

**THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE; ATTITUDES AND
ACTIONS OF LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGERS**

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Affairs and Public Policy

Spring 2015

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper would not have been possible without the support of Dr. Danilo Yanich, my advisor and Committee Chair. His outlook on the dissertation writing process allowed me to feel unconstrained in my writing, and for that I am very grateful. He was patient with me, even when I did not deserve his patience.

My committee has been very supportive during this extended venture and I sincerely appreciate their assistance. The expertise of Dr. Maria Aristigueta and Dr. Richard Sylves has been tremendously helpful in keeping this project on the right path. Russell Strickland, who has also served as a mentor during my professional career, provided his much needed perspective on the practice of emergency management during our coffee sessions.

Finally, my family has been my greatest source of support and strength during this process. My successful endurance of this dissertation can only be attributed to their good humor and patience.

DEDICATION

To my husband and my father, whose sacrifice and service to this county have offered me a life full of opportunities.

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ABSTRACT

Scholars agree that, since the inception of the Department of Homeland Security, emergency management in the United States has been increasingly centralized. This study posits that centralization has been a longer term trend with negative effects on federal relationships. This dissertation examines the pay arrangements between the local and federal governments with respect to the Emergency Management Performance Grant and the Public Assistance Program. A nationwide study of county emergency managers investigated the attitudes towards these two programs and related budgetary actions. Respondents were asked to consider the extent of federal control over these financial assistance programs and the extent to which they were dependent upon them for program sustainment. Results of the study show that elements of federal control are more evident in the program that requires only a 25% match by the local government. Further, emergency managers report that their organizations are dependent on federal aid and experience decreased autonomy as a result of the receipt of funds. Lastly, budgetary activities on the local level which would guard against this dependence and loss of autonomy are generally not undertaken.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the role of federalism and intergovernmental relations in managing disasters. The post September 11, 2001 and post Katrina environments have seen scholarly work surface which examines the intricacies of intergovernmental relations across both manmade and natural disasters. Many critiques have been produced on methods of organizing for disaster, the viability of policies, and numerous other aspects of emergency management which are touched by issues of federalism and problems of coordination. Recently however, research has focused on the centralization of emergency management functions under the Department of Homeland Security and its impact on catastrophic response since September 11, 2001. Many scholars argue that transformation towards centralized planning for terrorism by the federal government reduced capacity to act on natural disasters despite the billions of dollars invested by the federal government at the local level. However few, if any, studies have examined the perspective of the local emergency manager in managing further centralization in the system. Most scholars and practitioners agree that there is a deficit of effort to understand the local perspective on what the effects of post 9/11 policies have been. If, as a mantra common in practice goes, “all disasters are local” then examining the perspective of the local emergency manager is key to a deep understanding of how these changes have affected their local disaster management function. In the specific case of this study however, the examination of this perspective focused on

centralized planning efforts as an on-going problem for emergency management and not solely the centralization after September 11th.

Chapter One of this study provides an introduction to this selected topic. A brief description of the rationale and significance of the study are provided first, followed by my background and assumptions. Next, I offer an overview of topics central to the study that will be expanded upon in the literature review. Lastly, the problem statement purpose and research questions that guided this study are established.

Rational and Significance

The rationale for this study lies in the current debate over the role of government and the increased attention to emergency management in the new century. The endless critique of the federal government that plays out in the media and scholarly work, and the reactive policy making thereafter continues to reinforce the federal role and has led this researcher to question the actual effect of increasing federal involvement. Large scale disasters on the magnitude of Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Sandy have demonstrated across the course of three decades the inability and undesirability of the federal government to be relied upon for pre-event planning, preparations and catastrophic response. Yet policies which centralize authority and responsibility at the federal level are continuously expanded. This problem has real effects at the local level which include the potential for reliance upon the federal government for much more than it is actually capable of doing. Given the new reality of greatly increased centralization of disaster planning and funding at the federal level, this study sought to understand the perspective of local emergency managers and the way they plan and prepare fiscally for disaster.

While much scholarly work exists that details the intent of federal level policy to provide assistance, it is critical to assess not only the intent but the actual effect on local

programs. It is not sufficient to study only the success and failure of governments to coordinate during disaster; but we must also gain understanding of the effects of policies which mold and guide this coordination. One of, if not the primary objective of federal level emergency management policy, is to grant financial assistance to local government. A closer examination of the fiscal relationship that has sustained local programs leveraging a combination of funding types is critical to understanding how federalism is at work in emergency management policy. This examination benefited from a study inclusive of both the perspective of the emergency manager on this centralized approach and their resultant actions.

A model which explains the status of federal relationships in disaster policy can assist in numerous ways across practice and academia. The availability of such a model can help policy-makers now and in the future to understand the impact of federal interventions on local government in emergency management specifically. Additionally, this model can contribute to the broader ongoing scholarly debate about reliance on federal funding for local programming, and more specifically the discourse regarding capabilities for managing emergencies.

The significance of this study finds dual footing in its potential to inform both science and practice. It is intended to advance the state of research in the growing academic field of emergency management. It has the potential to provide a useful model in the examination of financial arrangements for local emergency management organizations and thus provides a new perspective on desirable attributes of local emergency management and federal relationships. Additionally this study informs the policy making process as the United States seeks to strengthen its emergency management system. This contribution demonstrates what the effects of federal policy

have been at the local level and thus illuminates both strengths and weaknesses in the current approach.

Researcher Perspective

I have spent over a decade in the field of emergency management and the broader field of emergency services. Serving in various positions including Emergency Planner, Deputy Emergency Manager and currently, Deputy Director of Emergency Services has granted me the ability to view local emergency management operations from multiple perspectives. However, these perspectives are from my experience at one organization. It is with a sincere interest in how the work of emergency management is being conducted that I would embark on this effort to study some of my colleagues across the country and their organizations.

Interest in the specific matter of the federal –local relationship has stemmed from the recognition that at times the state role seems inconsequential in fiscal matters. The state often serves merely as a pass through organization for grant funding as well as for post-disaster public assistance funding. Additionally, the direct assistance given to individuals living in the local community as well as the one-on-one work with FEMA contractors for post-disaster reimbursement are, for me, curious arrangements. This relationship, paired with the enormous investment by the federal government in local matters, has made me consider if we have become excessively reliant upon federal financial assistance. Moreover, if an emergency management function is desirable at the local level should its funding, which originates with tax dollars paid by people living at the local level, be contingent upon the taxing and budgetary processes of the federal and state governments or by the norms and tradeoffs decided upon by local citizens at that local level?

Increasingly nation-focused policy that followed the advent of the Department of Homeland Security centralized functions for domestic emergency management. This reaction is an understandable one, as the federal government sought to improve the ability of all levels of government to respond to acts of the very real terror threat. Over a decade later, however, it is important to know what the effects on local emergency management have been.

Background of the Study

Considerations for an On-going Debate

James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper No. 39 “... the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere,” (Madison, 1788). It is with concern that the sphere of local authority is increasingly more subject to that of the federal government, that debate over the current state of federalism has garnered renewed attention in the United States. There exists now a vigorous discourse since the implementation of a health care system with the federal government at the helm, but this discourse has not been limited to health care. Vastly different sets of policy- most notably health care, legalization of marijuana, and gun laws – have sparked new discussions about the role of government (Davenport, 2012; Green, 2013; Turley, 2012; Yoo, 2005). Dually focused on policy content and location of policy origination, critics of the current state of American federalism claim policy making is increasingly centralized. Conversely, advocates of the broader federal role see increasing federal assistance and national policy making as a method of solving wide-spread social problems and inequities. Each of these very different, very salient discussions regarding the role of government is bound to not

only large and visible policy campaigns, but also to some of the most humbling and vulnerable of circumstances. Few events transpire which better frame the questions of federalism as clearly as disaster.

Increasingly devastating and increasingly expensive disasters serve to focus the nation's attention simultaneously on individual suffering and on the intricacies of government at work. Relations among the levels of government in this context are ripe for investigation as we know very little about the impact of these relationships on local government financial decision making. Specifically, it is critical to examine fiscal responsibility for local emergency management programs in order to gauge their sustainability and ultimately to successfully respond to the needs of local communities during disasters. Local governments are often positioned as recipients of federal assistance, both programmatically and fiscally, and thus may have unique challenges in building and sustaining a grassroots effort for community preparedness. This is so given the long history of federal government intervention into local community matters, and its supplanting of community effort regardless of whether this intervention is successful or not. This section will address key historical and contextual issues relevant to the study of federalism, fiscal responsibilities, emergency management, and decision making. The primary objective of this section is to briefly describe the evolution of the fiscal and policy arrangements between the federal and local government. A secondary objective is to demonstrate the role of government in emergency management and discuss how responsibility for disaster management and response has evolved.

The Local- Federal Relationship

Increasingly, there is a closer and more direct relationship between the federal and local governments. While this study did not ignore altogether the role of the state on

matters pertaining to financial assistance, the local government receives money that is first transferred by taxing to the federal government. In some instances assistance is received in the form of grants. The Emergency Management Performance Grant is authorized by the Stafford Act of 1998 and intended to support the growth of a strong national “system of emergency preparedness,” (Department of Homeland Security, 2013).

Similarly, the collection of Homeland Security Grant Programs was authorized by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and while its intentions have morphed somewhat, this grant pool was earmarked to “prevent, protect against, respond to, mitigate, and recover from potential terrorist attacks and other hazards,” (Department of Homeland Security, 2013).

Local jurisdictions also receive assistance in the form of post-disaster reimbursement for incidents reaching the status of presidentially declared disasters, as authorized by the Stafford Act and for a multitude of hazard types. This assistance, in the form of the Public Assistance program, provides a minimum of 75% reimbursement for local operations in emergency and permanent work (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007). The Public Assistance program can reimburse costs for local governments who meet directly with federal government personnel to produce “projects” to submit for reimbursement to the federal government. While the state is involved to provide support in information gathering and pleading the case for a disaster declaration, the example of the public assistance program is one of many in which there is support given by the federal to local government. Thus, through a multitude of avenues, the federal government is financially and administratively assisting the local level emergency management organization. While this study will seek to understand what the effect of this relationship has been, others have already articulated problems that have arisen

between the levels of government. As Birkland and DeYoung (2011) point out “State and local governments have become dependent on federal aid for disasters, blurring the division of labor in the federal-state-local emergency management relationship,” (p. 486).

Emergency Managers as Decision Makers

The process used by an emergency manager to make decisions outside of an emergency event remains understudied. While emergency managers do have unique considerations for decision making they are, much like other public managers, exposed to the phenomenon of what other some scholars have referred to as “publicness” (Moulton, 2009; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994; Coursey & Bozeman, 1990). The term publicness was coined by Bozeman to characterize the external control of resources and public ownership of organizations which ensures that decisions are subject to public scrutiny. Thus, the emergency manager must make decisions with resources that are constrained first by tax dollars available and secondly by the allocation process of his jurisdiction or the granting entity. Few studies exist which illustrate these complex pre-event financial and resource decisions that are made by emergency managers. Indeed, their activities in preparation for incidents can dictate the success or failure of their responses. It is of note, however, that not every local emergency manager has exactly the same budgetary responsibilities. Yet all have some role in preparing their county financially through budget requests, appealing to officials, and grant applications, for sustaining an emergency management program. These activities to organize funding benefit the spectrum of activities undertaken by the emergency manager. However, it is understood that there are a number of factors external to the emergency manager which influence program funding such as government type, political ideology, and demographics (Choi, 2004). To make decisions, and certainly to operate within the

framework allowed by these external influences, the emergency manager must make several assumptions about his environment. Sylves (2008) writes that there are a series of assumptions made by the emergency manager about managing disasters. These same assumptions can be made for planning and management of normal operations. Of particular relevance for the understudied peace time decisions are that “disaster planning is a continuous process”, and “disaster management needs to be “sold” effectively to communities to be taken seriously” (p. 21).

Problem Statement

The problem at the crux of this study is that an increasingly significant federal investment into local emergency management may affect the roles of government intended by a federalist system. The implication of this is that local programs may be unsustainable without federal assistance at a time when there is intense discourse on the role of the federal government and increasing concern about its ability to continue to fund existing programs. This study presumes that, from the perspective of the local emergency manager, it is important to maintain at the local level an emergency management presence. It is therefore critical to study how budgetary decisions have been made at the local level given the convergence of the issues of centralization and dwindling funding.

Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to better understand the attitudes of the local emergency manager about federal financial assistance programs, and further, to understand actions taken at the local level which affect fiscal sustainability. In order to fully explore this issue three research questions are examined below to focus this study.

Undoubtedly, the public manager at the local level must often carry out or work within the frameworks of federal policy. That these policies are not generated at the local level, and because they are often attached to grant funding, the county emergency manager, in this case, has to make decisions regarding methods for implementation and on how grant funds can best compliment a local budget. In providing the ability to bolster an emergency management program, federal funding should ideally expand what is possible for emergency managers to affect with their budgets. It is important to understand how the county emergency manager perceives this potential. Further, it is critical to know how this affects, if at all, the perception of their responsibilities as it pertains to financial sustainability of the local program. Therefore, the following questions were examined:

RQ 1: How do emergency managers perceive the ability of their jurisdictions to contribute funding towards the local emergency management function?

RQ2: What are the attitudes of the local emergency manager towards using federal financial assistance for emergency management?

In a time when the discussion over the role of the government, specifically federal, is at a heightened pitch, it is incumbent upon managers at the state and local level to consider potential alterations to fiscal arrangements that exist with the federal government. In the case of this study it was imperative to investigate, in light of Research Question One, the actions taken by the local emergency manager to consider increasing budgetary assets through local funding methods for the sustainability of their programs. Further, this study benefited from an understanding of what local emergency managers do to plan financially for their organization. Therefore the following question was also examined:

RQ3: What actions, if any, has the local emergency manager taken to plan for and locally sustain an emergency management program independent of federal funding?

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Through a selective review of the literature, this section will provide a foundation for the remainder of the study. As this study draws from seemingly disparate areas of literature, it will be critical to ensure that their relatedness is established in this literature review. This review will present literature under three major headings: (a) federalism, (b) emergency management, (c) and decision making. Their interconnectedness will be the focal point of the sub-headings. Within the broad heading of federalism, this section will include a review of constitutional intent, types of federalism, and federal policy as incentive. A section on emergency management will review the existing policy framework which outlines the federal – local relationship as well as the existing studies of federalism and emergency management. Lastly, this literature review will present material on decision making in public administration in order to illuminate the processes in government by which budget and resource decisions are made. A fourth section of the literature review will summarize the included information and identify any gaps in the literature which are relevant to this study.

Federalism

Federalism and Constitutional Intent

As Sundquist and Davis (1969) pointed out “In the absence of a common doctrine, the structure of federalism embodied in a particular bill reflected the ideas of

whatever particular group of legislative draftsmen worked on that particular measure and what laws they used as precedents” (p. 13). Thus federalism has evolved with policies, and those policies do not inherently place a pure federalism as their foremost influence. Therefore it is imperative to stop from time to time to assess how closely the U.S. system still adheres to the characteristics of federalism. To do so is a complex analysis as, in his assessment of the scholarly literature on federalism, Stewart (1982) identifies 326 metaphors and models that seek to explain or predict something about the federalist system of government. While each has made its contribution, the scholars responsible for the production of the theories of federalism “have been particularly prone to use ostensibly crude, nonmathematical, frequently metaphorical conceptualizations to label changes in governmental roles,” (Stewart, 1982, p. 5). Therefore, a study on the impact of federal policy at the local level must first address the imperatives of federalism at its inception. This is so because one cannot reach conclusions about governmental relationships without an understanding of the foundations they presuppose. To this end, Madison tells us in Federalist Paper 39:

First, in order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.

