption should be against covert structure. Putting aside considerations of how the syntax generates such subsentential output, or how that subsentential output receives the appropriate sentential force, there is at least a preliminary reason to consider a non-sentential analysis.

Unfortunately, a non-sentential approach seems very undesirable when the facts are more closely investigated. As we have already seen, 2nd person reflexive pronouns are licensed in GoalCs, and 2nd person non-reflexive pronouns are not.

(285) a. Hands off yourselves! / *myself / *themselves!

b. Hands off *you / me / them / us!

I cannot see a desirable account of the facts in (285) without appealing to additional structure or features. Positing that GoalCs possess AddrP straightforwardly explains the contrast in (285) by using the type of theoretical device that has already been argued to independently exist for traditional imperatives. If GoalCs do not have a covert 2nd person subject, then the facts about binding should not precisely match when there is a covert 2nd person subject, as in traditional imperatives.

GoalCs also display the same tag possibilities as traditional imperatives, a fact that seems impossible to satisfactorily explain if there is no additional structure in GoalCs. These facts seem much easier to explain if we posit additional covert structure.

In addition, a non-sentential analysis cannot explain why determiners are significantly degraded in GoalCs. There must be structure available for the determiner if there is an NP for the theme in the first place. The best account, therefore, seems to require covert structure,

and I will not pursue a non-sentential approach further for English.[14]

A more common approach in generative grammar has been to argue that the fragments are derived from full sentences. Doing so will draw an analogy between a GoalC like (172), reprinted as (286a) below, and a traditional imperative like (286b).

(286) a. Books on the shelf!

b. Put the books on the shelf!

Within sentential approaches to analyzing fragments, there are generally two approaches, the *in-situ* approach, and the *movement-and-ellipsis* approach. The *in-situ* approach argues that fragments are derived without movement, typically using ellipsis mechanisms necessary to account for other types of ellipsis, such as those necessary for gapping. Reich (2007) provides this type of account for short answers. The essential idea behind this account is that every part of the utterance that is not focused is elided, and that focus distribution is determined by the relevant Question Under Discussion (QuD). This QuD can either be explicit or implicit. An account of in-situ ellipsis for GoalCs would therefore involve a deletion like the following in (287).

(287) ~~You put the~~ books$_F$ on$_F$ the$_F$ shelf$_F$!

Under this account, the pronounced material "books on the shelf" receives focus and therefore survives the ellipsis operation, which cannot target focused material. The elided material does not receive focus. Leaving aside how exactly focus is assigned in a construction like (287), such an account has an inherent advantage in not requiring movement to explain its ellipsis. Another nice advantage to an in-situ account is that it straightforwardly derives non-constituent fragments, as Lemke (2021) points out. In addition, the analysis presented by Reich (2007) makes use of focus to explain what is and is not pronounced under conditions of ellipsis. Given the fact that determiners, adjectives, and numerals all improve under conditions of contrast, and the fragment appears to be a non-constituent, an in-situ ellipsis account initially seems quite desirable.

[14] Pollard and Sag (1992, 1994) develop a theory, called head-driven phrase structure grammar, in which binding takes place over thematic roles rather than the syntax itself. See Landau (2010) for some arguments against this theory in general.

The account provided by Reich (2007) struggles to explain several GoalC properties, however. For one, objects like negation should never be deleted by an ellipsis operation. As we have already discovered, even in contexts of contrastive focus, material like negation and adverbs cannot appear to the left of the GoalC theme.

(288) a. A: Books off the shelf!
B: (puts books on the shelf)
A: *No, *don't / not / no* books off the shelf!

b. A: Books off the shelf!
B: (takes books off, but slowly)
A: *No, *quickly* books off the shelf!

If GoalCs are being entirely derived by focusing marking, then these properties are impossible to explain. Reich's analysis as stated cannot explain fragments like GoalCs. The facts about GoalCs are that nothing outside of the NP can be pronounced to the left of the GoalC theme within the clause, regardless of focus status. Reich's analysis, therefore, makes the wrong prediction regarding focused material to the left of the GoalC theme. In a sense, the issue with Reich's analysis as applied to GoalCs is that the ellipsis mechanism appears to be too discriminatory, in that it only deletes material that lacks a certain feature. This is a great strength of the analysis when applied to ellipsis processes like VP ellipsis, but it is a weakness when applied to GoalCs because GoalCs indiscriminately delete all material to the left of the theme.

This leaves a movement-and-ellipsis style approach to deriving fragments. A movement-and-ellipsis approach argues that fragments are derived via focused material escaping a deletion site through movement by moving to a higher projection. Merchant (2005) argues for this type of approach. In this approach, there is a feature, E, which is a feature of a head that then deletes its complement. Focused elements within that lower phrase move to a higher projection, FP, which is pronounced. Below is a derivation of how this type of analysis might work for GoalCs, where the TP that is the complement of E is an imperative clause.

(289)



The E-FEATURE located on F^0 deletes the lower TP. The major benefit of this approach is that it derives ellipsis through a process that is nearly universally considered to be present in the syntax, *movement*. Although it needs to resort to using movement to explain ellipsis, movement is standardly argued to exist in generative syntax. Additionally, there are several facts that are otherwise difficult to explain regarding the symmetries between fragments and moved elements, such as the obligatory pronunciation of the complementizer in moved CPs (see (Morgan 1973; Stowell 1981) for discussion).

There is a significant complication when applying a movement analysis to GoalCs, however. GoalCs involve a theme and a goal, but exclude determiners. This appears to be a non-constituent. It is worth investigating whether or not the pronounced material of a GoalC could plausibly be a constituent. It is possible for the complement of a put-type verb to lack a determiner, as in (290) below.

(290) Put books on the shelf!

If determiner-less complements like the one (290) were obligatorily the input to GoalCs, then we would not need to explain the restriction on determiners, since (290) does not have a determiner. At a conceptual level, it seems impossible to limit the complement of "put" to lacking a determiner, because "put" can take NPs with determiners as its complement, as in (291) below.

(291) Put **the** books on the shelf!

Even if it were possible to somehow limit "put" to selecting a determiner-less complement, I don't think it would be a good idea to explain GoalCs. When the determiner is not

present, the traditional imperative in (290) can only mean a non-specific number of books. The meaning of the GoalC in (292) below, however, must reference specific books that are relevant in a certain context.

(292) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)
A: Books on the shelf!
✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.
X: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

The felicity conditions on the GoalC which lacks the determiner match the felicity of a traditional imperative with a determiner (293), and not the felicity of a traditional imperative without a determiner (294).

(293) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)
A: Put the books on the shelf!
✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.
X: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

(294) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)
A: Put books on the shelf!
✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.
✓: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

An additional piece of evidence in favor of there being a deleted determiner is the possibility for the theme of a GoalC to be a bare singular.

(295) Book on the shelf!

It is not possible that the string in (295) could be derived from a traditional imperative that lacks a determiner, because bare singulars are not acceptable in object position in English.

(296) *Put book on the shelf!

GoalC themes always seem to reference specific, definite objects and not indefinite objects. I take these facts to mean that GoalCs have a determiner underlyingly, because

they pattern with traditional imperatives that have a determiner, and not with traditional imperatives that lack a determiner. If a determiner is present underlyingly in GoalCs, but is always deleted, the end product appears to be a non-constituent. "Books on the shelf" could not possibly be a constituent, because it would be leaving behind "the." It is unclear, given the standard assumptions about movement, how Merchant's system could derive the string in (289). Given that it is standardly argued that only constituents can move in the syntax, it is not clear how the string "books off the shelf" could move anywhere in a derivation like (289).

Leaving aside the pesky determiner, a reasonable objector might wonder whether a small clause analysis of "the books off the shelf" is plausible. The following structure in (297) seems to be an initially plausible analysis of the internal structure of GoalCs, with the verb "put" selecting for a small clause complement.

(297)



If a small clause like the one above in (297) was the right structure for the complement of "put," then we could explain GoalCs via the movement of that SC to a higher projection. Unfortunately, positing a small clause in the structure is not without problems. Small clauses are well-known to constitute opaque domains for anaphora (Pesetsky 1996; Bruening 2018).

(298) a. *The professor$_1$ wants them away from herself$_1$!

b. *I$_1$ expect you near myself$_1$ as soon as possible.

GoalCs, on the other hand, allow anaphora. It is possible for the imperative subject to bind material within the supposed small clause.

(299) IMPPRO$_1$ hands to yourselves$_1$ / each other$_1$!

If GoalCs involved a small clause, it is unclear how the imperative subject could bind within that small clause, given that small clauses constitute opaque domains for anaphora. Complements of *put-type* verbs also do not constitute opaque domains for anaphora (Pesetsky 1996; Bruening 2010, 2018).

(300) a. The tiger$_1$ put butter on itself$_1$.

b. Ganon$_1$ put the pillow next to himself$_1$.

In addition, it is not possible to cleft the material in question, suggesting that it is not a constituent.

(301) a. *The books on the shelf is what she put.

b. *It was the books on the shelf that she put.

There is an additional problem with trying to apply Merchant's theory to GoalCs. Merchant's original theory utilizes the licensing condition on ellipsis of *e-givenness*, which is part of the semantics of the E-FEATURE. Merchant (2005) provides the following semantics for E.

(302) $[\![\text{E}]\!] = \lambda$p: e-GIVEN(p) [p]

Merchant requires that semantic composition can only succeed if the complement TP of E is E-GIVEN. This analysis of ellipsis works straightforwardly for patterns like VP ellipsis, which require an explicit linguistic antecedent.

(303) Artemis reads more books than I do ~~read books~~.

Requiring that elided material is *given* can be a significant problem for explaining discourse initial fragments which have no linguistic antecedent. Merchant argues that there is precisely one VP in English which can be elided without an explicit linguistic antecedent, the VP *do it*. The following examples, from Merchant (2005), are all able to be interpreted as the VP *do it*.

(304) a. [Miss Clairol advertisement]
Does she or doesn't she? Only her hairdresser knows.

b. [John attempts to kiss his wife while driving]
John, you mustn't.

c. [As a response to an offer of a second piece of chocolate cake]
I really shouldn't.

d. [As an invitation to dance]
Shall we?

e. [Mary gets John an expensive present]
Oh Mary, you shouldn't have!

f. [Gesturing toward an empty chair]
May I?
[Responding]
Please do.

Merchant provides a series of arguments in support of this claim, and I find them very convincing when applied to the examples he is attempting to explain. Unfortunately, it seems impossible to apply it to GoalCs. It is not plausible that the elision in GoalCs, which occurs on the left edge, could be elision of *do it*.

(305) *Do it books on the shelf!

Merchant himself mentions that the assertoric fragments that he is discussing must be separated from other non-sentential fragment utterances. In particular, he mentions "short directives" as exactly the type of fragment that his theory does not seek to explain.

(306) Short directives: Left! Higher! Scalpel! (from Merchant 2005; his 231)

With respect to each of these analyses, then, it seems that none is a perfect fit for analyzing GoalCs. Although it is possible to include movement in an analysis of GoalCs, additional mechanisms would be necessary to derive the pattern of determiner deletion. Currently, none of the theories presented can precisely account for the distribution of GoalCs.

This is not entirely unexpected, given that GoalCs are a new object of study in generative linguistics. I will therefore provide a variant of the in-situ analysis, synthesizing favorable elements from previous theories of ellipsis without appealing to focus, to explain the facts in GoalCs.[15]

3.4 Analysis

In this section, I present an analysis of GoalCs that accounts for their left-edge effects, goal requirement, and their more general imperative-like behavior. I account for these properties by positing that GoalCs are underlyingly imperative clauses that undergo deletion of material to the left of the theme. This deletion only happens when there is a put-type verb present, of the type that selects for one NP argument and one goal argument. Additionally, this deletion is insensitive to the material that it deletes - it indiscriminately deletes all material to the left of the theme within the clause. The sentence level prosody is syntactically represented as the head of a Prosody Phrase, and must be COMMAND. There is an imperative operator in C^0, which selects ModP, a requirement on the imperative operator. This

[15] Magdalena Kaufmann, p.c., brings up the possibility of using a similar form to a GoalC as a question.

(1) a. Feet on the floor?
b. Hands up?

Both of these fragments seem to have some modal meaning, but with the speaker as the intended subject. Both can be paraphrased as the following. Only 1P reflexives are possible.

(2) a. Should I put my feet on the floor?
b. Should I get my hands up?
c. Hands off myself? / ourselves? / each other? / *yourself?

There are other question fragments, however, that can only be interpreted as having an addressee subject.

(3) a. ~~Are you~~ Going out tonight?
b. ~~Are you~~ Done with your homework yet?

It may ultimately be the case that these fragments can be consolidated with the command fragments, given that they share similar form. At present, however, not enough is known about these fragments to say anything definitive or to offer an analysis.

Mod^0 is always filled with a priority modal, identical to traditional imperatives. There is an Addressee Phrase which introduces an operator that bears obligatory 2nd person features, binding the lower subject, IMPPRO. IMPMOD is the underspecified modal element that accompanies traditional imperatives, also present in GoalCs. "Put" assigns $[+\alpha]$ features to the two arguments that it selects, both the theme argument and the goal argument. For the VP structure, I follow the analysis of Larson (1988). The following is the full analysis of "Books on the shelf!"

(307) Books on the shelf!



This tree represents an imperative clause that is truncated through ellipsis. This is triggered by having at least two [+α] features, the first being associated both with the feature COMMAND on Pros^0 and the other with the complement of the verb "put." When this feature is present on the COMMAND feature, the rest of the structure is scanned for another [+α] feature. If another feature is found, all material between the two [+α] features is deleted. The remainder of this section will address each of these decisions in detail.

3.4.1 IMPPRO

Prior to the tree in (307), I used "you" as a placeholder for the imperative subject, based on data from reflexives. The subject of traditional imperative clauses is well-known to be restricted to being some subset of the addressees. We have already seen that GoalCs show the same pattern as traditional imperatives. 2nd person reflexives are possible, while 1st and 3rd person reflexives violate Condition A.

(308) a. Hands off yourselves!

b. Hands off each other!

c. *Hands off myself!

d. *Hands off themselves!

We have also already seen that 2nd person non-reflexive pronouns produce a Condition B violation. 1st and 3rd non-reflexive pronouns are grammatical.

(309) a. *Hands off you!

b. Hands off me!

c. Hands off them!

Following Wratil (2005) and Kaufmann (2012), I take subjectless imperatives to contain a covert subject pronoun, IMPPRO, which is confined to appearing in imperatives and is restricted to denoting the addressee. I propose that there is a projection, AddresseeP, which contains an operator which limits the interpretation of the subject of the clause it combines with to being some subset of the addressees.

(310)



(311) OP$_{Addr}$: [λx : x = addressee(c).]

Following this convention, I will use IMPPRO as the subject of all GoalCs throughout this chapter from this point on. Nothing changes with respect to overt subjects in imperatives, we still expect to see "you" if the subject is capable of being overtly pronounced.

3.4.2 IMPMOD

One of the first serious treatments of imperatives in the generative linguistics literature, Katz and Postal (1964), argues for a covert *will* in the structure of imperatives, based partly on the fact that imperatives appear to be oriented in the future. As we have already seen, however, Bolinger (1967) argues against this by noting that a variety of tags are compatible with imperatives.[16]

(312) a. Hand me that book, will you? / would you? / could you?

b. Paint those walls, will you? / would you? / could you?

Much like traditional imperatives, GoalCs are compatible with tags, and the modal possibilities in tags are identical to those originally noted for traditional imperatives by Bolinger.

(313) a. Books off the table, will you? / would you? / could you?

b. Feet on the floor, will you? / would you? / could you?

The fact that the subject tag is limited to 2nd person is explained by the presence of IMPPRO. Based on the fact that both constructions permit the same range of modals in the tag, I propose that they contain the same underlying modal. Following Kaufmann (2012), I will use the term IMPMOD to describe the unpronounceable, underspecified modal element present in imperatives that is capable of combining with multiple modals in imperative tags.[17] What this analysis means is that the subject and modal present in GoalCs are identical to those in traditional imperatives.

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[16] The observation of flexible tags in imperatives goes back at least to Jespersen (1946), who notes the token "Be quiet, can't you?" from Charles Dickens' novel *The Pickwick Papers*.

[17] Kaufmann (2012) analyzes IMPMOD as originating in the specifier position of MoodP, selected by the modal base and ordering source. I place it on T^0 to emphasize the flexibility in tags, given that T^0 is the position most typically associated with modal tags.

3.4.3 Imperative Operator

Unlike declaratives and interrogatives, imperatives are obligatorily *performative*, in the sense originally described by Austin (1962) below, who lays out the following two properties of performative utterances.

(314) a. They do not 'describe' or 'report' [...] anything at all, and are not 'true or false.'

b. The uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action,

Austin (1962), pg. 5 (A and B)

Imperatives are therefore performative utterances because they cannot be considered true or false under normal conditions, and they are used to *do* something rather than merely report something. To illustrate this principle, neither traditional imperatives nor GoalCs can be felicitously replied to with "That's (not) true!"

(315) a. A: Paint the walls!
B: #That's (not) true!"

b. A: Books on the shelf!
B: #That's (not) true!"

Replies that directly reference truth or falsity are judged as infelicitous because imperatives do not have accessible truth values. Despite the fact that these truth values are not accessible, Kaufmann (2012) argues that imperatives are underlyingly truth-conditionally equivalent to modal statements with *should*. Thus, the following utterances have essentially the same truth conditions, but the latter has its truth conditions concealed.[18]

(316) a. You should paint the walls.

b. Paint the walls!

One major difference between modal statements like (316a) and imperatives like (316b) is that the former are not necessarily *performative*, whereas the latter always are.

[18] The argument that imperatives have truth conditions is far from universally accepted. See Portner (2004, 2007) for an alternative view, that does not make use of an operator in imperatives.

To account for this difference, Kaufmann (2012) and Oikonomou (2016) argue that there is a covert operator present in all imperatives that ensures that imperatives are sufficiently performative by providing a series of presuppositions that always accompany felicitous imperatives.

The following list of presuppositions always accompanies imperatives and serves to separate imperatives from modal declaratives, by ensuring that the context is sufficiently performative. f is the modal base, and g is the ordering source laid out originally by Kratzer (1977).

(317) Non-past constraint The time at which p takes place must not be entirely in the past. (Kaufmann 2012: Sect. 3.2.2)

(318) Authority condition The speaker must be in a privileged position with respect to the truth of $[\![\text{OP}_{IMP}\ \text{f g}\ ]\!]$, either as an authority figure or as a knowledgeable expert. (Kaufmann 2012: Section 4.2.2)

(319) Epistemic uncertainty constraint It is unknown whether *p(w)* is true or false before the imperative is uttered. (Kaufmann 2012: Section 4.2.3)

(320) Ordering Source Restriction The imperative must address a salient decision problem D, and the speaker and addressee must consider g to be the relevant ordering source for resolving D. (Kaufmann 2012: Section 4.2.3)

In Chapter 2, I argued that the Authority Condition was best conceived as arising via an interaction between the imperative operator and a priority modal, given the fact that general prohibitives and Imperative and Declarative conjunctions have accessible truth values. I include here, however, because I argue that GoalCs always combine with a priority modal. As such, they are subject to the Authority Condition.

The remainder of this subsection will go through each of these presuppositions for GoalCs. The finding will be that each presupposition is obligatorily present in GoalCs, as it is in traditional imperatives, and therefore GoalCs can plausibly be analyzed as having the same operator and modal combination that has been argued to exist in traditional imperatives.

3.4.3.1 Non-Past Constraint

For the NON-PAST CONSTRAINT, Kaufmann (2012) argues that imperatives are not compatible with times contained entirely in the past. Presumably, the performative object created by a successful utterance of an imperative is incompatible with past tense, given that the addressee cannot affect actions contained in the past.[19]

(321) a. #Paint the walls yesterday!

b. Paint the walls now!

c. #Hand me that pen last year!

d. Hand me that pen as quickly as you can!

GoalCs are subject to the same constraint as traditional imperatives; they are completely incompatible with past tense modification. Combinations of GoalCs with past tense modifiers are uniformly infelicitous.

(322) a. #Books off the shelf yesterday!

b. Books off the shelf now!

c. #Hands where I can see them last year!

d. Hands where I can see them as quickly as you can!

3.4.3.2 Authority Condition

The AUTHORITY CONDITION is a condition that states that by virtue of uttering an imperative, it presupposes that the speaker is an authority over the relevant rules.[20] Keshet and Medeiros (2019) point out that the following utterance is infelicitous.

(323) #Go to your room, Dad! (spoken by a 2-year-old)

[19] Some languages have been argued to have legitimate past-tense imperatives (cf. Mastop 2005 for Dutch, Rubio-Vallejo 2017 for Spanish.)

[20] Kaufmann (2012) also has in mind that the speaker can be a *knowledgeable expert*, which derives certain ADVICE readings. These are not applicable in the case of GoalCs, which are limited to COMMAND interpretation.

The AUTHORITY CONDITION necessitates that the speaker of an imperative like (323) possesses the necessary social authority to command the addressee. The same holds for a GoalC, the speaker must possess the relevant social authority to command the addressee.

(324) a. #Books off the shelf, Dad! (spoken by a 2-year-old)

Of course, the AUTHORITY CONDITION is a condition on the usage of imperatives in the real world, and is intended to be limited to sincere contexts where the speaker believes themself to have the requisite social authority to command the addressee. The important point about the authority condition is that imperatives serve to either reinforce or establish authority relations in the real world. Both traditional imperatives and GoalCs appear to establish these relationships in the same way.

3.4.3.3 Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint

The EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY constraint is a presupposition to the effect that the speaker must believe that both $p(w)$ and $\neg p(w)$ are possible before uttering an imperative. In essence, imperatives are infelicitous if the speaker knows that the content of the imperative is either impossible or inevitable. Thus, the following sequences are incoherent for traditional imperatives.

(325) a. #I know you will do this no matter what, so do it also.

b. #I know you won't be able to do this, but do it anyway.

(adapted from Kaufmann (2012))

Imperatives are infelicitous in situations where the speaker believes that the outcome of the event is certain. GoalCs are subject to an identical constraint, the speaker must believe that it is possible that the content of the GoalC is fulfilled.

(326) a. #Books onto the shelf! (Speaker knows the books will not fit)

b. #I know you will move the books no matter what, having said that, books on the shelf!

3.4.3.4 Ordering Source Restriction

The ORDERING SOURCE RESTRICTION is a restriction that commits both the speaker and addressee to believing that p constitutes a possible answer to the best course of events. Thus, sequences like (327) are infelicitous for traditional imperatives.

(327) Call Melli! #But I don't want you to call her. (Kaufmann 2012: pg158)

The imperative in (327) commits both the speaker and addressee to believing that calling Melli is somehow an answer to the problem of how to best proceed. Thus, if the speaker subsequently denies that this is a good course of action, it results in infelicity.

Again, GoalCs act the same as traditional imperatives with regard to the restriction on the ordering source. Sequences like the following (328) are infelicitous.[21]

(328) Books on the shelf! #But I don't want the books to be on the shelf.

I take the fact that each of these presuppositions is present in GoalCs to indicate that GoalCs can plausibly be analyzed as having a covert imperative operator.

3.4.4 Command Prosody

Each component included in the derivation of GoalCs so far has been taken from the analysis presented by Kaufmann (2012) for traditional imperatives. It was our task to show that each of these mechanisms was appropriate for GoalCs, and we have done so. There are additional mechanisms in (307) that are departures from standard analyses of traditional imperatives, however. One key component of the analysis presented in (307) is that there is a projection that contains sentence-level prosodic information. The reasoning behind including this projection is that GoalCs are limited to COMMAND prosody. It is typically considered undesirable to have explicit Speech Act information located in the left periphery (Speas and Tenny 2003), as it is evocative of the oft-criticized *performative hypothesis* originally proposed by Ross (1970b). As such, I propose that sentence level prosodic information is contained in a head located in the left periphery. COMMAND is one of the heads that can appear in

[21] It is, of course, possible for a rational speaker to change their mind over time. Sequences like (327) mean to indicate that the speaker is not changing their mind.

this position. This prosodic head is located in the structure from the very beginning of the derivation and can have morphosyntactic consequences in the clause that it combines with (in this case, left-edge deletion). There is then an algorithm at PF that matches certain prosodies with notions like speaker intent. Doing this avoids putting a Speech Act explicitly in the syntax, which is typically taken to be undesirable.

The reason for including a sentence-level prosodic feature COMMAND is because GoalCs are limited to being COMMANDS, which means that there must be some feature present in GoalCs that is not mandatory in traditional imperatives. As we have already seen, traditional imperatives can participate in a range of speech acts. Since put-type verbs are relevant for the analysis of GoalCs, I will show that each use is also possible with a traditional *put* imperative.

(329) a. Put the books on the shelf! (Command)

b. Please don't put me in time out! (Wish)

c. Put the books on the shelf, if you want. (Permission)

d. A: How do I get a clean room?
B: Put the books on the shelf. (Advice)

Each speech act is associated with somewhat distinct prosody. Given that traditional imperatives can participate in at least these four speech acts, it is not tenable to suggest that the prosodic feature COMMAND is somehow an essential ingredient in forming all imperatives.

The analysis that I am providing here does not take this fact for granted. I take this to mean that it is not a coincidence that the COMMAND prosody is always present in GoalCs, but rather COMMAND prosody is an essential ingredient in forming a GoalC. What this means is that it is a constellation of the prosodic feature COMMAND, together with the put-type predicate present in GoalCs, which always coincides with the left-edge ellipsis present in GoalCs. This feature has noticeable prosodic effects. English has unique dedicated command prosody, and this command prosody must accompany GoalCs. Other prosodies are not possible.

(330) a. Books on the shelf! (command)

b. #Books on the shelf. (wish/permission/statement)

What this all amounts to is stating that a feature in a projection that hosts information about the sentence level prosody is capable of triggering an ellipsis process in the syntax. Although the mechanics of performing this type of ellipsis are possible given standard assumptions about the morphosyntax, to my knowledge no one has ever claimed that ellipsis can ever be conditioned by a prosodic feature. I can think of one other instance in English in which ellipsis is conditioned only in a specific speech act configuration.[22] Traditional imperatives used as written instructions can drop their objects when that object is contextually salient.

(331) a. (on a bottle of pills) Take with food.
b. (on a spy note) Burn after reading.
c. (on a bottle of wine) Serve chilled.

It cannot be solely the salience of the object that licenses object drop. If we imagine a scenario where the addressee is carrying a fragile package out the door, the following is quite odd if uttered aloud.

(332) #Handle with care!

(332) is very odd as a command given to someone carrying an actual package, but is completely acceptable as written instructions given on the package itself. I take this contrast to mean that the object deletion is conditioned by a specific prosodic feature. I propose that it is the feature INSTRUCTION on $Pros^0$ that must be responsible for licensing object drop in English imperatives. Below is a derivation for this deletion.

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[22] Note, however, that there are well-known left-edge ellipsis effects in casual speech that appear to be conditioned by register. The following examples, from Weir (2022), show that left-edge ellipsis can delete "extra material" if adjacent to a deletion site.

(1) a. Has the postman been yet?
b. The postman been yet?
c. Postman been yet?

Examples (1b) and (1c) seem to be available only when speaking informally. Whether or not there is a separate projection for register remains to be seen.

(333)



When the feature "Instruction" is placed in Pros^0, the object "this" is capable of being elided. Although it may seem counter-intuitive to have INSTRUCTION present on a Prosodic Head, it derives the ellipsis pattern. This explains the asymmetry between object drop in command imperatives vs. instruction imperatives. The COMMAND head is not capable of eliding "this" in object position, and therefore must pronounce its object.

The crucial takeaway from this should be that the mechanisms of left-edge ellipsis (in the case of GoalCs) and object ellipsis (in the case of instructions) are generally and readily available to the grammar. However, the trigger in this case for both mechanisms is the specific sentence level prosody itself, and the surrounding context (which presumably licenses the speech acts). The best explanation for the syntactic effects that these individual prosodies are capable of having on syntactic mechanisms, such as ellipsis and null pronouns, is that there is an explicit Prosodic Head in the syntax.

3.4.5 GoalCs as Immediate Commands

I take the fact that GoalCs are obligatorily COMMANDS to indicate that their left-edge ellipsis is dependent on a COMMAND feature being present on the head of ProsP. In terms of pragmatic force, English speakers surveyed provide the intuition that, while GoalCs and traditional command imperatives are very similar in their meaning, GoalCs have an additional strength or immediacy associated with them. Thus, the difference between the following two utterances seems to be that (334b) is interpreted as more urgent than (334a).

(334) a. Put the books on the shelf!

b. Books on the shelf!

(334b) deletes on its left edge, and also is judged as being more urgent. In order to make this explicit, I place the added urgency in the feature that forces the ellipsis. I introduce a feature, $[+\alpha]$, which can co-occur with the prosodic COMMAND feature, which is responsible for the deletion in GoalCs. When present, $[+\alpha]$ has the pragmatic force of adding urgency. By "adding urgency", it means that the addressee should carry out the content of the command as quickly as possible.

(335)



One piece of evidence in favor of added immediacy to GoalCs is the fact that GoalCs are only felicitous when they are intended to be carried out immediately. Thus, even modifiers in the relatively recent future are not possible in GoalCs, but are acceptable in traditional imperatives.

(336) a. Feet on the floor (#next week)!

b. Hands up (#tomorrow)!

c. Put your feet on the floor next week!

d. Get your hands up tomorrow!

Although it may seem odd to have a feature that encodes urgency in imperatives, there are a number of languages outside of European languages that can distinguish urgency. For example, in Jarawara, an Arawá language from Southern Amazonia, there are separate

imperative morphemes that indicate that the command is urgent (Dixon and Vogel 2004: 397).[23]

(337) a. otara noki ti-jahi
1Excl.Obj wait 2sgAGT-DISTAL.POSITIVE.IMP.Fem
'You (sg) wait for us (in some distant time or place)'

b. otara noki ti-na-hi
1Excl.Obj wait 2sgAGT-AUX-IMMEDIATE.POSITIVE.IMP.Fem
'You (sg) wait for us (here and now)'

I take the existence of morphemes that signal immediacy in imperatives to indicate that it is possible to have a morphosyntactic feature that corresponds with immediacy/urgency. This feature is realized as an overt verbal morpheme in Jarawara, and it causes left-edge ellipsis in languages like English. I therefore analyze the pragmatics of the [+α] feature to be associated with increased urgency on behalf of the speaker relative to the addressee, and relative to a standard COMMAND.

The [+α] feature is optionally attached to a prosodic COMMAND head. This means that COMMANDS can be specified as urgent, but need not be so. Intuitively, this feels correct. One reason that the [+α] feature cannot be obligatorily associated with the feature COMMAND is because it is possible to express commands with the verb *put* overtly expressed. The following, in (338), is a traditional imperative with some of the ingredients from a GoalC.

(338) Put those books on the shelf! (command)

If COMMAND prosody always caused edge deletion, then the utterance in (338) would be inexpressible with an overt verb. The [+α] feature on the Prosody Head is therefore optional. When present, left-edge deletion takes place and the utterance is interpreted as urgent. When absent, nothing happens and you get a normal imperative, as in (338). In the next section, I will argue that there is another [+α] feature that accompanies *put-type* verbs. Only when there are two [+α] features does the left-edge ellipsis process take place.

[23] Unfortunately, nothing is listed in the original resource about the prosody of these utterances.

3.4.6 Put-Type VPs

Put-type verbs (e.g., *put, get, keep, slide*) subcategorize for both an NP theme argument and a goal argument. If either the theme or goal argument is absent, the result is ungrammatical.

(339) a. I put the cats into the carrier.

b. *I put the cats.

c. *I put into the carrier.

Put-type verbs take two complements: a theme and a goal. This forms a perfect analogy with GoalCs, which also possess a theme and a goal. I argue that this analogy is not a coincidence, and that the overt material of GoalCs is the complement of a covert put-type verb. The following structure in (340) is provided for the extended VP of a GoalC, in which a put-type verb selects the GoalC theme and goal, but the verb is deleted. Following Larson (1988), I utilize multiple shells within the VP layer. I propose that there is a feature, $[+\alpha]$, which is assigned via Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001). The syntactic operation of Agree was originally introduced by Chomsky as a mechanism for feature valuation between a probe and a goal. There is, of course, much debate about the exact nature of Agree in the syntax, with many various proposals (Zeijlstra 2012, Baker 2008, Preminger 2013, Bošković 2007, among many others). I will argue that "put-type" verbs probe downwards, and assign the $[+\alpha]$ feature to their NP theme and to their goal. This agreement happens with all put-type verbs, across all clauses, but does not have morphosyntactic consequences except for in GoalCs. If there is no $[+\alpha]$ feature on the Pros^0, the derivation does not crash. Instead, the derivation proceeds as normal and there is no deletion. Deletion will only happen in the case that the Prosody Head is filled with the head COMMAND, which can also bear the feature $[+\alpha]$.

(340)



The structure in (340) places the feature [+α] on both the lexical heads in its complement. Because put-type verbs select both a theme and a goal, they also Agree with both their theme and goal, and both receive an [+α] feature. For English, only the [+α] feature on the theme is necessary to derive the ellipsis. I will fully justify the need to assign an [+α] feature to both lexical heads in the VP based on the flexible word order in Japanese in Chapter 4.

The [+α] feature is not only assigned to the theme and the goal by the lexical item *put*, but rather several *put-type* verbs that can select for this type of complement. Each of the following verbs can be interpreted as the deleted verb in a GoalC.

(341) a. ~~Put the~~ books on the shelf!

b. ~~Get your~~ hands up!

c. ~~Keep your~~ hands on the table!

What this means is that it is a class of verbs that bears the [+α] feature, rather than a specific lexical item. Indeed, there may be multiple possible paraphrases for the deleted verb in a GoalC. (341a), for example, may be paraphrased as either of the following.

(342) a. Books on the shelf!

→ Put the books on the shelf! / Get those books on the shelf!

An anonymous reviewer provides the suggestion that it may be more parsimonious to posit a single lexical item rather than a class of lexical items. Unfortunately, this does not seem possible based on the flexible interpretations that are available to GoalCs. For example, there are scenarios where GoalCs are acceptable, but could only reasonably be paraphrased with "keep." If we imagine a scenario where the books are already on the shelf, and some force could potentially push them off, then a librarian can easily utter (343a) or (343b) to her assistant, whereas (343c) would be quite strange.

(343) a. Books on the shelf!

b. Keep the books on the shelf!

c. #Get the books on the shelf!

The exact opposite is true in the default case, in which the books are not already on the shelf. In this instance, the librarian can also utter (344a), but this time only with the meaning of "put/get" and never "keep."

(344) a. Books on the shelf!

b. #Keep the books on the shelf!

c. Get the books on the shelf!

Reich (2011) argues that this type of indeterminacy is a defining feature of what he calls "situation-based ellipsis" (s-ellipsis), which is ellipsis that lacks an antecedent. Reich's argument for this is that, in order for the hearer to resolve s-ellipsis, they must resort to extralinguistic context. The type of example he has in mind is the following.

(345) Tall decaf cappuccino.

Reich notices that there are several possible paraphrases to the utterance in (345) (I'd like a tall decaf cappuccino, Give me a tall decaf cappuccino, etc.) This is in contrast to a-ellipsis, which possess a linguistic antecedent and can be unambiguously resolved. Given that GoalCs do not require a linguistic antecedent, I find this indeterminacy encouraging rather than discouraging.

Analyzing GoalCs as being derived from traditional *put-type* imperatives also explains why English GoalCs are subject to strict word order. When the verb is overtly expressed, the theme must precede the goal.

(346) a. *Put on the shelf the books!

b. *Get up your hands!

c. *Keep on the table your hands!

If GoalCs are derived from *put-type* imperatives, then we would expect the theme to obligatorily precede the goal in GoalCs as well. This is exactly what we find, the order of the constituents in a GoalC must be the theme preceding the goal, and the goal-theme word order is ungrammatical.

(347) a. *On the shelf (the) books!

b. *Up (your) hands!

The best analysis that I can see, therefore, is that GoalCs involve edge deletion of traditional imperatives with put-type verbs. I will briefly explain why this analysis is better than a small clause analysis. We have already seen arguments against treating the complement of *put* as a small clause.

Another possible analysis involving a small clause is that the small clause is not the complement of a put-type verb, but instead is the complement of a CAUSE head, similar to the type argued to exist in cause-motion predicates by Folli and Harley (2006).

(348) *(to be rejected)*



A structure like the one in (348) seems to derive the correct semantics. It is unclear, however, how to restrict the predicate to goals. Recall that non-goals are ungrammatical in GoalCs.

(349) a. *Books about Rome!

b. *Prisoners free!

The CAUSE head in (348) selects for a small clause, but it is unclear how it can impose specific requirements on the properties of that small clause, given that its semantics are only that of causation. The structure in (348) should be able to take a complement like "books about Rome" to mean something like "Make these books be about Rome!"or a complement like "prisoners free" to mean "Set these prisoners free!" These meanings are unavailable, however. A small clause analysis is too unrestrained in the types of GoalCs is predicts.

We might consider that the CAUSE head in (348) could potentially be enriched into something like CAUSE-BY-PLACING. Unlike a simple CAUSE head, this would derive mostly the right semantics. This would rule out GoalCs like the one in (349a), because it cannot be resolved via PLACING. Unfortunately, this cannot explain the syntactic facts. The syntax of the theme and goal is not that of a small clause.

The best explanation of GoalCs, then, is that they are complements of *put-type* verbs, rather than small clauses. The objection may reasonably be raised that there is an unacceptable conceptual issue with this analysis. The objection goes as follows: other theories of ellipsis appeal to general mechanisms that occur independently of any specific lexical item, but GoalCs require a specific type of lexical input: put-type verbs. Such ellipsis mechanisms are typically argued against because they are stipulative and not necessary.

Unfortunately, the GoalC facts will not cooperate with such an analysis. The reality is that GoalCs are limited to an interpretation with a very specific, limited class of lexical items, and that there is a large amount of evidence in favor of deletion of material on the left edge. Because of this, I think the approach taken here has significant merit. The fact is, unlike other types of ellipsis, GoalCs are limited to containing a goal. Their semantics are also limited to the several meanings available to put-type verbs. Therefore, the best analysis that I can see of this construction involves this edge ellipsis, even if it comes with the stipulation about being triggered by a class of lexical items (put-type verbs).[24]

Note that even if we adopted a movement and deletion analysis, where there was movement of a small clause, we would still have to limit the deletion to put-type verbs. Other types of verbs are not possible.

(350) a. *Girl above reproach!
≠ Consider the girl above reproach!

b. *Sailors off the ship!
≠ Allow the sailors off the ship!

The best analysis of the facts, therefore, is an edge deletion process, triggered by features that are necessary in GoalCs. In the next section, I formalize this deletion process.

3.4.7 Left-Edge Deletion

I propose that the left-edge effects seen in GoalCs are a result of a deletion process that takes place when there are at least two [+α] features in the derivation, and one of them is present on Pros^0. The fundamental intuition behind this derivation is that deletion occurs

[24] Thanks to Satoshi Tomioka for bringing this issue to my attention.

between the two [+α] features. The following is an algorithm that determines whether or not ellipsis will occur, based on the presence of [+α] features.

(351) 1. If there is an [+α] feature in Pros^0, begin scanning rightwards.
2. If no second [+α] feature is encountered, do nothing.
3. If a second [+α] feature is encountered, stop scanning, and delete all material between the first [+α] and the second [+α].

This algorithm is fully intended to exist inside the PF branch of the grammar, in the sense laid out by (Halle and Marantz 1993) and typically assumed to exist in generative grammar. Edge deletion has usually been argued tp take place entirely in the PF component of the grammar (Weir 2012, Napoli 1982, among others). What the algorithm in (351) means is that, if there is an [+α] feature on the Prosody Head, and a subsequent [+α] feature on a lexical head, then there will be deletion between the two features. The GoalC theme will always be marked with an [+α] feature, because put-type verbs always assign this feature to their theme via Agree. The Pros^0 can optionally be marked with an [+α] feature. This means that the presence of other [+α] features, for example the one on the goal, are not relevant towards the deletion because the algorithm has already stopped. Below is a derivation of how this deletion works. Deletion takes place in (352) because there is an [+α] feature on both the Prosody Head and the theme.

