

1896

NOTES FOR ADDRESS AT AIR WAR COLLEGE OF THE AIR  
UNIVERSITY ON THE THEME "REQUIREMENTS FOR SOUND  
POLITICAL ACTION IN THE FIELD OF THE UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN POLICY", TO BE DELIVERED ON APRIL 25, 1950.

-----

I am deeply appreciative of this opportunity to again address you on the invitation of General Anderson and his associates in the direction of the studies of the Air War College. At the outset I must frankly tell you that during the last year in particular, because of the extraordinary occupations which my private obligations have thrust on me, it has been impossible for me to follow the details of developing events in the same close and I hope thoughtful manner that I did during so many years when I was in the service of our Government. Since I last had the opportunity of addressing the College in October 1948 I have traveled continuously in our country and have made several trips to Europe, but while the ground I covered in those travels was fairly broad, the opportunities for observation, study and reflection, as well as for conversation and association with those who are engaged with the responsibilities of policy in a number of countries were limited due to the character of these personal business occupations and preoccupations.

The thoughts which I will express today may, therefore, not have the same value in some respects as they would have had up to the recent past, and my only basis for appearing before you during this study which you are making of the vital problems which confront ourselves and the world today, and in which studies the decisions in our country are predominant and controlling, is that I still speak as one who has given these problems of policy considered attention, not only as an observer in my own and other

countries

countries over a long period of years, but also as a participant in the formulation and execution of policy, until a few years ago.

My opinion of the vital work which you are doing in the College is known and I do not wish to make further comment in this respect except to say that I consider the College is making one of the very major contributions to our military and political thinking in these continuing critical days. I also do not elaborate on a thought which I have frequently expressed during the last few years that I consider that never in the history of our or other peoples has a military branch of government given such serious, understanding and constructive thinking to the problems of how to achieve the conditions under which we and others can live in peace, and in case that peace is definitely threatened, how to destroy the threat by the use of military force as the only means which then exists. In the case of such definite threat to peace the full use of our force is the only means to reestablish the peaceful conditions under which men can live an endurable life anywhere.

I have given a great deal of thought to what I may most usefully say to you on the theme assigned to me "Requirements for Sound Political Action in our Foreign Policy". When I first had the privilege of addressing you in October 1948 I spoke at perhaps far too great length on the theme of "Diplomacy as a Weapon of Modern Warfare". The notes of these remarks may be available to you. I endeavored in those remarks to make some basic observations on the use of diplomatic action as an instrument for maintaining peace, and in war, and I emphasized particularly some of the conditions which must be present to make diplomatic action at any time effective. I shall endeavor in what I say to you today, in remarks which have to be brief and condensed, to state very briefly and necessarily without elaboration some of the factors which must be present in our country in the fullest measure possible if our foreign policy, whatever its objectives may be, is to be effective in reaching the ends for which it is designed.

I will give a very brief and inadequate resumé of some of the conclusions readily drawn from the remarks I made before the College in 1948.

1.- I expressed the opinion that out of my observation and experience and analysis of events as they had developed in the past, and in the recent past, and at that moment, that a preventive war undertaken by our country and supported by the friends we could still count upon, was the only sure and safe answer to the problem of the maintenance of our security and peace and that of the world.

2.- That we were facing an enemy with so clear and all-embracing and definite a purpose, and so unreasonable and not to be swayed by any reason, who knew only one language which was that of force, and who, while planning to attain these ends without the use of force, was prepared to use it at the moment of his choosing.

3.- Public opinion at the time in our country and in most countries that we could still call friends, was ready for any measure that our country was prepared to use to prevent what the overwhelming majority of the people in the United States and of Europe and in this Continent felt was otherwise inevitable disaster for everyone.

4.- That many leaders of public opinion in our country and others felt that the solution of preventive war was the only safe one.

5.- I expressed doubt that we would actually proceed with the solution of the problem through preventive war.

6.- I expressed the opinion that the diplomatic weapon did not have the same effect as in the past in preventing wars and did not have the same efficacy and scope of action during the period of actual conflict. I observed that while we still had not learned to use the diplomatic instrument to its best advantage, we had made some progress in the use thereof, and that even with the most favorable conditions which could be anticipated we might not be able to use it with adequate effect -- that is to achieve our ends.

7.- I stated that our known enemy had learned effectively tactics and strategy from our last enemy and from the whole accumulated record of history and that he was using what he had learned; and that we were not prepared even then to use effectively the direct methods needed and that we were held in by restraints and inhibitions and reactions which made in many respects negative the diplomatic weapon.

8.- I gave a number of observations to bring out the recorded lessons of experience that diplomatic action depends for its effectiveness and influence on the definiteness of policy of governments, their prestige, and their known capacity and will to act, and that all these must have be-

hind



hind them intelligent, informed opinion in our own and like-thinking countries.

I observed that when you face an enemy who has such implacable purpose as the Soviet Union no diplomatic action has any effect on him so far as ultimate restraints are concerned. I expressed the opinion that so far as our country is concerned concerted policies, attitudes and opinion have no effect on the enemy except to the degree that they are backed constantly by recognized superior force in the political, economic, social and military field, which forces the enemy knows will be used opportunely and that the will to use them is ever present.

It would be presumptuous for me to set forth to you what I consider the main lines of our foreign policy should be. I have been and now am in almost complete accord with every major line and objective of foreign policy that we have formulated and pursued as a government since the end of the Second World War. To enter into such detail of policy would in any event require exhaustive treatment which my time with you does not permit and is outside of the scope of my assigned remarks and I am sure is being covered by those actually dealing with these problems.

It is accepted that a carefully considered, adequately formulated, and clearly defined constructive, continuous and consistently intelligent and adequately implemented internal and foreign policy in the public interest, and which takes into account in an equitable manner the just interests of other countries, is the most powerful weapon for the prevention of war, as it removes the origins of war, and creates the conditions in which the germs of war cannot prosper.