Two schools of thought emerge with respect to the makeup of the federal system and constitutional intent. Some have written that the principles of the U.S. constitution in driving the federal system cannot be translated directly (Powell, 1985; Sandalow, 1981). Still others understand the tenets of the U.S. constitution as timeless and as worthy of being relied upon for framing our federalist system (Schechter, 1978). Schechter (1978) writes “The definition of American federalism still rests primarily on the constitutional

distribution of governing powers between a general (national) government and constituent (state) governments,” (p. 5).

This study will employ the second stance and understands the intended nature between the levels of government can be derived from the Constitution and thus, recognizes the more problematic discussion of local government autonomy. It is generally agreed upon that local government is not conferred power under the constitution, but instead it is granted autonomy and power by the state government. The importance of this arrangement and the extent to which localism is desired is a much debated topic. Some scholars have posited that local autonomy breeds parochialism and disparity, and argue for greater power for the states to counter this dangerous arrangement. Briffault wrote (1990):

New legal doctrines and governmental structures are needed to encourage state governments to take a state-wide perspective on local problems, to strengthen the states' role in overseeing local power and overriding parochial actions and to increase state accountability for local functions and for ameliorating interlocal wealth differences (p. 6).

Still others, on quite the opposite end of the spectrum, argue that the Constitution does accommodate a local sphere of power separate and apart from that of the state government. Sullivan (2003) articulates an understanding of the Tenth Amendment that “endows the people with the right to choose and define their local government.” Citing the constitution itself, Sullivan argues that the following section of the Constitution provides this autonomy: “Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Earlier arguments for strong local self-governance also exist. Eaton (1900) wrote “Is it not a part of the unwritten constitution, one of the common-law rights brought over from England by our ancestors and never surrendered?” (p. 447). In 1871 the matter of the

local government autonomy was explicitly defended in Cooley's decision in the *People v.*

Hurlbut:

...the constitution has been adopted in view of a system of local government, well understood and tolerably uniform in character, existing from the very earliest settlement of the country, never for a moment suspended or displaced, and the continued existence of which is assumed; and, second, that the liberties of the people have generally been supposed to spring from, and be dependent upon that system.

Thus there is a long standing and multi-faceted debate over the role of local government with scholars pointing towards the Federalist Papers, the Constitution, and Court decisions as evidence of that role. Therefore I can surmise only a few tenets. The foundations of local government autonomy are addressed in early writings including the Federalist Papers, and powers are granted explicitly to "the people" under the Constitution. The Courts have also upheld local autonomy (Sullivan, 2003; *New York v. United States*, 1992; *People vs. Hurlbut*, 1871). Certainly the federal government working directly with the local government in some cases supports legitimacy- albeit not necessarily in a positive sense where the state is bypassed. As "the people" are most proximal to the local level, examination of policy affects at this level- disaster policy included- is most critical.

There have been challenges to the traditional understanding of federalism, exacerbated by a number of factors including the nationalization of state and local political organizations and a distancing of elected officials from their geographic base (Kincaid, 1990). Even popular terms used in public administration offer complex problems. Schechter (1978) warns us that new emerging terms such as "intergovernmental management" do not hinge upon matters of constitutional intent and are not bound by an understanding of federalism. As this and other like terms are often

used to describe emergency management, this study will be most explicit when describing the relationships between the levels of government.

Types of Federalism

An acknowledgement of the “types” of federalism is relevant to any policy discussion as these definitions establish the scope of the policies’ intended reach. It is clear that in policy design, few federal elected officials are primarily concerned with constitutional intent and are instead more determined to align policy with stated content goals. Therefore, it is reasonable to select the most prominent types of federalism in the existing public administration literature for the purposes of this study. The section below provides detail on cooperative, coercive, and opportunistic federalism.

Federalism in the U.S. has maintained a state of flux since the end of World War II. The majority of scholarly writings depict the two decades following the war as a time of “cooperative federalism”, (Conlan, 2006; Kincaid, 1990; Zimmerman, 2005). The nature of this cooperation was intended to strike a balance between state and national policymaking ensuring that broad national objectives could be achieved while allowing the states latitude to enact policy (Clark, 1938; Kincaid, 1990). During the 1950’s and 1960’s the federal government employed cooperative federalism in financial and policy intervention at the state and local level. A drastic increase in economic growth permitted very generous allotments to state and local governments (Kincaid, 1990). Consequently, the amount of aid grew from \$7 billion in 1960 to \$91 billion in 1980 (Zimmerman, 2005). Lovell (1981) writes that “...federal aids alone increased between 1957 and 1977 from 9 to 19 percent of all state and local revenues, while local own-source revenue dropped from 44 to 33 percent”. The federal government, under cooperative federal policy, increasingly expanded its scope in the areas of race and urban poverty in the

1960's to solve overarching national problems of social equity. Kincaid writes that on a variety of issues including "market fairness, racial justice, social equity, individual rights, and environmental protection, the states could hardly stand on anything but cooperative federalism, especially when the federal government provided incentives for cooperation," (Kincaid, 1990). This period reflected not only a growth in financial aid, but also in federal preemption of state and local policy space. Prior to 1965, the federal government employed policies which usurped state power on only 166 occasions in the history of the federation. However, between the years of 1965 and 2004, there were 356 preemptive statutes (Zimmerman, 2005). While mandates often come with financial assistance, that aid often decreases or goes away completely while the mandate remains leaving less space for local choice regarding local policy and an inherent dependence upon federal funds and federal program design (Doesken & Allen, 1990; Lovell, 1981). Not all scholars agree that this increase in dependency upon the federal government by the local and state government is solely a matter of cooperation on national level issues. Kee and Shannon (1992) recognize this time as shaped by crisis and centered on consensus in Washington and an "activist federal government". They write that crisis during this time "shredded the constitutional standards and the national government became legally free to move in areas once considered the local preserve of the states".

Scholars have written that the massive expansion of federal assistance and mandates ushered in a period of "coercive federalism" (Conlan, 2006; Kincaid, 1990). Kincaid writes that the prior model of cooperative federalism "placed the senior partner in the federal system in a position to become the commanding partner, (Kincaid, 1990). Thus the practice in the 1960's of federal-centric policy making and assistance placed the federal government comfortably in the role of central authority on policy and state and local governments as recipients and dependents of fiscal assistance. Resultant from this

was an increase in federal mandates. It is critical to note that the expansion of the federal set of mandates was not a partisan act. Conlan (2006) writes that "...the temptation to co-opt and prescribe is not driven by a single party or ideological affiliation". This is evident in the actions of administrations during each decade that would follow the 1970's. Financial assistance also continued to grow during this time period. While the impacts of aid are debated, a Brookings Institution study of 12 large cities found that each was dependent upon- financially and politically- federal assistance (Lovell, 1981). Federal dollars, in some cases, were funding over 30% of operating budgets and cities were falling prey to what Lovell describes as the "fiscal dependency syndrome".

On this topic however, there is the retort that during the 1980's, state and local governments became more self-directed and increasingly better able to navigate economic difficulty as a result of weakened federal fiscal power (Kee & Shannon, 1992; Nathan, 2008). Nathan (2008) wrote:

Fast-forward to the 1980s, when the pendulum of national social policy swung away from Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. Again, there was a surge in state-level activism, in this case in response to President Ronald Reagan's 1981-82 cuts in federal domestic spending. States reshaped their counterpart programs to reflect their priorities, increased the funding of programs in areas in which the federal government became less active, and assumed more control over the activities of local governments. In doing so, states expanded their influence, both vis-à-vis the federal government and in their relationships with local governments and nonprofit organizations.

Kee and Shannon point out that in assessing the economic condition of the United States during the late 1970's and 1980's there was a deep divide between conservatives and liberals in explaining how the U.S. arrived at those conditions. Conservatives saw an "over commitment on the expenditure side", and liberals viewed the problems as one of "under taxation on the revenue side" (Kee & Shannon, 1992). These differences are well-known and are echoed today in current debate.

This era of coercive federalism is also marked by an increasing preference of the federal government to work directly with individuals. “Entitlements, preemptions, and expanded authority have supplied opportunities to service constituents directly and to intervene in state and local matters, sometimes in competition with state and local officials and often on grounds of equity,” (Kincaid, 1990). A final characteristic of coercive federalism, the proclivity of federal elected officials to distance themselves from their respective state and local parties (Kincaid, 1990), might explain the usurping of state and local policy space in directly working with constituents.

A recent reemergence of the debate over federalism has been brought about by opposing perceptions that the federal government has either increased its role and is infringing on state and local policy space or is not involved enough in accomplishing social and economic national goals. Regardless of which party has been in charge, scholars point out that coercive policy has continued. However, Conlan points out that opportunistic federalism is a better descriptor of the recent give and take of federal, state, and local relationships. He writes

By opportunistic, I mean a system that allows and often encourages actors in the system to pursue their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective consequences...States often display similar behavior toward local governments, and both state and local governments behave opportunistically when they direct federal grants away from their intended purposes to serve strictly parochial ends (Conlan, 2006).

Advocates for bottom-up federalism can cite examples from both Republican and Democrat administrations wherein the federal government has usurped state and local policy space. During the administration of George W. Bush numerous policies were seen as infringements on local space including No Child Left Behind, the Family Marriage Amendment, as well as issues surrounding the right to die and marijuana use, (Conlan & Posner, 2011; Kincaid & Cole, 2008; Yoo, 2005). More recently under the Obama

administration, a far reaching federal role is pointed to in instances such as the Affordable Care Act, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and Race to the Top (Conlan & Posner, 2011; Gais, 2010). Several other trends depict a federal government seeking to grow. In 2009 federal aid to state and local governments equaled 4.6% of GDP, the highest amount since 1977 (Gais, 2010). In that same year, state and local spending was comprised of 24.5% federal assistance (Conlan & Posner, 2011). Critics of the current direction of federal government see assistance as a return to top down federalism, imposing policy objectives onto state and local governments. Supporters of expansive national policy, however, argue that crises occurring during both the Bush 43 and Obama administrations left gaps which only the federal government policy making apparatus could fill and that both administrations continued to engage the states as partners (Conlan & Posner, 2011). Despite continuing mandates however, it appears that state and local governments benefit in many ways from federal funding for local interests.

Federal Policy as Incentive for Local Governments

“Because cash grants on a major scale, and especially direct federal-local grants, are a relatively recent development, it is not surprising that the theoretical literature on grants does not have an extensive empirical base,” (Nathan, 1983 p. 47). Lindley (1975) points out that the federal - local relationship ignores the role of the state and therefore does not adhere to the intent of the U.S. system of federalism. Birkland and Waterman cite Project Impact as an example of this relationship and label it opportunistic federalism as “FEMA sought to circumvent state governments and work directly with localities,” (Birkland & Waterman, 2008, p. 698). Other scholars have surmised that the relationship is more assistive in carrying out national goals (Sundquist & Davis, 1969). Still others, like Lovell (1981), point out that this relationship, especially where the grants-in-aid are

concerned, have bred dependency. This debate at the individual and organization level is alive and well; can federal policy effectively incentivize and if so, what is the societal tradeoff? As the impact of this new federal-local relationship vis-à-vis emergency management is within the purview of this study, it is important to understand how federal policy has sought to incentivize local capability building.

As federal grants provide leverage to the federal government for implementing national goals, the financing of local operations post September 11, 2001 is an excellent example of this relationship. Most scholarship on this matter has focused primarily on centralized control of emergency management, and less on the impact of grants as incentive. That the primary disaster response mechanisms still rest at the state and local levels is offered as proof by Scavo, Kilroy, and Kearney (2008) that federal centralization has been resisted. However, this is contrary to the actual experience of local emergency management. Resistance to this effort of centralization would have likely been indicated by rejection of the grant funds that paid for this effort. Instead, state and local governments have taken in \$35 billion since the 2002 inception of DHS grant programs (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012). There is further evidence that not only grants, but funding in general, is expected from the federal government. As Birkland and DeYoung (2011) point out, one of the major complaints by the state and local governments regarding the federal response to the oil spill in the Gulf was the “amount and speed of federal aid” was insufficient to meet their needs. Further, there is evidence that local governments alter their modes of operation based on the federal assistance. Donahue and Joyce (2001) point out that:

At the same time, local governments still bear considerable responsibility for response and recovery efforts, but they may modify their activities in these areas to conform with federal criteria to secure as many resources as possible.

This expectation of federal resources is not only occurring among practitioners but is further reflected in the literature, as Roberts (2008) believes that there was insufficient funding in the post-9/11 era. It remains to be seen if this process of modifying local activities to meet federal requirements for financial incentives is ultimately a best practice.

Emergency Management

Emergency Management Funding Programs

It is critical to discuss the recent history of emergency management as it pertains to the role of government. While recent large scale disasters have brought to the forefront the role of the federal government in disaster response, it is equally imperative to examine the interplay between each level. Primarily this is so because it permits us to gauge successes or failures of government. Such an examination is also important as the scope of emergency management related fiscal investment is very broad. This section will address key contextual matters which have affected emergency management responsibilities including the increasingly centralizing policies and a refocusing of emergency management efforts.

The responsibility of managing disasters rests with local government that can, once resources are exhausted, petition for assistance from the State and Federal governments. The guiding legislation that sets forth disaster assistance mechanisms, the Stafford Act is written “to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters,” (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act , 2007). The Disaster Relief Act in 1974, later amended as the Stafford Act 1988, lays the foundation for the current

system of disaster declaration, coordination, and federal assistance. In its most current form, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act outlines guidance for the following areas; the process for obtaining a declaration, disaster preparedness and mitigation assistance, major disaster and emergency assistance administration, major disaster assistance programs, emergency assistance programs, and emergency preparedness. In doing so, it establishes the ground rules for the state and local governments to obtain federal assistance, generally in the form of 75% or more of reimbursements for all eligible disaster related expenses. This establishes the federal government as the primary payer for federally declared local disasters. While there is a need for federal assistance during extreme events, the payments are not reserved for these instances. Instead, pay arrangements exist under the Stafford Act for lesser impact events such as snow storms, providing even adjacent jurisdictions this same 75% reimbursement for eligible expenses.

State government is a key component of emergency management and serves as an intermediary between the federal and local governments. Its role in both relief programming and preparedness grants is to assist the locals in determining their needs, articulating what those needs are, and identifying methods for meeting the increased demands of local response and recovery. Most importantly, the state plays a key role after local resources are exhausted by providing resource support and requesting federal assistance (Schneider, 1990). In the Public Assistance program for example the state is responsible for alerting local governments about the availability of post-disaster funding (Leon & Lubin, 2000). Applications for assistance are reviewed by the state after the local-federal project teams draft worksheets detailing expenses. Leon and Lubin (2000) also point out that the state often determines how the non-federal match is paid.

The state also responds to disasters with state resources that often include National Guard units (state militias), state law enforcement, and infrastructure related functions such as information technology and public works. Landy (2008) points out that during Katrina, state governments had two roles. Primarily, the state mobilized its own resources as listed above. Additionally, however, the state took the lead role in determining the allocation of Community Development Block Grant funds that were made available during the recovery phase.