(352) [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~You~~.....[$_{VP}$ ~~put~~ [$_{NP}$ ~~the~~ books][$_{PP}$ on the shelf]]]
[+α] ⟶ [+α]

This approach falls into the categorization of an *in-situ* ellipsis approach. As was already mentioned, *movement-and-ellipsis* approaches typically rely on the pronounced material being a constituent, or multiple constituents, given standard assumptions about movement in syntax. Though non-constituent deletion may seem to be an unusual process, it is attested in English in at least two other constructions. It is possible to delete both the subject and the auxiliary in informal addressee-oriented questions (Schmerling 1973; Napoli 1982; Weir 2012, 2022).

(353) a. ~~Have you~~ ever been to Paris?

b. ~~Are you~~ heading out?

Note that the deletion of the subject depends on the deletion of the auxiliary. An (2016, 2019) describes a similar phenomenon in Korean, where case markers can be omitted only if in the rightmost position, next to the site of deletion.

In this work, An describes a cross-linguistic phenomenon in which material that is adjacent to a deletion site can itself be deleted if it is recoverable. An represents this deletion according to the following configuration in (354). (Following An's system, Δ stands for a deletion site).

(354) *(X) (Y) Δ

What this representation means is that Y can be deleted if recoverable, by virtue of being next to a deletion site (Δ). X on the other hand cannot be deleted, because it is not next to a deletion site. However, the configuration in (354) is intended to be iterable. This means that when Y is deleted, it is incorporated into Δ, meaning that X is now adjacent to the deletion site and available for deletion itself. Because this deletion happens entirely in the PF component of the grammar, it is able to delete linear strings that are not constituents. This strikes me as being essentially the same as what is happening in English, since under no analysis of English would the subject and auxiliary form a single constituent, yet both are deleted together in (353). The requirement on auxiliary drop seems to be that there is morphology on the verb that allows the auxiliary to be recovered. Auxiliaries that do not have morphological consequences on the verb they select are much more restricted.

(355) a. *~~Will~~ you go to the store?

b. *~~Should~~ we meet up at the park?

Weir (2022) argues that fragments are governed by a restriction that they must be interpretable. Of course, it is well-known that interpretability/recoverability cannot be the only restriction on ellipsis (Merchant 2001). Nevertheless, fragments are clearly governed by some principle where the speaker is limited in the ellipses they can choose based on what the addressee will be able to interpret. This principle is also able to delete several other instances of string-initial material. For example, so-called 'diary drop' is able to drop 1st person subjects (and sometimes the auxiliary "be") in written English (see Haegeman 1990).

(356) a. ~~I~~ went to the store today.

b. ~~I~~ bought eggs.

c. ~~I am~~ going to the pub tonight.

One reason to believe that the subject omission in (356) must be edge deletion is that it is not possible in questions. This is because the subject and auxiliary must invert in English yes-no questions. Imagine the following utterance as an example written in a diary.

(357) a. Am I going in the wrong direction?

b. *Am going in the wrong direction?

If subject register merely allowed omission of a 1st person subject, we would expect (357b) to be grammatical. The fact that it is not grammatical suggests that the subject must be pronounced because it is not on the left edge. There is also a left-edge ellipsis process that deletes determiners when they are in utterance-initial position, similar to the one in GoalCs (Napoli 1982).

(358) a. ~~The~~ guy just went nuts!

b. ~~The~~ game was boring.

Weir (2012, 2014, 2022) proposes a series of Optimality Theory based analyses of the left-edge ellipsis, in which a series of constraints can be re-ranked to produce several edge ellipsis outputs. The important thing is that the constraints are flexible, deriving both the pattern in which ellipsis occurs and the one in which it does not occur. This is important because left-edge ellipsis of the kind in (353) and (358) is optional.

GoalC deletion is not optional, however. That is to say, you either get the entire construction, or a GoalC. Intermediate deletion is not acceptable.

(359) a. Get the books off the shelf, now!

b. *The books off the shelf, now!

c. Books off the shelf, now!

An's "extra deletion" analysis and Weir's Optimality Theory analysis would both allow (359b) to surface. An's analysis allows deletion of the determiner through being adjacent

to the site of deletion and through being an unstressed, recoverable element. Weir's analysis derives a similar effect through Optimality Theory. This type of deletion is more reminiscent of the MaxElide constraint described in detail by Takahashi and Fox (2005). In essence, they propose a condition like the following.

(360) MaxElide:

Elide the biggest deletable constituent.

In their original conception, Max-Elide applies to ellipsis that contains an A-bar trace. Although this process is still generally considered mysterious, we know that the syntax is capable of occasionally forcing the largest possible deletion in certain configurations.

The types of edge deletion discussed by An and Weir, however, act differently. For example, under situations of focus, the subject could be pronounced in non-GoalC edge deletion cases.

(361) A: Ever tried dropping acid?

B: YOU ever tried dropping acid?

This is exactly why I utilize a "stronger" version of ellipsis in this construction. The effects in GoalCs are not optional. Instead, the $[+\alpha]$ feature indiscriminately deletes everything in its path until it reaches another $[+\alpha]$. There is no option to not delete, deletion is always mandatory. Because of this, tying the ellipsis to a feature that is associated with strengthening commands is necessary in the case of GoalCs.

3.4.7.1 Adverb Derivation

I would like to start with adverbs, possibly the most straightforward case of left-edge deletion. Recall that adverbs are acceptable on the right edge of GoalCs, but not on the left edge, and this property was not explained by the adverb positions available to traditional imperatives.

(362) a. *Quickly books on the shelf!

b. Books on the shelf quickly!

Below is a derivation for the example (362a). This sentence is ungrammatical because an adverb is being overtly pronounced in a position that must be deleted.

(363) $[_{ProsP}$ COMM.....~~You~~...$[_{AdvP}$ ~~quickly~~]....$[_{VP}$ ~~put~~ $[_{NP}$ ~~the~~ books]$[_{PP}$ on the shelf]]]

$[+\alpha] \longrightarrow [+\alpha]$

When the adverb is placed on the right edge, however, it can surface. The path of deletion does not change between (362a) and (362b), it is supplied by the command feature and the verb "put" in the same way in both instances. Because of this, right-edge adverbs are acceptable.

(364) $[_{ProsP}$ COMM.....~~You~~.....$[_{VP}$ ~~put~~ $[_{NP}$ ~~the~~ books]$[_{PP}$ on the shelf]$[_{AdvP}$ quickly]]]

$[+\alpha] \longrightarrow [+\alpha]$

The left-edge analysis perfectly accounts for these facts - adverbs on the left are unacceptable because they are in the path of deletion, whereas right-edge adverbs are acceptable. So far we are doing well.

Note again that traditional analyses of ellipsis would struggle to explain a pattern like this. Adverbs are contentful material, they are not de-accented, and in this instance they are not given. Note also that a movement-and-ellipsis approach could not account for the left-right asymmetry. The only analysis that I can see that can derive this effect is an *indiscriminate* deletion analysis that can delete contentful material.

3.4.7.2 Embedded GoalCs

There is also evidence that edge deletion happens in embedded clauses.Going back to at least Hooper and Thompson (1973), it has been noticed that the embedded clause can contribute the main assertion instead of the main clause in certain instances. Krifka (2011) describes the verb "say" as being capable of what he calls "proxy performativity," meaning that the speaker can make a performative statement in proxy for another person or institution. This happens despite the fact that the prosodic feature COMMAND in this case would have to be embedded. If this is the case, then it is plausible that the verb "say" is capable of embedding the Prosody Phrase, at least in English, as was essentially proposed by (Crnič and Trinh 2009). It is well-known that imperatives generally resist embedding

(Aikhenvald 2010; Alcázar and Saltarelli 2014; Kaufmann 2012). Crnič and Trinh (2009) argue convincingly, however, that English can embed imperatives under exactly one verb, "say." Some points of evidence that they use therein are that the form of negation is "don't" rather than "not" and that the subject can co-refer with material in the embedded clause (showing that the embedded material cannot be a quote).

(365) a. Hannah said don't call!

b. Hannah$_i$ said call her$_i$ mother!

English GoalCs appear to work identically to traditional imperatives in that they are embeddable only under "say" and never under any other verbs.

(366) a. Allison *said* books on the table!

b. *Allison *asked* books on the table!

c. *Allison *requested* books on the table!

d. *Allison *demanded* books on the table!

The same tests used by Crnič and Trinh (2009) for binding within the embedded imperative point to the fact that the GoalC is truly embedded in these contexts. In (367) below, the subject can bind within the embedded GoalC, which is not possible in a quote.

(367) a. Mike$_i$ said hands off his$_i$ mother!

b. Joanna$_i$ said everyone into her$_i$ car!

c. Josie$_i$ said "Everyone into *her$_i$ / my$_i$ car!"

Recall that embedded GoalCs cannot pronounce their subjects, analogous to main clause GoalCs.

(368) *Jo said you books on the table!

In order to account for this, I embed the Prosody Phrase under "say," following (Crnič and Trinh 2009), with the Prosody ASSERT in the main clause, and the Prosody COMMAND in the embedded clause. It is this embedded COMMAND feature that begins the deletion process and carries the [+α] feature, not the main clause ASSERT. Following the deletion

algorithm in (351), the [+α] feature scans rightward until it encounters the [+α] feature on the theme. What this means is that all material to the left of the theme within the embedded clause is deleted, but material to the right of the theme within the embedded clause remains, as well as material in the main clause.

(369) [$_{ProsP}$ASSERT....Jo.....[$_{VP}$ said [$_{ProsP}$COMM....~~You~~....[$_{VP}$ ~~put~~ [$_{NP}$ ~~the~~ books][$_{PP}$ on...]]]

[+α] ⟶ [+α]

This derivation accounts for the embedded left-edge effects that occur under "say." This is not intended to be a complete account of how embedded prosodic features work, nor why imperatives appear to be limited to being embedded under only "say." It is also not intended to necessarily make any predictions about which types of prosodies can be embedded in which positions. Following work that has already been established, however, we can see that the edge deletion analysis can account for the embedded edge deletion.

3.4.7.3 Vocatives in GoalCs

Vocatives are another instance of material that is not deleted. Separated by a prosodic break, vocatives can surface to the left of the GoalC theme.

(370) Pat, hands up!

Hill (2007) surveys the languages Romanian, Bulgarian, and Umbundu and determines that there is a structure within what she terms the "Speech Act Phrase," positing Speaker and Hearer roles (following Speas and Tenny (2003)) and a Role Phrase that selects the vocative DP. This analysis explains why vocative DPs receive vocative case in some languages, they enter into normal syntactic relations with a Role head that is capable of assigning case. It also separates direct address vocatives (such as proper names) from indirect address (such as "Hey!"), and claims that they occupy different syntactic positions within the Speech Act Phrase.

I agree with Hill (2007) that the syntactic position that hosts the Vocative DP/NP should be separated from interjections (indirect address vocatives). Interjections are limited to directly preceding the sentence that they are associated with (371a), whereas what she

terms "direct address" vocatives have flexible position, appearing before the sentence, after, and even sentence-medially.

(371) a. (Hey), leave those kids alone, (*hey)!

b. (Teacher), leave those kids alone, (teacher)!

c. The problem is, Mr. Bond, that you cannot be left alive!

Vocatives display the same surface positions in GoalCs. Interjections are restricted to appearing before the main utterance, whereas direct address vocatives can appear before or after.[25]

(372) a. Hey, books on the shelf!

b. *Books on the shelf, hey!

c. Bill, books on the shelf!

d. Books on the shelf, Bill!

For the purposes of analyzing GoalCs, vocatives must be outside the domain of edge ellipsis. I will use the neutral moniker "VocP" to signify a projection that is separate from the rest of the clause, and must obligatorily be divided by a prosodic break. Doing so makes the grammaticality of the direct address vocatives in (372c) and (372d) straightforward, neither is in the path of deletion.

(373) $[_{VocP}$ Bill $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~You~~.....$[_{VP}$ ~~put~~ $[_{NP}$ ~~the~~ books $][_{PP}$ on the shelf]]]]

$[+\alpha] \longrightarrow [+\alpha]$

(374) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~You~~.....$[_{VP}$ ~~put~~ $[_{NP}$ ~~the~~ books $][_{PP}$ on the shelf]]] $[_{VocP}$ Bill]

$[+\alpha] \longrightarrow [+\alpha]$

[25] The medial position is quite strange for vocatives in GoalCs.

(1) ??Books, Bill, on the shelf!

This restriction is not unique to GoalCs. This position is also quite odd for vocatives when the deleted material is pronounced.

(2) ??Put the books, Bill, on the shelf!

3.4.7.4 Determiners, Adjectives, and Numerals in GoalCs

The remainder of this section will be devoted to analyzing material within the NP. As we have already seen, articles are ungrammatical within the GoalC NP.

(375) a. (*The) books on the shelf!

b. (*A) book on the shelf!

Our analysis can currently explain this with no problems. Articles are not assigned the [+α] feature, the head noun is. Because of this, articles will always be in the path of deletion because deletion goes from the Pros^0 to the head noun, and articles obligatorily precede their nouns. Unfortunately, this analysis cannot explain the entirety of material that can appear inside the NP. Recall that demonstratives were marginally acceptable in all situations, and were improved by contrastive focus.

(376) a. Those books onto the shelf, and these into my trunk.

b. ?This pen into the drawer, and this pencil onto the desk.

c. ???Those books onto the shelf!

This means that demonstratives can survive the edge ellipsis in GoalCs if they are contrastively focused, but not if they are not contrastively focused. In addition, adjectives and numerals are also moderately acceptable without contrastive focus, and nearly perfect with contrastive focus.

(377) a. ?Red books onto the shelf!

b. Red books onto the shelf, and green books into my car.

c. ??Ten books onto the shelf!

d. Ten books onto the shelf, and nine into my car.

Because demonstratives, adjectives, and numerals are not entirely unacceptable, even in situations with no contrastive focus, I believe that the best analysis is that they are fundamentally acceptable in GoalCs. The mechanism by which they are acceptable is by agreeing with the head N in [+α]. In certain cases, such as demonstratives, this agreement is visible as English demonstratives overtly agree in number. In other cases this agreement

must be covert. A theory of concord within NP must possess some agreement operation between heads like determiners, numerals, adjectives, and the head noun. For example, (Bayırlı 2017) recently argued that nominal concord is universal across all languages, but that overt realization of concord is suppressed by the intervention of phasal domains.

(378)



Why then, can articles not agree with the head N and receive the [+α] feature? I tentatively postulate that the reason is that articles in English cannot participate in agreement with nouns. Because English articles are not agreeing elements, they are obligatorily deleted in GoalCs, because they can never agree with the head N in [+α], and therefore are always in the path of deletion. Later, in Chapter 4, I will claim that there is a correlation between agreeing elements within the NP and deletion within GoalCs.

A reasonable objector may feel that this analysis appears to be missing something. If contrastive focus improves demonstratives, adjectives, and numerals inside the NP, then arguing for an Agree relation between the head noun and prenominal elements seems to be on the wrong track, because focus should not have any obvious interaction with the Agree relation. This argument would seem to amount to saying that focused determiners can agree with the head noun, but non-focused determiners cannot. To my knowledge, there has been no proposed mechanism within the theory of Agree that can perform this function.

Instead, I would like to argue that non-article determiners can always agree with the [+α] feature on the head noun, and that contrastive focus improves them, but not for reasons of left-edge deletion. Recall that there is a contrast, even in non-focused situations, between demonstratives and articles.

(379) a. *The books on the shelf!

b. ??Those books on the shelf!

English demonstratives agree with the nouns they modify in number, making it plausible that they are participating in the Agree relation. If there is a uniquely identifiable set of books, "the" would be used. Since a demonstrative is used instead, there must be some contrasting set. One possibility is that GoalCs presuppose that the theme is unique and identifiable, and that contrast helps provide additional focus to each theme. It seems that (379b) is grammaticality well-formed, but pragmatically odd without contrast.

Contrastive focus therefore gives rise to certain possibilities in both GoalCs and traditional imperatives. The analysis presented here is therefore that agreeing elements within the NP can be marked with the [+α] feature, and non-agreeing elements cannot. There is a separate process by which demonstratives, adjectives, and numerals can improve under contrastive focus. Other items, such as adverbs do not improve at all under contrastive focus.

(380) *Quickly books on the shelf, and slowly magazines onto the table!

The current analysis predicts this because the adverb to the left of the theme cannot be interpreted as agreeing with the head noun. It therefore cannot receive an [+α] feature from the verb, because it is higher than the verb, and it cannot plausibly be receiving an [+α] feature by agreeing with the noun. NP internal material, such as adjectives, can receive an [+α] feature by agreeing with the noun. The following is a derivation for a demonstrative in a GoalC agreeing with the head noun and surviving the ellipsis process. Adjectives work in the same way.

(381) [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~You~~.....[$_{VP}$ ~~put~~ [$_{NP}$ those books][$_{PP}$ on the shelf]]]

[+α] ——————————→ [+α] [+α]

(382) [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~You~~.....[$_{VP}$ ~~put~~ [$_{NP}$ ~~the~~ red books][$_{PP}$ on the shelf]]]

[+α] ——————————→ [+α] [+α]

From the perspective of the deletion algorithm in (351), the [+α] feature on "books" is irrelevant to the edge deletion. The deletion starts at the COMMAND feature, and stops

at the determiner "those," because it is marked with an [+α] feature. The [+α] feature on "books" is relevant only to the extent that it supplies the [+α] feature on the determiner.

3.4.7.5 Quantifiers in GoalCs

The final point of investigation is quantifiers. Certain quantifiers are perfectly natural in GoalCs, on the left edge.

(383) a. All of the books onto the shelf!

b. More groceries into the trunk!

c. ?Fewer magazines onto the table!

It would be straightforward to assign each of these quantifiers an [+α] feature and say that they agree with the head noun. Indeed, under the analysis presented here, they must bear an [+α] feature, because they are capable of surfacing to the left of the GoalC theme. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Other quantifiers are not acceptable.

(384) a. *No books onto the shelf!

b. *Some books onto the shelf!

c. *Many books onto the shelf!

d. *(A) Few books onto the shelf!

e. ??Exactly 3 books onto the shelf!

f. *Most books onto the shelf!

g. *At most 5 books onto the shelf!

It is not immediately clear how to avoid assigning an [+α] feature to the quantifiers in (384) above. One possibility is that the acceptable quantifiers are actually adjectives. Each of the acceptable quantifiers in (383) can appear with a determiner.

(385) a. I gave it my <u>all</u>.

b. The <u>more</u> you know, the less you understand.

c. The <u>fewer</u> you buy, the better for our finances.

Many of the quantifiers in (384) are ruled out via this test, they cannot be modified by determiners.

(386) a. *Don't give it your no!

b. *The some you buy, the worse it will be.

c. *The many you buy, the worse it will be.

d. *I gave it my most!

Unfortunately, it doesn't work for them all. "Few" and "most" are perfectly acceptable modified by a determiner.

(387) a. The few, the proud, the Marines.

b. The most you can expect from him is 15%.

I am not certain what the correct analysis for "few" and "most" is, but because they are ungrammatical in GoalCs, it seems likely that they are not adjectives if our line of reasoning is on the right track.

Tentatively, therefore, I can just say that I will divide the quantifiers that can appear in GoalCs as being agreeing elements, and that the quantifiers that cannot appear in GoalCs are deleted because they do not agree. Unfortunately, there is no independent way to verify this distinction because agreement is not visible on these elements. The following is a derivation of the quantifier "all," which can receive an [+α] feature from the head noun.

(388) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~You~~.....$[_{VP}$ ~~put~~ $[_{NP}$ all the books $][_{PP}$ on the shelf $]]$

$[+\alpha] \longrightarrow [+\alpha] \quad [+\alpha]$

One thing worth noticing about (388) is that the determiner is possible to the right of "all." This is very strong evidence of an edge deletion account. In (388), the quantifier "all" can receive an [+α] feature by agreeing with the head noun, meaning the deletion will stop at "all." This means that, in effect, "all" is acting like a shield for the determiner, which does not receive an [+α] feature and would not be able to survive the deletion on its own. In that sense, the determiner to the right of "all" is analogous to the determiner inside the prepositional phrase in (388). This is a crucial point - GoalCs are not merely an instance

of telegraphic speech, they involve deletion only in a specific area of the clause. The same effect can be seen with other partitives.

(389) a. Tips of your fingers on the counter!

b. Front of the class into my office!

3.5 Some Outstanding Issues

The purpose of this section is to address several outstanding issues that the analysis provided in the previous section cannot explain. I will offer some tentative solutions to the problems mentioned here, but do not intend for my analysis to solve every problem that this data offers in this section.

3.5.1 Depictive Secondary Predicates

Secondary predicates in English can be used to predicate properties of arguments within the sentence without being the primary predicate of the sentence. Secondary predicates fall into two categories: *depictive* or *resultative*. While *depictives* can modify either the subject or the object, *resultatives* can only modify the object.

Below are some examples of secondary predicates in English.

(390) a. Ganon did the laundry *naked*. (subject-oriented depictive)

b. Darunia ate meat *raw*. (object-oriented depictive)

c. Ruto pounded the metal *flat*. (resultative)

In (390a), the secondary predicate describes the state of the subject during the laundry-doing event. In (390b), the secondary predicate describes the state of the object during the eating event. In (390c), the secondary predicate describes the end state of the metal, after the pounding event has concluded.

In (390a), the depictive secondary predicate modifies the subject, which is overt. However, depictive secondary predicates can modify covert subjects as well. Traditional imperatives, which allow optional pronunciation of the subject, can include a depictive secondary predicate that modifies their covert subject.

(391) a. Paint the walls naked!

b. Don't drive your car drunk!

Other instances of left-edge deletion, such as the deletion of subjects and auxiliaries in casual speech and subject deletion in diary register can also be modified by depictive secondary predicates, despite being covert.

(392) a. Ever been to Paris naked?

b. Went to the store drunk today.

The pattern is therefore clear, depictive secondary predicates that are oriented towards the subject can modify both overt and covert subjects equally well. Despite this, GoalCs cannot grammatically host subject-oriented depictive secondary predicates. This is in spite of the fact that "put-type" verbs can host subject-oriented depictive secondary predicates when the verb is overt.

(393) a. *Books onto the shelf naked!

b. ?Everyone into the showers naked!

c. Put the books onto the shelf naked!

d. Everyone get into the showers naked!

In theory, the structure that I pursued in (307) should allow the deleted subject to be modified by a subject-oriented depictive secondary predicate, given that covert subjects are generally capable of being modified by depictive secondary predicates, and that depictive secondary predicates in English are placed on the right rather than the left.

I have no definitive account for this fact, but one possible explanation is that the immediacy requirement placed on GoalCs clashes with a depictive secondary predicate. If depictive secondary predicates are typically not states that hold at utterance time, then it may be the case that the unacceptability of secondary predicates is just a mismatch of immediacy. I would also like to note that object-oriented depictive secondary predicates are also relatively unacceptable in GoalCs, intending to modify the theme, despite the fact that in this case, the object is overt.

(394) a. ???Meat into the freezer raw!

b. Put the meat into the freezer raw!

c. ??Beers into the fridge warm!

d. Put the beers into the fridge warm!

It may therefore be the same that depictive secondary predicates of all kinds are degraded because they tend to lack immediacy, and there is nothing special about the subject-oriented depictive secondary predicates. This is only a tendency though, subject-oriented depictives are grammatical given the right context. In the following exchange, A can command B to do something immediately with a depictive secondary predicate that is acceptable.

(395) A: Put the laundry out on the clothesline!

B: But I'm naked.

A: Put the laundry out on the clothesline naked then!

(396) Laundry onto the clothesline!

B: But I'm naked.

A: ???Laundry onto the clothesline naked then!

3.5.2 The special status of "everybody"

As was previously discussed in Section 3.2.1, 2nd person subjects are generally not able to be overtly pronounced in GoalCs.

(397) a. Hands up!

b. *You hands up!

Imperatives are well-known to be able to host third-person subjects in many languages, in addition to their default second-person subject (Zanuttini et al. 2012; Potsdam 2017). 3rd person subjects seem to pattern with the second-person subject in GoalCs that have an overt theme, they are unpronounceable, even if those subjects are generally available in English imperatives.

(398) a. *Everybody books on the shelf!

b. *Someone milk into the fridge!

c. *Nobody packages under the table!

These facts follow from the left-edge restriction of (258). If the left-edge deletion starts from the theme and moves leftwards, it would delete the subject. This should be equally true of second-person and third-person subjects, which have been argued to occupy the same structural position (Potsdam 2017).

There is a subclass of GoalCs with "everybody" paired with a location that is grammatical, however. This configuration is only possible with universal subjects such as "everybody/everyone" and never with other third-person subjects, even those that are generally possible in English imperatives.

(399) a. Everybody out of the chunnel!

b. ???Nobody out of the chunnel!

c. ???Someone out of the chunnel!

(399a) appears to potentially be a violation of the left-edge restriction described in (258). If "everybody" is analyzed as the subject of a GoalC that does not have a theme, then the overt pronunciation of "everybody" cannot be explained under the current analysis. One possibility, however, is that "everybody" in (399a) is the theme, and that the subject is the covert second person "you." While it is true that tags for "everybody GoalCs" must be second-person and never third-person, the same is true of tags in traditional imperatives with third-person subjects.

(400) a. Everyone into the car, won't you / *they?

b. Everybody please leave, won't you / *they?

This shows that the syntactic subject of "everybody" GoalCs seems to still be IMP-PRO. This also means provides a potential explanation for why "somebody" and "nobody" are unacceptable - they are strange as the object of the put-type verb when it is overtly expressed.

(401) a. Get everybody out of the chunnel!

b. *Get nobody out of the chunnel!

c. ?Get someone out of the chunnel!

This idea can explain why "nobody" is unacceptable in GoalCs, because it is unacceptable in all contexts. On the other hand, (401c) seems fine in an exchange like the following.

(402) A: Who should I get out of the chunnel first?

B: It doesn't matter, just get someone out of the chunnel!

This same context does not help "someone" in a GoalC, however.

(403) A: Get those people out of the chunnel!

B: (acts indecisively about who to get out first)

A: *SOMEONE out of the chunnel, now!

Further complicating the matter is that (399a) is ambiguous, and seems compatible with two readings, one where it is acting more like a subject and another where it is acting more like an object.

(404) Everyone into my car!

→ Reading A: Everyone is obligated to get themself into my car.

→ Reading B: Addressee is obligated to get "everyone" into my car (may or may not include the addressee).

Reading A is compatible with a situation where there is a group of adults and the speaker wants everyone to go into their car. Reading B is compatible with a situation where there is a group of children, and the speaker is entreating the addressee to lead the children into the car. In Reading A, it seems that "everyone" is acting more like a semantic subject than an object, and it seems to be acting more like an object in Reading B. It is unclear to me whether or not the analysis originally presented in (307) can account for this, as it appears that it predicts only Reading B to be available.

3.5.3 Themeless GoalCs

To this point, the significant majority of GoalCs that I have mentioned have consisted of a theme adjacent to a goal. It is possible however to express what appears to be a GoalC without a theme, with just the goal expressed overtly, but no overt verb.

(405) a. This way!

b. Over here!

c. Into that bunker!

d. Out of my sight!

e. To the Batmobile!

Unlike GoalCs with overt themes, the best paraphrase of the themeless GoalCs in (405) does not always seem to involve a put-type verb. For example, (405a) above does not seem easily able to be paraphrased with a put-type verb. Every attempt fails or produces something highly unnatural.

(406) a. ???Get yourself this way! / *Get this way!

b. *Put yourself this way! / *Put this way!

c. ??Bring yourself this way! / *Bring this way!

It is easy to imagine verbs that *do* make reasonable paraphrases for the GoalC in (405a) (*go, come*, etc.), but the fact is that put-type verbs seem a bad fit for at least some themeless GoalCs. This makes it challenging to consolidate themeless GoalCs with the GoalCs we have analyzed thus far. It is not the case that all themeless GoalCs act in this way, however. The other GoalCs in (405) all seem able to be paraphrased with *get*.

(407) a. *Get* over here!

b. *Get* into that bunker!

c. *Get* out of my sight!

d. *Get* to the Batmobile!

In (407), the addressee is interpreted as both the subject and the theme of the GoalC. That is to say that the only interpretation that (407a) can be that the addressee must be responsible for getting the addressee (themself) over here. The same is true for the verbless version in (405b), the addressee is the only reasonable subject of the GoalC.

This data might lead us to conclude that there is no difference between these GoalCs that lack themes and the GoalCs with overt themes, and that both are limited to having an

addressee subject because they possess AddrP. I think there are good reasons to believe that extraneous factors are limiting the GoalC subject to being interpreted as the addressee in (405b), however. Some of the GoalCs in (405) are perfectly compatible with an interpretation in which the speaker also takes place in the action. A reasonable paraphrase for (405e), for example, involves *let's*.

(408) Let's go/get to the Batmobile!

Constructions with *let's* have been analyzed several times before, often as a 1st person equivalent of an imperative (Seppanen 1977; Davies 1986; Potsdam 2017). Potsdam (2017) argues that *let's* in imperatives is an imperative particle, and is not a contraction of "let us," at least in the synchronic grammar of modern English. It is not entirely clear how *let's* would delete from an imperative like (408) to form (405e). If *let's* is a particle in English imperatives, it may be able to be deleted via left-edge deletion of the same kind that deletes subjects, negation, and adverbs. Unfortunately, there is a complication. The prosody in (408) appears to be compatible with a HORTATIVE interpretation, meaning that the speaker is encouraging the action rather than commanding it. Of course, it is also interpretable as a COMMAND, but unlike the GoalCs we have seen so far, it is not limited to COMMAND. Under the system we have developed so far, the $[+\alpha]$ feature associated with the COMMAND Prosody Head was responsible for limiting the Prosody in GoalCs to an urgent command. This was desirable in the case of the GoalCs we have seen to this point, but it is now under-generating in the case of themeless GoalCs.

This difference in available Speech Acts may lead us to consider a different approach. We might, for example, consider a *direct interpretation* approach to these fragments. After all, it seems difficult to derive the ellipsis necessary to produce just a PP with relatively flexible interpretation. Binding facts, however, seem to suggest that the typical imperative subject licensed by the presence of AddrP is present in GoalCs.

(409) a. To me, everyone! / *To myself, everyone!

b. *To you, everyone! / ???To yourselves, everyone! / ???Towards each other, everyone!

c. To him, everyone! / *To himself, everyone!

1st and 3rd person non-reflexive pronouns are acceptable as the goal, but not 2nd person. I take these facts about binding to be indicative that there is a AddrP present in *"to"* imperatives. This fact is straightforwardly explained if these *"to"* GoalCs possess AddrP.

Of course, there may be an interpretational reason why 2nd person pronouns are highly marked in this construction. Given that *"to"* GoalCs are limited to an interpretation of movement, it is not clear semantically how the addressee(s) can move to themselves. Moving to the location of another person is acceptable and has a clear meaning, but moving to yourself is semantically quite odd. Nevertheless, there seems to be a slight contrast in the speakers that I surveyed between the reflexive and non-reflexive pronoun in (409b). This could potentially be explained by the fact that the typical imperative subject is present in the construction, blocking the grammaticality of 2nd person non-reflexive pronouns via Condition B. The 2nd person reflexive pronoun is grammatical, but semantically quite odd, causing high unacceptability but still producing a contrast with the non-reflexive pronoun.

If this contrast is real, then we can potentially analyze these PP imperatives as being GoalCs. All of the left-edge effects present in the previously analyzed GoalCs are also present in PP imperatives.

(410) a. *You out of my sight! (subject)

b. *Not out of my sight! (negation)

c. *Quickly out of my sight! (adverb)

Despite this fact, the uses available to some PP imperatives are not identical to GoalCs. GoalCs were limited to COMMAND usage, WISH and PERMISSION uses are unavailable to GoalCs. As we will see in Chapter 4, this restriction holds across a sample of 8 additional languages. Despite this, there is a difference in available uses even within the category of themeless GoalCs. PPs like (410) above are limited to COMMAND usage, but PPs with *"to"* are also compatible with a HORTATIVE interpretation in which the speaker is also a participant in the action.

(411) To the Batmobile!

→ Interpretation A: Only the Addressee goes to the Batmobile.

→ Interpretation B: Speaker and Addressee go to the Batmobile.

Interpretation B is not available for each instance of a PP imperative we have seen. The PP "out of my sight" does not allow Interpretation B.

(412) Out of my sight!

→ Interpretation A: Addressee only gets out of speaker's sight.

≠ Interpretation B: Speaker and Addressee get out of speaker's sight.

However, there is a clear explanation for this fact - it is semantically implausible that the speaker could remove themself from their own sight. If the object of the PP is modified to something that is semantically plausible, then the hortative reading appears.

(413) Out of the woods!

→ Interpretation A: Addressee only gets out of the woods.

→ Interpretation B: Speaker and Addressee get out of the woods.

One possible explanation for these facts is that putative GoalCs with flexible agent interpretation like (413) are not in fact GoalCs at all, but in fact are an instance of the "GOAL with X" construction that was discussed previously. If this is the case, the flexible agent interpretation is contained in a deleted PP.

(414) a. Out of the woods with you!

b. ??Out of the woods with us!

This analysis would explain the variable interpretation of the agent in these instances. I am not entirely convinced, however. Most speakers that I asked found the supposed derivation involving both the speaker and addressee in (414b) to be quite odd. If this is really the underlying form, we might expect that it would sound more natural, given that deletion of the PP should be optional here.

As mentioned in the previous section, "everyone" is possible directly preceding a PP with no prosodic break. The status of "everyone" remains somewhat unclear.

(415) Everyone out of my sight!

3.5.4 Coordination

It is possible for the GoalC theme to be two conjoined NPs.

(416) Books and magazines on the table!

When these NPs are conjoined, as in (416), neither conjunct can have a determiner.

(417) (*The) books and (*the) magazines on the table!

The ungrammaticality of the article in the first conjunct has been explained up to this point in our analysis of agreement within the NP and the [+α] feature. Because it cannot receive an [+α] feature, and is in the path of deletion, it is obligatorily deleted. The same cannot be said of the article in the second conjunct. As it stands, our analysis appears to predict that articles within the second conjunct should be grammatical, given that they are not in the path of deletion. In a traditional imperative with no deletion, it is possible to coordinate NP with a determiner in each conjunct, or conjoin the NPs under one determiner.

(418) a. Put the books and magazines on the table!

b. Put the books and the magazines on the table!

Our current analysis of GoalCs causes a traditional imperative like (418a) to serve as the input to the GoalC in (416). Given the ungrammaticality of (417), it seems that (418b) cannot serve as the input to a GoalC at all.

One possibility is that there is simply a restriction against an ellipsis process that operates outside a coordinate structure, and then goes into only one coordinate. Since edge ellipsis in GoalCs starts in ProsP and proceeds rightward until it encounters an [+α], this means that the ellipsis begins outside the coordinate structure but enters into it. If this is the case, perhaps there is some problem with deleting only one edge of a coordinate. Because of this, only the version in which coordination takes place under the determiner can feed as the input to GoalCs. Since the determiner is outside coordination, deletion does not need to enter the coordinate structure. It is also possible to coordinate other instances of left-edge ellipsis.

(419) a. Ɨ went to the store and Ɨ bought milk.

b. ~~I'm~~ going to the pub tonight and ~~I'm~~ trying something new.

Unfortunately, not much is known about the restrictions that may exist on edge deletion, meaning that more work needs to be done on the acceptability of edge deletion to know why exactly it is that the coordinates have to match in their determiners.

3.5.5 Distribution of "The Hell"

This subsection will discuss the incompatibility of GoalCs with the expression "the hell," an incompatibility that is somewhat tricky to explain given that both constructions appear to require goals. Since (Pesetsky 1987), it is well-known that there exists an expression, "the hell," which can combine with some wh-phrases in English, appearing to their right (e.g., "what the hell"). As Pesetsky (1987) points out, "the hell" wh-phrases must obligatorily move to the front of the clause, and certain combinations are ruled out (*which the hell). Combining "the hell" with a wh-expression is typically associated pragmatically with being "aggressively non-D-linked," meaning they cannot be linked to prior discourse (Pesetsky 1987).[26]

(420) a. What the hell were you doing?

b. Why the hell would do you that?

[26] One unusual case of "What the hell" that does not seem to act as an intensifier is as an answer to a yes-no question.

(1) A: Do you want to go to the play tomorrow?
B: Ah, what the hell!

Here, B's answer means "yes" and seems to be semantically very similar to "Why not?" I do not know of any analysis of this usage of "What the hell" but it appears to be limited only to "what" and not other wh-phrases.

(2) A: Do you want to go to Athens?
B: #Ah, where the hell! / Ah, why the hell #(not)!

Interestingly, this usage seems degraded with "the fuck," though still may be marginally possible.

(3) A: Do you want to go to Outback Steakhouse?
B: #Ah, what the fuck! (#Yes)

c. Where the hell have you been?

d. I want to know where the hell you went.

e. I go wherever the hell I want.

Although the majority of the focus in the literature on "the hell" has been on wh-constructions (Pesetsky (1987); Huang and Ochi (2004); Polinsky (2007); Den Dikken and Giannakidou (2002)), the syntactic distribution of "the hell" is wider than is usually recognized. Below are several corpus examples of "the hell" preceding prepositions that are compatible with goal interpretation in at least some contexts.[27,28]

(421) a. Won't wear a mask on a plane? Get **the heck** off and pay a big fine.

Chicago Sun-Times, May 13, 2021

b. When "Shut **the Hell** Up" is the Best Advice

(https://www.bernsteincrisismanagement.com/when-shut-the-hell-up-is-the-best-advice/)

c. I'm completely **the fuck** over Michael Moore.

(https://twitter.com/kokomothegreat/status/1286453697187381253)

In (421), "the hell" expressions precede the prepositions "off," "up," and "over." It is worth noting that these prepositions may be used in situations completely divorced from

[27] As far as I can tell, "the heck," "the hell," and "the fuck" share a mostly identical syntactic distribution, with each member occupying a different register ("the heck" being the least profane, "the hell" being in the middle, and "the fuck" being the most profane). Where there exist small distributional differences, the most likely explanation seems to be that certain phrases become conventionalized with only one of the terms.

[28] The distribution of "the hell" phrases is even more complex than can be described here. For example, "the hell" can also precede "not," auxiliaries, and infinitives.

(1) I think **the fuck** not...

(https://twitter.com/iamkennieg/status/608676823367450624)

(2) We sure **the heck** will!

(https://twitter.com/chrislhayes/status/1298360756182941697)

(3) Can you get **the fuck** to sleep please?

(https://youtu.be/3Sid3kylguM?t=1228)

their literal meaning. The particle verb construction "shut up" in (421b) does not have any literal meaning for "up," it is an entirely idiomatic combination of the lexical verb "shut" and particle "up". Nevertheless, "up" in this construction can be preceded by "the hell." Because "up" is compatible with being a goal, it can apparently host "the hell" even when used non-literally.

As far as I am aware, Bruening (2011) in a blog post is the first to notice that "the hell" can precede certain prepositions in English. He notes that it is specifically directional PPs that license "the hell," and that other parts of speech are impossible. The following examples, all taken from Bruening's blog post, illustrate the impossibility of an NP, AdjP, and CP.

(422) a. *I fled the hell the scene.

b. ??I got the hell lost.

c. *I ran the hell as fast as I could.

d. *I hope the hell (that) she's not there. (not to be confused with I hope to hell that...)

e. *I wonder the hell where she went. (Bruening 2011)

What Bruening does not note, and to my knowledge no one has noted, is that the syntactic distribution of "the hell" is specifically limited to appearing before locative PPs. Other PPs are not acceptable.

(423) a. *This book is the heck about the Decembrist revolt.

b. *Justin appeared at the party the hell with Britney.

c. *The Krogan battled the fuck against the Rachni.

d. *Cut it the hell with the knife!

e. *Stop fooling the hell around!

"The hell" expressions can only precede goal PPs, and never non-goal PPs, even if "goal PPs" are not being used in an obvious goal context.[29] The connection between "the

[29] One interesting example is "home" which acts in the syntax like a PP with no head.

hell" and GoalCs goes deeper than simply involving locative phrases, however. It turns out that GoalCs are actually in complementary distribution with "the hell." Traditional imperatives and declaratives can host "the hell" within them to the left of locative prepositions.

