Do proposers strategically hide information from intermediaries in dictator games?
Date
2023
Authors
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Publisher
University of Delaware
Abstract
There are many circumstances where economic agents can choose to hide or reveal information from other agents who then choose to make decisions based on the information provided to them. This study investigates to what extent individuals are willing to strategically hide information from other players who are acting as the main decision maker within a group setting. We contrast the proportion of selfish choices in a standard, binary dictator game to the proportion of selfish choices in a modified dictator game in which the dictator can strategically hide information from an intermediary who makes the ultimate allocation decision. We find that dictators are more willing to pursue selfish outcomes by concealing information than by directly choosing a selfish allocation. This finding has important implications regarding the benefits of mandatory disclosure policies.
Description
Keywords
Moral wiggle room, Intermediation, Experimental economics, Binary dictator games