While, in general states have exercised broad powers to respond to disaster, these powers, especially those related to military assets, can often elicit a tense state-federal relationship. It was this tension that Landy (2008) points to as one of the more prominent intergovernmental conflicts after Katrina. Landy also points out that the demeanor of Louisiana and Mississippi officials in dealing with the federal government could not have been more different. He writes that Louisiana made “aggressive demands” and acted with “defiant hostility” whereas Mississippi was proactive and acted as a “grateful and worthy supplicant”. Neither Louisiana nor Mississippi were willing to permit the President to federalize National Guard resources. This denial elicited a response from the Bush administration in 2006 that would deny the Governor the sole authority to call up the National Guard (Gramlich, 2008). Later, in 2008 this act was rescinded.

The years that followed the Stafford Act have seen a marked increase of declarations for disaster. While the declarations ranged in scope and nature, on public assistance alone in 2012 – those funds reimbursed to state and local governments and non-profits, the federal government spent \$267,370,298 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013). Surely, the new century has been marked by huge tragedies including the attacks of September 11, 2001 and Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy which account for much of the federal funding. Yet, this is but one method of funding transfers

from the taxpayer, to the federal government and then to state and local governments. Together with the myriad of other emergency management and homeland security grants, the significant investment of funds paid to the federal government and then to the management of local emergencies depicts an increasingly centralized fiscal responsibility. Furthermore, the growing investment into individual level loss has also signified a willingness of FEMA to act as a safety net for not only governments, but all levels of community.

In addition to disaster declarations, grant funds are also authorized under the Stafford Act. The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is a primary source of funds for many state and local jurisdictions, offering a 50/50 funding match for local expenses. A 2012 study by the International Association of Emergency Managers shows that responding local organizations, on average, fund between 27% and 31% of their program budgets with EMPG alone (U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency Managers, 2012). The IAEM, a professional association comprised of many practitioners, believes firmly in EMPG's ability to grow local capacity. With reference to the failures of Hurricane Katrina, an earlier IAEM report states "The way to avoid these problems in the future is to invest in preparedness grant programs, such as the EMPG program, that are focused on achievement of the outcomes associated with the prepared jurisdiction," (Jensen, 2011).

Indeed, there have been additional investments into the management of local emergencies. The FY 13 Homeland Security Grant Program offered a combined \$913,389,689 in State Homeland Security and Urban Area Security Initiative Grants. This grant program funds, without a required match, an expansive array of items included on an Authorized Equipment List. The DHS grants focus on "implementation of the National Preparedness System (NPS) by supporting the building, sustainment, and

delivery of core capabilities essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) of a secure and resilient Nation” (Department of Homeland Security, 2013). It is critical to note that not all of these funds went directly to Emergency Management agencies as much of the funding focus was for terrorism response by law enforcement and to bolster state and local capabilities to handle man-caused hazards. This spending has been the subject of much criticism. Most recently a report released by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma has included state and local expenditures such as: long range acoustic devices to deter G-20 protestors, sno-cone machines, and bear-cat armored vehicles for a jurisdiction with an annual homicide rate of 1 (Coburn, 2012). This report reminds us of the intent of much of the homeland security funds:

UASI grants were designed to be start-up investments to help the most vulnerable urban areas enhance both their readiness and response capabilities. ...Success for the UASI program, therefore, would be defined by it growing less needed, not more. DHS has since spent an estimated \$35 billion on its grant programs over the last decade, including \$7.144 billion for UASI Urban areas.

There was, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an increased level of attention paid to the management of domestic emergencies. It is often argued that planning for emergencies in the years between the attacks and Hurricane Katrina is best characterized as terror-focused, with reduced concentration on natural hazards planning (Birkland & Waterman, 2008; Scavo, Kearney, & Kilroy, 2008). Several additional phenomena were at play between the attacks of 2001 and Hurricane Katrina. Firstly, despite organizational upheaval in 2002, FEMA handled a series of four hurricanes in 2004 with very little public complaint and thus there was little existing reason for concern about its capabilities (Derthick, 2009). Secondly, despite years of warnings by meteorologists, government officials at all levels were caught off guard by this mega storm. In fact, similar storms had served as the basis for recent exercises and planning

scenarios, yet there was a clear lack of awareness of the potential for destruction (Nathan & Landy, 2009; Tierney, 2008). Within this context, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast. While there was little focus on the successes or failures of state and local government or individuals, the outcry about the role of the federal government was deafening. Birkland and DeYoung (2011) point out that this outcry was mirrored again after the Gulf Oil Spill:

Despite the well-known shortcomings in FEMA's response to Katrina, Americans came to believe that FEMA has powers and capabilities that are far greater than those specified in the Stafford Act. That FEMA is the public face of all federal emergency response efforts caused the public—and many state and local officials—to believe that the federal government should issue some sort of “disaster declaration” for the oil spill, (p. 479)

As has generally been the case, the failures at the federal level were resolved by writing new policy which in turn only further solidified the centralized approach to emergency management in the United States (Crabill & Rademacher, 2012). While there is now a turn towards all-hazards planning, indeed the years during which funding was tied to terrorism related preparations did change traditional emergency management (Birkland & Waterman, 2008; Derthick, 2009). It is clear from examples like the local response to the Boston bombings that great strides have been made by some of the programs. Despite the discussion of problematic policies for local county program sustainability, this study does not deny the threat of terrorism or the advances that have been made in order to prepare for attacks.

Emergency Management in a Federal System

Numerous studies have focused on federalism and emergency management and their findings have been very diverse. Regarding post- 9/11 and post-Katrina changes to the emergency management system, many studies have focused on increasingly centralizing efforts by the federal government (Derthick, 2009; Roberts, 2008; Scavo,

Kearney & Kilroy, 2008). Others have examined the failures in intergovernmental relations in responding to catastrophic disaster (Birkland & DeYoung, 2011; Birkland & Waterman, 2008) and have offered recommendations for policy improvement (Landy, 2008). Landy (2008), points out that change to the governmental system cannot substitute for “civic and leadership failure.” Donahue and Joyce (2001) and Schneider (2008) have focused on matching the roles and responsibilities of emergency management with the correct level of government to improve effectiveness. Collaboration, a critical component of governmental response, has been the focus of multiple studies as well (Caruson & MacManus, 2012; McGuire & Silvia, 2010). Many of these studies employ the component of fiscal responsibility, but an in-depth study such as this can add to the body of literature.

Decision Making

The Context for Public Sector Decision Making

The individual administrator or manager undoubtedly makes numerous decisions during the course of a career. Public organizations are often charged with matters of public protection and security and thus, some public administrators deal frequently with decisions which may have an impact on public safety. Using emergency management as an example, heightened public awareness of disasters has increased the study of organizations and individuals who make public safety related decisions. The concept of “publicness” is often used to describe the characteristics of public organizations and has taken a dual meaning in the literature. “Publicness” defines for the organization not only legal ownership (public versus private) but also a number of contingent variables such as “the percentage of resources from government, the frequency of communications with government, or the importance of government to organizational growth and survival,”

known as “dimensional publicness” (Moulton, 2009). Numerous studies on the attributes and meaning of publicness exist and are helpful here in providing a context for public sector decision making. (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994) (Coursey & Bozeman, 1990) (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000). Critical to this study is that decision making for emergency managers is constrained by the attributes of publicness in that the external control of resources and activities must be considered throughout the decision making process.

Classic economic theory dictates that decision making for the emergency manager must take into account that, “according to applied economics, citizens will demand an increasing number of publicly provided services in increasing amounts while wanting to spend less of their personal income for these goods and services,” (Leuenberger, 2009). This is significant for emergency management given the very public nature of its failures when they become evident. Public safety services, such as those offered by emergency management, are considered “common pool resources because citizens cannot be excluded from access, and a high number of users can result in competition for the good” (Leuenberger, 2009). Applying classic economic theory in this context tells us that more people will want more services, no one will be excluded in their provision, and fewer will want to pay. What then are the implications for the financial decisions made by emergency managers? In his 2009 study of city managers and administrators in Minnesota, Nebraska, and Iowa, Leuenberger demonstrates that public managers recognize the concerns of increasing public want and problems that arise from competition for few resources. However, “Respondents again supported provision of common pool resources, indicating that they are the least appropriate for budget cuts ...” Public managers recognize the imperatives of providing common pool resources including public safety services such as emergency management. This study will illuminate the practices used to obtain funding sources to support emergency

management and will further examine how federal provision of funding affects this support.

Decision Making and the Emergency Manager

Understanding how the emergency manager makes decisions also illuminates those pre-event activities which can influence the ability of the jurisdiction to respond to future disasters. Decisions are often made in organizational settings collaboratively. This study, however, is concerned with the individual emergency manager's perception of federal level policies and how he makes financial decisions based on this perception, as these decisions can dictate resources on-hand. Thus this section of the literature review borrows from available literature about the individual as decision maker to illuminate processes and factors which affect budgetary decisions. Secondly, this study considers aspects of decision making which, for the emergency manager, employ consideration of financial and resource allocations.

The nature of decisions made by the emergency manager during normal operations includes planning for the financial stability of his or her organization and the ability to affect a program of emergency management for his jurisdiction. Budgets can be comprised of operational funds, grant awards or some combination thereof and provide the mechanism for funding for publicly provided services. Primarily the emergency manager provides services in preparation for public protective action measures such as evacuation, shelter, planning, and supplies that remain without controversy unless they are perceived as inadequate for disaster. While literature exists which focuses on the act of decision making during emergencies, how the emergency manager makes decisions during normal operations goes largely unstudied. Several examples, however, offer insight into decision making as planning and forethought.

Choi and Kim (2007) examined the effect of multiple power bases on emergency management networks and addressed decision making as an issue central to influence within those networks. Their findings discussed several compelling factors critical to decision making. Among them and germane to this study is that a “designated legal or official lead agency” is deemed most influential when it has the ability to make decisions about funding. An emergency management agency which dictates how grants are spent, for example, was found to be more influential within the network than those that do not make these types of decisions. Conversely, in cases where the emergency management agency is only a recipient for funds and is not involved in programming the money, the authors found that there can be a perception problem if they are not deemed as a central actor. In light of these finding it is clear that financial or resource decision making authority directly affects the perceived role of the emergency management agency, and indirectly the emergency manager.

In a study of 67 Florida County Emergency Management Offices, the factors influencing financial resources devoted to emergency management were assessed. Choi (2004) reported that differences in spending could be attributed to county government type, political ideology, and demographic factors. As the allocation of funds to emergency management is a product of decision making, Choi’s study can inform this review. It serves to clarify that quite often, final budget details are the decision of local elected officials or government actors other than the emergency manager. Choi (2004) did not focus on the emergency manager as an individual, but his study of attributes affecting budgetary decisions applies to this study.

In Sylves (2008), the author offers seven assumptions that are included in the decision process of an emergency manager. They include assumptions that are held during normal operations such as “Disaster planning is a continuous process.” and

“Disaster planning should attempt to reduce uncertainty in crises by anticipating problems and projecting possible solutions,” and of note for this study “Disaster management needs to be “sold” effectively to communities to be taken seriously.” Application of the latter assumption to this study is of interest given the implications of the perceived necessity to “sell” a service to gain community support. In this case, the emergency manager would make decisions regarding the extent and frequency of information sharing in order to ensure that emergency management is taken seriously.

Lastly, Collins and Peerbolte’s 2012 study of local emergency managers from the Commonwealth of Virginia produced significant findings regarding decision making practices. While the study focused on critical thinking skills, the outcomes are relevant to peacetime decision making. On matters of reasoning, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments, Collins and Peerbolte, found reason to believe that emergency managers might benefit from additional management skills. Particularly, they found that emergency managers may not gather and use information appropriately in decision making. Further, EMs exhibited problems with interpretation of information that was available to them including a lack of objectivity and emotional responses that made possible courses of action less clear.

Gaps in the Current Literature

While the studies on federalism and emergency management do address the local level, few discuss the original intent of the founding of the U.S. federal system. Future studies could add depth to the existing literature by questioning the effects of changes that have crept into the system and added dimensions of federalism not addressed by any founding documents. We must then examine what it means when these changes occur. Primarily, the most discussed alteration to federalism specific to emergency management

is the centralization that occurred in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. I would argue, however, that one other matter has been at play since long before the attacks. The Stafford Act and its programs, while touted as a model system of federalism at work, has had three impacts not central to federalism's intent that are largely overlooked in the literature. Firstly, it centralized the payment responsibility for disaster at the federal level. Thus regardless of the language of local and state responsibility, the actual obligation rests with the federal government to fund, or not fund, critical activities across the phases of disaster. Secondly, along with other programs, it has institutionalized a direct federal-local relationship with the state acting as a middle man with varying degrees of involvement. While this claim is not made in the emergency management literature specifically, we see evidence of the same emerging relationships elsewhere. Lastly, there is a direct transfer of costs that depend upon location, adherence to strict preparedness standards, viability of local population, and local and state willingness to fund programs. When disaster strikes in locations that ignore the lessons of past disasters, the cost of disaster is transferred to the other parts of the country.

Scholarly work has understandably focused on the disaster related decisions of emergency managers. There is an evident gap in the available literature on decision making by emergency managers during normal operations. This omission leaves space for the further examination of how and to what extent preparations are made for disaster. Further, a local perspective on the intergovernmental relationships is critical to creating new policy solutions, but has been understudied.

Conceptual Framework

In order to address each research question fully, this study employed a conceptual framework that emerged from the literature review and practices in local emergency

management. The significance of the EMPG and the Public Assistance Programs- the two financial assistance programs on which we will evaluate the research questions- is underscored by their authorization in the Stafford Act. The framework in Figure 1 presents a model on which the level of federal control and payment responsibilities present in the EMPG and Public Assistance programs will be plotted based on a document analysis. This representation of responsibilities will answer the question “What is the predominant nature of federalism expressed in guiding documents?” Answering this question by understanding the presence of language about responsibilities will assist in evaluating the attitudes and actions uncovered in the research questions.

In the framework, two continua are offered which represent both the corresponding level of federal control and the extent of federal payment responsibility, expressed as a typology of federalism that has emerged from the literature review. The research questions will refer back to this framework as both the attitudes and actions of the emergency manager will be discussed within the context of this model. Chapter Four will first present this figure with responsibilities identified in the document analysis. Finally, a second version of the framework is presented in Chapter Four, with responsibilities plotted as a representation of the attitudes of emergency manager as discovered in the survey.




Figure 1 Conceptual Framework

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to better understand the attitudes of the local emergency manager about federal financial assistance programs, and further, to understand actions taken at the local level which affect fiscal sustainability. The intent of this study is to offer a model that could help policy makers now and in the future to understand the impact of federal interventions on local government emergency management. Additionally, this model can contribute to the broader ongoing scholarly debate about the use of federal funding for local programming, and more specifically to the discussion of capabilities for managing emergencies. This chapter will address the following elements (a) study timeline and approach, (b) research sample, (c) data-collection and analysis, (f) ethical considerations, (g) issues of trustworthiness, and (h) delimitations and limitations of this study.

Study Timeline and Approach

This study was conducted using a mixed methods approach. There are benefits to pairing methods such as document analysis and survey research for the purposes of triangulation. Chiefly that “When focused on the same issue, qualitative and quantitative studies can triangulate- that is, use different methods to assess the robustness or stability

of findings,” (Firestone, 1987, p. 20). Further, this pairing can offer research that is pragmatic in its approach. “Mixed methods research offers great promise for practicing researchers who would like to see methodologists describe and develop techniques that are closer to what researchers actually use in practice,” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15).