(424) a. Get the hell up that tree!

b. I got the hell up that tree.

What this crucially shows is that "the hell" is compatible with the force of an imperative. That is to say, it cannot be the fact that "the hell" is incompatible with an imperative, given that it is grammatical in (424a). Even though "the hell" can appear in imperatives, and GoalCs require a goal, GoalCs can never host "the hell."

(425) a. Get those books the hell out of here!

b. *Books the hell out of here!

The Left-Edge Restriction in (258) cannot account for the data in (425) because 'the hell" is ungrammatical even to the right of the theme. Thus, "the hell" could not be plausibly in the path of deletion leftward from the theme, yet it is still ungrammatical. It is not tenable to argue that the performativity of imperatives more generally in English somehow clashes with the attitude specified by "the hell," given that "the hell" does grammatically appear in traditional imperatives that are interpreted as forceful commands, identical to GoalCs.

One possible analysis of this data is that the performativity in GoalCs is in complementary distribution with "the hell" because there is one performative specifier position

---

(1) a. Go (*to) home!
b. Go *(to) Rome!

Despite this, "home" strikes me as quite unacceptable in GoalCs, though it can host "the hell" to its left.

(2) a. *All the children home!
b. Get all the children home!
c. Get the hell home!

What this shows is that there may potentially be a small difference in the distribution of GoalC goals and location phrases that can be preceded by "the hell," despite there generally being a large overlap between the two.

available for a PP that can host either a necessity modal (necessary for deriving the COMMAND meaning of GoalCs) or "the hell."

(426)



In essence, the tree in (426) is arguing for a single syntactic position that hosts the performativity associated with GoalCs, which I name a "Performative" head here without any particular theoretical implications intended. One reason to think there is a specifier position inside the PP for "the hell" is the word order of "the hell" relative to "right." "Right" can be used to modify PPs, always appearing to their left (Huddleston and Pullum 2002).[30]

(427) a. The fox went *right* up the tree.

b. The boat went *right* over the river.

It is possible to combine "right" and "the hell." When combined, "right" always precedes "the hell" and never vice-versa.

(428) a. The fox went right the hell up the tree.

b. The boat went right the hell over the river.

c. *The fox went the hell right up the tree.

d. *The boat went the hell right over the river.

[30] Much like GoalCs and "the hell" more generally, "right" only modifies goal PPs as well.

(1) a. *George RR Martin wrote that book right about the White Walkers.
b. *The children are right asleep.
c. The children fell right asleep.

One possible analysis of these facts is that there is some operator present in Spec-PP that is in complementary distribution with "the hell." This operator possesses the feature [+α]. If there is COMMAND prosody, this operator moves to Pros^0, and you get deletion.

(429)



Although the relationship between the performative head and the imperative operator is not entirely clear, I simply intend for the tree in (429) to signify that, at some level, "the hell" and imperative performativity are in complementary distribution because they are reliant on the same structural position. I take the data in (428) as evidence that "the hell" originates inside the PP, in the specifier position, whereas "right" modifies the PP and is PP-external. This specifier position is also associated with the performativity of GoalCs, and thus GoalCs cannot host "the hell" expressions.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there exists a construction, the *Goal Command*, which has the properties of a truncated imperative clause. There is an edge ellipsis process that deletes material to the left in English. This edge ellipsis is conditioned by the presence of at least two [+α] features: one associated with COMMAND prosody, and the other with a put-type verb. This edge ellipsis analysis derives the facts accurately; subjects, negation, and adverbs are all ungrammatical because they surface to the left of the GoalC theme. This edge ellipsis process is unusual typologically, in that it bans contentful, non-given material from appearing in the path of ellipsis. Within the NP, acceptability is more variable, because of the ability of NP-internal material to agree with the theme in [+α]. These facts all indicate that the best analysis of GoalCs involves edge ellipsis that is conditioned by features present on put-type verbs and a Prosody Head.

Chapter 4

CROSS-LINGUISTIC GOAL COMMANDS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will be a cross-linguistic investigation of the properties of Goal Commands (GoalCs). Although it is possible to read this chapter on its own, I highly recommend reading Chapter 3 beforehand, as this chapter will compare the data across languages to the data collected for English in Chapter 3 and utilize similar diagnostics. Far from being a phenomenon limited to English, GoalCs are found in a robust number of languages and language families. Below is featured a subset of the languages that will be investigated in this chapter.[1,2]

(430) a. Qo'l-lar stol-da!
hand-Pl table-Loc
'Hands on the table!' (Uzbek)

b. Lichi-ta refrigeradura-pi!
milk-Acc fridge-Loc
'Milk into the fridge!' (Quechua)

c. Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
book Pl in pot iron the
'Books in the box!' (Igbo)

[1] All judgments in this chapter were collected as a result of original consultation with native speaker linguists. When possible, these linguists have consulted with family members and friends to confirm the judgments.

[2] I am not claiming that this construction is universal. Benjamin Bruening (p.c.) points out that languages like Passamaquoddy-Maliseet may lack an analogous construction because the language appears to lack adpositional phrases entirely. If a language requires verbs to mark all positional relations, then by definition it cannot participate in GoalCs, which must be verbless.

d. Meli-ey son!
head-Loc hand
'Hands on your head!' (Korean)

Based on the properties of English GoalCs described at the beginning of Chapter 3 for English, the utterances in (430) all appear to be GoalCs. The three essential properties that were described in Section 3 were that a GoalC must contain a 1) *goal*, 2) be limited to COMMAND prosody and subsequently the speech act COMMAND, and 3) must lack an overt verb. Following these criteria, each of the examples in (430) appears to be a GoalC.

There is, however, minor variation across each of these languages, based on the individual morphosyntax of each language. The Uzbek example in (430a), for example, does not mark the theme as accusative, despite the language having accusative case available when the verb is overt. The Quechua example in (430b) displays the opposite pattern, obligatorily marking the theme with accusative case. The Igbo example in (430c) does not mark case on the theme, but does mark number. The Korean GoalC in (430d) marks neither number nor definiteness on its theme, as is typical of Korean NPs.

Despite some small variation, all of these GoalCs share many more commonalities than differences. Where there are differences, this variation is related to the morphosyntactic properties of each language, rather than evidence of each language having a unique construction. The semantic/pragmatic force of each utterance is remarkably stable across languages, and each lacks an overt verb despite the existence of a form in each language with an imperativized verb. Because of these facts, I will treat each instance of this construction as a "GoalC" in an attempt to determine the relevant cross-linguistic properties.

The central finding of this chapter is that GoalCs are widespread, existing with a similar pragmatic function and morphosyntax in every language in the sample. Although the group of languages surveyed in this chapter constitutes an opportunity sample, I have done my best to represent a number of language areas and families within the sample. It was necessary to utilize an opportunity sample in this case because, to my knowledge, essentially no literature exists on this topic across languages. Within this opportunity sample, the following generalizations emerged.

Each language in the sample is capable of truncating a traditional imperative to form a GoalC. The first order of business for each language will be to establish some basic properties of traditional imperatives within that language, and subsequently compare them to GoalCs within that language. Additionally, I will establish for each language the speech acts that are compatible with traditional imperatives, and the speech acts that are compatible with GoalCs. The results are striking: In every language in the sample, traditional imperatives have variable force, participating in at least COMMAND and PERMISSION uses, and almost always participating in WISH uses as well. GoalCs, however, are always limited to COMMAND usage and prosody. I take this to mean that it is at least initially promising that the $[+\alpha]$ feature could be operative in languages other than English, with the same pragmatic effect, limiting the possible prosody to COMMAND.

The next objective of this chapter is to establish the relationship between the word orders and cases available to traditional imperatives and the word orders and cases available to GoalCs. I establish a four-way typology of GoalC languages: *well-behaved*, *poorly-behaved (superset)*, *poorly-behaved (subset)*, and *disjunct*. Each of these characteristics applies at both the word order level and the case marking level, meaning that a language can be characterized in two different ways at each level. For example, Quechua is *well-behaved* with respect to its case marking, but *poorly-behaved (subset)* with respect to its word order. With one exception, each of the languages that I investigate in this chapter mark case overtly on nouns, so that the case-marking diagnostic can be tested. An example of a well-behaved GoalC language with respect to both word order and case is Japanese. Below is an example of a put-type traditional imperative and a GoalC in Japanese. Accusative and topic marking are possible on the direct object of both the GoalC and traditional imperative, and not nominative or null marking.

(431) a. Hon-**o**/-**wa**/*-**ga**/*∅ tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book-**Acc**-**Top**-**Nom**-**Null** shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol
'Put the books onto the shelf!'

b. Hon-**o**/-**wa**/*-**ga**/*∅ tana-ni!
book-**Acc**-**Top**-**Nom**-**Null** shelf-Loc
'Books onto the shelf!' (Japanese)

Japanese therefore counts as *well-behaved* because the case that the theme receives is unaffected by the overtness of the verb. If the default assumption is that (431b) is derived from (431a), this is what we would expect. Japanese is also well-behaved with respect to the possible word orders of the goal and theme. In both traditional imperatives and GoalCs in Japanese, both the theme-goal and goal-theme orders of the constituents are grammatical.

(432) a. Tana-ni hon-o modoshi-nasai!
shelf-Loc book-Acc put-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book-Acc shelf-Loc put-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

c. Tana-ni hon-o!
shelf-Loc book-Acc
'Books on the shelf!'

d. Hon-o tana-ni!
book-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'

This is exactly what we would expect if GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives in Japanese. A central finding of this chapter, however, is that not all languages match the possible cases and word orders between traditional imperatives and GoalCs. There are some poorly-behaved languages where the case marking of a GoalC theme is more restricted than the case marking available to the theme of a traditional imperative. I call these *subset* languages, because the options for case-marking in GoalCs are a proper subset of the options available to traditional imperatives. Korean is an example of a *subset* language with respect to case marking.

(433) a. Meli-ey son-**ul/*-un/*-i/-∅** noh-a-yo!
head-Loc hand-**Acc-Top-Nom-Null** put-Imp-Pol
'Hands on your head!'

b. Meli-ey son-***-ul/*-un/*-i/-∅**!
head-Loc hand-**Acc-Top-Nom-Null**
'Hands on your head!' (Korean)

The crucial condition that makes Korean a *subset* language is the accusative. The accusative (*son-ul*) is a possibility in the traditional put-type imperative in (433a), but is ungrammatical in the GoalC in (433b). Instead, null marking is required. Thus, the options for case-marking in GoalCs are a *subset* of the general case possibilities. Subset languages are also possible with regard to word order. Traditional Quechuan imperatives allow the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders, but GoalCs are restricted to the theme-goal word order.

(434) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
'Put the books on the table!'

b. Mesa-pi libru-kuna-ta chura-y!
table-Loc book-Pl-Acc put-Imp
'Put the books on the table!"

c. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
'Books on the table!'

d. Mesa-pi libru-kuna-ta!
table-Loc book-Pl-Acc
#'Books on the table!' / the books that are on the table (Quechua)

Not all poorly-behaved languages exhibit the subset pattern. There are also poorly-behaved languages in which the case marking of a GoalC theme appears to be more permissive than the case marking available to the theme of a traditional imperative. I call these *superset* languages. They are *poorly-behaved* to the extent that there is an asymmetry between possible case-marking in GoalCs and put-type traditional imperatives. Greek is an example of a *superset* language.

(435) a. Val-e ton anaptira / *o anaptiras sto rafi!
put-Imp the.**Acc** lighter.**Acc** / the.**Nom** lighter.**Nom** on.the shelf
'Put that lighter on the shelf!'

b. Ton anaptira / O anaptiras sto rafi!
the.**Acc** lighter.**Acc** / the.**Nom** lighter.**Nom** on.the shelf!
'Lighter onto the shelf!'

The crucial condition that makes Greek a *superset* language is the nominative. The nominative is possible for the GoalC theme, but is ungrammatical on the theme of an overt-put type verb. Thus, the options for case-marking in GoalCs are a *superset* of the general case possibilities. If the GoalC theme receives case from a covert verb in Greek, it is difficult to see how it could receive nominative case in an example like (435b).

This marks the end of the attested patterns in this chapter. Given the small, opportunistic sample, we cannot generalize this data to all languages, but the patterns that do exist are notable. There are no languages in the sample that exhibit a *superset* word order pattern. A theoretical language that exhibited this pattern would require strict word order in a traditional imperative, but free word order in a GoalC. The following is a representation of what a *superset* word order language would look like, which is unattested in the actual sample presented here.

(436) a. Verb Theme Goal!

b. *Verb Goal Theme!

c. Goal Theme!

d. Theme Goal!

There are no disjunct languages, either in case-marking or word order, in the sample presented here. The closest language is Turkish, which in one word order configuration displays a disjunctive pattern.

(437) a. Kitap-lar-**ı/*-∅** raf-a koy!
book-Pl-**Acc/Nom** shelf-Dat put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Kitap-lar-***ı/-∅** raf-a!
book-Pl-**Acc/Nom** shelf-Dat
'Books onto the shelf!'

Turkish cannot be considered a true disjunct language, however, because bare objects are possible in other imperative configurations. A true disjunct case language would be a language that requires one case when the verb is overt, and a different case in GoalCs. Below is a sketch of what such a language could look like.

(438) a. Verb Theme-acc/*dat Goal!

b. Theme-dat/*acc Goal!

Below is a table that shows the classifications of each language in this sample which marks case overtly with regards to its case-marking.

Language Type	#	Example Languages
Well-Behaved	3	Japanese, Bengali, Quechua
Poorly-Behaved (Subset)	2	Korean, Turkish
Poorly-Behaved (Superset)	2	Greek, Uzbek
Disjunct	0	

There are also no disjunct word order languages in the sample. A disjunct word order language would require one word order in one configuration and a different word order in another configuration. Because GoalCs in many instances only consist of a theme and goal, there are only two possible orders of these elements with respect to one another. Below is a sketch of what a disjunct word order language, unattested in this sample, would look like. The crucial difference between this and (436) is that the only configuration for a GoalC is never possible in a traditional imperative.

(439) a. Verb Theme Goal!

b. *Verb Goal Theme!

c. Goal Theme!

d. *Theme Goal!

Below is a table that shows the classifications of each language in the sample with respect to word order. It is possible to assign a value to every language in the sample, unlike case, which was undefined for several languages that do not mark case.

Language Type	#	Example Languages
Well-Behaved	7	English, Japanese, Korean, Greek, Turkish, Bengali, Igbo
Poorly-Behaved (Subset)	2	Uzbek, Quechua
Poorly-Behaved (Superset)	0	
Disjunct	0	

This means that there are only two languages that are well-behaved both with respect to case marking and word order, Japanese and Bengali.

The final section will investigate whether or not there is any evidence of edge ellipsis in each language. There are three main patterns that have been discovered. The first, left-edge ellipsis, was already explained for English in Chapter 3. English typifies this pattern by allowing adverbs on the left edge of traditional imperatives but not GoalCs.

(440) a. (Quickly) place the books on the shelf (quickly)!

b. *Quickly books on the shelf!

c. Books on the shelf quickly!

Japanese is an example of a language that shows a similar effect to the one shown above for English in (440), but on the right edge, forming a mirror to English.

(441) a. (**Hayaku**) hono-o tana-ni (**hayaku**) modoshi-nasai!
quickly book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly return-Imp.Pol
'(Quickly) put the books (quickly) onto the shelf!'

b. *Hon-o tana-ni **hayaku**!
book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

c. **Hayaku** hon-o tana-ni!
quickly book-Acc shelf-Loc
'Quickly books on the shelf!'

Despite initially seeming opposite, Japanese and English are actually acting quite similarly with respect to GoalCs, with the only difference being the direction of deletion.

This is not the only way in which English and Japanese exhibit different ellipsis behavior. They also exhibit different behavior when it comes to *gapping*. Gapping is a type

of ellipsis in which the highest verb, possibly along with portions of its VP, is removed in one, or a series of, coordinations.

(442) Spence built a computer, and Keith ~~built~~ a woodshed.

Ross (1970a) describes two main types of languages, forward gapping languages and backward gapping languages. English exhibits *forward* gapping only, meaning that the pronounced verb must precede the deleted verbs. If the pronounced verb succeeds the deleted verb, the result is ungrammatical.

(443) *Spence ~~built~~ a computer, and Keith built a woodshed.

Japanese, on the other hand, exhibits only backwards gapping. If the pronounced verb precedes the deleted verb, the result is ungrammatical.

(444) a. Watakusi-wa sakana-o, Biru-wa gohan-o tabeta.
I-Top fish-Acc Bill-Top rice-Acc ate
'I ate fish and Bill rice.'

b. *Watakusi-wa sakana-o tabeta, Biru-wa gohan-o.
I-Top fish-Acc ate Bill-Top rice-Acc
Intended: 'I ate fish and Bill rice.' (Ross 1970a)

For each language in the sample, I will investigate both the direction of edge ellipsis and the directionality of gapping in that language. The basic theory of gapping presented here will be that gapping is a directional process that scans the structure and deletes all identical verbs (and optionally VP internal material).

(445) Gapping: Gapping is a PF deletion process that takes either the leftmost or rightmost instance of a verb in a coordinated structure and deletes all identical verbs in one direction.

Conceiving of gapping in this way makes one prediction that is borne out, there is no such thing as an "intermediate" gapping language that can delete the leftmost and rightmost instances of a verb in a conjunction of three or more items. Neither forwards nor backwards gapping languages can exhibit this behavior.

(446) a. Spence ~~built~~ a computer, Pat built a treehouse, and Keith ~~built~~ a woodshed.

b. *Watakusi-wa sakana-o ~~tabeta~~, Biru-wa gohan-o tabeta, Akira-wa natto-o
I-Top fish-Acc ate Bill-Top rice-Acc ate Akira-Top natto-Acc
~~tabeta~~.
ate
Intended: 'I ate fish, Bill rice, and Akira natto.'

The essential hypothesis is that languages will generally prefer to delete at PF in the same direction. That is, if a language exhibits forwards gapping, it will delete on the left edge in GoalCs. If a language exhibits backwards gapping, it will delete on the right edge.

Other languages do not display any obvious evidence of edge ellipsis at all. Uzbek speakers, for example, differ in whether or not they accept adverbs to be acceptable in GoalCs. However, all speakers surveyed agreed that adverbs were either acceptable regardless of position, or unacceptable regardless of position. Because the edge effects are fundamentally based on an asymmetry, this suggests that no Uzbek speakers are deleting on the edge. I omit a classification table for this diagnostic, because we will see that there are several complications that make the edge of deletion not entirely clear in each case.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that this sample was as diverse as possible for an opportunity sample. The following table displays the language family and region associated with each language in the sample.

Language	Family	Primary Continent
Japanese	Japonic (isolate)	Asia
Korean	Koreanic (isolate)	Asia
Greek	Indo-European	Europe
Turkish	Turkic	Europe
Uzbek	Turkic	Asia
Quechua	Quechuan	South America
Bengali	Indo-European	Asia
Igbo	Niger-Congo	Africa

Two language families are represented twice; there are two Indo-European languages and two Turkic languages. In both cases, however, the region associated with each language

is quite different.

The starting point for the investigation of each language will be to attempt to compare that language's properties to the analysis that was presented for English in Chapter 3. In many cases significant departures will be necessary. I will always attempt to ground each analysis of GoalCs in the morphosyntactic properties of that language more generally, keeping in mind the similarity between GoalCs and traditional imperatives. And now, to the data!

4.2 GoalC Data

4.2.1 Japanese GoalCs

This section will be an investigation of Japanese, a language isolate primarily spoken in Japan.[3] Japanese has very different morphosyntax from English, meaning that it provides an interesting initial testing ground for applying our theory of English GoalCs to another language. Japanese marks case overtly and has relatively flexible word order. What we will find is that Japanese is *well-behaved* with respect to both case and word order, meaning that the possibilities for GoalCs match what is available to traditional imperatives. Japanese deletion is to the right, rather than to the left, forming a mirror of the English pattern.

4.2.1.1 Japanese Traditional Imperatives

Traditional Japanese imperative verbs possess a suffix that indicates the clause type is an imperative and marks the overall politeness level of the context. In (447a) below, the direct object of the put-type verb receives accusative case, and the verb is marked with the suffix "-nasai," which both indicates that the utterance is an imperative and that the context is a relatively polite one. In (447b) below, the imperative verb is marked with the suffix "-se," which indicates that the utterance is an imperative but does not indicate anything particular about the discourse context (here marked as "plain").[4]

(447) a. Hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book-Acc shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol

[3] Thanks to Yuki Seo and Keita Ishii for providing the judgments throughout this section.

[4] Politeness in Japanese is significantly more complicated than is presented here. See McCready (2019) for a more complete overview of the Japanese formality system.

'Put the books onto the shelf!'

b. Torofi-o tsukue-no shita ni modos-e!
trophy-Acc desk-Acc under Loc return-Imp.Pln
'Get the trophies under the desk!'

Following the original pattern established for English, it is possible to express commands that are very similar to the ones expressed by (447a) and (447b) as GoalCs. In (448a) and (448b) below, only the theme and location are overtly expressed, while the verb is omitted. The theme is unmarked for number, as is typical of Japanese objects, and can be interpreted as either singular or plural.

(448) a. Hon-o tana-ni!
book-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'

b. Torofi-o tsukue-no shita ni!
trophy-Acc desk-Acc under Loc
'Trophies under the desk!'

The utterances in (448) both appear to superficially match the properties of English GoalCs. They both omit the verb, yet possess a meaning similar to an analogous traditional imperative that is expressed with an overt put-type verb. Both require a location argument of some kind (in this case, the locative suffix "-ni" performs this function). The GoalCs in (448) are also used most naturally as urgent commands. My Japanese informants volunteered that the context that was evoked by commands such as those in (448) would be something like a drill sergeant barking orders at a recruit, which is identical to added force that we saw for English GoalCs. Traditional Japanese imperatives have a range of uses available to them, reminiscent of the case in English, allowing at least permission and wish uses in addition to command usage (Davis 2011).

(449) a. Pen-o kure!
pen-Acc hand.me.Imp
'Hand me the pen!' (command)

b. Ashita ame huru-na!
tomorrow rain rain-Neg
'Don't rain tomorrow!' (wish)

c. Hoshi kereba kukki-o tori-nasai.
want if cookie-Acc take-Imp.Pol
'Take a cookie, if you like.' (permission)

This range of uses is very similar to the range available to traditional English imperatives. Japanese GoalCs on the other hand, can only be used as urgent commands. Permission and wish uses of GoalCs are infelicitous, despite the fact that they are possible in traditional imperatives.

(450) a. Te-o tsukue-ni!
hand-Acc table-Loc
'Hands on the table!' (command)

b. Nimotsu-o posuto-ni!
package-Acc mailbox-Loc
'Package in the mailbox!' #(wish)

c. #Hoshi kereba, te-o tsukue-ni.
want if hand-Acc table-Loc
'Hands on the table, if you like.' (permission)

In Section 3, I analyzed English GoalCs as containing a feature, [+α], that licensed GoalCs and strengthened a COMMAND feature on a Prosody Head, with the discourse effect of making the command interpreted as urgent. Given that Japanese GoalCs are also limited to COMMAND usage, it seems promising to utilize the same [+α] feature in Japanese. I will place the Prosody Head in the right periphery, to match the location of C^0, for now, following Miyagawa (2022) in arguing that Japanese has its periphery on the right. C^0 is typically argued to be rightward in Japanese (Kuno 1973; Saito and Haraguchi 2012). I propose a preliminary derivation of (450a) in (451) below. There is an [+α] feature associated with the Prosody Head COMMAND, and two additional [+α] features that are assigned to the complements of the put-type verb *modoshi*. For now, I leave aside the issue of the Addressee operator.

(451)



An interesting issue arises in Japanese that is not present in English. As we have already seen, Japanese can mark the verb with a suffix which is typically argued to be present in the right periphery of the clause and host clause-type information (Davis 2011). Interestingly, however, the imperative suffix cannot surface in GoalCs. Neither the polite nor plain imperative verbal suffix (bolded below) from (447a) and (447b) can grammatically appear in a GoalC.

(452) a. *Hon-o tana-ni-**nasai**!
book-Acc shelf-Loc-Imp.Pol
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

b. *Torofi-o tsukue-no shita ni-**nasai**!
trophy-Acc desk-Acc under Loc-Imp.Pol
Intended: 'Trophies under the desk!'

c. *Hon-o tana-ni-**se**!
book-Acc shelf-Loc-Imp.Pln
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

d. *Torofi-o tsukue-no shita ni-**se**!
trophy-Acc desk-Acc under Loc-Imp.Pln
Intended: 'Trophies under the desk!'

The most likely explanation for this fact is that the imperative suffix cannot appear in a GoalC because it is a verbal suffix, and is therefore in the path of deletion. Because the imperative suffix is limited to suffixing onto a verb, and GoalCs lack verbs by definition,

the suffix can never appear in a Japanese GoalC. This means that, since verbs are the bearers of clause-type information in Japanese, an interesting side-effect of verb-deletion is the loss of clause-type information. The copula and interrogative markers are also completely ungrammatical.

(453) a. *Hon-o tana-ni-**da**.
book-Acc shelf-Loc-Decl.Pln
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

b. *Hon-o tana-ni-**ka**?
book-Acc shelf-Loc-Q
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

Despite the fact that GoalCs cannot contain clause-type marking suffixes, they are always interpreted as imperatives (specifically immediate commands), and never as declaratives or interrogatives. Following the discussion of clause-type information bundling to this point, they receive COMMAND prosody, which is falling in Japanese, distinct from other prosodies (Alpatov 2001).[5] Even in environments where clause-typing markers are ungrammatical, speakers are able to correctly identify GoalCs as imperatives.

4.2.1.2 Word Orders and Case

An issue that was not raised by English but is posed by Japanese is the available word orders and case marking of the arguments in Japanese GoalCs relative to Japanese traditional imperatives. Japanese word order is much freer than English, with the only somewhat strict requirement being that the verb comes at the end of the sentence. Starting with traditional put-type imperatives, the goal can precede the theme (454a) or follow it (454b). I do not investigate orders in which the verb is not clause-final, since verb- final is the default position for the Japanese verb, regardless of clause type (Hasegawa 2014).

(454) a. Tana-ni hon-o modoshi-nasai!
shelf-Loc book-Acc put-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

[5] Although Alpatov mentions "imperative" intonation, my findings are that the intonation is related to the intended speech act, and not necessarily to the clause type itself. Regardless, Alpatov is referring to commands in the original work.

b. Hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book-Acc shelf-Loc put-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

I will set aside issues of how the various word orders are derived and simply note that the word order of the goal and theme seem to be free with respect to one another. If we assume that GoalCs are derived from a corresponding traditional imperative with a put-type verb, we would expect each of the word orders in (454) to be possible in GoalCs, but with the verb omitted. This prediction is borne out; both the goal-theme and theme-goal orders can form grammatical Japanese GoalCs.

(455) a. Tana-ni hon-o!
shelf-Loc book-Acc
'Books on the shelf!'

b. Hon-o tana-ni!
book-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'

This suggests that whatever process is deriving Japanese GoalCs happens regardless of the initial word order of the constituents, at least with respect to the position of the theme and the goal. At the very least it seems that the mechanisms that allow for free word order in Japanese are operative in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs. I propose that the following in (456) should be taken as the default assumption about word order in GoalCs.

(456) *GoalC Word Order Hypothesis*:
Word orders that are possible in traditional put-type imperatives should also be possible in GoalCs.

The statement above in (456) is the barometer against which languages will be judged, languages that conform are *well-behaved* and languages that do not are *poorly-behaved*. In essence, what this says is that the process that derives GoalCs should not be sensitive to the word order of the constituents in the clause. Since the $[+\alpha]$ feature is associated with the Prosody Head and a put-type verb, ellipsis should take place regardless of the order of the objects.

The potential for flexible word order of the theme and goal in some languages is also the main motivation behind assigning the [+α] feature to both of the arguments selected by "put." By assigning [+α] to both the theme and the goal, we ensure that both constituents will always survive ellipsis regardless of the word order of the theme and goal. For consistency, "put" assigns an [+α] feature to both lexical heads even in languages with strict word order where the same derivation could be achieved by assigning only one [+α]. For the rest of this chapter, I will always assign an [+α] feature to each argument of "put," even if not directly motivated by the facts of that specific language.

Japanese word order is therefore acting as we would expect per the default assumption made by (456). The other important property is the grammatical cases that can be marked on the GoalC theme. Because Japanese has overt accusative case, it can provide an insight that English cannot, which is the case that the GoalC theme receives. The central question of interest is whether the theme of the GoalC receives the same case that a transitive object of a traditional imperative verb receives.

The GoalCs we have already seen in (448) had accusative case on the theme. Nominative case is marked overtly in Japanese, and is ungrammatical on the GoalC theme (457a). It is also impossible on the direct object of an overt verb (457b).

(457) a. *Hon-ga tana-ni!
book-Nom shelf-Loc
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

b. *Hon-ga tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book-Nom shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol
Intended: 'Put the books on the shelf.'

The same pattern is seen with unmarked themes. Unmarked themes are incredibly unnatural in traditional imperatives in both the theme-goal and goal-theme word order. They are completely unacceptable in GoalCs in both word orders as well.

(458) a. ???Hon tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book shelf-Loc put-Imp-Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. ???Tana-ni hon modoshi-nasai!
shelf-Loc book put-Imp-Pol

'Put the books on the shelf!'

c. *Hon tana-ni!
book shelf-Loc
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

d. *Tana-ni hon!
shelf-Loc shelf
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

This fact leads to an interim hypothesis - that the case of the GoalC theme must match whatever cases, and only the cases, that argument could have received if an overt verb was present. This hypothesis is expressed in (459) below.

(459) *GoalC Theme Case Marking Hypothesis*:
In languages that mark case overtly, the case of the theme of a GoalC matches the case that would be expressed on that argument if the verb were expressed overtly.

The hypothesis in (459) serves as the default assumption that languages will be judged against in this chapter. This means that starting expectation for case marking is that there exists some analogy in the minds of speakers between the theme of a GoalC and a direct object of a "put-type" verb in the language. As the introduction to this chapter showed, languages will differ significantly with how well "behaved" they are with respect to the principle in (459), but the default expectation is that they will match.

Topic marking in Japanese nicely illustrates the case analogy between GoalCs and "put-type" imperatives. Though nominative marking is always ungrammatical in Japanese GoalCs, and accusative marking is always grammatical, topic marking is possible on the theme in a specific context.

(460) a. Yuki, hon-wa tana-ni!
Yuki book-Top shelf-Loc
'Yuki, books on the shelf!'

(You see Yuki looking around, wondering where to put the books)

b. Yuki, hon-wa tana-ni, pen-wa hikidashi-ni!
Yuki book-Top shelf-Loc pen-Top drawer-Loc
'Yuki, books on the shelf, pen in the drawer!'

Per the hypothesis in (459) above, we would expect this fact about topic marking to not be a quirky fact specific to GoalCs, but a general pattern that is available to contrastive direct objects with "put-type" verbs. Indeed, that is exactly what is found, contrastive objects of this nature can indeed receive topic marking in Japanese when the verb is overt.

(461) a. Yuki, hon-wa tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
Yuki book-Top shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol
'Yuki, put the books on the shelf!'

(Yuki just put the trophies on the shelf mistakenly)

b. Hon-wa tana-ni, pen-wa hikidashi-ni modoshi-nasai.
book-Top shelf-Loc pen-Top drawer-Loc return-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf and the pen in the drawer.'

This topic marking confirms the hypothesis in (459) for Japanese, making it *well-behaved* with regards to case marking. If case is assigned based on structural positions, and the structure of a GoalC is identical to a traditional imperative, then this fact has a straightforward explanation. I will use this in the next section to inform my analysis of Japanese as being a truncated traditional imperative.

4.2.1.3 Edge Ellipsis

A major conclusion from the work on English GoalCs was that there is a left-edge ellipsis process that deletes all material to the left of the theme. The crucial takeaway from English is that it is not merely the case that the verb is deleted, but that there is actually an edge deletion process on the left that includes the verb. The three pieces of evidence in favor of this were the impossibility of overt subjects, negation, and adverbs. This section will apply each of these diagnostics to Japanese. At first glance, the Japanese data appears to also indicate that there is deletion on the left edge. Japanese default word order is SOV, meaning that the subject is to the left of the goal and theme by default. Overt 2nd person subjects are not possible without a heavy prosodic break, analogous to the case in English. Nominative case can optionally be pronounced on vocatives, but no true subject argument can appear (462b).

(462) a. Anta(-ga), hon-o tana-ni!
You-Nom book-Acc shelf-Loc

'You, books on the shelf!'

b. *Anta(-ga) hon-o tana-ni!
You-Nom book-Acc shelf-Loc
Intended: 'You books on the shelf!'

The data in (462) above appear to adhere to the Left-Edge Restriction originally given for English in (258), that material pronounced to the left of the theme of a GoalC without a heavy prosodic break is ungrammatical. Upon closer analysis, however, the data from (462) are misleading. As is relatively common across languages (Aikhenvald 2010), overt subjects are generally ungrammatical in traditional Japanese imperatives (Svahn 2016) without a heavy prosodic break.

(463) a. Hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai!
book-Acc shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Anta, hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai/se!
You.Fam book-Acc shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol/Pln
'Hey you, put the books on the shelf!'

c. *Anta(-ga) hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai/se!
You.Fam-Nom book-Acc shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol/Pln
Intended: 'You put the books on the shelf!'

I will assume that the "subject" in (463b) is really a vocative, given that it must be separated by a prosodic break. The same subject is ungrammatical without a prosodic break in (463c). Because of the fact that subjects must be omitted in Japanese imperatives, the fact that they also cannot appear grammatically in GoalCs tells us nothing meaningful. If there were no deletion at all in Japanese GoalCs, we would still expect subjects to be impossible in them if they are underlyingly imperatives. This leaves negation and adverbs as possible diagnostics for determining the direction of edge deletion. As for negation, its normal position is following the non-past form of the verb.

(464) Hon-o tana-ni modosu-**na**!
book-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp-Neg
'Don't put the books on the shelf!'

Because negation typically follows the verb, this makes it very unlikely to appear in a GoalC. Indeed, attempts to remove the verb and attach the suffix to other material in the clause is judged comically ungrammatical by my Japanese informants.

(465) a. *Hon-o tana-ni-**na**!
book-Acc shelf-Loc-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the shelf!'

b. *Tana-ni hon-o-**na**!
shelf-Loc book-Acc-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the shelf!'

Thus, negation is ungrammatical in Japanese GoalCs, much like English GoalCs, but there is a highly plausible explanation in Japanese that is not related to left-edge deletion. Therefore, both the first and second criteria fail to argue either in favor of or against deletion on either edge.

The third criterion is the available positions for adverbs. Unlike overt subjects and negation, adverb position in Japanese conclusively decides in favor of deletion on the right edge. Japanese allows adverbs to surface to the left of the theme with a prosodic break, as in (466a) below, but also without one, as in (466b) below.

(466) a. Hayaku, hon-o tana-ni!
quickly book-Acc shelf-Loc
'Quickly, books on the shelf!'

b. Hayaku hon-o tana-ni!
quickly book-Acc shelf-Loc
'Quickly books on the shelf!'

If the left-edge restriction from (258) was active in Japanese, we would not expect (466b) to be grammatical without a prosodic break. The fact that is it grammatical indicates that Japanese cannot be deleting to the left.

This leaves two major possibilities: that either deletion is happening on the right edge, or that only the verb is deleted. Because Japanese is verb-final, a process of right-edge deletion would delete the verb in its base position. What this means is, if Japanese adverbs are restricted from appearing on the right edge of GoalCs, then this would be a perfect

mirror of what English showed on the left edge. This is exactly the pattern we see; they are ungrammatical with no prosodic break, as in (467a), but they are grammatical with a prosodic break, as in (467b). This is true for both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders.

(467) a. *Hon-o tana-ni hayaku!
book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

b. Hon-o tana-ni, hayaku!
book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
'Books on the shelf, quickly!'

c. *Tana-ni hon-o hayaku!
shelf-Loc book-Acc quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

d. Tana-ni hon-o, hayaku!
shelf-Loc book-Acc quickly
'Books on the shelf, quickly!'

This result is striking; adverbs are ungrammatical on the right edge, but grammatical on the left edge. Because typical Japanese sentences are verb-final, there are two derivations that could produce a string like (467a), one with the verb preceding the adverb, and one with the verb succeeding the adverb. Only the version where the adverb precedes the main verb is grammatical in Japanese, as shown in (468b).

(468) a. *Hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai **hayaku**!
book-Acc shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol quickly
Intended: 'Put those books onto the shelf quickly!'

b. Hon-o tana-ni **hayaku** modoshi-nasai!
book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly return-Imp.Pol
'Put those books quickly onto the shelf!'

If Japanese was simply deleting the verb and its suffixes to form a GoalC, we would expect (468b) to be able to be shortened into (467a), but this is in fact ungrammatical. I have provided a structure below in (469) for example (467a) with what it would look like if Japanese was only deleting the verb. I assume that the clause-typing particle "-nasai" is

placed on C^0, and forms a phonological word with the verb, and is therefore deleted along with it. I will suppose a structure of put-type predicates that is analogous to the type proposed for English by Larson (1988), but modified to accommodate Japanese word order facts. As in English, I use strikethrough to indicate phonological deletion. I use an Addressee Operator to restrict the syntactic subject to being a subset of the addressees.[6]

(469) (Derivation for ungrammatical adverb placement)

[6] The notion of "morphological word" is fraught with well-known difficulties, and I will avoid using this term here. See Haspelmath (2011) for a thorough explanation of the difficulties in assigning criteria for morphological wordhood.



If Japanese was deleting only the verbal complex to form a GoalC, we might expect the derivation in (469) to be grammatical. Because it is ungrammatical, this suggests that Japanese is deleting more than just the verb. We can hypothesize that the best explanation of this fact is that Japanese is working very similarly to English, but in reverse. The difference between them is that there is truncation at the right, rather than left, edge. This causes the exact inverse of the effects seen in English, *right-edge* effects.

Given that Japanese is a head-final language, C^0 is on the right-edge rather than

the left-edge (Fukui 1988). Assuming that the Prosody Head is also on the right-edge, this means that the analysis of Japanese will mirror the analysis of English. There is a feature ([+α]) that is introduced onto the Prosody Head COMMAND to add urgency. Another ([+α]) feature is introduced via the put-type verb "modoshi" assigning ([+α]) to its arguments. The verb assigns ([+α]) to each lexical head in its complement, via the mechanism Agree. Note that it cannot merely agree in ([+α]) with the first lexical head in its complement. If it did so, it would assign the ([+α]) feature to "hono" (books) but not "tanani" (on the shelf). Doing so would result in the PP being in the path of deletion. In (470) below, the first lexical head that the deletion will encounter during linearization is "tana-ni."

(470)



(471) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....~~Anta~~....$[_{vP}[_{NP}$hono$][_{PP}$tanani$]$ $[_{v}$~~modoshi~~$]$ $][_{C}$~~nasai~~ $]$ $]$ $]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$

[+α] [+α] ← [+α]

The following algorithm presents the steps that are followed for deletion in Japanese.

(472) 1. If there is an [+α] feature in Pros^0, begin scanning leftwards.

2. If no second [+α] feature is encountered, do nothing.

3. If a second [+α] feature is encountered, stop scanning, and delete all material between the first [+α] and the second [+α].

This algorithm is intended to be a mirror of the analysis presented for English in (351), but with the scan happening to the left, from a rightward Pros^0. This analysis explains the basic fact about edge effects in Japanese, right-edge adverbs are deleted because they are in the path of deletion, whereas left-edge adverbs are not deleted because they are not in the path of deletion.

This analysis straightforwardly explains the grammaticality of topic marking in Japanese GoalCs. Because topic-marked phrases are in the left periphery, the Japanese Topic Head is head initial. Because of this, Japanese topics are not in the path of deletion. Below is a derivation of a Japanese GoalC with a topic, placed in a leftward Topic Head, that is not in the path of deletion. Topics are typically analyzed as base-generated in the specifier of TopicP and correlating with a null argument in typical argument position in Korean (Kim 2007) and generally for Topic prominent languages (Huang 1984).

(473)



Another fact that a right-edge deletion analysis can easily explain is the availability of determiners. Japanese determiners can surface in GoalCs, with their regular meaning.