Through conditions which are not of our own making the maintenance of the peace of the world depends upon us, upon the success of our policy and our strength in carrying it through. As a result of the conditions which have been created in the world by Soviet Russia and the objectives which that government has towards complete world domination, we have no alternative but that of making the main objective of our foreign policy the creation of conditions at home and elsewhere which will enable us to maintain the peace, and to enforce peace.

I will briefly set forth what I consider are some of the major requirements which will make it possible to carry through sound political action in the field of our foreign policy.

1.- We must have social peace within our country, and we do not have this except on the surface. Unless we have this equitable social peace at home its absence will have serious repercussions in every part of the world and will weaken our position and that of others.

2.- We must maintain our present industrial strength and superiority and continue the development of our industrial structure, for in it lies in an extraordinary measure our capacity to maintain our political and military power. Our industrial strength is being weakened by the acts of government in interfering with business to the degree that industrial initiative, which has been one of our primary strengths, is diminishing and this threatens our entire capacity to back up policy and maintain political peace.

3.- We must maintain our financial strength for that is the backbone of our social and industrial system and our financial strength is directly related to social and industrial peace and strength. Our financial position and strength and our capacity to carry through programs of policy, internal and external, is being weakened by certain acts of government which if not modified or eliminated will create serious elements of weakness in our whole position.

4.- Our moral strength and our morale at home are being affected by many factors and this is affecting our position abroad as well as at home. The increased emphasis on personal security over individual initiative is having disastrous effects.

5.- We must maintain the psychologic factors which in our American life have been a primary element of strength.

6.- While the press must remain free, a greater degree of responsibility must be assumed by the press -- by those who own and direct and by those

who

who write therein.

7.- Our schools and colleges and universities have been and must remain the bulwarks in our public life which they have been for several centuries. Both in the public schools and in the higher schools doctrines are being freely taught which are undermining practically every aspect of our strength. Adequate steps must be taken to maintain academic freedom but at the same time to prevent the undermining of the basic principles on which our national life is founded -- and this is happening today.

8.- Consistent and concerted and intelligent effort must be made so that understanding by our people of what threatens us is not dimmed or confused, but is fully maintained.

9.- We must maintain the present recognition by our people of the vital necessity of maintaining the governments and economies of friendly countries through such political, economic and financial help as we can give without weakening our own capacity at home to be helpful.

10.- We must maintain at all costs preponderant military strength in every branch of the services.

11.- We must continue to have in our possession military weapons superior to those of any country and maintain the organizations and means for research and production.

12.- Diplomacy involves the whole machinery of formulation of foreign policy and implementation thereof at home and abroad. It involves the planning of major overall near- and long-range foreign policy; the fitting in of near- and long-range policy as respects definite areas and countries into this major overall foreign policy; and the implementation of general and specialized area policies. We must increase the effectiveness of the diplomatic instrument.

13.- We must reestablish the bi-partisan formulation and conduct and implementation of foreign policy and relations with other countries.

14.- We must maintain the principle of equity, and full understanding of other peoples, in the conduct and implementation of policy.

15.- We must improve the machinery for the conduct of policy at home and abroad.

16.- There should be prompt, adequate and understanding implementation of Point Four of the Administration's program to aid the economic strength of less developed and favored areas.

17.- Whether in the military, political or economic field, we cannot neglect any area of the world. The charge that we are difusing our effort to the extent of weakening our policy is not sound. The task incumbent on us is almost superhuman, but it is not beyond our present resources and strength and to maintain our position there is no area and no problem that we can neglect.

18.- Foreign policy must have definite objectives and continued application, but it cannot be static and completely inflexible -- more particularly as to certain areas and the method of implementation in certain areas.

19.- The successful use of the diplomatic weapon and of the military weapon means the use of every single capacity which a country has to make itself effective and controlling.

20.- Too great emphasis cannot be placed on the necessity for foreign policy being the result of coordinated consideration by all of the appropriate agencies of government concerned.

21.- We cannot put our whole faith in the diplomatic weapon or in financial or economic strength or in the superiority of armed forces. We must constantly focus all of our strength in the winning of the cold war or there is no such thing as the winning in actual armed combat.

Our situation and the whole world situation are much changed since I addressed you in October 1948. We were then in an overwhelmingly superior position politically, militarily and economically, and our prestige was unimpaired, our public opinion was alive and keen and almost completely understanding of the issues and relatively unconfused. Our prestige throughout the world which is so primarily a policy and military instrument was superior, undisputed and recognized even by the new enemy. We had superior combined military forces. If we were inferior in land forces that inferiority was relatively less important, as it was obviously at that time air and sea forces primarily which would have determined the issue in armed conflict. We had the atomic bomb and whatever the Soviet may have had, we had reason to believe that she did not have what we had in that respect. In the means of delivering the bomb she was still far behind. We were confident of success in carrying through a preventive war should we undertake it. We were overwhelmingly confident that the destruction of the Soviet's offensive power would have been easier at that moment, that the struggle would have been confined entirely or almost entirely to the territory of the enemy, and that it would be reasonably short, and measured in terms of the cost of modern war -- not so costly.

But above everything else, the Soviet was, while on the surface on the offensive, really on the defensive, and we had a firm, convinced and almost completely understanding public opinion in our country and relatively informed and understanding opinion among our friends.



It is almost incredible that in the short space of a year and a half this favorable situation for us should have so materially changed. We are weaker diplomatically and stronger militarily. There were many of us who foresaw the form which developments would take if preventive action was not undertaken.

I shall now so far as my time permits make some observations which may be of interest to you as background and amplification of the thoughts just expressed. I have not attempted to arrange these thoughts in any related order, as I have endeavored to cover as much ground as this brief hour permits.