To achieve this, directed qualitative content analysis of key documents provided a foundational understanding of the written intent of federal policy for this study. Content analysis can be defined as “...a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns,” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). A directed approach permitted the use of deductive codes based on a typology of federalism. The intention of the content analysis was to provide a backdrop for analysis of perspectives through the lens of federalism- a system in existence in the U.S. since its inception- but a system that is subject to implementation that might not adhere to foundational documents. This study offered the opportunity to understand, from a cross-section of jurisdictions in this country, sentiments on federal policy. A quantitative analysis of survey data provided an assessment of attitudes and actions about those same policies and an understanding of how federal policy constructs their budgetary planning realities. However, any responses to open ended questions in the survey were analyzed using qualitative methods. As Feilzer (2010) points out, survey instruments while generally used to gather data for quantitative analysis, can offer unexpected qualitative analysis of supplemental comments made within the space offered. Thus, the intention of this research design was to examine information with a factual basis (eg. existing policy, exchange of funds) as well as attitudes about policies and process which impact those same funds.

Research Participants

Emergency managers not only work during disasters, but conduct business during normal operations in an intergovernmental system that is increasingly complex and competitive. McGuire and Silvia (2010) write that “Emergency managers face extraordinary challenges, both in number and severity” (p. 279). These attributes alone make emergency managers a compelling population to study. Emergency managers exist at all levels of government and in the non-profit and private sectors, therefore the selection of a sample for this study had to be sufficiently narrow to permit a focus on the federal-local relationship. Owing to the pragmatic nature of this study, it was necessary to select from this population a sample of emergency managers who were closely involved with the many policies and programs that originate at the federal level and affect the local level. The selected sample for this purpose was 3,068 county emergency managers. Comfort (1985), Waugh (1994), and Choi (2004) agree that county government is best able to respond during disaster and manage program and policy requirements. This compliment of 3,068 emergency managers represents each of the 3,068 Counties in the United States and therefore is the universe of county emergency managers. For the purposes of this study and according to the National Association of Counties, Alaska’s boroughs and Louisiana’s’ parishes area considered among the 3,068 (National Association of Counties, 2014a).

Data Collection and Analysis

The information required to complete this study was gained through a mixed methods approach employing content analysis and a survey. Table 1 provides an overview of data used to complete the study. What follows in this section is a description of methods of data collection and analysis organized by research question.

Table 1 Data Collection and Analysis

Question	Information Needed	Location	Method of Analysis
What is the predominant nature of federalism expressed in the guiding documents?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent is coercive, opportunistic, and cooperative federalism present in the documents? What themes arise? 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Stafford Act EMPGFOA PA Guidebook 	Directed Content Analysis
RQ1: How do emergency managers perceive the ability of their jurisdictions to contribute funding towards the local emergency management function?	What are the perceived effects of the funding programs as they relate to local ability to pay?	Survey of county emergency managers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Qualitative analysis of open ended questions Quantitative analysis of survey responses
RQ2: What are the attitudes of the local emergency manager towards using federal financial assistance for emergency management?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> What are their attitudes about the use of federal funds? What are their attitudes about the local and federal roles? 	Survey of county emergency managers	Quantitative analysis of survey responses
RQ3: What actions has the local emergency manager taken to plan for and locally sustain an emergency management program independent of federal funding?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> What decisions are made about requesting local own source funds? What mechanisms are employed to demonstrate need? What emphasis is put on local financial sustainability during budget requests? 	Survey of county emergency managers	Quantitative analysis of survey responses

Establishment of theoretical underpinning for this study; what is the predominant nature of federalism expressed in guiding documents?

Directed content analysis of the Stafford Act, EMPG guidelines, and Public Assistance guidelines was conducted to provide an understanding of the written intent of

key documents guiding federal financial assistance to local emergency management. As Hsieh and Shannon (2005) point out, “the goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory.” Three theories of federalism- coercive, cooperative, and opportunistic- emerged in the literature and are marked by their presence along a relationship spectrum. Elements of control are present in each and provided the basis for codes necessary to carry out directed content analysis.

Table 2 provides these codes.

Table 2 Federalism Codes

Type of Federalism	Code
Coercive	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased opportunities to service constituents directly and to intervene in state and local matters (Kincaid, 1990, p. 149) 2. Reductions in federal aid to state and local governments (p. 148) 3. Increased preemptions of state and local authority (p. 148)
Opportunistic	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Directing of federal grants away from their intended purposes to serve strictly parochial ends (Conlan, 2006, p. 667) 2. Federal constraints are greatly relaxed (p. 667) 3. Places individual political and jurisdictional interests above shared goals (p. 667)
Cooperative	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Balance between national minimum and experimentation within states (Kincaid, 1990, p. 151) 2. Major increases in federal aid to states and localities made possible by economic growth and federal receipts that delivered abundant resources (p. 140) 3. Centered on equity goals (p. 140)

RQ1: How do emergency managers perceive the ability of their jurisdictions to contribute funding towards the local emergency management function?

RQ2: What are the attitudes of the local emergency manager towards using federal financial assistance for emergency management?

RQ3: What actions has the local emergency manager taken to plan for and locally sustain an emergency management program independent of federal funding?

This section of the study was carried out using a quantitative, natural research design. RQ 1, RQ 2, and RQ3 were examined first using quantitative analysis of a three part cross-sectional survey which focused on the attitudes and actions of county emergency managers. Chi-square was used to identify statistically significant relationships between variables. In order to address the research questions an electronic survey was sent to 2,339 county emergency managers during the Fall of 2013. Part one of this survey examined the attitudes of the study population regarding federal financial assistance. Part two of the survey examined the actions of County Emergency Managers which have an impact on the level of fiscal independence of the emergency management program. Programs of focus were the Emergency Management Performance Grant as well as the FEMA Public Assistance program for disaster related costs. Lastly part three of this survey captured relevant demographic information. Questions included in the survey used a combination of Likert-scale and open ended questions. As a follow up to this quantitative analysis, open ended questions were analyzed using qualitative analysis.

Ethical Considerations

As this study involves human subjects, this study diligently adhered to the IRB process. Approval was granted in order to carry out data collection among the county

emergency managers. The identity of participants for this study was removed from survey responses to ensure anonymity.

Issues of Trustworthiness

Credibility

It is always critical to address any effects on credibility that might emerge from a research study. Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) establish several forms of credibility a study can employ. First, with respect to research bias it is unavoidable that in order to arrive at the research questions experience and opinions assist in the formulation of topics. Admittedly, concern about the federal-local relationship as it pertains to funding has influenced this study, and thus this study provides the opportunity to examine several aspects of this relationship. Second, involvement in the practice of emergency management has led to a strong understanding of the interactions that are studied here. Credibility can be gained in this design by relaying an understanding of common and best practices along the way, and also by relaying all biases.

Separate from my background are a number of other matters which affected credibility including triangulation and presentation of discrepant findings. This study sought to triangulate through a mixed methods, natural research design. Data collected examined attitudes and actions through a survey and document review in order to examine evidence using multiple methods. The intent of this triangulation is to arrive at conclusions that are not based on one method or one survey question but are produced by a demanding, iterative process.

Dependability

Two steps were taken to ensure dependability of this study. As suggested in Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) the dependability of this study hinges on a detailed explanation of the data collection and analysis phases as well as consistency in coding to reduce “the potential bias of a single researcher collecting and analyzing the data.” Therefore this study methodically produced accounts of the survey and document reviews and ensured that data collected are available for review.

Chapter 4

FINDINGS

The purpose of this study is to better understand the attitudes of the local emergency manager about federal financial assistance programs, and further, to understand actions they take at the local level which affects fiscal sustainability. A better understanding of how the centralization of responsibility at the federal level has affected local emergency management is critical to an examination of the federal-local relationship in the context of a federal system. In order to fully explore this issue three research questions were employed to focus this study. They were:

RQ 1 How do emergency managers perceive the ability of their jurisdictions to contribute funding towards the local emergency management function?

RQ 2 What are the attitudes of the local emergency manager towards using federal financial assistance for emergency management?

RQ 3 What actions have the local emergency manager taken to plan for and locally sustain an emergency management program independent of federal funding?

To gain information from county emergency managers, a three part cross sectional survey was distributed using Qualtrics Survey Software. The survey was open from November 14th, 2013 until December 31st, 2013 allowing one and a half months for survey completion. The selected sample for this study was county emergency managers, representing the 3,068 counties in the United States. Of the universe of 3,068 county emergency managers, there were 2,339 publicly available e-mail addresses and each was contacted by e-mail for the purposes of this study. While there were 694 total responses,

only 598 answered key questions which registered a valid response. Therefore there was a 25% response rate.

Chapter 4 is organized in three sections. The first section presents the document analysis and completed conceptual framework. Secondly, this chapter offers demographic information about the respondents, the organization for which they work and their geographical location. Finally, Section III presents results of statistical tests.

Document Analysis Findings

The following section presents an analysis of three key documents which guide governmental relationships as they pertain to disaster financial assistance. Specifically, a review was conducted of the Stafford Act, the 2013 Emergency Management Performance Grant guidelines and the Public Assistance Guidebook. The purpose of this document analysis was to identify major themes of federalism, based on a typology gleaned from the literature review. The findings of this review for the program guidance documents were plotted along the continua in the conceptual framework to represent the ways in which responsibility for payment and control was presented in the documents. Figure 2 provides the conceptual framework with document analysis findings. Further, as this same typology assisted in the production of the codes against which the survey responses were analyzed, this exercise offers an understanding of what the guiding documents tell us about federal relationships in emergency management. This understanding provided a point of comparison against the attitudes and actions of emergency managers, and how they relate to the types of federalism. The following analysis is organized by document, with sections under each document description for coercive, cooperative, or opportunistic federalism where relevant. At the conclusion of

this section is an analysis of the major themes present in each document which are relevant to this study.




Figure 2 Conceptual Framework with Document Analysis

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

The Stafford Act, signed into law in 1988, provides the framework and “statutory authority for most Federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FEMA programs” (FEMA 2013). Its purpose is to describe the mechanisms for federal disaster assistance to state and local entities as well as the process for disaster declarations. Most important to this study, it is the legislation which authorizes both the Emergency Management Performance Grant as well as the Public Assistance program. This document was selected for analysis based on

its status as the foundational doctrine of the current model of disaster assistance, as well as its relationship with the two financial assistance programs in this study.

The language regarding roles and responsibilities, primarily where there is a financial exchange discussed does not adhere to any one type of federalism. Some of the stipulations of assistance are highly indicative of coercive federalism. Specifically, within the Stafford Act there is a prevalent usurpation of state and local authorities. This seizing of control is carried out with a stick and carrot approach; financial aid hinges on the adoption and implementation of federally-dictated requirements. In general, the requirements placed on state, local and tribal governments are intended to prevent future damage and thus are purported to represent an attempt at cost savings to all levels of government. Examples of such standards include the following:

- The state must have an approved Hazard Mitigation Plan to garner the full 20% of total disaster costs as a return for Mitigation Projects. As a result of this increased funding, local and tribal governments must also produce a plan.
- Applicants for property acquisition and relocation assistance (primarily local government) must be subject to federal open space, recreation, or wetlands requirements for remaining land.
- Federal funding of projects under major disaster and emergency assistance programs entails an adherence to National Environmental Protection and National Historic Preservation Acts.

Still, there are other coercive attempts to enforce federal standards at the local level. The presence of preemption of state and local authorities exists also with respect to logistics, and is not necessarily tied to a funding source. The Stafford Act states that the provision of federal assistance at a time when the federal government believes this assistance is “necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage” (p. 26), can be sent by the President without a request from the state.

Furthermore, the provision of assistance, while it should be coordinated with the state, “shall not, in notifying and coordinating with a State under subparagraph (A), delay or

impede the rapid deployment, use, and distribution of critical resources to victims of a major disaster” (p. 27). Thus, no request for or acknowledgement of incoming resources is required by the state. While such assistance has historically been of a benevolent nature, it is regardless an excellent example of the preemption of state and local authority.

Additionally, there is a presence of opportunism in the Stafford Act that is primarily evident when discussing the exchange of funds between the levels of government. Examples include:

- Under the new “alternative procedures” for the Public Assistance program state, local, and tribal entities can use any excess funds remaining after projects for other activities deemed “cost effective” or for activities that will “improve future Public Assistance operations”.
- When state and local governments do not find it best to repair, restore, reconstruct, or replace a public facility, they can be reimbursed “90 percent of the Federal Share of the Federal estimate” of the costs that would have been incurred by “repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing” the facility. These funds can be used to repair other facilities, build new ones, or other mitigation measures deemed necessary by the state, local, or tribal governments.

These caveats leave room for state and local discretion for use of funds given to them by the federal government and present a relaxed stance on their use. Certainly, they represent a difference in tone and potentially a “carrot” to the more coercive “sticks” in the Stafford Act.

As one of the Stafford Act’s purposes is to assist state, local, and tribal entities, it was assumed that many elements of cooperation would be evident. However, adherence to the codes of federalism as defined for the purpose of this study bore a much different result. Several examples illuminate this outcome. The Act does not claim to seek to restore a jurisdiction to some baseline minimum capability level or seek equity- two of the elements of cooperative federalism. Therefore, there is no finding in this document that fits either definition. Further, the definition of cooperative federalism also includes that increases in federal aid are generally due to national economic growth. As federal

disaster assistance as authorized under the Stafford act has increased even in times of economic down turn, it is also not included as an instance of cooperative federalism because it does not fit the definition as expressed in the codes of federalism.

Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG)

The EMPG Funding Opportunity Announcement (EMPGFOA) provides a description of the purpose of the grant, as well as the process for obtaining funding and meeting federal benchmarks as a recipient. It outlines the federal government's intention to align EMPG with the broader National Preparedness System as well as the overarching Whole Community approach forwarded by FEMA. Finally, it provides 5 objectives and measures against which grant recipients should judge and report their performance. The EMPGFOA is the key document providing information on the governmental roles and responsibilities as it pertains to this particular grant program.

Several requirements placed upon grant recipients demonstrate the authority of the grantee to dictate how funds are spent. Firstly, the activities undertaken with EMPG funds must be approved by the federal government, and are intended to meet the central purpose of implementing a national system of emergency management. The document states that "EMPG Program grantees may only fund activities and projects that were included in the FY 2013 Work Plan that was submitted to and approved by a FEMA Regional Program Manager," (EMPGFOA 2013). Further, there are examples of preemptions beyond that of how the funds are used:

- Jurisdictions are required to adopt the National Incident Management System to promote "Utilization of the standardized resource management concepts such as typing, inventorying, and cataloging promote a strong national mutual aid capability needed to support delivery of core capabilities," (EMPGFOA 2013).
- Jurisdictions performing projects with potential environmental impact must undergo an Environmental Planning and Historic Review. This process includes documentation regarding the project submitted to FEMA and other federal

regulatory agencies to ensure that all federal laws are followed which dictate environmental and historic preservation.

- Grantees (states) must have an updated Emergency Operations Plan as well as a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment that meet federal compliance measures.

While the aforementioned grant guidelines are coercive in that they do institute a federal mandate to follow certain rules, throughout the document there are elements of the EMPGFOA which exhibit cooperative federalism. The overarching goal, to implement a strong national system of emergency management is, by its very nature, cooperative as it indicates that there should be some parity in preparedness across locales. It is made clear that this grant is distributed with equity in mind as it institutes a system of shared use for equipment that is purchased. Not only does the grant support programs which have a regional goal, but assets acquired with EMPG funds must be able to be deployed to other locations as well. This message is reinforced throughout:

- “National preparedness is a shared responsibility of the whole community. Every member must be given the opportunity to contribute.”
- “Each program reflects the Department’s intent to build and sustain an integrated network of national capabilities across all levels of government and the whole community.”