(474) a. *Kono*-hon-o tana-ni!
those-book-Acc shelf-Loc
'*Those* books on the shelf!'

b. *Anata*-no hon-o tana-ni!
your-of book-Acc shelf-Loc
'*Your* books on the shelf!'

c. *Sono* san-satu no hon-o tana-ni!
that three-Cl of book-Acc shelf-Loc
'*Three of those* books on the shelf!'

In English, determiners were highly restricted, and subject to a constraint where they needed to be contrastively focused in order to surface. In Japanese, on the other hand, they are unrestricted. Because there is no left-edge deletion, there is nothing to stop determiners from surfacing.

Overt subjects are generally ungrammatical in traditional Japanese imperatives, as was already shown in (463c). However, there is one context where pronouncing the subject overtly is marginal.[7] In a scenario where the speaker is commanding multiple people to do multiple things, the 2nd person subjects can be overtly pronounced with topic marking to contrast each individual with the other, without a prosodic break needed for either subject. This scenario is compatible with GoalCs in a configuration like the following.

(475) ?Anata_wa$_1$ hon-o tana-ni, anata-wa$_2$ pen-o hako-ni!
You.Form-Top book-Acc shelf-Loc You.Form-Top pen-Acc box-Loc
'You$_1$ books on the shelf, you$_2$ pens in the box!'

We can therefore describe the directionality of the ellipsis in both Japanese and English in a satisfactory way to describe most of the facts. There is one outstanding fact about Japanese that requires explanation. Certain discourse particles are grammatical on the right edge of a GoalC.

(476) Hon-o tana-ni-ne? Wakatta?
Book-Top shelf-Loc-ne understood
'Books on the shelf, understood?'

[7] Thanks to Satoshi Tomioka for pointing this possibility out.

"-Ne" is a discourse particle that accompanies rising intonation which means that the speaker wants to make sure that the addressee "got it." This means that a sentence like "Did you understand?" can readily follow it. Under our analysis, the discourse particle "-ne" should be deleted, but it is not. So what is happening here?

In a traditional imperative, "-ne" would appear as the final suffix, appearing after both the verb and clause-type particle.

(477) Hon-o tana-ni modoshi-nasai-ne?
book-Acc shelf-Loc return-Imp.Pol-ne
'Put the books onto the shelf!'

This leaves us with a bit of a mystery. If we believe that the verb is deleted by a right edge deletion process in Japanese, then "-ne" should either block this deletion entirely, or be deleted along with it. Instead, it seems that the verb can be deleted and "-ne" can remain in (476). On the other hand, we have already seen evidence that Japanese is deleting more than the verb, from the adverb data. I take this to mean that "-ne" is actually situated higher in the clause than the Pros^0, meaning that it is not in the path of deletion. Below is a structure of this clause.

(478)



The position of "-ne" to the right of the COMMAND feature in Pros^0 means that it will not be deleted, because deletion proceeds leftwards from the Command feature. The rest of the deletion proceeds normally.

There is one slight deviation, however. The presence of "-ne" allows an adverb to surface on the right edge. The following provides the crucial contrast.

(479) a. *Hon-o tana-ni hayaku!
book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

b. Hon-o tana-ni hayaku-ne?
book-Acc shelf-Loc quickly-ne
'Books onto the shelf quickly, got it?'

I propose that "-ne" attracts the closest element in the structure to it. By doing so, it means that adverbs that would have been in the path of deletion can be "rescued." Below is a derivation of the adverb which starts in the path of deletion moving out of the path of deletion.

(480)



(481) $[_{DiscP}[_{ProsP}[_{CP}$ hono tanani t_1 ~~modoshinasai~~$][_{Pros}$ COMMAND$][_{Disc}$ hayaku-ne$]]$

$[+\alpha]$ $[+\alpha]$ ⟵ $[+\alpha]$

This analysis therefore consolidates the instances with "-ne" and those without under the same operation. The only difference is that "-ne" draws a lexical item to combine with, escaping deletion. I would now like to draw our attention back to gapping.

Ross (1970a) distinguishes between SVO languages in which gapping operates forward, as English does, and SOV languages in which gapping operates backward.[8] By operating "forward," Ross means that the pronounced verb can only come in the first conjunct, and not the second. The following is an example of backward gapping, which is unacceptable in English.

[8] This is, of course, not the only conception of gapping. Steedman (1990), Goodall (1987), Muadz (1991), and Johnson (2009), among others, conceive of gapping as being a process of coordination. Nevertheless, I do not really mean to make use of Ross's analysis here, merely the conception of "forward" and "backward" that he utilized.

(482) *Skyler basketball, and Dev plays tennis.

This is strikingly similar to the deletion that occurs in GoalCs. This deletion also proceeded rightward in English, producing "left-edge" effects, because the deletion stops when it encounters a lexical item with the feature $[+\alpha]$. Gapping in Japanese is also the perfect mirror of English, the pronounced verb must occur in the second conjunct, and never the first. The following set of examples, from Ross (1970a), illustrates this for Japanese.

(483) a. Watakusi-wa sakana-o, Biru-wa gohan-o tabeta.
I-Top fish-Acc Bill-Top rice-Acc ate
'I ate fish and Bill rice.'

b. *Watakusi-wa sakana-o tabeta, Biru-wa gohan-o.
I-Top fish-Acc ate Bill-Top rice-Acc
Intended: 'I ate fish and Bill rice.'

My analysis of gapping is that it is a PF deletion process in which deletion proceeds in a direction from either the left or right edge of the clause, depending on the language in question, deleting all material that is identical to the verb. This deletion is conceptually quite similar to the deletion that takes place in GoalCs. Below is a derivation of the grammatical gap in (483a) above. Deletion proceeds leftwards from the verb and deletes all identical verbs, in this case "tabeta." Below is an algorithm for how gapping takes place in Japanese.

(484) 1. Start from V_{CONJ}, begin scanning leftwards.
2. Any identical V that is encountered may be deleted under identity.
3. If no identical V is encountered, do nothing.

(485) Watakusi-wa sakana-o ~~tabeta~~, Biru-wa gohan-o tabeta.

←

What this means is that, when located inside a coordinate structure, verbs may be deleted if and only if they are pronounced to the left of an identical verb. This deletion proceeds rightward.

What this means is that the position of the verb is crucial in determining the directionality of ellipsis in gapping. This forms a perfect analogy with GoalCs, in which the

position of the verb must be in the path of deletion. The difference between the constructions is that gapping must pronounce at least one verb, whereas GoalCs do not pronounce any verb. Nevertheless, the idea here is that languages tend to do PF deletion in one direction. In the case of Japanese, that deletion proceeds rightward.

4.2.1.4 Japanese Conclusion

Japanese is a "well-behaved" GoalC language with respect to both word order and case, because each of the expected GoalC forms is grammatical based on what is available to Japanese traditional imperatives. Both the word order and case facts fall out from an analysis of GoalCs being derived from full imperative clauses with a put-type verb. Unlike English, Japanese deletes on the right edge, showing rightward adverb effects. The analysis originally developed for English in Section 3 can be applied to Japanese by reversing the direction of the ellipsis.

4.2.2 Korean GoalCs

This section will be an investigation of Korean, a language isolate primarily spoken in Korea.[9] Korean has relatively similar morphosyntax to Japanese, meaning that it serves as an interesting example of how the properties of GoalCs can differ even between languages that are otherwise relatively similar. Unlike Japanese, Korean is *poorly-behaved* in the sense that part of the traditional imperative paradigm is unavailable to GoalCs. We will see that Korean accusative case requires a contrastive element, similar to English determiners, but only when the case marker is on the right edge. Thus, we will see that case markers are also deleteable by edge deletion in Korean.

4.2.2.1 Korean Traditional Imperatives

In Korean, imperative verbs are marked with a suffix that indicates the clause type and overall politeness level.[10] In (486a) below, the verb is marked with the suffix "-usipsio,"

[9] Thanks to Jinwoo Jo, Juyeon Cho, and Myung Hye Yoo for providing the judgments throughout this section.

[10] The politeness system in Korean has at least six distinctions, and possibly contains the most politeness distinctions of any language. See Portner et al. (2019) and Sohn (2001) for

which indicates that the utterance is an imperative and the discourse context is relatively polite.[11] Additionally, the direct object is unmarked for both case and number, as is possible for direct objects in Korean (Ahn and Cho 2007; Ko 2000). In (486b), the verb is marked with the suffix "-ala," which indicates that the utterance is an imperative but does not indicate anything specific about the discourse context, which I mark here as "plain." The direct object in (486b) is overtly marked with accusative case.

(486) a. Meli-ey son noh-usipsio!
head-Loc hand put-Imp.Form
'Put your hands on your head!'

b. Thulophi-lul chayksang alay-ey noh-ala!
trophy-Acc desk under-Loc put-Imp.Pln
'Put the trophies under the desk!'

The object can be marked with accusative case (486b) or not (486a). Doing so does not necessarily change the meaning of either the object or the entire sentence, as Korean bare objects are capable of being interpreted as fully referential (Kwon and Zribi-Hertz 2006). Following the pattern established for English in Chapter 3, and Japanese in this chapter, it is possible to express commands that are very similar to ones in (486) as GoalCs by omitting the put-type verb, in this case, "*noh*." The imperative clause-typing suffixes present on the verb are also omitted.

(487) a. Meli-ey son!
head-Loc hand
'Hands on your head!'

b. Thulophi-lul chayksang alay-ey!
trophy-Acc desk under-Loc
'Trophies under the desk!'

The utterances in (487) match each requirement that was placed on English GoalCs. They are used as commands, they omit the verb, and they require a goal, in these cases

a complete description of the Korean system.

[11] Korean spelling throughout is based on the Korean Romanization Convention. The following website was used for uniform Korean spelling: http://roman.cs.pusan.ac.kr/input_eng.aspx?

indicated by the locative suffix *"-ey."* My Korean informants report that the GoalCs in (487) are most naturally used as urgent commands, for example a military context in which a drill sergeant is using urgent command prosody to bark an order at a subordinate. The discourse context that is appropriate for Korean GoalCs is therefore very similar to the ones already established for English and Japanese. Much like in English and Japanese, traditional Korean imperatives have a range of uses available to them, allowing at least permission and wish uses as well as the canonical use of commands.

(488) a. Ku pheyn na-hanthey cwu-e!
that pen 1sg-Dat give-Imp
'Hand me that pen!' (command)

b. Pi o-ci mal-ala!
rain come-Comp Neg-Imp
'Don't rain tomorrow!' (wish)

c. Wenha-myen khwukhi mek-e.
want-Cond cookie eat-Imp
'Take a cookie, if you like.' (permission)

Analogous to the case in Japanese and English, Korean GoalCs are only available as immediate commands. Permission and wish uses of Korean GoalCs are infelicitous, despite the fact that they are possible in traditional imperatives.

(489) a. Thakca-ey son!
table-Loc hand
'Hands on the table!' (command)

b. Wuphyenham-ey thaykpay!
mailbox-Loc package
'Package in the mailbox!' #(wish)

c. #Wenha-myen thakca-ey son.
want-Cond table-Loc hand
'Hands on the table, if you like.' (permission)

Throughout this dissertation, I have analyzed GoalCs as containing a feature, $[+\alpha]$, that licenses GoalCs and makes a COMMAND feature interpreted as an immediate command. Because Korean GoalCs are also limited to COMMAND usage, and we have already used this

feature to derive this pragmatic effect in Japanese, it is promising to use this feature in Korean as well. I will utilize the same basic clause structure as Japanese, with the Prosody Head and C^0 in the right periphery, and the two complements of the put-type verb *noh* receiving the feature [+α].

(490)



As we have already seen, Korean marks the verb with a clause-typing suffix, which is typically argued to be present in the right periphery of the clause. The right periphery in Korean has been argued to host clause-type information (Pak 2008). Analogous to the case in Japanese, imperative verbal suffixes cannot grammatically appear in a GoalC, presumably due to the deletion of the verb which would host the suffix. Both of the GoalCs above in (487) are ungrammatical with any clause-typing suffix, regardless of the formality level.

(491) a. *Thakca-ey son-sipsio!
table-Loc hand-Imp.Form
Intended: 'Hands on the table!'

b. *Thulophi-lul chayksang alay-ey-sipsio!
trophy-Acc desk under-Loc-Imp.Form
Intended: 'Trophies under the desk!'

c. *Thakca-ey son-a-la!
table-Loc hand-Imp-Pln
Intended: 'Hands on the table!'

d. *Thulophi-lul chayksang alay-ey-ala!
trophy-Acc desk under-Loc-Imp.Pln
Intended: 'Trophies under the desk!'

Despite the fact that GoalCs cannot grammatically host clause-type markers, they always use COMMAND prosody, which is falling and halting, and are limited to command interpretation. Thus, even in the absence of the explicit clause-type marker, listeners are able to correctly identify GoalCs as being commands. This means that Korean GoalCs are restricted in the same way that English and Japanese GoalCs have been, in being restricted to COMMAND prosody and interpretation.

4.2.2.2 Korean Word Orders and Case

Another issue that is relevant to Korean is the available word orders and case marking of the arguments in Korean GoalCs relative to Korean traditional imperatives. Korean word order is similar to Japanese, relatively free but with the verb preferring to come in final position (Sohn 2001). Starting with traditional imperatives, the word order of the goal and theme is free with respect to one another; the goal can precede the direct object (492a) or follow it (492b). For now, I will limit the object to being unmarked, due to complications that arise with accusative marked objects.

(492) a. Meli-ey son noh-a-yo!
head-Loc hand put-Imp-Pol
'Put your hands on your head!'

b. Son meli-ey noh-a-yo!
hand head-Loc put-Imp-Pol
'Put your hands on your head!'

Given the GoalC word order hypothesis in (456), we would expect each of the word orders in (492) to be possible in GoalCs, but with the verb omitted. This prediction is borne out, both goal-theme and theme-goal orders are grammatical.

(493) a. Meli-ey son!
head-Loc hand
'Hands on your head!'

b. Son meli-ey!
hand head-Loc
'Hands on your head!'

This means that when the object is unmarked, Korean is *well-behaved* with respect to word order. The word order hypothesis originally posited in (456) predicts that all orders that are available to traditional imperatives should be available to GoalCs, and this is what we see in Korean for unmarked objects. A complication arises for accusative-marked themes, however. In traditional imperatives, and for put-type verbs across all clause-types, the direct object can either receive overt accusative case (494a), (494b) or be unmarked for case as we have already seen in (492a), (492b).

(494) a. Meli-ey son-(ul) noh-a-yo!
head-Loc hand-Acc put-Imp-Pol
'Put your hands on your head!'

b. Son-(ul) meli-ey noh-a-yo!
hand-Acc head-Loc put-Imp-Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

For traditional imperatives, the position of the theme and goal is free with respect to one another, regardless of whether or not the theme is marked with accusative case. Unmarked themes also demonstrate this pattern in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs. Unexpectedly, this is not borne out for both word orders with accusative marked themes in (494). While the theme-goal order is only slightly marked in a GoalC (495a), the goal-theme order is judged as totally unacceptable (495b).

(495) a. ?Son-ul meli-ey!
hand-Acc head-Loc
'Hands on your head!'

b. *Meli-ey son-ul!
head-Loc hand-Acc
Intended: 'Hands on your head!'

Given that Korean traditional imperatives allow the direct object to either be unmarked or marked for accusative case regardless of word order, the data point in (495b) serves as a direct counterexample to the case-marking hypothesis originally posited in (459). The question we must therefore ask is why accusative case is ungrammatical when the theme is to the right of the goal, and only in a GoalC. Similar instances of accusative case deletion

have been discussed in detail for fragment answers in Korean by An (2016). The rightmost case marker in a fragment answer is capable of being omitted.

(496) a. Nwu-ka John-ul manna-ss-ni?
who-Nom John-Acc meet-Pst-Q
'Who met John?

b. Cho-(ka).
Cho-Nom
'Cho (met John).'

(497) a. Nwu-ka nwukwu-lul manna-ss-ni?
who-Nom who-Acc meet-Pst-Q
'Who met whom?'

b. Cho-*(ka) John-(ul).
Cho-Nom John-Acc
'Cho (met) John.'

The crucial instance that shows that this is an edge effect is (497b). The same nominative argument that can be null marked in (496b) must receive overt nominative case if there is overt material to its right. When it is the rightmost element, it can be deleted. An argues that this is so because the accusative case marker is adjacent to a deletion site.

This analysis could be extended to GoalCs, but with one major change. If the deletion in GoalCs is mandatory, then the pattern in (495) falls out, and accusative case must be omitted when adjacent to a deletion site. Although An's analysis as stated cannot account for the mandatory deletion in Korean GoalCs, the $[+\alpha]$ feature forces mandatory deletion. The case marker *-ul* does not receive $[+\alpha]$, and therefore must be deleted.

(498)



(499) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}\ [_{vP}\ [_{PP}\text{meliey}][_{v'}\ [_{NP}\ [_{N}\text{son}][_{Case}\sout{\text{ul}}][_{v}\sout{\text{noh}}]][_{C}\sout{\text{a}}]]]\ [_{Pros}\text{COMMAND}]\ ]$

[+α] [+α] ← [+α]

We may think to look at other cases in Korean. Topic-marked themes display the same restriction as accusative, acceptable in theme-goal order but not in goal-theme order.

(500) a. Chayk-un senpan-ey!
book-Top shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'

b. *Senpan-ey cheak-un!
shelf-Loc book-Top
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

The GoalC theme is capable of receiving topic marking, assuming that the discourse conditions are sufficient to warrant topic marking (Krifka 2008). Initially, the data for topic-marked themes in (500) appear to show the same restriction as the data for accusative-marked

themes in (495). There is another explanation for the ungrammaticality of the goal-theme word order in (500b), however. When the verb is pronounced, topic-marked objects in clause-medial position are relatively unacceptable (501b) but perfectly acceptable in clause-initial position (501a).

(501) a. Chayk-un senpan-ey noh-a-yo!
book-Top shelf-Loc put-Imp-Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. ???Senpan-ey chayk-un noh-a-yo!
shelf-Loc book-Top put-Imp-Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

With respect to topic marking then, Korean is actually *well-behaved* because topic marked themes are appearing in exactly the positions that they do when the verb is pronounced. Following Moon (1991); Choe (1995), I will consider Korean topics to be base generated in a dedicated Topic Phrase, and that the presence of an appropriate Topic necessitates object drop of the co-referenced object (Huang 1984). Below in (502) is an analysis of the position of topic marked GoalC themes in Korean. I use e here to reference an empty, but still co-referenced argument that is not a trace. As with Japanese and English, I utilize an $[+\alpha]$ feature on the Prosody Head and complement of the put-type verb. Although it is not directly relevant in this case, I do not assign $[+\alpha]$ to the topic since it is base-generated in a high, leftward position and is not the complement of the verb.

(502)



The tree in (502) allows the topic to surface because the deletion process takes place on the right edge and stops when the goal is encountered. This makes an interesting prediction with regard to the interaction of topics and edge deletion. If Korean were deleting on the left-edge, like English did, then topics would be in the path of deletion. Because topic-marked

NPs are not the syntactic complement of the verb, they cannot receive the [+α] feature to force deletion to stop. Unfortunately, no language in the sample presented here has both overt Topic marking and deletion in which the Topic marked noun would be in the path of deletion, so this prediction remains currently untested.

To round out the theoretically possible cases on the GoalC theme, nominative case is also *well-behaved* in the sense that it is ungrammatical both on the GoalC theme and the object in traditional imperatives regardless of word order.

(503) a. *Senpan-ey chayk-i noh-a-yo!
shelf-Loc book-Nom put-Imp-Pol
Intended: 'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. *Chayk-i senpan-ey noh-a-yo!
book-Nom shelf-Loc put-Imp-Pol
Intended: 'Put the books on the shelf!'

c. *Senpan-ey chayk-i!
shelf-Loc book-Nom
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

d. *Chayk-i senpan-ey!
book-Nom shelf-Loc
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

Thus, Korean GoalCs serve as a genuine counterexample to the case and word order hypothesis in (456) and (459), but in exactly one configuration; the goal-theme word order with accusative case on the theme. Because there is one case that is grammatical in traditional imperatives but not GoalCs, Korean is a *subset* language with respect to case marking, following the classification laid out originally in the opening of this chapter, because Korean accusative case cannot receive the [+α] feature.

There is a context, however, in which accusative case improves significantly in what appear to be GoalCs. In a list scenario, where multiple commands are being given at once, accusative case on the theme improves significantly. My Korean informants reported that

(504a) below is only very slightly degraded, whereas it is completely unacceptable without a salient contrastive object.[12]

(504) a. ?Senpan-ey chayk-ul, thakca-ey capci-lul!
shelf-Loc book-Acc table-Loc magazine-Acc
'Books on the shelf, magazines on the table!'

b. *Senpan-ey chayk-ul!
shelf-Loc book-Acc
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

It is possible to contrast objects like this in traditional imperatives, but there is no special meaning assigned to the accusative in this construction, and both accusative marked and unmarked objects are equally grammatical with the same meaning.

(505) Senpan-ey chayk-(ul) noh-a-yo, thakca-ey capci-(lul) noh-a-yo!
shelf-Loc book-Acc put-Imp-Pol table-Loc magazine-Acc put-Imp-Pol
'Put the books on the shelf, put the magazines on the table!'

This restriction on accusative case is reminiscent of the restrictions on determiners in English. Recall that in Chapter 3, English determiners were judged as highly unacceptable without receiving contrast, but improved significantly if there was an overtly contrastive element present.

(506) a. ??Those books on the shelf!

b. Those books on the shelf, and these books into the trunk.

English determiners were analyzed as being grammatical, but subject to a presupposition that there is not a uniquely identifiable set of books in the context in order to surface. Accusative case appears to be working the same way in Korean - it is only compatible with

[12] It is also possible to use topics contrastively with a similar meaning, though only in the theme-goal word order.

(1) Chayk-un senpan-ey, capci-nun thakca-ey!
book-Top shelf-Loc magazine-Top table-Loc
'Books on the shelf, magazines on the table!'

contexts in which the theme is not uniquely identifiable, and therefore must contrast against something else in the context. When that contrast is provided, accusative case becomes significantly more acceptable.

Although the relationship between requiring contrast and imperatives is still not well understood, particularly in the case of GoalCs, the symmetry between Korean and English with respect to requiring contrast in GoalCs leads me to believe that this is on the right track. As was shown in Chapter 3, English list imperatives are subject to different requirements than non-list imperatives. In English, this manifests as a restriction on proper name subjects in imperatives - they are ungrammatical without contrast.

(507) a. *Liana hand me that pen!

b. Liana hand me that pen, Xander hand me that coconut!

The restriction here seems identical to the restrictions so far that have been discussed for English GoalC determiners and Korean accusative case. Proper names in English imperatives appear to presuppose that the addressee in a given context is not uniquely identifiable. What this means is that using a proper name is infelicitous without contrast is infelicitous because you are already addressing an individual who must be considered the subject of the imperative by default. Thus, (507a) is blocked by the imperative "Hand me that pen!" when uttered to Liana. The list imperative in (507b) is acceptable because there is not a uniquely identifiable subject in the context, as evidenced by the acceptability of the list.

4.2.2.3 Edge Ellipsis

The other major theme of this work to this point has been edge ellipsis processes that delete all material to the edge of the theme in a language-specific direction. English showed this effect on the left edge, while Japanese showed it instead on the right edge. This section will discuss the facts concerning expressing subjects, negation, and adverbs in Korean. We will see that Korean appears to be deleting on the right edge.

Korean GoalCs do not allow subjects without a heavy prosodic break, the same pattern that we have seen thus far in Japanese and English.

(508) a. Ipwa ne, meli-ey son!
hey You head-Loc hand

'Hey you, hands on your head!'

b. *Ne-ka meli-ey son!
You-Nom head-Loc hand
Intended: 'You hands on your head!'

Overt subjects are ungrammatical in Korean GoalCs. If they are acceptable in traditional imperatives, this would potentially count as evidence that Korean is deleting on the left, rather than right, edge. The facts show that unlike Japanese, Korean traditional imperatives do allow overt pronunciation of their subjects (509c).

(509) a. Senpan-ey chayk-ul noh-a-yo!
shelf-Loc book-Acc return-Imp.Pol
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Ipwa ne, senpan-ey chayk-ul noh-a!
hey You, shelf-Loc book-Acc put-Imp
'Hey you, put the books on the shelf!'

c. Ne-ka senpan-ey chayk-ul noh-a!
You-Nom shelf-Loc book-Acc put-Imp
'You put the books on the shelf!' (no prosodic break)

Because of the fact that subjects are generally possible in traditional Korean imperatives, the fact that they are ungrammatical in GoalCs suggests that Korean is deleting material on its left edge. Because subjects appear to the left of the theme in traditional imperatives, but not GoalCs, the simplest explanation is that Korean is deleting to the left, and the subject is in the path of that deletion, analogous to English. As for negation, it runs into an interesting issue. In traditional imperatives, negation is a prefix on an imperative clause-type morpheme, appearing to the right of a complementizer.

(510) Meli-ey son-ul noh-ci mal-ala!
head-Loc hand-Acc put-Comp Neg-Imp
'Don't put your hands on your head!'

Because negation is a prefix on the complementizer, it could theoretically appear in a GoalC if the deletion was happening to the left-edge. Even though the verb appears on the right edge, and would not be in the path of deletion, it could potentially be possible to

argue that the verb deletion process was somehow independent of the edge ellipsis process. Nevertheless, it is ungrammatical to include negation and the clause-typing marker in a GoalC.

(511) *Meli-ey son-ul mal-ala!
head-Loc hand-Acc Neg-Imp
Intended: 'Don't hands on your head!'

It is hard to see how the ungrammaticality of negation in Korean GoalCs could be explained by a process of left-edge deletion, given that it is on the right edge. Thus, negation is ungrammatical in Korean GoalCs, much like English GoalCs, but the reasons for this ungrammaticality cannot plausibly include left-edge deletion.

One remaining possibility is that Korean deletes to *both* the left and the right. Left-edge deletion could explain the facts about the ungrammaticality of the subject, and right-edge deletion could explain the facts about the ungrammaticality of the negation and clause-typing marker. The third criterion, the possibility of adverbs in GoalCs, provides strong evidence that there is deletion on only the right edge of GoalCs. Korean allows adverbs to surface to the left or the right of the theme with a prosodic break, as in (512a) and (512b) below.

(512) a. Ppalli, meli-ey son!
quickly head-Loc hand
'Quickly, hands on your head!'

b. Meli-ey son, ppalli!
head-Loc hand quickly
'Hands on your head, quickly!'

This is, perhaps, not surprising, given that the original left-edge restriction in (258) was formalized as taking place within a single clause. There is not a restriction on material appearing on the edge if it appears in a separate clause. The crucial data point, then, is the adverb data that takes place in the same prosodic phrase as the goal and theme. This data suggests that Korean is deleting on the right edge, as left-edge adverbs are perfectly grammatical but right-edge adverbs are incredibly awkward.

(513) a. Ppalli meli-ey son!
quickly head-Loc hand
'Quickly hands on your head!'

b. ???Meli-ey son ppalli!
head-Loc hand quickly
'Hands on your head quickly!'

Much like we saw for Japanese, the data in (513) cannot be explained via restrictions on available adverb positions in Korean. The position of adverbs in traditional Korean imperatives is quite unrestricted, analogous to the cases in English and Japanese.

(514) (Ppalli) senpan-ey (ppalli) chayk-(ul) (ppalli) noh-a!
(quickly) shelf-Loc (quickly) book-Acc (quickly) put-Imp
'(Quickly) put (quickly) the books (quickly) on the shelf (quickly)!'

Because there is a grammatical position for an adverb between the theme and verb, there is a possible underlying derivation for (513b). Nevertheless, it is ungrammatical. The only explanation for this fact that I can see is that Korean deletes on the right edge of its GoalCs, banning the right-edge adverb in (513b). What this means is that according to the diagnostics we have used thus far, Korean exhibits a mix of left-edge and right-edge effects. Below is a table that summarizes these effects.

(515)

Diagnostic	Left-Edge	Right-Edge
Subject	✓	
Negation		✓
Adverbs		✓

I cannot see a way of reconciling the facts in (515) with our current analysis if analyzed as presented here. The ellipsis mechanism presented here is not intended to be discriminatory, it deletes all material on a given edge until it encountered the feature $[+\alpha]$. This deletion mechanism is not able to delete subjects on the left edge but leave adverbs because it cannot tell the difference between these elements. The indiscriminate nature of this ellipsis mechanism was highly appealing in the case of English, given that it was deleting clear

non-constituents and across a number of syntactic categories. To maintain this indiscriminate deletion, an alternative explanation must be found. The adverb data is particularly suggestive that we need to maintain a strict right-edge deletion in GoalCs.

In order to pursue this, the unavailability of subjects, which would typically appear on the left, must be explained. Although there is not an immediately obvious answer as to the unavailability of subjects, one possibility is that there is a force mismatch between an overt subject and the force necessary for a GoalC. Languages that allow overt subjects in imperatives typically associate some pragmatic function with the inclusion of the subject, with null subject being the default (Aikhenvald 2010). Common pragmatic functions include contrasting the subject or adding politeness. Because GoalCs must obligatorily be interpreted as urgent commands, if the pragmatic function of including an overt subject ends up weakening the command, this may result in a force mismatch. Unfortunately, the pragmatic effect of adding the subject overtly is not entirely clear. Informants reported that it seemed "awkward" to include the subject of a traditional imperative in many cases, but it was grammatical, and there was no obvious force associated with it.

I do not think it wise to risk explaining nothing in an attempt to explain everything, however. There is a great deal that the right-edge deletion analysis does explain, as well as pairing the analysis of Korean with Japanese. All other facts about Korean GoalCs fall out from right-edge deletion. I will assume the same basic structure as Japanese for the clausal structure of a Korean GoalC. Below is a derivation for the ungrammatical adverb placement. I utilize the same algorithm as Japanese, reprinted here below.

(516) 1. If there is an $[+\alpha]$ feature in Pros^0, begin scanning leftwards.
2. If no second $[+\alpha]$ feature is encountered, do nothing.
3. If a second $[+\alpha]$ feature is encountered, stop scanning, and delete all material between the first $[+\alpha]$ and the second $[+\alpha]$.

Much like Japanese, I place the Prosody head on the right, to derive the effect on the right edge. I also assign the $[+\alpha]$ feature to both complements of the verb, to account for the flexible word order.

(517) (Derivation for ungrammatical adverb placement)



(518) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....~~Neka~~....$[_{vP}[_{NP}$sonul$][_{PP}$meliey$][_{v}$~~noh~~$][$.AdvPppalli$]][_{C}$~~a~~$]]]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$

[+α] [+α] ← [+α]

(518) derives the ungrammaticality of right-edge adverbs in Korean by causing the

deletion process to travel through the potential adverb position on the right edge. The adverb cannot receive the $[+\alpha]$ feature because it is not a complement of the verb. This means that it is unpronounceable in this position, exactly as it was in Japanese and exactly the mirror of English.

Similar to Japanese, there is a host of material that can appear suffixed onto the NP and can grammatically surface in a GoalC, regardless of the word order. Below are some of the suffixes which are grammatical in this position.

(519) a. Chayk-*to* senpan-ey!
book-*also* shelf-Loc
'Also books on ths shelf!'

b. Chayk-*man* senpan-ey!
book-*only* shelf-Loc
'Only books on the shelf!'

c. Chayk-*ilato* senpan-ey!
book-*even.if* shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf, (if there is nothing else to put on the shelf)!'

d. Chayk-*puthe* senpan-ey
book-*from* shelf-Loc
'Start with books on the shelf!'

e. Chayk-*kkaci* senpan-ey!
book-*up.to* shelf-Loc
'Finish with books on the shelf!'

(520) a. Senpan-ey chayk-*to*!
shelf-Loc book-*also*
'Also books on ths shelf!'

b. Senpan-ey chayk-*man*!
shelf-Loc book-*only*
'Only books on the shelf!'

c. Senpan-ey chayk-*ilato*!
shelf-Loc book-*even.if*
'Books on the shelf, (if there is nothing else to put on the shelf)!'

d. Senpan-ey chayk-*puthe*!
shelf-Loc book-*from*

'Start with books on the shelf!'

e. Senpan-ey chayk-*kkaci*!
shelf-Loc book-*up.to*
'Finish with books on the shelf!'

These nominal morphemes, particularly in the goal-theme order, form an interesting contrast with the unavailability of accusative case in the same position. I take this to mean that these suffixes are capable of agreeing with the noun the attach to, meaning that they are valued for $[+\alpha]$ and are not deleted.

In the Japanese section, we also noticed that there was a connection between the directionality of the ellipsis in GoalCs and the directionality of ellipsis in gapping. English deletion proceeds rightward from the Prosody Head, causing left-edge ellipsis effects. Gapping also operates forward in English, where the verb can only be pronounced in the first conjunct.

(521) a. Skyler plays basketball and Emmanuel ~~plays~~, tennis.

b. *Skyler ~~plays~~ basketball, and Emmanuel plays tennis.

I hypothesized in the previous section that there was a correlation between the direction of gapping and the direction of ellipsis in GoalCs. Because Korean does not permit material on the right edge of GoalCs, this means that deletion proceeds leftward. This predicts that, if these mechanisms are tied, that Korean must be a backward gapping language. The following set of examples, from Jung (2017), show that this is indeed the case - Korean only exhibits backward gapping and not forward gapping.

(522) a. Na-nun sengsun-ul, Bill-un bap-ul mek-ess-ta.
I-Top fish-Acc Bill-Top rice-Acc eat-Pst-Decl
'I ate fish and Bill rice.' (lit. I fish and Bill ate rice.)

b. *Na-nun sengsun-ul mek-ess-ko, Bill-un bap-ul.
I-Top fish-Acc eat-Pst-ko Bill-Top rice-Acc
Intended: 'I ate fish and Bill rice.'

This means that Korean is acting like Japanese, which means that the position of the verb is crucial in determining the directionality of ellipsis in gapping, and that this gapping

can only proceed backward. The hypothesis that gapping is related to GoalC deletion has another language data point in support of it, Korean deletes leftward for both operations.

4.2.2.4 Korean Conclusion

Korean is a "poorly-behaved" GoalC language in the goal-theme word order, because accusative case is acceptable in traditional imperatives in the goal-theme word order, but not in GoalCs. Accusative case was not capable of receiving the $[+\alpha]$ feature, and is therefore deleted when in the path of deletion. Right-edge deletion explains the unavailability of negation and adverbs on the right edge. Several facts remain unexplained, such as the unacceptability of subjects (despite being on the left edge) and the contrast between accusative case and other nominal suffixes.

4.2.3 Greek GoalCs

This section will be a discussion of Greek, an Indo-European language primarily spoken in Greece.[13] Greek marks case overtly and has flexible word order. Therefore, despite being geographically and historically distinct from Japanese and Korean, the morphosyntax of Greek imperatives provides an analogous testing ground for how case and word order work in GoalCs. Like Korean, Greek is *poorly-behaved*, because the options for case-marking in GoalCs do not perfectly match traditional imperatives. Unlike Korean, however, it is a *superset* GoalC language, meaning that GoalCs have more case marking options available to them than traditional imperatives. Like English, there is evidence of left edge deletion in Greek.

4.2.3.1 Greek Traditional Imperatives

In Greek, traditional imperative verbs tend to come at the beginning of the sentence, and are marked with an imperative morpheme. In (523a) and (523b) below, the direct object of the put-type verb obligatorily receives accusative case. The imperative suffix on the verb

[13] Thanks to Dionysia Saratsli, Myrto Grigoroglou, and Konstantinos Pozoukidis for providing the judgments throughout this section.

marks that the utterance is an imperative. There is no clause-type marker that marks the clause overtly as an imperative.[14]

(523) a. Bal-e ton anaptira sto rafi!
put-Imp the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'Put the lighter on the shelf!'

b. Xos-e ta tropaia kato apo to krevati!
hole.in-Imp the.Acc.Pl trophies.Acc under from the.Acc bed.Acc
'Get the trophies under the bed!'

Both traditional imperatives in (523) have the verb at the beginning of the clause. Given that Greek is SVO by default, and the subject is not pronounced in either imperative in (523), the word orders could be derived via simple non-pronunciation of the subject. Nevertheless, Oikonomou (2016) argues that Greek traditional imperative verbs move to Asp^0 and then to the imperative operator, which is located in an intermediate position between C^0 and T^0. Because this position is in the left periphery, this derives the verb-initial word order seen in (523a) and (523b). Below is the proposed structure given by Oikonomou (2016) for the clausal structure of Greek imperatives, for the example in (523a).

[14] Greek also marks gender on determiners and nouns. I will keep the relevant examples to feminine, singular nouns, because there is a contrast between overt nominative and accusative case for this part of the nominal paradigm.

(524)



It is possible to express commands that are very similar to the ones expressed in (523a) and (523b) as GoalCs. In (525a) and (525b) below, only the theme and goal are overtly expressed. The goal is part of a prepositional phrase, and the theme is marked with a determiner.

(525) a. Ton anaptira sto rafi!
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'Lighter on the shelf!'

b. Ta tropaia kato apo to krevati!
the.Acc trophies.Acc under from the.Acc bed.Acc
'Trophies under the bed!'

The utterances in (525) both appear to match the definitions of GoalCs. They both omit the verb, yet possess a meaning similar to an analogous traditional imperative that is expressed with an overt put-type verb. Both require a goal argument, in the case of (525a) provided the preposition "sto," and in the case of (525b) provided by the complex preposition "kato apo." Both GoalCs in (525) are also most naturally used as urgent commands.

Similar to Japanese and Korean, my Greek informants suggested that the maximally felicitous contexts for uttering a GoalC like (525) are a boss commanding a subordinate, or a military commander commanding a subordinate. Traditional Greek imperatives have an uncommon use limitation that has not been present so far in any language in this sample. They allow both command and permission uses, but wish uses are significantly more restricted (Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016; Kaufmann 2022).[15]

(526) a. Val-e ta vivlia sto rafi!
put-Imp the.Pl book.Pl on.the shelf
'Put the books on the shelf!' (command)

b. Par-e ena biskoto, an theleis.
take-Imp a.Acc cookie.Acc, if like.2sg
Take a cookie, if you like. (permission)

c. #Pern-a omofra!
pass-Imp nicely
'Have a good time!' (well wish)

Unlike English, Japanese, and Korean, traditional Greek imperatives cannot felicitously be used as wishes. Oikonomou (2016) shows that a subjunctive, marked by the subjunctive marker "na," must be used instead.

(527) Na perasis omorfa!
Subj pass.2sg nicely
'Have a good time!' (wish)

The subjunctive marker cannot form a GoalC, and attempting to combine the subjunctive marker with a GoalC results in ungrammaticality. (528) below can neither be interpreted as a command nor as a wish, it is simply ungrammatical.

[15] Myrto Grigoroglou (p.c.) brings up the fact that wishes seem possible with exactly one Greek verb, "become."

(1) Gin-e kalo pedi!
become-Imp good kid
'Become a good kid! / I hope you become a good kid.'

(528) *Na ton anaptira sto rafi!
Subj the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
Intended: 'Lighter on the shelf!'

Despite the fact that wish uses are unavailable to traditional imperatives, traditional imperatives still participate in both command and permission uses. As such, there is still an asymmetry between the potential uses of GoalCs and traditional imperatives in Greek. GoalCs cannot be used for permission, unlike traditional imperatives. The crucial example, therefore, is (529b) below.

(529) a. Sto rafi ton anaptira!
on.the shelf the.Acc lighter.Acc
'Lighter on the shelf!' (command)

b. #Ton anaptira sto rafi, an theleis.
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf if you.like.2sg
'Books on the shelf, if you like.' (permission)

c. Sto rafi ton anaptira!
on.the shelf the.Acc lighter.Acc
'Lighter on the shelf!' (#wish)

I therefore do not consider the lack of wish uses for GoalCs to be relevant because wish uses are unavailable to traditional imperatives. If GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, we should expect wishes to be unavailable, which is the case. More importantly, Greek GoalCs are acting like GoalCs in other languages in being limited to command usage.

4.2.3.2 Word Orders and Case

Because the default word order for Greek is SVO, Greek imperatives are verb-initial by default when the subject is unpronounced. All 6 possible permutations of Verb, Object and Goal are grammatical in Greek for the traditional imperative originally given in (523a). Scrambling the object and/or goal to the left of the verb has the pragmatic effect of focusing the shifted material (Georgiafentis 2004).