We are told by the Soviet that, and so far as persons like myself can gather, she has the atomic bomb. We are told that she has the formulas for the hydrogen bomb and that she can make it and is doing so. We are told that she is developing undersea craft of a dangerous type which she is producing and continuing to produce at no too great expense and in great number. We are told that she has continued her development in air strength and techniques and that she has continuously increased her already recognized great land forces. Whatever the real facts may be concerning specific aspects of military strength and power to deliver force against us, we do know that her prestige in the political field has increased, that she has consolidated her position within her own territories instead of this having diminished. We know that in the satellite states the political and economic domination of the Soviet has been strengthened. We know that to areas which before we could count at least as friendly if not as active aides in conflict, the Iron Curtain has advanced and shut them within the sphere of Soviet political, military and economic action. Any of us who know what happened in the way of industrial development and increase in economic strength

strength which took place in Soviet territory before the Second World War, also know that this has been going on at even greater pace and efficiency in recent years. I do not know what the actual strength of Russia's power, actual and potential, in the military field is. You are in a position to know. Whatever the specific facts may be in any particular field of power, we know that our overall position is, compared with two years ago, relatively weaker and theirs is relatively stronger, in many respects, except in the actual possession of weapons of great power, the capacity to produce them in effective quantity and the means to use and deliver them.

To me what is of the most supreme importance is that whatever some of these changes in the relative situation, particularly in the field of actual implements of war and capacity to deliver and use may be, there has been this undoubted change in the psychologic situation in our own country and among our friends. You who are necessarily profound students of all aspects of war, what leads to it and how to wage it effectively, know that the psychological situations before and during war are almost as great, if not as great a factor in determining the issue of conflict, as the actual physical implements of warfare.

That psychologic situation has profoundly changed in an incredibly short space of time. Instead of being overwhelmingly confident of our power and therefore of the capacity to maintain our security, if not peace, without war, some now speak already of our being on the defensive. We are no longer sure of our all-around military superiority. Instead of being supremely confident of the outcome if we should engage in a preventive war or if the enemy should undertake war against us, many are already doubtful, not only as to the length of the struggle, but even of the outcome. If this change in this aspect of the psychological situation has taken place in our own  
country,

country, there is no doubt that the confidence in our power, political, diplomatic, economic and military, has deteriorated in other countries who know that their future depends on us.

This deterioration in the psychological situation was almost inevitable. Time does and has dulled the minds of people. When I last spoke before the school the impact of years of war, of daily news of conflict, disaster, of death striking the individual home, of the inconveniences and domestic burdens of war, the horrors of conflict, had left their mark on our people and practically every man, woman and child was still conscious in his thoughts many times a day that we had a new implacable enemy who had set out against all reason to destroy and enslave us. In the countries just so recently freed from Nazi domination and ravages, initiative to destroy the damage of war and to rebuild anew was still at a standstill because they felt already a new and more implacable enemy was making its will to dominate felt and these stricken countries saw no hope except in us, who emerged from the last conflict politically, militarily, economically and morally stronger. While they had supreme confidence that we who had made possible the defeat of the last implacable enemy would not permit another to fatten and become strong with time, their recovery effort was still feeble.

Even in this incredibly short period of two years our memories have become dulled and our immediate preoccupations of living have become more predominant. We are reaching that dangerous stage at home and elsewhere where we are more preoccupied with the immediate future than we are with what we still know is almost inevitable in the near or not too long-range future. Our fears are becoming stronger each day than our sound understanding and vision. Telling our people of the atom bomb and hydrogen

bomb

bomb and what their delivery involves still shocks our people and scares them, but these things do not have the same impact as they did two years ago. We hear new voices harping on the old strain with which some of us are so familiar, telling us in the most unrealistic way that war must be avoided at all cost, that peace can be secured by agreement, that the use of certain weapons is immoral, as though that would prevent their use by an implacable aggressor no matter what agreements he might ostensibly be bound by. We are even being told that we can buy off so implacable an enemy with a Marshall Plan extended to it. There are those who are prepared to weaken ourselves further by fattening the enemy with the proceeds of our sweat and labor, deluded by vain dreams that this enemy possesses reason and can live and act by reason.

We are passing through the same weary struggle with confused idealistic thinkers who as before will not wake up until the first bomb has been delivered on us, and then they will wail as if wailing helped.

We are reaching a serious stage of confusion in our thinking and new prophets are making their voice increasingly heard, and this strikes us at a time when confidence in our own leadership is decreasing among our own thoughtful as well as among less informed persons. Completely irresponsible attacks are being made on those responsible for our leadership in policy and in action. From responsible as well as irresponsible sources and from many sources attacks are being made on those in responsible authority and those who should be free to formulate constructive policy have their time largely taken up in meeting attacks upon them. With all that the average man reads in his paper every day and hears blared on the radio by irresponsible and, regrettably, by some responsible commentators on developments, confidence among our people in our leadership and our policy is undermined.

I would like to point out that there is another element in the problem which is neglected even by thoughtful people. This time there is no use thinking that we can make up for delays and vacillation because of the strength of our overwhelming industrial machine. That was a tremendous element in securing victory in the First and Second World Wars when total effort in industrial effort and capacity meant so much. All that tremendous superiority which we have had and still have in this field may be disorganized and destroyed after the successful delivery of the first few bombs by the enemy.

We are doing less realistic thinking. We hear very few discussing why it is that if we are not ready to use the bomb we should make them. Why did we make the first atomic bombs? Was it not because the struggle in which we were engaged was so severe that we knew that we had to be sure of some overwhelming weapon which we could use? Why did we use the atomic bomb in the last days of the last war? Was it because we knew our enemy had this bomb or would have it and use it? The situation is still the same in this respect. We felt that we must get there first, and in my opinion wisely so, and we did. We used the bomb because we knew we could win the most costly war of history with it without ruining ourselves and the world, that we could limit its action to the enemy, and in any case that we could shorten the war, the consequences of which we knew every day would take more years to recover from. Are we not exactly in the same position today and more so? And yet we have the most fantastic discussions as to whether a

weapon such as this, destructive as it is, is beneficent in the sense that it would prevent complete destruction of a world in which anyone can live.