Thus EMPG, like its parent document the Stafford Act, has elements of coercion and cooperation. However, this analysis found no evidence of opportunism or leverage for local governments to use funds outside of the intent expressed by the federal government. However, the scope of use is fairly broad. Lastly, it is critical that this grant program entails a 50/50 match. The local government, or in some cases the state, must meet the federal government half way in funding particular programs and therefore requires an increased local financial commitment.

Public Assistance Guidebook

FEMA'S Public Assistance Program, as authorized by the Stafford Act, undertakes the objective of providing financial assistance to disaster stricken states, communities, and certain nonprofit organizations (Public Assistance Guidebook, 2013). The Guidebook provides a road map for the Public Assistance application process as well as considerations for use of funds.

The Guidebook shares the language of the whole community, indicating a desire to cooperate but does not profess to restore a national standard or minimum capability level. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the evidence of cooperation does not meet the definition of cooperative federalism employed for this study, on pg. 44. However, elements of coercion are evident. In carrying out the Public Assistance program the federal government works very closely with the local government. This willingness to service the local communities directly is a breach of traditional federal relationships and is highly indicative of coercive measures. However, it is not immediately apparent what FEMA is attempting to coerce through the various one on one meetings with local applicants.

As Public Assistance is highly geared towards large construction and renovation projects there are a number of regulatory considerations. Per the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), FEMA must use a pre-prescribed process to ensure that both decision makers and the public are aware of any environmental impacts. Further projects are subject to additional regulatory requirements including:

- Endangered Species Act
- National Historic Preservation Act
- Clean Water Act
- Clean Air Act,
- Executive Orders on floodplains, wetlands or environmental justice
- Clean Air Act
- Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Most evidence of opportunistic federalism identified in the PA program was already captured under the earlier section on the Stafford Act. In general, a relaxing of the standards for how funds can be used represents best the opportunism evident in PA. One additional specific example exists that was both located in the document and a matter of personal experience. Federal project workers sent into communities have been, in my experience, more than willing to help craft project worksheets and ensure that the locals are reimbursed for 75% of all eligible costs. Indeed in my experience they were extremely helpful in creating language to ensure every cent possible was reimbursed and were not there to represent a hardline federal fiscal stance.

Themes Identified During the Document Analysis

Responsibility for Emergency Management

In each document, the theme of shared responsibility for emergency management arises. Both the EMPGFOA and the PA Guidebook stress FEMA's recent "whole community" approach. Whole Community

“...reinforces the fact that FEMA is only one part of our nation's emergency management team; that we must leverage all of the resources of our collective team in preparing for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from and mitigating against all hazards; and that collectively we must meet the needs of the entire community in each of these areas” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014)

The earliest document, the Stafford Act, does not include this specific language but does discuss that the federal government is only one actor among many and therefore plays an assistive role. It follows that, generally, a state or local jurisdiction must meet a certain financial threshold before that assistance can be enacted. However, emergency assistance is often still available without any threshold. At a rate of 75% or more, which

then positions the federal government as primarily responsible for disaster costs, the process of reimbursement is not assistive. Instead it shifts responsibility in its entirety to taxpayers, most of whom do not live in the affected area and many of whom reside in an area of lower risk.

While responsibility is a concept that pervades all three documents it is not addressed broadly across the levels of government and is not tied to any one type of federalism discussed in this study. The inner workings of roles and responsibilities in emergency management are subject to caveats and loopholes and carrots and sticks and do not draw upon any one definition.

Economic Growth and Cooperation

While in each document there is cooperative language, one caveat must be acknowledged regarding the way cooperative federalism is defined. Kincaid (1990) posited that cooperative federalism can occur when “economic growth and federal receipts that delivered abundant resources” permit increased levels of assistance (p. 140). However, EMPG and PA are authorized without consideration for whether or not there has been economic growth. In fact, EMPG continued to grow during the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis until the present. Therefore, assistance given regardless of economic health, while it is cooperative on its face, does not fit within the definitions employed by this study. While this study does not attempt to define what exactly this phenomenon is, it most closely aligns with opportunism given that status quo disaster aid spending during economic downturn co-opts the definition as described by Kincaid.

Regulation

Throughout the documents it becomes evident that disaster assistance comes with mandates to adhere to certain regulatory matters. These mandates are listed as coercive

measures for two reasons. Firstly, the usurping of local preferences fits fully the definition of coercive federalism as described by Kincaid. Secondly, while one might argue that in order to take federal dollars it is reasonable to expect to adhere to federal standards, this disregards the notion that the origin of the dollars is at the local or household level.

Survey Findings

Demographic Information of Respondents

Demographic questions were asked of survey participants in order to examine their responses and articulate any significant differences. Furthermore, demographic information was used to understand the extent to which the respondents were representative of the larger group of emergency managers, public safety managers in general and of the U.S. workforce. Questions regarding the variables of age, gender, and education focused on the individual. Additionally the survey asked about the organizational home of the emergency management agency as well as the county and state in which it is located.

Age

The question regarding respondent age was answered by 494 emergency managers. Their age ranged from 25 – 76 years old, with a median age of 53 and standard deviation of 10.28. The age ranges of 40 -49, 50 – 59 and 60 – 69 represent a clear majority, or 84.4% of the group. Conversely the other ages listed, 20 – 29 and 70-79 represent only 6% of the total respondent group. For the purposes of this study, only age groups comprising at least 5% of total respondents were included in the analysis to ensure that the intended statistical tests could be used.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics offers two occupational listings that can be employed in a comparison. As seen in Table 3 service occupations had a median age of 40.9 while the category of management, professional and related occupations listed a median of 44.9. In each case the responding emergency managers are significantly older than these three groups (United States Department of Labor, 2014).

Table 3 Median Age Comparison

Population/Sample	Median Age
Management, professional, and related occupations	45
Public safety directors (McCauley)	49
Emergency managers	53

Gender

There were 514 survey participants that reported their gender. Of these, 80% of respondents were male, 20% were female, and <1% refused to answer. Overwhelmingly, the respondents in this study were male. It is important to know if this representation of gender is comparable to other studies. Indeed, it is nearest to the percentage of females working in the protective services, 21.1%, as demonstrated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. However, it is markedly different from the management, professional and related occupations category which lists that 51.4% are female (United States Department of Labor, 2014).

Other studies may provide samples against which this distribution of gender can be compared. McCauley’s study of public safety directors in Ohio reports that the

population, (n) = 203, was 90% male and 10% female (McCauley, 2011). Table 4 provides a comparison of all listed samples.

Table 4 Female Percentage Comparison

Population	Percentage
Protective service occupations	21
Management, professional and related occupations	51
Public safety directors	10
Emergency Managers	20

Education

High School Diploma is listed by 29% of respondents for highest level of education. Additionally, 71%, of respondents report that they have a college degree. Those who report that they hold an undergraduate degree (in any subject matter) is 42% and 29% have a graduate degree (in any subject matter). It is notable that the percentage of respondents reporting that they have high school diplomas in this study are nearly exactly the same as represented in the 2012 American Community Survey (United States Census Bureau, 2008). However, the responding emergency managers report having undergraduate and graduate degrees more than twice than the average American.

In 2006 the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia and the National Association of Counties conducted a study of county emergency managers which asked about the education level of the Top Emergency Management Administrator. In fact, this study used the Carl Vinson/NACO categorization of education levels in the construction of the survey questionnaire. Therefore, it is easy to

see the differences and similarities. Primarily, the respondents to this 2013 study report more college degrees at 68% in comparison to the NACO study at 57% (Clarke, 2006). Likely due to this increase, there is a corresponding decrease in high school diplomas from the 2006 to the 2013 studies. Table 5 displays the comparison data.

Table 5 Comparison of Education Levels with the NACO/Carl Vinson Institute Study

Level of Education	2013 Study (n) = 518 Percentage	2006 NACO Study (n) = 487 Percentage	American Community Survey 2012 Percentage
High School Diploma	28	43	28
Undergrad Degree in an EM Related Field	12	36	18
Undergrad Degree in Unrelated Field	28	7	
Graduate Degree in an EM Related Field	9	12	28
Graduate Degree in an Unrelated Field	19	2	
Refuse	4	<1	NA

Organizational Home

Respondents were asked about the organizational home of the emergency management function. In a majority of cases, or 59% of responding county emergency managers work in organizations that are stand alone. To the extent possible, the responses were also compared to the 2006 NACO/Carl Vinson Institute Study in Table 6. While responses that the function of emergency management is housed within a fire service organization is close at 6% and 7%, there appear to be a higher percentage of respondents to this study that work in a standalone, or law enforcement organization.

Table 6 Organizational Home of the EMA

Organization Type	Percentage	2006 NACO Study
Stand Alone	59	40
Other	13	
Emergency Svcs. Non Fire Service	11	
Law Enforcement	11	7
Fire Service	6	7
	100.0	54

Form of County Government

Respondents were asked to indicate their form of county government. The answers offered in the survey were selected from the National Association of Counties' listing of the basic forms of county government (National Association of Counties, 2014a). Most notably, 68% of respondents answered that they work within a commission-based structure.

Location of Organization

Valid survey responses were received from 598 counties in 46 states. Only Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island had no respondents. Both Connecticut and Rhode Island have regional boundaries and are designated as counties but do not have functioning county governments (National Association of Counties, 2014b). Neither New Hampshire nor Vermont had county emergency managers listed.

FEMA has divided the country into ten regions for the purpose of planning and providing regionalized support. While each of those ten regions is represented, Region I contains Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont, which were not respondents to this study. Of Region I, only counties in Maine and Massachusetts have responded, (n) = 7. The majority of responses, 79%, came from counties in the south

(Regions IV and VI) and from the mid-west (Regions V, VII, and VIII). For the purposes of this study, regions with less than 5% of the total responses will not be included to ensure consistency and permit statistical tests. These are Regions I, II, and IX.

Results of Statistical Tests

Under each subsection, statistically significant variable relationships will be discussed. Headings for this section will be the major themes of dependence and federalism on which questions were based. For this study, relationships were examined using chi-square as a measure of variable independence with an alpha level of .05. The chi-square test results were included where less than 20% of cells had an expected count less than 5 and where the minimum expected count was more than 1. The questions asked in Likert scale format offered five possible answers including *strongly disagree*, *disagree*, *neither agree nor disagree*, *agree*, and *strongly agree*. Responses were re-coded in SPSS to combine *strongly disagree and disagree*, as well as *agree and strongly agree*.

Research Question One

Dependence

Research Question One examined how the respondent understood their jurisdiction to be positioned financially to contribute to the local emergency management function. Such a contribution occurs within the context of decision making about other available funding sources as well, specifically federal grants. Thus, RQ1 was explored through a series of survey questions which asked the respondent about the effects of the Emergency Management Performance Grant program and the Public Assistance program as well as the level of dependence and autonomy from the federal government. These

concepts are explored, along with statistical test information, in Table 7. A majority of respondents, 56%, report that their local emergency management organizations are dependent upon the EMPG program to sustain operations. Therefore, in this case, respondents perceive the ability of their jurisdiction to contribute funding that would make up for the loss of EMPG as low. However, only 17% of respondents suggested that their jurisdictions were dependent upon the Public Assistance program in the post-disaster environment. The most prominent response, 43%, was that the Public Assistance program was supportive of local recovery efforts but not wholly responsible. In the case of the PA program, therefore, respondents perceive the ability of their jurisdiction to contribute funding for disaster response and recovery as high.

Table 7 Statistically Significant Relationships Using the Chi-Square Test for Independence (RQ1)

Theme	Research Question	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	P-Value
Dependence/ Autonomy	RQ 1	Geographic Location	Reliance on EMPG	23.548**
			Federal government should provide more funding for after disasters	24.217**
			Federal government should provide less funding after disasters	21.603**
		Form of County Government	Dependence and Autonomy Statement Selections	9.811

*Alpha level at $p < .05$

**Test produced a low cell count in excess of 20%

Respondents were also asked about the relative dependence or autonomy of their local jurisdiction emergency management function from the federal government.

Responses included that 46% of surveyed county emergency managers selected all statements that indicated dependence. Only 4% selected all statements which indicate autonomy. Elements of dependence included reliance upon external funding for personnel, equipment, and training. Elements of autonomy included the ability to independently meet the needs of citizens and sufficient autonomy from the federal government as to act in the best interest of the organization and its citizens. It appears in this case that the responses support the perception that the ability of the local government to contribute funding, in general, is low. Further, the understanding of the responding local emergency managers is that there is not sufficient autonomy in order to make the optimal decisions for the local level.

The concept of dependence was also explored by asking direct questions about reliance using a Likert scale. Respondents were asked if they relied heavily on either the EMPG or PA program. Respondents report that 76% agree or strongly agree that their organization relies heavily on EMPG funding. Similarly, 76% report heavy reliance by their jurisdiction on the PA program, should a disaster occur. Results demonstrate that the understanding of the jurisdictions ability to pay is low, and that there is significant dependence on federal sources of funding. To gain further insight on the perception of jurisdictional needs for funding, respondents were asked if the federal government should pay local jurisdictions more or less money for local EM programming and disaster response and recovery. Overwhelmingly, respondents agree that more funding is needed in both areas, and disagree that less funding should be given.

Statistically Significant Relationships

Dependence/Autonomy Statements

While 50% of respondents selected a combination of dependence and autonomy characteristics, 46% selected a combination which included all dependence characteristics. Still, within these responses is considerable variation, and a significant relationship exists between this selection and form of county government, $X^2(4, N = 393) = 9.811, p = .044$. Most notably, fewer respondents from a commission based government selected a combination of variables that included all dependence statements. In comparison to the other two forms of government these respondents were much less likely to select these dependence statements.

Geographic Location

The variable of geographic location has statistically significant relationships with the variables of reliance on EMPG, federal government should provide more funding after disasters, and federal government should provide less funding after disasters. However, in each case the expected low cell count breached 20% of total cells and therefore will not be included in this analysis.

Research Question Two

Cooperative Federalism

Research Question Two was examined through a series of questions that focused on either attitude towards internal or external aspects of the use of federal funds. Questions were designed based on the typology of federalism that was developed for this study. One set of questions was designed based on cooperative federalism and explored the use of federal funds to establish a baseline capability level as well as to work towards

equity among jurisdictions. Table 8 demonstrates the concepts that were the subject of inquiry and also provides statistical significance. County emergency managers were queried for their opinion of the ability of EMPG and PA to encourage jurisdictions to meet a minimum standard or capability level. According to Kincaid's (1990) theory of cooperative federalism, these programs would indeed encourage some baseline capability level for all local jurisdictions. Regarding EMPG, it is likely that these baselines or minimums would exist in broad categories such as planning, training, exercise, and staffing. Conversely the use of the Public Administration program would, under the assumptions of the theory of cooperative federalism, assist jurisdictions to restore to some minimum standard of capability level that is lost during disaster. When asked about establishing a baseline capability level, 83% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that EMPG encourages jurisdictions to establish a minimum standard of capability, and 88% agree that restoration of those capabilities after a disaster are encouraged by the PA program.