(530) a. Val-e ton anaptira sto rafi! (VOG)
put-Imp the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
b. Vale sto rafi ton anaptira! (VGO)

c. Ton anaptira vale sto rafi! (OVG)

d. Ton anaptira sto rafi vale! (OGV)

e. Sto rafi vale ton anaptira! (GVO)

f. Sto rafi ton anaptira vale! (GOV)

'Put that lighter on the shelf!'

Each of these word orders is not equally likely in real speech, but each is permitted in some context and is permitted by the grammar. Following the analysis given for traditional imperatives by Oikonomou (2016), the verb moves to Asp^0 and then higher to the imperative operator, between C^0 and T^0. If this happens in all traditional imperatives, it means that the orders in (530) in which the verb is not initial must be derived by the theme and goal scrambling to a higher position than the verb. If GoalCs are derived from a corresponding traditional imperative with a put-type verb ("vale"), then we would expect both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders to be possible in GoalCs per the Word Order Hypothesis in (456), given that both orders are available in a variety of permutations available to traditional imperatives. This prediction is borne out.

(531) a. Ton anaptira sto rafi!
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'Lighter on the shelf!'

b. Sto rafi ton anaptira!
on.the shelf the.Acc lighter.Acc
'Lighter on the shelf!'

Because there are multiple possible positions for the verb in (530), this provides multiple possible derivations for GoalCs. It is logically possible that the verb could precede the goal and theme, follow the goal and theme, or come between the theme and goal. All of these possibilities seem viable initially, given every permutation of goal, theme, and verb are possible in (530). For now, I will assume that the verb is deleting from the left, given that verb-initial is considered to be the default word order for traditional Greek imperatives. Later on in this chapter, I will argue that the verb must be initial in order to be in the path of *left-edge* deletion.

With regards to the word order hypothesis originally posited in (456) then, Greek GoalCs are *well-behaved*. Greek is permissive in terms of the word order of the theme and goal in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs, allowing both permutations of theme and goal. To this point, I have restricted the investigation of Greek GoalCs to themes that are marked with accusative case. Traditional Greek put-type imperatives must mark their themes with accusative case, nominative case is ungrammatical.

(532) a. Val-e ton anaptira sto rafi!
put-Imp the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'Put that lighter on the shelf!'

b. *Val-e o anaptiras sto rafi!
put-Imp the.Nom lighter.Nom on.the shelf
Intended: 'Put that lighter on the shelf!'

Following the Case-Marking Hypothesis originally posited in (459), we would expect nominative case to be ungrammatical on the GoalC theme. This is the pattern that was exhibited by Japanese and Korean, nominative was ungrammatical as both the theme of an overt-put type verb and the theme of a GoalC. In Greek, however, both accusative and nominative appear to be grammatical as the theme of a GoalC.

(533) a. Ton anaptira sto rafi!
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'Lighter on the shelf!'

b. O anaptiras sto rafi!
the.Nom lighter.Nom on.the shelf
'Lighter on the shelf!'

Given that traditional Greek imperatives require the direct object to be marked with accusative case, the data point in (533b) serves as a direct counterexample to the expectation provided by the case-marking hypothesis in (459). The possibility of nominative case raises the question as to whether or not the "theme" in (533b) is acting like a syntactic subject, which is typical of nominative marked arguments, or acting like an object that happens to be marked with nominative. Given that nominative case is typically reserved for subjects, we might expect that "o anaptiras" is the syntactic subject of (533b). If this were the case,

then it would be difficult to argue that (533b) was derived from an imperative clause, given that imperatives have addressee-restricted subjects, and "o anaptiras" is not interpreted as an addressee. A reasonable test to determine whether or not "o anaptiras" is the syntactic subject of (533b) is checking the possibilities of reflexive pronouns. Because GoalCs have been argued to be derived from traditional imperatives, they should bind 2nd person reflexives. Both GoalCs with nominative marked themes and accusative marked themes are capable of binding 2nd person pronouns in the goal.

(534) a. Tis skepsis su gia ton eafto su!
the.Acc thoughts.Acc your for the.Acc.Masc self.Acc.Masc your
'Your thoughts to yourself!'

b. Oi skepsis su gia ton eafto su!
the.Nom thoughts.Nom your for the.Acc.Masc self.Acc.Masc your
'Your thoughts to yourself!'

My initial reaction to the data in (534) is that the 2nd person reflexive must be licensed in (534a) by IMPPRO. If we interpret the nominative marked theme as being a true subject in (534b), then the 2nd person reflexive would not have a clear licenser. On the other hand, if it is not a true subject, but rather an object that is exceptionally marked with nominative case, then the 2nd person reflexive pronoun is licensed by IMPPRO in both cases. Unfortunately, the status of the 2nd person subject is not totally clear. Non-reflexive 2nd person pronouns are also grammatical in this position for both nominative-marked and accusative-marked themes.

(535) a. Tis skepsis su gia sena!
the.Acc thoughts.Acc your for you.Acc
'Your thoughts to you!'

b. Oi skepsis su gia sena!
the.Nom thoughts.Nom your for you.Acc
'Your thoughts to you!'

If there is a 2nd person subject in (535), it is unclear why there is not a Condition B effect for the 2nd person non-reflexive pronouns in the prepositional phrase. If there is not a 2nd person subject in (534), it is not clear how the 2nd person reflexive is bound.

The binding evidence is therefore not telling us anything interesting about the status of a 2nd person subject in GoalCs, which in turn tells us nothing about the status of the theme. 1st and 3rd persons do not illuminate the matter at all. Both reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns were judged as highly odd with either nominative marking or accusative marking on the theme.

(536) a. ???Tis skepsis mou gia mena!
the.Acc thoughts.Acc my for me.Acc
'My thoughts to me!'

b. ???Oi skepsis mou gia mena!
the.Nom thoughts.Nom my for me.Acc
'My thoughts to me!'

c. ???Tis skepsis tis gia ekeni!
the.Acc thoughts.Acc her for her.Acc
'Her thoughts to her!'

d. ???Oi skepsis tis gia ekeni!
the.Nom thoughts.Nom her for her.Acc
'Her thoughts to her!'

e. ???Tis skepsis mou gia ton eafto mou!
the.Acc thoughts.Acc my for the.Acc.Masc self.Acc.Masc my
'My thoughts to myself!'

f. ???Oi skepsis mou gia ton eafto mou!
the.Nom thoughts.Nom my for the.Acc.Masc self.Acc.Masc my
'My thoughts to myself!'

g. ???Tis skepsis tis gia ton eafto tis!
the.Acc thoughts.Acc her for the.Acc.Masc self.Acc.Masc her
'Her thoughts to herself!'

h. ???Oi skepsis tis gia ton eafto tis!
the.Nom thoughts.Nom her for the.Acc.Masc self.Acc.Masc her
'Her thoughts to herself!'

It seems, therefore, that the availability of reflexive or non-reflexive pronouns is not a good test for the presence of a higher subject, at least in this construction.

This means we must seek an alternative explanation for the flexible case that the theme displays. The availability of both nominative and accusative case on the GoalC

theme is not a general property of Greek fragments. Other fragments are more restricted in terms of the available cases. Case connectivity is seen in fragment answers, as is typical (Merchant 2005). In (537) below, B's fragment answer can only bear the case that it would in the full sentence, in this instance accusative.

(537) a. A:Poion eídes na baínei sto magazí?
who see.2sg.Pst Subj walk into.the store
Who did you see walking into the store?

b. B:*Giannis / Gianni.
Giannis.Nom / Giannis.Acc
'Giannis.'

B's reply in (537b) must be marked with accusative case because it is interpreted as the object of the verb "see" in A's question. This means that it cannot be true that fragments in Greek do not obey the case-marking available to complete sentences, because B's reply is subject to the same case marking rules as complete sentences despite being a fragment. Other fragments such as exclamations also do not have free case marking between nominative and accusative. For example, an exclamation such as (538a) below can only bear nominative case, accusative is ungrammatical.

(538) a. Ei, i alepu!
hey the.Nom fox.Nom
'Hey, the fox!'

b. *Ei, tin alepu!
hey, the.Acc fox.Acc
Intended: 'Hey, the fox!'

What this means is that Greek GoalCs, fragment answers, and exclamations all act distinctly from one another with respect to case marking. GoalCs themes can be either nominative or accusative, exclamations must be nominative, and fragment answers display obligatory case connectivity. This means that the case marking facts in GoalCs cannot be some property of fragments, since all these fragments act differently.

Analyzing Greek GoalCs are being small clauses also does not explain the case marking. Recall that a small clause analysis was ruled out for English, based on small clauses

constituting opaque domains for anaphora. The case marking on the subject of a Greek small clause receives its case from the verb that selects the small clause. In (539a) below, the small clause subject must be marked with accusative case, nominative case is ungrammatical.

(539) a. O Janis theori **ti** **Maria** eksipni.
the.Nom Giannis.Nom consider.3sg the.Acc Maria.Acc intelligent.Fem.Sg
'Giannis considers Maria intelligent.'

(Philippaki-Warburton and Spyropoulos 2002)

b. *O Janis theori **i** **Maria** eksipni.
The.Nom Giannis.Nom consider-3sg the.Nom Maria-Nom intelligent.Fem.Sg
Intended: 'Giannis considers Maria intelligent.'

This leaves the grammaticality of nominative case marking on the GoalC theme as somewhat surprising. If GoalCs are derived from traditional Greek imperatives that select a small clause, we would expect the case on the theme to be limited to accusative. This nominative marking can therefore not be explained by virtue of the fact that GoalCs are fragments, nor by invoking a small clause.

I will consider two main possibilities for the derivation of Greek GoalCs in an attempt to explain these unusual case marking facts. The first possibility is that Greek GoalCs are left-dislocated, and the second possibility is that there are two distinct derivations for GoalCs which happen to converge on the same meaning. As we will see, neither is particularly appetizing, but I will ultimately suggest that nominative marked themes must be in a separate, higher projection to avoid being assigned accusative case.

The literature reports judgments like (540a) below, in which a left-dislocated object can receive nominative case. My informants report that this same left-dislocated argument may also receive accusative (540b) with no change in meaning between the two.

(540) a. O paraksenos anthropos, dhen ton idhame.
the.Nom strange.Nom person.Nom not him.Acc saw
'The strange person, we didn't see him.' (Johannessen 1998)

b. Ton parakseno anthropo, dhen ton idhame.
the.Acc strange.Acc person.Acc not him.Acc saw
'The strange person, we didn't see him.'

The possibility for left-dislocated objects to be marked with either nominative or accusative case makes left-dislocation a promising analysis for GoalC themes, which can also be marked with either nominative or accusative. If GoalC themes are also left-dislocated, then the case marking facts would fall out for free. Unfortunately, my informants did not accept the nominative-marked left-dislocated object NP in (540a). Because they do allow nominative-marked GoalC themes, this makes it unlikely that their grammars are analogizing left-dislocated nominative themes and GoalC themes as in (540a) and (540b).

Another potentially promising possibility is a cleft. Below is a simple transitive sentence, and two counterparts with the object clefted. In (541b) below, the clefted object is marked with accusative, matching the case it would have received if it stayed in its base position. In (541c) however, the clefted object is marked with nominative, and there is argument marked with accusative in the main clause. My informants fully accept both nominative and accusative marked clefts.

(541) a. O Apollonas kinigise ti Daphne.
the.Nom Apollo.Nom chase.3sg.Pst the.Acc Daphne.Acc
'Apollo chased Daphne.'

b. Ti Daphne itan pu kinigise o Apollonas.
the.Acc Daphne was.3sg that chase.3sg the.Nom Apollo.Nom
'It was Daphne that Apollo chased.'

c. I Daphne itan pu kinigise o Apollonas.
the.Nom Daphne.Nom was.3sg that chase.3sg.Pst the.Nom Apollo.Nom
'It was Daphne that Apollo chased.'

According to my Greek informants, there is no difference in meaning between (541b) and (541c). The ability for clefted objects to freely take either nominative or accusative case is an intriguing starting point for an analysis of GoalCs, which also freely take either nominative or accusative with no difference in meaning. Below is a structure of (541c), with the nominative marked argument originating in the cleft position. I utilize the neutral terminology CleftP to avoid any specific claims about Greek clefts. The verb moves from its base position to an intermediate focus position to precede the subject, matching its surface position in (541c).

(542)



The nominative marked argument starts in cleft position, where it is assigned nominative case by Cleft^0.[16,17] A natural analysis that would account for the flexible case on the pivot is that the accusative-marked pivot is moved from the lower clause, whereas the nominative-marked pivot is base generated inside the cleft. Case assignment happens before movement to the cleft position, meaning that the moved object is assigned accusative.

The question we must next ask is this: Can this reasonably be applied to the case of GoalCs? In order to do so, we would need to cleft both the theme and the goal to a higher

[16] A reasonable position may be that the so-called "CleftP" here is actually just a TP, which can assign nominative case. More work is needed into Greek cleft structures to be able to say this with certainty, however, so I will stick with the more neutral tag.

[17] It is also possible that nominative case is assigned by virtue of being the default case in Greek, a state of affairs argued for by Johannessen (1998) and Schütze (2001).

position and delete the matrix clause, since GoalCs do not express an overt verb, even one in the cleft. This deletion could proceed similarly to Merchant's E-FEATURE deletion, where the clefted material escapes the deletion site, with all other material being deleted. Unfortunately, there are some serious reasons to think that style of analysis is not on the right track. One serious problem is that traditional Greek imperatives do not allow clefts at all. Clefting either the subject or object out of an imperative results in ungrammaticality, in both Greek and the English translations of the attempted Greek clefts.[18]

(543) a. *Esi eisai pu fug-e!
You be.2sg/3sg that leave-Imp
Intended: 'It is you that (must) leave!'

b. *I/Ti Daphne eisai pu kinigis-e!
the.Nom/the.Acc Daphne it.is that chase-Imp
Intended: 'It is Daphne that (you must) chase!'

If clefting is not possible with imperative clauses, it is unclear how clefting could form a GoalC. Additionally, GoalCs would require multiple constituents to be clefted, both the theme and the goal. My Greek informants judged clefting a theme and goal simultaneously to be highly unacceptable regardless of the word order of the goal and theme within the cleft or the case on the theme, even when the clause involved is not an imperative.

(544) a. ???O anaptiras sto rafi itan pu ebala.
the.Nom lighter.Nom on.the shelf was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst
'It was the lighter on the shelf that I put.'

b. ???Ton anaptira sto rafi itan pu ebala.
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst
'It was the lighter on the shelf that I put.'

c. ???Sto rafi o anaptiras itan pu ebala.
on.the shelf the.Nom lighter.Nom was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst
'It was on the shelf the lighter that I put.'

d. ???Sto rafi ton anaptira itan pu ebala.
on.the shelf the.Acc lighter.Acc was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst

[18] I place "must" in the English translations to help the reader understand the attempted meaning of the ungrammatical clefts. There is no word for "must" in the Greek originals.

'It was on the shelf the lighter that I put.'

Clefting just the theme or goal is possible in declarative clauses. When the object is clefted, it can bear either nominative or accusative case, as is typical of clefted objects, but when it is not clefted it must bear accusative. Clefting only the prepositional phrase is slightly awkward, but is grammatical (545c).

(545) a. O anaptiras itan pu ebala sto rafi.
the.Nom lighter.Nom was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst on.the shelf
'It was the lighter that I put on the shelf.'

b. Ton anaptira itan pu ebala sto rafi.
the.Acc lighter.Acc was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst on.the shelf
'It was the lighter that I put on the shelf.

c. ?Sto rafi itan pu ebala ton anaptira.
on.the shelf was.3sg that put.1sg.Pst the.Acc lighter.Acc
'It was on the shelf that I put the lighter.'

To summarize, Greek traditional imperatives do not seem to allow clefts, and clefting in general does not allow both a theme and a goal to be clefted. Both of these operations would be required in order for an analysis of GoalCs as clefts to be plausible. Unsurprisingly, attempts to cleft multiple objects out of a traditional imperative, as would be required for GoalCs, are completely ungrammatical.

(546) a. *O anaptiras sto rafi einai pu val-e.
the.Nom lighter.Nom on.the shelf is.3sg that put-Imp
Intended: 'It is the lighter on the shelf that (you must) put.'

b. *Ton anaptira sto rafi einai pu val-e.
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf is.3sg that put-Imp
Intended: 'It is the lighter on the shelf that (you must) put.

c. *Sto rafi o anaptiras einai pu val-e.
on.the shelf the.Nom lighter.Nom is.3sg that put-Imp
Intended: 'It is on the shelf the lighter (you must) put.'

d. *Sto rafi ton anaptira einai pu val-e.
on.the shelf the.Acc lighter.Acc is.3sg that put-Imp
Intended: 'It is on the shelf the lighter (you must) put.'

In short, it seems unlikely that traditional Greek imperatives could be clefting both their theme and goal, and then deleting the main clause to form GoalCs. Although this analysis gets the case facts correct, it seems to get every other fact wrong.

The other possibility is that nominative-marked GoalCs have a different underlying form than accusative-marked GoalCs, and happen to converge on the same meaning. Under this conception, accusative-marked GoalC themes are easy to explain, they are analogous to GoalC themes in the languages we have studied to this point in this chapter. Nominative themes, on the other hand, are subjects underlyingly. One good candidate for an underlying form of nominative-marked GoalCs is a verb of belonging. The following utterance could therefore come to take the form of a GoalC by non-pronunciation of the verb.

(547) O anaptiras (pai) sto rafi!
the.Nom lighter.Nom go.3sg on.the shelf
'The lighter goes on the shelf!'

Under imperative-like circumstances, a declarative like (547) could be used performatively to induce action from the addressee. Ignoring how exactly the verb is deleted from an utterance like (547), this is a promising starting point for getting a GoalC-like meaning with nominative case on the proper argument. If (547) is a declarative then we would expect the derived version to also be a declarative. If it is a declarative, we would expect to have accessible truth values, meaning that interlocutors can directly reference the truth or falsity of an utterance like (547). This is felicitous for the version in which the verb is overtly pronounced.

(548) a. O anaptiras pai sto rafi!
the.Nom lighter.Nom go.3sg on.the shelf
'The lighter goes on the shelf!'

b. Den einai alithia afto!
not is true that
'That's not true!'

This is unsurprising, given that (547) is a declarative, we expect it to be compatible with references to truth and falsity. What about the GoalC version where the verb is

unpronounced? The answer turns out to be unclear. Informants differed in the acceptability of an exchange like the following.

(549) a. O anaptiras sto rafi!
the.Nom lighter.Nom on.the shelf
'Lighter on the shelf!'

b. %Den einai alithia afto!
not is true that
'That's not true!'

One of my informants found B's reply in (549) to be perfectly felicitous, regardless of A's intentions in ordering B in the first place. For this speaker, it seems that what we have been calling "nominative marked GoalCs" may not be GoalCs at all, but are instead just declaratives with the verb deleted. All speakers found referencing truth and falsity when the theme was marked with accusative to be unacceptable.

(550) a. Ton anaptira sto rafi!
the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'Lighter on the shelf!'

b. #Den einai alithia afto!
not is true that
'That's not true!'

I take the utterance in (550a) to be an unambiguous GoalC, derived from a traditional imperative in a way similar to English. The utterance in (549a), on the other hand, may be a declarative underlyingly, at least for some speakers. I will therefore consider these speakers to only be allowing accusative-marked GoalCs, and nominative-marked GoalCs to be coincidentally quite similar.

Nevertheless, some speakers rejected B's reply in (549). Because of this, Greek's official classification is *superset*, though clearly more investigation is needed. If these speakers are truly deriving nominative marked GoalCs from traditional imperatives, that means for these speakers that it is less clear that a nominative-marked GoalC could be derived from (547). If the nominative case cannot be derived from a sentence like (547), and also cannot be a cleft, then how does nominative marking appear on the theme? At the end of the next

section I will offer a speculative solution for the speakers whose nominative-marked themes are acting performatively.

4.2.3.3 Left Edge Ellipsis

The final topic that will be addressed for Greek is edge ellipsis. English exhibited this effect on the left edge, while Japanese and Korean exhibited this effect on the right edge. This section will discuss the facts of expressing overt subjects, negation and adverbs in Greek. Greek GoalCs do not allow the overt inclusion of a 2nd person subject unless there is a prosodic break, a perfect analogy of English.

(551) a. *Esi ton anaptira sto rafi!
You.Nom the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
Intended: 'You books on the shelf!'

b. Esi, ton anaptira sto rafi!
You.Nom the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'You, books on the shelf!'

This unavailability of subjects in GoalCs is somewhat unexpected, given that traditional Greek imperatives permit, but do not require, overt subjects. In traditional Greek imperatives, the subject may be included with the pragmatic effect of emphasizing the addressee.

(552) Esi val-e ton anaptira sto rafi!
You.Nom put-Imp the.Acc lighter.Acc on.the shelf
'You put the lighter on the shelf!'

Analogous to the case in English, the impossibility of subjects in GoalCs is evidence that Greek GoalCs are deleting to their left edge. If subjects were in the path of this deletion, which only takes place in GoalCs, then the impossibility of subjects would follow. The next diagnostic used to determine whether edge deletion was occurring was the possibility of negation in the deletion site. Greek does not allow traditional imperatives to be directly negated, requiring a subjunctive verb form in the presence of negation (Han 1998).

(553) a. Vale ta vivlia sto rafi!
put.Imp the books on.the shelf
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Mi vazeis ta vivlia sto rafi!
not put.Subj.2sg the.Acc books.Acc on.the shelf
'Don't put the books on.the shelf!'

There is again some degree of dialectal variation with regards to the grammaticality of the negative marker in GoalCs. One informant found the following to be marginally acceptable, as an example of what was described as "baby talk." The other informants found it to be unacceptable. I take this designation to indicate unacceptability in the adult grammar, though perhaps it is not totally clear-cut.

(554) *Mi ta vivlia sto rafi!
not the.Acc books.Acc on.the shelf
'Don't books on the shelf!'

If Greek GoalCs were merely omitting the verb, we might expect negation to be compatible with GoalCs, as in (554). The fact that negation appears to be unacceptable indicates Greek GoalCs are deleting on the left edge. The final diagnostic for determining the availability of edge positions was adverbs. Adverbs are quite unrestricted in traditional Greek imperatives, able to grammatically appear clause-initially, clause-finally, between the verb and theme, or between the theme and goal, exactly what we have seen in the sample to this point.

(555) a. *Grigora* vale ta vivlia sto rafi!
quickly put.Imp the books on.the shelf
'Quickly put the books on the shelf!

b. Vale *grigora* ta vivlia sto rafi!
put.Imp *quickly* the books on.the shelf
'Put the books quickly on the shelf!

c. Vale ta vivlia *grigora* sto rafi!
put.Imp the books *quickly* on.the shelf
'Put the books quickly on the shelf!

d. Vale ta vivlia sto rafi *grigora*!
put.Imp the books on.the shelf *quickly*
'Put the books on the shelf quickly!

If there is no edge restriction in Greek, we would expect all of the adverb positions available in (555) to be available in GoalCs. Informants were again inconsistent with their judgments with respect to adverbs. One speaker found the adverb on the left edge in (556a) to be completely unacceptable, while the other speaker found it to be acceptable. Adverbs in other positions were universally accepted.

(556) a. %*Grigora* ta vivlia sto rafi!
quickly the books on.the shelf
'Quickly books on the shelf!'

b. Ta vivlia *grigora* sto rafi!
the books quickly on.the shelf
'Books quickly on the shelf!'

c. Ta vivlia sto rafi *grigora*!
the books on.the shelf quickly
'Books on the shelf quickly!'

There is speaker variation on the acceptability of the left edge adverbs. Below is a summary of the differences between the informants. I also include the other instance of dialectal variation, whether or not nominative-marked themes were acting performative. I mark ? for the speaker who accepted negation on the left edge as an instance of "baby talk."

	Speaker 1	Speaker 2
Subjects	X	X
Negation	?	X
Left-Edge Adverbs	✓	X
Nominative-marked themes	X	✓

As we can see, Speaker 1 seems to be more permissive towards left-edge material than Speaker 2. Speaker 1 also treated nominative-marked GoalCs as non-performative. Speaker 2, on the other hand, did not allow any material on the left edge, and treated both nominative and accusative marked GoalCs as performative.

Speaker 2 is acting essentially in an identical way to English, deleting all material to the left of the theme. Below is a derivation for this edge deletion, identical to the pattern seen in English, applicable only to the dialect of Speaker 2. For now, I assume that the

determiner receives an [+α] feature by agreeing with the noun, which is highly plausible given that determiners show overt agreement for Case, Number, and Gender with the nouns they agree with. The following is a derivation for a GoalC with an accusative case marked theme.

(557) Speaker 2

[$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~Esi~~.....[$_{VP}$ ~~vale~~ [$_{DP}$ ton anaptira][$_{PP}$ sto rafi]]]

[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α]

If Greek is deleting to the left edge, the subjects, negation, and adverbs should all be ungrammatical, because they are in the path of deletion and cannot receive an [+α] feature.

Speaker 2 also allows nominative case on the theme. Although it seems clear that GoalCs cannot be derived from clefts, the analogy between the available cases to clefted objects and the GoalC theme is enough to make me believe that there must be some structural similarity. Following this intuition, I will place nominative marked objects as being base-generated in a higher projection, termed FP here. This position is base-generated very high in the structure, higher than the prosodic feature, which means it is not in the path of deletion.

(558)



The reason that "o anaptiras" receives nominative case in the configuration in (558) is that nominative is an unmarked case in Greek, and does not require T^0 to assign it

(Schütze 2001; Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2021). Deletion proceeds normally in (533b), it proceeds until it encounters an [+α] feature. The only difference is that there is an argument base-generated in a high position.

Accusative case does not involve movement. Case is assigned locally by the verb, and edge deletion proceeds until it reaches the first [+α] feature.

(559)



A derivation of the difference in edge deletion is shown below.

(560) [$_{FP}$ O anaptiras sto rafi [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND [$_{CP}$ ~~Esi vale~~ e$_1$ sto rafi]]]
[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α]

(561) [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND [$_{CP}$ ~~Esi vale~~ ton anaptira sto rafi]]]
[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α] [+α]

Edge deletion on the left explains the adverb pattern. The following is a derivation for an acceptable and unacceptable adverb configuration in Greek.

(562) [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND [$_{FP1}$ *Grigora* ton anaptira sto rafi] [$_F$ E [$_{CP}$ ~~Esi vale t$_I$~~]]]
[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α] [+α]

(563) [$_{ProsP}$ COMMAND [$_{FP1}$ Ton anaptira sto rafi grigora] [$_F$ E [$_{CP}$ ~~Esi vale t$_I$~~]]]
[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α] [+α]

In (562), there is an adverb in the path of deletion. This means that pronouncing an adverb in this position is ungrammatical. In (563), however, the adverb is not in the path

of edge deletion, and can be pronounced. There are no restrictions on moving adverbs into FP, the only restrictions are what can be pronounced. Because adverbs cannot be assigned [+α], they are deleted when in the path of deletion, which is on the left edge.

Analyzing Greek as deleting on the left-edge fits with the cross-linguistic generalization about the directionality of gapping and edge ellipsis. Greek is a forward gapping language, backward gapping is ungrammatical. Both speakers agreed that only forward gapping was possible.

(564) a. Ego efaga psari kai o Bill ryzi.
I eat.Pst.1sg fish and the.Nom Bill rice
'I ate fish and Bill rice.'

b. *Ego psari kai o Bill efage ryzi.
I fish and the.Nom Bill eat.Pst.3sg rice
Intended: 'I fish and Bill ate rice.'

This means that, for the speaker who has edge ellipsis, the edge ellipsis is proceeding in the same direction as it must for gapping. There is only one outstanding fact about Greek that is not explained by the analysis that was given for English. Greek determiners are permitted in GoalCs. Omitting the determiner is highly unacceptable (565).

(565) ???Vivlia sto rafi!
book.Pl on.the shelf
'Books on the shelf!'

This is easily accounted for if we analyze Greek determiners as being agreeing elements. Because Greek determiners overtly agree with the head noun in gender, case, and number, the fact that they also agree in [+α] is intuitive.

(566)



Under our analysis, the lexical head "vivlia" must bear an [+α] feature because it is selected by a put-type verb. The determiner "ta" also receives an [+α] feature, meaning that deletion stops at the point of the determiner. This explain the difference between English and Greek; English cannot pronounce determiners (despite determiners being present semantically), but Greek must pronounce determiners because they are agreeing elements. This is plausible because Greek determiners carry more information than English determiners. I would like to propose that there is a correlation between ϕ-features carried by a determiner and that determiner's amenability to deletion in GoalCs. The following principle describes this generalization.

(567) *GoalC Determiner ϕ-Feature Generalization*:

In languages with determiners, languages whose determiners carry ϕ-features are not deleted by edge deletion in GoalCs. Languages whose determiners do not carry ϕ-features are deleted.

Another way of framing the generalization in (567) is that determiners that carry ϕ-features will have the [+α] feature bestowed upon them in that language. This analysis makes

intuitive sense, the less information that linguistic material carries, the easier that material should be to delete.

4.2.3.4 Greek Conclusion

Greek is the first language we have encountered whose classification is not entirely clear. For one speaker, it seems that Greek GoalCs are *well-behaved* in terms of both word order and case. For another speaker, Greek is a "poorly-behaved" GoalC language, regardless of word order, with respect to its case marking, because it allows the theme to be nominative marked, which is not an option in traditional imperatives. Nominative case is the default case in Greek, indicating that the environment for assigning case is somehow optionally destroyed in the process of making a GoalC. Determiner facts are explained by Greek articles agreeing with the head noun. I tentatively proposed an analysis involving movement of the theme and goal to a higher projection, to account for the word order facts. A subsequent edge deletion then applies to the focused constituent, explaining the edge deletion facts.

4.2.4 Turkish GoalCs

This section will be a discussion of Turkish, a Turkic language primarily spoken in Turkey, Cyprus, Europe, and the Middle East.[19] Turkish marks case overtly and has flexible word order, and can therefore easily be compared to the languages tested thus far in this Chapter. Like Korean and Greek, Turkish is *poorly-behaved*, in the sense that its GoalC paradigm does not perfectly match its traditional imperative paradigm. I will argue that Turkish is a *subset* language, because the options available to GoalCs are more restricted than those available to traditional imperatives. Like English and Greek, there is evidence of left-edge deletion in Turkish. However, Turkish default word order is SOV, meaning that the default surface position of the verb is not in the path of that deletion.

4.2.4.1 Turkish Traditional Imperatives

In Turkish, traditional imperative verbs are a bare stem, and tend to come at the end of the sentence, which is the default position for Turkish verbs across clause types (Kornfilt

[19] Thanks to Bilge Palaz, Samet Kocagöz and Dursun Altınok for providing the judgments throughout this section.

2013). In both (568a) and (568b) below, the theme is marked with overt accusative case. In (568a), the theme precedes the goal, and in (568b), the goal precedes the theme. Turkish lacks a clause-type marker that marks the clause overtly as an imperative.

(568) a. Kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Masa-nın altındaki ödül-ler-i al!
table-Gen under trophy-Pl-Acc get.Imp
'Get the trophies under the desk!'

Both traditional imperatives in (568) have the verb at the end of the clause. The verb also comes clause-finally in declaratives and interrogatives by default. Unlike imperatives, there is a dedicated clause type marker for interrogatives in (569b).

(569) a. Enes o kitab-ı raf-a koy-uyor.
Enes that book-Acc shelf-Dat put-Pres
'Enes is putting that book on the shelf.'

b. Enes o kitab-ı raf-a koy-uyor mu?
Enes that book-Acc shelf-Dat put-Prs Q
'Is Enes putting that book on the shelf?'

Following the general pattern established thus far, it is possible to express commands that are similar to the ones in (568) as GoalCs. In (570a) and (570b) below, only the theme and goal are overtly expressed. The goal is marked with the dative suffix "-a" in (570a), and by the postposition "altındaki" in (570b).[20] In both the theme is unmarked. Turkish lacks determiners.

(570) a. Kitap-lar raf-a!
book-Pl shelf-Dat
'Books on the shelf!'

[20] There may be some speaker variation in the acceptability of the postposition to be interpreted as a goal in this configuration. One informant reported that (570b) sounded more natural as a reduced relative clause, i.e. "the trophies (that are) under the table." The theme-goal order can still only be interpreted as a command.

b. Masanın altındaki ödül-ler!
table under trophy-Pl
'Trophies under the table!'

The utterances in (570) both appear to have all the essential properties of GoalCs. They omit the verb while possessing a meaning nearly identical to an analogous traditional put-type imperative. Both require a goal argument, in this case provided by the dative marker and the postposition "altındaki." Both GoalCs in (570) are also most naturally used as urgent commands, exactly the pattern seen throughout this chapter thus far. My Turkish informants reported that the most natural context for GoalCs like in (570) is as a harsh command, possibly by a teacher disciplining a student or a parent disciplining a child, using command prosody. Traditional Turkish imperatives can participate in the standard range of uses, at least being used as commands, wishes, and permission.

(571) a. Kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!' (command)

b. Lütfen yakışıklı ol!
please handsome be.Imp
'Please be handsome!' (wish)

c. Istersen bir kurabiye al.
if.you.want a cookie take.Imp
'Take a cookie, if you want.' (permission)

Turkish GoalCs, following the pattern established thus far in this chapter, are restricted to being used as commands. Wishes and permission are infelicitous in GoalCs.

(572) a. Kitap-lar raf-a!
book-Pl shelf-Dat
'Books on the shelf!' (command)

b. Paket posta kutusun-a!
package mail box-Dat
'Package in the mailbox! (#wish)

c. #Istersen, kitap-lar raf-a!
if.you.want book-Pl shelf-Dat
'Books on the shelf, if you like.' (permission)

4.2.4.2 Turkish Word Order and Case

Despite the fact that the default word order of Turkish sentences is SOV, Turkish word order is generally quite flexible. Like Greek, all 6 possible permutations of Verb, Object, and Goal are grammatical for the traditional imperative originally given in (568a). Scrambling objects to the left has the discourse effect of focusing, and it is possible to scramble multiple constituents at once (Kornfilt 2005).

(573) a. Koy kitap-lar-ı raf-a! (VOG)
put.Imp book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat
b. Koy rafa kitapları! (VGO)
c. Kitapları koy rafa! (OVG)
d. Kitapları rafa koy! (OGV)
e. Rafa koy kitapları! (GVO)
f. Rafa kitapları koy! (GOV)
'Put the books on the shelf!'

Each of these word orders is licensed by specific discourse contexts, and thus some may be unlikely in actual speech, but are nevertheless grammatical. It has been argued that Turkish constituents can sometimes move to the right and can be higher in the structure than the verb (Kural 1997). Regardless of how constituents move in Turkish, if we assume that GoalCs are derived from a corresponding traditional imperative with a put-type verb ("koy"), then we would expect both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders to be possible in GoalCs based on the flexibility of position in (573). This prediction is borne out, both theme-goal and goal-theme orders are grammatical.

(574) a. Kitap-lar raf-a!
book-Pl shelf-Dat
'Books on the shelf!'
b. Raf-a kitap-lar!
shelf-Dat book-Pl
'Books on the shelf!'

With regards to the word order hypothesis originally given in (456) then, Turkish GoalCs are *well-behaved*. Turkish is permissive in terms of the word order of the theme and

goal in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs, allowing both permutations of the theme and goal.

With regards to case marking, each traditional imperative in (573) has the theme marked with overt accusative case. Accusative case is grammatical on the theme regardless of its position with respect to the verb, but plural themes that are unmarked for case are unacceptable as the object of "koy" in (575a) and (575b) below.

(575) a. *Kitap-lar raf-a koy!
book-Pl shelf-Dat put.Imp
Intended: 'Put (the) books onto the shelf!'

b. *Raf-a kitap-lar koy!
shelf-Dat books-Pl put.Imp
Intended: 'Put (the) books onto the shelf!'

Combined with the data in (573), we have a clear prediction about what we should expect to see in GoalCs. Because the traditional imperatives can have accusative themes in both the theme-goal and goal-theme order, and can have unmarked nouns in neither position, we should expect to see only accusative case on GoalC themes, per the GoalC Case Marking Hypothesis in (459). Instead, the exact opposite pattern is seen. Bare themes are possible in both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders, whereas accusative marked themes are highly degraded.

(576) a. Kitap-lar raf-a!
book-Pl shelf-Dat
'Books onto the shelf!'

b. Raf-a kitap-lar!
shelf-Dat book-Pl
'Books onto the shelf!'

c. ???Kitap-lar-ı raf-a!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat
'Books onto the shelf!'

d. ???Raf-a kitap-lar-ı!
shelf-Dat book-Acc
'Books onto the shelf!'

What this means is that Turkish is acting very *poorly-behaved* with respect to case marking in GoalCs. In fact, based on what we have seen so far, Turkish is a candidate for being a *disjunct* language, because it appears that no part of the GoalC paradigm is available to traditional imperatives. Korean was a *subset* language, in the sense that the options available for case-marking in GoalCs were more limited than that of traditional imperatives. Greek was a *superset* language, in the sense that the options available for case-marking in GoalCs are more permissive than traditional imperatives. Turkish GoalCs must have bare themes, and traditional imperatives with "put" must mark their themes with accusative case. It is worth noting that Turkish does not obligatorily case mark objects in all syntactic configurations, it is in fact possible for objects to sometimes receive null marking in the presence of an overt verb. Because null marking is sometimes possible, I classify Turkish as a *subset* language.

Unmarked nominals in Turkish are eligible for pseudo-incorporation, in which the nominal shows the semantic properties of an incorporated noun without forming a morphological unit with the verb (Mithun 1986; Baker 1988). The semantic effect of incorporating an unmarked nominal is that it makes the object non-specific. The contrast between (577a) and (577b) below is that the pseudo-incorporated unmarked nominal in (577b) is interpreted as non-specific.

(577) a. Ali kitab-ı oku-du.
Ali book-Acc read-Pst
'Ali read the book.'

b. Ali kitap oku-du.
Ali book read-Pst
'Ali did book-reading.' (Öztürk 2009)

The incorporated nominal in (577b) is compatible with plural interpretation, despite being morphologically unmarked for number. Sağ (2021) shows that plural objects that are unmarked for case are more limited in their distribution than singular objects unmarked for case. She argues that bare plurals only appear in environments where bare singulars are ungrammatical because noun incorporation is not possible. She provides the following contrast (emphasis is my own).

(578) a. Ali **kitap** oku-du.
Ali book read-Pst
'Ali did book-reading.'

b. *Ali **kitap-lar** oku-du.
Ali book-Pl read-Pst
Intended: 'Ali did book-reading.' (Sağ 2021)

According to Sağ (2021), there is competition between the form in (578a) and (578b). (578b) is unacceptable because it is blocked by (578a). We saw that plural nouns with no case marking were perfectly acceptable in GoalCs, however. We might ask whether or not the unmarked plural nouns in (576a) and (576b) are grammatical because noun incorporation is blocked with a bare singular. Initially, this is plausible, given that the deletion of the verb likely creates a sub-optimal environment for incorporation. Additionally, GoalCs with bare singular themes are quite unacceptable, with either the interpretation of a single book or multiple books.[21]

(579) a. ???Kitap raf-a!
book shelf-Dat
'Book(s) on the shelf!'

b. *Raf-a kitap!
shelf-Dat book
Intended: 'Book(s) on the shelf!'

It seems initially plausible that the grammaticality of bare plurals in GoalCs could be due to the fact that bare singulars are associated with incorporation, but the deletion of the verb creates an environment in which noun incorporation is impossible. For example, a bare singular is very odd in an example like (580) below, when it is attempted to be incorporated with an elided verb.

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[21] The bare singular in the theme-goal word order improves significantly in a *list context*.

(1) ?Kitap raf-a, çakmak masa-ya.
book shelf-Dat lighter table-Dat
'Books on the shelf, lighters on the table.'

My informants report, however, that the meaning of such an utterance is more like reading a list of instructions than a multi-tiered command.

(580) a. Ayı avlar mı-sın?
bear hunt Q-2sg
A: 'Do you go bear hunting?'

b. ??Hayır, geyik.
no deer
B: No, deer.