How many voices were then raised against the use of the bomb and what were those voices? We know that those, if we had listened to them, were the voices of the same people who before were preaching doctrine and courses of action which would have led to defeat and slavery. We have the same voices today except that they are now in many cases more responsible voices who command for any number of reasons more hearing. We have the voice of an in many ways sound and intelligent Senator telling us that we can buy off the enemy by extending Marshall Plan aid to it. We have a group of distinguished professors working on the bomb calling for the formation of a national committee to discuss whether we should make or not make the hydrogen bomb. These are just a few of the voices which are really the instruments, though in many cases totally unconsciously so, of the enemy. Why can we not be realistic in our thinking in these matters when in so many ways in matters affecting our immediate personal lives and domestic problems we are so realistic a people?

I do not wish to use the precious minutes which I have with you in concrete examples because these are, to men like you, ever present. I do want to observe, however, that Nazi Germany had prepared the ground for the full capitulation of Munich with fears in England over the use of aerial warfare and missiles from the air. They did this by as insidiously planned means as the human mind can conceive. Already in 1933 and 1934, before the plans of Nazi world domination had developed to the all-embracing scope they afterwards assumed, the Nazi Government had notices posted in the houses and public buildings and in the streets in all German cities

and

out for time  
X  
that read  
up Marshall



and towns telling householders how they could protect themselves against air raids, and this was at a time when air power in England and France and in our country was relatively low and there was no thought of any aggression and not even of advance against anyone in the minds of the people. The Nazi Government did this in the very beginnings of the German air force program and they did it to instill fear in the mind of every German of an enemy which did not really exist but <sup>also</sup> in order to build, through that fear, the atmosphere in which they could proceed vigorously with the building up of the air program and the instruments which they did intend to use against others. The purpose of these warnings against air raids and how to protect against them was as much for effect outside of Germany as in Germany. In Germany it had the effect of making every man, woman and child believe that other countries, near and far, had tremendous air forces which they were already prepared to use relentlessly against Germany. The particular effect in England was that pamphlets which had been prepared by sound elements in the British Government on air raid protection were not distributed for years and until the German air force had actually been built up and was an immediate threat.

We cannot avoid war or stop danger by ignoring it. We are being asked again by so many unrealistic thinkers to do the same things that were done before. These unrealistic thinkers believe that agreements not to use a bomb or any weapon, would have meaning when someone wishes to use it who had such an implacable purpose as the German Nazis had, and we must certainly know that Soviet Russia now has. The experiences we learned from the relentless practices and the insidious planning of the Nazi German Government seem to have already been forgotten.

Timing has always been an element in warfare, but with the development of modern life and modern war timing has become a major factor. The Nazi leaders of Germany knew this. They knew what they wanted and they wanted to attain it by instilling fear of themselves and without war, but they knew that they needed time in order to build up the capacity militarily to impose themselves by force when that imposition became necessary. They used every conceivable method to gain their ends without force but they did not neglect to build up feverishly the force necessary to achieve the end. To some of us who lived through this period of feverish German preparation for war in every possible field this impression is as vivid as it was from 1933 to the beginnings of the last war.

The major mistake which the Nazi German leaders made was to precipitate their course of "peaceful penetration" and control. They became intoxicated with their successes in this method of operation and one can see how that intoxication had a real basis. They became intoxicated with what they saw of their own military strength and the degree to which they had developed it and they were impelled to its use before they should have used it because they misjudged the timing and the strength of those who still had the will to defend themselves. Had Nazi Germany continued the course of "peaceful penetration" there is no telling to what degree the situation would have deteriorated in other countries of the world and there is no telling whether in due course they would not have gained their ends with-

out

out the use of the force which they had built up. My memory serves me only too vividly in this respect because I knew some of our countrymen, and I am not speaking of bund fuhrers but of apparently responsible persons of my acquaintance, who were already sure in their perverted minds that they would be the gauleiters in our country.

The Soviet with respect to this factor of time and timing is following the same policy as Nazi Germany. They wish to gain their ends by "peaceful penetration" and control, but they are even more determined and realistic about the necessity of building up force and even more determined in the use of it when necessary. It takes no profound student of history to note that the success of "peaceful penetration" as followed by the Soviet is having just as spectacular and just as effective results as the same policy followed by the Nazis. Already in the new countries behind the Iron Curtain resistance under the unrelenting and relentless methods used by the Soviet is becoming less and in an incredibly short space of time resistance is being replaced by resignation and complete acceptance is already in the offing. In the areas still ostensibly unaffected by the Soviet penetration the situation in some respects has been strengthened and is being strengthened by measures which we, at extraordinary sacrifice, have taken to hold the dam.

It is my considered opinion that diplomatic effort and money and all kinds of aid, whether it be military or pecuniary or moral, cannot of themselves withstand the effects of time and continued unrelentless application of Soviet policy of penetration. Let us not forget that the economic situation in Austria when the Germans took it over by force was relatively good in Europe. Let us not forget that the military position, in terms of

real

real strength, and strategically, as well as morally, in Czechoslovakia was very strong, when almost in a day Nazi Germany took over without a struggle. Military aid, pecuniary aid and moral aid are limited in their application and scope, in effectiveness. It is the inevitable fears of peoples and the pressures of fears and the deterioration which comes through the undermining effect of the passage of time and the uncertainty of the future and the lack of confidence in capacity to protect oneself, when standing alone, that decrees and determines the final attitudes of peoples when "peaceful penetration" enters into the final phases.

I have been in favor of every measure which our government and others have undertaken in the way of diplomatic action, propaganda, pecuniary aid, military aid and every one of the ingenious forms that implementation of our policy has assumed. Out of my personal experience through direct contact with the problems which we have to meet today and out of my knowledge of what others have learned from the accumulated experiences of history, I am in complete accord with every major line of political and diplomatic action that our Government has taken since the end of the last war and more particularly in the last years. In spite of this I am not convinced that time is working in our favor.

I read a few days ago an editorial by my good friend David Lawrence in his extraordinarily good publication, UNITED STATES NEWS & WORLD REPORT (issue of March 17, 1950), entitled "The Battle Against Fear". I know of no more patriotic and in many ways more experienced journalist than David Lawrence. Without any pretensions he is as a rule a sound thinker. He has all the basic qualities and character which make our people still the greatest and finest people in the world. His idealism as shown by this editorial

is

is overwhelming and submerges the realism which generally characterizes his thinking and writing.

Until a few years ago time may have worked in our favor. I am convinced that it is no longer working in our favor. I am not a defeatist. I am what I hope is a sound combination of the idealist and the realist, but I have always known and in fifty years of making my own living and in honestly trying to help to make the living of others easier and better I have learned that the possession of ideals is necessary to any satisfaction in living no matter what other material satisfactions one may earn or have forced upon one. I have learned, however, that no ideal is attained without maintaining a completely realistic attitude towards weight of experience, the nature of peoples and the effect of time and work as essential factors. Just because I have learned the extraordinary effectiveness of time and of effort I see that at least the factor of time is working against us, while so far as effort is concerned our enemy is certainly making as great an effort as we are and with time there is at least the probability that his effort will become increasingly as effective as ours.

One factor in our favor is that our people are still for full armament. All the money needed or reasonably needed can be got for the Army and Navy and Air Forces. We are prepared to give Marshall aid and to make the necessary tax sacrifices. We are prepared to vote all the money necessary for vast information programs. We are prepared to give the money for intelligence services into which, in my opinion, we are putting too much confidence. We are running the grave risk of deluding ourselves into thinking that by tax sacrifices and by spending at home and abroad we are effectively protecting ourselves.

The

The fear is still in our hearts but we must not permit those who through their fears were so wrong before to lead us into wrong solutions now.

The longer the situation behind the Iron Curtain lasts the more strongly it will be consolidated. Time <sup>in this respect</sup> helps the stronger and not the weaker.

Resistance is being wiped out in these controlled areas deliberately. It is a deliberate, cruel and relentless policy. Perhaps in a measure it is intended by the Soviet as a shock to us and as a warning to us. But it is meant more to shock those capable of resistance in these countries and in immediately neighboring countries. The effect on us is intended to be more remote but with time to become in the same measure effective. It is a deliberately cruel and relentless policy because the Soviet knows that is the only way to wipe out resistance and wiping out resistance is the objective. Too many of us are passing our time in asking ourselves and debating questions such as "How can the Soviet do this to others and to us?" What we should be concerned about is not this futile question, but we should be concerned about the purpose behind all this deliberate wiping out of resistance and what it means for the particular country and people and for us. We should recognize that history teaches us that once resistance is wiped out the new order is accepted practically as though there had never been another.

What we are doing to help to keep up resistance in these countries may be good but it will not save anything if all that is good in a country is wiped out. We have to recognize that efforts from without to keep up resistance within a country have little effect against the cruelty involved in wiping out every show of resistance in a country. If this deliberate wiping out of resistance keeps up we will have a Soviet Russia everywhere except in our country in what is in history a relatively short time, and

in



in such a world what could we long do? We can ask ourselves what we could do in such a world with all idealism and right living wiped out, after we have destroyed the Soviet with our bombs. We have to keep in mind that if the present situation as it is developing lasts too long and the Soviet is given sufficient time, victory by us would mean nothing, and that Soviet domination and ideologies would govern even if the Soviet regime is destroyed. If the world is to be safe either the Soviet will have to precipitate the issue soon and be beaten or we will have to precipitate it. Time is working in this fundamental respect for the Russians and they know it. What we are doing now is to let the Russians choose their time and perhaps they will not make the mistake like Hitler did, and then all that we have been and are working for runs at least a risk of being destroyed.

I wish to mention a few weaknesses in our position.

The Soviet has a platform in the United Nations and a sounding board and propaganda organ in our press which for it have a value which money and even power cannot buy. The only reason why the Soviet stays in the United Nations is to retain this platform. She has no use for such instruments as the United Nations in which we should and properly do place so much faith and value. For her it is purely a sounding board and a time-saving device. I am sure none of us took seriously the threats of the Soviet to leave the United Nations on the basis of her objection to the retention of his seat by the Chinese representative. Our press, and in this must be included to some extent our best press, helps the Soviet by giving their irresponsible, devious, mendacious and threatening presentations and explanations of acts the widest possible hearing. I refer only as an example to the handling of the Vogeler matter which was effectively helpful in the last analysis to the Soviet, and we gave them the publicity in the press and on the radio that they could not have bought with money or by any diffusion means directly of their own. A McMahon speech causes rejoicing and satisfaction in Moscow. The idea could not have been better conceived in Moscow, and yet the man who made the speech is a thoroughly good and intelligent man who because of lack of knowledge and background is not able to form the realistic and understanding judgments which are necessary these days.