Table 8 Statistically Significant Relationships Using the Chi-Square Test for Independence (RQ2)*

Theme	Research Question	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	P-Value
Cooperative Federalism	RQ2	Age	PA has been positively affected by changing priorities at the national level	14.166
		Gender	PA involves an equitable process	6.483
		Geographic Location	EMPG provides funding that helps toward equity	27.186
		Organizational Home of the EMA	PA has been positively affected by changing priorities at the national level	14.702
Coercive Federalism	RQ2	Age	EMPG requires a close local-federal relationship	15.501
		Gender	PA has been negatively affected by changing priorities at the national level	9.241
		Geographic Location	PA enforces federal requirements for projects instead of local requirements	22.663
		Level of Education	PA enforces federal requirements for projects instead of local requirements	10.284
		Organizational Home	EMPG requires organizations work closely with the federal government	12.727
Opportunistic Federalism	RQ2	Organizational Home of the EMA	Federal approach to EMPG is relaxed	15.168

*Alpha level at $p < .05$

Questions designed based on cooperative federalism also inquired about the county emergency manager's opinion of the ability of EMPG and PA to work towards equity across all local jurisdictions. As cooperative federalism makes equity a primary

goal, it follows that both EMPG and PA would work towards a national system of emergency management or specifically, as in the case of PA, disaster recovery that seeks to equalize capability levels. In this case 58% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that EMPG works towards equity, and only 49% believe that the PA program employs an equitable process. Therefore attitudes towards use of these two types of funding are not consistent, despite the premise of cooperative federalism on which the questions were all based. Instead it appears that the attitude of the emergency manager towards the ability of federal funding to establish minimum standards is consistent with cooperative federalism. Additionally, a majority of respondents report that EMPG works towards equity and just under half agree that PA adheres to an equitable process. Therefore the attitudes of emergency managers appear consistent with the principles of cooperative federalism.

External influence of the funding programs was also explored through cooperative federalism by asking about the impact of national priority setting. When asked if EMPG has been positively affected by changes in national priority setting, the most prominent response was 41% of respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed. When asked the same question about PA, 52% reported that neither agree nor disagree. These two questions are therefore inconclusive regarding cooperative federalism.

Statistically Significant Relationships

Age

A statistically significant relationship exists between age of respondent and belief that the PA program has been positively affected by changing priorities at the national level, $X^2(6, N = 385) = 14.166, p = .028$. Over half of respondents report neither

agreeing nor disagreeing with this statement- an indication that it may not be a topic considered important or influential by emergency manager in general.

Gender

A statistically significant relationship exists between the belief that the funding processes for the PA program are equitable and the variable of gender. While males and females indicate respectively that 50% and 48% agree or strongly agree with this statement, differences exist in the other categories of response. Men are more likely to strongly disagree or disagree with this statement while women are significantly more likely to be neutral.

Geographic Location

There is a statistically significant relationship between the belief that EMPG encourages equity across jurisdictions and the variable of Geographic Location, $X^2(12, N = 444) = 27.186, p = .007$. While opinions vary somewhat between FEMA Regions, every region except for Region V reflects at least 50% of respondents that strongly agree or agree with the statement and the regions therefore trend towards agreement. The percentages of agreement range from 48% in Region V to 70% in Region IV. It is not immediately evident why Region V is an outlier, nor do other variable relationships reflect this difference.

Organizational Home of the EMA

There is a significant relationship between the belief that the PA program has been positively affected by changing national priorities and the variable of organizational home of the EMA, $X^2(6, N = 371) = 14.702, p = .023$. The trend in opinion appears to be that in each category other than non-fire service emergency services, respondents are

most likely to neither agree nor disagree. Those agencies housed in a non-fire service Emergency Services agency are significantly more likely to disagree that there have positive effects of changing national priorities. They are also much less likely to agree.

The chi-square statistical test also reported a significant relationship between organizational home and attitude towards the ability of PA to encourage the restoration of basic capabilities lost during disaster. However, the expected low cell count was above 20%.

Coercive Federalism

RQ2 was also examined through a series of survey questions that attempted to learn if the local emergency manager saw attributes of coercive federalism in the funding relationships. Areas of examination spanned not only the direct local-federal relationship but also the use of federal standards in implementation of the EMPG and PA programs. Additionally, the effects of national priority setting were examined using concepts of coercive federalism.

Questions, designed based on coercive federalism, inquired about how closely the local organizations work with the federal government on both focus programs. As coercive federalism assumes that the federal government will intervene in state and local matters, it follows that these funding opportunities would present a space where the federal government could indeed breach the “state as middle man” concept of federalism. Questions sought to understand, from the perspective of the county emergency manager, how closely the local-federal relationship became while working in these programs. Respondents were asked about the working relationship with the federal government during implementation of EMPG. There is no overwhelming agreement on this question, with only 39% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing, and 30% strongly agreeing or

agreeing. Conversely, when asked about the relationship during the PA program, 74% of respondents agree that there is a close local-federal relationship.

Questions also used the model of coercive federalism to understand how national standard and priority setting influences the EMPG and PA programs from the perspective of the emergency manager. In general, policies and programs can be expected to usurp local authority under a coercive model which was anticipated to have a negative influence in the eyes of local government. Regarding EMPG, respondents were asked if local standards were replaced with federal standards, to which 63% reported that they strongly agree or agree. When asked the same question about the PA program, 58% strongly agree or agree. Finally, the survey asked respondents if they believed that changing national priorities had a negative effect on EMPG or PA. Neither set of answers resulted in overwhelming agreement, with 45% strongly agreeing or agreeing that EMPG has been negatively affected and only 39% agreeing that PA was negatively affected.

There is strong evidence of coercive federalism in several specific areas. It appears that PA requires a close working relationship between the local and federal governments, but this is not the attitude about EMPG. Additionally, respondents report that federal standards are enforced in the EMPG and PA programs which are also characteristic of coercive federalism. Overall, responses reflected an attitude towards the use of these programs that indicates the presence of coercive federalism in certain aspects of funding.

Statistically Significant Relationships

Age

It was determined that a significant relationship between the opinion that EMPG requires that emergency managers work closely with the federal government and the variable of age, $X^2(6, N = 440) = 15.501, p = .017$. Respondents in the age ranges of 30-39 and 40-49 were more likely to strongly disagree or disagree with this statement. Respondents in the range of 50-59 answered almost evenly across the three possible options. Notably, the likelihood of strongly agreeing or agreeing increases as the age of respondent increases.

Gender

A significant relationship exists between the belief that PA has been negatively affected and the variable of gender, to $X^2(2, N = 426) = 9.241, p = .010$. It is most notable that both males and females are primarily neutral on this concept. However, men are much more likely to hold an opinion regarding whether or not this effect has taken place, while women are significantly more likely than men to remain neutral.

Level of Education

A statistically significant relationship, $X^2(4, N = 421) = 10.284, p = .036$, exists between respondent's level of education and their belief that the PA program enforces federal standards rather than local ones. While variation exists across each category of education, there is no clear pattern or obvious significant differences.

Organizational Home

A statistically significant relationship exists between organizational home and the sentiment that EMPG requires local organizations to work closely with the federal

government, $X^2(6, N = 428) = 12.727, p = .048$. While this question is answered with nearly even percentages in each category, variation does exist. Emergency management offices housed within a law enforcement agency are significantly more likely to disagree that a close working relationship exists, and are the least likely to be neutral or agree with this statement.

Opportunistic Federalism

In order to fully examine RQ2, several questions were asked that attempted to understand the presence or absence of the characteristics of opportunistic federalism. According to Conlan (2006), a scholar of opportunistic federalism, agencies will place their own interests above broader national interests when implementing programs such as EMPG and PA. To better understand how this is at play internally, questions were asked about the county emergency manager's opinion on the leniency of the EMPG and PA programs in allowing local goals, as opposed to federal goals, to be set. Just over half of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that EMPG permits local goals to be a priority. However, only 41% agree that this is the case for the PA program.

Opportunistic federalism, according to Conlan (2006), is also present when federal constraint on the use of funding sources becomes relaxed and therefore use at the local level can ignore original programmatic intentions. Instead, the use of funds will serve local goals, as opposed to a more cooperative federalism which has as its goal national priorities. It is recognized that EMPG and PA programs are quite different, so to best understand federal approach to local use, the survey questions were asked differently. Respondents were asked about whether or not the federal government has a relaxed posture towards local use of EMPG funds. Conversely, they were also asked if the federal government permits the reimbursement of funds that already existed in the

local coffers, as opposed to just using PA to assist with unanticipated costs. Fifty three percent of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed that the federal approach to local use of EMPG is relaxed. Conversely, 81% strongly agree or agree that this relaxed approach results in restoration of local budget funding.

Statistically Significant Relationships

Organizational Home

There is also a significant relationship between the beliefs about the approach of the federal government towards the use of EMPG and the variable of organizational home of the emergency management function, $X^2(6, N = 429) = 15.168, p = .019$. Across all forms of organizational home, respondents disagreed that the federal approach towards EMPG was relaxed. Significant variation, however, exists between respondents that agreed that this was the federal approach. Agreement ranged from 14% of respondents from stand-alone organizations to 32% of emergency service (non-fire service) organizations.

Research Question Three

Research Question 3, which explored actions taken to ensure financial sustainability of the EM organization, was examined through a series of statements to which respondents could agree or leave blank. Respondents were given a list of budgetary activities and asked to select each activity that they had undertaken in the last twelve months. Five statements were offered, with the sixth statement offering space for “other”. No groups of answers listed as “other” met or exceeded 5% and therefore were not included. A respondent was considered to have answered the question if he selected

at least one activity. An overview of concepts and statistically significant relationships are provided in Table 9.

Table 9 Statistically Significant Relationships Using the Chi-Square Test for Independence (RQ3)

Theme	Research Question	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	P-Value
Budget Activity	RQ3	Age	Applied for non-federal grants	8.789
		Level of Education	Provided presentations for local elected officials	6.482
		Level of Education	Partnered for resource sharing	9.007

RQ3 is answered by gaining an understanding of what budgetary actions the emergency manager had taken in the previous 12 months. In most cases a significant majority of respondents agreed to these administrative actions however, in two cases there was little agreement. Only 37% applied for non-federal grants, and only 3% turned down federal funds. An analysis of these activities shows that there is not agreement when activities involve a movement away from federal funding.

Statistically Significant Relationships

Age

There is a statistically significant relationship between age and the activity of applying for non-federal grants, $X^2(3, N = 447) = 8.789, p = .032$. As age decreases, so does the likelihood that a respondent selected this activity.

Education

There is a statistically significant relationship between education and the activity of partnering with neighboring jurisdictions for the purposes of resource sharing, $X^2(2, N = 482) = 9.007, p = .011$. While each category of respondent is most likely to select this activity, there is significant variance. Those with an undergraduate degree were more likely than other respondents to agree that they had formed this type of partnership.

There is also a statistically significant relationship between education and the activity of providing presentations to local elected officials, $X^2(2, N = 482) = 6.482, p = .039$. While each category of respondent is most likely to select this activity, it appears that as level of education increases, so does the response that this activity was undertaken.

Chapter 5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The purpose of this study is to better understand the attitudes of local emergency managers about federal financial assistance programs, and further, to understand actions taken at the local level which affect fiscal sustainability. Increasing reliance on the federal government for local emergency management has centralized responsibility for disasters. Therefore it is imperative to understand the perspective of the local emergency manager on this evolution of the federal system. To carry out this research project, a mixed methods study employing content analysis and a survey questionnaire was designed. The results were analyzed using the chi-square test for independence, and variables with statistically significant relationships were discussed in the findings section. Additionally, patterns which emerged during the analysis of survey responses were also evaluated for their implications for local emergency management.

This study is intended to inform the financial assistance arrangements that exist between the federal and local governments and ultimately, to increase understanding of how federal funds affect local programming. Specifically, this study illuminates the attitudes of one set of local government managers about the financial assistance arrangements of the Emergency Management Performance Grant program and the Public Assistance program. This chapter recalls the problem with such arrangements as identified in Chapter One. Increasing federal government investment in local programming has unintended effects on relationships in a federal system. In this case, the

study has identified a chaotic blend of federalism types that morph across program and function. Primarily what has emerged from this study is the realization that local programs are overwhelmingly dependent upon federal funding. What follows is an analysis of the findings of this study which consider the impact of such a relationship.

Expectations

Scholarly research into emergency management and federalism provided a particularly interesting basis for expectations of this study. The literature reviewed poses that decentralized decision-making has been maintained in emergency management, despite the federal government's efforts to centralize. Ultimately, authors noted that the Stafford Act enabled a bottom up local-state-federal continuum of responsibility for disaster (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). Others, such as Scavo, Kearney, and Kilroy (2008) noted the ability of local governments to ward off centralization and effectively maintain the authority of decision making in emergency management. Thus my expectations were that emergency managers would view federal actions as further centralizing, but would still see themselves as retaining autonomy.

Public sector decision making literature established several benchmarks against which it was imperative to compare emergency management financial arrangements. As pointed out by Leuenberger (2009) public managers generally believe in the continued provision of common pool resources and believe they are not appropriate for budget cuts. Included in this definition are public safety resources and by extension, emergency management. A natural outcropping of this understanding is that local governments will financially support public safety functions. However, because this study focused on the emergency manager and not on the perceptions of other budgetary decision makers, it was important to consider specific elements of how he understands the budgetary

process. Regarding the ability of emergency managers to navigate the decision making process, Collins and Peerbolte (2012) found that they exhibited problems with interpretation of information that was available to them including a lack of objectivity and emotional responses that made possible courses of action less clear. With respect to these concepts, this study anticipated varied findings regarding the effects of the federal-local relationship and its implications for budgetary decision making at the local level.

Representativeness

The description of demographic information in chapter four enables a closer examination of the average respondent to this survey. For the purposes of this study it is critical to assess whether or not the sample is representative of the broader population of emergency managers. The average participant is a male of 53 years of age. He has an undergraduate degree in a field not related to emergency management. He works in a standalone emergency management organization not directly housed under law enforcement or the fire service. The average respondent is most likely to work in the South, West or Midwest regions of the U.S.

The age of the average respondent is greater than the average age of public safety respondents to other similar surveys. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the categories of protective service jobs, management, professional and related occupations, and the U.S. workforce in general all depict average respondent ages that are younger than this study. In comparison to the 2006 NACO/Carl Vinson Institute study, the average age of respondents to the 2013 study is also greater. The percentages of male and female respondents are very similar to the category of protective service occupations. However, the ratio is significantly different for the U.S. workforce in general and professional and management related occupations. In both cases there are significantly

more females. In comparison to the U.S. workforce in general, the responding emergency managers report nearly double the undergraduate and graduate degrees.

Addressing Gaps in the Literature

During the literature review several opportunities for contribution were identified. One aim of this study was to address a gap in literature which examined the changes to the federal system in emergency management. Current studies focus on the centralization of the emergency management function after 9/11, but few examine long term consequences of changes to traditional federal relationships. Under this broad topic are three finer points which can be addressed. At the time when these gaps were identified, it was clear that payment for disaster was centralized at the federal government level. What is equally clear now is that the financial support for local EM programming is also highly centralized at the federal level. This study sought to contribute to this topic by addressing attitudes about these financial arrangements in terms of federalism and arrived at the conclusion that emergency managers understand these arrangements in terms of a variety of types of federalism. Secondly, lived experience and the survey and document analyses contributed to a concern that the Public Assistance (PA) program instituted a direct local-federal relationship to carry out funding requests that is a breach of the intent of traditional notions of federalism. In response to a question about this relationship, 74% of respondents agreed that they had to work closely with the federal government after a disaster to implement the PA program. The examination of this relationship specifically is not only assistive to the body of literature but demonstrates that bypassing of the state is occurring. Lastly, a third gap was identified early in this study which would examine the direct transfer of the cost of disaster from disaster prone areas to areas less prone.

This study does not examine this transfer, but recognizes this topic as an important area for future research.

Interpretation of the Findings

Finding #1

The presence of coercive attributes of the local-federal relationship increase and cooperative attributes decrease as the federal proportion of program funding increases.

