Abstract: Presentism is the view that all of reality is exhausted by the present. That is,
the only objects and individuals that exist are those that exist in the present; anything
else literally does not exist. How then is a presentist able to ground the truths of
propositions uttered in the present which seem to be about wholly past individuals? I
examine three possible solutions proposed by the presentist, concluding all three suffer
from the shifting truth-maker objection. I then look at how a presentist might employ a
descriptive theory for the meaning of names to avoid apparently committing
themselves to the existence of non-present individuals. This is then contrasted by the
direct reference theory of names as argued for by Kripke, before concluding the
descriptive view is unacceptable as a theory of meaning. After considering the
proposed solutions presented by the presentist, I argue that Presentism should be
avoided due to its counterintuitive consequences in favor of Eternalism.