We

We have not helped matters by some of our attitudes in the armed forces. We have washed too much of our dirty linen in public. We have permitted very reasonable and proper discussions of differences to be aired in the press when they should have been settled in the councils of government and the armed forces. Our armed forces are not entirely blameless in this. There was a very pertinent editorial in the NEW YORK TIMES in February to the effect that Crommelin should have carried on his polemics within the Navy and the armed forces and not aired them before the public. The greatest danger to us, however, from a Crommelin is not at home but abroad, where an arm of government not disciplining an officer is looked upon as a real weakness. We are apt to judge these things by our own standards and not by the standards of others, but in matters of this kind where prestige is so fundamentally important we cannot neglect what others who are our friends and whom we wish to keep as our friends and whose morale we must maintain, think.

We have done ourselves incredible harm in real ways and in loss of prestige through the attitude assumed by some of our highest government officials who, it would appear for political reasons, have called the search for Communists a red herring. In the light of continuing developments this would appear to be a most serious act. Our Secretary of State stages a defense of Hiss who had had two trials and a conviction by a jury of acts equivalent to treason, and when he considers that public opinion compels him to account for the position taken, he states that the statement with regard to Hiss was made by him as a Christian. Without in any way questioning the motivation behind the attitude taken, there is no doubt that the explanation did not remove any of the feelings which had been aroused by the original statement.

In

In my remarks in October 1948 with respect to the diplomatic instrument before and during war I said that the effect of diplomatic action depended almost entirely on the prestige of our country and the confidence which other countries have in us and in the instrument which conducts and implements that policy. We need that confidence and prestige more than ever. Statements that the Communist hunt is a red herring when public opinion has been convinced by proved acts that there are Communists and traitors in important government offices, disorient and confuse public opinion at a time when government must have behind it a clearly defined public opinion. To call the Communist hunt a red herring does not protect us from Communist sabotage.

The fact that men like Hiss and Fuchs are sick men does not lessen in any importance the danger of their acts and repentance by them does not undo the harm that they have done and partial condonance of their acts does not prevent their repetition by others. The announcement that Kennan was leaving the Planning Board, temporarily or permanently, without adequate explanation therefor being given to the public, was confusing and disoriented not only our own people but friends everywhere. It was widely known through his own statements, or statements which were known to be his, what his attitude was with respect to the Soviet and its procedures and acts and strategy. Whether he left the Planning Board temporarily or permanently is not known to the confused public today. Whether he left it because of frustration through differences or through incapacity to act, or whether he left because of a change of policy is known to very few, and the confusion in the minds of thoughtful Americans, as well as men in high place in other countries, persists. They cannot interpret it in any other way except as a change of policy with respect to the Soviet. The explanations which have been made it would seem were almost deliberately confusing and intended to create uncertainty. If

that

that was the intention it was a grave policy error. If it was not done with intent then it was stupidity of a kind which seems incredible in our time. ~~I emphasize this because not only did we leave this confusion, but the man who replaced him, while he may be in every way an excellent man and with the same ideas as Kennan, is considered by many because of previous connections, expressed thoughts and some activities as holding views entirely too friendly to the ideas which are basic in Communism and near-Communism.~~

Our Secretary of State, in whose official acts since he became Secretary of State I have complete confidence, has for a number of reasons been obliged to protest too much. He has had to protest as to his own convictions and thinking and policy from the day that he came into the Department as Secretary until today, when he has had to defend himself with reference to his statements in the Hiss matter and with regard to the allegations as to Communists in the State Department. He is a man of high character and great loyalties, but the problems of our country and the responsibilities of position go beyond friends and associations.

We permit men of known Communist and near-Communist leanings to teach in our universities, to write in our press, and we defend it on the basis of free speech. No one could be more zealous than myself in his defense of academic freedom and of freedom of expression. Communism, however, is basically a sickness and not a political doctrine. Better said, the apostles of Communism are sick men. If we are going to permit academic freedom and freedom of the press to the limit, at least we shall have to make it necessary that those who are Communists and who propagate the doctrine do so openly and branded as such, and are not permitted to continue to operate as wolves in sheep's clothing. The incalculable harm which has been

done

not read  
at that will  
cut out  
definitely  
Ed Gibson  
revised  
to delete  
9 am 4/16/62

done to a very considerable part of our young men and women in some of our most responsible institutions cannot be underestimated and these institutions have produced too many with completely distorted social ideas.

There are too many people today who are wealthy who are sick of wealth. We have too many young people who revolt against the wealth of their parents while calmly enjoying the benefits thereof. There are too many people who fight things big in business and do not realize that it is through bigness that most of our industrial progress has been possible and that through it we were able to establish a scale of living which extended its benefits widely and way down among our people. We have too much seeking of security at the expense of independence in living and thinking and of continued personal initiative. The spirit of adventure among our people is already passing. Some of us wonder whether the G. I. in the next war will show the same initiative as he did in the last.



I am one of those who believe that the major lines of policy which we have been following since the end of the last war have been sound and constructive, and for the most part wise and the best that could be done. Our weakness lies not in the policies which we have been following but rather in the weakness of the instruments who have to conduct and implement policy. Important members of government in whom our people and other peoples must have the most complete and unquestioned confidence, have been constantly under attack. The State Department, which after all is and must remain the instrument for the final formulation, conduct and implementation of policy, is under constant attack, and has been for some years. Until a few years ago there was the most complete confidence in our State Department at home and in a very large measure abroad. When our people see it constantly attacked in the press and men holding high office therein constantly put on the defensive it creates a lack of confidence and a confusion which is doing us immeasurable and I hope not irreparable harm.

My conviction is that the weakness does not lie in policy, or in the departments as such, or even in the ideas held by most of the men in high places who are under such constant attack. The weakness lies in the unfortunate circumstance that some of these men have laid themselves open to attack and their assailability in times like these has been too great.

The

The Soviet leaders from Stalin down are almost entirely names to us, still surrounded by mystery which has not been dispelled by some of the articles and books which have been written about them. They have surrounded themselves by mystery and we have intensified that mystery and unintentionally emphasized their power. While the acts of the Soviet Government and the real character of its leaders are shrouded in this mystery which gives the aura of power, we parade for them and for their people all of our weaknesses and differences. This is essentially dangerous, for some of us know that it was the Nazi over-emphasis on this parade which we made of our weaknesses and differences that made them think that we were weaker than we were and encouraged them to their reckless course.

The Soviet has always counted on our power being weakened through financial and economic difficulties. While they used this hope for propaganda purposes and its effect on weaker peoples who look to us, we at home felt ourselves very strong. A good many of us are now wondering whether our financial position is not becoming weaker and if our tax and other burdens may not be increasing to a danger point.

We have to spend to help to maintain the financial and economic position in so many parts of the world. I believe that what we have done is wise and that most of it has been done soundly. When we started on these programs it was specifically with the idea that the effect thereof would be felt sufficiently rapidly and that the aid could be given on a diminishing scale. We are already feeling the strain. The support in public opinion, which is reflected in the Congress, for Marshall aid is less and less. The support for the arms program which started out so strong is decreasing so that the program is already seriously affected and there is less confidence in it at the receiving end. The demand for full financial, economic and military aid is increasing in the receiving countries rather than decreasing. Our expectations for a downward trend in demands on us has not been realized.

We have not exhausted our resources, like Britain <sup>and others have partially done</sup> ~~has done~~, but we are weakening our power to produce the wealth which we are diffusing. The very existence of the aid which we are giving and which is only possible because

of

of certain conditions we have been able to maintain in our country is threatened by some of the acts which the receiving countries are taking or which have their reflection on us or which they are trying to force on us and which will reduce our power to produce.

The Soviet is counting more than ever on this factor of financial exhaustion in the United States and on the opposition of the people of our country to the continuance of the aid programs.

Every year brings a wider demand for money and leadership and every year is bringing less capacity to meet the demand. The anomaly is that Russia, which is in every way, financially, industrially and generally economically weaker, is getting stronger with time, while we are getting weaker with time and in this respect time is against us.

In this connection I would like to make the observation that I do not think it is true that the Soviets do more thinking and planning than we do. The substantial difference is that they do their thinking more realistically and act more ruthlessly and are not bound by the reserves which cripple us.

In the last few months there has been less talk in high places about the imminence and inevitability of war. We now talk about the war coming in five or ten years instead of being in the offing. Some high military leaders in our country are quoted as saying that war is no longer imminent. They do not stress, as they did, the inevitability. What they do not say and what they must think is that every year which passes is certain to make war more inevitable, more costly, more destructive, and the issue less certain and the recovery from the effects of war longer and more difficult.

There are encouraging features in the situation. The elections in Australia and New Zealand give us some hope. The elections in Britain are extraordinarily significant. Let us, just for the record and our thinking, not forget the noise which the Communists made in the last House of Commons. The rest of the world almost got to think that they were a majority from the noise which they made. Basic Communist doctrine is that Communists must be vocal and always the first and last heard. It was also Nazi strategy. Parenthetically, I recall as of interest that in a Cuban constitutional convention about a decade ago there were some eleven Communists, but they were so vocal, always present and first and last to be heard on any point, and when the constitution emerged it was quite clear that the eleven Communist members of the convention had had more influence in shaping the new constitution than the more than 280 other members.

With respect to the British elections as a hopeful sign I would observe that in January and February of this year I could not help but form the impression in England that a great mass of the people in practically all social levels had reached the point where their great virtue of patience and endurance had turned to resignation and acceptance, and that as we know is the first step to the abdication of will and resistance. What was happening in England through calculated acts of the Labor Government was exactly what had happened in Germany where the Nazis gave full employment, social services, holidays and extravagant promises as an anodyne and meanwhile were forging the chains that made the German people slaves. Perhaps England

has

not future  
not  
not  
not



has waked up and this is of tremendous importance to us.

Private enterprise in Britain was being throttled and gradually but definitely destroyed. If the Labor Party had had a clear victory and majority in this last election private enterprise and initiative would have received a blow in England that would have been fatal and in my opinion in a relatively short time England could no longer have been counted upon as a stable and healthy ally. A Labor victory would have had almost fatal repercussions in many countries of Europe which are still struggling to maintain sound policy, and a Labor victory would have had serious repercussions in our own country. Destroy enterprise and initiative and you have a Communist victory just as much and perhaps more definitely than if it had been imposed by Communist military force instead of by suicide.

The last elections in Britain meant more for us and other countries than any election in any other country than ours has meant. It is the first time that an election in another country has been as important for us in many ways as one of our elections. I would like to observe that the result is all the more important as it was fought out in the real sense of the word and perhaps even more so than in some of our elections in which the issues are not so clearly defined. There was no confusion in the minds of the British people as to the issue at stake.

— X

I remain of the opinion that one of the primary decisions we have to make is whether we <sup>can</sup> will fight a preventive war. Some of those who were so strongly convinced that in a preventive war lay our own safety are strangely silent. The question is now being asked whether it is too late for a preventive war. There is no doubt that realistic thinking compels us to admit that we have lost two years and that the Soviet has gained two years which for it are very precious. I still remain of the opinion that this is a major decision to which we must give our earnest thought. The principal obstacle to preventive wars seems to be not that we do not recognize, and this more generally than is believed, in high places that a preventive war is necessary, but rather that we are told that countries like ours do not and cannot fight a preventive war. I do not agree. We may not fight a preventive war but it is not because we cannot fight a preventive war. Nor do I agree with the contention that countries do not fight preventive wars. You who are more careful students of history in this respect than I, are aware of the many examples of war which in history are called aggressions but which are in the mind of the aggressor simple preventive wars. We recognize that there are aggressive wars. We have had to fight and win two wars because an aggressor had to fight before he was ready, or before he was as strong as he thought he was or because the attacked was stronger than he thought. We quibble about words very often when there is much at stake. This time really our future is at stake. We are so realistic about some things

things that it is difficult to understand why we cannot be so realistic about this major vital decision. We may be rapidly approaching the time when a preventive war on our part is no longer possible because the aggressor feels that his moment has come to use his power and will to use his power in order to prevent any possibility of our strength increasing and his diminishing. After all, it is only a question of who will begin the preventive war. Parenthetically I may observe with regard to our quibbling about words, that I recall only too distinctly that before the Second World War, and in the first stages of it, there were some of us who could not even mention the fact, and the recognized fact, that it was basically an ideological war. I remember so distinctly how definitely I was forbidden to use that word in documents and speeches. And yet, after two years of the war the main support for it from our people was aroused through our making it clear that it was an ideological war and because our people were convinced that it was an ideological war.

You military are accustomed to deal with the realities of war. You would prefer that our people and our policy makers would deal with the question of war and peace in all their stark realities, for you know that in such realistic dealing with the issue there lies the possibility of action by peoples, statesmen and governments to prevent war. You know that you have to be the instrument with which the war will be fought but you do not make it. In great and powerful countries like ours and in our time of global and total war, wars have to be fought as global wars and they are not started by a few men or by the armed forces. Wars in our time are forced by the imperative necessity of preservation of a people and a way of living.

We know that war cannot be stopped by international agreements. We know that wars cannot be prevented purely by superior military preparation

and

and superiority in one country. We know that wars can only be prevented by such definite determination on the part of the stronger to use its power and to show on every occasion that he will use it. This is the only intimidation which will stop an enemy such as the one by whom we are faced. In such a situation as the one in which we have been in the last few years and are today diplomatic maneuvers are acts in a cold war and are therefore not really purely diplomatic procedure. When we speak today of sound foreign policy it is no longer a question of speaking of purely diplomatic moves as we knew them in the past, because every diplomatic move today in a period of cold war has to be a political and military one. The maneuvers of the Soviet in the Berlin blockade were a diplomatic and military step. The maneuver of the Soviet was stopped because we met it with a show of military power and determined will of a people. The Soviets wanted to show us and the Germans and Europe what they could do when they chose to do it and we countered the ill-advised step of the Soviet and used it to our advantage. Had we not decided resolutely on the airlift or had we not been able to carry it through the situation in Europe would have deteriorated much more by this time, instead of having in a number of respects materially improved. The airlift was the most impressive demonstration of what we can do and what will we can show to implement policy and to thwart an enemy.

Marshall aid is a diplomatic as well as a military policy. Had we not decided on Marshall aid and hurried it through there would have been Communist governments in Italy and France and <sup>probably</sup> in England eventually, in that order. The Socialist Labor Government in England would have become entrenched, not by the agreement of the English people but through their resignation to circumstances. Attlee and Bevin would soon have had to give way to Shinwell and Strachey and Aneurin Bevan. The decent-minded Socialists

in

in England such as Attlee and Cripps and Bevin would have been hanged by Ziliacus and his crew, just as they are being hanged and murdered in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It is not too much to say that this last election in England has saved many a decent Englishman with good intentions from being interred in the grave which he had unconsciously digging for himself.

Let us not be too complacent about our own situation. We are getting more and more confused in our thinking. It was extraordinary to what degree among some of my friends <sup>had</sup> the mistaken idea that Marshall aid such as we are giving in Europe would have the same helpful effect in China and in the Far East and even in Russia. In the Far East it would only have fattened our enemies and strengthened their aims and made them stronger instruments in any conflict undertaken by Soviet Russia to destroy us. In Russia we would have fattened our enemy. Would the country that would not let its own people know what we gave them and did for them in the last war let their people know what we were doing for them through Marshall aid? Perhaps they were right during and immediately after the last war in not letting their people know what we had done, for the Soviet leaders must have known that letting their people know the truth would be the end of their power and their aims.

But even if that was not the reason we know, as our State Department and our military have consistently said, that you cannot make any agreement with the Soviet and expect it to be kept. We are not dealing with a people or with the leaders of a people which can express its will. We are dealing, as we did in the case of Nazi Germany in the beginning, with a tight, self-imposed regime that means to keep power and to establish certain ideas.

These observations, gentlemen, which I have been able to make in the generous, and of course at the same time necessarily limited period, of an hour represent the best thoughts that I can give you at this time. You will deduce from these observations that I remain of the opinion that a preventive war is still the only means through which we can be certain to maintain our security and our way of life for ourselves and for the rest of the world. I am sure I need not tell you that I hold this opinion because I see in military force and the application of it in war the only solution. I believe that certain other forces and instruments if given adequate and full play and effect could still make such a war unnecessary, but the same realism which has led me to the conclusion that preventive war is the only safe solution is that which has led me to the conviction that these other forces cannot be made adequately and broadly enough to prevail in time either with us and within us and among other peoples. When we consider our own situation at home in government and in our relationships which make up the sum of our national life and see that neither statesmen nor politicians can rise above petty personal weaknesses and ambitions; when we see that capital and labor cannot work together in their common interest in the way that they should because of human weaknesses; when we see that in spite of our recognition of the grave danger which threatens to destroy everything we have and wish to conserve we permit our personal interests, prejudices and weaknesses still to transcend and control, I can have no hope that we will in time make these forces prevail within and among us. In the same way when I



1896

- 41 -

see the same thing happening in every part of the world among every people in even more aggravated measure than among ourselves, I can have no hope that we will in time, before the enemy has sufficient time to disrupt and destroy and disorganize, make these forces which are at our command prevail and obtain adequately. This may seem profound pessimism, but I am one who has struggled for fifty years for ideals, always with the realization that the only safe judgment for action is based in experience and profound realism in implementing that experience and knowledge.