The Cambodian Civil War and the Vietnam War: a tale of two revolutionary wars

Abstract

This dissertation compares and contrasts the Vietnam War (from the founding of the Vietnamese first republic in 1955 until the Tet Offensive in 1968) and the civil war in Cambodia (1979-91) in order to draw insights for counterinsurgency theory. The counterinsurgent in Vietnam was not successful because it could not effectively implement its political program, which prevented it from mobilizing enough committed people to fight in order to defend the regime. On the other hand, the revolutionary organization implemented its political program well and received a tremendous amount of external support. The counterinsurgent in Cambodia, on the other hand, was victorious in 1991 due to three factors: an appealing and effectively implemented political program, cohesive military organization, and the use of a hybrid army which was predominantly composed of territorial forces. Using the lessons from the civil war in Cambodia, this dissertation provides insights into the complexity of civil war, the dynamics of hybrid warfare, and the challenges facing a revolutionary organization which struggles to become an effective conventional army. This dissertation argues that a properly organized territorial army can complement the regular units very well, and this army is the underappreciated key to success in countering revolutionary war.