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PRELIMINARY PAPER

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A SOCIAL CONTROL ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
OF FOUR DISTURBANCES

John S. Fitzpatrick

with the assistance of

J. Rick Ponting

and

E.L. Quarantelli

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

The Approach

This report selectively analyzes four different civil disturbances¹ that occurred in the summer of 1969. The cities involved, three in the midwest and one in the south central section of the United States, are all major metropolitan centers with a substantial nonwhite population. Some of these cities have experienced civil disorders in their recent past, others have not. However, no systematic attempt is made to relate past events with those under examination in this analysis. Each disturbance is primarily analyzed as a separate case study of a contemporary incident, although some comparisons are made between them.

The cases presented also represent, in one sense, a continuum of seriousness from major to minor. Standard "objective" criteria for evaluating the seriousness of a civil disorder usually involves such matters as number of participants, duration of the disturbance, casualty counts, numbers and types of arrests, incidents of looting, amount of property damage, and the like (see Quarantelli and Dynes, 1973). On the basis of such "objective" criteria none of our events could be classified as major. However, it is also possible to incorporate "subjective" criteria such as the perception of observers and participants, into a classification scheme. This is what was done in our analysis. Thus, the disturbance considered major in Case Study 1 was not characterized, to any appreciable extent, by the massive lootings, extensive fires, and wholesale casualties descriptive of past disorders in Watts, Detroit, or Newark (for general descriptions see the Kerner Report, 1968). Nevertheless, as the largest civil disturbance in the city to that time, those involved defined the event in Case Study 1 as being of major proportions. On the other end of the continuum the disorder in Case Study 4 was perceived as minor. Case Studies 2 and 3 fell somewhere in the middle on the basis of subjective criteria.

A racial factor is involved in the disturbances reviewed. Each centered around a confrontation between black "ghetto" inhabitants and predominantly white-manned social control agencies such as the police and the National Guard. Because of this, these events may differ in certain significant ways from other recent types of civil disturbances that have appeared in American society, notably campus disruptions or Vietnam War demonstrations.

The approach utilized in this study was initially intended to be multi-dimensional. That is, the report was to have presented the varying perceptions and divergent accounts of the disorders as seen from the perspective of the traditionally white social control agencies and from the view of a multiplicity of black organizations. Such an approach is not totally new. The Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence fruitfully used this approach in its study of a riot in Richmond, California (Kapsis et al., 1970). Unlike many other case studies which attempt to find "what really happened" (i.e., the one "true" account), Kapsis and his associates argue that a unidimensional approach conveys a false sense of authenticity by attempting to synthesize divergent versions of what happened during a civil disturbance. Furthermore, the strain towards descriptive consistency inherent in the unidimensional approach destroys the very essence of a civil disturbance, which is a series of group conflict encounters.

However, we were not able, as originally conceived, to replicate in part, the Kapsis study. The data collected from the black organizations was not as systematic as that from the social control agencies, and simply of not good enough quality for the intended purpose. As such, we had to forego a multi-dimensional approach using the perspective of black as well as other groups involved in any of the disturbances. This report, then, will present a study of social control agencies, primarily police department perceptions of civil disturbances. Furthermore, although we use the concept perception, the perspective employed is organizational rather than social psychological. The descriptive accounts which follow are necessarily composite organizational perspectives.²

Data Sources

In the field studies associated directly or indirectly with this research, a considerable amount of data was collected from black and from white respondents and informants in a variety of agencies and groups. This report uses only selected portions of the information gathered by the Disaster Research Center (DRC). None of the material collected from the black groups or mass media organizations, for example, was utilized either to develop the descriptions or make the analysis.

There were three major sources of data used for this report.

1. In 1968 DRC had studied a number of public agencies in the four cities, as well as others, in an attempt to gather baseline data on organizational and community expectations and planning for civil emergencies.³ Data from this research was gathered some six to nine months prior to the outbreak of any of the disturbances we studied. In general, this data provides for this report, in some cases, previously held perceptions of when and where racial hostilities would emerge, "troublesome" people and groups within given cities, and projected techniques for suppressing civil hostilities.

2. A series of tape recorded interviews, about 50 in number, were obtained a few days to six weeks after the disorders. The bulk of these interviews were with primarily high ranking officials from the police and fire departments⁴ of the affected city, county sheriff organizations, and National Guard units from their respective states. These interviews were generally the prime sources used to develop the descriptions of the four civil disturbances.

3. In addition to interviews, various documents were obtained by DRC from the different social control agencies. These documents included intraorganizational memoranda, after-action reports, arrest records, and plans and handbooks of operational procedures. In general, such material was used as supplementary to the interview data, but in the absence of adequate interviews (such as the absence of tape recorded interviews with police respondents in one city) had to be relied on more heavily than might have been desired. After-action reports, for example, are oriented toward the organization as a whole, and therefore, do not reveal the subtleties and individual variation evident in interview transcripts. Additionally, after-action reports as public documents tend to justify both the actions of subordinates to their superiors and the actions of the department as a whole to the citizens of a community. Still, the documentary data does include information on the events obtainable from no other sources and in totality involves quantitatively more data than is usually available to researchers into civil disturbances.

The Descriptive and Analytical Framework

The literature on disorders depicts the dynamics of disturbances in a variety of ways. A typical framework used is that of singling out some event or incident as a "precipitating" factor. Thus, the McCone report (1965) singles out an arrest of two black brothers as the triggering event for the whole Watts disturbance in 1965; the Kerner (1968) and other reports typically point to the police raid on the "Blind Pig" (i.e., an illegal after hours drinking place) as the crucial incident generating the Detroit racial riots of 1967.

In our report we depart somewhat from this traditional view of the dynamics of collective violence. We feel that such terminology and conceptualization renders an injustice to the collective dynamics involved. It is our position that such kinds of events merely set the stage for the possibility of a disturbance. They do not ipso facto either hasten the occurrence of the disturbance, or draw out a disorder from some nebulous "grievance bank," as might be inferred from the somewhat chemical use of the word.

We also feel that a refinement of the concept of precipitating event into two distinct concepts -- mainly the setting event and keynoting behaviors -- will enhance the predictive utility of the conceptualization. The concept "precipitating event" does not adequately discriminate between those setting events which are followed by disturbances and those which are not. Illustrative of this point is the situation soon to be described in detail, which took place in Case Study 1. Police department records note at least four different incidents which occurred in the days prior to the outbreak of the disturbance which would ordinarily be termed "precipitating events." Yet none of the four incidents were followed by a disorder, at least as officially defined, and certainly nothing which was qualitatively similar to the disturbance which we shall analyze.⁵

Because of observations of this kind of recurrent phenomena and other reasons, we feel more attention should be directed towards the properties of keynoting behavior. Keynoting, to use Turner and Killian's standard definition, means "the presentation of a positive suggestion in an ambivalent frame of reference" (1972:89). The limits of our data on keynoting in the incidents we studied do not allow us to approach, for example, a test of the multiple-nuclei model offered by Hundley (1969:485-486). But we will order some of our descriptive accounts using the concept of keynoting and we shall offer suggestions as to the analytical usefulness of the concept.

In each case study that follows, we open with a brief, general description of the city and some remarks on the character of the neighborhoods where the disturbances took place.⁶ These observations are followed by a discussion of the setting event and keynoting behaviors, and a descriptive chronology of the major events of the disturbance period. Next some comments are made about the termination of the disorders, including the general control strategy used. Each case study then concludes with a section noting the organizational perceptions of the opposing black participants and an evaluation of the organization itself. The last part of this report brings together some overall comments cutting across the four case studies, and a few remarks on the implication of our analysis for understanding disturbances.

Our general but nonetheless restricted objective particularly needs to be kept in mind in reading what follows. We do not attempt a synthesis of different views of various participants in a disturbance, the descriptive and analytical procedure typically followed in sociological accounts of this kind of collective violence. Our goal instead is to present the almost certainly partial and selective, not to mention probably inconsistent perspective of the social control agencies involved in these four disturbances. The emergent picture may not be as neat and clear as in most accounts, but it may be nearer to the situation as it was perceived by a major party to the conflict, the social control agencies.

PART II: CASE STUDY 1

Description and Background

Our first case study involves a midwestern city with a metropolitan area population of around a million. The black residents are approximately one fifth of the central city population. The city is a major manufacturing center with tool and die, industrial machinery, and electrical equipment industries being dominant. Banking, insurance, wholesale and retail distribution, government, and educational institutions are also significant employers. White collar occupations make up about 50 percent of the work force.

The black population is concentrated in the central section of the city primarily on the east and south sides. The black areas of the city do not call forth the typical stereotype of an urban ghetto with large decaying, closely packed tenements, garbage strewn streets, and the building stoops occupied by unemployed men, dirty children, and sodden winos. Two story single family dwellings with small lawns and trees are the rule. The black occupied areas are among the oldest in the city, houses are closely pressed together, boarded up store fronts are evident, small evangelistic churches are as common as neighborhood taverns but, on the whole, conditions in these neighborhoods are probably not any worse than those found in the student occupied university district or in other areas where Appalachian whites are dominant.

The disorder took place in the east side black neighborhood. The disturbance was focused at a major intersection on a city thoroughfare approximately 20 blocks from the city center. However, before detailing the chronology of this disturbance we will note the respondents' varying perceptions of the background or setting of the disturbance. Considerable variation occurs in terms of the degree of specificity of these perceptions, their articulation, and the proximity of the respondent to the area. Perceptions sometimes also vary greatly between different respondents in the same organization. Thus, we have one high ranking National Guard officer describing the disturbance area as disadvantaged and therefore, potentially explosive. At the same time another National Guard officer saw the setting in terms of black revolutionaries teaching black youngsters "to hate whites," particularly the police as the "enemy" and teaching them that anything they can do to whites such as stoning their cars, is for the "good of humanity."

A local safety official held a middle view seeing the community as "boiling, all the time boiling," with some people just looking for an excuse to "start things." However, he felt that if a riot occurred it would be instigated by outsiders rather than by the local citizenry. A somewhat similar view of the area's black residents as being rather content was expressed by a white fire department officer with 15 years of experience working in the strife-torn area and who felt he knew the people. He said, "I was of the feeling that our problem was over. Two years ago [the residents] became more friendly . . . I didn't think they would stone us, I didn't think they'd throw bottles, I didn't think they'd fire bomb us, because I felt that we had a better relation and understanding."

Official police after-action reports regarded the entire curfew area as a rough one. One report gave a detailed statistical crime and arrest profile of the area,

describing it in terms of having disproportionately high crime rates compared to the remainder of the city. Another report cited the corner where the disorders erupted as "a source of police problems for some time." These problems included robbery, muggings, prostitution, gambling, narcotics, vandalism, and the "fencing" of stolen property. "Rock throwing is encouraged by the young adults who frequent the corner." Indeed, it was not uncommon for youngsters aged 12 to 17 years to gather in aggregates of 150 to 200 at a roller skating rink on the corner and hurl rocks, bottles, and verbal abuse at passing motorists during the evening hours.

In marked contrast to the above characterization were the perceptions of a black fire department respondent and resident of the riot area. He described the background in terms of residents' resentment of real or perceived exploitation by area merchants. He cited the frustration experienced by residents in trying to alleviate this exploitation and viewed the riot as an attempt to "get even" with the merchants and as the only way those who felt exploited knew how to fight back.

In summary, we note that some respondents perceived the setting as relatively calm while others saw it as boiling either with grievances or with the activities of revolutionaries. Some saw the potential rioters as exploitive thugs while another saw them as exploited themselves with an accompanying frustration that led to aggressive attempts to administer justice their own way. The major and, perhaps, only perception shared by the respondents was the agreement that the specific corner where the disturbance broke out was, indeed, a volatile trouble spot which had experienced prior minor disruptions.

The Setting Event and Keynoting Behavior

The question of what was defined as the setting and how it was defined is our next topic of discussion. Here we have a "lowest common denominator," which is to say that of those respondents who addressed themselves to this question, all agreed that the setting event was a shooting incident. Some respondents elaborated on this to indicate that the victim was a black male, the assailant a white neighborhood businessman, and the victim was killed. A black fire official provided more detail indicating the background of an argument which led to the shooting. According to him, the businessman, who operated a dry cleaning establishment, objected to the small neighborhood children tramping down the grass as they played in his back yard, the only available play area they had apart from the streets and alleys. The merchant allegedly spread broken glass around his back yard so that the children would cut themselves and be forbidden, by their parents, to continue playing there. Other neighborhood adults were reported to have protested this condition to the businessman who failed to take corrective action. The neighborhood was also supposedly incensed not only by these actions but by his attitudes. It was reported that the businessman disapproved of white and black children playing there together. "It was distinctly a racial thing." The victim came to protest the proprietor's actions and the latter pulled a gun and shot the victim three times.

This theme of legitimate grievances contrasted sharply with the perception of a white fire official who saw the shooting as merely an excuse used by subversive elements to arouse the neighborhood. "I definitely believe you have subversive elements in every end of town," he added.

An official police report gave more detail. This report indicated that the victim was 27 years old with the assailant 67 years of age. Furthermore, the shooting occurred shortly after noon on a Monday in the front doorway of the cleaners. In addition the police report can be interpreted as expressing the neighborhood feud from the assailant's point of view indicating that he "had prior trouble" with the victim. But even more important, the police reported that the suspect was transported unhandcuffed in an air conditioned police ambulance cruiser to police headquarters where he was charged with second degree murder with bond set at \$25,000.

Keynoting behaviors were perceived in various ways by different respondents. Only one respondent indicated that there had been any stone throwing on the part of the people who had gathered at the scene of the shooting. A fire official stated that a fire was started about one half block from the cleaning establishment shortly after the shooting. He said that the group that had gathered resolved to do something about the shooting but he did not indicate how this accord was reached nor what lines of action were advocated. The police reported that "male and female agitators harangued the crowd urging them to tear the town apart and to burn the cleaning establishment."

This then is the background against which the event developed. We now turn to a chronology of the disturbance. Again the perspective is primarily from that of the social control agencies involved.

Chronology of Events

To briefly recapitulate, we note that a black man was shot three times shortly after noon on a summer Monday by a white businessman in the doorway of the latter's dry cleaning establishment, in a predominantly black neighborhood. Police arrived on the scene by 12:10 pm and a crowd gathered. The victim was taken to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead-on-arrival. The assailant was transported to police headquarters in a manner which was deemed by some crowd members to constitute "preferred treatment," i.e., air conditioning and unhandcuffed.

Although a large number of people including some acting in a rather excited manner had gathered at the scene, by 1:30 pm most of them had been dispersed into smaller groups. Police intelligence personnel remained in the area in unmarked cars to observe the clusters of people. "Agitation" and rumor were seen by police as heightening tension and as representing "the major riot ignition factors, particularly in their effect on those in the 9 to 16 age bracket." Allegations were circulated to the effect that the assailant had also kicked the victim following the shooting and stories surfaced to the effect that black militants were coming from several nearby major cities to participate in the rioting. Businessmen, both in the area and in other sections of the city, reported receiving anonymous telephone calls that they would be targets for fire bombing.

At this point we may observe why the setting event and keynoting behaviors were seen by our social control respondents as escalating into something more than just these events themselves. Again, a white fire official attributed responsibility to "subversive elements," saying: "There isn't any doubt about it . . . all it needs is an incident to get these people (the subversives) to come forth and to try to stir,

and if they got a background of people to back them up and give them support . . . it will cause an incident." A high ranking National Guard officer concurred while also citing opportunism. He said that people "will take advantage of any opportunity to loot, burn, to steal or fall in, and this is how it gets out of hand." He said that someone did "stir them up."

The black fire official, however, put more emphasis on structural conduciveness, to use Smelser's term (1963: 240), especially the ease of communication among the aggrieved. This communicative ease resulted in rapid expansion of the crowd and a decision to do something about the injustice. He qualified his remarks with the opinion that escalation will not occur unless there is a background to the case. The implication is that the knowledge of this history must be shared within the collective memory of the aggrieved community.

For about 45 minutes, it appears that relative calm prevailed, with social control personnel noting no untoward activities, at least of an overt nature. However, at 2:45 pm a police captain reported a "little problem" in the area, with indications that a bigger disturbance would develop later. At about 3:30 pm the captain and three other police cruisers arrived at the crucial corner where the shooting had taken place and found about 100 persons throwing rocks and bottles with another 200 to 500 onlookers lending encouragement. One black boy was arrested for failing to comply with an order to depart, allegedly he was blocking the sidewalk. An adult male community leader and member of the Mayor's Human Relations Committee objected to the arrest and suggested that tension might be relieved if the lad were returned to his mother and permitted to return home with her. The police captain and his lieutenant conferred, agreed, radioed to have the boy returned to the scene, and turned him over to his mother. The tactic was successful and the crowd dispersed.

During this same incident a member of the Mayor's Community Relations Committee, who was also a clergyman, circulated among all the bars in the area with the lieutenant. They received promises from the bar owners that they would cooperate with the police in trying to cool the people's tempers, even to the point of closing if necessary.

About 4:00 pm a police conference was held in the parking lot of a nearby state agency. Included were the aforementioned captain and lieutenant, the Safety Director, and two sergeants. They discussed the general situation and the likelihood of further trouble.

Around 4:30 pm the off-duty assistant fire chief was notified of the general situation by telephone and asked to meet with the Safety Director. At 4:39 pm a fire station in the neighborhood was abandoned due to "unruly crowds roaming about the area." The men and apparatus moved to a safer location.

Another police report noted that at 4:20 pm small groups of boys (aged 9 to 16 years) were observed throwing rocks and bottles at passing motorists. "They would dart out from between buildings and throw several missiles before running to hide. Considerable damage was inflicted . . ." However, it was not clear whether this was a separate incident or merely a discrepancy in time. Either way, by 4:55 pm the area was quiet as six to twelve foot patrolmen watched the area.

Again a lull developed in the activity of the various small clusters of persons standing around the streets. The police attempted to maintain a normal traffic pattern. However, while some officials believed that the situation had been brought under control, other emergency organizations were preparing for further trouble.

Near 6:00 pm the Safety Director briefed the Assistant Fire Chief on the situation and indicated that he wanted the abandoned Fire station manned. A police guard was provided and the engine company returned to their post at 6:35pm. The Safety Director himself following his usual procedure for that day of the week went to the regular city council meeting.

Slightly earlier, between 6:00 pm and 6:30 pm a crowd of 50 to 75 people formed on the sidewalk outside a bar near the critical corner. The crowd swelled as people parked their cars on side streets and walked back to the bar. There a high ranking staff member of the Community Relations Commission was engaged in an argument with police. He said that there was no reason for the crowd having to move on and accused the police of attempting to provoke an incident. The police said that they explained to him their view on people gathering in the area at that time and invited him go for a ride in a cruiser to discuss the problem. He refused but agreed to meet with the lieutenant 10 minutes later at the state agency parking lot to discuss the matter. The Community Relations Committee member was then given an opportunity to try to disperse the crowd but failed in his effort.

According to the police report the lieutenant went to the meeting place waited 20 minutes, and was "forced to leave" before the Community Relations Committeeman arrived. He returned to the parking lot at 7:00 pm and was informed that the Community Relations man had been there and had refused an offer to have the lieutenant recalled "because he had to go to lunch."

By 7:15 pm the crowd at the bar was estimated at 100 and growing. "This group started to move toward eight police officers who were involved in chasing others... The crowds' mood was described as ugly by police officers at the scene." The lieutenant returned to the scene at 7:20 pm and found several hundred people throwing rocks and bottles at police officers and passing cars. Police reinforcements were requested.

The police report continued: "Within a matter of a couple of minutes approximately 1,500 people were throwing bottles and rocks at the officers and passing cars." By this time there were probably 2,000 or more onlookers and supporters of the crowd. The dry cleaning establishment was fire bombed and at 7:34 pm a fire department company was dispatched to the blaze. At 7:58 pm smoke was observed in the vicinity of a nearby printing company, which along with the dry cleaners, had been threatened with arson earlier in the day. Firemen responding to the fires were heavily pelted with rocks and bottles. According to a fire official who had responded to the alarm, the fire department company was at the fire site and among the crowd while the police were still mobilizing down the street. "We came right in on them . . . and I was walking right among them. I think they figured we were probably afraid of them and we didn't show much fear. I think they didn't know how to react." After 5 minutes of intensive barrage the respondent reported that he went to request police protection for his men from nearby police units.

At 7:55 pm the Riot Proclamation was read to the "mob" and the crowd was ordered to disperse. Phase I of the police riot plan was activated. This action primarily involved calling to duty the next shift. Just prior to this, at 7:30 pm, the Assistant Adjutant General of the National Guard received a telephone call from the Governor's Administrative Aide who had in turn been called by the city Safety Director. This series of calls alerted the National Guard to the possibility of their being needed in the city.

The crowd increased in size and by 8:00 or 8:45 pm (police reports are inconsistent) was described as occupying both sides of the street for a distance of about nine short blocks. At 8:17 pm the aforementioned police lieutenant ordered tear gas to the scene to help disperse the crowd. More tear gas was requested at 8:30 pm. Attempts to scatter the crowd met with minimal success. Around this time a curfew was invoked by the Safety Director and arrests were to be made for its violation. At 8:50 pm the police department of an adjacent suburb closed off the street to traffic at their boundary with the affected city upon request from the affected city's police department.

The first burglary and looting which was of a drugstore, in the riot area was reported just before nine o'clock. This was followed at 9:02 pm by further reports of store windows being broken nearby. Sometime during this period, between 8:56 pm and 9:04 pm, the second phase of the police riot plan was activated. Inconsistencies in police reports leave the question unanswered as to whether this activation occurred before or in response to the looting. This phase involved calling to duty the last relieved shift.

More looting and four more fire bombings, including one of a fire department car, by 9:25 pm made it apparent to fire officials that greater precautions would be required to provide protection for firemen. Thus, the fire department also escalated its response according to prior plans and went into a task force formation. Four task forces each composed of two engine companies, one ladder company, and one battalion chief went into operation shortly thereafter. At 9:40 pm an off-duty shift was called in, and while two more task forces were later assembled, they were not used.

At 9:40 pm the first sniper shot was recorded and more looting, window breaking, and fire-bombing occurred. At 10:00 pm phase III of the police riot plan was operationalized. This involved the automatic cancellation of leaves, vacations, and days-off, initiation of a system of two 12-hour shifts, and a request for assistance from civil and military agencies, including the activation of the Guard. Also, the sale of liquor was suspended in the county.

Several factors were behind the decision to activate the National Guard. First, the police decided that they would not withdraw and attempt to let the community leaders "cool" the situation. They felt that such a withdrawal would constitute abdication of responsibility and delegation of authority. Secondly, the police had serious misgivings about the efficacy of counter-rioters. Feeling that their alternatives had thus been restricted, the police department justified its actions in the following manner: "The appropriate city officials made the decision to restore order and protect lives and property in the affected areas once it became evident that the technique of negotiation and persuasion were not having the desired effect."

A high ranking National Guard officer provided the following comments on the decision to call out the Guard. He noted that the Public Safety Division in the city: "were really worried and concerned and felt that the disturbance that was underway, at that point, would be the development of something larger than that which the police could handle.... The decision to mobilize the Guard was made after it was evident that the number of police available for duty were inadequate to cope with the problem as it was developing at that time.... The policy of this state is to try to head off the major problems rather than deal with them after they're fully blown and fully developed." He stressed that the police manpower and equipment capabilities rather than the prevalence of specific types of activities were the dominant consideration in assessing the seriousness and potential of the disturbance.

Official logs show that during the next four hours, from 9:40 pm to 1:40 am, the fire department responded to twelve, four, seven, and six fires in each respective hour. Their busiest period extended from a few minutes before 8:00 pm to shortly before 11:00 pm during which time they averaged approximately one run every five minutes. A total lull of about 55 minutes occurred, after which the fire calls again increased to an average of one every 9 minutes in the period extending from just before midnight to just after 2:00 am.

A police report indicated that the use of tear gas had been fairly effective in dispersing the large crowd into smaller groupings. The main behavioral pattern observed was the utilization of hit-and-run tactics by small groups fire bombing and destroying property. The police mobilized into four-man mobile units to cope with the situation.

A temporary police field command post was set up earlier at the crucial corner and mobile units were dispatched from there to areas where lootings were being reported. By now the Emergency Operations Coordinating Center (EOC) established several hours before at police headquarters contained liaison personnel from the following organizations: Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Guard, police, fire, Civil Defense, city attorney, mayor's office, recreation department, division of water, telephone, gas, and electric utilities, a local Air Force installation and mass media groups. In general, field decisions were made at the field command post, with overall policy decisions and coordination being handled at the downtown EOC.

Sometime between 10:30 pm and 10:55 pm the police field command post was hit by sniper fire from a nearby rooftop. A civilian was shot through the neck and killed. He was an active member of the police department's Crime Watch Program and was apparently in the area to assist police. One respondent reported that the victim was carrying a lighted flare at the time. The police field command post was immediately relocated in the parking lot of another state agency nearer the fringe of the affected area. Glass breaking, bottle throwing, and fire bombing continued to elicit the same police and fire response.

Between 2:00 am and 2:30 am Tuesday, the National Guard began deployment in the affected area. The mission of the Guard was four-fold: (1) to protect vulnerable installations (e.g. water supplies, transfer stations, etc.); (2) to protect the firemen; (3) to conduct roving patrols; and (4) to prepare a reserve mobile strike

force. The fire protection teams consisted of ten men assigned to each threatened fire house. Three Guardsmen rode the fire apparatus, five followed the trucks, and two guarded the empty firehouse. The roving patrol units consisted of 20 teams of two Guardsmen. Each team was assigned with at least one city police officer (since only the police possessed a thorough knowledge of the city and had the power of arrest) to form a patrol unit. The National Guard mobile strike force stood by at a central location available for rapid deployment to any "crisis" location. With the arrival of the Guard the remaining violence was quickly brought under control for the night.

The police reported that "rumors continued to build during the morning hours of impending trouble from outside influence. Businessmen received threats over the telephone that their places would be burned the following night." By daybreak the area was totally quiet.

At 10:15 am Tuesday, a crowd again gathered in the affected area. Looting commenced 20 minutes later. Two fires occurred just before 1:00 pm and small groups gathered at several more locations between 1:00 pm and 3:00 pm. A report indicates that a cache of 16 Molotov Cocktails was discovered in a downtown parking lot at 1:35 pm.

At 6:00 pm the suspension of liquor sales for the duration of the night went into effect. Half an hour later a 12-hour curfew was initiated. The remainder of the night was relatively quiet. Notable incidents included a few crowd gatherings (including some in other black areas of the city), several sets of arrests, two unfounded reports of explosions including one at City Hall, at least seven fires including some in other black areas, at least two or three unsuccessful fire-bombing incidents, and two reports of sniper fire of which one or both were unfounded. In addition, stories continue to circulate that black militants were coming to renew the rioting.

On Wednesday afternoon another small cache of 12 Molotov Cocktails were found outside the previous disturbance area. The curfew was modified by the Mayor such that it was in effect only from 11:00 pm to 6:30 am. Later in the afternoon known members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) passed out mimeographed leaflets downtown urging citizens to rise up and assist the Black Power movement in the city. A raid of the SDS headquarters that evening turned up a rifle and 1,500 printed leaflets. Three persons were arrested and charged with Inciting to Riot. Five other SDS associates were charged with the same offence but fled the city. Six days prior to the disturbance a police report indicated that 26 SDS members had arrived in the city. The report also cited the spray painting of five schools, the distribution of SDS literature at high schools, and a lecture at a high school on the use of weapons with references made to "killing pigs" as SDS activities.

The first fire-bombing of the night was reported at 10:01 pm. Eleven more fires or fire-bombings occurred between then and 4:45 am Thursday. One large crowd was reported at 10:30 pm Wednesday slightly northeast of the original riot area and rock throwing was reported in the original area at 4:45 am. Thus, the disturbance that night encompassed a larger area with violent activities reaching further into the night.

On Thursday afternoon and evening, stories were still circulating and calls were being received that fire-bombing would erupt that evening in several scattered areas of the city. However, violent activities were again minimal as the police record indicated only 8 fires, 2 large crowd gatherings, and one case of window breaking. Some units of the National Guard were withdrawn from the affected area.

On Friday, a great number of people gathered in the original riot area but were easily dispersed. All things considered, the area was near normal. A number of calls were still received to the effect that as the National Guard withdrew, the riot would be renewed. Nevertheless, the Guard completed its withdrawal without major incident.

On Saturday isolated incidents of juveniles stoning cars were reported during the morning and evening hours. This, however, was not an unusual activity for the affected area. One can infer that the situation had essentially returned to normal. On Sunday all police personnel returned to their usual tours of duty.

A statistical summary of the riot shows that two persons were killed, 34 persons injured (none were social control personnel), and approximately 75 locations were damaged. "The bulk of the damage appeared to be broken windows caused by small groups preparatory to looting attempts." In addition, thirty police vehicles were damaged at a cost of about \$30,000. Fifty-three fire alarms were responded to by the fire departments during a four day period of which twenty were considered fire-bombings.

Arrest records indicate 388 adults (86 percent black, 14 percent white) were arrested for offenses directly related to the riot. Thirty-two arrestees were black females; eleven were white females. A total of 122 arrestees had a prior record with the local police. Of these 58 "had previous encounters with police for riot related offenses . . .," the term not related being a rather broad ranged definition used by the police. A total of 108 juvenile arrests were made of whom 63 had previous records for "riot related" offenses. There were seven registered complaints of police brutality. No shots were fired by law enforcement agents according to official reports, but off-the-record interview comments by high police officers indicate that at least probably four shots were fired by city policemen.

Termination of the Disturbance

Police and fire department personnel had divergent views on when the disturbance came to an end. Whereas the fire department, in both interviews and after-action reports, describes the riot as lasting from Monday to Tuesday, corresponding sources in the police defined the disturbance as a five to six day event. Indeed, it was not until the seventh day that all police personnel returned to their normal tours of duty. The fire department reported operating "almost normally" during the remainder of the first week though they were on alert and did experience sporadic fire-bombing.

What was seen as bringing the disturbance to an end? Views on this varied. It is significant that none of our respondents specifically mentioned any actions of the Community Relations Commission as a factor contributing to the final quelling of the riot. Instead, it was attributed to the various actions of the police and National Guard, e.g. "handling force with superior force," calling in the third shift, fast mobilization of the Guard, detailed advance planning. However, one fire official did stress that, "The good people in the area were themselves quelling the hate-brained people . . ." He felt that the "responsible citizens" must have reasoned with the others, telling the latter that the fire department would soon refuse to fight fires, thereby endangering the entire neighborhood. There are in fact far more references to cooperative citizens in the area by our fire department sources than by those in the police department.

A National Guard spokesman credited the "immediate total commitment" of the local police force with scattering the "ring leaders" and thereby breaking up the riot. He also said that the show of force and readiness of the Guard acted as a powerful deterrent. Another Guard official cited the cooperation of the great majority of the residents in the affected area.

The police report itself stresses three major factors as being instrumental in bringing the riot to an end. These were: (1) the early imposition of a curfew with a penalty of a \$1,000 fine, one year in jail, or both; (2) the restraint shown by the local news media in their reporting of the events; and (3) the suspension of the sale of liquor, firearms, and gasoline. Elsewhere the report praised the professional department of the National Guard. And finally, the report credited the use of street cleaning equipment with making a major contribution to the return to normalcy. That is, cleaning the streets deprived the activists of debris for throwing and demonstrated that there was no break in the continuity of essential services. This appears to be a conscious attempt on the part of the police department to impose their definition of the situation (the definition being that the area had returned to normalcy) by means of the self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism.

Brooks, Dynes and Quarantelli (1972) in an analysis of eighteen major police departments around the country regarding organizational preparation and civil disturbances, discerned two basic strategies of social control -- show-of-force and containment. Historically, the show-of-force strategy has had a basic goal of committing a maximum number of men and equipment to the situation in a minimum amount of time. Such an approach suggests notions of crushing the opposition. The containment strategy, on the other hand, retains some aspects of the show-of-force approach in that it seals off the disturbance area, retains the use of curfews, liquor bans, and the like. It differs, however, in that its arrest techniques are selective rather than wholesale, physical force is utilized only as a last resort, and neighborhood citizens are often utilized in helping quell the disorder.

Two major features in the process of social control stand out in this disturbance. First, social control personnel were quickly mobilized and deployed at the disturbance scene. Police reports indicated that riotous activity reached intense proportions by 7:20 pm on the opening day of the disturbance. Activation of the first phase of the riot plan took place within eight hours of the disturbance's birth and within forty minutes of the first big outbreak of disorderly activity. Phase II of the police riot plan was activated around 9:00 pm and Phase III at 10:00 pm. Within three hours of the first intensive burst of the disturbance, social control

forces were fully mobilized. Though this mobilization did not immediately put large numbers of men on the streets, deployment of social control personnel was relatively rapid. The step by step activation of the police riot plan resulted in a gradual but steady increase in their manpower. This increase, though gradual, was accomplished within a few short hours.

Though this period of mobilization and deployment was not as rapid as has been found in other disturbances, (e.g. Case Study 3 in this report), it does appear more rapid than the average, especially with reference to some earlier major disorders such as Newark, Detroit, and Watts (Kerner et al., 1968). Our interest in this time variable stems from an underlying assumption in the show-of-force strategy. This assumption tends to hold that crowd violence is best controlled and subdued by the rapid presence of a great amount of force. In this particular case, not only was the mobilization and deployment period of short duration, the force variable was appreciable. Approximately 200 National Guardsmen were on duty, in addition to the virtually complete complement of city police personnel, numbering some 800. Use of the 12-hour shift system put approximately half of this manpower on the streets at any given time. In addition, support for these social control agencies was supplied by the county sheriff's department, the state patrol, and fire department to mention but a few.

A second salient point in the strategy of handling this disturbance was the consistent refusal by social control officials to use counter-rioters to cool off the situation. Social control officials viewed this process as an abdication of their authority. We make mention of this point only because the use of counter-rioters tends to reflect a control strategy oriented toward containment rather than show-of-force.

The commitment to a quick mobilization of force, the rejection of the use of counter-rioters, and the street tactics already discussed in our descriptive chronology bespeak a police strategy oriented toward "show-of-force." Furthermore, respondents from social control agencies also tended to emphasize show-of-force variables. Termination of the riot was usually attributed to various actions of the police and National Guard (e.g., "handling force with superior force," calling in the third shift, fast mobilization of the Guard, detailed advance planning, and the "immediate total commitment" of the local police force). Finally, the show-of-force and readiness of the police and National Guard were viewed as a powerful deterrent to continued disorderly activity.

Social Control Perceptions of Black Participants

With the previous detailed chronology of the disturbance as background, we now narrow our focus to an examination of the perceptions held by social control agents of the black participants in the disturbance. Several dimensions will be examined. The first dimension concerns whom (and how many) were perceived by social control groups as being the "major participants" in the disturbance and the nature of the role seen as being played by those participants.

An official police report distinguished three non-mutually exclusive types of riot roles. These were labeled the "agitator," the "initiator," and the "sustainer."

These roles were not visualized as being organized. That is, the police despite some public statements to the contrary, did not believe that the disturbance had been organized, planned, or in any sense had been consciously plotted by any group either within the local community or from outside.

Agitators were defined in the usual sense, in terms of using emotion charged exhortations to direct violent actions. They were said to move about rapidly, staying in large crowds into which they could disappear upon police arrival. The initiators were described in the police report as a cohort of 9 to 16 year olds and as "fertile ground for the agitators." Their activities consisted of roaming the streets in groups, hurling bricks, stones, and bottles at police and firemen, automobiles, business establishments. The sustainers, according to police perceptions, "are those who, after the riot is going, attempt to sustain and exploit the chaos for a variety of reasons." Thus, the police recognize a heterogeneity of motives. They also recognize that in addition to the three types outlined above, there were other blacks who attempted to prevent the violence.

Within the fire department the major participants on the black "side" were seen as children. One respondent saw them as 15 to 22 years old "just wanting trouble." Another characterized the major black participants as "a small group of young people in their twenties or so." The first fire official mentioned here also observed and identified three roles. The first was played by the "subversive element" (corresponding to the police "agitators"). The second role was that of the "bystander," or audience member who applauds and lends support to the actions of the activists. And thirdly, he identified the "arsonists" whom he felt performed their actions in secret. This respondent saw riot dynamics in almost theatrical terms as evidenced by his statement that rioters "will extend themselves to great limits to have someone (the bystanders) applaud them."

A high ranking National Guard respondent also emphasized the role played by children. He saw looters as being in a late-teens to early twenties age category. He felt that they were often from other cities and saw the situation as an opportunity to get something for nothing.

Another dimension studied was the evaluation of black groups especially militants. In general it may be said that the fire department respondents seemed to hold a less harsh evaluation of the actions of the black groups than did other sources. One National Guard respondent tended to see the riot somewhat in terms of a power struggle between militants and revolutionaries on one hand, and the city administration on the other hand, whereas the fire department tended to see the events as the actions of "devil-may-care" children encouraged by a few outside subversives.

The fire department felt that the harassment it received was sporadic, uncoordinated, and uncoordinated. (Our black fire department respondent characterized the harassment as "token," in that the rioters could have done a lot more than they did.) References were made by fire department sources to "hair brained children," "youngsters just doing things for a lark," "a bit of devilment," "I don't think they are capable of understanding or realizing what the ramifications of their acts are," "just for kicks," and "the majority of the people in the area are good people."

Another fire respondent was ambivalent as indicated by his remark that, "a lot of them were in sympathy with us; they hated what was happening," but "deep down inside felt this was going to do them some good. They weren't going to bend over backwards to suppress anything." Our black respondent felt that the established militant groups did not play much of a role in the disturbance. Instead, he expressed the opinion that the young in general, both black and white, are characterized by a free-floating militancy. Although fire department respondents, at the time of the interviews, tended to accept the preliminary police findings of no crowd organization, a few were still leery of the role possibly played by "subversives." One respondent "speculated" that the supper time lull in Monday's activities might have been due to some participants taking time out to create "some little semblance of organization."

Related to this was a similar ambivalence expressed in a National Guard official's statement that, "We don't necessarily consider that it must be an insurrection. But we certainly feel that there were elements involved that may have this as their purpose." That lack of unanimity is just as possible within the top echelons of an organization as elsewhere is illustrated by statements of two other high ranking Guard officers. One used the rather neutral term "demonstrators" in referring to a Tuesday night crowd. In contrast, another official pointed to a perceived lack of civil rights issues being presented in conjunction with and as justification for the riot and went on to describe how the "militants and revolutionaries were bent on showing that the administration can't control the situation, that the militants are in control, and what they say is going to be law."

The official police report seemed to share the above feeling concerning civil rights issues as suggested by the statement: "The evidence at this time appears to be that the majority of those who actively participated in the rioting were motivated more by personal aggrandizement and raising hell than by neighborhood improvement." In a way, this is also similar to some fire department statements. That is, "raising hell" may possibly be equated with "just for kicks" although the police department report leaves the overall feeling of a more negative view of black participants than does the fire department report.

With regard to the interpretation of the riot as the "culmination of legitimate grievances," the police report stated, "Whether this is true or not, is a matter for the experts to decide." A better indication of the police evaluation of the black groups involved is contained in the following statement: "Praise from the area's responsible citizens was high for the police . . . the thugs and rabble had lost the battle and were resorting to rumor as a final defiant gesture."

Social Control Perception of Their Own Organizations

Fire department respondents were emphatic in reiterating that their sole function is to fight fires rather than become involved in crowd control, etc. However, another fire official stated that as soon as his men came under bodily attack from the crowd, he felt justified in pulling out and letting the fires burn. This respondent was critical of the fire department response at the higher levels of the organization calling it disorganized and uncoordinated. He did, however, justify the decision to delay going into task force formation on two grounds. First, he said, the task force response is a slow one resulting in larger fires which is what

the rioters want. Secondly, he felt that the task force implementation could be delayed because the disturbance was relatively confined. He was critical of the whole task force concept and noted that his problems multiplied when he used it. This respondent also stated that he would have liked the police to use more force. Another fire official, while not offering any evaluation of his own organization, did offer comments on the policing of the disturbance. He expressed the opinion that certain high ranking Division of Safety officials may have been a little slow to react in this case, although, he added, it did not take them long to regain control. In fact, he felt that the local police had the disturbance under control before the National Guard arrived. He felt that "our police do a tremendous job out there."

With our police sources we find a unanimous positive evaluation of their organization's actions in contrast to the self-criticism of the fire officials. For instance, concerning the setting event the official police report told us "the trigger to the city's riot was a normal and proper police action." The decision to call in the Guard was described by the Safety Director in terms of a reluctantly chosen course of action necessitated by the local police department's inability to "fight on more than one front." We have already referred to the justification of police actions by appeals to higher values -- ("The decision to restore order and protect lives and property") and by defining the situation in terms of closed alternatives. The decision not to withdraw police while community leaders attempted to cool the situation was couched in terms of avoiding an abdication of responsibility and an extra-legal delegation of authority. Another police respondent expressed the opinion that "you can't back down." "Give them the upper hand and you're in trouble" which would seem to imply a positive evaluation of the police actions in not pulling out of the riot area. He added, the "only thing anyone understands is swift and sure punishment," implying a melting of the traditional separation of the law enforcing and judicial functions of civil government.

The police also took credit for holding practically all cases of reported looting to a minimum through prompt police action. With regard to specific incidents, a police report evaluated the releasing of the arrested boy to his mother in the following terms: the officer on the scene "felt that any move which might immediately cool tempers and relieve the tension would be justified." Another Monday afternoon incident involved accusations by a Community Relations Commission official that police officers were trying to start an incident by "checking out" some people on the sidewalk. The police denial is as follows: "At no time were these people checked in the sense that we know it in the police department" i.e., by checking identification or asking names, "They were simply asked to keep moving."

The National Guard praised the city police. One high ranking Guard officer reasoned that since the disturbance occurred in a "disadvantaged" area, it required a rapid and over-whelming response. He saw it as being much more "dangerous" than other types of gatherings which might be equally unlawful. Another official felt that the residents of the affected area "need to see that there are forces out there trying to control the situation and re-establishing normalcy. This hastens the end of the disturbance in my opinion." He added, "Our mission is the restoration of law and order, we don't intend to stand by and see laws broken or disregarded . . .

We strongly feel that the fact that the Guardsmen hit the street with ammunition or a loaded weapon is a deterrent in itself . . . We never fire over their heads. We never bluff . . ." But "we've certainly made it a point to try our level best to be judicious in the exercise of force . . . and . . . certainly have tried to accord fair treatment to everyone." Another ranking Guard official reiterated several aspects of the police position, in terms of reference to higher values and the inadvisability of police or troops turning the situation over to counter-rioters. He felt that such withdrawal merely allows militants to take control of the situation.

This concludes our first case study. The account is partial, selective, and to some extent not even consistent. But this is as it should be for we have attempted to present the situation as the social control agencies, particularly the police, saw the disturbance in their on-the-scene perceptions and in their written reports. Any organizational perspective almost necessarily will be partial, selective, and somewhat inconsistent. To give the total picture, an overall view and a totally consistent account, while closer to typical presentations found in the literature, would not have been in harmony with our general objective.

PART III: CASE STUDY 2

Description and Background

Our second case study involves another midwestern city with a metropolitan area population of over half a million. The black inhabitants of the central city consist of more than a fourth of the total population. The city is a major industrial center with steel manufacturing, metal fabricating, and automobile assembling predominating. About two-thirds of the labor force can be classified as blue collar.

The black areas of the city have much in common with those described in the first case study. Again, the stereotype of the urban ghetto would fail to fit the picture. Homes in much of the city are closely pressed together brick and frame dwellings. Most are fairly old and tend to be dirty from the smoke and soot which permeates the entire area. The residences found in the several major black neighborhoods are not much different from those which are occupied by the large ethnic groups which make up the bulk of the white inhabitants of the city. The black areas form a rough U-shaped ring around the city center, and are located on the north, east, and south sides of the town.

The disturbance to be described and analyzed in this account erupted at an east side white business establishment. During the first days of the disorders, activities were fairly well confined to this locale. However, on the second day and subsequent days of the disturbance, the focus of riotous action shifted primarily to the southside black area with the eastside neighborhood returning to relative overt tranquility.

Before discussing the particular chronology of this disturbance, some views of how the respondents saw the disturbance background are in order. In the spring of 1968, as did many other communities around the country, the city experienced a racial disorder following the Martin Luther King assassination. One city official, in response to the questions from the 1968 DRC study conducted after the 1968 riot but prior to the trouble in 1969, claimed that the disorder "brought a greater polarization than ever before between black and white." This respondent's remarks took an ambivalent form. He qualified the above statement by adding that "the state of race relations were fairly good." A high ranking police official described the state of race relations as tense. He indicated that the biggest trouble spot, as far as the police were concerned, was the southside black neighborhood. At the time of these 1968 remarks, the same police official identified a local black organization which used at least two different names as a rabble-rousing troublesome group.

The federal anti-poverty programs also received a considerable amount of comment from the respondents. One high ranking police official, in the 1968 study, described these programs as being corrupt and filled with black militants (especially members of the double named black group mentioned earlier) who are "trying to rouse the black community (by) blowing events all out of proportion . . . (but) particularly in the schools." A year later the same respondent stated, "They never had any trouble with these kids in school (or other places) until . . . those action centers (operated by various poverty programs) were established in town here."

Themes of subversive elements within the community were illustrated by other police officials. One commented with reference to the poverty program: "In the program there's blacks in it, there's whites. They got a lot of commies in each of these programs. There's no doubt about it. Hoover's been telling them (no mention as to who them were) for I don't know how long . . ." The other respondent was not so specific. "Small parts of the (black) community that for reasons of their own are bent on disruption of the community. They have somebody preaching black racism, hate . . . in order to build revenge on the police department."

The final background description pictured dimensions of conflict within the black community. A high ranking National Guard officer said, "Internal bickering exists among the Negro element with the so-called militant groups. Some of the people don't want this militant group to speak for them." Police respondents suggested similar themes. One police official described the 1968 disturbance in terms of a "power struggle" between competing militant groups.

In summary, the data illustrate a characterization of the black community primarily in terms of subversive elements and tensions within the area ready to be exploited. This is not to suggest that the respondents failed to perceive other dimensions. One police department official was quite emphatic about the black community "having legitimate grievances." Paramount among these grievances were the need for more jobs, more job training especially for school dropouts, and corrective measures within the public school system where "many public schools are nearly all black." Our presentation and stress on the respondent's perceptions of the "subversive" element and community tension is not an attempt to mask the theme of "legitimate grievances." Rather, we have attempted to stress the factors paramount in our respondent's perceptions as being most important and central to the disturbance that occurred in 1969.

The Setting Event and Keynoting Behavior

There was complete agreement by everyone that the disturbance setting was in terms of a picketing group getting out of hand. The picketing was an attempt to boycott and close an east side, white-owned dairy store. This picketing had gone on for over 20 days.

On a Monday afternoon some twenty-two days prior to the disturbance a pre-school black boy went into the dairy store to exchange a candy bar for some fruit. The store clerk thought the lad was stealing and allegedly grabbed the child. The child told of the incident to his mother waiting in the car who was reported to have entered the store to make a complaint to the proprietor that the clerk "man-handled her little boy." Reportedly, a scuffle took place. The black matron claimed that the store owner had kicked her in the stomach and that she was pregnant at the time. On the following Tuesday the victim swore out a warrant against the proprietor charging him with assault and battery. The merchant, in turn, swore out a warrant against the black woman claiming that she "kicked, beat, and pushed his daughter," the store clerk. Both individuals pleaded not guilty at a hearing later that week and, at the time of the disturbance, the charges and counter-charges had yet to receive their day in court.

The news of the incident at the store quickly spread throughout the black community. Some young black groups were said to have met and to expressed "anger and unhappiness." In the time period prior to the disturbance a number of verbal attacks directed at the proprietor were reported. Furthermore, inflammatory literature (by police definition) was being circulated in the neighborhood. A police investigation traced the source of this material to an "east side antipoverty and neighborhood center." The individual operating the center felt that printing and distributing such leaflets was within his jurisdiction, and no police action was taken.

On the Saturday following the ruckus between the proprietor and black woman, the dairy store was firebombed. The bomb did not explode but five black youths were arrested two days later in connection with the incident. Following these arrests picketing was reported to have begun en masse. A city official reported that efforts were begun in earnest to cool what they saw as a "rapidly deteriorating situation." He indicated that the mayor's office, Human Relations Committee, and police department tried to level off tempers by having their representatives meet with a number of individuals and groups in the black community and talk things out. (No mention was made to what individuals and groups were contacted.) Furthermore, "the mayor's office tried to cool things" and even went so far as to suggest that "if you want to run the man out of business, boycott him, a peaceful boycott. If not, . . . peaceful picketing . . . (but) minimal in size." Response to this suggestion and others developed in the course of meetings with east side residents was described as "good." On the other hand, it was also reported that southside residents got involved in activities at the store and "churned things up." During this time also a story had been circulating that the white merchant involved in the trouble had extended a large amount of credit to east side residents and that there was a lot of sympathy for him and that the neighborhood wanted him open.

While there was consensus on the setting event, there was little agreement on what keynoted the disturbance. A number of our respondents failed to suggest anything related to keynoting activities. The fire department was consistent in this regard. One fire official stated that the fire department did not receive its first alarm until 10:16 pm Tuesday, and the police were already at the scene. He did remark, however, that things were "tense." A high ranking National Guard officer offered this succinct statement: "First they (the crowd) broke his windows and then they threw in a fire-bomb."

Police respondents were more informative. One police official said: "A large crowd gathered up there (at the dairy store) and it became a little unruly. They were demanding a talk with Captain X (a police official)." A plainclothes police officer observing the picketers was reportedly taunted and hit by a thrown bottle. This officer called for assistance. Seven cruisers arrived at the scene and attempted to disperse the gathering. To quote our police official, "they thought they had it slightly under control and then somebody busted some windows and then didn't that start it off." Another police official provided a similar description. "Crowds of young adults and some juveniles decided they were going to stop traffic . . . tension built up . . . (and) an incident developed where they broke a window in the store and about this time some guy walked in and built a fire."

The official police report indicated the gathering of a group of about twenty young male Negroes in front of the store. These youths began throwing bottles. A detective at the scene called for assistance which soon arrived. A police sergeant at the scene reported the twenty youths were yelling "Black power, white pigs, etc." Someone in the group yelled "Let's stop all the traffic," and the group began walking very slowly back and forth across the street, bringing traffic to a complete stop. The police prepared to disperse these persons. The report continues, "At this point several Negro subjects approached the sergeant and said that they represented the East Side Community Action Center. They felt that the use of police force was actually desired by the juveniles present -- 'to give them an excuse to really go wild and riot.' These citizens requested the removal of police personnel at the scene, insisting that upon such removal 'they could talk the group into dispersing and going to their homes peacefully.'" The request was granted. But within minutes the picket signs were being burned before the store and its windows were smashed. From that point on, the disorders escalated.

In summary, the respondents identified keynoting behavior in terms of window breaking, gatherings becoming unruly, taunting the police officer, setting fires, and throwing bottles. It is significant to note that only two respondents suggested that perhaps police action may have supplied an important keynoting behavior. One high ranking police official stated: "We talked to people that said they were leaders, (who) said they could calm them down and pull them back. . . we pulled back (as requested by the blacks) and we had this increase (in riotous activity). Whether they considered this a sign of weakness or what, I don't know. But this seemed to aggravate their action."

Chronology of Events

In the preceding section we have already mentioned the keynoting behavior such as the window breaking, firebombing, and the taunting pickets. The official police report indicates that these events took place between 9:35 pm and 10:00 pm Tuesday. At 9:58 pm the Negro subjects approached the sergeant in command at the scene requesting police withdrawal. As already indicated, the sergeant agreed to the request and ordered his cruisers to withdraw one block. As the cars withdrew the protesting pickets heaped their cardboard signs in a pile in front of the store, set them afire, threw several objects through the store windows; and then ran off dispersing into a crowd of spectators gathered at a nearby corner. At 10:14 pm the sergeant ordered the police cruisers back to the disturbance scene and issued a call for fire department assistance. This latter call was received by the fire department at 10:16 pm.

At 10:17 pm the second injury of the disturbance was recorded by a fireman hit by an unknown object while responding to the alarm at the dairy store. The police report continues: "By this time (10:21 pm) a large number of spectators had arrived surrounding the entire area of the fire, and it became impossible to distinguish the spectators from the rioters."

A police cruiser on duty two blocks south of the dairy store reported a burning automobile and requested fire department assistance at 10:50 pm. By 10:56 pm the police officers had dispersed the 150 to 200 persons that had gathered near the store with most police units leaving the vicinity to patrol adjacent areas. About

11:00 pm two civilians were hospitalized for injuries received from riotous gangs. One was assaulted in his car, the other in a telephone booth. The looting and burning of a neighborhood drug store was reported at 11:04 pm. Burglary and looting attempts were again reported at 11:32 and 11:41 pm.

Following the injury of the fireman at the 10:16 pm alarm the fire department activated its riot plan. The basic ingredient of this procedure is that the fire department will neither fight fires without police or National Guard protection nor will it respond to alarms without prior police verification. Other provisions in this plan include procedures for personnel call-up, twelve-hour shifts, and task force formation of fire apparatus. None of these latter procedures were activated. One fire official explained their reasoning and use of the plan in this way: "The only job the fireman has is to answer fire alarms. The main interest of the fire department is the safety of its men and putting fires out." He went on to add that "fire department participation (in this disturbance) was minimal." During the disturbance week the fire department responded to three blazes Tuesday, two on Wednesday, and none for the rest of the week though there were a considerable number of false alarms. Unlike the 1968 disturbance, the National Guard did not ride shotgun on fire apparatus.

Returning to the chronology, at 1:00 am Wednesday, a police cadet was assaulted by seven or eight Negro males using fists and beer bottles. Reports of juveniles making fire bombs were received at 1:04 pm and 1:20 pm. Both were cleared as unfounded.

At 1:04 pm a shift in the disturbance from the east side black neighborhood to the south side was indicated by the looting and attempted arson of a food market on a southside thoroughfare. This incident was followed, at 2:28 am, by the injury of two patrolmen struck by a lit fire bomb and the arrest of four black males for disturbance and suspicion. From 2:28 am until noon Wednesday, reports were received of four lootings or attempted lootings, three attempted fire bombings, and damage to six automobiles parked at a high school. All events were reported from the south side black neighborhood.

A relative lull in disturbance activity was indicated between noon and about 4:00 pm Wednesday afternoon with no incidents reported. At 4:50 pm a car with male Caucasian subjects possessing what appeared to be Molotov Cocktails was reported in the periphery of the south side disturbance area. This was the first of three reports throughout the disturbance week of armed whites in or near the disturbance area. Police investigated all such calls but no record of arrests was evident. From 4:00 pm until midnight the police responded to thirty-two separate disorder related incidents. Twelve incidents were classified as lootings, burglary, or window breaking; four concerned with property damage -- mainly automobiles; eight were reports of crowd gathering, drinking, or hurling stones and bottles; and two made reference to the use or possession of firearms. Two civilians were injured and four arrests were made, three for suspicion and one for curfew violation.

Wednesday evening at about 11:30 the police department activated its riot plan in full. The procedure included calling in for duty all available off-duty police officers, cancellation of vacations and days off, and assignment of men to twelve-

hour shifts. In addition, the police department went to the tactical deployment of squads consisting of three officers and twelve patrolmen. A ban on the sale of liquor was put into effect as well as a twelve-hour curfew to extend from 7:00 pm until 7:00 am until the state of emergency was called off. One police official pointed out that Tuesday was not considered part of the emergency period. He characterized the activities near the dairy store as "almost routine" though the department "did have a few extra men in the streets." He further stated that police tactics were "sufficient that first day" (Tuesday). The crescendo of disorderly activity on Wednesday prompted the police department to go on emergency status. The major justification for activating the riot plan was insufficient police strength to quell the disturbance using standard, everyday operational procedures and numbers of officers. One police official characterized the situation in these terms: "... when you don't have sufficient strength, the most you can do at that time is to try to keep them (the rioters) running and break them up, don't let them congregate. If you don't have enough men to start picking them up and making arrests, but if you can keep them dispersed and on the run and don't allow them to congregate in too big a number, then it alleviates the situation, at least temporarily."

At about the same time the police activated their plan, the mayor, on the advice of the police officials, called the Governor to ask National Guard assistance. A National Guard military police unit from a neighboring city was activated and arrived at the disturbance scene by 3:00 am Thursday. Assistance was also received from the county sheriff's department who sent men and material for police use. In addition, the sheriff's department took over patrol duties in areas of the city unaffected by the disturbance to free city police personnel for emergency duty. Three guardsmen and at least one police officer worked as patrol units. The presence of the police officer was requisite since guardsmen do not possess arrest power.

In addition to citing the lack of sufficient police strength to quell the disturbance, the police respondent quoted above suggested that the presence of the guard was also beneficial in other respects. He stated: "I consulted with other police officials and they gave the impression that we couldn't go on too long (on twelve-hour shifts, etc.) because men have to have some sleep and rest. In fact, if we keep them (policemen) working too long without rest they start getting awful edgy and tired, and sometimes you'll have an unfortunate incident develop." Another police official saw a prime contribution from the National Guard in terms of heightening the police department's arrest powers and thus quelling the disturbance. He remarked: "(In) situations like this, in these large crowds, you can't arrest everyone. But you try to indicate that you're going to make as many as you can."

Mobilization of police personnel through the riot plan allowed the police department to put over 200 uniformed officers into the disturbance area. In conjunction with the curfew providing a legal basis for clearing the streets, the massive police mobilization resulted in increasing numbers of arrests. Twenty individuals were arrested between midnight and 3:40 am primarily for suspicion and curfew violation. A lull in activity took place after the National Guard reached the disturbance streets with no incidents reported between 3:40 am and 6:00 am. Until about 9:00 am little disorderly activity was indicated though six burglaries or looting attempts were reported by business proprietors opening their shops. The felonious activities took place during the previous night.

Unruly activity and arrests increased in volume again beginning about noon. Throughout the afternoon and early evening, reports dealt mainly with crowds gathering and their dispersion, stone and bottle throwing, and robbery attempts. At 8:00 pm police were sent to investigate the report of a male Caucasian with a rifle in his car. Police activity increased in intensity from 8:00 pm and midnight with thirty-two police responses recorded. Reports of lootings, burglary, and fire bomb preparation were the major foci of investigation with arrests for suspicion and curfew again dominant.

On Friday the National Guard and police continued their patrols of the disturbance area. The curfew remained in effect that evening. During the eighteen-hour period from midnight until 6:00 pm Friday six arrests were reported. Riotous activity again increased in the evening hours and two injuries were reported from gunshot wounds. Burglaries, fire bombings, and stonings continued to receive the bulk of police attention.

The activity of Friday evening spilled over into the early morning hours of Saturday. Sixteen arrests for curfew violation and nine for suspicion were recorded from 12:10 am to 3:35 am. No further arrests took place for over twenty hours for riot-related incidents. Police activity rapidly subsided with only seventeen recorded incidents for the twenty-four hour period. Saturday evening was calm with only five police calls and two arrests between 6:00 pm and midnight. Unruly activity was nil on the following Sunday, with two burglaries and one arrest for suspicion highlighting police activity for that day.

A statistical summary for the disturbance week indicated a total of 123 arrests. Fifty of these were for curfew violation, forty-one for suspicion, and thirty-two for other offenses notably resisting arrest, traffic violations, and causing a disturbance. No breakdown was available for the number of juvenile versus adult arrests though it appears that adults were, by far, in the majority. Nineteen individuals were reported as injured though none seriously. Seven injuries were sustained by police and fire personnel, twelve by civilians. Six civilians were victims of assault, two were wounded by gunfire, and four injured by thrown debris. Lacerations and contusions resulting from being struck by thrown objects accounted for five of the police and fire department casualties. Two police officers were injured from other causes. No National Guardsmen were reported injured and there were no reported fatalities.

Termination of the Disturbance

At least three different perceptions of the duration and termination of the disturbance can be noted in the data provided by social control personnel. As previously noted the fire department respondents conceived the disturbance as essentially a two day affair beginning late Tuesday evening when the riot plan was partially activated and ending Wednesday night after extinguishing two blazes in south-side homes. Throughout the remainder of the week, the fire department did not respond to any blazes associated with the disorders though the procedure of police verification of false alarms continued until the week's end.

The National Guard official noted the disturbance as essentially a "12- to 24-hour period." This period was Wednesday and Thursday after the Guard had been activated and social control agencies worked diligently to quell the disturbance. The official did indicate, however, that he had sent reconnaissance teams to monitor the disturbance area prior to the National Guard activation. Furthermore, though he characterized the disturbance as a "12- to 24- hour period," he noted that the National Guard units remained in the area where the disorders occurred until the weekend.

Police respondents, unlike those of the fire department, saw the beginning of the emergency period or riot as beginning on Wednesday rather than Tuesday evening. Events prior to the activation of the police riot plan and call for assistance from the National Guard were perceived as relatively common though quickly growing to major proportions. Termination of the disturbance was seen in slow wind-down of disorderly activity beginning after the National Guard arrival until the police department returned to normal operation on Sunday evening.

Probed as to what events terminated the disturbance, fire department officials indicated the lack of fire alarms requiring organizational response. Police officers provided another picture. One high ranking police official saw the termination of the disturbance in terms of a massive show of force, the curfew, and liquor ban. "These three things showed a real profound effect." Another police respondent followed with a similar line of reasoning: "I am a firm believer that in these situations (riots), you must show a massive show of force. . . . The National Guard uses what we call a massive show of force but you never have to use it" (implying that it is the show that is important and the show in itself precludes any need for techniques of force or coercion).

With reference to other factors that may have terminated the disturbance, one police respondent stated that, "one of the tactics that is used is to get volunteers, people that are looked up to and well known in the different sections of the city, to talk to these kids, to persuade them to go home, and don't get involved in this thing." This suggests the use of "counter-rioters," a tactic negatively viewed in Case Study 1. It was also indicated that some police officers that "are pretty good with the kids in some of these hot spots" endeavored to do the same in this new situation, but the efficacy of the efforts are unclear. Other groups reported as involved in attempts to lessen the disorders included some representatives from the mayor's Human Relation Commission, and a "lot of ministers and neighborhood leaders trying to cool it on their own." The high police official making this last remark concluded with a statement to the effect that "they weren't making any headway on them" and "it wasn't working with this group" (i.e., the participants in the disturbance).

Perhaps the most interesting remark on this matter was provided by a National Guard official. He stated: "Once a thing like this actually does get started, many people back off. For instance, you get parents who go out . . . whose children are involved, who go out, grab their kids by the back of the neck, and yank them home. They start solving some of their own problems. Because, most of the people in these areas really don't want these things (disturbances) and they'll try to do anything they can to prevent it."

It appears that the social control agencies of this city are undergoing a slow transition from control of disturbances in terms of the traditional "show-of-force" strategy to the newer "containment" strategy. Since 1968 an increasing amount of emphasis has been placed on preventing disorders through the creation of such programs as the Police Cadets and the Bureau of Police Community Relations. Some police officials still refer to their street procedures as being a "massive show-of-force," but the label is somewhat misleading.

In this disorder, aspects of both the "show-of-force" and "containment" strategy could be discerned. Heavy emphasis was placed on quickly mobilizing the "troops." Once sufficient manpower levels had been reached, arrests were made in wholesale lots, especially on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Finally, large amounts of tear gas and other crowd dispersion techniques were utilized in full, though fire arms were not used to any degree by social control agents. Such tactics are definitely reminiscent of the "show-of-force" strategy. On the other hand, "containment" variables were very much the case in the deployment of manpower in small mobile units to curtail hit-and-run violence, the attempt to allow black leaders to cool the situation despite their apparent failure, and finally, in the slow mobilization of police personnel in the early stages of the disturbance. As previously indicated, Tuesday, the first day of the disturbance, was not considered part of the emergency period. Only after police resources had been taxed to their limit was a decision made to activate the riot plan and call for outside assistance.

On the whole, it appears that city social control agencies are endeavoring to move toward a "containment" strategy of riot control. The use of the "show-of-force" approach may be the product not of an unwillingness to change, but more the result of insufficient organizational resources with which to operationalize "containment" techniques as fully as might be desired.

Social Control Perceptions of Black Participants

The typology of agitator, initiator, and sustainer elaborated by police respondents in the first case study is applicable, in part, to perceptions of black participants in this study. Respondents from all social control agencies in this disturbance tagged the agitator role to "subversives" and "militants" with the initiators labelled as "kids." Examples of this characterization are seen in some of the following remarks: ". . . all it takes is a militant to get that crowd stirred up and then you have trouble;" "Black Nationalists are right in the middle of the thing;" "militant groups who were quite young. These are the type of people who normally instigate things. These kids were fourteen to fifteen years old;" or "They just got these impressionable kids to get out there and break some windows;" "There are little hard core groups that . . . operate just within the law . . . they're out to cook things up;" "I call them subversive, they operate under the guise of civil rights . . . they always come up with this line of 300 years of oppression and racist society. That old line that you've been hearing for the last three to five years. They don't have freedom, they don't have equal rights . . . This is the spiel that they sucker the youngsters with;" "the blame should be placed on the people in the immediate area . . . They shouldn't be using these kids in that way" (implying that children were told to set fires and throw rocks, etc.)

With the exception of this last comment by a police official, other respondents made a very emphatic distinction between the two riot roles of "subversive" and "kids" and the "real people" in the black community. But the role of sustainer clearly seen in the first case study was not as obviously delineated in this disturbance. As we have already alluded to, the third role was that of the "real people." With reference to both the 1968 and 1969 disturbances, one police official remarked, "I'd say in both (riots), they (the militants) didn't get the participation of the real black community. They (the riots) weren't things that were participated in by the whole community . . . We have a lot of good people in this town. I'd say 95 percent of them are. And maybe more than that." A fire department official also indicated this theme: "I am not talking about the black people. I am talking about the radicals in the black group." A final illustrative note in this regard was seen in the previously mentioned comment by the National Guard official to the effect that black parents were "grabbing their kids by the neck and yanking them off the streets" in efforts "to solve their own problems."

Virtually all respondents characterized this disturbance as having some modicum of organization, primarily by militants. One fire official put it this way, "We still maintain that there has to be a certain group that are leading these kids on." Another fire official dismissed the idea of riot spontaneity by pointing to the previous picketing, the distribution of "inflammatory" pamphlets, and the crowds throwing stones. This official suggested that there were no stones available in the disturbance area and that they must have been brought in from other sections of town. A police official elaborated on the above factors and went on to mention that people were moving young children from one section of town to another to cause trouble. Another police official stated: "I think both of these (referring to both the 1968 and 1969 riots) were something that were manufactured by individuals that had other motives."

Themes of spontaneity were mentioned only by two respondents. In one case a National Guard official said that riots are "usually spontaneous incidents that nobody can predict." The course of conversation with this individual, however, indicated that he also looked to militants and subversives as playing a crucial organizing role. The other person suggesting spontaneity was a fire official who did not qualify his remarks.

In contrast to social control personnel in Case Study 1, a number of officials in this case did mention that the black community had a number of legitimate grievances. Although subversive elements and trouble making children were seen as the major elements in causing the disturbance, legitimate grievances were seen by some respondents as contributing factors. Most illustrative of this theme is a comment made by a National Guard officer: "In the Negro community you'll find that on warm days people will be all over the streets. The living conditions are not good. Too often those people don't have enough to do . . . enough to keep them occupied." A police respondent used the theme of legitimate grievances in distinguishing between militants and the real black community. ". . . they (the black community) had some real grievances (hunger, unemployment) I'd say they (the militants) didn't get the participation of the real black community."

A last perception that must be noted concerns the general restraint the rioters exhibited in some facets of behavior. One police official made continual

reference to the participants in the disturbance not using guns against police, fire, or National Guard personnel. A fire department official was more precise. He stated: "In all fairness, I don't think they (the rioters) bothered the fire department much . . . I don't think they intended to even harm the firemen . . . I am under the impression that with all the shots fired Wednesday night that if they wanted to hit somebody they could have hit them. There is not an easier target than a fireman. That is why I am assuming they didn't want to hurt firemen."

Social Control Perceptions of Their Own Organizations

Fire department officials stated that the only job of the fireman is to answer fire alarms which they did. Activation of their riot plan did not preclude fire-fighting but did demand that the safety of the firemen be logically prior to extinguishing fires. One fire official summarized the activities of his department with this statement: "We went in and did our job. The police surrounded us and we had no problems whatsoever."

Likewise, police officials had no criticism of their own organization. As previously mentioned, the police department did mention their lack of sufficient men and material to cope with the disturbance problem. In response to this shortcoming, police officials activated their riot plan and asked assistance from the county sheriff's department and National Guard. Cooperation with other organizations was described as excellent. A typical remark was that "once the National Guard arrived everything was quiet." A police respondent elaborated further: "I can't commend them (the National Guard) too highly for the assistance they gave us. I think that the city and state are very fortunate that they've adopted this procedure (of calling in the Guard). You can save lives, you save a lot of property damage, the police as a rule have a much better working relationship with the people after the Guard leaves." If the police have to deal with the entire situation and need to use considerable force to restore order, relationships with neighborhood citizens, bad and good, are tarnished. This same respondent was the individual who advocated the "massive show-of-force" to control disturbances.

While not criticizing the decision to activate the National Guard, one police official felt that the local law enforcement agency had the necessary resources to control the situation. He remarked: "I don't think we even needed the Guard to tell you the truth because we had busted them (i.e., the rioters) back right before the Guard got here. But, the Mayor wanted to play it safe . . . to cool things." He noted that persons participating in disturbances would not listen and could not care less. In a disorderly situation the only thing that can be done "is to protect life, that is number one, and property, that is number two. When you protect, you've already started the process of quelling the disorder . . . You've got to instill fear of loss into the participants."

As previously discussed, most respondents gave low marks to the idea of black neighborhood leaders cooling the disturbance. One police official stated, "it wasn't working with this group (the rioters)." A city official couched it two ways. First, "the big problem in cooling these things is reaching the right people . . . the NAACP and Urban League usually isn't it . . . you need a good pipeline to the youth." Second, "identify leaders and put them to work cooling it (the riot) off but, that doesn't

work. The leaders soon get lost in the crowd." One police official was decidedly against the whole idea. "We talked to people that said they were leaders, said they would calm them (the rioters) and pull them back. Both times we've done this in 1968 and 1969 we pulled back and we've had this increase. Whether they considered this a sign of weakness or what, I don't know. But this seemed to aggravate their action." This idea also received support from a city official who commented: "Telling the police to withdraw may have been the turning point. If the police had stood fast and broke up the crowd they would probably have collared the leaders and finished things off." In this same vein of reasoning, one police official saw an important need for community leaders to act as cooling or as preventative agents. He stated: "The black community was appalled by the events which transpired . . . But, there is a big need for the black community to speak out against the militants who do not represent the majority."

This concludes the second case study. Again the perspective has been that of the social control agencies in the situation, with all the limitations that such an approach involves. We now turn to Case Study 3 in our comparative analysis and description.

PART IV: CASE STUDY 3

Description and Background

Our third case study involves another midwestern and multi-county metropolitan area of over a million persons. Blacks comprise less than a fifth of the total population of the central city which dominates this particular metropolitan region. The city is a major manufacturing and trade center. Transportation equipment, machinery, chemicals, printing, and food processing (especially of bakery goods) are industries which underlie the city's economic base. Wholesale and retail trade, government, and educational institutions are also significant employers. Job descriptions reveal a work force with slightly less white collar than blue collar workers.

The black population is centered primarily on the east, northeast, and western areas of the city center. A physical description of the black areas would be analogous to these already presented in Case Studies 1 and 2. The city has a high rate of private home ownership and black areas are no exception. One city official in a previous DRC study, mentioned that the city had a very low rate of unemployment dropping to 1 percent on occasion. He did mention, however, that pockets of high unemployment (as compared to the rest of the city) did exist in black areas. The city has large numbers of "hillbilly" southern whites and emigrant blacks attracted by jobs in the metropolitan area.

Our respondents did not provide the elaborate characterization of the disturbance area that was evident in the two prior cities. The 1968 DRC study revealed that most officials felt the most "troublesome" or potential riot area was in the northeastern section of town. The disturbance we focus on in this report took place in the western black neighborhood. Many of the inhabitants of this area are elderly, and it was defined as a relatively quiet neighborhood compared with other more traditional trouble spots in the city. However, even the western neighborhood was seen as having a history of rowdiness, relatively high crime rates, and "honky-tonk joints" with potential for trouble. One police officer, in fact, stated there were spots in the eventual disturbance area that were "really a jungle" especially on Friday nights.

Physically the westside black neighborhood is badly run down and in transition. Most business establishments left are white-owned but gradually closing down and leaving the area for other locations in the suburbs and other sections of the city. Housing in the area is being bought up by two universities in the city to augment their facilities. One respondent suggested a contributing factor in the disturbance was black fears over loss of housing with no place to relocate.

One city official indicated that there had been growing unrest on the west side, which may have contributed to the eventual disorders. He cited two westside incidents three weeks prior to the disturbance indicative of growing black unrest: (1) a white meter maid ticketed a Black Panther leader's car and he beat her up, and (2) in the days following the parking ticket incident, twelve parking meters were destroyed. The respondent suggested that this latter activity was some sort of retaliation by the Black Panthers aimed at the city administration.

The Setting Event and Keynoting Behavior

Respondents from the police department and the city all saw the setting event as a fight between three black males in front of a public housing development. The fight was reported to the police department and a two-man mobile unit was dispatched to the scene about 8:15 pm, Thursday. Upon arriving at the scene, the investigating officers reported seeing two black males beating and dragging a third black male toward the street. The officers pursued the two assailants but both fled down the street and were not apprehended.

Fire department officials did not provide any description of the riot setting. These respondents all stated that they knew nothing of the disturbance until they were called to action with the first fire alarm at about 10:00 pm, some 1½ to 2 hours after the disturbance erupted. Each, however, did state that after reading the official police after-action report, it was their conclusion that the fight at the housing development set things off.

Keynoting behaviors were seen in the events immediately following police attempts to break up the fight and their pursuit of the two black assailants. After a fruitless chase, the two officers returned to the fight scene. A small group of from fifteen to twenty onlookers had gathered. Some of these persons were described as "irritated." One individual stepped forth haranging the group and attempted to stir them up. (Police officials did not indicate the content of this individual's remarks.) The police officers attempted to arrest this "agitator" (their definition) and were "jumped" by some members of the group. The officers broke loose and called for assistance with several area cruisers responding to their call.

During the brief scuffle, one policeman lost his pistol to one of the persons involved in assaulting the officers. The other officer fired two warning shots as the individual fled. The pistol was dropped and retrieved by the police officers. No further shots were fired nor were any arrests attempted.

From that point, the disturbance "mushroomed." The black crowd grew in size and participants began hurling rocks and bottles at police officers, business establishments, and passing white motorists. Small groups of blacks moved into the street and started stopping traffic. All police units in the area withdrew taking their injured with them (some officers had been hit by flying debris though none were seriously hurt).

Unlike the two previous case studies where there was some vagueness about the crucial or most important keynoting behavior, such was not the case in this incident. All respondents commenting on the situation placed heavy emphasis on the police attempt to arrest the agitator. No evaluation of why this particular act should touch off a riot was offered. No clearcut evidence of police brutality, favoritism, or simple mishandling of the situation was indicated. Our respondents did suggest, however, that potential disturbance situations have existed in the past and have been primarily focused on police arrest activity within the black community. In past situations the incidents had not escalated, but in this particular case the potential became an actuality.

Chronology of Events

An indication that this particular disturbance was not as extensive as those recounted in Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 is given by the fact that no after-action report was compiled either by the city fire or city police departments. Thus, some of the specific details of the unfolding of the disorders are not as clear as otherwise would be desirable. Nevertheless, we were able to ascertain enough information to get a definitive overall picture of who did what and where during the course of the disturbance.

The activities that transpired until the police withdrew from the area around the public housing project occupied about 45 minutes until about 9:00 pm. Most of the high ranking police officials in the city were attending a banquet that evening. Word of the disturbance was flashed to them a little after 9 o'clock. This led them to activate the riot plan. Some time between 9:10 and 9:15 pm Code 1, the first step of the plan, was put into operation. Following the general guidelines of the plan, all police cruisers near the scene of the disorders moved into action. Some cruisers proceeded to cordon off the disturbance area, sealing off about an 8-block section of the neighborhood. Other police cruisers went on patrol duty, halting and redirecting traffic around the effected zone.

Between 9:00 pm and 10:00 pm representatives from the Black Panthers and other militant groups met with police officials. They asked permission to try and cool the situation and asked the police to withdraw their units farther down the street. The request was granted. Immediately thereafter a supermarket was firebombed and the rock throwing escalated. One police official described the situation this way: "We had people from the Panthers, people from other militant groups . . . that were inflaming the young people. At first they started talking cool it. . . They (other police officials) thought that if we'd withdraw down the street to stop the missiles flying that we could let these alleged leaders stop it. And it looked like it might work because some of them were highly responsible people that were already trying to stop the situation. We got to a point, where certain individuals, known to us as active in the agitation field, when we withdrew down the street, they (the agitators) seemed to turn the burner up. And so it didn't work" (the supermarket was firebombed).

The fire department received its first alarm of the evening in conjunction with the supermarket fire at 10:08 pm. The alarm call was normal and the fire department had no idea that a disturbance was taking place. The first fire units responding to the blaze saw a large crowd spilling out into the street. The chief in charge of responding fire units thought the crowd was related to a High School Graduation ceremony being held that evening. He ordered his trucks to take another route. The change in course led the fire apparatus to a police perimeter checkpoint where a police officer informed the fire chief of what was happening. Fire department vehicles continued to the blaze where they were halted by a large crowd of spectators and rioters. Firemen and trucks were showered with bottles, rocks, and fire bombs. Police protection was not available and the fire department withdrew without fighting the fire.

The failure in communication that resulted in the fire department responding to fires in the disturbance area without police cover occurred on two more occasions

that evening, at 11:26 pm and 12:00 pm. On the second and third runs to alarms in the riot vicinity, fire officials stated that they "assumed things were under control." All three fire responses met with crowd harassment and two firemen were injured.

At 10:38 pm Code 4 of the emergency plan was called for by police and fire officials. This is the last step of the plan and supposedly involves its full implementation. However, not all possible measures were taken. The second shift of police and fire personnel was held over. Men on the night shift were called in early and the 12-hour shift system instituted. National Guard and sheriff's department officials were alerted and asked to standby. News Code 30 was also activated. This latter procedure called for a ban on press releases and barred newsmen from the disturbance area for 30 minutes. This procedure was voluntary but "great cooperation" was extended by local media sources.

The supermarket fire gathered a considerable number of spectators (estimated from 300 to 500). Harassment of police units at the scene continued but few injuries were reported. A police official at the scene explained the situation as well as the lack of injuries in this way: "... the people that were primarily responsible for the trouble were behind the children and females . . . which meant they had to throw their missiles with a high trajectory and we could see them coming." "It was a situation where we were getting rocked while we were standing there, rocks and bottles were flying like crazy." As the fire burned in the supermarket, a laundromat across the street was looted and vandalized behind the cover of the spectators and rock throwing crowd.

At 10:55 pm, Code 4 was called off only to be reinstated at 11:40 pm seemingly because of a lull then a reflare of disorderly activities. At 12:16 am Friday, the fire department was again called back to the supermarket blaze in an effort finally to extinguish the fire. On this run, local blacks that were members of a group called The Neighbors rode with the fire personnel in their cars and trucks. These "counter-rioters" calmed the black spectators and other crowd members and allowed the fire department to fight the blaze without any further harassment. Police units assisted the firemen. At about 1:30 am the fire department quenched a fire in a burning car in a nearby street. No difficulties were encountered. The supermarket fire was finally extinguished at 5:12 am. By this time, spectators, rock throwers, and so forth had almost disappeared and there were no further major incidents in the disturbance area. Code 4 was again called off at 5:35 am.

Friday was relatively quiet throughout the morning, afternoon, and early evening with only sporadic reports of rock throwing, theft, and fire bombings. The police department was on standby alert. At 9:35 pm a department store was looted. Earlier in the evening black leaders and police officials again met to discuss the situation. One police official called the meetings a "hoax" and described them in these terms: "Now they (the black representatives) had a proposition for the police department that if we threw a weiner roast, they wanted 3,000 hotdogs and buns . . . that they might be able to cool it." Speaking of another meeting outside the department store, this comment emerged: "... while we were having this confrontation and discussion about stopping the looting in front of the store, the Black Panthers had opened up the back doors of the store and had carried half the store away. This was the first

time that we realized that everything we saw on the surface was just like the old proverbial iceberg. There is more underneath the surface than there was at the top."

By 10:00 pm riotous activity started a new upward crescendo. Crowds and groups began gathering, missiles were being thrown, and lootings were reported. At 10:38 pm Code 4 was reinstated. This call unlike in previous instances resulted in a massive mobilization of police personnel. The sheriff's department went on standby. Mutual aid agreements with suburban police forces were activated. These latter agreements called for the suburban police agencies to patrol various sections of the city to free police personnel for riot control. Numerous police units moved into the disturbance area, although not en masse but in small squads. Crowds were asked to disperse, but this often resulted in a response of bricks, rocks, and bottles. While some crowds were estimated to have reached a size of 300 to 400 persons most were perceived as being made up of about 30 or 40 individuals. A curfew was not imposed but several neighborhood businesses, particularly taverns, were asked to close. The supermarket, gutted the previous night, again burst into flames. This blaze was attributed to smoldering timbers again catching fire and not to arson. The fire department responded to the blaze and extinguished it without incident. Sniping was reported from the buildings in the housing development. One police officer was wounded but no assailant could be found. Eventually all large and small gatherings were dispersed and the streets cleared by 2:30 am Saturday.

In the various police meetings with representatives of black groups held earlier Friday night an interesting development took place. One of the meetings held at The Neighbors headquarters was with members of a black organization called the TIGERS. In this meeting, one of the black speakers claimed that the disturbance was the consequence of a "power grab" between Black Panther groups from outside the community, the local Panther chapter, and a local black leader with a following of his own. The black groups at this meeting, setting themselves aside from the other black groups (with which the police had also been meeting) asked also for police cooperation in allowing them (i.e., the TIGERS and The Neighbors) to try and calm the local black population. The police department was requested to resume local patrols but to use a minimum amount of manpower and a maximum number of black police officers. A command post would be set up at The Neighbors headquarters. Black representatives claimed their interest in this proposal stemmed from a desire to thwart the Panther power play and to "show the law community that they are big enough to handle" the responsibility for calming the population and quelling the disturbance. Police officials apparently granted the request.

However, Code 4 remained in operation all day Saturday. At 6:00 pm on Saturday night the police fully mobilized again. Most of the personnel were kept on a standby basis in case the calming efforts of the TIGERS and The Neighbors failed. However, the night like the day passed relatively quietly. A few fire alarms and rock throwing incidents were reported but nothing of major consequence. On Sunday, the same held true. Fire department operations proceeded quite routinely. Police units were again on a standby basis through most of the day, but when nothing happened, normal operations were resumed at midnight. On Monday all police and fire department activities were back to normal.

Termination of the Disturbance

None of the social control personnel contacted in this study put much emphasis on police force or shows-of-force as being instrumental in quelling the disturbance. Disorderly activities were seen as quickly escalating with the peak activity level reached in the first few hours after unruly actions started. From a high point on Thursday, the disturbance reached a plateau throughout Friday and quickly diminished Saturday and Sunday. Tear gas was not used in the situation, nor was a curfew imposed. Help from other law enforcement agencies, outside of some taking over routine city patrol work, was not necessary. Likewise, while the National Guard was alerted, no units were ever mobilized and brought into the city. And despite the massive mobilization of police department personnel, street tactics concentrated on the use of small police squads making selective rather than mass arrests.

The use of local black citizens in attempting to calm the disorders was of paramount importance in this disturbance. On at least three different occasions, representatives from black groups and police officials discussed separate and combined efforts by area residents to bring calm into the situation. Two of these occasions did not evoke successful efforts. The police considered one such meeting a hoax, if not a downright cover for illegal actions. Nevertheless, the third venture was considered a successful meeting. The TIGERS received police cooperation in calming the area on Saturday. Police units were massively mobilized and on standby; nevertheless, they did not move while TIGER members went through the community discouraging violence or any street disorders.

Still neither the influence of the TIGERS, nor the threat of potential massive police retaliation was explicitly singled out as a major factor in terminating the disturbance. Police officials did give high praise to the actions of the TIGERS but did not particularly credit them with terminating the disturbance. Fire department officials did recognize the assistance of The Neighbors in allowing personnel and equipment to get to the blaze at the supermarket, but made no reference to the assistance of the black group in ending the disorders.

Police street tactics throughout the disturbance reflected a "containment" strategy. Small mobile units of police officers moved to contain disorderly persons or small groups with selective arrests. The use of police fire-power either in terms of using either tear gas or firearms was kept to an absolute minimum. Local assistance from local groups was utilized in attempt to prevent the disorders from spreading. These approaches to riot control worked quite well for this city. At worst there was only a "mini-riot," activities that at other times and places in American society would not have merited even consideration of the label of riot.

Social Control Perceptions of Black Participants

The disturbance roles singled out in this community mirrored those named in Case Study 1. These were the roles of the agitator, the initiator, and the sustainer of the disturbance. Additionally, a role mentioned in Case Study 2, the "real people" or the non-disturbance participating black populace of the community, was also alluded to by social control personnel.

Agitator roles were primarily ascribed to perceived militants, particularly members of such groups as the Black Panthers. One police officer cited the case, as the police department saw it, of the Panthers pretending to attempt to calm the situation while in back other members of the organization were looting a department store. Another police official said, "We had people from the Panthers, people from other militant groups. . . that were inflaming the young people." Without naming a specific group this individual also stated that "there were people that after this thing was off the ground, that managed to try and keep it going." A fire official offered a similar comment to the effect that the "Black Panthers possibly did a lot to ferment the disturbance." This same official mentioned that his comment was purely opinion and that he could not offer any specific evidence to support his view. Another mention of agitation was during the early stages of the disturbance when an individual was said to have come out from the spectators at the fight scene and to have urged violent action.

It is of interest to note that the Black Panthers did not receive any mention as a trouble-making group in this community when it was studied a year earlier by DRC. At that time, a group called the University House and a number of specific individuals were named by police department members as the most active agitators and troublemakers in the city. In the 1969 disturbance the University House and some of the afore-mentioned individuals were conspicuous by their absence from the agitator listing and naming by the police. This may be due, in part, to police officials tending to place most militant individuals and groups under the heading of Black Panthers, especially since the Panthers had become well known as militants during the course of that year. However, it is also possible that the University House and other named individuals were not involved in the later disturbance. It could be that they were geographically located in other than the black neighborhoods where the disorders took place and thus had less opportunity to participate in the disorders.

The initiator role was thought of as youngsters throwing rocks, bottles, and fire bombs and participating in other unruly and violent activities. Mention has already been made to the police view that the Panthers were "inflaming the young people." In describing the composition of the groups and crowds participating in the disturbance, one police officer noted, "There was a great number of young children out there. I mean down to four, five years old." (The officer did qualify his statement to the effect that the very young ones were merely spectators.) A pronounced change in the makeup of disorderly groups was noted by this same officer on Friday and subsequent days. He observed that "the complexion of the crowd changed. The young ones, the real young weren't there. This was the teenagers and upwards. The middle twenties and some even over."

The role of bystanders serving as a supportive group was not verbalized by any of the social control personnel, even though it was observed more than once that large numbers of people were in the streets watching what was going on. As did the police in Case Study 2, officials tended to characterize the majority of the black community as being good, solid citizens. One police officer highlighted this theme by pointing to the sincere efforts he saw by many local black residents to calm the situation. He went on to say "The Negro community in this city is overwhelmingly responsible . . . The Panthers and Black Muslims have been here for years and they just can't get off the ground. They're just not accepted. Their philosophy is not accepted by the black community."

In comparison to case studies one and two where themes of riot organization and outside influence were prevalent, this disturbance was not characterized as having either of the two. One police respondent said the disorder was "definitely spontaneous." "I don't think there was anything planned . . . I am positive there wasn't anything planned . . . I don't think there was any outside agitation other than that from local people. Of course, there were rumors flying all over about people coming from a nearby city and all this kind of nonsense." A fire official stated that, "There was every evidence that the disturbance was spontaneous." And finally a city official indicated that he "didn't feel any outside influence was involved in the incident."

An interesting theme that emerged from the disturbance was the reevaluation of the black leadership in the community. A city official stated, "Black leadership came from where it wasn't expected. The Black Panthers perpetuated a hoax. They said they were in control and they weren't. They may have done this to keep things hot and tense." A police respondent couched his remarks in terms of a power play utilizing the "cool it" front. "Interestingly enough to me was the type of people who came here to discuss this problem with us. In the past, there was no responsive action between the two (the Panthers and some local organizations) because there was this power (struggle) here and seeing them together kind of concerned me. I asked one of the leaders what brought them together. 'Well, we're helping our brothers and we thought this would be the best way'." The police respondent suggested that if the disturbance was to bring some sort of black unity, then it failed. The groups split. One group in particular, the TIGERS, wanted to bring calm to the situation. The TIGERS were seen as a potential new, local black leadership group. The Panthers were seen as having lost ground because they were thought to have attempted to extend the disorders and had failed in that attempt.

As other studies have indicated and which is also suggested in Case Study 2 of this report, the traditional black organizations such as the NAACP and others have little influence in disturbance situations. The city official in this study repeated the theme that the "NAACP and Urban League didn't exert much influence in this situation." In the 1968 DRC study this same respondent spoke in great detail about the excellent rapport and communication the city administration and police department had with such local black groups as the Panthers, Citizen's Forum, NAACP, and the Black Ministerial Association. Following the events of the 1969 disturbance this respondent "felt the city administration would have to reorient itself to the black leadership and (learn) to distinguish the good from the bad."

Social Control Perceptions of Own Organizations

On the whole, respondents from all social control agencies were quite content with the functioning of their organizations during the disturbance period. The fire department stated that its riot plan, developed in 1968 and motivated by the disturbances in Watts, Newark, Detroit, etc., worked fairly well. The one major problem they had was the communications breakdown on Thursday evening. Fire officials expressed great appreciation for the help they received from The Neighbors in getting to the supermarket fire. One fire official stated, "without the assistance of The Neighbors the fire department could not have got into the location at all to

fight the fire." Despite the communications breakdown and the harassment the fire department thus received, fire officials did not verbalize any criticism of the police department.

All of our fire officials indicated that there would be no major changes in their organization plan and "none are anticipated." One fire official did feel the "need for reevaluation" of task force logistics. A Code 4 alarm mobilizes fire companies on a task force plan. The procedure combines three or four companies into a task force at one central location outside the disturbance perimeter. Our fire official indicated that the task force concept is excellent for mammoth disturbances, less so for that experienced in the city. The basic problems with the task force is the need to move much equipment most of which is unnecessary at most fires and the response is generally slow.

Police officials were also relatively satisfied with their organization. One police official noted that the department riot plan (Code 4) was only eighteen months old. Though it had been rehearsed on one prior occasion, this disturbance was its first field test. He suggested that with any new plan there are bound to be a "few bugs in it that need to be ironed out." "It (the plan) functioned fairly well. The second night it functioned extremely well." With reference to the communications breakdown between the police and fire departments, this respondent suggested the difficulty lay between the field command post near the disturbance area and the Emergency Operations Center at police headquarters. The respondent was very emphatic about his warning the fire department about the disturbance situation. He stated: "I gave by telephone, by our call box system, and over the radio to our operations center at headquarters, the order not to send any fire units in without police protection and not to have them stand by on the perimeter. We would get somebody to them. But somehow there was a breakdown of communications and the next thing, we turn around, (and) here's some (fire) units coming to try to get back to the fire we had just sent units away from. These men got the same things the first units did," that is, rocks, bottles, and fire bombs thrown at them. Though this official was not specific, he suggested that there may have been some criticism of police action by fire department officials. He did state, "there was some feeling on the firemen's part that we hadn't given our leg" by which he meant a failure on the part of the police to do their part.

A fire official commenting on the communications breakdown said that "it was his understanding that fire crews were going to be protected." He was as surprised as anybody that they were not. In appraising the situation, this respondent said: "Apparently the police department communication center was swamped. It appears that orders to protect the fire department got held up in the morass."

As an interesting aside, a police respondent in the 1968 DRC study stated: "It's no secret that this city's police communications are going to be written up as being one of the finest in the country. The Command Post is second to none and our plan incorporates all areas." The city actually had had no prior experience with civil disturbances. Riot plans had been developed in response to the civil disorders occurring elsewhere around the country in the middle 1960s.

Another facet of police department activity during the disturbance situation that received high marks from our respondents, was the discipline and restraint exhibited by the police department. One policeman noted that neither the department nor individual officers "overreacted." It was observed that "very few of the officers used their firearms. The only time we used our firearms was against snipers. There was no tear gas used and if you read the commentaries and editorials that have been written about the police department, the restraint and perseverance used, it's fantastic; you won't believe it . . . two thirds of the people in the community didn't know anything had transpired," until order was restored.

Perhaps the only organizations that came under fire were those of the news media. One police official said, "National newspapers played this to the hilt." Comments about local media sources were on the other hand favorable, ". . . It was not sensationalized" locally. The city officials offered comments in the same vein, not feeling that the event was one of major proportions and thus were "displeased with the way the national media played it up" though quite complementary of the discretion shown by local news agencies.

News Code 30 was considered a success. Cooperation from local media groups was nearly 100 percent. One local television station did not cooperate with the endeavor and was criticised for its action by some respondents.

This concludes our third case study from the perspectives of the social control agencies in a disturbance. This case, as we have indicated, was a "mini-riot" at best. In the next and last case, we examine an instance further toward the non-disturbance end of the continuum we talked about in the first part of the report.

PART V: CASE STUDY 4

Description and Background

Our fourth case study involves a city in the south central section of the United States. The central city has a little more than 40 percent of the total metropolitan population of more than three quarters of a million. About a fifth of the residents of the city are black.

The city is a major manufacturing center. The transportation industry, food processing, tobacco manufactures, household appliances, and the production of other types of electric machinery underlie the city's economic base. Blue collar workers outnumber white collar representatives in the work force in a ratio of about three to two.

Black neighborhoods form an L-shaped block on the east and south sides of the city center. These areas are old, some dating back to the early 1800's when the city was first founded. Railroad tracks and freeways slice through the areas with factories and warehouses distributed throughout. Black neighborhoods as well as some neighboring white sections, are badly run down. Federal anti-poverty programs are prominent. The city has divided the "poverty zones" into seven sections each headed by an "area council" which administers anti-poverty funds. The locale in which this disturbance took place was labeled the Jefferson area, and is just east of the downtown center.

The disturbance area, like many of the other depressed sections of the city, has been the focus of Urban Renewal Programs. One city official noted that the Urban Renewal projects have exacerbated an already existing housing shortage within the city. Slum dwellings cleared for renewal purposes have not been replaced by any large scale development of new housing facilities nor has there been any systematic plan for relocating persons displaced by the renewal programs. The result at the time of the disturbance had been to overcrowd greatly existing housing units and to intensify tensions among the poor, black, and displaced in certain parts of the community.

In 1967 the city was (according to terms used by our respondents) swept by a "major" disturbance. In 1968 the city again underwent what was defined as a "minor" outbreak of racial hostilities. In part, as we shall see, these earlier outbreaks of disorders may have led to a characterization of the incident we studied as being almost insignificant. The 1968 DRC field study, conducted after the two earlier set of disorders, revealed that inadequate housing and high unemployment were visualized as the major problems within the black neighborhoods. At the time of the 1969 disturbance, most of our respondents indicated that conditions had not changed much from previous years. They qualified their remarks, however, by claiming that the city administration was busy working on these difficulties.

The disturbance area is not characterized by any outstanding feature. It is in fact in undistinguished neighborhood with no boundaries or real landmarks, criss-crossed with busy commercial thoroughfares behind which lay intermixed pockets of

lower class whites and blacks. Census figures indicate that it has a higher percentage of poorer people (more than 50 percent) than any other section of the city.

The interviewed city and police officials did indicate there had been some problems associated with trying to make arrests in the black areas. A police official described the situation in these terms: "The minute you make an arrest it seems like you get a milling crowd." ". . . They (black residents) distrust the police . . . Nothing a police officer does is right. Everything he does is wrong." The respondent described the difficulties that the police department has faced in developing rapport within the black community at great length. He ended his comments on the note that he "felt things were improving."

The specific street where the disturbance originated had been a continual source of trouble in the area. Over a period of several years it had become known as a place where racial groups clashed, with white motorists driving through shouting and occasionally shooting without aim at blacks on the street who tended to throw rocks or sometime shoot also without aim at the passing cars. The major intersection where the trouble started, furthermore, had long been a gathering place for idle youngsters in the neighborhood.

The Setting Event and Keynoting Behavior

The disorderly activities that occurred in this city during the time period DRC studied in 1969 were clearly seen as of a very minor and almost insignificant nature. This can be seen in several ways. Neither the social control agencies or other city organizations in the community bothered to write up an after-action report of the incident. Social control personnel when interviewed several weeks after the incident had difficulty remembering details and tended to either confuse or mix their descriptions of this situation with more salient disorders of the previous two years. Furthermore, street activities roughly similar to the one DRC studied had occurred several times in earlier months and also had been generally defined as of no great significance either.

On the other hand, the police did activate some phases of their riot plan. The incident did have strong racial overtones. (And in terms of our originally intended but not carried out multi-dimensional analysis, black respondents in this city considered the incident with its ensuing disorders far more serious than did the primarily white-manned social control agencies.)

There was total agreement that the setting event was a shooting episode in a mixed black-white area. As in Case Study 1, a white attack upon blacks was involved. A car with three adult white males passing a black church fired one shotgun blast into the open door of the building, interrupting a worship service and slightly injuring, apparently by ricochet, a 15 year old boy. (It is of interest that most police accounts obtained by DRC failed to mention this injury.) The police were notified and came to the scene taking a description of the automobile and its occupants. Both the car and its passengers were apprehended within an hour. One police official called the arrested persons "white militants, the youngest about 30 years old." The apprehended persons were said to have been upset over their arrest since

they "claimed to be helping the police." The suspects were charged with malicious shooting, considered a relatively minor offense in the state in which this occurred.

Immediately after the shooting, these attending the church service as well as youngsters on the street, gathered in a group outside of the church. The keynoting behavior arose from some of the actions of a few of these individuals. They milled around and refused to disperse when police appeared upon the scene, or re-formed in small groups when they had been dispersed. Police estimates were that not more than 30 or 40 persons were involved, mostly youngsters. There was no claim by law enforcement groups that agitators in any way were present, or that there was any organization to the milling activity near the church location. Initially at least there appears to have been no rock throwing, but this soon started.

Chronology of Events

The shooting incident was reported to the police at about 7:30 pm and on a Sunday evening. Within minutes police were on the scene and were faced with the milling groups, and eventually rock and bottle throwing by a relatively few individuals. Reports of this activity quickly reached police headquarters as well as other city agencies, including the mayor's office. However, the response was left to the police who within an hour activated the first phase of their riot plan. Among other things, this involved cordoning off the area of disturbance to all but police vehicles. A number of police cruisers manned by about 20 police officers were also dispatched to the scene for possible riot control. Their main function was to attempt to disperse any collection or gathering of persons in the area, and to stop the very sporadic missile throwing.

The disorderly activities seem to have remained quite localized in time and space and not to have escalated. As one officer noted, the disturbance "didn't get too hot." However, the police were unable to clear the small groups that constantly re-formed on the streets. Assistance was sought and obtained from certain prominent local black residents to come and to try to "get the kids off the corner." One very well known black woman, an active member of a neighborhood council, appeared on the street several times and appealed to the youngsters to disperse, a fact which the police in their retrospective accounts of the situation did not particularly note. This is especially noteworthy because this woman herself became the source of a later confrontation between the police and some black residents of the neighborhood.

Several hours after the initial shooting at the church, the police arrested two sons of the woman just mentioned, apparently for failing to leave the street. The exact details of the ensuing situation are unclear and a matter of dispute. The mother was called to the scene and, according to the police, got into an altercation with the arresting officers and was seen by them as attempting to prevent her sons from being arrested. She was then arrested herself, initially for inciting to riot. As officers were putting her in a police car to take her to the station, the woman allegedly became violent, supposedly reaching for the revolver of the driver. There is agreement that she was blackjacked as she sat in the police car at that time. In fact, this is confirmed by a stop at the hospital for minor treatment on the way to the police station, where the woman was additionally charged with resisting arrest and assaulting a policeman.

Spectators near the scene who had gathered during the altercation were reported to have become "irritated" about the blackjacking and arrest of the woman. It does not appear that these spectators numbered more than three or four dozen persons. Before the police drove the woman away, they were subjected to some hurling of rocks and bottles.

However, despite this particular episode, calm was eventually restored to the area that night. All groups were finally dispersed with a few arrests (the exact number being unclear) being made. Apart from the sporadic rock and bottle throwing, no other violent actions were undertaken. No looting was reported and no fires were set, and the fire department was never called into action in the disturbance area that night.

After quiet was restored and people dispersed, the police department kept the area under surveillance with foot and mobile patrol units. One police officer reported that the neighborhood was "saturated with line beats." A line beat in this city is a system of mobil patrols so constructed that police units are continually criss-crossing one another's paths. Such a procedure allows double coverage of an area with fewer men than does normal patrol operations. Also, such a system insures a certain amount of protection for the roving police units by lowering the possibility of isolation, entrapment, and attack upon individual cars or officers. Following a previously planned operation, black police officers made up a large complement of the patrolling law enforcement units.

The police cordon around the area was lifted within several hours; at midnight the normal shift changeover was allowed to take place. Throughout that evening, four members from the Police Community Relations Division were used in the disturbance area as reconnaissance teams. One police official explained the use of the Community Relations personnel in this way. They "worked in the area . . . to . . . observe what was going on . . . and identify the leaders that were in this thing and to track and locate what was troubling them." There is no indication that these police officers found anything unusual in the disturbance area. Local black groups, seemingly independent of the police, also worked to calm area residents.

The morning and afternoon of the following day passed uneventfully. However, small groups of young blacks gathered at different localities in the involved neighborhood. News of the arrest of the suspects in the shooting incident the previous night and the weak charge of malicious shooting as well as the arrest of the prominent black woman on much stronger charges of inciting to riot, had spread throughout the black community. Local black groups sent members throughout the area to keep residents calm.

Towards Monday evening, however, minor disorders again occurred. Cars going through the area were stoned, and a few persons suffered minor abrasions that had to be treated in the emergency room of one of the hospitals. Some shooting also seems to have taken place, mostly at street lights, and there were one or two Molotov Cocktails and some cherry bombs thrown.

The procedures of the previous night were reemployed by the police department. Again a "line beat" was instituted, and the neighborhood was cordoned off. Police

units on patrol again dispersed any gathering groups. A potentially dangerous episode occurred when a 15 year old black boy was shot in the area, but the police were quickly able to get local black witnesses to identify the assailants as four black men when word started to spread that the boy had been shot by white persons.

No arrests seem to have been made Monday night in connection with street activity, and no one was reported injured. Police saw no reason to institute a curfew, and basically characterized the second night as "fairly quiet." There were only minor continuations of any unruly activities in any of the black areas in the following days, as members of local community groups worked to keep the situation calm. Two trash fires were set in the area, and firemen responding to blazes were stoned by spectators with one being slightly injured, but this was not perceived as anything unusual in this neighborhood. The last non-routine police action appears to have taken place on Friday night, when a very small cordoning of the area took place. Emergency police activities had been considerably reduced the previous two evenings compared with that which took place Sunday and Monday nights.

A statistical breakdown of numbers and types of arrests in connection with the disturbance is impossible because the events we are discussing, especially the first two nights, were not separated out from the usual arrest activities going on in the rest of the city. However, it would not appear that more than a dozen persons or so were arrested in connection with the specific event studied. This is in line with some police estimates that the two first evenings of trouble "involved about 100 people totally." This is reference to black persons that may have been involved in actions in the street.

Termination of the Disturbance

The police generally saw the disturbance, such as it was, lasting only two days. As one police officer noted, "after those two days, nothing happened. It cooled itself out." This was the definition of the situation even though some isolated unruly episodes and some emergency police activities lasted until Friday, a total of five days.

In general, officials tended to take the view that there was little to terminate because there was little that had been started. There had been no need and no effort necessary to mobilize and to activate other law enforcement agencies other than the city police. There was no necessity to call upon military forces such as the National Guard. Actual property damage had been minimal, very few had been injured, and the police did not have to use their weapons. Thus, compared with the prior disorders of 1967 and 1968, this was a very minor incident, quite similar to several others which had already been experienced in the earlier months of 1969. In many ways, this was a riot that never materialized.

Considerable attention was called to the action of local black residents in helping to prevent a potentially explosive situation from getting out of hand. Thus, one city official suggested that the local residents as well as the Human Relations Commission may have played an important part in preventing escalation. He noted that commission members "worked night and day to keep everything cool. That is, I think the underlying reason . . . that we haven't had anymore trouble than we had."

A police official voiced the same theme of local involvement in minimizing the disturbance. He noted that "we got some people in the area councils, we have some neighbors, and I mean, people in every neighborhood that are working hard and when something happens they try and keep it down." In this and other remarks, the impression conveyed was more of prevention of escalation rather than termination of a disturbance. This was even voiced in the remark of the official who said "the reason that" the initial event "did not escalate was the fast action of the police using the particular program," that is, the first phase of the riot plan.

Due to the perceived rather minor nature of this disturbance, it is difficult to look at police tactics and determine their underlying strategy. The disturbance area was cordoned off, and police officers were used somewhat aggressively to disperse any groups that might be gathering. In view of these actions one might be inclined to view police tactics as emphasizing a relative show-of-force strategy.

But several things argue against that point of view. In earlier civil disorders in the community, a show of force was seen as important in eventually quelling the disturbance. Thus, one of the DRC studies showed that "the quick strong show-of-force" was viewed as a major factor "in containing the magnitude of the riot," that is, the 1967 disturbance. Police officials did not advance this view in the disorders of 1969. Furthermore, as we have noted, officials gave considerable credit to local residents and groups working at preventing an escalation of both the initial shooting episode and the arrest of the prominent black woman. Such activity is normally part of a containment strategy. Finally, the actual police tactics used while putting police officers visibly in the streets, did not involve either massive arrests or the actual or threatened use of firearms.

Social Control Perceptions of Black Participants

The social control officials interviewed in this particular case, did not present a full typology of riot roles as we found in the first three case studies. This is hardly surprising since in many respects the unruly activities that happened were not considered a real riot or major disturbance. Thus, many remarks and comments were couched in terms of the black community as a whole rather than specific roles in the limited unruly activities a few hours during two evenings.

Initiator or sustainer roles were not mentioned or implied at all. Potential participants were simply seen as being available. As one police officer said, "it's this one mob or small percentage that is only looking for trouble. They're looking for anything at all to give them a reason to do what they plan to do anyway. So, all they're waiting for is a triggering event. Then they're going to do it." On the other hand, there were some observations made about agitator roles and the "good people" of the black community.

One police officer touched on a number of these dimensions in his description of participants and those involved in the disorders. One focus was on the agitation activity of certain ministers. Some of the black ministers this officer said "cause more trouble than they keep down, because they want to. They're for everyone," the reference being to black militants as well as others. "And they're going to have to change that attitude."

Another dimension noted was black home life and self-conceptions. "This is what is against us. The home ain't worth a damn, probably never has been, never will be. The old man and woman say 'You go to church' (but the youngster says) 'Well, hell, I don't want to go. Dad and mom don't go to church.' The kid goes to church and nobody pays him a damn bit attention . . . The only person that he ever sees, that ever restricts him at all is the policeman."

A third dimension mentioned was weapons even though there was only unverified use of them in this particular disturbance. "A lot of weapons are now" available to people in the streets. "You understand that young people almost all young people run around with little cheap pistols that cost \$10 to \$15, maybe less. Not worth that much. And they all have them."

The role of the "good" people in the community was described by one police official in this way. "And then you've the good colored people; 95 percent or 98 percent, I guess, are just as law abiding as anyone else." This respondent also said it was his observation that most of the black community was slowly developing good relations with the Police Community Relations Division. Implied was the notion that only "good" people could do this.

It is interesting to note that no specific black militant groups were named as being involved in the disturbance. The general characterization instead of the more active elements in the disorders was one of "loud-mouthed youths that just want trouble." In the 1968 DRC study all organizational respondents interviewed considered the state of race relations within the city to be fairly good and steadily improving. Only one official listed any troublesome groups. Paramount in this list were the Black Unity League, Students for a Democratic Society, and the Black Student Union. At that time he didn't feel a local Black Panther chapter existed in the city. Needless to say, none of these organizations were ascribed any importance in the initiation of the disturbance either one of the two evenings. In fact, there was no tendency to attribute any planning or organization behind the disorders that occurred.

Social Control Perceptions of Own Organizations

Fire department personnel and the National Guard were not involved in any way in this disturbance. As to the police, they had few observations about the actions of their own organizations. This might have been anticipated from the low saliency and relative unimportance attached to the activities we have examined as a disturbance in this city. Certainly, no one offered any type of criticism. By lack of comment, it can be supposed that it was felt that a reasonable good job was done. One city official did offer some explicit praise of the police as well as the local citizens. He observed that "we're knocking our brains out trying to establish good relationships between everybody. All the citizens and the police. And I think they they've done a fantastic job, quite frankly."

This concludes our fourth case study. We now turn to some observations and comments cutting across the four disturbances we have described.

PART VI: SOME GENERALIZATIONS

In this last part of the report we pull together some common aspects in our four case studies, using the descriptive details noted in the previous parts as well as the other data available. Essentially we try to set forth some generalizations about organizational perceptions in civil disturbances, which hopefully might have some applicability in other similar emergency situations, or at least would appear worth testing in crises elsewhere. Our basic theme is that social control organizations have certain perceptions of the situation, a prime one being that disturbances are to be explained by the involvement of certain kinds of people, "bad elements" in the black community. In this respect, this study lends support to the notion that in part social control personnel operate with a "riff-raff theory" of riots. The importance of this is not the validity of the view, which is highly doubtful, but the fact that this is a major perception guiding the activities of these kinds of social organizations.

Our data suggest that social control organizations:

1. View disturbances as resulting from specific events rather than a process or sequential series of happenings;
2. Define these specific events as being the results of individual actions rather than as the consequences of social conditions;
3. See these individual actions as relatively unorganized and unplanned;
4. Perceive the disturbances as stemming from the involvement of certain types of persons; and
5. Visualize themselves as blameless for the disturbances.

In what follows we try to present the social control organization point of view. We follow each presentation with an analysis about the perception involved, and conclude with some brief suggestions about what might underlie the organizational perspective.

1. Social control agencies tend to view disturbances as emanating from one event rather than a process or series of sequential happenings.

How do social control agencies perceive what is "responsible" for disturbances? In general, the tendency is to see one event as responsible, or as a "precipitating event." Thus, in the first case study, the shooting and death of a black male; in the third case study, the attempted arrest of an "agitator" after police intervened in a fight; and in Case Study 4, the shooting into the doorway of a church, were all seen as the precipitant of the crowd emergence.

For analytical purposes, we divided the "precipitating event" into the "setting event" and "keynoting behaviors." The action stressed by our respondents as triggering the disturbance in Case Studies 1 and 4 fell into our classification of

a setting event. That is, such actions do not in themselves necessarily bring forth a crowd and hence riotous behavior. Something more is needed -- keynoting behaviors which present some types of positive suggestions for the development of subsequent actions.

Social control agencies are usually brought into action by some specific event, or happening. There is a tendency to let that happening dominate the initial actions that are undertaken and to overlook the possible dynamics of the situation. Thus, in our first case study, the police viewed the disorders as an outburst that was a product of the shooting or setting event, and generally ignored such keynoting behaviors as persons calling for action on the part of the group that had gathered. In Case Study 4 focus was on the shooting into the church, and far less on the activities associated with the arrest of the black woman attempting to prevent her two sons from being taken into custody.

Interestingly, the police riot plans of the two cities involved did emphasize the importance of locating, isolating, and arresting disturbance leaders. But this prescription was not carefully heeded, at least in the early stages. Limitation of the keynoting process to prevent the development of riotous behavior was recognized in organizational plans, but not in the actual operations of social control agents.

Some of the reasons for such a limited focus seem clear enough. Situations which later develop into disturbances are often initially responded to by small numbers of social control agents. Also, in many cases the actual setting event, such as a shooting, requires the attention of the responding officers to specific details such as the collection of evidence, the identification of witnesses, etc. Thus, there is a general lack of attention to possible keynoters or keynoting behavior. Furthermore, the very action of the police toward a keynoter, as Case Study 3 suggests, may act as the focus which will help to crystalize the crowd. Nevertheless, the restricted focus on the specific event which mobilizes them, tends to lead police to overlook the dynamics of the situation in which they are operating. In the vast majority of cases in which the police normally act, it is probably true that the mobilizer of action (e.g., a murder, a traffic violation, etc.) is unlikely to keep developing, but this is not so in potential disturbance situations.

2. Social control agencies tend to view disturbance-generating events as being the results of individual actions rather than as the consequences of social conditions.

Social control personnel were not unaware of either the poor living conditions or the grievances being expressed about them within the black communities, especially the ghetto areas. Respondent after respondent alluded to such conditions as widespread unemployment, inadequate housing, insufficient recreational facilities, poor educational opportunities, and insufficient channels of communications with city agencies. That blacks voiced complaints about these and related matters was also readily admitted.

However, while social control personnel acknowledged the existence of the aforementioned conditions and associated voicing of grievances, there was a tendency to downplay their importance, especially as being significant factors in the outbreak

of the disturbances. The dominant tendency was towards personalizing the conditions in generating the disturbances. That is, disturbances were seen primarily as the product of malcontent, subversive, or trouble-making individuals. In this perception, neither current conditions within the black community nor their historical antecedents were viewed as important contributing factors in the rioting. In at least two instances, Case Studies 1 and 3, some respondents openly scoffed at the idea. In the first case, where no civil rights issues were formally raised, the disturbances was viewed as being without historical meaning or in Gary Marx's phrase as "issueless" (1970). In Case Study 3 a police respondent characterized the rhetoric of black youths about "300 years of oppression" as "utter nonsense."

In essence what we find being argued is not that social conditions occasion riots, but that people do, by choice. Such a conception is consistent with Groves' findings with reference to police attitudes towards the causes of civil disorders (1968: 110). This is a point of view different from, for example, that expressed in the Kerner Report (1968). In that analysis, stress was given to the centuries of neglect and discrimination by whites against blacks and to the general and inadequate response, both publicly and privately, to problems within the black community, be it housing, education, unemployment or whatever. Research by social scientists has tended to support these notions, while in addition suggesting other variables as involved in the disturbances such as the close contact of people, rumor, milling, emergent norms, and the convergence of large numbers of people at a setting event, to mention just a few (e.g., Hundley, 1969).

What academicians or investigative committees suggest as the "causes" of civil disturbances versus what social control agents and organizations perceive may be a moot point for some purposes. To use an overworked social psychological proposition, "situations defined as real are real insofar as their consequences are concerned." It is patently clear that to the extent that civil disturbances are seen as the result of the activities of individual participants, conspiracy, and emanating from one rather than from a series of happenings or out of the background of the black community history and conditions, then social control tactics will, in part, mirror this view. The analysis of social control tactics and strategy in each of the preceding case studies partially bears out this thesis. In each of the previous cases there is a relationship between the social control strategy used and the social control agency perception of the disturbances. For example, in the first case study, the site of the most intense disturbance, the control strategy used was definitely that of a show-of-force. This case also illustrates the harshest definition of the riot and rioters. Thus, there was personal blame rhetoric about "subversives" and "revolutionaries," conspiracy themes, rumors (checked out consistently by the police) of militants coming to town to keep things in turmoil, the definition of the disturbance as a meaningless one, and the seeing of it as blossoming from the shooting event and not with preferential police treatment of the assailant as blacks charged. In Case Study 3, on the other hand, the containment strategy used mirrored a more moderate perception of the riot participants. Here, themes of conspiracy were far less common, personalization of blame occurred but in more moderate tones (e.g., agitators, militants), and the initiation of the riot was seen as something in which police officers had a part.

Nevertheless, in this and the other cases also, conditions within the black neighborhoods were overlooked as causative factors in the disturbances. This is

understandable for the police as other groups in American society (including social scientists) tend to explain social behavior in terms of the makeup of individuals. Answers for social problems especially are sought not in the social structure but within the participants in the system: Who is to blame, not what is responsible is the general question asked. The police in looking at civil disturbances reflect this general American view of the world and reality.

3. Social control agencies tend to see individual actions in disturbances as being relatively unorganized and unplanned.

Superficially, it might appear that social control personnel saw a degree of planning and organization in the disturbances. This theme was certainly voiced by some of our respondents in the first three case studies. Pre-planning for a riot was visualized in some instances with organized elements seen as being involved from the very onset of the process. This view particularly prevailed in Case Study 2 where certain black groups were said to have met over a three-week period to agitate the black community over a black-white altercation incident. In two of the other case studies, some social control personnel saw organization emerging after the disorder had already appeared. That is, certain groups were seen as working at some "semblance of organization" and "there were people that after this thing /i.e., the disorder/ was off the ground, that managed to try and keep it going."

However, it is important to note that the idea of pre-planning or organization of the disturbances was not one that prevailed across-the-board. While this point of view was expressed it was frequently denied or not supported in the remarks and observations of other officials in the same social control agencies. While some even saw nation-wide conspiracy, and usually couched such statements in highly dramatic terms, most respondents simply did not see the actions of riot participants, which were interpreted as individual rather than collective actions, as something that was the result of organized criminal conspiracy.

The denial of any organization or planning in the disturbances was even more strongly expressed by higher officials in the social control agencies, and also particularly by specialized personnel, such as members of police intelligence units. Many such respondents openly scoffed at reports of organization and planning. They often noted that they had heard rumors about "outside agitators" coming into the local community and frequently checked on these kinds of stories, but seldom found they had any validity whatsoever. Case Study 1 neatly illustrates our general point here in that the highest officials, members of the intelligence squad, and the official report all explicitly denied any organization or planning in the disturbances whereas some individual line officers in interviews claimed just the opposite.

At the agency or organizational level, it is even clearer that little validity was given to notions of planning of the disorders. The social control agencies we studied on the whole were not receptive to such a perception of the situation. They had reached the same conclusion as had the Kerner report that "the Commission has found no evidence that all or any of the disorders or the incidents that led to them were planned or directed by any organization or group, international, national or local" (1968: 202).

There were times during and after the disturbances when some of the social control agencies did issue statements through representatives that sounded as if conspiracy notions were being supported. However, such remarks about planning and organization of disorders seemed almost ritualistic statements of a public relations nature voiced from the consumption of the organization's assumed audience rather than because agency officials voicing them believed them to be true.

In fact, this observation may be an indicator of what is involved in this seeming discrepancy between individual and group perceptions of the situation, and what was sometimes expressed for public consumption. It has been suggested with regard to other social phenomena that there sometimes exists a general belief about a situation which, however, participants disavow as applying to themselves. For example, there is a widespread belief that college and university students find higher education impersonal, uninteresting, non-relevant, etc. but surveys indicate that while most students believe that this is true in general, they do not apply the observation to their own personal educational experiences which they find satisfying and rewarding. (At a different level, studies show that Americans believe life in recent years has become worse, more problematical and difficult, but that they themselves do not have many individual complaints and that they and their families are doing relatively well.) Similarly, many social control personnel project a widespread belief about conspiratorial planning in disturbances, although themselves not personally holding such a view. Thus, when faced with the need for a public explanation, some social control personnel, rather than indicating what appears to be a very deviant position, make statements along expected lines which it is thought might be applicable elsewhere anyway (the attribution of the source of trouble to "outside agitators" is a particularly good rhetorical stance which allows public support of the general belief while at the same time allowing the local situation to be perceived as an exception).

4. Social control agencies tend to perceive disturbances as stemming from the involvement of certain types of persons.

There is a strong tendency on the part of social control personnel to label or typologize participants in civil disturbances. The types specified, their number, and their degree of explication differed in each of our case studies. Nevertheless, about six basic riot-related roles tend to be identified. As might be expected from a common sense typology, the categories are neither mutually exclusive nor based on a single principle of differentiation. The labels applied are our own.

(1) The agitator role was most clearly distinguished in all of the four case studies with its content being most consistently and concisely defined. Essentially it was applied to young males using affectively charged exhortations to direct violent actions. Such persons were seen as operating primarily before the actual emergence of disturbances and were not perceived as taking direct actions themselves.

(2) The enactor role was also clearly distinguished in all four case studies. It was generally attributed to mostly pre-teen and teen aged youngsters who were seen as "fertile ground for the agitators." Their activities were primarily seen as consisting of roaming the streets in small groups, hurling missiles and verbal assaults at social control personnel, and engaging in firebombing, looting, and destroying property.

(3) The sustainer role was not as clearly delineated as the two previous roles but seemed generally to refer to persons who when a disturbance was underway, attempted to keep it going. A variety of motives were attributed for such behavior, ranging from personal to ideological reasons. No particular age or sex category was singled out as engaging in this role.

(4) The supportive role was seen as being played by persons who provided either explicit or implicit support for the developing disturbance. The behavior is viewed as essentially of a passive nature, almost that of a bystander at the scene but nevertheless encouraging agitators, enactors, and sustainers just by their very presence. Females were generally perceived as filling this role more than males with all ages being possibly involved but with a predominance of middle-aged persons or older.

(5) The non-participant role has reference, of course, primarily to the non-involved local black population. They are seen as consisting the vast bulk of local black ghetto residents. Their actions in the disturbances consist of avoiding any seeming support (even of a passive nature) of the more active participants in disorders.

(6) Finally there is the counterrioter role. This is perceived as individuals actively working to prevent a disturbance, or if one has started, attempting to bring it to a halt. Altruistic as well as opportunistic motives are attributed to counter-rioters. They are most often seen as representatives of traditional Negro organizations, although in some cases young, local black males are perceived as playing the role.

Perhaps equally as important as the use of a typology is that the social control agencies implicitly attributed the emergence and development of disturbances partly to the interplay of the varying roles. Social control personnel besides not viewing black persons in their communities as an undifferentiated mass, also perceived some pattern of riot dynamics. This is not unexpected. It has long been noted that undifferentiated perceptions are characteristics of groups with little contact with one another whereas social control agencies and ghetto area interactions are extensive and intensive. Furthermore, of necessity there is a "popular sociology" of dramatic events. Faced with disturbances, it is hardly surprising that social control agencies attempt to account for them in some way and draw elements of the explanation from the social class, occupational and subcultural backgrounds of their organizational members.

The implicit riot dynamics model involved in social control agency perceptions of disturbances appears to be somewhat as follows. The world is seen in relatively concrete terms. Thus, a disturbance is directly associated with a specific event (e.g., a shooting) to which in retrospect it can chronologically be linked. The event itself is seen as primarily involving people. In Gestalt terms, the figure rather than the ground stands out. Thus, the people involved in the initial event are seen as crucial in what may develop. The confusion and uncertainty associated with the situation in the initial stages clearly argues against any collective planning of the event. More important, social control agency personnel do not perceive an undifferentiated mass of people responding to the event. Rather they see some persons (i.e., the agitators) trying to initiate disorderly actions, others (i.e., the enactors) willing to carry out advocated actions, still others (i.e., the sustainers) wanting to continue any ongoing disorders, with still more (i.e., the supporters)

willing to encourage in a passive way any developing disturbance. On the other hand, most theoretically potential recruits stay away as much as possible from the event and there are even a few (i.e., the counterrioters) who actively oppose illegal activities.

Disturbances occur when certain kinds of people (i.e., those playing the first four social roles mentioned) get more heavily involved in the situation than certain other kinds of people (i.e., those playing the last two roles listed). In essence, social control agencies see the source of disturbances in the participants themselves, as to an extent they also see the absence of disorders stemming from the personal characteristics of ghetto residents. Rather oversimplified and overstated but still capturing the basic perceptual idea involved, disturbances are seen as occurring when the "bad guys" dominate the situation rather than the "good guys."

5. Social control agencies tend to visualize themselves as blameless for disturbances.

Social control agencies do assign responsibility or blame for disorders or riots. But as just indicated it is placed on other than their own organizations or personnel. Thus, even in Case Study 3 where the disturbance was seen as resulting from the police attempt to arrest someone defined as an "agitator," our respondents saw "trouble makers" and black militants as the major source of the initiation of the disturbance. But as one official said "the militants didn't get the participation of the real black community." It should be noted that it was consistently stressed in all of our four case studies, that insofar as the black community was concerned "95-98 percent are just as law abiding as anyone else." In general, there is a strong tendency to assign responsibility or blame for the disturbances on a relative handful of "agitators" along with somewhat larger numbers of "enactors," "sustainers," and "supporters." Groves and his colleagues in their study of police in the ghetto suggests a similar theme. He notes that "while individual policemen differed considerably in their ascription of responsibility for the problems they face, (normal police work as well as incivil disorders) most tended to see disorders as a result essentially of lawless, negligent, belligerent, and criminal uprising of some elements of the Negro community" (1968: 110).

This point of view is essentially consistent with what has been called the "riff-raff theory of riot participation." Fogelson and Hill aptly summarize it in the following terms:

At the core of this theory are three distinct, though closely related themes. First, that only an infinitesimal fraction of the black population actively participated in the riots. Second, that the rioters, far from being representative of the Negro community, were principally the riff-raff -- the unattached, juvenile, unskilled, unemployed, uprooted, criminal -- and outside agitators. Indeed, many public figures have insisted that outside agitators, especially left-wing radicals and black nationalists, incited the riff-raff and thereby provoked the rioting. And third, that the overwhelming majority of the Negro population -- the law abiding

and respectable 98 or 99 percent who did not join in the rioting -- unequivocally opposed and deplored the riots (1968: 222).

Drabek and Quarantelli (1967) in a study of three disasters in American society indicate that there is a tendency to seek the cause of a non-natural disastrous event in a who rather than a what. This process is no less true in civil disturbances as mass media accounts, official police reports, and the records of post-disturbance investigative commissions and groups will readily testify. The major difference in their treatment of the issue is the matter of who is to blame, that is, social control agents or their opposition, be it blacks, students, or whatever.

Social science research into civil disturbances often utilizes a synthesis approach; that is, draws on material from all sides and attempts to construct a dispassionate one "true" account. The result is to move away even further from the scapegoating process found in the accounts of participants or organizations close to the disturbance. There are many advantages to the synthesis approach but it does tend to discount the possible significance of the fact that contending groups in disturbances do blame one another, and, perhaps more important, obscure the fact that organizations act on the basis of their perception, although other factors are also operative in determining group actions.

Anyway that one analyzes civil disorders, events of this nature are a form of conflict, if not physically by opposing combatants, then at least normatively through challenges to the existing order of things. Even the most mundane or ideologically pure form of disorder (e.g., the hooliganism that often accompanies victory celebrations after winning the "big game") almost always engenders some form of confrontation between social control agents and the active participants. Not only do civil disorders engender some type of confrontation, we would suggest that they, in large part, spring from this confrontation. Janowitz (1968: 10-17) in a brief historical review of American racial disturbances since World War I, has indicated a transition in their basic pattern. Pre-World War II disorders are termed "communal" or "contested area" riots and basically involve a form of ecological warfare between white and black areas. The combatants were generally white and black civilians. Post World War II riots are termed "commodity" riots. That is they involve the destruction and looting of property and retail establishments (See also Dynes and Quarantelli, 1970). Combatants in these cases are blacks and forces of social control, i.e., police, National Guard, and fire departments that overwhelmingly are white-manned.

In our four studies, the dominant perception among our social control agencies was that some part of the black community was at fault with regard to the disturbances. To use an analogy which was implied in many remarks and observations, the disturbances were often viewed as if they were a mass "mugging." On the one hand, there are the "forces of evil," the "subversives," the "hate-brained people" and those relatively small segments of the black community which initiate and support the rioting for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, there are hapless

and innocent bystanders, the passing motorists, blameless businessmen and merchants, and so on who are violated and attacked by "riff-raff" elements, unless or until social control agencies step in to curtail them.

Viewed this way, it is understandable why social control agencies disavow any responsibility for disturbances. From their point of view, far from being a possible source of disorders, they are the group who are trying to prevent them. In many ways social control personnel transfer their view of fighting individual everyday crimes on to the unusual collective actions of racial disturbances. As we have already pointed out, perceptions of reality are often mirrored in related actions. The nominalistic view of the disturbances presented by our respondents finds its action corollary in the tactics and strategies of social control agencies. Be it a show-of-force or containment strategy, the basic orientation is the same, the removal of "deviant" individuals from the disturbance scene thereby preventing or quashing the development of disturbances. This tends to be the view taken with respect to ordinary crime. Even massive civil disturbances are perceived in a parallel fashion.

In some respects the results of this study are not unexpected. The major finding that social control agencies perceive certain numerically small "bad elements" in the black community as responsible for the disturbance is in line with the frequently expressed "riff-raff" riot theory attributed to law enforcement organizations in American cities. Others of our findings, such as that social control organizations see disorders as being unorganized and unplanned, are not consistent with other also widely expressed views on how the police, for example, tend to view mass racial disturbances. But perhaps more important than specific findings was that we obtained some data on a group seldom directly studied and that we did it from their perspective, a seldom used research stance. If, as we indicated earlier, a synthesis approach to disturbances, crowds, and other kinds of collective behavior is on questionable methodological grounds, a whole series of studies using the multiple perspectives of all parties involved are badly needed. This report is an attempt at a very tiny step in that direction.

FOOTNOTES

1. Throughout this report the terms "civil disorder," "civil disturbance," and riot, are used rather interchangeably. In doing so we intentionally ignore some conceptual problems involved in these labels. Our intent is to avoid the ideological connotations, as Grimshaw (1968) notes, that are attached to these terms, particularly as involves the etiology of the phenomena.
2. We use the term composite recognizing that the organizational perspective contains elements contributed by each of its members in addition to those factors resulting from the collective process in itself.
3. Part of this more general study is reported in Dynes and Quarantelli, (1973).
4. The inclusion of fire departments in the social control category is based primarily on the close working relationships that almost always exist between police and fire departments during riot situations, as well as the fact that fire departments are responsible to the governmental control of their respective city administrations.
5. The incidents included: (1) rock and bottle throwing directed at a church, YMCA, and motorists one month prior to the riot; (2) three weeks before the disturbance, three police officers near a neighborhood roller rink were the target of an attempted fire bombing; (3) four days after the fire bombing of the police officers another fire bombing was reported in the same vicinity; (4) three days before the disorder, black youths aged twelve to fourteen congregated at the skating rink and pelted police officers and passing motorists with rocks and bottles.
6. The names of the cities, identifiable officials and local groups have either been changed or left out in the descriptive accounts so as to maintain anonymity.

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