As shown in Figure 3, emergency managers indicated that the Public Assistance (PA) program has more characteristics associated with coercive federalism than the Emergency Management Performance Grant program (EMPG). Additionally, there are fewer attributes associated with cooperation. This is significant as PA involves a higher percentage of federal government funding than EMPG. Additionally, this is in contrast with the literature on federalism. Increased government spending was most nearly associated with cooperative federalism as was the funding of programs that tackled national level problems (Kincaid, 1990). This study has identified instead, that with respect to the comparison of EMPG and PA, the program on which the federal government spends the most money is seen as coercive. Similarly, PA is subject to relaxed federal standards on local use and is therefore perceived as more opportunistic.




Figure 3 Conceptual Framework- Survey Analysis

Statistically Significant Relationships and the Federalism Typology

In most cases, the statistically significant relationships identified in Chapter 4 have unclear long term effects on the local-federal relationship in emergency management. However, analysis of several others provides distinct considerations for future planning efforts.

Cooperative Federalism

Equity's significant relationship with gender with regard to PA uncovers interesting variation. While males and females are both most likely to agree or strongly agree that PA includes an equitable process for funding, men are significantly more likely to report disagreement than women. Women, on the other hand, more frequently

reported neutrality with the statement. While the small n represented by women and their relatively small percentage of the entire population of emergency managers render this finding inconclusive, there are implications for the future. As reported in Chapter 4, women represent 51.4% of management and professional occupations; a much larger percentage than responded to this survey (United States Department of Labor, 2014). With the increase of degree programs and the professionalization of emergency management as a goal of standard bearer organizations, it stands to reason that females will represent an increasingly larger percentage of the total of emergency managers (International Association of Emergency Managers, 2007). Additional females in the field could signify an increase in emergency managers who are in concurrence- or at least are not opposed to- the method for distribution for programs such as PA.

Coercive Federalism

Bypassing the state government and servicing the local government directly was, for the purposes of this study, one characteristic of coercion. Regarding EMPG, the responses were nearly evenly spread among those who agreed, disagreed, or were neutral. It is important to note however that across the categories 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59, as respondent age increases, so does the sentiment that local personnel must work closely with the federal government as a requirement of EMPG. That age has a significant relationship with a potentially coercive element of the local-federal relationship was not anticipated by the body of emergency management or federalism literature, but does hold key implications for the future. The long term impact of age as it pertains to belief in coercive action, given that the median age of the emergency manager is 53, is that the career field will soon be comprised of younger people. In this study, younger emergency managers were more likely to understand EMPG to be unaffected by changing national

priorities. Also, they were far less likely to believe that EMPG required a close working relationship with the federal government. Future emergency management personnel may therefore be less alarmed by working with the federal government directly and less likely to interpret national level changes as negative. In general, younger personnel may have additional tolerance for coercion by a federal government that is heavily involved in local emergency management programming.

When asked about the negative effect of national priority setting on PA the primary response was neutrality. This is important, as it reflects the sentiment that either the average emergency manager does not feel comfortable identifying those changes, or that it is not recognized as an important matter in carrying out or obtaining PA. The survey reports that females are more likely to be neutral but given the small number of female respondents, this is likely not a significant matter. Again however, as additional females join the ranks of emergency managers it is possible that neutrality regarding the effect of national priority setting might increase.

Opportunistic Federalism

There is disagreement among the respondents that the federal government takes a relaxed approach to EMPG use. Such an approach is customary to opportunistic federalism. A statistically significant relationship exists between organizational home and belief in this relaxed approach. Emergency managers who work for a fire service or non-fire service emergency services organization are also significantly more likely to agree that this approach is relaxed. Given the nature of these organizations to have multiple functional areas (for example fire, emergency management and ems) , it is possible that respondents have been exposed to other grant programs and found those

grants to be more stringently structured than EMPG. These respondents may agree then, that on this program the federal government is relatively relaxed.

Finding #2

Local emergency managers perceive their jurisdictions to be overwhelmingly dependent upon federal funds. As a result of this dependence, local governments do not have sufficient autonomy to exercise sound decision making.

Emergency managers perceive the ability of their jurisdiction to contribute funding towards the local EM function as low as evidenced by the heavy reliance on federal funding programs and little autonomy to make critical decisions. When respondents were asked about the effects of EMPG the theme of dependence emerged as the most prominent response identified. This study did not anticipate that they would report dependence upon EMPG funds to the extent that they did. It was anticipated that answers would primarily be focused on providing resources or expanding the scope of the current local program. Instead, this question about the provision of funds by the federal government was responded to by expressing that many local jurisdictions could not sustain an emergency management function in its absence. If, in fact, a direct or indirect result of the provision of funds from the federal level is to take away the local willingness to contribute there are consequential program effects. When asked about the effects of the PA program, respondents cited that the primary response that the program is helpful, or supportive of local efforts to recover. To some extent these answers represent the very opposite of what might be expected, given difference in cost between running an emergency management program and the immense cost of disaster recovery. Based solely on cost, as this study did not identify any literature which addressed this

difference, it was expected that local emergency managers would overwhelmingly report that their jurisdictions could not recover without PA.

In chapter two, literature on the ability of federal policy to act as incentive was briefly examined. In this case, and as it applies to this particular research question, EMPG should incentivize local capability building. Given that EMPG requires a 50/50 match from the state or local level, it could be said that EMPG acts to incentivize a local financial commitment to emergency management. However, this does not answer the question about contributing to the sustainment of emergency management in lieu of EMPG. Given the multitude of answers which indicated that EM would cease to exist without it, or some critical aspect of the program would no longer be carried out, it is evident that Lovell's (1981) concerns about dependence resultant of federal assistance may be applicable here.

The nature of dependence on grant funds to support a local program may stem from the perception that local budget decision makers are unable or unwilling to support it with more local funds than are necessary to match EMPG. In between disasters it may be difficult to find support for emergency management, which may seem like an extraneous peacetime expense to budget decision makers. Conversely, when disaster strikes local response and recovery often leave decision makers with no choice but to expend funds. Dependence emerges in the analysis of EMPG as an expression of concern that the emergency management function could easily go away, whereas disasters will strike regardless of the presence of an emergency management program and are likely to overwhelm local budgets. There is virtually no reason to predict that PA funds will go away anytime soon, given the consistent increase in declared disasters and amounts across the decades.

Local emergency managers' responses also reflect the perception of overwhelming dependence upon the federal government for equipment, personnel, and training. More concerning even, they do not believe that emergency management has sufficient autonomy from the federal government in order to act in its own best interest or the best interest of local residents. Lovell's (1981) theory of local government dependence was the framework for constructing the set of questions which determined levels of dependence and autonomy. Given her definition of a healthy local government, it is clear that the lack of autonomy identified is a result of financial dependence. One statistically significant relationship emerged in the analysis of responses to the dependence and autonomy statements. There appears to be a relationship between these concepts and form of county government as commission based governments are less likely than the others to select all of the dependence statements listed in the survey. However, this relationship may be subject to change. The National Association of Counties (NACO) reports that increasingly, county governments are transitioning to Commission-Administrator or Executive forms. Currently, these types of governments comprise 40% of all county governments (National Association of Counties, 2014). As they are significantly more likely than Commission based governments to agree that they are dependent on federal funds, it is likely that demand will only increase in coming years.

Lastly, when asked if the federal government should provide more financial assistance to local programs and more assistance for disaster response and recovery, there is overwhelming agreement. This is not surprising given the dependence on federal funds in general and concerns that local budgets will not help sustain EM. This indicates however that because emergency managers recognize that there is little autonomy and

still request more funding from the same avenues, the cycle of funding and dependence will likely continue.

Finding #3

Local emergency managers undertake a core set of budgetary activities which support local financial sustainability of their organization. Few, however, undertake activities which disassociate themselves from federal sources of funding.

In planning for the local emergency management budget, a majority of respondents reported requesting a local increase to their budget, partnering to share resources, and providing presentations to elected officials regarding the importance of local emergency management. These activities can be established as core budgetary duties undertaken by the emergency manager in order to plan for the budget year. Each of these three activities enables or encourages local sustainment of emergency management without necessary federal involvement. However, where the sharing of resources is the product of a regionalized approach using federal grant funds, it would not fall into this category of sustaining activities.

Two activities were not reported to have been undertaken by a majority of emergency managers- each of which entails the rejecting of a budget based on federal funding. Only 3% report turning down federal funding, despite the recognition of federal usurping of local authority on several accounts as discussed above. Further, only 37% report applying for non-federal grants. That grant making organizations span government, private, and non-profit sectors ensures that there is availability of non-federal support. It is not nearly as readily available or plentiful as federal dollars, however.

Finding #4

The current framework for delivery of federal emergency management assistance has grave implications for states' rights.

The Stafford Act's provision of a loophole for notification of involvement by the federal government is alarming. Specifically the act enables the President to send unrequested resources into a disaster area directly to victims without prior coordination with the state. To do so perverts the intention of a federal system that has emergency management resources at all levels. It has the potential to disregard non-profit and private sector resources that may be available to assist, and strengthen the bureaucracy that often befalls recovery. This language further ignores what should be the primary role of the states- to facilitate resource deployment. To provide this entry point for federal control disregards the separation of the spheres of influence at all levels. Much like other aspects of financial assistance, this section of the Stafford Act provides a breach of traditional federal relationships.

Contributions to the Practice of Emergency Management

Conflict between Documentation and Perceptions

With the importance of the federal relationships in mind, the conceptual framework was drawn up to explain the level of control the federal government might have over program implementation, relative to the amount of its responsibility to pay. Implementation of programs that are accompanied by financial assistance, in this case EMPG and PA, was expressed in terms of a continuum constructed along a typology of federalism with varying control dynamics. A second continuum expressed the amount of federal responsibility to pay for the programs. Two versions of this conceptual framework were completed. The first represented elements of the typology of federalism

as they were identified in the document analysis. The second version plotted these same elements that emerged from review of survey responses. A comparison between the two shows both similarities and differences. The implication of these findings is that program directives and methods of implementation vary. In both analyses, there was no difference in the coercive elements of the programs. However, one characteristic of cooperative federalism was expressed in the survey responses about the PA program that was not identified during the document analysis. Survey respondents report that the use of PA encourages local jurisdictions to restore basic capabilities. Not only was this attribute of PA not evident in the document analysis, but nearly half of respondents also stated that PA involved an equitable process for funding. Regarding the process for distribution of PA funds the literature does not support the opinion that the distribution is equitable. Instead, multiple studies have shown the distribution of federal funds post-disaster to assist with relief to be a highly political process (Sobel & Garrett, 2003; Sylves & Buzas, 2007). Further, Leeson and Sobel (2006) have identified a relationship between federal relief funding given to states and corruption. They wrote that this relationship is colored in part, by the fact that “The incentive of political actors is to help themselves by distributing money in ways that benefit them and their political careers” (p. 8). Thus the literature points towards not only an unequal, but corrupt process. While there is no literature that emerges to refute or support the opinion that PA assists in restoring capabilities to some minimum standard, it is evident that the PA Guidebook and emergency manager opinion are quite different.

Two elements of opportunistic federalism are present in the survey responses, but not in the document analysis. Emergency managers believe EMPG allows local goals to be a priority- a sentiment that was not present in the analysis of the EMPG Funding Opportunity Announcement. Not only is the prioritization of local goals a characteristic

of opportunistic federalism, but the absence from the document and presence in opinion makes the argument stronger that opportunism is at work. Additionally, survey responses revealed that PA enables the restoration of funds to the local budget that were spent on emergency management operations. While this seems to be a straightforward goal of PA, it is nonetheless opportunistic. Local jurisdictions incur costs before, during and after the disaster that were previously budgeted for, and therefore not outside the scope of activity that was anticipated for the budget year. The replacement of this money by shifting tax dollars from other locations is within the definition of opportunism. Lastly, the relaxing of federal standards for funding in the PA program is evident in the document. However, emergency managers do not agree that the federal government's approach to local use of PA is relaxed, clearly demonstrating a distinct difference in the representation of the two versions of the conceptual framework.

The disconnect between federalism's intent, policy goals, and local implementation have placed local government emergency management in a precarious position. It is the recipient of billions of dollars of assistance to increase preparedness levels and has an exceptional lobby in the International Association of Emergency Managers. However, emergency management lacks the staying power of local support. This current policy framework has implications at each level of government. The federal mechanism for funding has aided in the removal of financial responsibility at the local level, and has dismantled local ability to make sound decisions. The states have varying degrees of involvement in programming funds, but have also seen their authority reduced by the Stafford Act which places the federal government as primarily responsible for disaster. The federal government cannot fund the myriad of programs it has initiated, because it initiates programs that are not in the purview of a central government. It is in

this culture of dependence and misplaced roles that the fate of local emergency management rests.

Local Autonomy and Federal Grant Making

Emergency managers do not believe that their organizations have sufficient autonomy from the federal government in order to act in its own best interest or the best interest of local residents. As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the areas where emergency managers agreed there are coercive measures is in the replacement of local standards by federal standards. Despite this acknowledgement they report that they believe the federal government should give their jurisdiction more money for both local programming as well as disaster recovery. As further centralization of the emergency management function occurs this paradox is likely to remain. It is exacerbated by the fact that most emergency managers report that they do not apply for non-federal grants or turn down federal funding.

For federal policy makers, it is imperative to realize that federal dollars are the lynch pin for local emergency management. Without the contribution of federal dollars, it is likely that many counties might cease to have an emergency management function. The decision to continue to fund this effort at a level that permits counties to sustain the function must hinge on the measure of performance of local emergency management and the utility of emergency management verses other initiatives that policy makers want to fund.

Contributions to Theory

General Implications for Federalism Theory

In order to study the effects of federal policy at the local level, it is critical to first understand the role of both levels of government in this exchange. Chapter Two illuminated this important requirement and addressed several key elements which highlight features of the emergency management framework in question. First, federal funding programs are not necessarily formulated with a pure federalism in mind. Instead, programs are designed which often push against the norms of federalism and in turn the policy arenas morph (Sundquist & Davis, 1969). Certainly this is true for emergency management. In fact, disaster relief served from the earliest days of this republic as a model for general welfare spending (Dauber, 2005). Thus emergency management assistance to the local level is not merely the product of years of altered policies, but it is instead the forefather of many other assistance programs. Together this collection of programs has assisted in the shaping of federalism. It is normal then, that all three types of federalism- each with varying levels of federal control- emerge as attributes of the current local and federal financial assistance arrangement.

What is absent from this arrangement, however, is a clear connection to the U.S. Constitution which outlines the permeability of local standards by the federal government, as well as the transfer of tax dollars to the federal level to affect a national system of emergency management. Absent this, additional morphing of federalism can result in unfavorable measures. One example emerged during the document analysis of the Stafford Act that is particularly concerning. When FEMA deems it is "...necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage", resources can be sent without a request from the state. Furthermore, the provision of assistance, while it should be coordinated with the state, "shall not, in notifying and coordinating with a State under

subparagraph (A), delay or impede the rapid deployment, use, and distribution of critical resources to victims of an emergency.” This vague language leaves open the movement of federal resources at a time when the Governor or local officials may not necessarily agree that they are needed. If indeed local emergency managers believe that they are dependent on federal funding and if, as a caveat of this funding there is little autonomy to make good decisions, there is no reason to believe that the local governments will have a voice when it comes to resource movement in and out of their jurisdiction. The primary contribution of this study to theories of federalism is that financial relationships between the levels of government in emergency management are not congruent with the original intent of the separation of spheres of influence.