Unfortunately, the exchange in (580) does not tell the whole story. B's reply in (580) does not improve if the bare nominal is plural-marked, it becomes completely unacceptable.

(581) a. Ayı avlar mı-sin?
bear hunt Q-2sg
A: 'Do you go bear hunting?'

b. *Hayır, geyik-ler.
no deer-Pl
B: No, deer.

According to Sağ (2021), we should expect to see bare plural forms in environments where bare singulars are blocked because noun incorporation is impossible. The unacceptability of B's reply in (581) therefore indicates that the bare singular in (580) is not ungrammatical purely because incorporation is blocked. The evidence is therefore quite unconvincing that the origin of bare plural nominals in GoalCs is due to the fact that bare singulars are ruled out in incorporation scenarios in which the verb is not overt. Making it even worse, if Turkish GoalCs are derived from their corresponding traditional put-type imperatives, we would expect accusative to be possible, with a definite interpretation.

Furthermore, GoalC objects do not have the same interpretation as pseudo-incorporated objects. GoalC themes are always interpreted as definite, analogous to the case in English. The bare plural themes in (574) are always interpreted as referring to specific books that are relevant in the context.

(582) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)
A: Kitap-lar raf-a!
Book-Pl shelf-Dat
'Books on the shelf!'

✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.

X: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

The felicity conditions on the GoalC uttered by A in (582) with a caseless theme matches the felicity of an object in a traditional imperative with accusative case. It is ungrammatical to leave a plural object caseless when the verb is overt, but it is acceptable with no number marking at all.

(583) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)

A: Kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy!

Books-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp

'Books onto the shelf!'

✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.

X: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

(584) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)

A: Kitap raf-a koy!

Book shelf-Dat put.Imp

'Books onto the shelf!'

✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.

✓: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

What this means is that GoalC themes, despite being unmarked, are acting essentially the same as accusative-marked themes when the verb is overt.

One thing worth investigating is whether or not the null-marked themes are nominative. Nominative marking in Turkish is null and therefore morphologically indistinguishable from a bare object. If Turkish GoalC "themes" were actually subjects, then they would be marked with nominative, explaining why they are bare. Although it may seem strange to argue that the GoalC theme is actually nominative marked, this is not particularly far-fetched when it is considered that we have already seen that Greek was capable of marking GoalC themes with nominative case, which in that language is overt. I will consider several possible analyses for nominative-marked GoalCs.

A promising possibility is that there is a belonging relation between the theme and the goal in Turkish GoalCs. The word "ait," borrowed from Arabic, may be used to indicate a belonging relationship alongside a silent copula, as in (585) below. Its subject is marked with nominative and its goal is marked as dative.

(585) Kitap-lar raf-a ait.
book-Pl shelf-Dat belong
'The books belong to the shelf.'

Although the meaning of an utterance like (585) is not identical to "Put the books on the shelf!," it is nevertheless a promising starting point because it requires both a nominative and dative argument. Removing "ait" from (585) leaves the remaining arguments with the correct cases. Unfortunately, analyzing GoalCs as involving the word "ait" permits certain material as a GoalC that does not actually appear. For example, "ait" can be used to predicate any belonging relation, but GoalCs cannot.

(586) a. O sanat eseri Istanbul-a ait.
that art work Istanbul-Dat belong
'That artwork belongs in/to Istanbul.'

b. Sanat eseri Istanbul-a!
art work Istanbul-Dat
'*The artwork belongs in Istanbul! / Fine: Artwork to Istanbul!

Turkish GoalCs are *performative*, imperative utterances, and always obligate their addressee(s) to some course of action. For example, like traditional imperatives, GoalCs do not allow replies that directly reference truth or falsity.

(587) a. Sanat eseri Istanbul-a!
art work Istanbul-Dat
'Artwork to Istanbul!'

b. #Hayir, doğru değil.
no correct not
'No, that's not correct.'

Statements with "ait" are not obligatorily performative, and are easily countered with replies that directly reference truth or falsity.

(588) a. O sanat eseri Istanbul-a ait.
that art work Istanbul-Dat belongs
'That artwork belongs in/to Istanbul.'

b. Hayir, doğru değil.
no correct not
'No, that's not correct.'

What this means is that if we want to argue that "ait" expressions form the input to GoalCs, then there is work to do to induce the correct performativity. We could argue that there is an imperative operator present in Turkish GoalCs, as I have been arguing throughout this chapter, but that operator is present in a syntactically declarative clause, analogous to the analysis that was given for English General Prohibitives. Below is a structure of this combination of declarative/imperative properties. Note that AddresseeP cannot be present given that the subject is not restricted to the addressee.[22]

(589) (to be rejected)

[22] I place the Prosody Head on the left edge, rather than the right. This is in anticipation of the left-edge ellipsis facts which we will see in the next section.



The [+α] feature on the Prosody Head is associated with GoalCs and conditions the deletion that takes place on the GoalC edge. Unfortunately, there is a major problem with taking the structure in (589) to be the input for GoalCs. A put-type verb is required to assign [+α] features to its theme and goal. The (589) has no obvious way to assign an [+α] feature to anything. Doing this would separate the analysis for Turkish from the analyses of other languages, which all required put-type verbs in their derivations.

Nevertheless, if we assume that the imperative operator can combine with a declarative clause in (589), then the operator can derive the correct performativity with respect to the speech update induced in a GoalC. This structure also places the GoalC theme as its syntactic subject. It is worth investigating whether there is any evidence that the GoalC theme is acting like a nominative argument in the syntax. One well-known property of Turkish subjects is that the bear genitive case in nominalized embedded environments (Kornfilt

2003). In (590b) below, the verb "bil" selects for a nominalized complement clause with a genitive subject.

(590) a. Ali kitab-ı oku-du.
Ali book-Acc read-Pst
'Ali read the book.'

b. [Ali-**nin** kitab-ı oku-du-ğun]-u duy-du-um.
Ali-Gen book-Acc read-Pst-Comp-Acc hear-Pst-1sg
'I heard that Ali read the book.' (Kornfilt 2009; p. 109, her 41a and b)

What this means is that if the GoalC theme receives genitive case in an embedded environment, then we can reasonably infer that it was receiving nominative in the unmarked case in the standard GoalC. We can therefore ask, do GoalC themes get genitive case in embedded environments? Unfortunately, imperatives are notoriously difficult to embed (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Kaufmann 2014). Traditional Turkish imperatives initially appear to be able to embed under the verb "say," similar to the case in English (Crnič and Trinh 2009).

(591) Deniz$_i$ san-a anne-si$_i$-ni ara de-di.
Deniz you-Dat mother-3sg.Poss-Acc call.Imp say-Pst
'Deniz$_i$ said call his$_i$ mother.'

Unfortunately, the status of the embedded clause in (591) is not entirely clear. Although it is possible to bind into the embedded clause, which Crnič and Trinh (2009) take as evidence of a genuine embedding, the putative embedded subject receives dative case, which is not characteristic of Turkish embedded clauses. Additionally, the verb "de" does not nominalize its embedded clauses at all, which is typically taken to be required for Turkish embedded clauses. Genitive case is ungrammatical on the subject of the embedded clause.

(592) *Deniz$_i$ sen-**in** anne-si$_i$-ni ara de-di.
Deniz you-**Gen** mother-3sg.Poss-Acc call.Imp say-Pst
Intended: 'Deniz$_i$ said call his$_i$ mother.'

There is another verb in Turkish that can be translated as "say," which is "söyle," which does take a nominalized complement. This verb is capable of taking what appears to potentially be an embedded imperative in (593).

(593) Deniz$_i$ sen-in anne-si$_i$-ni ara-ma-n-i söyle-di.
Deniz you-Gen mother-3sg.Poss-Acc call.Nmz-2sg.Poss-Acc say-Pst
'Deniz said (for you) to call his mother.'

Unfortunately, there is a compelling reason to believe that the clause embedded in (593) is not an imperative. Imperative clauses are restricted to syntactic subjects that are some subset of the addressees. This configuration, on the other hand, can freely embed other persons as well.

(594) Deniz$_i$ ben-im anne-si$_i$-ni ara-ma-m-i söyle-di.
Deniz 1sg-Gen mother-3sg.Poss-Acc call.Nmz-1sg.Poss-Acc say-Pst
'Deniz said for me to call his mother.'

It remains very unclear, therefore, that the embedded clause in (591) is a genuine imperative. If Turkish is capable of embedding traditional imperatives, however, then it is at least plausible that Turkish could embed GoalCs as well. Unsurprisingly, there are some complications involved with telling whether or not GoalCs are truly embedded. It is possible for the verb "de" to apparently embed a GoalC, with the subject receiving no overt case.

(595) Osman kitap-lar masa-ya de-di
Osman books table-Dat say-Pst
'Osman said books on the table!'

Given what we know about the verb 'de," however, the embedded material in (595) is most likely a quote and not a genuine embedding. It is also possible to mark the theme with the morpheme "-in," which is used for genitive case marking. Unfortunately, the morpheme "-in" is used for both genitive marking and for the 2nd person possessor. Therefore, the following example is ambiguous morphologically between genitive marking (required for nominalized embedded environments) and 2nd person possession. According to my informants, however, it can only be interpreted as 2nd person possession, and not the genitive required for embedded clauses.

(596) Osman kitap-lar-ın masa-ya de-di!
Osman book-Pl-ın table-Dat say-Pst
'*Osman said books on the table!' / OK: 'Osman said **your** books on the table!'

Adding credence to the idea that the embedded material in (595) and (596) is most likely a quote in each instance is the fact that possessive markers are perfectly grammatical in main clause Turkish GoalCs. The possessor is allowed in main clause Turkish GoalCs, even though possessors are not acceptable in their English translation.

(597) Kitap-lar-ın masa-ya!
Book-Pl-2sg.Poss table-Dat
'Your books on the table!'

Attempting to embed the nominalize the embedded material in (597) under "söyle" is not possible. An attempt at adding a nominalizer to this verbless material fails.

(598) a. *Deniz kitap-lar-ın masa-ya-ma-ların-ı söyle-di.
Deniz book-Pl-Gen table-Dat-Nmz-Pl.Poss-Acc say-Pst
Intended: 'Deniz said books on the table!'

b. *Deniz kitap-lar-(ın) masa-ya-**yı** söyle-di.
Deniz book-Pl-Gen table-Dat-Acc say-Pst
Intended: 'Deniz said books on the table!'

c. *Deniz kitap-lar-ım-ın masa-ya söyle-di.
Deniz book-pl-1sg.Poss-Gen table-Dat say-Pst
Intended: 'Deniz said my books on the shelf!'

d. *Deniz kitap-lar-ım-ın masa-ya-**yı** söyle-di.
Deniz book-pl-1sg.Poss-Gen table-Dat-Acc say-Pst
Intended: 'Deniz said my books on the shelf!'

Because of this, I do not believe that GoalCs can be embedded in Turkish. This leaves a reflexive test to see whether or not the syntactic subject of GoalCs is IMPPRO, analogous to traditional imperatives. If GoalCs can license 2nd person reflexives, this suggests that they must have a 2nd person subject, even though that subject is obligatorily covert. 2nd person reflexive pronouns are entirely ungrammatical in theme position, analogous to the case in English.

This is borne out: 2nd person reflexive pronouns are perfectly acceptable as the goal, and there is a strong contrast between their acceptability and the acceptability of non-reflexive pronouns (599b).

(599) a. Fikir-ler-in kendine!
thought-pl-2sg.Poss yourself.Dat
'Thoughts to yourself!' (lit. 'Your thoughts to yourself!')

b. *Fikir-ler-in san-a!
thought-pl-2sg.Poss you.Dat
'Thoughts to you!' (lit. Your thoughts to you!')

The contrast between (599a) and (599b) was the exact contrast used to argue in favor of an addressee-restricted subject in English. There is, however, a potential binder in (599a) that was not present in the English example. (599a) is most naturally constructed with a 2nd person possessive pronoun on the theme. If this possessive pronoun is capable of licensing reflexives, then it could follow that there is no 2nd person imperative subject associated with Turkish GoalCs. In other contexts, however, this possessive marker is not capable of licensing reflexives.

(600) a. Para-n-ı *san-a* ver-di-m
money-2sg.Poss-Acc you-Dat give-Pst-1sg
'I gave your money to you.'

b. *Para-n-ı *kendine* ver-di-m
money-2sg.Poss-Acc yourself.Dat give-Pst-1sg
Intended: 'I gave your money to yourself.'

The fact that the 2nd person possessive pronoun is not capable of binding a dative reflexive in (600b) suggests that there must be a 2nd person subject in (599a) that is binding the 2nd person argument in the goal. If this is the case, it seems highly unlikely that the unmarked theme could be the syntactic subject of the GoalC.

To summarize what we have learned so far: We have considered whether or not it was plausible that Turkish GoalCs could be declaratives that are truncated by some other means and are assigning the theme nominative case. It was not plausible that the GoalC theme could have been incorporated, in spite of its lack of case marking. It was also not plausible that the GoalC theme could have the subject of a clause of belonging, given the fact that there is no way to assign $[+\alpha]$ to the material that would supposedly not be elided. Data from embedding also suggested that GoalCs could not be genuinely embedded, because they do not seem to undergo a nominative-genitive alternation that is characteristic of Turkish

embedded subjects. In addition, binding data suggested that there is a 2nd person subject active in Turkish GoalCs, which would be mysterious if the theme was truly its subject.

The remaining possibility is that the GoalC theme is part of the pivot of a cleft. The pivot of a Turkish cleft is always zero marked, analogous to the GoalC theme. Below is an example of a simple transitive sentence in (601a), and versions with a clefted subject and object.

(601) a. Apollo Daphne-yi kovala-dı.
Apollo.Nom Daphne-Acc chase-Pst
'Apollo chased Daphne.'

b. Daphne-yi kovala-yan Apollo-y-du.
Daphne-Acc chase-Rel Apollo-Cop-Pst
'It was Apollo that chased Daphne.'

c. Apollo-nun kovala-dığ-ı Daphne-y-di.
Apollo-Gen chase-Rel-Poss Daphne-Cop-Pst
'It was Daphne that Apollo chased.'

d. *Apollo-nun kovala-dığ-ı Daphne-yi-y-di.
Apollo-Gen chase-Rel-Poss Daphne-Acc-Cop-Pst
Intended: 'It was Daphne that Apollo chased.'

The pivot "Daphne" does not receive case-marking in (601c), and cannot. Unfortunately, it also combines to form a single unit with the copula and the tense marker. It would be possible to formalize an analysis in which this occurs, but given that these items form an inseparable phonological word, it seems clefts are an unlikely candidate for forming the input to GoalCs.

Nevertheless, it is striking that cleft pivots cannot receive case marking. In the next section, I will investigate the edge deletion facts in Turkish, and argue that GoalC themes are analogous to clefted objects, albeit in a different configuration.

4.2.4.3 Edge Deletion

The final property that will be investigated in this chapter is edge ellipsis. To this point in this chapter, we have seen some languages deleting on the left edge and others on the right. Although a declarative analysis was seriously considered in the previous section,

it was ultimately rejected due to binding facts. This section will therefore discuss the edge ellipsis diagnostics previously established for imperatives in this chapter: overt subjects, negation, and adverbs. Turkish GoalCs do not allow the overt inclusion of the 2nd person subject unless there is a prosodic break.

(602) a. ???Sen kitap-lar-ı raf-a!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat
'You put the books on the shelf!'

b. Sen, kitap-lar-ı raf-a!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat
'You put the books on the shelf!'

This is the exact pattern that has been seen in every language thus far, overt subjects are unacceptable in GoalCs without a heavy prosodic break. In traditional Turkish imperatives, the subject may be included with the pragmatic effect of indicating a list scenario (as in someone else in the context could be the intended addressee).

(603) Sen kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
'You put the books on the shelf!'

Analogous to the case in English, the impossibility of subjects in GoalCs could be taken as weak evidence that Turkish GoalCs are deleting on their left edge. If subjects were in the path of a left-edge deletion process unique to GoalCs, their ungrammaticality in GoalCs would follow. On the other hand, we have already seen languages like Korean which also ban subjects from GoalCs despite subjects not being in the path of deletion, so this is not knock-down evidence on its own. The next diagnostic for edge deletion was the possibility of negation. Turkish allows traditional imperatives to be negated with the negative marked directly suffixed onto the imperative verb.

(604) a. Kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy-**ma**!
book-pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp-**Neg**
'Don't put the books on the shelf!'

The unavailability of subjects provided weak evidence that Turkish was deleting on the left edge. If there is left edge deletion, we might expect it to survive the deletion process in GoalCs, given that the negative morpheme is on the right edge,. Because it is a verbal morpheme however, it does not make a particularly good test. Informants judged attempts to attach the verbal negative morpheme to the theme or goal as comically ungrammatical and difficult to even parse.

(605) a. *Kitap-lar raf-a-ma!
book-Pl shelf-Dat-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the shelf!'

b. *Raf-a kitap-lar-ma!
shelf-Dat book-Pl-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the shelf!'

Fortunately, there is a negative morpheme in Turkish that is not a verbal suffix. The adverb "değil" is acceptable in constructions like the following, on the right edge.

(606) Kitap-lar raf-a değil!
book-Pl shelf-Dat not
'Not books on the shelf!'

The GoalC in (606) has a nearly identical meaning to the negative traditional imperative in (604b). I therefore take (606) to be a legitimate instance of a negated GoalC, the first of its kind discovered so far in this dissertation. The grammaticality of "değil" in Turkish GoalCs on the right edge is therefore very strong evidence that Turkish is not deleting on the right edge.

The final diagnostic for edge deletion is the available position of adverbs. Turkish traditional imperatives have flexible word order for adverbs, appearing clause-initially, clause-finally, between the theme and goal, and between the goal and verb.

(607) a. *Hemen* kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy!
quickly book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
'Quickly put the books on the shelf!'

b. Kitap-lar-ı *hemen* raf-a koy!
book-Pl-Acc quickly shelf-Dat put.Imp
'Put quickly the books on the shelf!'

c. Kitap-lar-ı raf-a *hemen* koy!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat quickly put.Imp
'Put the books quickly on the shelf!'

d. Kitap-lar-ı raf-a koy *hemen*!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp quickly
'Put the books on the shelf quickly!'

If GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, and there is no edge deletion, then we would expect to see adverbs able to appear in each of these positions. However, similarly to English and Greek, the left edge is unavailable for Turkish adverbs without a prosodic break. Positions between the theme and goal and positions on the right edge are perfectly acceptable.

(608) a. **Hemen* kitap-lar raf-a!
quickly book-Pl shelf-Dat!
Intended: 'Quickly books on the shelf!'

b. Kitap-lar *hemen* raf-a!
book-Pl quickly shelf-Dat!
'Books quickly on the shelf!'

c. Kitap-lar raf-a *hemen*!
book-Pl shelf-Dat quickly!
'Books on the shelf quickly!'

This serves as direct evidence that Turkish is deleting on the left edge. Taken in concert with the facts about subjects and negation, it would seem that the best analysis of Turkish GoalCs should involve deleting on the left edge. However, there is an additional complication with Turkish GoalCs that left-edge ellipsis does not straightforwardly explain. The position of Turkish verbs, by default, is verb-final, putting the verbs outside of the path of deletion. Let us consider what this might look like. Because deletion happens on the left edge, I will place Pros^0 on the left.

(609)



(610) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~Sen~~.....$[_{VP}$ $[_{NP}$ kitap-lar]$[_{NP}$ rafa]$[[_{V}$ koy]]]

[+α] ⟶ [+α]

The issue becomes immediately obvious; unlike the analyses pursued thus far, the verb itself is not in the path of deletion. Although verb-initial orders are grammatical in Turkish imperatives (573), the default position of the Turkish verb is at the end of the sentence. This problem is still present even if we argued that GoalCs are somehow derived from declaratives with "ait," as "ait" is also not in the path of deletion by default.

(611) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~Sen~~.....$[_{VP}$ $[_{NP}$ kitap-lar]$[_{PP}$ $[_{NP}$ rafa]$[_{P}$ ait]]$[_{V}$]]]

[+α] ⟶ [+α]

Edge ellipsis alone does not seem to be able to derive the facts. This is true both about the position of the verb (or *ait*), and also with respect to case marking on the theme. On the other hand, we clearly need edge ellipsis to explain the adverb asymmetries.

Instead, I will propose a structure in which the GoalC theme and goal are base-generated in a higher projection (FP), similar to a cleft. In this higher projection, the GoalC theme is not assigned case. The lower projection is then elided. The remaining string undergoes a process of edge deletion, explaining the adverb facts.

(612)



Placing the theme and goal in a higher projection explains why the theme is not overtly marked for case, as well as explaining why the verb is not pronounced. This projection in Spec-FP then undergoes edge deletion. Below is a derivation showing both the ungrammatical adverb placement (613) and the grammatical adverb placement (614).

(613) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND $[_{FP1}$ *Hemen* kitaplar rafa] $[_F$ E $[_{CP}$ ~~Sen e$_1$ koy~~]]]

[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α]

(614) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND $[_{FP1}$ Kitaplar rafa *hemen*] $[_F$ E $[_{CP}$ ~~Sen e$_1$ koy~~]]]

[+α] ⟶ [+α] [+α]

Turkish is the first language in the sample that in which gapping data does not seem to match edge deletion in GoalCs. Recall that our hypothesis is that languages will generally to prefer to delete strings in PF in the same direction, and therefore the directionality of gapping should correspond with the directionality of edge ellipsis in GoalCs. Unlike the languages sampled so far in this chapter, Turkish permits both forward and backward gapping, as noted originally by (Ross 1970a).

(615) a. Adam kitab-ı, çocuk da dergi-yi oku-du.
man book-Acc child and magazine-Acc read-Pst
'The man read the book and the child the magazine.'
(Lit. The man the book, the child read the magazine.') (backward gapping)

b. Adam kitab-ı oku-du, çocuk da dergi-yi.
man book-Acc read-Pst child and magazine-Acc
'The man read the book and the child the magazine.' (forward gapping)

(Bozsahin 2000; pg. 2, his 1a and 1c)

Recall that our account of gapping is the following.

(616) Gapping: Gapping is a PF deletion process that takes either the leftmost or rightmost instance of a verb in a coordinated structure and deletes all identical verbs in one direction.

The grammaticality of (615a) shows that rightward deletion is possible in Turkish. Nevertheless, GoalCs are limited to leftward deletion. This is a point of evidence against our hypothesis that languages will delete obligatorily in the same direction.

There is also a paradox with case-marking. The GoalC theme must not be selected by the verb, since it does not bear accusative case. The GoalC theme *does*, on the other hand, receive an $[+\alpha]$ feature. It may be the case, therefore, that the case feature for the GoalC theme is unvalued but interpretable, in the sense laid out by Pesetsky and Torrego (2007).[23] The trick to this style of analysis would be to explain why the GoalC theme is unvalued for case, but themes in traditional imperatives are valued for case. Regardless, we have explained a lot in our investigation here, though maybe more work is needed about Turkish imperative, case marking and cleft syntax to make a definitive conclusion.

4.2.4.4 Turkish Conclusion

Turkish is a "poorly-behaved" GoalC language with respect to its case marking, because it requires the GoalC theme to be null marked despite the fact that accusative marking is typically required when the imperative verb is pronounced. The analysis pursued here involved the theme and goal being base generated in a higher projection where it cannot be

[23] Thanks to Rebecca Tollan for providing this suggestion.

assigned a case. This fragment then undergoes a process of edge deletion, explaining adverb asymmetries. The lower clause is deleted in a separate deletion process, explaining why the verb is not pronounced.

4.2.5 Uzbek GoalCs

This section will be a discussion of Uzbek, a Turkic language spoken primarily in Uzbekistan.[24] Uzbek provides an interesting contrast with Turkish, given that they are members of the same language family. The default assumption might be that Uzbek should be acting relatively similarly to Turkish, given the significant overlap in vocabulary, morphology, and syntax between the languages. What we find, however, is that the languages diverge quite significantly with respect to GoalCs. Uzbek is *poorly-behaved* with respect to both case and word order. It is a *subset* language with respect to word order and a *superset* language with respect to case marking. Uzbek also appears to be the first language investigated to this point that does not have edge deletion. In short, Uzbek GoalCs share almost no discernible properties with Turkish GoalCs.

4.2.5.1 Uzbek Traditional Imperatives

In Uzbek, like Turkish, traditional imperative verbs are a bare stem, and tend to come at the end of the sentence, the default position for Uzbek verbs (Sjoberg 1963). In both (617a) and (617b) below, the theme is marked with overt accusative case. In (617a), the theme precedes the goal, and in (617b), the goal precedes the theme. In (617a) the goal is provided by the dative suffix "-ga," and in (617b) the goal is provided by the postposition "tagiga." Uzbek does not possess a clause-type marker that marks the clause as imperative, but accusative case is typically associated with definiteness, typical of Turkic languages (Sjoberg 1963; Johanson and Johanson 2015).

(617) a. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
Put the books on the shelf!

[24] Thanks to Shakhlo Nematova and Zebosh Xabibullayeva for providing the judgments throughout this section.

b. Stol-ni tagiga quti-lar-ni qo'y!
desk-Acc under box-Pl-Acc put.Imp
'Get the boxes under the desk!'

Both traditional imperatives in (617) have the verb at the end of the clause. This property is not unique to imperatives, verb-final is also the default word order for declaratives and interrogatives. Unlike imperatives and declaratives, there is a dedicated clause-type marker for interrogatives in (618b).

(618) a. Zebo kitob-ni shkaf-ga qoy-di.
Zebo book-Acc shelf-Dat put-3sg
'Zebo is putting the book on the shelf.'

b. Zebo kitob-ni shkaf-ga qoy-di-mi?
Zebo book-Acc shelf-Dat put-3sg-Q
'Is Zebo putting the book on the shelf?'

Following the general pattern established thus far throughout this chapter, it is possible to express commands that are very similar to the ones in (617) as GoalCs. In (619a) and (619b) below, only the theme and goal are overtly expressed. In both, the theme is marked with overt accusative case, and the theme precedes the goal. Uzbek does not possess articles.

(619) a. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'

b. Quti-lar-ni stol-ni tagiga!
box-Pl-Acc desk-Acc under
'Boxes under the desk!

Both utterances in (619) appear to match the properties of a GoalC established in this chapter. They omit the verb while possessing a meaning nearly identical to an analogous traditional put-type imperative. Both require a goal argument. Both are also most naturally used as urgent commands, exactly matching the cross-linguistic pattern seen so far in this chapter. My Uzbek informants report that utterances like (619) are most naturally used in a military context, or when attempting to convey a harsh command. Traditional Uzbek

imperatives are not limited to urgent commands; they can participate in the standard range of uses, as at least commands, wishes, and permission.

(620) a. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat put.Imp
Put the books on the shelf! (command)

b. Iltimos, chiroyli bol!
please handsome be.Imp
'Please be handsome!' (wish)

c. Meva-dan ol, xohlasang.
fruit-Abl take.Imp, if.you.want
'Take some fruit, if you want.' (permission)

The range of uses available to Uzbek imperatives in (620) is the typical range that we have seen in this chapter. Following the pattern established so far, Uzbek GoalCs are limited to command usage. Wishes and permission are infelicitous as GoalCs.

(621) a. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!' (command)

b. Paket pochta qutisi-ga!
package mail box-Dat
'Package in/to the mailbox!' (#wish)

c. #Kitob-lar shkaf-ga, xohlasang!
book-Pl shelf-Dat if.you.want
'Books on the shelf, if you want!' (permission)

4.2.5.2 Uzbek Word Order and Case

Despite the fact that Uzbek sentences have a default word order of verb-final, Uzbek word order is very flexible. All 6 possible permutations of Verb, Object, and Goal are grammatical for the traditional imperative originally given in (617a). Uzbek is capable of

scrambling material to the left, the pragmatic discourse effects of which are not totally understood, given that Uzbek is an understudied language.[25]

(622) a. Qo'y kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga! (VOG)
put.Imp book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat
b. Qo'y shkaf-ga kitob-lar-ni! (VGO)
c. Kitob-lar-ni qo'y shkaf-ga! (OVG)
d. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y! (OGV)
e. Shkaf-ga kitob-lar-ni qo'y! (GOV)
f. Shkaf-ga qo'y kitob-lar-ni! (GVO)
'Put the books on the shelf!'

If we assume that GoalCs are derived from a corresponding traditional imperative with a put-type verb "qo'y," then we would expect both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders to be grammatical in GoalCs based on the flexibility of available positions in (622). This was the case in Turkish, where both the theme-goal and goal-theme orders were grammatical in GoalCs. Quite unexpectedly, however, in Uzbek GoalCs are limited to the theme-goal word order. The goal-theme word order is not interpretable as a GoalC regardless of whether or not the theme is marked with accusative case. Instead, they are obligatorily interpreted as relative clauses.

(623) a. Kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'
b. Shkaf-ga kitob-lar(-ni)!
shelf-Loc book-Pl-Acc
#'Books on the shelf!' / OK: the books that are on the shelf
c. Quti-lar(-ni) stol-ni tagiga!
box-Pl-Acc desk-Acc under
'Boxes under the desk!'

[25] Gribanova (2013) shows that Uzbek is capable of scrambling, but also cites Azimova (2010) that there is a pre-verbal position for focus in Uzbek. Scrambling the verb, therefore, may disrupt the standard focus interaction in Uzbek.

d. #Stol-ni tagiga quti-lar(-ni)!
desk-Acc under box-Pl-Acc
#'Boxes under the desk!' / OK: the boxes that are under the desk

This result is unexpected because both the theme-goal orders and the goal-theme orders are grammatical when the verb is pronounced in a traditional imperative. In fact, this means that Uzbek is the first language in this sample that is *poorly-behaved* with the word order hypothesis originally given in (456). This is additionally surprising because Uzbek in general is a very permissive language with respect to word order, typical of Turkic languages (Johanson and Johanson 2015). I take Uzbek as an important example, therefore, of the potential significant variation that can be present even within the same language family when examining GoalCs.

With regards to the word order hypothesis originally given in (456), then, Uzbek GoalCs are *poorly-behaved* because they are more limited than traditional imperatives. With regards to case-marking, GoalCs are also *poorly-behaved*, because they are more permissive in their case marking options than traditional imperatives. They therefore form a *superset* of the case marking options available to typical traditional imperatives. Traditional Uzbek imperatives must mark their themes overtly for case in both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders.

(624) a. *Kitob-lar shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl shelf-Loc put.Imp
Intended: 'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. *Shkaf-ga kitob-lar qo'y!
shelf-Loc book-Pl put.Imp
Intended: 'Put the books on the shelf!'

c. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

d. Shkaf-ga kitob-lar-ni qo'y!
shelf-Loc book-Pl-Acc put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

GoalCs, on the other hand, can freely mark their themes with either accusative case or leave them null marked.

(625) Kitob-lar-(ni) shkaf-ga!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc
'Books on the shelf!'

My informants report that the difference between marking the theme in (625) with accusative case or not is that the version that is unmarked for case is interpreted as slightly harsher. Otherwise, the two act identically. Outside of possibly adding some extra force, there is not a large pragmatic effect between using overt accusative case and leaving the theme unmarked. For example, both are incompatible with future modifiers that are not anchored in the immediate future, but are compatible with adverbs like "immediately," which are anchored in the immediate future. I utilize a prosodic break here, to avoid making any claims about right-edge deletion effects in Uzbek, but rather to show that Uzbek GoalCs are pragmatically compatible only with immediate future orientation.

(626) a. #Kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga, ertaga!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc tomorrow
'Books on the shelf, tomorrow!'

b. Kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga, darhol!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc immediately
'Books on the shelf, immediately!'

c. Kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga, tezda!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
'Books on the shelf, quickly!'

The generalization should therefore be clear, traditional Uzbek put-type imperatives require accusative case on their themes, but GoalCs do not require accusative case on their themes. This makes Uzbek a *superset* language with respect to the Case-Marking Hypothesis in (459), because traditional imperative themes must be accusative-marked, whereas GoalC themes can be either accusative-marked or null-marked.

Similar to Turkish, Uzbek nominative case is null. This means it could be either a null-marked object or a subject based on its morphology. Uzbek bare nominals can psuedo-incorporate with the verb, but can typically only do so when adjacent to the verb.[26] The object in (624) cannot be interpreted as incorporated in an imperative. Similar to Turkish, the bare themes in GoalCs can only be interpreted as definite.

(627) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)

A: Kitap-lar shkaf-ga!

books-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat

'Books onto the shelf!'

✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.

X: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

In spite of the fact that accusative case is associated with definiteness in Uzbek, the theme in (627) above is interpreted as definite regardless of whether or not it receives accusative case. It is possible to incorporate a bare object into a traditional imperative, as in (628) below. However, Uzbek requires the use of a nominal that is not marked for number. Plural marking is highly unacceptable in this position.

(628) (There is a pile of 12 books laying on the ground)

A: Kitap raf-a qo'y!

book shelf-Dat put.Imp

'Books onto the shelf!'

✓: B puts every book from the pile on the shelf.

✓: B puts half the books from the pile on the shelf.

(629) ???Kitap-lar raf-a qo'y!
book-Pl shelf-Dat put.Imp
Intended 'Put books on the shelf!'

Uzbek pseudo-incorporated themes strongly prefer to be singular. Goal themes, on the other hand, have to be marked as plural.

[26] Levy-Forsythe and Kagan (2020) show that pseudo-incorporated nominals can scramble in some contexts in Uzbek, analogous to Turkish. Regardless, the bare plural nominals cannot be interpreted as pseudo-incorporated in the examples presented in this chapter.

(630) *Kitap raf-a!
book shelf-Dat
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

These facts lead me to believe that the null-marked themes in GoalCs are not pseudo-incorporated with the deleted verb. Recall that we pursued an analysis for Turkish in which the null-marked themes were analogized to a cleft in terms of their available case markings. Uzbek clefts act identical to Turkish clefts, clefted objects cannot receive overt case marking.

(631) a. Apollo Dafne-ni quvla-di.
Apollo Daphne-Acc chase-Pst
'Apollo chased Daphne.'

b. Apollo quvla-gan Dafne edi.
Apollo chase-Nmz Daphne be.Pst
'It was Daphne that Apollo chased.'

c. *Apollo quvla-gan Dafne-ni edi.
Apollo chase-Nmz Daphne-Acc be.Pst
'It was Daphne that Apollo chased.'

d. Dafne-ni quvla-gan Apollo edi.
Daphne-Acc chase-Nmz Apollo be.Pst
'It was Apollo that chased Daphne.'

This gives us a plausible source for nominative case marking on the GoalC theme. Being in a higher, cleft-like projection could plausibly cause this argument to avoid being assigned case. Deriving accusative case on the theme is also straightforward if GoalCs are underlyingly traditional imperatives. Below is a structure for an Uzbek traditional imperative with "qo'y."

(632)



Accusative is structurally assigned by the verb "q'oy," which selects both a theme and a goal in (632). By default, I assume that the [+α] feature is assigned to both the theme and goal via the objects Agreeing with the verb. Given the ungrammaticality of bare-marked theme with an overt verb in (624a), however, (632) is not a likely underlying representation of null-marked GoalC themes. I am not aware of any other syntactic environments in Uzbek in which arguments can freely receive nominative or accusative case with no significant change in meaning. We have already seen that clefted objects cannot receive accusative case, making it unlikely that accusative marked GoalC themes are in a clefted position.

One possibility is that nominative case is assigned via another construction, which happens to converge with the accusative marked theme provided the derivation in (632).

A promising possibility is that GoalCs are derived from declaratives with the postposition "tegishli." Similar to the lexical item "ait" in Turkish, the word "tegishli" selects a dative complement and a nominative marked subject.

(633) Kitob-lar shkaf-**ga** tegishli!
book-Pl shelf-Dat belong
'The books belong on the shelf!'

There is an immediately promising reason to pursue (633) as the underlying form for Uzbek GoalCs. Apart from marking the arguments with the correct case for bare-marked GoalC themes, the word order of (633) is not flexible. The dative-marked goal argument must directly precede the postposition. The order of the theme and goal cannot be switched, as shown in (634) below.

(634) *Shkaf-ga kitob-lar tegishli!
shelf-Dat book-Pl belong
Intended: 'The books belong on the shelf!'

If (633) was providing the input to GoalCs, then the apparent violation of the Word Order Hypothesis in (456) would be immediately explained because the input is not from a traditional put-type imperative, which has flexible word order, but instead from this "belonging" declarative, which has strict word order. It is worth noting that (633) cannot take accusative case on its subject, making a poor candidate as the input for accusative marked GoalC themes, at least from a case-marking perspective.

(635) *Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga tegishli!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc belong
Intended: 'The books belong on the shelf!'

Nevertheless, the strict word order necessitated by "tegishli" expressions in Uzbek makes them a promising candidate as the input to nominative-marked GoalCs. Similar to "ait" in Turkish, "tegishli" clauses are declaratives. It is felicitous to follow "tegishli" clauses with replies of "That's not true!" but not GoalCs, exactly what is seen for traditional imperatives.

(636) a. Kitob-lar shkaf-ga tegishli!
book-Pl shelf-Loc belong
A: 'The books belong on the shelf!'

b. No-togri!
not-true
B: 'That's not true!'

(637) a. Kitob-lar shkaf-ga!
book-Pl shelf-Loc
A: 'Books on the shelf!'

b. #No-togri!
not-true
B: 'That's not true!'

What this means is that (633) is not acting as performative as a traditional imperative, because it can be felicitously followed by "That's not true!" As such, added performativity is necessary to derive the update necessary to transform (636a) into (637a). We saw in Chapter 2 that an imperative operator on its own does not block accessibility of truth values. Assuming the imperative operator remains consistent across languages, this means it also needs to select a priority modal in order to block truth values. Note that there is no AddresseeP, because the subject cannot be limited to some subset of the addressees under this conception.

(638)



The performativity is associated with the imperative operator combining with a priority modal. The copula is not pronounced, as Uzbek is a zero copula language. This analysis derives the correct performativity, as well as deriving the correct word order and the nominative case facts.

Unfortunately, this analysis runs into a couple of issues. The first is that, without a put-type verb in the structure, there is no way to assign an [+α] feature. All of our analyses to this point have included edge deletion, which is driven by the existence of an [+α] feature on Pros^0 and the complements of a put-type verb. Without a put-type verb, it becomes difficult to explain the ellipsis necessary to create a GoalCs.

The other substantial problem with this analysis is that it utterly fails to explain

the availability of accusative case. Although a "tegishli" analysis explains the strict word order in when the theme is unmarked, there is no plausible explanation for the strict word order for accusative-marked themes. Because of this, I will pursue an analysis in the next section that involves Uzbek GoalCs as being derived from put-type imperatives, and posit a potential account of the word order facts.

4.2.5.3 (Lack of) Edge Deletion

The final GoalC property that will be investigated in this chapter is edge ellipsis. To this point, we have seen every language in this sample delete either to the left or to the right. As we will see, Uzbek throws a wrench in this by not clearly deleting on either edge. This section will discuss the edge ellipsis diagnostics previously established for imperatives: overt subjects, negation, and adverbs. Uzbek GoalCs do not allow the overt inclusion of the 2nd person subject, even with a prosodic break.

(639) a. *Sen kitob-lar shkaf-ga!
You.Nom book-Pl shelf-Loc
Intended: 'You books on the shelf!'

b. *Sen, kitob-lar shkaf-ga!
You.Nom book-Pl shelf-Loc
Intended: 'You, books on the shelf!'

Although uncommon, it is not unattested for languages to ban pronouns from vocatives (Hill 2013). In traditional Uzbek imperatives, the subject may be included, with the pragmatic effect of adding extra emphasis to the addressee (in direct opposition to someone else), but not as a vocative.

(640) a. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Sen kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp
'You put the books on the shelf!'

c. *Sen, kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp
Intended: 'You, put the books on the shelf!'

The fact that Uzbek bans subjects in GoalCs but not traditional imperatives provides very weak evidence that Uzbek is deleting on the left. At this point, however, we have seen this restriction in every single language, regardless of the direction of deletion. As such, it seems as though negation and adverbs provide better evidence for the direction of edge deletion. As for negation, negation in traditional imperatives is a morpheme on the verb, analogous to Turkish.

(641) a. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y-**ma**!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp-**Neg**
'Don't put the books on the shelf!'

