Motivations behind strategic reputation building: experimental evidence for the behavioral implications of image and indirect reciprocity
Date
2025
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Publisher
University of Delaware
Abstract
Reputation can be a powerful determinant of human behavior. On one hand, individuals with preferences for indirect reciprocity may use reputation as a guide to how they should treat others. On the other hand, individuals may strategically make decisions based on how their actions will impact their own reputation. In an experimental helping game, Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) studied the impact of both pure indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building driven by the material benefits of having a good reputation. However, in this study, we explore a purely psychological motivation of strategic reputation building known as image concern that is driven by a desire to be perceived favorably—or possibly an aversion to being perceived poorly. To disentangle the confounded material and immaterial motivations of strategic reputation building, we modify Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009)’s within subjects design to include another treatment where individuals are publicly ranked on a leaderboard based on their helping behavior, evoking pure image concern with no material benefits. We find evidence that people help significantly more when they are publicly ranked compared to when they have a private reputation due to a strong aversion to shame. However, we find that image concern may also significantly weaken the reciprocity of these players, highlighting the potential risk strategic reputation building may pose to the stability of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Overall, this research demonstrates the positive influence that reputation can have on people’s prosocial behaviors, while providing a deeper analysis on inner workings of image concern.
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Keywords
Image concern, Indirect reciprocity, Reputation, Strategic reputation building, Human behavior