FROM REVOLUTION TO RESTORATION: THE MILITARY, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND THE FAILURE OF EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, 2011-2013

Abstract

The Arab Spring created unprecedented optimism in the Middle East, a region largely dominated by authoritarian rule since the end of the colonial era. In 2011, Egyptians mobilized with the expectation that through protests they could produce democratic change, ultimately forcing President Hosni Mubarak from power after three decades in office. However, this change was short-lived, with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi launching a military coup in 2013 and resuming authoritarian rule. The short timeframe from authoritarian rule, revolution, democratic transition, coup, and return to authoritarianism raises critical questions about why democracy ultimately failed in Egypt. This paper presents three reasons for the failure of democracy in Egypt in 2011 to 2013. The first reason is that Egypt is effectively a military with a state. The Egyptian military is the founder and protector of the Egyptian state and its actions in overturning democracy via the 2013 coup reflects a broader historical pattern of intervention when it perceives core state interests to be at risk. The second reason is the Muslim Brotherhood mishandled the democratic transition by leveraging their status as Egypt’s oldest and most organized opposition force to come to power via parliamentary and presidential elections, and subsequently governed ineffectively, sparking widespread discontent among the Egyptian public that led to mass protests. The third reason is that Egypt lacked political institutionalization. Egypt did not develop the durable institutions necessary for effective civilian governance and, combined with a polarized pluralist party system, this weakness contributed to governmental breakdown, mass protests, and ultimately military intervention in July 2013.