Subjects provided weak evidence that Uzbek was deleting on the left edge. Because negation is a verbal morpheme, however, informants judged attempts to suffix negation onto non-verbal elements to be comically ungrammatical and difficult to even parse.

(642) *Kitob-lar shkaf-ga-**ma**!
book-Pl shelf-Loc-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the shelf!'

Turkish had a free-standing negative morpheme that could grammatically appear on the right edge and served the purpose of negating a GoalC. Uzbek lacks a corresponding morpheme. The only potential candidate, the negative existential particle, is ungrammatical in this position with the meaning of a command.

(643) *Kitob-lar shkaf-ga **yoq**!
book-Pl shelf-Loc
*'Don't books on the shelf!' / OK: There are no books on the shelf.

The negative morpheme therefore fails to decide clearly in favor of either left-edge or right-edge deletion in Uzbek. The final diagnostic for edge deletion is the available position of adverbs. Uzbek traditional imperatives have flexible word order for adverbs, appearing in a variety of positions. The sentence-final position is the only position judged as highly unacceptable.

(644) a. *Tezda* kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y!
quickly book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp
'Quickly put the books on the shelf!'

b. Kitob-lar-ni *tezda* shkaf-ga qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc quickly shelf-Loc put.Imp
'Put quickly the books on the shelf!'

c. Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga *tezda* qo'y!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc quickly put.Imp
'Put the books quickly on the shelf!'

d. ???Kitob-lar-ni shkaf-ga qo'y *tezda*!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc put.Imp quickly
'Put the books on the shelf quickly!'

If GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, and there is no edge deletion, we would expect to see adverbs able to appear in each position relative to the goal and theme, per the data in (644). Unexpectedly, however, there is strong speaker variation in the acceptability of adverbs in GoalCs. One Uzbek speaker accepted adverbs in all positions.

(645) Speaker 1 Judgments

a. Tezda kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga!
quickly book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc
'Quickly books on the shelf!'

b. Kitob-lar(-ni) tezda shkaf-ga!
book-Pl-Acc quickly shelf-Loc
'Books quickly on the shelf!'

c. Kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga tezda!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
'Books on the shelf quickly!'

Speaker 1's judgments indicate that there is no edge deletion at all in Uzbek, or that if there is edge deletion, it does not include adverbs. Given the analysis pursued in this chapter thus far, there is no straightforward way to assign an adverb an $[+\alpha]$ feature, and so it seems likely that for Speaker 1 there is no edge deletion at all in GoalCs. For my other Uzbek informant, they displayed the exact opposite pattern, regarding all adverbs as unacceptable.

(646) Speaker 2 Judgments

a. *Tezda kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga!
quickly book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc
Intended: 'Quickly books on the shelf!'

b. ???Kitob-lar(-ni) tezda shkaf-ga!
book-Pl-Acc quickly shelf-Loc
'Books quickly on the shelf!'

c. *Kitob-lar(-ni) shkaf-ga tezda!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Loc quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

I cannot see an easy explanation of Uzbek that would easily account for the complete acceptability of adverbs for one speaker and the complete unacceptability of adverbs for another speaker. However, both speakers seem to agree that there is no contrast between adverbs on the left and adverbs on the right. For Speaker 1, they are both acceptable, and for Speaker 2, they are both unacceptable.

These adverbs facts are not some quirky facts about the adverb "tezda." Other adverbs that are compatible with the immediacy requirement placed on GoalCs display an identical pattern, with Speaker 1 finding them perfectly acceptable regardless of position and Speaker 2 finding them unacceptable regardless of position.

(647) a. %(Darhol) kitob-lar(-ni) (darhol) shkaf-ga (darhol)!
immediately book-Pl-Acc immediately shelf-Loc immediately
'Books on the shelf immediately!'

b. %(Kechiktirmay) kitob-lar(-ni) (kechiktirmay) shkaf-ga (kechiktirmay)!
instantly book-Pl-Acc instantly shelf-Loc instantly
'Books on the shelf instantly!'

c. %(Hoziroq) kitob-lar(-ni) (hoziroq) shkaf-ga (hoziroq)!
now book-Pl-Acc now shelf-Loc now
'Books on the shelf right now!'

Although both speakers disagree with one another, their judgments taken in concert indicate to me that there is no evidence of edge deletion in Uzbek in the grammar as a whole. This actually simplifies matters. In order to explain accusative case, we can move the theme

and goal to a higher projection, and then delete the lower CP. Speaker 1 can apparently move adverbs along with this moved VP, and Speaker 2 cannot.

(648)



The theme is assigned accusative case locally by the verb, and then it moves to a higher projection. As for the nominative marked themes, I propose that it is the result a similar configuration, but it is base-generated in the higher projection, and receives nominative case there.

(649)



There is no need for an $[+\alpha]$ feature, because there is no edge deletion. Nominative marked themes are base generated where they cannot receive accusative case, and accusative marked themes are base generated where they can, and then subsequently moved out of the deletion site.

The only thing left to explain is the strict word order in Uzbek GoalCs. We might consider an analysis in which the verb only assigns one [+α] feature to explain the strict word order. Imagine that we consider a structure like the following, in which *qo'y* assigns [+α] to only the goal, and not the theme.

(650)



If deletion proceeds leftward in Uzbek this would necessitate that the only possible order would be theme-goal. If the objects were in the goal-theme word order, then the theme would be in the path of deletion. Below is a derivation of each word order, under a configuration in which the verb only assigns one [+α] feature, to the goal argument.[27]

(651) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....~~Sen~~....$[_{vP}[_{NP}$kitoblarni$][_{NP}$shkafga$][_{v}$~~q'oy~~$]]]]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$

[+α] ⟵ [+α]

(652) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....~~Sen~~....$[_{vP}[_{NP}$shkafga$][_{NP}$kitoblarni$][_{v}$~~q'oy~~$]]]]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$

[+α] ⟵ [+α]

[27] The same effect could be derive by assigning one [+α] feature to the theme, and having deletion proceed from the left. This would not place the verb in the path of deletion, however, so I do not consider it here.

This analysis can explain the strict word order in GoalCs, by positing that one of the word orders is ruled out by virtue of one of the arguments not receiving an $[+\alpha]$ feature. Unfortunately, this analysis does not seem to be on the right track. Recall, that Uzbek speakers described no edge effects at all. Speaker 1 accepted adverbs in all positions, and Speaker 2 rejected adverbs in all positions. If edge deletion was responsible for forming GoalCs, we should expect to see adverbs being unacceptable on either the left or the right edge. Their unavailability leads me to believe that this style of analysis is on the wrong track.

Instead, I would like to propose that the grammar is capable of producing GoalCs in the goal-theme word order, but that they are blocked by a relative clause interpretation. Because Uzbek does not have an overt relative clause marker, word order is used to mark relative clauses. Thus, there is competition between relative clauses and goal-theme GoalCs. This means that there is competition between the following two interpretations.

(653) Shkaf-**ga** kitob-lar!
shelf-Dat book-Pl
→ Meaning 1: 'Books on the shelf!'
→ Meaning 2: 'the books that are on the shelf'

Meaning 1 is blocked by the availability of Meaning 2 in (653). There are two possible word orders available for GoalCs, while there is only one word order available to relative clauses. As such, Uzbek speakers strongly prefer to disambiguate GoalCs from relative clauses by using the theme-goal word order. Although this fact is intended to be strictly for Uzbek, a similar type of effect occurs in Turkish, where informants offered that the goal-theme GoalCs were grammatical but "less likely" than the theme-goal word order.

One might wonder why a GoalC interpretation is blocked in the goal-theme word order, given that GoalCs are partially licensed by COMMAND prosody. In other instances of ambiguity, one reading is not blocked. I tentatively hypothesize that fragments are generally less permissive of ambiguity than larger structures. Because GoalCs have a good deal of truncated structure, some languages mandate that they utilize a non-ambiguous word order.

Because there is no edge deletion in Uzbek, there is no possible correlation between direction of deletion in GoalCs and gapping. For completeness, I include the gapping data for Uzbek here. Both forward gapping and backward gapping are grammatical in Uzbek.

(654) a. Erkak kitob-ni, va bola jurnal-ni oqi-di.
man book-Acc and child magazine-Acc read-Pst
'The man read the book and the child the magazine.'
(Lit. The man the book, the child read the magazine.)

b. Erkak kitob-ni oqi-di, va bola jurnal-ni.
man book-Acc read-Pst and child magazine-Acc
'The man read the book and the child the magazine.'

4.2.5.4 Uzbek Conclusion

Uzbek is a "poorly-behaved" GoalC language with respect to both its case marking and word order. The case marking is a *superset* of what is available to traditional imperatives while the word orders form a *subset* of what is available to traditional imperatives. In addition, Uzbek does not display any edge deletion effects. The analysis pursued here argued that accusative marked themes are selected directly by the verb, where they can be assigned case. Nominative marked themes are base-generated in a higher projection. The word order facts were explain by appealing to the fact that Uzbek GoalCs are in competition with relative clauses.

4.2.6 Quechua GoalCs

This section will be a discussion of Southern Quechua, an indigenous language spoken in and around the Peruvian Andes.[28] Quechua marks accusative case overtly and typically exhibits flexible word order, and is therefore comparable with the languages sampled in this chapter thus far. Quechua is *well-behaved* in regards to case marking, but *poorly-behaved* in regards to its word order in GoalCs. Similar to Uzbek, there is no evidence of edge ellipsis in Quechua GoalCs.

[28] Thanks to Jermani Ojeda and Braulio Quispe Ramírez for providing the judgments throughout this section.

4.2.6.1 Quechua traditional imperatives

Quechua traditional imperative verbs are marked with a suffix, "-y," which marks the verb as an imperative. The imperative verb tends to come at the end of the sentences, which is the default position for Quechua verbs (Weber 1989). In both (655a) and (655b) below, the theme is marked with overt accusative case. Quechua exhibits relatively free word order; in (655a) the theme precedes the goal and in (655b) the goal precedes the theme.

(655) a. Lichi-ta refrigeradura-pi chura-y!
milk-Acc fridge-Loc put-Imp
'Put the milk into the fridge!'

b. Mesa-pi libru-kuna-ta chura-y!
table-Loc book-Pl-Acc put-Imp
'Put the books on the table!"

Both traditional imperatives in (655) have the verb at the end of the clause. Following the general pattern established thus far, it is possible to express commands that are similar to the ones in (655) as GoalCs. In (656a) and (656b) below, only the theme and goal are overtly expressed. The goal is marked with the locative marker "-pi" in both cases. Both themes are also marked with the accusative suffix "-ta." The theme precedes the goal in both instances.

(656) a. Lichi-ta refrigeradura-pi!
milk-Acc fridge-Loc
'Milk into the fridge!'

b. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
'Books on the table!"

The utterances in (656) both appear to match the definitions of GoalCs presented thus far in this chapter. They omit the verb while possessing a meaning nearly identical to an analogous traditional put-type imperative. Both require a goal argument, in this case provided by the locative marked "-pi." Both GoalCs in (656) are also most naturally used as urgent commands, exactly the pattern seen throughout this chapter thus far. My Quechua informants reported that the most natural context for GoalCs like in (656) is as a harsh

command, possibly by a teacher disciplining a student or a parent disciplining a child, with command prosody. Traditional Quechua imperatives can participate in the standard range of uses, at least being used as commands, wishes, and permission.

(657) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
'Put the books on the table!" (command)

b. Allin-lla ka-ku-y!
good-only be-self.Imp
'Be well!' (wish)

c. miku-ku-y kay t'anta-ta muna-qti-yki-qa
eat-self-Imp this bread-Acc want-if-you-Top
'Have some bread, if you want.'
Lit. 'Eat this bread, if you want.' (permission)

Following the pattern established thus far in this chapter, Quechua GoalCs can only participate in command usage. Wishes and permission are infelicitous in GoalCs.

(658) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
'Books on the table!" (command)

b. Carta-ta wasi-pi!
mail-Acc house-Loc
'Mail in the house!' (#wish)

c. #Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi muna-qti-yki-qa!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc want-if-you-Top
'Books on the table, if you want!" (permission)

4.2.6.2 Quechua Word Order and Case

Despite the fact that traditional Quechua imperatives tend to have the verb come at the end of the sentence, their word order is quite flexible like many of the languages we have seen thus far. All 6 permutations of Verb, Object, and Goal are grammatical for the traditional imperative originally given in (655). Object fronting has been attested across several dialects of Quechua (Cerrón-Palomino 1987), but to my knowledge the discourse effects of scrambling in Quechua are not well understood at present.

(659) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y! (OGV)
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp

b. Libru-kuna-ta chura-y mesa-pi! (OVG)

c. Chura-y libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi! (VOG)

d. Chura-y mesa-pi libru-kuna-ta! (VGO)

e. Mesa-pi chura-y libru-kuna-ta! (GVO)

f. Mesa-pi libru-kuna-ta chura-y! (GOV)

'Put the books on the table!'

Given that the default position for Quechua verbs is sentence-final, the orders in which the verb is not final are likely to be derived via some type of movement. To my knowledge, there is not much work on the structure of Quechuan scrambling, other than some references that note its existence (Cerrón-Palomino 1987; Muysken 1989). Regardless of how the various word orders in Quechua are derived, the acceptability of both theme-goal and goal-theme word orders in (659) means that we would expect both theme-goal and goal-theme orders to be grammatical in GoalCs. Analogous to Uzbek, however, Quechuan GoalCs are limited to the theme-goal word order. The goal-theme word order is not interpretable as a GoalC, but is again instead interpreted as a relative clause.

(660) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc

'Books on the table!'

b. Mesa-pi libru-kuna-ta!
table-Loc book-Pl-Acc

'#Books on the shelf' / OK: The books that are on the table.

c. Lichi-ta refrigeradura-pi!
milk-Acc fridge-Loc

'Milk into the fridge!'

d. Refrigeradura-pi lichi-ta!
fridge-Loc milk-Acc

#'Milk into the fridge!' / OK: The milk that is in the fridge.

This contrast between the acceptability of the theme-goal order and the unacceptability of the goal-theme order is essentially identical to what we saw in the previous section

discussing Uzbek. Traditional imperatives allow the arguments of the verb to appear in both the theme-goal order and goal-theme order, but GoalCs allow only the theme-goal word order to be interpreted as a command. This makes Quechuan GoalCs *poorly-behaved* with respect to their word order, as their possible word orders represent a *subset* of what is possible for traditional imperatives. With regards to case-marking, Quechuan GoalCs are *well-behaved*. Traditional Quechuan imperatives require the theme to be marked with accusative case, leaving the object unmarked is ungrammatical.

(661) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
'Put the books on the table!'

b. *Libru-kuna mesa-pi chura-y!
book-Pl table-Loc put-Imp
Intended: 'Put the books on the table!'

Nominative case in Quechua is unmarked, so there is no way to tell whether or not the potential theme in (661b) is nominative or an unmarked object. Regardless, it is unacceptable. This makes a clear prediction based on the Case-Marking Hypothesis in (459) that only accusative case will be acceptable as the GoalC theme. This is exactly what we find, accusative case is required on the GoalC theme, unmarked themes are not interpretable as commands.

(662) a. Libru-kuna-**ta** mesa-pi!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
'Books on the table!'

b. Libru-kuna mesa-pi.
book-Pl table-Loc
'Books are on the table.' / #'Books on the table!'

Quechua is a null copula language, meaning that (662b) above can be interpreted as an existential sentence with the copula unpronounced. It is not interpretable as a command. (662a) is only interpretable as a command. Thus, Quechuan GoalCs are acting *well-behaved* with regards to their case-marking, both traditional imperatives and GoalCs are limited to accusative case on their themes. It is worth pointing out that the unmarked theme is interpretable as an existential with the goal preceding the unmarked NP.

(663) Mesa-pi libru-kuna!
table-Loc book-Pl
'Books are on the table.' / OK: 'the books that are on the table' / #'Books on the table!'

The existential construction does not have any restriction on word order, it is possible with both the goal coming before the unmarked NP or after. The generalization is therefore clear, GoalCs require accusative case on their themes, and require strict word order of the goal preceding the theme. Other constructions are not necessarily subject to these restrictions. The same restrictions hold for singular unmarked themes, both word orders are possible with an existential construction, with a mandatory singular interpretation.

(664) a. Libru mesa-pi!
book table-Loc
'A book is on the table.' / #'Book onto the table!'

b. Mesa-pi libru!
table-Loc book
'A book is on the table.' / OK: The book that is on the table. / #'Book onto the table!'

When the theme is accusative-marked, the same restrictions apply. GoalCs are limited to the theme-goal order. Placing the accusative marked NP before the goal results in obligatory relative clause interpretation.

(665) a. Libru-ta mesa-pi!
book-Acc table-Loc
'Book onto the table!'

b. Mesa-pi libru-ta!
table-Loc book-Acc
'OK: the book that is on the table' / #'Book onto the table!'

The interpretation as a GoalC is therefore dependent on two factors: the theme preceding the goal and the theme being marked with accusative case. The case facts are easily explained by analogizing Quechuan GoalCs to Quechuan traditional imperatives. Below is a structure for a Quechua traditional imperative with "chura-y." I utilize the same basic

structure that used for Turkish and Uzbek.[29] I place the ProsP on the left merely because it has to be placed somewhere, I have no definitive evidence as of yet whether it is on the left or right. The put-type verb "churay" assigns an [+α] feature to each of its complements, the theme and the goal.

(666)



Accusative case is structurally assigned by the verb "chura," which selects both the theme and the goal in (666). The strict word order requirement placed on Quechuan GoalCs will have to be explained by other mechanisms, given that traditional Quechuan imperatives

[29] The syntactic similarities between Turkish and Quechua have long been noted, despite the fact that the languages are not plausibly connected in any way (Muysken 1989)

allow flexible order of the theme and goal. In the next section, I will investigate whether or not Quechua is deleting on the edge, and build the analysis from the edge deletion facts.

4.2.6.3 Quechua Edge Deletion

The final GoalC property that will be investigated in this chapter is edge ellipsis. In the previous section, Uzbek displayed no evidence of edge deletion, while all other languages in the sample have displayed some evidence of edge deletion on either the left or right edge. Quechua patterns more like Uzbek, it does not show any clear evidence of edge deletion in either direction. This section will discuss the edge ellipsis diagnostics previously established for imperatives: overt subjects, negation, and adverbs. Quechuan GoalCs do not allow the overt inclusion of the 2nd person subject, except with a prosodic break.

(667) a. *Qam libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
Intended: 'You books on the shelf!'

b. Qam, libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
'You, books on the shelf!'

Interestingly, however, there is one context in which the subject is allowed in Quechuan GoalCs. If the subject is being contrastively focused against another subject in a list, then it is grammatical in a GoalC.

(668) Qam_i libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi, qam_j libru-kuna-ta pampa-pi!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc table-Loc you.Nom book-Pl-Acc ground-Loc
'You_i books on the table, you_j books on the ground!'

The availability of an overt subject, even in a contrastive context, in Quechua is strong evidence that Quechua is not deleting to the left. Recall that such subjects were ungrammatical in English, even in a contrastive context, without a prosodic break. The fact that they are available in Quechua suggests that this position is available in traditional imperatives for overt pronunciation of the subject, and that this overt subject pronunciation carries over to GoalCs. It is possible to pronounce the subject overtly in traditional Quechuan imperatives, with the effect of singling out the addressee.

(669) Qam libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
'You put the books on the table!'

The fact that the imperative subject is pronounceable in a GoalC, even limited to a specific context, is very strong evidence that left-edge deletion is not taking place in these environments. This does not rule out the possibility of right-edge deletion in Quechua, however. Negation does not clearly rule in favor of either side of edge deletion. Traditional Quechuan imperatives are negated via a free-standing particle, "ama," which comes at the beginning of the imperative sentence, and a verbal suffix "-chu" which suffixes onto the imperative verb.

(670) a. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
'Put the books on the table!'

b. *Ama* libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y-*chu*!
not book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp-Neg
'Don't put the books on the table!'

Because negation comes on both the left and right edge of a traditional negative Quechuan imperative sentence, in theory it potentially makes a good diagnostic for determining if Quechua is deleting on either the left or right edge. In practice, however, it does not tell us much. This is because both components of negation are necessary to negate a traditional Quechuan imperative. If either instance of negation is omitted, the result is ungrammatical.

(671) a. **Ama* libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
not book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
Intended: 'Don't put the books on the table!'

b. *Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y-*chu*!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp-Neg
Intended: 'Don't put the books on the table!'

Perhaps unsurprisingly, every possible permutation of negation fails when attempted to be applied to a GoalC. This is most likely because "-chu" is both a verbal morpheme and required, meaning that it can never surface in GoalCs which omit the verb by definition.

(672) a. **Ama* libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
not book-Pl-Acc table-Loc
Intended: 'Don't books on the table!'

b. *Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi-*chu*!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the table!'

c. **Ama* libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi-*chu*!
not book-Pl-Acc table-Loc-Neg
Intended: 'Don't books on the table!'

The negative morpheme therefore fails to decide clearly in favor of either left-edge or right-edge deletion in Quechua.

The final diagnostic for edge deletion is the available position of adverbs. Traditional Quechuan imperatives are very flexible in terms of available positions for adverbs, with adverbs coming sentence-initially, sentence-finally, and sentence-medially between the theme and goal or between the goal and verb.

(673) a. *Utqaylla* libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y!
quickly book-Pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp
'Quickly put the books on the shelf!'

b. Libru-kuna-ta *utqaylla* mesa-pi chura-y!
book-Pl-Acc quickly table-Loc put-Imp
'Put quickly the books on the shelf!'

c. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi *utqaylla* chura-y!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc quickly put-Imp
'Put the books quickly on the shelf!'

d. Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi chura-y *utqaylla*!
book-pl-Acc table-Loc put-Imp quickly
'Put the books on the shelf quickly!'

If Quechuan GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, then we would expect to see adverbs be grammatical in any position, assuming there is no edge deletion. Instead, we see the exact opposite, my Quechua informants rejected adverbs in all positions.

(674) a. **Utqaylla* libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi!
quickly book-Pl-Acc table-Loc

Intended: 'Quickly books on the shelf!'

b. *Libru-kuna-ta *utqaylla* mesa-pi!
book-Pl-Acc quickly table-Loc
Intended: 'Books quickly on the shelf!'

c. *Libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi *utqaylla*!
book-Pl-Acc table-Loc quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

It is not entirely clear to me why adverbs are rejected in Quechuan GoalCs (and by one speaker for Uzbek), when they are accepted in the rest of the languages in the sample thus far. Nevertheless, adverbs fail to decide clearly in favor of edge deletion in either direction, given that they are rejected in all positions, including between the theme and goal (674b). The subject data strongly suggests that Quechua cannot be deleting on the left edge. This means that Quechua may either not be deleting on either edge, or it is deleting on the right edge without any direct evidence. I will assume that Quechua is deleting on the right edge because, given that it is a strongly head-final language with complementizers on the right, it is most likely that the ProsP is also on the right. This makes Quechua more like Japanese or Korean in its structure.

We propose that it was possible to explain strict word order via assignment of only one [+α] feature. If we were to adopt this style of analysis for Quechua, we could explain the word order facts. Quechua has strict word order in its GoalCs, unlike Japanese and Korean. If the goal is always assigned [+α], then, in combination with right-edge deletion, only theme-goal word order would be possible.

The rest of the analysis proceeds as is standard. An [+α] feature, associated with the feature on the Pros^0 COMMAND, begins an edge ellipsis process that proceeds leftward until it encounters another [+α] feature. The algorithm for deletion is reprinted below in (675).

(675) 1. If there is an [+α] feature in Pros^0, begin scanning leftwards.

2. If no second [+α] feature is encountered, do nothing.

3. If a second [+α] feature is encountered, stop scanning, and delete all material between the first [+α] and the second [+α].

(676)



Below is a derivation of each word order. As we can see, the goal-theme word order is ruled out in (678) because the theme would be in the path of deletion.

(677) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....(Qam)....$[_{vP}[_{NP}$libru-kuna-ta$][_{PP}$mesa-pi$][_{v}$~~chura~~$]][_{C}$~~ɣ~~$]]]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$

[+α] ⟵ [+α]

(678) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....(Qam)....$[_{vP}[_{PP}$mesa-pi$][_{NP}$libru-kuna-ta$][_{v}$~~chura~~$]][_{C}$~~ɣ~~$]]]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$

[+α] ⟵ [+α]

Because the verb is on the right edge by default in Quechua, this analysis also straightforwardly explains the deletion of the verb. Given that we pursue a rightward deletion analysis, we would expect Quechua to be a backwards gapping language. In actuality, however, Quechua exhibits both forward and backward gapping.[30]

(679) a. Juanito ayca-ta mik-un, Tiyuca-taq papas-ta.
Juanito meat-Acc eat-3sg Tiyuca-and potato-Acc
'Juanito eats meat and Tiyuca potatoes.'

b. Juanito ayca-ta, Tiyuca-taq papas-ta mik-un.
Juanito meat-Acc Tiyuca-and potato-Acc eat-3sg
'Juanito eats meat and Tiyuca potatoes.'
(Lit. Juanito meat and Tiyuca eats potatoes.)

4.2.6.4 Quechua Conclusion

Quechua is a "poorly-behaved" language with respect to its word order, but it is "well-behaved" with respect to the availability of cases on the theme. The available word orders form a subset of what is available to traditional imperatives. The available cases perfectly match what is available to traditional imperatives, requiring accusative case on the theme for both constructions. Quechua is also the second language in the sample to not permit adverbs. The analysis pursued herein is that Quechua has right-edge deletion which deletes the verb, and that the word order facts are explained by the verb only assigning one $[+\alpha]$ feature.

4.2.7 Bengali GoalCs

This section will be a discussion of Bengali, a member of the Indo-Aryan group of the Indo-European language family, spoken primarily in Bangladesh and Eastern India.[31] Bengali has flexible word order and marks case overtly, meaning it provides a fertile ground of comparison to the other languages in our sample. Unlike these languages, however, it only marks case on animate nouns. For this reason, I will restrict most GoalC themes in this

[30] Pulte (1971, 1973) reports that Quechua exhibits only forward gapping. This is not the pattern that my informant reported.

[31] Thanks to Sreeparna Sarkar for providing the judgments throughout this section.

section to animate nouns in order to see the possible case marking. Like Japanese, Bengali is *well-behaved* in the sense that its GoalC paradigm perfectly matches what is available to traditional imperatives in terms of word order and case. Like Uzbek and Quechua, however, there is no clear evidence of edge deletion in Bengali.

4.2.7.1 Bengali Traditional Imperatives

In Bengali, traditional imperative verbs are a bare stem, and tend to come at the end of the sentence, which is the default position for Bengali verbs (Thompson 2012). (680a) below uses a serial verb construction, very common in Indo-Aryan languages, to express "put" (Jain and Cardona 2007). In (680b) below, the verb "do" combines with a causative marker to form the complex verb "dhukiye dao." In (680a) below, the theme is unmarked for case, because it is inanimate, and is only marked for number. In (680b) below, the animate theme is marked with overt accusative case.

(680) a. Boi gulo taak e rekhe dao.
book Pl shelf on put do.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

b. Beral gulo ke bari-te dhuki-ye dao!
cat Pl Acc house-to enter-make do.Imp
'Get the cats into the house!'

Following the pattern established thus far in this chapter, it is possible to express commands that are very similar to the ones in (680a) and (680b) as GoalCs. In (681a) and (681b) below, only the theme and goal are overtly expressed, while the verb is omitted. Case remains unmarked for the inanimate object "book," and remains marked for the animate object "beral."

(681) a. Boi gulo taak e!
book Pl shelf on
'Books on the shelf!'

b. Beral-der-ke bari-te!
cat-Pl.Acc house.Loc
'Cats into the house'

The utterances in (681) both appear to superficially match the definitions of GoalCs. They both omit the verb, yet possess a meaning similar to an analogous traditional imperative with the verb overtly expressed. Both require a goal, in these case provided by the postposition "e" and the locative marker "-te." Both the GoalCs in (681) are also most naturally used as forceful commands. My Bengali informants suggested that the most natural context for using commands such as (681) was an elder talking to someone younger, or a parent commanding a child, with command prosody. Traditional Bengali imperatives have the familiar range of uses available to them, allowing at least permission and wish uses in addition to command usage.[32]

(682) a. Beral gulo ke bari-te dhuki-ye dao!
cat Pl Acc house-to enter-make do.Imp
'Get the cats into the house!' (command)

b. ?Please bhalo dekhte hoy!
please good looking be.Imp
'Please be good-looking!' (wish)

c. Ichhe hole, mishti khao!
if want.2sg sweet take.Imp
'Take a sweet, if you want.' (permission)

Following the cross-linguistic pattern established so far in this chapter, Bengali GoalCs can only be used as forceful commands. Permission and wish uses are infelicitous, despite the fact that they are possible uses for traditional imperatives.

(683) a. Beral gulo ke bari-te!
cat Pl Acc house.to
'Cats into the house!' (command)

[32] The wish use in (682b) is perfectly acceptable in a context in which the addressee is not present. However, it is partially blocked by the existence of a productive 3rd person imperative form, which is more natural to use in this context (Thompson 2012).

(1) Please bhalo dekhte hoy-o!
please good looking be.Imp-3p
'Please be good-looking!' (wish)

b. Chithi gulo dorjar baire!
letter Pl mailbox-to door outside
'Letters on the front step!' (#wish)

c. #Ichhe hole, beral gulo ke bari-te!
if want.2sg cat Pl Acc house.to
'Cats into the house, if you want.' (permission)

4.2.7.2 Bengali Word Order and Case

Despite the fact that traditional Bengali imperatives tend to have the verb come sentence-finally, their word order is very flexible, matching the languages in the sample to this point. All 6 possible permutations of Verb, Object, and Goal are grammatical for the traditional imperative originally given in (680b). Ramchand (2004) mentions that the order in which material appears to the right of the verb is limited to marked discourse conditions, but my informant did not find them particularly marked.

(684) a. Beral gulo ke bari-te dhuki-ye dao! (OGV)
cat Pl Acc house-to enter-make do.Imp
b. Beral gulo ke dhuki-ye dao bari-te! (OVG)
c. Dhuki-ye dao bari-te beral gulo ke! (VGO)
d. Dhuki-ye dao beral gulo ke bari-te! (VOG)
e. Bari-te dhuki-ye dao beral gulo ke! (GVO)
f. Bari-te beral gulo ke dhuki-ye dao! (GOV)
'Get the cats into the house!'

I will set aside the issue of how exactly scrambling works in Bengali and how each of the above word orders in (684) is derived. The important takeaway is that the position of the goal and theme is free with respect to one another. If we assume that GoalCs are derived from a corresponding traditional imperative with a put-type verb, we might both possible word orders of the goal and theme to be possible with the verb omitted. This prediction is borne out; both the theme-goal and goal-theme word orders can form grammatical GoalCs.

(685) a. Beral gulo ke bari-te!
cat Pl Acc house-to
'Cats into the house!'

b. Bari-te beral gulo ke!
house-to cat Pl Acc
'Cats into the house!

This is exactly what we expect if GoalCs are formed from traditional put-type imperatives. Thus, GoalCs are *well-behaved* with respect to the word order hypothesis originally posited in (456), because the theme and goal exhibit flexible word order in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs. With regards to case marking, Bengali GoalCs are also *well-behaved*. Traditional Bengali imperatives require that animate themes be marked with accusative case. Nominative case is unacceptable on the theme of a put-type verb (686b).

(686) a. Beral gulo ke bari-te dhuki-ye dao.
cat Pl Acc house-to enter-make do.Imp
'Get the cats into the house!'

b. *Beral-ra bari-te dhuki-ye dao.
cat-Nom.Pl house-to enter-make do.Imp
Intended: 'Get the cats into the house!'

If GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, we would expect accusative case to be possible on the GoalC theme, and nominative case to be impossible. This is exactly what we find, in both word order permutations of goal and theme nominative case is unacceptable as a GoalC theme.

(687) a. *Beral-ra bari-te!
cat-Nom.Pl house-to
Intended: 'Cats into the house!'

b. *Bari-te beral-ra!
house-to cat-Nom.Pl
'Intended: 'Cats into the house!'

(687a) is acceptable if the speaker is directly addressing the cats, provided there is a prosodic break between "cats" and "house."

(688) Beral-ra, bari-te!
cat.Nom.Pl house-to
'Cats, into the house!'

Accusative case is required on the GoalC theme in both word order configurations, matching the requirement when the verb is overt. Unmarked themes are judged as highly unnatural or flat out unacceptable.

(689) a. Chhatro-der-ke bari-te!
student-Pl-Acc house-to
'Students into the house!'

b. Bari-te chhatro-der-ke!
house-to student-Pl-Acc
'Students into the house!'

c. ???Chhatro-der bari-te!
student-Pl house-to
Intended: 'Students into the house!'

d. *Bari-te chhatro-der!
house-to student-Pl
Intended: 'Students into the house!'

This means that case-marking in Bengali GoalCs is also *well-behaved*. Traditional Bengali imperatives require their themes to be marked with overt accusative case (when their themes are animate), and GoalCs also require their themes to be marked with overt accusative case in the same environments. This means that Bengali, along with Japanese, is the second perfectly *well-behaved* language in the sample to this point in terms of both word order and case marking. The next section will show, however, that Bengali does not perfectly match the analysis that was presented for Japanese or English.

4.2.7.3 Bengali Edge Deletion

The final GoalC property that will be investigated in this chapter is the existence of edge ellipsis. To this point, we have seen some languages delete on the left, some on the right, and others with no clear evidence of deletion. Bengali will pattern more with Uzbek and Quechua in not clearly showing any concrete evidence in favor of edge deletion. This section will discuss the edge ellipsis diagnostics previously established for imperatives: overt subjects, negation, and adverbs. Bengali GoalCs do not allow the overt inclusion of the 2nd person subject, except with a prosodic break. I restrict the use of the 2nd person subject

to a relatively informal pronoun, as the use of an familiar pronoun seems generally more compatible with the speech act COMMAND.[33]

(690) a. *Tumi boi gulo taak e!
You.Fam book Pl shelf on
Intended: 'You books on the shelf!'

b. Tumi, boi gulo taak e!
You.Fam book Pl shelf on
'You, books on the shelf!'

This is the exact pattern that has been seen in every language other than Quechua so far, overt subjects are unacceptable in GoalCs without a heavy prosodic break. In traditional Bengali imperatives, the subject is grammatical with the pragmatic effect of focusing the subject, with or without a heavy prosodic break.

(691) a. Tumi boi gulo taak e rekhe dao!
You.Fam book Pl shelf on put do.Imp
'You put the books on the shelf!'

b. Tumi, boi gulo taak e rekhe dao!
You.Fam book Pl shelf on put do.Imp
'You, put the books on the shelf!'

Analogous to the case in English, the impossibility of subjects in GoalCs could be taken as weak evidence that Bengali GoalCs are deleting on their left edge. If subjects were in the path of a left-edge deletion process unique to GoalCs, their ungrammaticality in GoalCs would follow. The next diagnostic for edge deletion was the possibility of negation. Bengali allows traditional imperatives to be negated by adding a negative particle to the direct right of the verb, and changing the tense to future.

(692) a. Boi gulo taak e rekhe dao!
book Pl shelf on put do.Imp
'Put the books on the shelf!'

[33] Bengali makes a three-way distinction in politeness between pronouns (Das 1968). These generalizations hold across all pronoun honorific levels.

b. Boi gulo taak e rekhe dio **na**!
book Pl shelf on put do.Fut.Imp Neg
'Don't put the books on the shelf!'

Given that the negative morpheme is on the right edge, and appears to be free-standing, we might expect it to survive a left-edge deletion process that would be happening in Bengali GoalCs. Indeed, this is exactly what we find, it is possible to negate a GoalC with the negative word "na" at the right edge of a GoalC but with the verb omitted.

(693) Boi gulo taak e **na**!
book Pl shelf on Neg
'Don't books on the shelf!'

The GoalC in (693) is limited to COMMAND usage, indicating that it is likely a GoalC and not a General Prohibitive in Bengali. The fact that the negative morpheme appears to the right of the verb in linear order is strong evidence that Bengali is not deleting on the right edge. Because the negative morpheme appears outside the verb, if Bengali was deleting from the right we would expect negation to be impossible because it is in the path of deletion, analogous to the case in English for left edge deletion.

(694) $[_{ProsP}[_{CP}[_{vP}$....~~Tumi~~....$[_{vP}[_{NP}$boi gulo$][_{PP}$taak e$][_{v}$~~rekhe dao~~$]][_{NegP}$ na$]]]$ $[_{Pros}$COMMAND$]$
$[+\alpha]$ $[+\alpha]$ ←——— $[+\alpha]$

Although there are several possible analyses of a pattern like this, the simplest analysis to this point would be that Bengali does not have edge deletion at all. Bengali adverb data does not provide any conclusive evidence of edge deletion. Traditional Bengali imperatives have flexible adverb positions, with adverbs possible at both the beginning and end of the sentence, and between the theme and goal and goal and verb.

(695) a. *Taratari* boi gulo taak e rekhe dao!
quickly book Pl shelf on put do.Imp
'Quickly put the books on the shelf!'

b. Boi gulo *taratari* taak e rekhe dao!
book Pl quickly shelf on put do.Imp
'Put quickly the books on the shelf!'

c. Boi gulo taak e *taratari* rekhe dao!
book Pl shelf on quickly put do.Imp
'Put the books quickly on the shelf!'

d. Boi gulo taak e rekhe dao *taratari*!
book Pl shelf on put do.Imp quickly
'Put the books on the shelf quickly!'

If Bengali GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, then we would expect to see adverbs be grammatical in any position, assuming there is no edge deletion. Instead, we see the exact opposite, my Bengali informants rejected adverbs in all positions, analogous to one speaker of Uzbek and all speakers of Quechua.

(696) a. **Taratari* boi gulo taak e!
quickly book Pl shelf on
Intended: 'Quickly books on the shelf!'

b. *Boi gulo *taratari* taak e!
book Pl quickly shelf on
Intended: 'Books quickly on the shelf!'

c. *Boi gulo taak e *taratari*!
book Pl shelf on quickly
Intended: 'Books on the shelf quickly!'

It is not entirely clear why adverbs are rejected in Bengali GoalCs (or in Quechua or to one speaker of Uzbek), when they have generally been acceptable in most of the languages in the sample, and seem semantically compatible with the meaning of GoalCs. Nevertheless, the unacceptability of all adverbs fails to decide either for or against edge deletion in any direction. It is not clear to me that Bengali needs any edge deletion to explain the facts. Instead, I propose that Bengali GoalCs are formed via base-generating the theme and goal inside the VP, and then moving them to a higher projection. The VP is then deleted. Negation is outside of the VP, and therefore is not deleted. There is no edge deletion, and there are no $[+\alpha]$ features necessary.

(697)



This analysis explains the facts of what we see in Bengali. There is an additional fact to explain, which is the presence of negation in Bengali GoalCs. I propose that Negation is in a higher projection, and is not in the deletion site.

(698)



Analyzing Bengali in this way allows most of the facts to fall out. The unavailability of subjects is explained because subjects remain in the deleted TP, and the availability of negation is also explained via negation not being in the path of deletion. The one thing that this analysis does not clearly explain is the unavailability of adverbs, but that has proven mysterious in several languages.

Because Bengali does not show any evidence of edge deletion, it does not make a prediction with regards to gapping directionality. For completeness, Bengali only permits forward gapping. backward gapping is ungrammatical.

(699) a. Ami maach khechhi, ar Bill bhaat.
I fish eat.Pst and Bill rice
'I ate fish, and Bill rice.'

b. *Ami macha, ar Bill bhaat keyechi.
I fish and Bill rice eat.Pst

Lit. 'I fish, and Bill ate rice.'

4.2.7.4 Bengali Conclusion

Bengali is a *well-behaved* GoalC language in both the sense of its word order and its case marking. In both instances, the options available to GoalCs exactly match what we would expect if GoalCs were derived from traditional imperatives. Because there was no evidence of edge deletion, a movement analysis was advanced in which the theme and the goal moved to a higher projection and the verb was deleted. Negation was base-generated outside of the deletion site, allowing for Bengali GoalCs to be negated.

4.2.8 Igbo GoalCs

This section will be a discussion of Igbo, part of the Benue-Kwa group within the Niger-Congo language family, spoken primarily in Nigeria.[34] My consultant is from the Anambra region, in the southern part of the country. The spelling used is *Igbo Izugbe*, or "Central Igbo," a standardized spelling system developed in the 1970s. Igbo does not mark case overtly, and has relatively strict word order. In that sense, Igbo is much more similar to English than the languages that we have investigated so far in this chapter. Igbo is a *well-behaved* GoalC language, in the sense that the available options for GoalCs perfectly match what is available to traditional imperatives in terms of word order. Because there is no case marking, case is unsurprisingly unmarked in both GoalCs and traditional imperatives. There is indirect evidence of left-edge deletion in Igbo, but it can only definitively be stated that there is not right-edge deletion.

4.2.8.1 Igbo Traditional Imperatives

In Igbo, traditional imperative verbs are bare stems. The default word order in Igbo is SVO (Emenanjo 2015), and this word order is typically adhered to quite strictly. Because

[34] Thanks to Vincent Nwosu for providing the judgments throughout this section.

Igbo imperatives do not require an overt subject, this means that the bare verb comes clause-initially in traditional imperatives. Igbo does not mark case on its Noun Phrases, and its determiners follow the noun.[35]

(700) a. Dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
'Put the books in the box!'

b. Wèté ìkó à n'òkpúrù óché à!
get.Imp cup the under desk the
'Get the cup under the desk!'

Following the pattern established throughout this chapter, it is possible to express commands that are very similar to the ones expressed above in (700a) and (700b) as GoalCs. In (701a) and (701b) below, only the theme and location are overtly expressed, while the verb is omitted. Both plural marking (701a) and determiners (701b) are acceptable modifying the GoalC theme.

(701) a. Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
book Pl in pot iron the
'Books in the box!'

b. Ìkó à n'òkpúrù óché à!
cup the under desk the
'Cup under the desk!'

The utterances in (701) both appear to match the definitional requirements on GoalCs. They both omit the verb while simultaneously possessing a meaning very similar to an analogous traditional imperative expressed with a put-type verb. Both require a goal argument of some kind (in this case, the prepositions "n'ímé" and "n'òkpúrù" perform this function). Additionally, the GoalCs in (701) are most naturally used as forceful commands. My Igbo informant volunteered that the most natural context for utterances like (701) would be an adult talking to a child, typically when taking disciplinary action, accompanied by harsh command prosody. This matches the cross-linguistic use conditions on GoalCs seen thus far.

[35] The compound "pot iron" in (700a) is used as the common word for "box," presumably because iron pots are often used for this function.

Traditional Igbo imperatives have a range of uses available to them, participating in at least permission and wish uses in addition to command usage.

(702) a. Dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
'Put the books in the box!' (command)

b. Bíkô bùrụ́kwá ásâ!
please be.Imp beauty
'Please be beautiful!' (wish)

c. Wèré ọ́jị, mà ị chọ́ọ́.
take.Imp kola.nut if you want
"Take a kola nut, if you want.' (permission)'

Igbo GoalCs, on the other hand, are restricted in their usage in exactly the way that we have seen throughout this chapter. Permission and wish uses of Igbo GoalCs are infelicitous, they can only be used as commands.

(703) a. Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
book Pl in pot iron the
'Books in the box!' (command)

b. #Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à, mà ị chọ́ọ́!
book Pl in pot iron the if you want
'Books in the box, if you want. (permission)

c. #Édémédé n'ụ́lọ́ édémédé à!
letter in.office letter the
'Package in the post office!' (wish)

4.2.8.2 Igbo Word Order

Igbo word order is quite strict, both in declarative clauses and also in traditional imperatives. Only 2 permutations of Verb, Object, and Goal are grammatical for the traditional imperative originally given in (700a). The standard imperative word order of VOG is acceptable, and the other acceptable order is the goal fronted before the verb (704e).

(704) a. [Dòbé] [ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à] [n'ímé ìtè ígwè à]! (VOG)
put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the

b. *[Dòbé] [n'ímé ìtè ígwè à] [ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdíà]! (VGO)

c. *[Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdíà] [dòbé] [n'ímé ìtè ígwè à]! (OVG)

d. *[Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdíà] [n'ímé ìtè ígwè à] [dòbé]! (OGV)

e. [N'ímé ìtè ígwè à] [dòbé] [ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdíà]! (GVO)

f. *[N'ímé ìtè ígwè à] [ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdíà] [dòbé]! (GOV)

'Put the books in the box!'

Because traditional Igbo imperatives are capable of not pronouncing their subjects, the word order in (704a) does not require any stipulations to be derived. The following structure can derive the standard VOG word order in (704a). I assume that there are imperative features, such as the imperative operator and IMPPRO, in Igbo that match the features argued to exist in English. I utilize the same double-object syntax argued to exist for English (Larson 1988).

(705)



The GVO word order can be explained by the possibility of fronting the PP to a higher position. None of the other orders are acceptable. The theme can never front in Igbo, ruling out the OVG, OGV, and GOV word orders. The VGO word order is apparently ruled out by a restriction on the internal structure of the vP. If Igbo GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, then we would expect Igbo GoalCs to also have strict word order. This is exactly what we find, only the theme-goal order is grammatical in a GoalC. The goal-theme order, seen in (706b) below, is ungrammatical.

(706) a. [Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à] [n'ímé ìtè ígwè à]!
book Pl in pot iron the

'Books in the box!'

b. *[N'ímé ìtè ígwè à] [ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à]!
in pot iron the book Pl
Intended: 'Books in the box!'

The grammaticality of the theme-goal word order in (706a) is straightforwardly explained by the default order of the constituents given in (705). Because the default position of the verb is on the left, a left-edge deletion process would delete the verb and leave the theme and goal in the correct order in (706a). The ungrammaticality of (706b) can be explained by the fact that there is only one word order in which the goal is allowed to grammatically precede the theme, the GVO word order. However, in order to derive this order, the verb would have to intercede between the goal and the object in the underlying derivation. What this means is that the goal would be in the path of deletion, since it is to the left of the verb. These facts together mean that only the theme-goal word order in (706a) is grammatical.

Of course, Igbo does not mark case on noun phrases overtly, meaning the Goal Theme Case-Marking Hypothesis in (459) is undefined for Igbo. The GoalC Word Order Hypothesis in (456) is confirmed, but this is perhaps not particularly surprising for a language with strict word order.

4.2.8.3 Edge Deletion

The final GoalC property that will be investigated for Igbo is the edge ellipsis process that deletes all material on either the left or right edge. Given that there is no reason to believe that GoalCs are not derived from traditional Igbo imperatives, we will use the standard edge ellipsis diagnostics established in this chapter: overt subjects, negation, and adverbs. Unfortunately, as we will see, none of these diagnostics definitively establish edge ellipsis, though right-edge ellipsis will be ruled out. Igbo GoalCs do not allow the overt inclusion of the 2nd person subject, even with a prosodic break.[36]

[36] Igbo is typologically unusual in not allowing the 2nd person pronoun to serve as a vocative. Proper names, on the other hand, are perfectly acceptable in this position.

(1) Òkèchúkwú, dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Okechukwu put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
'Okechukwu, put the books in the box!'

(707) a. *Í ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
You book Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'Books in the box!'

b. *Í, ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
You book Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'You, books in the box!'

If overt 2nd person pronouns are grammatical in Igbo traditional imperatives, then the fact that they are ungrammatical in GoalCs would serve as evidence that there is left-edge deletion. Overt subjects are not possible in traditional Igbo imperatives, however, regardless of context.

(708) *Í dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
You put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
Intended: 'You put the books in the box!'

The fact that overt subjects are not possible in traditional Igbo imperatives means that their ungrammaticality in GoalCs fails to meaningfully decide in favor of or against an edge deletion analysis for Igbo. Given that traditional imperatives cannot host an overt subject pronoun, we would also expect them to be ungrammatical in GoalCs, even if there were no deletion. The second diagnostic in determining edge deletion in GoalCs is negation. Traditional Igbo imperatives are negated with two morphemes, one precedes the verb "é" and the other is a verbal suffix "-nâ."

(709) a. Dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
'Put the books in the box!'

b. É dòbé-nâ ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Neg put.Imp-Neg book Pl in pot iron the
'Don't put the books in the box!'

Both negative morphemes are required for a negative imperative. If only one of the morphemes is present, it results in ungrammaticality.

(710) a. *É dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Neg put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
Intended: 'Don't put the books in the box!'

b. *Dòbé-nâ ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
put.Imp-Neg book Pl in pot iron the
Intended: 'Don't put the books in the box!'

In order to negate a GoalC with this morphology, therefore, the expectation is unclear. Because " -nâ" is a verbal suffix, we might expect that negation is not possible in a GoalC, which by definition must delete the verb. On the other hand, we might expect that one negation might be enough to license semantic negation in an ellipsis scenario. In actuality, all possible combinations of negation markers are ungrammatical when applied to a GoalC.

(711) a. *É ákwụ́kwọ́-nâ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Neg book-Neg Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'Don't books in the box!'

b. *É-nâ ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Neg-Neg book Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'Don't books in the box!'

c. *É ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Neg book Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'Don't books in the box!'

d. *Ákwụ́kwọ́-nâ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
Book-Neg Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'Don't books in the box!'

My informant claims that each of the attempts to negate a GoalC in (711) above is laughably bad. Because negation is partially on the left-edge of the clause, this might seem like evidence that Igbo is deleting on the left. If Igbo were deleting on the left, it might be the case that the negative markers were also deleted along with the verb, making negation impossible. There is another potential reason for the ungrammaticality of negation, however. Given that one aspect of negation is a verbal suffix, it is expected that it cannot surface when the verb is deleted. Because negation comes in two parts in Igbo, it could be the case that if one part is not overtly expressed, the utterance will just be ungrammatical. Therefore, it

can not be conclusively be decided whether or not Igbo is deleting the negative marker in an edge ellipsis process, or whether negation is inexpressible because of verb deletion. The third test, adverbs, also fails to clearly decide in either direction. Igbo adverbs are relatively restricted, coming most naturally at the end of the clause. All non-clause-final orders are either entirely ungrammatical or significantly degraded. This makes Igbo the first language in this sample in which adverb position is quite restricted in traditional imperatives.

(712) a. ??*Ọ́sịsọ* dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
quickly put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the
'Quickly put the books in the box!'

b. *Dòbé *ọ́sịsọ* ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
put.Imp quickly book Pl in pot iron the
Intended: 'Put quickly the books in the box!'

c. ??Dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à *ọ́sịsọ* n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
put.Imp book Pl quickly in pot iron the
'Put the books quickly in the box!'

d. Dòbé ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à *ọ́sịsọ*!
put.Imp book Pl in pot iron the quickly
'Put the books in the box quickly!'

If GoalCs are derived from traditional imperatives, we would expect to see adverbs able to appear on the right edge only in perfectly acceptable GoalCs. This is more or less what we see in Igbo GoalCs. The left edge is completely ungrammatical, the position between the theme and goal is marginal, and the position on the right edge is only slightly awkward.

(713) a. **Ọ́sịsọ* ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
quickly book Pl inside pot iron the
Intended: 'Quickly books in the box!'

b. ??Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à *ọ́sịsọ* n'ímé ìtè ígwè à!
book Pl quickly inside pot iron the
'Books quickly in the box!'

c. ?Ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à n'ímé ìtè ígwè à *ọ́sịsọ*!
book Pl inside pot iron the quickly
'Books in the box quickly!'

The fact that (713c) is relatively acceptable strikes me as strong evidence that Igbo cannot be deleting to the right. There is also a noticeable contrast between the complete unacceptability of the left-edge adverb in (713a) and the left-edge adverb in the traditional imperative in (712a). Taken in concert, I think that this data favors an account of Igbo deleting on the left edge. I will therefore argue for the following derivation for deletion in Igbo, where there is left-edge deletion that includes the verb and any possible left-edge adverbs (even though some of these positions for adverbs would already be ungrammatical for independent reasons).

(714) $[_{ProsP}$ COMMAND.....~~Í~~.....$[_{VP}$ ~~dòbé~~ $[_{NP}$ ákwụ́kwọ́ ńdị́à $][_{PP}$ n'ímé ìtè ígwè à]]]

$[+\alpha] \longrightarrow [+\alpha]$

Lending credence to this analysis is the direction of gapping in Igbo. Igbo gapping proceeds strictly forward, backward gapping is ungrammatical.

(715) a. Vincent tàrà ázụ̀, Bill mkpụ́rụ́ ósị́sị́.
Vincent eat.Pst fish Bill fruit tree
'Vincent ate fish, and Bill fruit.'

b. *Vincent ázụ̀, Bill tàrà mkpụ́rụ́ ósị́sị́.
Vincent fish Bill eat.Pst fruit tree
Lit. 'Vincent fish, and Bill ate fruit.'

I take the fact that Igbo only allows forward gapping to indicate that the location of ellipsis is likely to be on the left edge. If directional ellipsis tends to be set to only one direction a given language, then we would expect both process to proceed rightwards. Analyzing Igbo in this way allows all the facts to fall out.

4.2.8.4 Igbo Conclusion

Igbo is a "well-behaved" GoalC language with respect to its word order, displaying restricted word order in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs. Igbo does not mark case overtly, making it undefined in its behavior towards case marking. There is indirect evidence that Igbo is deleting to the left, given the acceptability of right-edge adverbs. The default position of the Igbo imperative verb is in the posited path of deletion.

4.3 Scalpel Commands

The purpose of this section will be to briefly investigate the case-marking properties of what I term "scalpel" commands across languages. I have previously stated that the case-marking facts seem to suggest that "scalpel" commands cross-linguistically do not always pattern neatly with GoalC themes. Nevertheless, they initially appear quite similar.

4.3.1 Scalpel Commands in English

Scalpel commands are a set of commands like the following, which require only an overt NP.

(716) a. Scalpel.

b. Sponge.

c. Attention, passengers!

d. Ticket, please.

e. Next patient.

Scalpel commands seem quite similar to GoalCs in a number of respects. They do not have an overt goal, but they do have a semantic goal. In each utterance in (716) above, the goal can only be interpreted as "me." Thus, an utterance like (716c) is restricted in its interpretation.

(717) Attention, passengers!

→ Pay attention to me/this announcement!

≠ Pay attention to him/her/them/something else!

The deleted content in all of these seems to be roughly equivalent to "Give me..." As such, we could imagine that scalpel commands are equivalent to GoalCs, with a 2nd person Addressee-Restricted subject and an imperative operator.

(718)



I place the imperative operator, IMPPRO and IMPMOD in the structure, the same elements that are in traditional imperatives. As for the imperative operator, scalpel commands are examples of performative utterances, analogous to traditional imperatives. They do not have questionable truth values.

(719) A: Scalpel, please.

B: # That's (not) true! / #You don't mean that!

I take this to mean that it plausible that scalpel commands could have the imperative operator. As for the subject, there is reason from possessive pronouns to believe that scalpel commands have an addressee-restricted subject. The noun "attention" requires that the

possessor is identical to the subject of "give," and different from the first object of "give" in a traditional imperative.

(720) a. Give me your attention, please!

b. *Give me my attention, please!

c. *Give me their attention, please!

This makes a clear prediction about what we should expect to see in scalpel commands. If the subject is addressee-restricted, we should expect to only see the 2nd person possessor in the scalpel command. This is exactly what we find. 1st and 3rd person possessive pronouns are ungrammatical.

(721) a. Your attention, please!

b. *My attention, please!

c. *Their attention, please!

The best account of this fact is that scalpel commands have an addressee-restricted subject. The same logic applies to the modal. We have already seen in Chapter 3 that the modal in traditional imperatives is underspecified, meaning that multiple modal in the tag are possible. The same is true of scalpel commands.

(722) a. Give me that scalpel, won't you / will you / would you?

b. Scalpel, won't you / will you / would you?

I take this as strong evidence that both the subject and modal in scalpel commands are the same as those in traditional imperatives. Could the [+α] feature be responsible for the deletion in scalpel commands? Unfortunately, it is not totally clear to me how this would work. Recall that the [+α] feature indiscriminately deletes all material in a certain direction. In the case of English, this is on the left edge. One of the great benefits to this analysis was that it deleted determiners in GoalCs. Scalpel commands optionally permit determiners, however, while GoalCs do not.

(723) a. (The) scalpel, please.

b. *The books on the table!

We originally conceived that certain elements within the NP could survive deletion because they could agree with the head noun and receive the [+α] feature via Agree. It is not tenable to argue that articles could be agreeing with the head N in only scalpel commands, but not GoalCs. This is a point against an analysis depending on [+α]. Given that a determiner is possible in scalpel commands, it is somewhat strange that the determiner is omissible. Bare singulars are not permitted in object position in English.

(724) *Give me scalpel, please.

Another point is the range of uses available to scalpel commands. Scalpel commands, as indicated by their name, as used as commands by default. Unlike GoalCs, which also have "command" in their name, it is much easier to weaken a scalpel command.

(725) a. Scalpel, would you?

b. Scalpel. When you get a chance.

c. Scalpel, if you don't mind.

None of these utterances requires COMMAND prosody. When it comes to range of uses, scalpel commands therefore seem to be acting more like traditional imperatives than GoalCs. I take this fact, in combination with the permissibility of determiners, to mean that there is no edge deletion in scalpel commands that is caused by an [+α] feature. This means that there needs to be a different analysis of scalpel commands and GoalCs.

There is an additional piece of evidence against them counting as GoalCs from the available case marking across languages.

We have already seen that Japanese GoalC themes required accusative marking or topic marking on them, with topic marking requiring the theme-goal word order. Japanese scalpel commands, on the other hand, display a different pattern. Bare marking and accusative marking are grammatical, while nominative marking and topic marking are ungrammatical.

(726) a. Hon-**o**/-**wa**/*-**ga**/*∅ tana-ni!
book-**Acc-Top-Nom-Null** shelf-Loc
'Books onto the shelf!'

b. Mesu-∅.
scalpel-Null
'Scalpel.'

c. Mesu-o.
scalpel-Acc
'Scalpel.'

d. *Mesu-ga.
scalpel-Nom
'Scalpel.'

e. *Mesu-wa.
scalpel-Top
'Scalpel.' (Japanese)

It is difficult to see how these case-marking facts could be explained if scalpel commands and GoalCs are underlyingly the same construction in Japanese. In particular, the possibility of null-marking on the scalpel theme suggests that they cannot be the same construction. If the verb is overtly pronounced, the theme must be marked with accusative.

(727) a. Mesu-o kure!
scalpel-Acc hand.me.Imp
'Give me the scalpel!'

b. *Mesu kure!
scalpel hand.me.Imp
'Give me the scalpel!'

Greek displays a similar pattern. For Speaker 2, who accepted both nominative and accusative case on the GoalC theme, only accusative case on the scalpel theme was acceptable.

(728) a. Ton anaptira, parakalo!
the.Acc lighter.Acc, please.
'Lighter, please.'

b. *O anaptiras, parakalo!
the.Nom lighter.Nom, please!
'Lighter, please!' (Greek)

This does not mean that every language does not conform in its case-marking between GoalCs and scalpel commands. Some languages like Quechua require accusative case in both their GoalCs and scalpel commands.

(729) a. Lichi-ta refrigeradura-pi!
milk-Acc fridge-Loc
'Milk into the fridge!'

b. *Lichi refrigeradura-pi!
milk.Nom fridge-Loc
'Milk into the fridge!'

c. Bisturi-ta!
scalpel-Acc
'Scalpel!'

d. *Bisturi!
scalpel.Nom
'Scalpel!'

I do not take the fact that Quechua requires accusative case on both the GoalC theme and the scalpel theme to be evidence that the constructions are necessarily the same. Taken in totality with the cross-linguistic data, I think the most likely scenario is that the two constructions are distinct, though may share a considerable amount of overlap given that they are imperatives that involve massive truncation and are heavily licensed by the context. As a first pass, I would argue that scalpel themes move to a higher projection to avoid deletion. The lower TP is then deleted, meaning that "give me," or the equivalent in that language, is not pronounced.

(730)



The one remaining thing left unexplained by this analysis is the optionality of the determiner. The only possible analysis that I can see is that scalpel commands are an instance of *telegraphic speech*. Telegraphic speech is generally capable of optionally omitting determiners in English.

(731) (A) shark bit (the) mayor!

Note that this is a very different deletion process than the one in GoalCs. GoalCs obligatory deleted articles on the left-edge, and never deleted determiners that were not in the path of deletion. An utterance like (731), on the other hand, which would be appropriate for a newspaper headline, can optionally delete determiners throughout. I propose that certain lexical items inherently bear a [+telegraphic] feature. When they are in the presence of a telegraphic operator, they can optionally be deleted. This means that (732) can become (733) in a telegraphic environment.

(732) The mayor was bitten by a shark!

- The, [+telegraphic]
- was, [+telegraphic]
- a, [+telegraphic]

(733) (The) mayor (was) bitten by (a) shark!

A similar analysis can be applied to Japanese. According to my informants, Japanese case markers are optional in a telegraphic environment.

(734) Same-ga shicho-o kan-da!
Shark-Nom mayor-Acc chew-Past
'A shark bit the mayor!'

- -ga, [+telegraphic]
- -o, [+telegraphic]
- -da [+telegraphic]

(735) Same(-ga), hito(-o) kamu(-da)!

I take this to mean that it is plausible that both languages involve a [+telegraphic] feature that is present in scalpel commands. In English this has the effect of optionally omitting articles, whereas in Japanese it means you can optionally omit case markers.

4.4 Cross-linguistic Conclusions

In this section, I would like to briefly summarize what we have found so far in this chapter. The first, and most important finding, is that GoalCs exist as a robust construction across a variety of languages and language families. There was not a single language in the sample that did not allow a GoalC to be expressed in some way. I take this to be strong evidence that there is something highly natural about omitting a put-type verb to express an urgent command, even if the connection between these elements is not obvious *a priori*.

Another central finding in this chapter is that every language in the sample permitted a range of uses to their traditional imperatives, but limited GoalCs to COMMAND usage.

(736)

	Flexible Uses for TIs	Restricted Uses for GoalCs
English	✓	✓
Japanese	✓	✓
Korean	✓	✓
Greek	✓	✓
Turkish	✓	✓
Uzbek	✓	✓
Quechua	✓	✓
Bengali	✓	✓
Igbo	✓	✓

This narrowing of potential uses was the motivation for the [+α] feature that was introduced in Chapter 3 and used throughout Chapter 4 to explain why the deletion on the edge directly corresponds to using COMMAND prosody and the command being interpreted as urgent. At a conceptual level, it makes sense that a feature that is associated with truncation could pragmatically be associated with urgency. By shortening the message, the speaker conveys that the urgency of the request also applies to the length of their utterance.

I do not think it is a coincidence that GoalCs are limited to command prosody and use, as opposed to say, permission or wish prosody and use. Although each of these uses is available to traditional imperatives, commanding is often taken as the most basic meaning behind an imperative clause (Kaufmann 2012; Von Fintel and Iatridou 2017).

Oikonomou (2016), for example, argues that the nature of the inherent nature of the imperative operator is actually a bouletic one, and that, at their core, imperatives express desires. Although many of the arguments given in that thesis appear to be quite convincing, it is conceptually curious that we would find a putative imperative form that is limited to only command usage, if the default underlying usage is something like a wish. Similarly, Kaufmann (2012) decomposes the imperative operator into a possibility operator and an exhaustifier. The reasoning behind this decision is that, in the presence of certain elements that she terms "anti-exhaustifiers," such as the modifier "for example," imperatives can present a possibility for the addressee's best course of action. GoalCs are not compatible with "for example."

(737) *Books on the shelf for example!

At a conceptual level, it is curious that GoalCs are not compatible with "antiexhaustification" as described in (Kaufmann 2012, Ch. 5.3.1). If the imperative operator really decomposes into possibility plus exhaustification, but this exhaustifier can be blocked by certain "anti-exhaustifiers," why not in GoalCs as well?

The analysis pursued in this thesis attempts to go some of the way towards explaining this by suggesting that there is a syntactic feature, required for deletion, that would be incompatible with this. But a significant amount of future work is needed to iron out the

details in this regard. For example, this thesis does not present a detailed prosody analysis of COMMAND prosody in the languages that were sampled. A natural question that arises is "Are there shared prosodic properties of commands across languages?" Is that is the case, we may be able to be more specific and say that it is a specific prosodic contour that is associated with edge deletion, rather than the more vague notion of COMMAND prosody.

Most of the languages in the sample generally have flexible word order, and even more have flexible word order of the theme and goal in put-type constructions. Below is a summary of the word order possibilities for the theme and goal in both traditional imperatives and GoalCs. The abbreviations in the table stand for "theme-goal" and "goal-theme," and "TI" stands for "Traditional Imperative," as opposed to a GoalC.

(738)

	TG (TI)	GT (TI)	TG (GoalC)	GT (GoalC)
English	✓	X	✓	X
Japanese	✓	✓	✓	✓
Korean	✓	✓	✓	✓
Greek	✓	✓	✓	✓
Turkish	✓	✓	✓	✓
Uzbek	✓	✓	✓	X
Quechua	✓	✓	✓	X
Bengali	✓	✓	✓	✓
Igbo	✓	X	✓	X

The well-behaved languages in (738) are the languages in which the two columns to the left of the double line match the two columns to the right of the double line. So what can we conclude about the correlation between the available word orders to traditional imperatives and GoalCs?

For one: most languages in the sample are *well-behaved*. The only *poorly-behaved* languages in the sample are Uzbek and Quechua, and both display the same pattern, in which GoalCs are restricted to the theme-goal word order while traditional imperatives can have either word order. Both poorly-behaved languages are *subset* languages, where

the options in the GoalC are a subset of what is available to the traditional imperative. Although this sample is still quite small, we can ask ourselves if this is a coincidence?

I cannot say this with 100% certainty, but I would be surprised if upon significant expansion, this sample contained many *superset* languages with respect to word order. It is not logically possible for a free-word order language to be a *superset* language, because all of the possible configurations are already grammatical, meaning that at most it can be *well-behaved*. This means that it would have to be a language that has strict word order in a traditional imperative but free word order in a GoalC. Although I cannot be certain that no such language exists, it seems highly unlikely for a language like English or Igbo, which adheres to a relatively strict theme-goal order for put-type verbs, to allow goal-theme order in GoalCs. If we allow for the fact that multiple forms might be competing in Uzbek in Quechua, it seems reasonable to conclude that the factors that are important in determining word order in traditional imperatives are operative in GoalCs as well.

As for case-marking, the hypothesis originally given in (459) does not appear to hold universally. In the 7 languages that mark case overtly, only 3 were *well-behaved*. Of the 4 that were poorly-behaved, only Greek exhibited a *superset* pattern, and that superset pattern was only for one speaker. As such, taken in totality we might be skeptical that Greek is really a superset language. We saw no superset word order languages, and Greek is the only language that was classified as a superset case-marking language. Although I would not want to remove the classification based on what we have seen, it does bring the classification potentially into question. At the very least, it shows that being a superset language is highly unique, and possibly limited to a small set of speakers.

This investigation makes it clear that case-marking in GoalCs cannot always be reduced to matching the case that is assigned in a traditional put-type imperative. Nevertheless, it is not the case that there are no patterns at all. The default assumption that I made at the beginning of this chapter was that the case-marking options would match between traditional imperatives and GoalCs. Although it does not always match perfectly, there are many patterns that we never saw. For example, there is no language that exhibits the following pattern.

(739) a. Put the books-Acc on the shelf!

b. Books-Acc/Dat on the shelf!

None of the languages in the sample had a case like the dative mysteriously arise in GoalCs. It seems that the available cases can broadly placed into two categories. The *well-behaved* languages simply matched the cases that could be assigned by the verb, in the languages presented in this sample, that was accusative. The *poorly-behaved* languages each had a case that was available in a dislocated environment. Greek, for example, permitted accusative case, which was analyzed as being assigned directly by the put-type verb. Nominative case was analyzed as being the result of dislocation. Other instances of poorly-behaved cases will analyzed in similar fashion.

More investigation is needed into the ways that case-marking breaks down in fragments in order to understand why each language acts the way that it does. More knowledge about the individual morphosyntax of each language is necessary to be able to properly understand why dislocation is possible in some languages but not others.

As for the edge diagnostics, we discovered something interesting about overt subjects. Overt subjects were near-universally acceptable in traditional imperatives, and near-universally unacceptable in GoalCs.

	Overt subjects in TIs	Overt subjects in GoalCs
English	✓	X
Japanese	%	%
Korean	✓	X
Greek	✓	X
Turkish	✓	X
Uzbek	✓	X
Quechua	✓	%
Bengali	✓	X
Igbo	X	X

The only language in the sample in which overt subjects were completely unacceptable in traditional imperatives was Igbo. Although Aikhenvald (2010) reports that it is relatively common among the languages of the world to not permit overt imperative subjects, the

tiny sample presented here showed that it is more common to allow an overt subject in a traditional imperative than disallow one. This makes it all the more interesting that overt subjects are banned in nearly every language in GoalCs. In fact, there was not a single language in which the usage of overt subjects in GoalCs was unrestricted. In both Japanese and Quechua, overt GoalC subjects are permitted only when part of a contrastive list, analogous to 3rd person subjects in traditional English imperatives. In all other languages, overt subjects were ruled out. This includes Korean, which had clear evidence of right-edge deletion, meaning that the overt subject should not be in the path of deletion. My intuition here is that something else is banning overt subjects, at least some of the time. For some languages, such as Bengali, I argued that a *movement-and-ellipsis* approach was deriving GoalCs, which explained the obligatory deletion of the subject because it could not be moved along with the theme and goal.

It is worth pointing out that overt subjects in Japanese and Quechua are subject to improvement via being part of a list. The following is a comprehensive list of each element that improves when being part of a list scenario, paired with their respective examples.

- English 3rd person subjects.

  (740) a. *Keith hand me that pen!
  b. Keith hand me that pen, Rachel hand me that lighter.

- English GoalC demonstratives.

  (741) a. Those books onto the shelf, and these into my trunk.
  b. ???Those books onto the shelf!

- Japanese GoalC subjects.

  (742) ?Anata_wa$_1$ hon-o tana-ni, anata-wa$_2$ pen-o hako-ni!
  You.Form-Top book-Acc shelf-Loc You.Form-Top pen-Acc box-Loc
  'You$_1$ books on the shelf, you$_2$ pens in the box!'

- Korean accusative case in goal-theme word order.

  (743) a. ?Senpan-ey chayk-ul, thakca-ey capci-lul!
  shelf-Loc book-Acc table-Loc magazine-Acc
  'Books on the shelf, magazines on the table!'

b. *Senpan-ey chayk-ul!
shelf-Loc book-Acc
Intended: 'Books on the shelf!'

- Turkish accusative case.

(744) a. ?Kitap-lar-ı raf-a, dergi-ler-i masa-ya!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat magazine-Pl-Acc table-Dat
'Books onto the shelf, magazines on the table!'

b. ???Kitap-lar-ı raf-a!
book-Pl-Acc shelf-Dat
'Books on the shelf!'

- Uzbek goal-theme word order.

(745) a. ??Shkaf-ga kitob-lar(-ni), stol-ga jurnal-lar(-ni)!
shelf-Loc book-Pl-Acc table-Dat magazine-Pl-Acc
'Books on the shelf, magazines on the table.'

b. *Shkaf-ga kitob-lar(-ni)!
shelf-Loc book-Pl-Acc
Intended: Books on the shelf!'

- Quechua GoalC subjects.

(746) Qam$_i$ libru-kuna-ta mesa-pi, qam$_j$ libru-kuna-ta pampa-pi!
You.Nom book-Pl-Acc table-Loc you.Nom book-Pl-Acc ground-Loc
'You$_i$ books on the table, you$_j$ books on the ground!'

Mauck and Zanuttini (2005) mentions that the syntax may need some notion of contrastive list to explain the English subject pattern, which is puzzling given that there is nothing in our theory of contrastive focus that involves being part of a list or not. Adding such a notion complicates our theory of focus. Even more challenging is that these effects seem mostly limited to imperatives.

I do not have an analysis of each of these patterns. I would like to mention, however, that I consider it a great strength of our current analysis that deletion is dependent on a prosodic feature. Although contrastive lists may not be distinct semantically, *list intonation* is a distinct prosody from COMMAND prosody (Ladd Jr 1980). It is reasonable that contrastive lists remove at least some of the prosodic features that are responsible for effects like deletion.

The final contribution of this chapter was the discovery of an edge deletion process that can exist on either the left or right edge and deletes all material in a certain direction. This was analyzed by being initiated by a feature, $[+\alpha]$, which can exist on a Prosody Head and deletes all material until it encounters another feature $[+\alpha]$. There is a three-way classification of edge deletion, languages that delete on the left, languages that delete on the right, and languages that were indeterminate. Languages that did not exhibit any edge effects were argued as moving the pronounced portion out of an ellipsis site.

The following is a table for how each left-edge deletion language interacts with gapping. Recall that the prediction was made that because left-edge deletion proceeds forward, there should be a correlation between the edge that deletion takes place on and the directionality of gapping. We find that for each language that deletes on the left-edge in GoalCs, each permits forward gapping.

(747)

	Left-Edge	Forward Gapping
English	✓	✓
Greek	✓	✓
Turkish	✓	✓
Igbo	✓	✓

Turkish also permits backward gapping, meaning that it is not a "pure" forward gapping language. The other three languages only permit forward gapping. Nevertheless, despite the relatively small sample, a generalization emerges.

(748) If a language deletes on its left edge in GoalCs, it also permits forward gapping.

Obviously, there is not a definitive answer to why the direction of deletion in GoalCs and gapping tends to be the same, but I can offer a possibility. It is more economical for the grammar of a language to only delete in one direction. This seems particularly helpful from the point of view of the listener. If you are the listener in a language that could in theory be deleting leftward or rightward, it increases the difficulty of parsing a fragment. On the other hand, if you know that your language deletes only in one direction consistently, the listener can more easily form expectations.

As for right-edge deletion, there were three languages that showed significant evidence for deleting on the right edge. Per the prediction on gapping direction, we should expect each to exhibit backward gapping. This is what we see, though it is a very small sample.

(749)

	Right-Edge	Backward Gapping
Japanese	✓	✓
Korean	✓	✓

This allows for a very tentative preliminary generalization, the reverse of (748).

(750) If a language deletes on its right edge in GoalCs, it also permits backward gapping.

More languages would need to be added to the sample to see whether or not (748) and (750) actually hold up. Nevertheless, I am encouraged by the logic behind this generalization. It makes sense that certain languages are more comfortable operating "forward" and that other languages prefer to operate "backward." This property may then correlated with other features of the language, such as that language's basic word order.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The primary intent of this dissertation was to expand our understanding of imperative clauses by extending previously existing analyses of imperative clauses to verbless imperatives. By extending our notion of what constitutes an "imperative," this provided insight into the relationship between clause-type operators like the imperative operator, and the morphosyntactic properties that are associated with them. By separating the concept of a morphosyntactic imperative from the imperative verb, we were able to explain the commonalities in meaning and use between traditional imperatives and verbless ones. In understanding the nature of imperatives, both traditional and non-traditional, our understanding of speech acts in the grammar gains clarity.

The first issue that we discussed in detail was the properties of General Prohibitives in English. Of particular interest is that I proposed that the imperative operator can be separated from the well-known Addressee Restriction on imperatives, at least for non-traditional imperatives like General Prohibitives. What this means, in essence, is that General Prohibitives possess most of the meaning components of traditional imperatives without possessing imperative morphosyntax.

This approach explains a variety of properties of General Prohibitives, such as their lack of 2nd person subject and having accessible truth values. Extending our current understanding of traditional imperative clauses to General Prohibitives provides a few interesting contributions. The first is that imperatives can have accessible truth conditions under significantly more situations than previously thought. I consider this fact to be more compatible with a modal operator approach to imperatives, such as the type undertaken by (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012; Oikonomou 2016) and less with the pragmatic approach typified by (Portner 2004, 2007). This is because, for the modal operator approach, imperatives fundamentally represent propositions. As such, we can consider General Prohibitives to be

an instance in which the imperative operator does not block the truth conditions that are underlyingly present in imperatives.

The other main contribution of the investigation of General Prohibitives was an extensive analysis into their morphosyntax, which determined that they possess the pleonastic subject "there," and lack the Addressee Restricted projection argued to exist by (Zanuttini et al. 2012). In doing so, I attempted to do away with the notion of morphosyntactic clause type, replacing it with Prosodic heads and semantic operators. This follows in a line of recent work which has attempted to create clause-types compositionally (Portner 2018; Isac 2015).

A question that remains open after this investigation is what exactly the restrictions on the morphosyntactic position of the imperative operator are. Previous analyses have neatly explained that imperative meaning is limited to appearing in traditional imperative clauses. Although I believe we have good reason to place some type of imperative meaning in a General Prohibitive, doing so in a clause that lacks an Addressee-Restricted subject essentially opens up the imperative operator to appearing in any type of sentence - which may be too permissive. I argued in Chapter 2 that the imperative operator is limited in some sense by a requirement that it must select for a lower modal, in this case the modal element "allowed." Although this may do some of the work, it is clearly not sufficient, because there are a host of modal elements that do not seem to form imperatives at all. Further investigation of the relationship between modal elements and imperative-like meaning in verbless clauses is required to fully understand this relationship.

The second issue addressed in this dissertation was the imperative morphosyntax of Goal Commands. The main contribution of this chapter was that languages can possess fragments that display the full force and morphosyntactic properties of imperative clauses despite lacking an overt verb. The verb was deleted via a phonological deletion process that was associated with a COMMAND feature on a Prosody Head, which deleted all material between that Prosody Head and the complement of a put-type verb.

This approach explains a variety of properties that Goal Commands have, such as their inability to place adverbs on the left edge. In addition, it explains why Goal Commands are limited to having COMMAND prosody by tying the deletion process to that specific

Prosodic Head. In doing so, it strongly connects Goal Commands to our previous understanding of imperative clauses, by showing that Goal Commands are conditioned by the same constraints in meaning and use as traditional imperatives.

One question that this analysis raises is what exactly the restrictions on phonological edge deletion are. Our analysis makes use of a device that allows ellipsis to be conditioned by a specific set of lexical items, namely put-type verbs, in conjunction with a Prosody Head. Although this analysis is constrained in one sense by limiting this deletion process to only put-type verbs, it is quite unrestrained in a more theoretic sense. In theory, ellipsis could be conditioned by any lexical item in conjunction with any speech act, a configuration that does not seem to actually happen very often. If a different way of limiting ellipsis to the class of put-type verbs could be found, this stipulation could be done away with, which might make the account more parsimonious. Unfortunately, I could not see a way to do it here. A more well-developed theory of edge deletion is necessary to make concrete claims about its nature in this construction.

The third issue raised in this dissertation was the cross-linguistic study of Goal Commands. We found that they are robust, and that the analysis presented for English could be applied in many instances with minimal modifications. This approach allowed us to draw attention to the overwhelming similarities across unrelated languages with respect to this construction. These similarities lead me to believe that there is something highly natural about truncating a traditional put-type imperative to form a verbless Goal Command, and that a simpler analysis that consolidates all languages together may be possible in the future.

One open question left from this analysis is what governs case-marking in languages that mark case overtly. We analyzed *poorly-behaved* languages as allowing NPs to originate in projections where they could avoid be assigned the wrong case. Turkish, for example, was analyzed as having the NP originate in a higher projection where it could not be assigned accusative case. Nevertheless, there is not currently any prediction about when a language will allow a GoalC theme to originate in a higher projection.

Another open question is whether or not there are consolidating features of COMMAND prosody across the languages in the sample. Each set of informants reported that the prosody used in GoalCs was reserved for the Speech Act COMMAND, which is why I have represented

it in this way. Nevertheless, we might hope to explain this ellipsis via specific prosodic features that are associated with commands that would allow us to predict whether or not languages will form GoalCs in this way.

In closing, I hope that this dissertation is viewed as a first attempt to understand the nature of verbless imperatives and consolidate them with traditional imperatives. I think many of the issues discussed in this dissertation highlight the need to investigate imperative clauses cross-linguistically in relation to other constructions, such as fragments, in order to understand the connections between them. Although I believe that our understanding of verbless imperatives and traditional imperative has increased significantly as a result of the undertakings in this dissertation, I believe that our understanding can increase even more in the future. I believe that our understanding of traditional imperative clauses will benefit greatly as well as discovering new connections related to the phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of these constructions.

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