Equity in a 21st century labor crisis: the weight of power in intrahousehold time allocation
Date
2023
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Publisher
University of Delaware
Abstract
The substantial increase in household domestic labor requirements caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying increase in the cost of outsourcing domestic labor, such as by paying for childcare during pandemic-related school closures, has resulted in a disproportionate withdrawal of women from the labor force. Previous research has indicated that labor-force participation rates for women recover far more slowly than for men in the aftermath of an external shock, which necessitates critical research regarding why women's careers are most vulnerable to the burden of domestic labor. This thesis aims to evaluate household time-allocation decisions regarding paid, market labor and unpaid, domestic labor as domestic-labor outsourcing costs increase. We use an online, economic experiment to test a theoretical framework wherein household time-allocation decisions are examined in the context of gender norms, specialization, preferences, and bargaining power. In each experimental session, a heterosexual couple is given information regarding their performance in two tasks, a Paid Task and an Unpaid Task, before they make a series of incentive-compatible decisions over four rounds regarding how they will allocate their time to tasks if the round is selected for implementation (i.e., which participant will complete the Paid Task and which will complete the Unpaid Task). Each round has a different Cost that allows the couple to pay to "outsource" completion of the Unpaid Task so that both participants may complete the Paid Task. Round Costs are calculated given an "individual productivity threshold," or the lower of the two participants' scores for the Paid Task, allowing for control over which decision is profit-maximizing in each℗ round. We hypothesize that when outsourcing costs are below the individual productivity threshold, both participants will complete the paid task regardless of preferences or productivity differences. Conversely, when outsourcing costs are above the individual productivity threshold, participants are expected to have only one household member complete the Paid Task and to specialize in the task for which they have a higher productivity. The influence of gender norms, preferences, valuation of intrahousehold bargaining power, as well as financial and sociodemographic factors, are examined as potential determinants of time-allocation decisions. While results indicate that task preferences, age, financial decision-making control, and individual bank-account ownership are statistically significant determinants of time-allocation decisions, participants largely allocated time according to expected profit-maximizing outcomes, and no sufficient evidence was found to indicate that either bargaining-power distribution within the household or the gender of the higher-scoring participant influenced time-allocation decisions.
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Keywords
Bargaining power, Experimental economics, Gender, Financial decision-making control, Time allocation