APEC Research Reports

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Browsing APEC Research Reports by Subject "Auction efficiency"

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    Reverse Auctions for Purchases of Ecosystem Services: The Effect of Information on Auction Structure Performance
    (Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE., 2016-03) Duke, Joshua M.; Messer, Kent D.; Lynch, Lori; Li, Tongzhe
    Differences between private and public decision-making are quantified using willingness-to-accept (WTA) data collected in artefactual field experiments. Participants first makedecisions in a second-price auction (private rounds) followed by majority-rule voting (public rounds) on the median price collected in the private rounds. Results suggest that other-regarding behavior in the public rounds regarding stigma and disgust can significantly reduce WTA. Chatbox communication can further reduce WTA, and social preferences, education, and unrelated communication are the primary drivers that lead participants to accept significantly lower prices for potentially disgusting tasks. The results have application for sustainable, cost-effective recycled water projects.
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    When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?
    (Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE., 2016-03) Messer, Kent D.; Duke, Joshua M.; Lynch, Lori; Li, Tongzhe
    Government conservation agencies that conduct reverse auctions traditionally provide a significant amount of public information about past auction results. This information includes not only the amount of money spent by the government but also can include the number of offers received, number of offers accepted, highest accepted bid, lowest accepted bid, and the average accepted bid. This research uses induced-value experiments to evaluate the effect of past auction information on seller rent seeking. Results from 140 participants suggest that sellers use some public information to learn how to secure higher rents. However, when sellers are given information only about the buyers’ budget, they secure lower rents. Results also suggest that relative budget size affects rents and that budget variability in the presence of market information diminishes the effect. Thus, in the presence of public information and equivalent total outlays, variable budgets are more likely than stationary budgets to achieve conservation auction fiscal efficiency. Finally, this research finds that auctions with greater heterogeneity in seller opportunity costs are less fiscally efficient than when the distribution is more homogeneous.