Free Will, Manipulation Arguments, and Sourcehood
Date
2021-05
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Publisher
University of Delaware
Abstract
n this essay I discuss the logical structure, as well as what one might call the logical style, of manipulation arguments. After briefly presenting Derk Pereboom’s influential Four-Case argument in the second chapter, I discuss the general framework of manipulation arguments. In the third chapter I discuss the two historically prominent control conditions on moral responsibility, access to alternative possibilities and sourcehood, and note that manipulation arguments most often are concerned with the latter condition. In the fourth chapter and fifth chapters I draw from multiple contemporary arguments in a discussion of the structure of manipulation arguments and of justifying thepremises of a manipulation argument, in particular the claim that a manipulated agent is not the proper source of their actions. In the sixth chapter I turn to parallel manipulation arguments, centering on a recent version of a parallel manipulation argument offered by Taylor Cyr. In the seventh chapter I argue that manipulation arguments can be adapted as arguments for impossibilism. The key point I make is that causal history itself can serve as the candidate element in manipulation scenarios that explains a manipulated agent’s lack of moral responsibility. I conclude that impossibilists can support their position by making use of manipulation arguments, and that incompatibilists face a greater challenge than was previously recognized in developing manipulation arguments to support their own position.
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Keywords
Manipulation arguments, Derk Pereboom, Taylor Cyr, Impossibilism, Moral responsibility