Confirming Local Government Dependency Syndrome

In 1981 Lovell explained that large city governments were falling prey to the local government dependency syndrome. She wrote “Whether the reasons be political or economic, the fact is that cities no longer depend on their own revenue sources to pay for locally delivered services.” In light of the federal investment into local emergency management it was logical to employ this study to see if local emergency managers also saw this syndrome in their counties. Overwhelmingly, respondents indicated dependence. Primarily, Lovell’s description of this theory focused on reliance on federal funds to pay for items that can be gained through a local operational budget. Additionally, she indicates that a healthy local government will have sufficient autonomy from the federal government to enact good decision making. Dependence on the federal government for funding is seen as a contra indicator for independent decision making. In the case of emergency managers, this study provides evidence that Lovell (1981) is correct and that her theory may apply to counties, and not only large cities.

Delimitations

The scope of this study employed explicit boundaries, as suggested by Bloomberg and Volpe (2008). A narrow scope was applied in this study to ensure that the research aims were achievable. While there is an expansive number of policies and programs which could have been assessed to illuminate the federal-local relationship, this study employed as its parameters specific financial assistance programs under established federal legislation. It was further narrowed in scope to County emergency managers, excluding City emergency managers or other form of local jurisdiction personnel.

Limitations

As the population of this study excludes all emergency managers with the exception of County emergency managers, the findings are limited in applicability to Counties. Within this sample, however, further limitations emerged as in some cases responses did not come from a particular subset of the sample, or if answers were present, they were small in number. Responses from FEMA Regions I, II, and IX were discarded based on a low response rate- each represented less than 5% of the total. Additionally there were no responses from several states in Region I including Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Emergency Managers in the age-ranges of 20-29 and 70-79 totaled less than 5% of responses and were also not included.

Areas for Future Research

Examining pay arrangements for emergency management using federalism theory is only one of many lenses that can be used to evaluate governmental relationships. Several other areas that would provide clarity about the local-federal relationship in emergency management that emerged during the course of this study. Most notably, the study of actions of the local emergency manager can be further understood by evaluating

their budgetary decisions using public choice theory or more specifically, William Niskanen's theory of government budgeting. Assessing the extent to which emergency managers act as *budget maximizing bureaucrats* would assist in validating or invalidating claims that federal funding should sustain local operational budgets. A natural outgrowth of this study and potential future studies using public choice theory is an evaluation of the effectiveness of local emergency management organizations to achieve established response or recovery goals. Such a study might weigh federal costs against the utility of having an emergency management organization in every county.

If we are to assess the worth of an emergency management function in each County, its performance must be measured. Current programs often stipulate that local personnel undertake a combination of plans, training courses, and exercises. Neither EMPG nor PA requires anything past these items, and nothing that is mandated actually gauges how prepared a jurisdiction is, or how resilient. Rather, there is much scholarly work on what a jurisdiction cannot or has not done under the theme of social vulnerability. Further research which examines appropriate benchmarks for a well-prepared local emergency management agency must be devised. This information will assist local personnel to make the case for financially sustainable emergency management to local elected officials, even in the absence of federal funds. Conversely, performance information might also be employed by policy makers who seek a regionalized or other approach if it does not appear that an organization in every county is required. Currently, data that is collected is almost solely to make a positive case for continued federal funding at all levels. A more balanced approach might answer the question of performance.

One overarching topic that requires additional study is the movement of local funds through the taxing function to the federal level to be programmed for emergency

management. The utility of doing so is clearly intended to fulfill the goal of establishing a national system of emergency management, but quantifying the effectiveness of such a system is difficult. Given the findings of this study, it is clear that many emergency managers fear their organizations will disband if federal funds go away. If, in fact, the local or state governments do not feel strongly enough about this presence in each county to sustain them financially, the question may be asked- why should it stay? Conversely, given the local and state financial burden born by other types of federal policies or federal inability or unwillingness to execute policies, should not the federal government contribute in general to sustaining local operational budgets?

Conclusion

Few events lay bare the challenges of a federal system quite like disaster. Recent scholarship which examines these challenges cites increasing centralization after September 11, 2001. However, an overreaching federal government was evident in the guiding documents of emergency management long before this event. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina forced these tendencies onto center stage and both serve as examples of the federal government's primary role in disaster response. This study sought to examine the local emergency manager perspective on this federal prominence as it is translated into financial relationships.

At a time when the role of government is a particularly contentious topic, scholarship which seeks out the effect of current federal arrangements can provide clarity to policy makers and academics alike. For this study, several areas of literature provided a framework. The typology of federalism that is central to this research study emerged from the body of public administration literature. However the significance of preemption, which underlies the typology, is rooted in reviews of legal research as well

as founding documents. Emergency management literature provided context for not only the local-federal relationship, but also both programs- the Emergency Management Performance Grant and the Public Assistance program. The conceptual framework consisted of two continua, each acting as an x or y axis. Along the x axis the two focus programs are plotted as a reflection of the percentage for which the federal government is financially responsible. The y axis represents the typology of federalism as a range of federal control.

This mixed methods study began with directed content analysis, employing the theories of federalism that make up the typology. Analysis of the Stafford Act, the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program 2013 Notice of Interest, and the Public Assistance Guidebook answered the question “What is the predominant nature of federalism expressed in the guiding documents?” While each document varied, at the conclusion of the document analysis it was obvious that no type of federalism emerged as primary over the others. Secondly, this study explored the perceptions of local emergency managers (LEMs) through a nationwide survey. What emerged was the overwhelming agreement that financial dependence on the federal government underlies the local emergency management function. Across a series of questions designed to ask about dependence in multiple ways, respondents reported that their organizations are reliant upon federal money to maintain operations. Additionally, LEMs understood their jurisdictions to be so reliant, in fact, that they report being unable to make the best decision possible for their local jurisdiction because of this reliance. Across multiple budgetary priorities that generally represent local operational budget expenditures, LEMs report being unable to purchase what they need without the federal government.

This study did not attempt to understand why local governments might not sustain an emergency management function in the absence of federal funding. Compared to

other expenses, disaster preparedness may seem like an unnecessary expense. The inability to see long term or amorphous benefits can certainly make budget requests difficult. This study also did not request the total expenses of each local government and therefore we cannot compare the financial situation of each jurisdiction. However, because this sample is representative of the population of county emergency managers, we can be sure that the presence of local emergency management hinges largely upon the ability or willingness of the federal government to support it financially. This matter clearly demonstrates that emergency management as a field of practice continues to be challenged to prove its worth. It is either difficult to quantify its performance or, its impact is not great enough in some locations for local officials to support funding year after year. A natural question is – what does the federal government gain by perpetually sustaining these county organizations? Or, we might ask- how do taxpayers benefit directly from the services of local emergency management? The answers to these two questions can accompany this study on the effects of federal funding and illuminate the proper future for these local programs.

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Appendix A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Emergency Managers Survey - 2013

Q1 You are being asked to participate in a research study. The information provided here tells you about the study including its purpose, what you will do if you decide to participate, and any risks and benefits of being in the study. Please read the information below before you decide whether to participate. Your participation is voluntary and you can stop the survey at any time. My name is Amy Crabill, I am a PhD candidate at the University of Delaware, and have worked in local emergency management since 2004. You are being asked to take part in a nationwide study about local emergency managers and emergency management policy in the United States for the purposes of dissertation research. Because it is critical to survey the people involved in emergency management, you have been selected as a county or borough emergency manager to participate. Most other emergency managers representing a county or borough in the United States has also been asked to participate. This study is limited to county or borough emergency managers and therefore other governmental and private sector personnel have not been asked to participate. Your participation in this study requires the completion of an electronic survey. This survey should take no longer than 5- 10 minutes. There is no follow up response required from you after you complete the survey. There are no costs or compensation associated with participation in this study. While there are no direct benefits for you by taking part in this research, the intent of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the effect of federal emergency management policies in the United States. There are no anticipated risks to you by your participation however, in order to minimize risk your name and jurisdiction name will not be used. Any information obtained in connection with this research study that could identify you will be kept confidential. Under no circumstances whatsoever will you be identified by name in the course of this research study, or in any publication thereof. All data will be coded and securely stored, and will be used for professional purposes only. We will keep the research results in a password protected computer and/or a locked file cabinet at the School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Delaware. Research results will be reported without names or specific jurisdiction name. Information will only be shared with academic institutions that have the same policies on confidentiality. We will follow all laws which guide the confidentiality of research records. In the event of any publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable information will be shared. Your research records may be viewed by the University of Delaware Institutional

Review Board; however the confidentiality of your records will be protected to the extent permitted by law. Taking part in this research study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to participate in this research. If you choose to take part, you have the right to stop at any time. If you decide not to participate, there will be no penalty. Your refusal will not influence current or future relationships with the University of Delaware.

If you have any questions about this study, please contact Amy Crabill at acrabill@udel.edu. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Delaware Institutional Review Board at 302-831-2137. .

Q2 Before you can proceed, please answer the following questions: I agree to participate

- Yes (4)
- No (5)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey

Q3 I am at least 18 years of age

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey

Q4 The following questions are an opportunity to share your experiences and opinions. Please answer openly and truthfully.

Q5 Has your organization received federal funding from the Emergency Management Performance Grant?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

If Yes Is Selected, Then Skip To In your opinion, what has been the ef...

Q6 If your organization does not receive EMPG funding, do you personally have past experience working with the EMPG grant?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To The federal government should provide...

Q7 In your opinion, what has been the effect of EMPG on local emergency management?

Q8 EMPG enables jurisdictions to make local goals a priority rather than focus on federal standards

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q9 EMPG encourages local jurisdictions to meet a minimum standard of capabilities

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q10 Because of EMPG, local jurisdictions must use federal standards instead of local ones for activities such as planning, exercise, training, staffing

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q11 EMPG provides funding that helps work towards equity in emergency management programs across all local jurisdictions in the United States

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q12 EMPG requires that local emergency management organizations work closely with the federal government

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q13 EMPG funding has been negatively affected by changing priorities at the national level

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q14 The federal government takes a relaxed approach to how EMPG is used by local jurisdictions

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q15 EMPG funding has been positively affected by changing priorities at the national level

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q16 My organization relies heavily on EMPG funding

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q17 The federal government should provide more funding to local emergency management programs

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q18 The federal government should provide less funding to local emergency management programs

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q19 Has your jurisdiction received federal funding from the Public Assistance program after a federally declared disaster?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

If Yes Is Selected, Then Skip To In your opinion, what has been the ef...

Q20 If your organization has not received Public Assistance funding, do you personally have past experience working with the Public Assistance program after a disaster?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To The federal government should provide...

Q21 In your opinion, what has been the effect of the Public Assistance program on local emergency management?

Q22 The Public Assistance program enables local jurisdictions to make local goals a priority, rather than focus on federal standards

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q23 The Public Assistance program encourages local jurisdictions to restore basic capabilities that were damaged or lost during a disaster

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q24 The Public Assistance program enables jurisdictions to restore funding to the local budget that was spent on response or recovery activities

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q25 The Public Assistance program enforces federal requirements for projects instead of local ones (several examples include land use, zoning, environmental, historical)

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q26 The Public Assistance program involves an equitable process for funding

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q27 After a disaster, the Public Assistance program has required that my organization work closely with the federal government

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q28 The Public Assistance program funding has been negatively affected by changing priorities at the national level

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q29 The Public Assistance program funding has been positively affected by changing priorities at the national level

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q30 My jurisdiction will rely heavily in the future on the Public Assistance program if disasters occur

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q31 The federal government should provide more funding for local jurisdictions after declared disasters

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q32 The federal government should provide less funding for local jurisdictions after declared disasters

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
- Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

Q33 In the last 12 months, what actions have you taken pertaining to your organization's budget? Please click all that apply

- Requested an increased local budget for emergency management (1)
- Applied for non-federal grants (2)
- Partnered with a neighboring jurisdiction or other entity to share resources (3)
- Provided presentations to local elected officials regarding the importance of emergency management (4)
- Turned down federal financial assistance (5)
- Other, please specify (6) _____

Q34 In your opinion, which of the following should be the budgetary responsibility of the local emergency manager? Please click all that apply

- Requesting local funding for emergency management programs (1)
- Demonstrate the need for local funds to budget decision makers (2)
- Demonstrate the need for local funds to local elected officials (3)
- Ensure local financial sustainability of the emergency management program (4)
- Apply for federal grant opportunities (5)
- Seek out partnerships for the purpose of sharing resources (6)
- Other, please specify (7) _____

Q35 In your opinion, local emergency management in your jurisdiction has the following characteristics. Please click all that apply.

- Relies upon external funding for emergency management personnel to respond to local problems (1)
- Relies upon external funding for emergency management training required to respond to local problems (2)
- Relies upon external funding for emergency management equipment required to respond to local problems (3)
- Can independently meet the diverse needs of citizens of citizens during the preparedness phase (4)
- Can independently meet the diverse needs of citizens of citizens during the response phase (5)
- Can independently meet the diverse needs of citizens of citizens during the recovery phase (6)
- Has sufficient autonomy from the federal government to act in its own best interest (7)
- Has sufficient autonomy from the federal government to act in the best interest of local residents (8)

Q36 Name of the county where you work:

Q37 Name of the state where you work:

Q38 What is the form of your County government?

- Commission (1)
- Commission- Administrator (2)
- Council- Executive (3)
- Other, please specify (4) _____
- Refuse (5)

Q39 Where is the organizational home of your emergency management function?

- Stand alone (1)
- Fire Service (2)
- Emergency Services, non fire service (3)
- Law Enforcement (4)
- Other, please specify (5) _____
- Refuse (6)

Q40 What is your age?

Q41 What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Refuse (3)

Q42 What is the highest level of education you have attained?

- High school diploma (1)
- Undergraduate degree in an emergency management related field (2)
- Undergraduate degree in field not related to emergency management (3)
- Graduate degree in an emergency management related field (4)
- Graduate degree in field not related to emergency management (5)
- Refuse (6)

Appendix B

CODES FOR OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS

Open Coding Results- Effect of the Emergency Management Performance Grant on Local Emergency Management

Code	Percent
Dependence/Reliance	55
Financially Helpful/Supportive	34
Other	11
Total	100

Open Coding Results- Effect of Public Assistance on Local Emergency Management

Code	Percent
Helpful/supportive	28
Dependence	17
Cost off-set	11
Burdensome/bureaucratic	10
Other	15
Minimal or no impact to EMA	7
Repairs to infrastructure/buildings	7
Recover in a timely manner	5
Total	100

Appendix C

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD LETTER



RESEARCH OFFICE

210 Hallibur Hall
University of Delaware
Newark, Delaware 19716-1551
Ph: 302/831-2136
Fax: 302/831-2828

DATE: November 13, 2013

TO: Amy Crabill, PhD
FROM: University of Delaware IRB

STUDY TITLE: [518766-2] THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE;
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS OF LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGERS

SUBMISSION TYPE: Amendment/Modification

ACTION: DETERMINATION OF EXEMPT STATUS
* Remains Exempt 2

DECISION DATE: November 13, 2013

Thank you for your submission of Amendment/Modification materials for this research study. The University of Delaware IRB has determined this project is EXEMPT FROM IRB REVIEW according to federal regulations.

We will put a copy of this correspondence on file in our office. Please remember to notify us if you make any substantial changes to the project.

If you have any questions, please contact Nicole Famese-McFarlane at (302) 831-1119 or nicolefm@udel.edu. Please include your study title and reference number in all correspondence with this office.

cc: