

STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND NATURAL HAZARDS
A STUDY ON THE LEGACY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S IMPERIAL
PRACTICES AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THEIR
ISLAND POSSESIONS

by

Hans M. Louis-Charles

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Disaster Science and Management

Summer 2016

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| LIST OF TABLES | x |
| LIST OF FIGURES | xiv |
| ABSTRACT | xvi |

Chapter

| | | |
|-------|--|----|
| 1 | INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 2 | MISSING LINKS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND THE NEED FOR STUDY | 5 |
| 2.1 | Disaster Management in History | 5 |
| 2.2 | International and Comparative Studies | 11 |
| 2.3 | Focus on the Caribbean | 13 |
| 3 | COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND COLONIAL TYPOLOGY | 21 |
| 3.1 | The Commonwealth of Nations..... | 21 |
| 3.2 | Colonial Experience and Typology | 24 |
| 4 | LATE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTALITY: THE INTER-WAR PERIOD AND THE “CONDUCT OF CONDUCT” | 30 |
| 4.1 | Technologies of Power and Biopolitics of Late Colonial Period | 31 |
| 4.1.1 | Governmentality in Colonial Studies | 35 |
| 4.2 | Controlling Conduct and Colonial Development | 40 |
| 4.2.1 | The West Indies and Resistance | 45 |
| 4.3 | Catastrophes versus Disasters..... | 52 |
| 5 | MULTIPLE CASE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY | 55 |
| 6 | CASE STUDY #1: THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO..... | 69 |
| 6.1 | The Disaster Management Agency in Trinidad and Tobago..... | 71 |
| 6.2 | Historical Context and the Genocide of the Native Carib Population..... | 79 |
| 6.2.1 | Tobago’s Vacillating European Colonizers..... | 81 |
| 6.2.2 | The Reign of the British and Plantation Economics | 83 |
| 6.2.3 | 1814 Treaty of Paris and Governing from Barbados..... | 90 |

| | | |
|-------|--|-----|
| 6.2.4 | End of Slavery and the Post-Emancipation Period..... | 91 |
| 6.3 | Event #1 Tobago Hurricane of 1847 | 95 |
| 6.3.1 | Destruction of Indigenous Disaster Knowledge and Devastation Ensues..... | 97 |
| 6.3.2 | Colonial Bureaucracy and Tobago’s Disaster Recovery..... | 101 |
| 6.3.3 | Requests for Financial Assistance and Punishment by the “Cat” | 107 |
| 6.3.4 | The Governor’s dispatches to the Colonial Office and the Queen..... | 113 |
| 6.3.5 | Distribution of financial assistance and loan forgiveness | 117 |
| 6.4 | In-Case Analysis and Summary of Event #1 | 120 |
| 6.4.1 | The Rule of the Sovereign and Tobago’s Disaster Recovery.... | 121 |
| 6.4.2 | Health Response: Plantation Labor Access | 122 |
| 6.4.3 | Financial Assistance: Loans for Plantation Owners | 123 |
| 6.4.4 | Legislative Process: Delayed Action..... | 124 |
| 6.4.5 | Military Use and Controlling the Population | 126 |
| 6.4.6 | Population Displacement and Resettlement | 128 |
| 6.5 | Event #2 Trinidad 1933 Hurricane | 129 |
| 6.5.1 | Brief History of Trinidad, a Plantation Economy, and a Crown Colony | 129 |
| 6.5.2 | Trinidad and Tobago’s New Representative Political Structure | 136 |
| 6.5.3 | Late Colonial Governmentality in the Inter-war period | 145 |
| 6.5.4 | Trinidad and Tobago in the 1930s and the Expansion of Government Interests..... | 149 |
| 6.5.5 | Birth Rates and Health Services | 150 |
| 6.5.6 | Housing Sectors and the Plantation Estate | 152 |
| 6.5.7 | Public Education and Child Labor | 155 |
| 6.5.8 | Police and Law Enforcement..... | 157 |
| 6.6 | 1933 Hurricane Event of Trinidad..... | 158 |
| 6.6.1 | Trinidad and Tobago Colonial Government Response and Recovery Efforts..... | 163 |
| 6.6.2 | Project #2 - Loans for clearing debris that became grants | 164 |
| 6.6.3 | Project #3 Hurricane Relief Fund- Central Relief Committee and the Rehousing program..... | 165 |
| 6.6.4 | Clothing and Food Donations Convergence and Denial | 169 |
| 6.6.5 | Rehousing Program: Build it Back the Same | 170 |

| | | |
|---------|---|-----|
| 6.6.6 | Project #4 Loans to the Cocoa Estates | 174 |
| 6.6.7 | A Legacy of Cocoa Bailouts and Government Collusion | 178 |
| 6.6.7.1 | The Cocoa Planters Association of Trinidad Ltd. in the Legislative Council..... | 182 |
| 6.7 | In-Case Comparitive Analysis of Disaster Events | 183 |
| 6.7.1 | Health Response | 187 |
| 6.7.2 | Financial Assistance from the Colonial Government | 189 |
| 6.7.3 | Legislative Policies and Bureaucracy..... | 191 |
| 6.7.4 | Controlling Population Movements | 194 |
| 6.7.5 | Population displacement and resettlement | 195 |
| 6.8 | Event #3 – Hurricane Flora 1963 | 196 |
| 6.8.1 | Trinidad and Tobago Political Development at 1963: The Crown Colony becomes Independent..... | 198 |
| 6.8.2 | The Emergence of Eric Williams and the People’s National Movement (PNM) | 202 |
| 6.8.3 | Demise of the Governor’s Power and Rise of the Prime Minister’s..... | 204 |
| 6.8.4 | West Indies Federation 1958-1962..... | 205 |
| 6.8.5 | Independence from Britain 1962 and Bicameralism | 207 |
| 6.8.6 | PNM Politics, Education, Economics and Social Change | 215 |
| 6.8.7 | Control and Discipline of Labor..... | 218 |
| 6.9 | Hurricane Flora: Government Preparation, Response, and Recovery... .. | 219 |
| 6.9.1 | Preparations | 221 |
| 6.9.2 | Devastation | 223 |
| 6.9.3 | Initial Response | 229 |
| 6.9.3.1 | Short Term Program: Restoration Work and Maximizing Employment..... | 233 |
| 6.9.3.2 | A Caribbean Association for Relief Against Hurricane: Hurricane Center and U.S Chaguaramas base | 236 |
| 6.9.3.3 | United Kingdom and Regional Aid | 237 |
| 6.9.3.4 | U.S Navy and U.S Government Assistance | 239 |
| 6.9.4 | The Government’s Major Response and Recovery Projects..... | 241 |
| 6.9.4.1 | Tobago Relief Fund..... | 243 |

| | | |
|---------|--|-----|
| 6.9.4.2 | State of Emergency: Travel Ban and Other Executive Powers | 247 |
| 6.9.4.3 | Origin of Act..... | 247 |
| 6.9.4.4 | Use of Executive Powers following Hurricane Flora. | 250 |
| 6.9.4.5 | Anti-squatting Laws and Banned Fire | 255 |
| 6.9.4.6 | Inoculation Campaign | 257 |
| 6.9.5 | Tobago Planning Team: Long Term Recovery and Mitigation | 259 |
| 6.9.5.1 | Fears of Land Reform..... | 262 |
| 6.9.5.2 | Long Term Plan Presented and Debated in Parliament..... | 264 |
| 6.9.5.3 | The Population State and Disaster Recovery | 268 |
| 6.9.5.4 | Agriculture Goals | 271 |
| 6.9.5.5 | Education and Community Development | 277 |
| 6.9.5.6 | Rehousing Program | 279 |
| 6.10 | With-In Case Multi-Event Analysis of 3 State Responses to Disasters | 282 |
| 6.10.1 | Legislative Process and Bills..... | 286 |
| 6.10.2 | Financial Assistance | 287 |
| 6.10.3 | Health Response | 288 |
| 6.10.4 | Policing of the Population Associated with Disaster Response | 290 |
| 6.10.5 | Housing and resettlement | 292 |
| 7 | CASE STUDY #2 THE UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF BERMUDA | 294 |
| 7.1 | Overview of Bermuda | 296 |
| 7.1.1 | Current Disaster Management Structure | 302 |
| 7.1.2 | Disaster Sub-culture | 304 |
| 7.2 | Historical Context: Spanish Discovery and Neglect before British Arrival | 306 |
| 7.2.1 | The Bermuda Company Charter to Crown Colony and the structure of Government..... | 308 |
| 7.2.2 | Early Demographics | 313 |
| 7.2.3 | Rise of the Maritime Economy and Slave Emancipation Compensation | 321 |
| 7.2.4 | Rule of the Sovereign and Social Control | 326 |
| 7.3 | Disaster Event #1: Governor Reid’s Hurricane of 1839 | 331 |

| | | |
|---------|---|-----|
| 7.3.1 | Description of the storm | 332 |
| 7.3.2 | Response to the storm..... | 334 |
| 7.3.2.1 | Colonial Office Dispatches..... | 339 |
| 7.4 | Cross-case Analysis of Disaster Response and Recovery under the Old Representative System: Bermuda Hurricane 1839 and Tobago Hurricane 1847 | 341 |
| 7.4.1 | Public Health Response | 343 |
| 7.4.2 | Financial Assistance to Hurricane victims | 344 |
| 7.4.3 | Military Use and Population Control | 345 |
| 7.4.4 | Legislative Process | 346 |
| 7.4.5 | Population displacement and resettlement | 348 |
| 7.5 | Disaster Event #2 Hurricane Arlene 1963..... | 349 |
| 7.5.1 | Education..... | 352 |
| 7.5.2 | Governance..... | 353 |
| 7.5.3 | Hurricane Arlene 1963 | 354 |
| 7.5.4 | Damage..... | 356 |
| 7.5.5 | Response and Recovery Efforts..... | 358 |
| 7.5.6 | Emergency Measures Organisation (EMO) | 361 |
| 7.6 | Cross-case analysis Disaster Response and Recovery of Bermuda and Trinidad & Tobago in 1963..... | 364 |
| 7.6.1 | Public Health Response | 365 |
| 7.6.2 | Financial Assistance | 366 |
| 7.6.3 | US Military Presence..... | 367 |
| 7.6.4 | Legislative Process and non-financial Policies | 367 |
| 7.6.5 | Population displacement and resettlement | 368 |
| 8 | EVOLUTION OF CARIBBEAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT & CONCLUDING REMARKS | 370 |
| | REFERENCES | 375 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 1. Attributes of the Multi-case Study | 58 |
| Table 2. Colonialization and Sovereignty Multi-Case Study | 59 |
| Table 3. Tropical Cyclones of North Atlantic Ocean 1861-1986. Source: Daniel and De Souza et. al. | 76 |
| Table 4. Parishes of Tobago in 1765 | 86 |
| Table 5. No. of Laborers on Pay Lists at 30 th September 1845..... | 93 |
| Table 6. Impact of the 1847 Storm on Exports | 99 |
| Table 7. Damage to Houses. Source: Tobago Assembly. | 104 |
| Table 8. Damage to Public Buildings and Chapels. Source: Tobago Assembly..... | 105 |
| Table 9. Damage to Sugar Estates. Source: Tobago Assembly. | 105 |
| Table 10. Return of the Number of Prisoners confined in the Gaol of Scarborough 1 st January 1847. Source: Tobago Assembly | 112 |
| Table 11. Estimated Damage to Property in Tobago. Source: Colonial Dispatches.. | 115 |
| Table 12. Governance and Recovery from 1847 Tobago Storm..... | 120 |
| Table 13. Trinidad and Tobago 1933 Census. Source: Colonial Reports. | 135 |
| Table 14. 1889 Trinidad and Tobago Crown Colony Legislative Council. Source: Meighoo 2012..... | 138 |
| Table 15. 1933 Legislative Council Trinidad and Tobago. Source: Colonial Reports..... | 144 |
| Table 16. Damage to oilfields reported to the Colonial Office. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. | 161 |
| Table 17. Level of crop damage per district from 1933 Hurricane. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. Source: Colonial Dispatches..... | 162 |
| Table 18. Notable donations from the business and civic society. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. | 168 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 19. Rebuilt houses per district and cost. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. | 172 |
| Table 20. Financial Statement of Hurricane Relief Fund. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. | 173 |
| Table 21. The Art of Government in Trinidad’s Disaster Recovery: A Comparison of Two Hurricanes’ Disaster Response | 183 |
| Table 22. Comparison of health care system and response by the government..... | 188 |
| Table 23. Comparison of financial assistance provided by the government | 189 |
| Table 24. Comparison of Legislative Council and Policies in response to Hurricane | 192 |
| Table 25. Comparison of Control Methods | 195 |
| Table 26. Comparison of rehousing projects..... | 195 |
| Table 27. Transition to responsible legislature and Chief Minister. Source: Meighoo 2012..... | 201 |
| Table 28. Parliament Composition Transition to Independence. Source: Meighoo 2012..... | 208 |
| Table 29. The Members of the House of Representatives and the Executive Cabinet..... | 213 |
| Table 30. Table Destruction level of houses in Tobago. Source: Tobago Planning Team. | 226 |
| Table 31. Housing-Destruction by Districts- Selected Districts. Source: Tobago Planning Team..... | 226 |
| Table 32. Prime Minister’s Hurricane Fund. Source: Tobago Planning Committee. | 245 |
| Table 33. House of representative vote outcome. Source: Trinidad and Tobago Parliament. | 266 |
| Table 34. Cocoa Industry Grants and Loans over next 5 years. Source: Tobago Planning Committee. | 272 |
| Table 35. Livestock and dairy loans and grants. Source: Tobago Planning Committee. | 274 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 36. Tourist sector loans and grants. Source: Tobago Planning Committee. | 276 |
| Table 37. Loans and grants to Education. Source: Tobago Planning Committee. | 277 |
| Table 38. Loans and Grants for housing. Source: Tobago Planning Committee. | 281 |
| Table 39. Governing Typology of Trinidad and Tobago | 283 |
| Table 40. Governing Structure During each Event | 285 |
| Table 41. Legislative process and bills passed following storm | 286 |
| Table 42. Financial Assistance Provided for each Event | 288 |
| Table 43. Public Health Services Provided for Each Event | 290 |
| Table 44. Use of Military and Police Force | 292 |
| Table 45. Housing and Resettlement Effort for each Event..... | 293 |
| Table 46. Census of the Eight Tribes, 1622 (Does not include public lands in St. George's approx. 700 total pop 1500. Source: Bernhard 1999. | 314 |
| Table 47. Census of St. George's and the Tribes, 1764. Source: Bermuda Assembly. | 318 |
| Table 48. The population of the Colony of Bermuda 1839. Source: Bermuda Assembly. | 320 |
| Table 49. Slave Owner Compensation. Source: Royal Gazette of September 1st, 1835. | 325 |
| Table 50. Marriages, Births and Deaths of the colony of Bermuda 1839. Source: Bermuda Assembly. | 328 |
| Table 51. Request for aid sent by the Vestry of Pembroke Parish | 336 |
| Table 52. Colony Profiles during Disaster Event #1 | 341 |
| Table 53. Health Response to the Hurricane | 343 |
| Table 54. Financial Assistance to Hurricane Victims | 345 |
| Table 55. Military Involvement and Policing following the storms | 346 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 56. Legislative Process of the two colonies | 347 |
| Table 57. Population Sheltering and Resettlement..... | 349 |
| Table 58. Hurricane Alert Committee. Source: Public Information. | 361 |
| Table 59. 1963 Government Structure of Case Studies | 364 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 1. The territories that were at one time or another part of the British Empire. The British Overseas Territories are underlined in red. Source: Wikipedia. | 24 |
| Figure 2 Case Study Bermuda..... | 63 |
| Figure 3. Disaster Response and Recovery during the “Territorial State”..... | 68 |
| Figure 4 Disaster Response and Recovery During the "Population State..... | 68 |
| Figure 5. Case Study Analysis of Trinidad and Tobago | 78 |
| Figure 6. Map of Tobago Parishes. Source: Wikipedia..... | 87 |
| Figure 7. British prisoner on a penal treadmill being struck with a cat-o’-nine-tails. Source: Photos.com/Jupiterimages..... | 109 |
| Figure 8. Captain Cipriani. Source: GenI..... | 142 |
| Figure 9. Cocoa Estate, Trinidad 1930s (Source: UWI West Indiana Collection)..... | 153 |
| Figure 10. Trinidad and Tobago Legislative Council Evolution..... | 199 |
| Figure 11. Dr. Eric Williams Chief Minister and First Prime Minister 1956-1981. Source: Information Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communication. | 203 |
| Figure 12. Path of Hurricane Flora. Source: Trinidad Guardian. | 220 |
| Figure 13. Flora destroys villages in Tobago. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives..... | 223 |
| Figure 14. Historic Moriah Church Destroyed. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives..... | 225 |
| Figure 15. PM Eric Williams, GG Solomon Hochoy and team of officials "Tobago Relief Work". Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives. | 229 |
| Figure 16. Police help transport injured to Trinidad using US Navy airplane. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives..... | 231 |
| Figure 17. PM Eric Williams GG Hochoy and team of officials inspect temporary sheltering camps. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National. | 232 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 18. PM Williams and team of officials visit Bothel relief center. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives. | 235 |
| Figure 19. PM Eric Williams with US Navy "Tobago Relief". Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives..... | 240 |
| Figure 20. PM Dr. Eric Williams inspects damage to Tobago forestry reserves. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives..... | 256 |
| Figure 21. Case Study #2 The Overseas Territory of Bermuda. | 296 |
| Figure 22. Path of Hurricane Arlene. Source: Colonel Edward Jones 1963. | 355 |
| Figure 23. Destruction caused by Hurricane Arlene. Source: Bermuda Royal Gazette..... | 357 |
| Figure 24. Dissertation Model | 370 |

ABSTRACT

The current era of Non-Self-Governing-States and semi-Autonomous regions continue to contemplate referendums on their political associations while access to natural hazard relief is cited as a significant reason to resist full sovereignty. This dissertation informs how a State's autonomy status affects how natural disasters are prepared and mitigated for, responded to and recovered from. Additional enquiry addresses how colonial settlement and colonial administration shaped disaster management practices. A historical multi-case study was conducted using a sample pool of island states associated with the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Within-case and cross-case analyses of the major themes: use of military forces, displacement and resettlement; legislative policy and process; financial compensation and public health services, were conducted following 5 government responses to significant hurricane storms on 3 former and current British colonies over the span of 250 years. A Foucauldian theoretical framework, Late Colonial Governmentality, is used to explain the emergence and formalized disaster management in the Atlantic/Caribbean region. Whether or not a colony was extractive, (i.e. a plantation) played a significant factor in historical government responses. The findings show that greater political sovereignty allows for the use of transformative disaster management initiatives that can address longstanding vulnerabilities, social and economic injustices. Despite some limitations, this study provides empirical evidence that greater political sovereignty will not jeopardize access to natural hazard relief and is a significant asset towards mitigating future disasters.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years a number of states have held or will hold referendums on their continued colonial status or bloc group memberships spurred directly by public concerns surrounding their sovereignty. Sovereignty here is defined as *the final and absolute authority in the political community... and no final and absolute authority existing elsewhere*.¹ The modern world holding that the community being wholly or partly the source of sovereignty and the state as the sole instrument which exercised it. Despite international support for decolonization through the United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV) and the creation of the Committee of 24, there are still 17 Non-Self-Governing States (NSGS). The majority of these NSGS are island possessions of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the majority of these islands are located in the precarious areas of the Atlantic Hurricane Belt and the Pacific Ring of Fire. Supporters of continued colonial association list natural hazard relief as a significant reason for maintaining status-quo.² However, a comprehensive study on political sovereignty among islands and natural hazard relief does not exist.

Reviewing the available literature on the development of disaster management within island possessions of former colonial empires reveals the significant knowledge

¹ Hinsley, *Sovereignty*.

² Baldacchino, “‘Upside Down Decolonization’ in Subnational Island Jurisdictions.”

gap that exists within the disaster studies field. Much greater attention has been given to the region's disaster management development since the 1980s³ and models linking disaster recovery to sustainable developments.⁴ This pre-80s gap may exist for a number of reasons, such as an ongoing disconnect to the field of Humanities. The limited literature available often lacks conscientização or critical consciousness⁵ from the Caribbean and Pacific Islander perspective. The way in which island states have dealt with these constant threats of natural disasters can, in turn, teach lessons to the rest of the world. As concerns for island vulnerability to natural hazards continues to grow with increased climate change, it is also important for researchers to highlight their often overlooked capacities and capabilities in surviving and in many cases thriving in such at-risk natural hazard zones. Those indigenous to these regions often know the best way of handling extreme events, including when to move to safer ground, how to channel excess energies, what to cache or stockpile and when to fight fire with fire.⁶

This monograph aims to answer how the possession of greater political autonomy or of greater dependency status enhances or prohibits a state's disaster management capabilities. To fully assess this "political question" this dissertation also addresses how the legacy of colonialism reveals itself in response to current and past

³ Jeremy Collymore, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean: Perspectives on Institutional Capacity Reform and Development," *Environmental Hazards* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 6–22, doi:10.3763/ehaz.2011.0002.

⁴ Berke and Beatley, *After the Hurricane*.

⁵ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

⁶ Clark, "Aboriginal Cosmopolitanism."

catastrophic events. This study hypothesizes that having greater political autonomy presents governments with the option to utilize more transformative disaster management methods that can mitigate longstanding vulnerabilities. In this regard, NSGS are at a disadvantage as their governments will consistently behave more conservatively.

This historical comparative study uses a sample of case studies chosen from island states associated with the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Through content analysis of archival documents, the findings demonstrate how disaster management practices have evolved and in some ways remained consistent over the centuries. In what follows, the Foucauldian inspired theoretical framework of *Late Colonial Governmentality* is used to frame essential changes in ruling practices by the United Kingdom within these islands. These changes in the form and execution of government affected disaster management practices. The theory provides an explanation for the early development of emergency management entities in the Atlantic region and the findings of this study provide some empirical insight to states contemplating referendums on their colonial association. This study creates a conceptual framework that can be replicated by other researchers interested in the interplay of colonial history, politics and disaster management.

In Chapter 2, the historical evolution of disaster management is outlined along with its lack of global and comparative perspectives. This section underscores the need for this study and locates its academic contributions. Chapter 3 discusses the development of the Commonwealth of Nations and the colonial typologies used to select the case studies of islands. Chapter 4 explains the theoretical framework of Late Colonial Governmentality and the shift in governing practices within the mid-20th

century. This study uses this governing epoch to analyze state responses to major disasters. This study's methodology of multi-case studies is discussed in Chapter 5 which synthesizes the preceding chapters to discuss the disaster case studies included in the study and the archival qualitative methods employed. Content coding led to the selection of five themes: use of military forces, displacement and resettlement; legislative policy and process; financial compensation and public health services as areas for case study comparison. Chapter 6 is a case-study of Trinidad and Tobago and its disaster management following hurricane events in 1847, 1933 and 1963. Chapter 7 contains the second case-study of Bermuda and its disaster management following hurricane events in 1839 and 1963. The case study chapters also contain within- and cross-case analysis. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a summary of findings and the academic contribution to the field. A model rendering of the dissertation is provided as well as the limitations of the study.

Chapter 2

MISSING LINKS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND THE NEED FOR STUDY

2.1 Disaster Management in History

Archeologists have found evidence that many early civilizations made attempts to address flood hazards. In Egypt (1817-1722 BC), pharaoh Amenemhet III created what has been called history's first substantial river control project. A system of over 200 water wheels diverted the annual floodwaters of the Nile River into Lake Moeris. In doing so, the Egyptians were able to reclaim over 153,000 acres of fertile land that otherwise would have been useless.⁷ The roots of the modern fire department can be found in the city of Rome over 2000 years ago when the city was nearly destroyed by fire. A system dependent on untrained slave labor to fight fires was replaced by a formal, citywide firefighting unit from within the Roman army, called the Corps of Vigiles. With the fall of Western Roman Empire in the fifth century A.D., however, came the disappearance of the Corps of Vigiles, and organized firefighting did not appear anywhere in the world for another thousand years.⁸

Disaster scholar Coppola writes that modern disaster management, in terms of the emergence of global standards and organized efforts to address preparedness, mitigation, and response activities for a wide range of disasters did not begin to

⁷ Quarantelli and Center, *Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection*.

⁸ Coppola, *Introduction to International Disaster Management*.

emerge until the mid-20th century. In most countries, this change materialized as a response to specific disaster events. At the same time, it was further galvanized by a shift in social philosophy, in which the government played an increasing role in preventing and responding to disasters.⁹ However, he does not go into detail explaining this social philosophy nor does he connect it to disaster events occurring in the “third world”. In response to air raids and the prospect of nuclear attack many industrial nations’ governments began to form elaborate systems of civil defense. Great Britain’s disaster management agency traces its roots to the Civil Defense Act of 1948 and the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency grew out of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Other countries such as Peru in 1970, Nicaragua in 1972 and Guatemala in 1976 developed their disaster management structures not for civil defense, but after being spurred into action by popular criticism for poor management of natural disasters. Although Coppola mentions Latin America, the Caribbean’s evolution is missing from his historical analysis, an omission all too common in disaster literature.

Phillips et. al (2012) also trace the birth of modern emergency management to the Cold War and the development of the civil defense. Typically, a civil defense position was part-time, low paying, and required little if any training or education. The American National Red Cross and Salvation Army were the only volunteer organizations available to assist disaster victims. Civil defense positions during World War II allowed a citizen to feel as if they were contributing to the war but were largely symbolic. The onset of the Cold War in the early 1950’s and the bitter rivalry with the

⁹ Ibid. Pg. 4

Soviet Union elevated civil defense. In the United States, the federal government created various offices of civil defense (i.e., Federal Civil Defense Agency 1953-1958; Office of Civil Defense Mobilization 1958-1961; and the Office of Civil Defense 1968-1979) to lead and coordinate efforts to protect residents from chemical and nuclear attack. Until the 1950s, disaster management had been primarily a matter for local and state governments. However, following severe flooding in the upper Midwest, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act in 1950. This legislation though narrow in scope allowed the federal government to become involved in any future disaster relief efforts without additional Congressional approval. Through the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and the Stafford Act of 1988, the federal government could provide aid for communities and later directly to disaster victims. Until 1979, the federal government had no true centralized department to deal with emergency management issues until the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by President Jimmy Carter. The Clinton Administration elevated this agency to cabinet-level with its administrator reporting directly to the President. However, President Bush would later reposition it under the Department of Homeland Security following the 9/11 attacks.¹⁰ Here again, we notice that the historical accounting for the development of emergency management neglects all experience and knowledge to be found outside of the USA neglecting the experiences and interactions with its closest neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean.

What is more surprising is that the development of the United Kingdom's emergency management gives no mention of their colonies' experiences. Centuries of

¹⁰ Phillips, Neal, and Webb, *Introduction to Emergency Management*. Pg. 6-8

imperial practices responding to disasters in their territories outside of their homeland are seemingly ignored or not considered. The Cold War era and the Civil Defense Act of 1948 that enabled a response to hostile situations is widely cited as the birth of emergency management provision and legislation in England and Wales. This has since been supplemented by the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act that for the first time placed a statutory duty on local responders to plan for emergencies.

Naim Kapucu (2010) writes that following the end of the Cold War, the Civil Defense in Peacetime Act of 1986 is framed for the existing system and recognized central and local government responsibility approach. Civil disasters were then a lead driver to the review of the existing emergency management system in 1989 and 1991. However, it was the Millennium Bug experience, which was followed by flood events, and the UK Fuel Blockade crisis of 2000 that raised the question about complexity and lack of capacity of structure for needed information provision, action, and management of disasters at the local level. This led the UK to adjust its focus and review the emergency management system which was implemented through Home Office.¹¹ The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) of 2004 introduced a single framework for civil protection in the UK and brought new changes to the table such as replacing and updating former Civil Defense and Emergency Power legislations. The CCA is now composed of two parts. Part 1 defines regulations, guidance, a clear set of goals, and responsibilities for all involved organizations at the local level. The local responders are divided into different sections and categories based on their specific duties and roles. Part 2 updates Emergency Power Act of 1920 and focuses on most

¹¹ Kapucu, “Emergency and Crisis Management in the United Kingdom: Disasters Experienced, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations for the Future.”

serious emergencies and future risk profile.¹² Critiquing UK's emergency management, McEntire and Mathis (2007) write that it is still unclear to whom the local authorities should report and information does not flow smoothly between the national and local authorities. This creates a potential to create confusion when disaster strikes.¹³

The two last world empires (U.S.A and U.K) have essentially developed/evolved their emergency management practice and theory from the possible onset of nuclear war while neglecting the centuries of experiences not only around the world but more importantly in their former colonies. This lack and the need for more international and comparative perspectives are constantly noted in disaster studies literature. Disaster scholar Russell Dynes writes that "the significance of disaster... is brought sharply into focus when one takes a cross-cultural and international view"¹⁴ Following the 40th anniversary of the Disaster Research Center (DRC), numerous scholars gathered to reflect on the past and propose directions for the future.¹⁵ From this and other similar efforts scholar, Thomas Drabek highlights two key themes that are relevant to this study. The first being the need for alternative theoretical

¹² Ibid.

¹³ McEntire and Mathis, "Comparative Politics and Disasters: Assessing Substantive and Methodological Contributions." Pg. 184

¹⁴ Dynes, "Cross-Cultural International Research." Pg. 102

¹⁵ Rodriguez, Wachtendorf, and Russell, "Disaster Research In The Social Sciences."

perspectives should be elaborated, encouraged and compared and (second) a focus on global, rather than a national (US) focus must be developed.¹⁶

Disaster scholar David McEntire (2007) writes about the lack of interests in disaster studies by researchers involved in global studies but that the two are ironically born from the same Cold War era beginnings. The need to understand how populations would react to nuclear war motivated the government to turn towards scholars for assistance, leading to the creation of academic institutions like the Disaster Research Center and its expertise in human behavior. McEntire argues that International Relations has the potential to provide a number of lessons for Disaster Studies. First students interested in International Relations have spent a great deal of time investigating decision-making in times of crisis. Decision-making is a major problem in disasters, but the lessons from International Relations have yet to be fully applied in emergency management. The second finding in International Relations that could be applied to disasters is from the study of regimes and epistemic communities. A third and most relevant point is the area of theory development. International Relations has already undergone many of the challenges facing disaster scholars, and lessons about explanatory perspectives, methodological strategies, and theoretical values and assumptions can be integrated into research about disasters.¹⁷

McEntire and Mathis (2007) write that although a great deal of attention is being directed toward the increasingly recognized profession [Emergency

¹⁶ Drabek, “Sociology, Disasters and Emergency Management: History, Contributions, and Future Agenda.” (pg22)

¹⁷ McEntire, “International Relations and Disasters: Illustrating the Relevance of the Discipline to the Study and Profession of Emergency Management.” Pg. 174

Management] in terms of new degree programs, additional academic journals and recurring conferences sponsored by emergency management associations, we lack understanding of disasters and emergency management institutions around the world. To correct this they recommend the discipline of comparative politics to help increase our understanding of disasters in other countries as well as promote more effective emergency management institutions and practices internationally. ¹⁸ Like International Relations and Disaster Studies, it too grew in popularity during the Cold War era. Its approach to research includes comparing and contrasting variables to identify why change occurs, what makes for a successful government, and how policy can be made effective. This approach will be utilized for this study and explained in greater detail in the methodology section.

2.2 International and Comparative Studies

Comparative work has also been useful to understand emergency management organization and human behavior around the world. ¹⁹ Benjamin McLuckie (1970) conducted one of the earliest comparative studies of official emergency management organizations examining organizations and warning systems in Japan, Italy, and the

¹⁸ McEntire and Mathis, “Comparative Politics and Disasters: Assessing Substantive and Methodological Contributions.” Pg. 178

¹⁹ Ibid. Pg. 181

United States.²⁰ Studies about Russia²¹, the United Kingdom²², Australia²³, and New Zealand²⁴, have been conducted. Joseph Scanlon (1994) compared the roles emergency operations centers in Canada and the U.S.A ²⁵ while Tricia Wachtendorf used the comparison to study the response of Canada and the United States to the flooding of the Red River in 1997.²⁶ Studying emergence, Aguirre et al (1995) study of gasoline explosion in Guadalajara, Mexico highlights the importance of preexisting social organization, as generally immediate relatives and close friends of victims were those that responded and began search and rescue efforts.²⁷ Although there are a number of studies focusing on the global north, much less is known about emergency management institutions in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean

²⁰ McLuckie, *The Warning System in Disaster Situations*.

²¹ Porfiriev, "Institutional and Legislative Issues of Emergency Management Policy in Russia."

²² O'Brien and Read, "Future UK Emergency Management."

²³ Gabriel, "The Development of Municipal Emergency Management Planning in Victoria, Australia."

²⁴ Britton and Clark, "From Response to Resilience."

²⁵ Scanlon, "The Role of EOCs in Emergency Management."

²⁶ Wachtendorf, Commission, and Center, *Interaction Between Canadian and American Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations During the Red River Flood of 1997*.

²⁷ Aguirre and Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center, *The Social Organization of Search and Rescue*.

2.3 Focus on the Caribbean

Natural hazards in the Caribbean are recurrent phenomena. Historically, different disasters have caused great damage and death within the region. Research by Tomblin (1981) has shown that almost every city in the Caribbean region has been devastated at least once during the last 300 years by earthquakes or hurricanes, and during the last century volcanic eruptions have caused greater loss of life in the Lesser Antilles alone than in the entire rest of the world.²⁸ Although the numbers are disputable,²⁹ as they are in many disasters,³⁰ the recent 2010 earthquake in Haiti has been estimated to have killed 300,000. The region is composed of small islands with great variety in terms of the countries' political ideologies and systems, economic situation and linkages, cultural background, and linguistic differences. Other hazards include epidemics, floods, landslides, fires, and industrial accidents. Epidemics like cholera killed 40,000 in Jamaica in 1850-51 and the recent outbreak in Haiti is considered the worst epidemic of cholera in recent history according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. After the 2010 earthquake, as of August 2013, it has killed at least 8,231 Haitians and hospitalized hundreds of thousands.³¹

Writing on disaster risk management in Latin America and the Caribbean, Lavell and Lopez-Marrero (2014) state that between the 1950's and 1970's most countries within the region established civil defense-type structures to deal with the

²⁸ Tomblin, "Earthquakes, Volcanoes and Hurricanes."

²⁹ Alexander, "News Reporting of the January 12, 2010, Haiti Earthquake."

³⁰ Aguirre, "Better Disaster Statistics."

³¹ "PAHO's Interactive Atlas of Cholera in La Hispaniola."

threat of internal conflict and also with emergencies and disasters. This was especially the case in Latin America where the need for social control in a situation of internal war against guerrilla movements was pursued by national authorities under the influence of the USA during the early days of the Cold War. The exception was Costa Rica which disbanded its armed forces in 1949. Set up to deal with internal security problems, these organizations quickly became the structural basis for institutional response to disasters triggered by natural hazards. They write that from the 1980's onwards, both in Latin America and the Caribbean countries these traditional structures were modified as the field of disaster management widened to include a mandate beyond mere disaster response, with more emphasis on prevention and mitigation, rehabilitation and reconstruction.³²

Focusing more specifically on the Caribbean region, Jean Luc Poncelet (1997) writes that until the 1960s there were no specific national organizations to deal with natural disasters in the Caribbean.³³ Concerted regional disaster management initiatives began emerging in the early 1980's. This regional initiative followed a series of major disasters which led to the development of the Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness Program (PCDPPP) laying the groundwork for the region's current Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). Toulmin (1987) looked at the early stages of PCDPPP and presented an evaluation of emergency preparedness and regionalized training on nine Caribbean islands during the period of

³² Lavell and Lopez-Marrero, "Disaster Risk Management in Latin America and the Caribbean- Four Decades of Evolution and Change, 1970-2010." Pg. 230

³³ "A World Safe from Natural Disasters - The Journey of Latin America and the Caribbean."

1980 to 1985.³⁴ PCDPPP's dissolution came after it was arguably successful in raising awareness of the threat of hazards and the potential for low-cost mitigation measures in the region. Collymore (2011) describes how disaster management in the region has developed over 25 years from event-driven and relief activities to a broader approach including elements of preparedness, prevention and mitigation, and more recently relating to topics of sustainability, development, and climate change.³⁵ Jamaican scholar Barbara Carby has written extensively on the value of improving local and scientific knowledge into formal plans³⁶ and in a forthcoming manuscript she highlights the experiences and challenges of integrating disaster risk reduction into national development planning. Berke and Beatley (1997) conduct a multi-case analysis of disaster recovery in the Caribbean with aims at linking this process to goals of sustainable development.³⁷ Returning to the work of Jean Luc, the most cited study on the region, he positions Caribbean nations in the larger realm of the developing world, summarizes the history of disaster management in the Caribbean *as a largely improvised response, lacking any prepared, planned or coordinated procedures. Special powers were simply handed over to heads of state, defense or police forces once a state of emergency had been declared.*³⁸

³⁴Toulmin, "Disaster Preparedness and Regional Training on Nine Caribbean Islands."

³⁵ Collymore, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean."

³⁶ Carby, "Beyond the Community."

³⁷ Berke and Beatley, *After the Hurricane*.

³⁸ Poncelet, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean," September 1, 1997. Pg. 277

Most analyses of the historical practices of disaster management in the Caribbean leave both practitioners and academics with very little understanding of how the region has learned to live with natural hazards over the centuries. This neglected history can address two concerns of this study; how this past has led to the current standards of procedures and a distinctive regional disaster sub-culture; and whether this institutionalization has made disaster mitigation efforts more efficient and effective. An exception can be found in the work Jennifer Santos who utilized a Weberian approach to explain the evolution of emergency management and social vulnerability in Puerto Rico.³⁹ Aspects of colonialism have shown most relevance in the field of vulnerability studies.⁴⁰ A field that tries to incorporate geographic, historic and socio-economic characteristics of social vulnerability in relation to vulnerability to environmental hazards,⁴¹ and where understanding capacities and capabilities⁴² are also encouraged. Concepts such as the *Pressure and Release* model note the role of root causes like experiences of colonialism in building social vulnerability.⁴³ Though the linkages to specific dynamic processes and unsafe conditions become less definite and difficult to pinpoint in the causation of specific

³⁹ Santos, “Integrating Perspectives on Social Vulnerability and Emergency Management in Puerto Rico.”

⁴⁰ O’Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner, “Taking the Naturalness out of Natural Disasters.”

⁴¹ Cutter, “Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards.”

⁴² Anderson and Woodrow, *Rising from the Ashes*.

⁴³ Wisner, *At Risk*.

events, it does at least acknowledge and allow space for integration of historical systemic attributes in understanding the effects of natural hazards.

Denise Thompson (2010) is another notable author focusing on disaster management in the Caribbean. She examined how it is possible to effectively organize to limit the impacts of hazards in resource-starved regions in her book “A Framework for Making Multi-state Disaster Management Systems Perform”. Thompson draws on literature on the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a frame of comparison on the factors of effectiveness in disaster mitigation and management.⁴⁴ Philip Duku Osei, in his study “Network Governance in Emergency Management in the Caribbean”, briefly mentions colonialism’s effect on shaping the region’s emergency management. Osei writes that *the legacy of differing governance institutions handed down by the colonialists and perpetuated in the postcolonial era, fashioning modern emergency management systems for the region and individual islands, required extraordinary acumen in communication, collaboration, and a wealth of resources.*⁴⁵ Cuba, Puerto Rico, Barbados, Jamaica and the French overseas departments were among the first governments to create specific bodies for emergency management. Cuba assigned its disaster-related responsibilities to civil defense, directed by its highest military command and the president. The Dominican Republic opted for a mixed system, with both a civil defense as well as a National Disaster Commission in charge of writing and updating the National Disaster Plan. The English-speaking countries created National Disaster Committees within the Prime

⁴⁴ Thompson, “Building effectiveness in multi-state disaster management systems.”

⁴⁵ Osei, “Network Governance in Emergency Management in the Caribbean.”

Minister's office or Ministry of the Interior.⁴⁶ While in Puerto Rico, the disaster emergency management office represented a mixed system in which the organization, first linked to the top elected official in the land, eventually became also highly dependent on the US' Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).⁴⁷

These studies highlight the bureaucratic locations of Disaster Management Organizations but gloss over the decades and centuries these communities have dealt with chronic hazards. Additionally, the grouping of all English speaking countries essentially in the same category fails to highlight the variability of capabilities and techniques employed among these nations. Properly analyzing this variation and its connection to the governing changes over time locates the objectives of this study and highlights its value and significance to the disaster studies field.

In the field of Political Science, Olson & Gawronski (2010) argue that only a handful of scholars have focused on low probability high consequence events. They have identified three major periods of such research, defining our current era as the "third generation of politics of disasters research."⁴⁸ They contest that the first generation in the "politics of disaster" appeared in the American Political Science Review (APSR) and was comprised of two studies: Barnhart (1925), who analyzed differential drought impacts across the US Great Plains and the associated rise of the Populist Party, and Walker and Hansen (1946), who focused on the difficulties of

⁴⁶ Poncelet, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean," September 1, 1997.

⁴⁷ Santos, "Integrating Perspectives on Social Vulnerability and Emergency Management in Puerto Rico."

⁴⁸ Olson and Gawronski, "From Disaster Event to Political Crisis." Pg. 206

adapting local government models from the American East to the much larger and harsher environments of the American West. Abney and Hill (1966) report on the non-effects of 1965's Hurricane Betsy on a local election in New Orleans is seen as a precursor to the 2nd generation of explicitly politically-oriented disaster research. Olson and Gawronski's contribution to the current third generation offers an understanding of how publics evaluate governmental disaster responses and how disasters often, but not always, become political crises. Our study should also be considered a contribution to this "3rd generation of politics and disaster research", which helps to expand current research methods and theoretical approaches.

The field of Humanities has provided perhaps the richest texts giving insight into the social life, governing changes and consequences of past disasters. As a comparative historical study, this monograph serves as an interdisciplinary bridge between the fields of social science and humanities study. Max Weber writes *that the sociologist's effort to formulate general statements about what happens* and *the historian's aim "to provide a causal analysis and an assessment of individual culturally significant actions, social systems, and persons are inherently different but nevertheless complementary activities.* ⁴⁹ Weber understood the essential nature and function of historical, as opposed to strictly diachronic sociological, analysis, but he also recognized the interdependence of the two.⁵⁰ Today the work of comparative historical studies can be found in the areas of slave societies, emancipations and race studies that use bilateral comparisons stressing differences and invoking social –

⁴⁹ Weber, Runciman, and Matthews, *Max Weber*.

⁵⁰ Fredrickson, "Colonialism and Racism: The United States and South Africa in Comparative Perspective."

scientific theory. Historian, Matthew Muchaly's text *Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean 1624-1783* (2008) is perhaps the most in-depth account of how these natural hazards shaped the colonies' social and built environment.⁵¹ His accounts during the early colonial timeframe provide valuable context for this dissertation which focuses on the late colonial period. Other historical texts that were useful to the development of this text include Constantine (1984); Ryan (1972); Stout (1953); Williams (1997); Rothermund (2006); Hodge (2006); Butlin (2009) and Bollard (1997).

⁵¹ Mulcahy, *Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783*, 2008.

Chapter 3

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND COLONIAL TYPOLOGY

This vast empire on which the sun never sets and whose bounds nature has not yet ascertained (George Macartney 1773).⁵²

3.1 The Commonwealth of Nations

The Commonwealth, linked by historical association with the United Kingdom when some countries were ruled directly or indirectly by Great Britain, is one of the world's oldest political associations of states and provides an extensive sample for selecting our case studies for this research study. The sample will also include British Overseas Territories which include Non-Self-Governing States. The British Commonwealth of Nations was formally constituted by the London Declaration of 1949, which established the member states as "free and equal". Today these countries co-operate with one another to the extent permitted by their separate national interests. Meetings at Commonwealth conferences, formerly called imperial conferences bring together ministerial and official representatives of all members. The conferences do not make decisions that are automatically binding upon the members of the Commonwealth.

Leading to its formation was the extensive progress Britain's former dominions developed in the nineteenth century. The four oldest former dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, achieved a considerable measure

⁵² Kenny, *Ireland and the British Empire*. Pg.55

of home rule, either as countries within their present borders or as geographical areas embracing several individual colonies. Some of these individual colonies became self-governing while retaining Britain's monarch as Head of State. The peace conference of Versailles saw Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India sign their first important treaty as separate states, and the establishment of the League of Nations in which the dominions and India, plus the Irish Free State after 1921, participated as individual members. The new position of dominions was announced in a report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, further elaborated at the Imperial Conference of 1930, and given constitutional form by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.⁵³ The term dominion was replaced by realm in the early 1950s.

A couple noteworthy aspects of the Commonwealth were the Sterling Area & military training. The Sterling Area (no longer in existence) made all member currencies convertible and trade was carried on without exchange restrictions. The reserves of gold and dollars of all sterling area countries were held in London, and they formed a common pool upon which the currencies of the individual members are founded. The maintenance of these common reserves led the Commonwealth members to agree to pursue mutually helpful financial and commercial policies. For example, Stout (1953) cites that in early 1949 when the drop in gold and dollar reserves became alarming all the sterling members of the Commonwealth agreed to restrict their dollar purchases by at least 25% and to push exports to dollar areas as vigorously as they could.⁵⁴ As the U.K is still considered a military force, Commonwealth members'

⁵³ Stout, *British Government*. Pg. 385-387

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

military forces were organized and trained along their military lines, and often depended on the U.K for weapons and equipment. Additionally, the former dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa have had strict immigration policies for people of color and gave preference for people of British stock.

Today, 53 countries are members of the Commonwealth, they come from Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe and the Pacific Ocean. The Commonwealth operates by intergovernmental consensus of the member states organized through the Commonwealth Secretariat, and non-governmental organizations organized through the Commonwealth Foundation. The symbol of this free association is Queen Elizabeth II who is the Head of the Commonwealth. The Queen (The Crown) is also the monarch of 16 members of the *Commonwealth realms* and is represented by a Governor General in each state. The Governor-General appointment is advised by the realm's Prime Minister. In the past, it was custom practice to appoint members of the royal house as Governor Generals but today they are often chosen from citizens of their respective countries. The other members of the Commonwealth have different persons as head of state: 32 members are republics and five members are monarchies. There are currently 14 Overseas Territories, which is a distinct group from the Commonwealth realm and Commonwealth of Nations.

These associations of states provide a wide range of geographies, as shown in Figure 1, and a plethora of governing typologies to select our case studies with a central connecting point to Great Britain's imperial practices. However, using a Commonwealth member states' current governing status (eg. Republic vs Realm) is arguably somewhat of a superficial form of difference. As citizens of realm nations will attest, in most ways they feel and act as fully independent nations. Therefore, to

add greater contextual layers to this study we will take into account a country's former colonial experience- the manner in which the U.K colonized that island and utilized it for colonial purposes.




Figure 1. The territories that were at one time or another part of the British Empire. The British Overseas Territories are underlined in red. Source: Wikipedia.⁵⁵

3.2 Colonial Experience and Typology

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British Empire was a diverse and scattered assortment of territories, some hugely valuable in commercial or strategic

⁵⁵ “British Empire.”

terms, others of little more than psychological value.⁵⁶ By the end of World War II, these 'colonial territories' occupied about one-third of the earth's surface. Today many of their former colonies are now considered fully sovereign nation-states. Britain's global power has retreated to a handful of "territories" (formerly termed colonies). The Monarch's powers remain as the figurehead leadership of the Commonwealth Realm, its military power continues through critical alliances and continued economic dominance through neoliberal financial institutions and policies.

Colonial rule was not a monolith of practices, neither across different European Nations nor within a single empire's possessions. An often-cited difference of governing tactics is the distinction of "Direct rule" versus "Indirect rule" in their African colonies.⁵⁷ Indirect rule left day-to-day government and administration in the hands of traditional rulers, while Britain controlled defense, external affairs, taxation, and communications. Direct rule meant relying on colonial administrators to run the colony with little reliance on the locals. This tactic tended to be more financially costly than indirect rule. Both strategies had lasting effects in civil affairs following independence movements, many of which are discussed in post-colonial studies. D.K. Fieldhouse classifies the British colonies after 1815 into eight groups. The oldest being in or near the Caribbean made important by the sugar boom that ended in the early nineteenth century⁵⁸; the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean possessed colonies of

⁵⁶ Butlin, *Geographies of Empire*.

⁵⁷ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

⁵⁸ According to Fieldhouse, the end of the commercial monopoly in the 1820s deprived these Caribbean colonies of their imperial function; the abolition of slavery

naval strategy and commercial interests; West African colonies for commercial interests from slavery to palm oil; East African possessions acquired in the Berlin Conference of 1884 and WWI; the East colonies served mixed evolving function e.g. Malaya, once occupied to protect trade route to China, became valuable for its tin and rubber; and the Pacific colonies annexed for humanitarian reasons or special interests of Australia and New Zealand.⁵⁹

This study will select from a group of island nations with diverse colonial experience and requires utilizing a typology of colonies. Finley writes that in antiquity the following possibilities occurred when the territory was encroached upon or subjugated: 1. It could be left largely autonomous on payment of a regular tribute, as in the Persian satrapal system; 2. It could be incorporated into the state, as in the provinces of the Roman Empire, usually with a substantial amount of settlement; 3. It could be colonized by military settlements on confiscated land, as in the colonies of the Roman Republic; 4. It could be peopled by the newcomers, migrating in small numbers to start a new city-state, as among the archaic Phoenicians and Greeks; or migrating as a ruling elite to a new, or newly recreated, independent state, as in the eastern Hellenistic monarchies.⁶⁰ In his *Colonialism Typology*, Finley (1976) narrows the variables to three; land, labor and the socio-economic structure of the metropolis. The classical Greeks, differentiated an apoikia from a klouchia, the Romans of the

in 1933 and the withdrawal of imperial preferences after 1846 completed their economic decline.

⁵⁹ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*. Pg. 286-288

⁶⁰ Finley, "Colonies."

Republic a Latin *colonia* from a Roman *colonia*, according to whether the migrants did or did not retain citizenship in the mother-city.

Within the British Empire, a number of scholars have identified different forms of colonization, with special attention often given to “Settler Colonization”.⁶¹ George M. Fredrickson’s distinguished between “occupation colonies”, “plantation colonies”, “mixed colonies”, and “settler colonies”⁶²; and Osterhammel identified a unique “New England type” of colonial endeavor.⁶³ Using these categories as ideal types Fredrickson adapts D.K. Fieldhouse’s typology of colonies into four categories of “occupation”, “mixed settlement”, “plantation”, and “pure settlement”.⁶⁴

Occupation colonies were those in which there were few settlers and the indigenous people were loosely supervised on what may be called a “frontier” system. Political control vacillated between indirect rule through indigenous kings, chieftains and supervision provided by European resident magistrates. This strategy was commonly used in Southeast Asia and Africa. In frontier colonies, there was little possibility of creating an extended European civilization because of limited numbers and aims.

The other three typologies (Mixed, Plantation and Pure Settler) can be classified under ‘colonies of settlement’. “Mixed” colonies had a large indigenous

⁶¹ Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*.

⁶² Fredrickson, “Colonialism and Racism: The United States and South Africa in Comparative Perspective.”

⁶³ Osterhammel, *Colonialism*.

⁶⁴ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*.

population that was exterminated. Settler culture succeeded in domination and hence relegated the local indigenous cultures to social inferiority. “Miscegenation” occurred often providing a buffer group between the two societies. This type of colony can be found in the highland societies of Latin America. In all mixed colonies, there was a conflict between the principles of policy thought desirable by the metropolitan power and the interests of European settlers. The actual policy was usually a compromise.

“Plantation” colonies can be identified by the exploitation of forced labor of imported workers. The indigenous population did not meet the needs of the colonizers nor did the white indentured labor, enslaved African labor often becoming the primary workforce. The plantation colonies of the Caribbean are a common example. These plantations were the ‘groceries’ that made Britain independent of foreign supplies and gave a surplus for re-export to Europe.⁶⁵ Economic scholar Eric Williams is widely cited for his thesis explaining how Britain’s slave industry helped finance the Industrial Revolution in England.⁶⁶ Plantation owners, shipbuilders, and merchants connected with the slave trade accumulated vast fortunes that helped them establish banks and heavy industry in Europe and expand the reach of capitalism worldwide. Monoculture, however, made plantation colonies vulnerable to market fluctuations and reflected European needs. This vulnerable practice of single crop (sector) economies continues today in many former plantation societies.

“Pure” settlement occurred with indigenous displacement or extermination. Utilizing white labor and perpetuating European cultural homogeneity were hallmarks

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*.

of the settlement colony. This type of colony is sometimes called the Australian case as the settlement of Australia fits the model so perfectly. It is worth noting that although a colony can start off as one type of settlement it can change over time. For example, New Zealand may have begun as an occupation colony in which the British would rule a Maori majority and control a settler minority. However, by 1870 increased British immigration and the grant of self-government morphed the colony virtually into a pure settlement colony in which the Maori were pushed to the frontiers of European settlement.

A typology cannot be correct or incorrect; its usefulness is subjective to the purposes for which it was designed.⁶⁷ In the case of this study Fredrickson's typology proves to be the most useful and to address our "political question" as it is vital that we encompass the diversity of colonial practices that existed throughout the European imperial era.

⁶⁷ Finley, "Colonies."

Chapter 4

LATE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTALITY: THE INTER-WAR PERIOD AND THE “CONDUCT OF CONDUCT”

This chapter outlines a philosophical concept of “Late Colonial Governmentality” to locate historical time periods within which we will analyze tactics and changes in disaster management. Conceptually the prospect of defining governmental change or greater self-rule presented the obvious choice of contrasting post-independence with pre-independence disaster event responses. However, considering that gaining Independence is a process, periods of incremental gains must also be considered. Authors Scott and Duncan’s concept of Colonial Governmentality developed from Foucault’s philosophy, isolated the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms in 19th century Ceylon as an example of such an epoch of change. Though problematic in their own incorporation of Foucault’s lectures, their work provides a guiding philosophy on which this study attempts to build. In essence, we invoke Foucault’s comparison of technologies of power becoming less utilized and the rise in technologies of discipline and the technologies of government.⁶⁸ Ultimately its integration into the study will help develop a better framework that focuses on the difference of power practices rather than simply those executing them. This study identifies the inter-war period of the early 20th century introducing new governing practices in the colonies and the introduction of Colonial Development Acts exemplifying a fundamental shift in ruling practices. A shift supported by the

⁶⁸ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*.

literature, as author Stephen Constantine documents how during this time period the emphasis on colonial development and welfare was, then, essentially a defensive operation, to provide a new justification which would legitimize the perpetuation of colonial rule. This was the essence of the arguments advanced by MacDonald to the Treasury and cabinet. They proved irresistible.⁶⁹

4.1 Technologies of Power and Biopolitics of Late Colonial Period

This section covers the lectures and theories of French philosopher Foucault, that lay the foundation for the author's concept of Late Colonial Governmentality.

In his February 1st, 1978 lecture held at the Collège de France, Foucault introduces the concept of the art of government or governmentality. A famous lecture that once translated into English gave rise to many post-colonial appropriations from the Foucault Effect⁷⁰ to Scott's Colonial Governmentality.⁷¹ Scholar Willaert Thijs, informs us on how these appropriations often decontextualizes his lecture by negating to integrate the series of lectures it came from.⁷² The series would later be translated and published as *Security Territory and Population*.⁷³

The lecture of February 1st can be best understood as arguably the opposition between sovereignty and governmentality. Using Machiavelli's treatise *The Prince* to

⁶⁹ Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940*. Pg. 260

⁷⁰ Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*.

⁷¹ Scott, "Colonial Governmentality."

⁷² Thijs Willaert, "Postcolonial Studies after Foucault."

⁷³ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*.

explain sovereignty, Foucault explains this medieval rationale of power through its object, target, goals, and instruments. The object of the rule is the territory of land while the target of the rule is its inhabitants. *Machiavelli's Prince receives his principality either through inheritance, or by acquisition, or by conquest; in any case, he is not part of it.*⁷⁴ Ultimately the *Prince's* goal is to protect the link between the prince, his territory, and its inhabitants. This circular rationale produces its own ends, of a self-referential one. As there is no fundamental, essential, natural and juridical connection between the prince and his principality” the prince will always be threatened by other sovereigns looking for territory or by inhabitants who refuse to accept his rule. *The goal 'of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality.'*⁷⁵ Here the use of instruments such as the law and the sword are essential elements of his rule to produce obedience. Acts of public torture are infamous tactics to reinforce sovereign rule and public obedience. Writing on the advancing power of the state, Norwegian historian Koht writes that the state was founded as a military force under the leadership of kings, whose function it was to defend their country when it was at war with other states, or even to subjugate other states under them. Soon the kings had to begin taxing their people in order to maintain the armed forces, besides mobilizing them to make war. Since the kings also were entrusted with the maintenance of domestic peace, they had to strengthen the judicial authority that society had established to provide peace and justice.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Ibid. Pg. 91

⁷⁵ Ibid. Pg. 90

⁷⁶ Koht, “The Advancing Power of the State.” Pg. 84

To distinguish the art of government from sovereignty, Foucault quote's the work of Guillaume de La Perrière, "*Government is the right disposition of things that one arranges so as to lead them to a suitable end.*" With this, he invokes the new type of finalities and not just the circular rationale of upholding sovereignty. The government will have to ensure that the greatest possible amount of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, and that the population can increase. Its ultimate end is not to protect or reinforce governmentality, 'but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, and health. Whereas the sovereign achieved obedience through his law, here the method of soliciting obedience is through the art of employing tactics rather than laws,

or, of as far as possible employing laws as tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means... Whereas the end of sovereignty was internal to itself and got its instruments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs; it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics than laws.⁷⁷

Foucault argues that this art of government was blocked until the eighteenth century imprisoned within the forms of the administrative monarchy. Whereas sovereignty had the sword and the law as its primary instrument, governmentality relies on a form of knowledge that would come to be known as political economy: The new science called political economy arises out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory, and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government,

⁷⁷ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*. Pg. 99

namely intervention in the field of economy and population.⁷⁸ From historian Koht perceptive the state has assumed a plethora of new duties, one of the most important and successful being the duty to provide work for the entire population. Not just a judicial state but now a welfare state. The population asks that it employ its power for the promotion of happiness among all people, an instrument for the new economic enterprise, a true driving force in progress.⁷⁹

The population now becomes the final end of government, not just to govern them but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health. Acting on the population through campaigns, or indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of the population to this or that region of activity. Population then appears as the end and instrument of government rather than as the sovereign's strength: it is the subject of needs and aspirations, but also the object of government manipulation; vis-a-vis government, [population] is both aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to it.⁸⁰ If governmentality is a form of power that operates through freedom, it presents an extremely efficient mode of power that does not have to control resistance, but rather succeeds in eliminating the need for resistance altogether. The entire lecture of March 1st, 1978 focuses on what Foucault has called 'counter-conduct'. Having located pastoral power as one of the main constituents of governmentality, Foucault notes that both pastoral power and

⁷⁸ Thijs Willaert, "Postcolonial Studies after Foucault." Pg. 101

⁷⁹ Koht, "The Advancing Power of the State." Pg. 90

⁸⁰ Thijs Willaert, "Postcolonial Studies after Foucault." Pg. 105

governmentality have developed a number of procedures and techniques to guide the conduct of individuals.

The state appears as an ensemble of projects and practices that can neither be separated from the knowledge and management of the population nor from the general apparatus of security. It is important to note that that Foucault did not see governmentality fully displacing sovereignty. *In fact, its emergence made sovereignty more acute. In fact, we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.*⁸¹ One of these technologies of security is the use of Biopolitics which includes issues and techniques as different as health insurance, personal hygiene, urban planning, birth control, car accidents, and security of the population versus its enemies. Resistance is not absent in this interplay, it is an equally specific set of procedures and techniques leading to movements that seek ‘to escape direction by others and to define the way for each to conduct himself’.⁸²

4.1.1 Governmentality in Colonial Studies

David Scott’s essay “Colonial Governmentality” (1995) theorizes that studies of colonial power would benefit from Foucault’s concept of governmentality in historicizing strategies of colonial rule. For Scott, the bulk of what is known as post-colonial studies has concerned itself with exposing the construction of colonial difference and the falsity of its civilizing myth. In his view critiques of colonialism have focused exclusively on the question of difference at the expense of a broader

⁸¹ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*. Pg. 108

⁸² Ibid. Pg 195

understanding of colonial power. Scott proposes the concept of governmentality as a remedy for this shortcoming. He then seeks to demonstrate the advantages of this approach through an analysis of modern colonial power in Sri Lanka. ⁸³

In Scott's thesis colonial sovereignty, the rationale of power which has its principle object "the extraction of tribute for the security and aggrandizement of the State and Crown" ⁸⁴ is displaced by Colonial Governmentality. Mercantilism or sovereignty is displaced by that of governmentality; *sovereignty being the pre-modern rationale of power and governmentality being the modern strategy of rule*. For Scott, the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms, which are a set of economic and juridical measures taken by the British government of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1833, marked the break between sovereignty and governmentality. They led to the unification of the administration of the island, the establishment of Executive and Legislative Councils, judicial reform, and the development of capitalist agriculture, modern means of communication, education, and the press.

Foucault has often been criticized for being too Eurocentric at the expense of the world outside Europe. Scott's appropriation of Governmentality has been critiqued for it homogenizes colonial power and does not make provision for rationales of power that co-exist or struggle against rather than simply replace one another. His theory assumes a straight succession of rationales of power, from pre-modern to modern power, rather than a space of competition and symbiosis. His conception of governmentality as a closed program does not explain how governmental rationale

⁸³ Scott, "Colonial Governmentality."

⁸⁴ Ibid. Pg. 207

could co-exist with other rationales or with a rule of difference seeking to perpetuate strategies of exclusion. As Thijs states, *it does not explain how a governmental rationale could co-exist with a rule of difference seeking to perpetuate strategies of exclusion. If governmentality really strives towards a liberal society with the illusion of free and equal subjects, how can racial difference still have the impact it does in the present day?*⁸⁵

Whereas Scott drew almost exclusively on the lecture of February 1st, 1978, Duncan's *In the Shadow of the Tropics* includes references to Foucault's earlier work on discipline and biopower.⁸⁶ Similar to Scott's appropriation of governmentality in 19th century Ceylon to study colonial power and authority, Duncan is particularly interested in the relations of power between government officials, planters of European descent, the native population, and immigrant laborers coming from India to work on the plantations. *He investigates the tactics Europeans used to discipline labourers, as well as the techniques labourers developed in response.* Duncan uses biopolitics to explain the efforts of the government to control the spread of diseases among the immigrant Tamil labourers, which, due to malnutrition and starvation, were particularly vulnerable. Considering Foucault's defined governmentality as a strategy aimed at improving health and wealth of the population, biopolitics is therefore embedded as a rationale. Duncan's application of biopolitics is understood as a subset of governmental tactics specifically concerned with health. Expanding colonial governmentality placed the health of laborers as a primary responsibility of the

⁸⁵ Thijs Willaert, "Postcolonial Studies after Foucault."

⁸⁶ Duncan, *In the Shadows of the Tropics*. Pg. 101

government.⁸⁷ Sanitation was also specifically noted as a central program of governmentality.⁸⁸ In essence, both rationales work together in tandem and sometimes opposing each other. Concepts of the conduct of conduct and resistance are also revealed in Duncan's book. This is demonstrated through the resistance put forward by planters to reject the government Ilbert bill which aimed at the creation of a legal system in which laborers gained legal rights on par with planters. With Duncan's revision of Scott's Colonial Governmentality, the concept expands beyond a simple pre-modern vs modern rule of government and instead is understood as a project amongst others.

Other studies on colonialism using a governmentality theoretical understanding include James Braun and Kevin Grove. James Braun analysis of the Caribbean Commonwealth Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, a seasonal worker program with Canada is argued not only as a solution to structural labor problems but also as a tool for population management.⁸⁹ Kevin Grove's work on the genealogy of Jamaican disaster management argues that participatory and mitigation techniques were de-territorialized from marginalized experiences of disaster and re-territorialized into mitigation policies through the confluence of local disaster events and the global emergence of sustainable development and resilience theory. His provocative manuscript argues that participatory techniques empower the defense of the neoliberal

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Pg. 103

⁸⁹ Braun, "Respectable Subjects: The Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program in Postcolonial Context."

order against socio-ecological emergence. Institutionalized mitigation enacts a new series of power relations through an immunity logic that problematizes adaptability as the source of and a solution to the threat that disasters pose to neoliberal order.⁹⁰ He ends by challenging disaster research to unearth and mobilize subjugated knowledge of catastrophe and adaptation silenced by unreflexive participatory initiatives that ultimately sustain rather than change unjust socioecological systems.

The following section, locates Governmentality in the colonial experience to establish time periods of study. This also helps understand why such advances in disasters management began occurring. During the interwar period of the early 20th century, island colonies were becoming transformed into spaces of least resistance or liberal rule of governmentality. Characterized by the expansion of local inclusion in executive and legislative committees, colonial welfare acts aim at improving the conditions of the poor, adult suffrage and the right to join labor unions. Rationales of resistance were also present from both the disenfranchised through labor strikes of the Great Depression and from capital holders on the islands demanding the colonial government not bend to the laborers wants. These tactics or projects allowed for the continued Colonial rule of their island possessions during the final era of British Empire.

⁹⁰ Grove, “From Emergency Management to Managing Emergence.”

4.2 Controlling Conduct and Colonial Development

Before WWI only limited amounts of aid were granted to the colonies by the Imperial government, a mere £1,400,000 was voted by Parliament in the forty years between 1875 and 1915... In Contrast, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 alone proposed an expenditure of up to £120 million over ten years and raised to £140million by the Act of 1950. ⁹¹

This section details why this study identified the inter war period of the 1930s when essential changes to ruling practices were introduced or “Late-Colonial Governmentality” and provide us with a deeper understanding of systematic changes in colonial disaster response techniques. During this period the British Colonial Empire adopts technologies of government and shift away from technologies of sovereign within their colonies. The rule of law and sword are no longer possible to control the links between the territory, the masses and the Monarchy and a move towards the “human side” of colonial development is adopted to maintain their possessions. Unprecedented international critique of colonial management; returning WWI soldiers demanding greater rights; the labor unrest of the Great Depression; Pan-African support for Ethiopia vs Italian invasion and ideological economic battles gaining ground in the colonies all contributed to this shift in tactics of power. These changing tactics allowed the colonial rule to last a few decades longer and controlled the process of de-colonization when it did occur.

The creation of the Permanent Mandate Commission in 1919 marked the first time in history that European powers came under the scrutiny of the international

⁹¹ Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940*. Pg. 267

community and their action was measured against the principle of trusteeship enshrined in the League of Nations Covenant. Under this mandate, Britain and France were awarded and held responsible for administrative responsibility for most of the former German and Ottoman Empire's territorial remains. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations asserted that colonial administrations in the mandated territories were to serve the interests of the inhabitants. By the 1920's international observers and philanthropic lobby groups increased their criticism of imperial practices and voiced greater demands for accountability and responsibility for the protection of indigenous rights and welfare. Advocates of colonial economic development assumed that a natural harmony existed between the interests of the British and colonial economies. This assumption would be rudely dismantled by the world economic depression. For much of the 1930s social and economic conditions in the colonies were arguably worse than they had been in the previous decade. Economic problems persisted and lay at the root of social and political unrest. There were strikes and riots in the West Indies in 1935 and more in 1937 and 1938. Deadly strikes occurred in Northern Rhodesia and Mauritius. Jewish immigration into British mandated territory of Palestine led to conflict with the Arabs leading to strikes and riots in April 1936. Pan-African protests against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the ongoing colonization of Africa were frequent. The riots in the West Indies were widely reported in the popular press as well as in the weeklies. In the late 1930's The Labour Party emerged better prepared and organized and informed to critique colonial matters. Historian Stephen Constantine writes that *the*

“1930s were a watershed during which the morality of colonialism and the record of Britain's achievements were subjected to fierce criticism at home and from abroad. The stability of the empire was also threatened, initially from within by social disturbances and burgeoning

nationalist movements, but late from outside with German, Italian and Japanese attacks and even from unsympathetic scrutiny by the United States. In these circumstances traditional justifications of colonial rule looked increasingly shoddy: protective trusteeship and the civilizing mission in the colonies had sown economic stagnation, social unrest, and political dissent. In response, a new policy of constructive trusteeship with the explicit purpose of improving social conditions in the colonies was devised, as a method of removing legitimate grievances in the colonies, reestablishing the empire and defusing criticism of British colonial rule.⁹²

This policy of constructive trusteeship is the art of government or what can now be called Colonial Governmentality.

Two important Colonial Imperial figures during this timeframe of change were Fredrick Lugard, Britain's permanent representative to the League of Nations from 1919-1936 and Malcolm MacDonald Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1938-1940. Fredrick Lugard eventually favored an appropriate "native policy" as an alternative to past efforts of imposing Western models of government and education. He emphasized the importance of traditional occupations and crafts, village schools, local vernaculars, manual agriculture, and of entrusting local domestic affairs to local communities through their own chiefs and authorities (and local courts). Lugard's theory, stressing native lines via "indirect rule" would become the guiding principle of British colonial policy between the wars.⁹³ An earlier introduction of this practice can be found in other British imperial possessions, such as in the aftermath of the great Indian Rebellion of 1857. With the emphasis on colonial trusteeship came new demands for state direction and control in such areas as health, sanitary administration,

⁹² Ibid. Pg. 259

⁹³ Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government*.

and education and rural reform. British Colonial officials and experts turned their attention to the problems of health and education and in turn envisioned the beginnings of an alternative colonial development model.⁹⁴ Here we can identify biopolitics becoming a new technology of colonial rule. The development of the Empire's human resources was seen as integral to improving the empire's material resources. This shift in colonial tactics and worldview was also occurring in other empires. Writers like Delavignette, Labouret, and others in the 1920s argued that the key to untapping France's tropical empire lay first and foremost in the *mise en valeur* of its human resources through improving health, education, and labor productivity.⁹⁵ The importance of the political economy of the colonies has now become vital but only in turn to improve the metropolis and not to relinquish colonial rule.

However, initial projects focused primarily on economic development such as The Colonial Development Act of 1929; in efforts to spur economic growth of the colonies as the expenditure policy at that time required self-funding. A major stipulation of that act was to promote commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom or arguably just the prosperity of the *Prinse*. This stipulation remained in place until the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 which now stated its primary purpose of promoting the prosperity and happiness of the peoples of the Colonial Empire. This is a shift in the art of government pushed by Secretary MacDonald. In the words of Clauson the head of Social Services department of the U.K government,

⁹⁴ Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*.

⁹⁵ van Beusekom, "Colonisation Indigene."

there are two motives behind this proposal, the one a desire to avert possible trouble in certain Colonies, where disturbances are feared if something is not done to improve the lot of the people, the other a desire to impress this country and the world at large with our consciousness of our duties as a great Colonial Power. To achieve this greater latitude needs to be given to the word development which would embrace social as well as material progress, and would include medical and educational services.⁹⁶

Annual expenditure on Colonial Development and Welfare schemes rose from £177,802 in 1940-41 to £2,806,456 in 1944-45 and on Colonial Research from the first allocation of £6,670 in 1941-42 to £58,345 in 1944-45, far less than the max sums envisaged in the legislation. Constantine documents how the ascension of Malcolm McDonald was vital to the passing of this act. Son of Ramsay MacDonald, the first Labour Prime Minister and later leader of the National Government, Malcolm was brought up in a highly political home. By the age of 22, he was already an MP and parliamentary under-secretary at the Dominions Office from 1931- 1935 and Secretary of State for the Dominions since 1935. This experience made him aware of the colonial debate and some detailed knowledge of colonial conditions and problems. When he returned to the Colonial Office on 16 May 1938 he was determined to enact a more active development policy.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940*. Pg. 243

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Pg. 233

4.2.1 The West Indies and Resistance

The period between 1880 and 1930 witnessed many strikes, riots, and other labor disturbances in the British colonies of the Caribbean. They reflected and helped to develop native class and race consciousness, preparing the way for the formation of a working class with its own labor organizations. However, The Great Depression of the 1930s amplified these ‘disturbances’ and also played a significant role in changing colonial practices and policies. Factors that contributed to this included the demobilization of thousands of soldiers during the First World War, who had grown disillusioned with the slow march of democracy at home; the repatriation of migrant workers from Panama after the completion of the Canal in 1914; the spread of Garveyite ideas among the working class; the influence of socialist ideas through literature from the Left Book Club and other sources; the emergence of little newspapers’ as *Trinidad*, *The Beacon*, *The People and Teachers’ Journal* (later *Teachers’ Herald*), all contributed to a heightening of political consciousness. The Great Depression of 1929-1931 led to a general lowering of wages, retrenchment and rising costs. Moreover, racial consciousness was heightened by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the evident betrayal of the Africans by the British and the French.⁹⁸ These strikes are examples of tactics of resistance that did not allow labor unions, neglected the health of the masses and limited adult suffrage at the time. Crown Colony status, with restriction of the franchise to only 6% of the population, reinforced the antagonisms in the society. As sir Anton Bertram tells us, Crown Colony meant the ‘direct personal rule of the Governor. All power and all responsibility are centered in him under the close and continuous control of the

⁹⁸ Craig, *Smiles and Blood*. Pg. 13

Secretary of State. This is, in essence, the rule of the *Prince*. Violent shootouts were commonplace and a heavy-handed militaristic response to labor unrest often occurred. Bans on public gatherings were also commonplace during this time, *the rule of law*. Using Trinidad as an example by 1936 the island produced 62.8% of the empire's oil and therefore was vital to Britain's military/political strategy as a world power. As a result, the oil interests constituted the dominant bourgeois fraction, with most of the investment in the hands of foreign companies. So strong was their influence that their company directors were regarded as the real Governors of Trinidad influencing policy to their bidding.⁹⁹ Political power at the time rested on the ability to control sanction. The first line of force was the local police; the second line of defense was the volunteer force. When the police and the volunteers failed to control the rest of the population, imperial ships and troops were summoned to protect the interests of property. Thus the employer class was also vital to the defense of the Colony and collaborated when imperial troops intervened by providing accommodation and food for them.

During the depression, a new wave of labor rebellions swept through the British Caribbean, beginning in British Honduras (now Belize), Trinidad, and British Guiana in 1934, and continuing in St. Kitts, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua, and the Bahamas. Cultural expressions such as the 1930's Calypsos of the time portrayed the context of hunger, unemployment, economic depression, worker militancy, desperation, struggle and sheer survivalism. These labor rebellions gave rise to trade unions that became the basis for subsequent local political developments in

⁹⁹ Ibid. Pg. 18

the 1940s and 1950s.¹⁰⁰ However, their inception served the Colonial government's last effort to control the conduct of the masses. Speaking on the 1937 strike Governor Fletcher complains.

The Government's efforts to negotiate a settlement are seriously impeded by the lack of trade union or recognized leader of the oil workers and by the fact that the oil company managements are in London, out of touch with the local situation, with the result that prompt decision which are so imperative cannot be taken.¹⁰¹

In the short term, the Colonial Government wanted to isolate and arrest "agitator" Uriah Butler and bring the working class to the side of the Governor, they wanted to introduce reforms that could also ensure their continued rule. On July 3, the Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed to receive a deputation of the West India Committee, representing all the principal interests in Trinidad- oil, cocoa, sugar, asphalt, shipping and commerce. They stressed the need for permanent naval and air force to reinforce fear into the laborers. At this same meeting, the Secretary decided that it was necessary to establish trade unions as a means of controlling the militancy of the working class, stating that their own machinery in England had saved them in recent times from innumerable strikes. It could not but be salutary that such machinery should exist in Trinidad.¹⁰² In 1937, the workers won the right to organize trade unions, but this was accompanied by the determination of the ruling class so to control those unions and thereby the gain to labor would be nullified.

¹⁰⁰ Bolland, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Struggle for National Liberation."

¹⁰¹ Craig, *Smiles and Blood*. Pg 29

¹⁰² Ibid. Pg. 36

It is difficult to determine where one phase of a country's history ends and another begins. The process is exponentially more difficult when you are looking at a multitude of countries. However, for heuristic purposes, it is often necessary to invent epochal division where often none exist. In his monograph *Race and Nationalism*, scholar Selwyn Ryan divides the history of Trinidad and Tobago into six major time periods of political development.¹⁰³ Somewhat in sync with this dissertation, Ryan's monograph claims the third major time period occurred from 1919 to 1936. Characterized as a major reform period becoming dominated by African working class, which chose as its leader a radical European planter of Corsican extraction, Captain Arthur Cipriani. This period also saw the introduction of elected representatives into the Governor's Legislative Council for the first time in 1925. Ryan's fourth time period begins in 1937 and ends after the World War II in 1946. This period witnessed the seizure of political leadership and initiative by Africans and Indians following a general strike making the old colonial system impossible to continue. Ryan's fifth time period of political importance lasted from the post-WWII 1946 until 1955. During this period introduction of universal suffrage, the maturation of the trade-union movement, the transfer of a considerable degree of executive authority to elected officials (1950) and the intensification of the movement for self-government and federation. The sixth period begins with the rise of Eric Williams and culminates Black Power movement of the 1970s. For the purposes of this dissertation, it focuses on his last 3 time periods which date from 1919-1971. However, considering the commonalities and slight differences of political development among the differing

¹⁰³ Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972.

colonies this monograph divides this period from 1919-1940 and 1940- 1970. As detailed previously during this first time period significant policy changes or incremental shifts away from tactics of the sovereign were implemented resulting in a slow administrative attrition from the metropole and the introduction of greater biopolitics and governmentality began occurring, however these changes did not take effect until after the labour riots of the great depression of the late 1930's and the financial collapse of the Empire following WWII.

Another important *project* of this time was the widely reported Moyne Commission. A Royal commission was dispatched to the West Indies to report on the "labor problem" and recommend improvements. The commission (Moyne Commission) submitted its report in 1940 was released only in 1945 to avoid any averse propaganda during WWII. Constantine argues that the commission did not provide the Colonial Office any new revelation on conditions but instead allowed MacDonald to use it as a political lever to open the Treasury's coffers and finance a policy already defined thus increasing the funding of future Welfare bills.¹⁰⁴ As political articulation and collective bargaining were to be preferred to riots, some of its recommendations included the permission to allow the establishment of local trade unions and political parties. In turn, this shift provided an opportunity for charismatic leaders that would give expression to national aspirations and offer assistance to the suffering of the exploited.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940*.

¹⁰⁵ Rothermund, *The Routledge Companion to Decolonization*.

As WWII came to an end, the impact of the Cold War's ideological battle provided the platform for Britain to pursue a process of decolonization along the path of their preference and in turn divide the growing socialist labor union leadership. Nigel Bolland (1997) dissects these divisions and convincingly lays out how the British's support for "moderate" labor union leadership usurped growing calls for federalization with left wing agendas. From its origins in the First British Guiana and West Indies Labour Conference held in 1926, The Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) formerly created in 1945, voiced concerns on improving the lives of working people through legislation and self-government, creating independent trade unions as well as a federal labor organization. During three years CLC articulated the need for unity in the regional labor movement and connected it to aspirations toward democracy, independence, and a socialist Caribbean Federation. However, cracks soon began to appear in the CLC in 1948, between Richard Hart on the left wing and Albert Gomes and Grantley Adams on the right. Yet it was the great split in the international labor movement in 1949, when the superpowers' Cold War rivalry divided the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), that led to the destruction of the CLC in the early 1950s ¹⁰⁶ and ultimately to the end of the West Indian Federation (1958-1962) in favor of fragmented nationalism.¹⁰⁷ Though the Colonial Office initially viewed federation as a useful administrative tool, its rejection of the CLC's proposal for

¹⁰⁶ Bolland, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Struggle for National Liberation." Pg.100

¹⁰⁷ Knight, *The Caribbean*.

Federation as “precipitate and unfeasible”¹⁰⁸ made some political leaders in the CLC, including Adams, Gomes and Manley, accept the compromise of a gradual, limited approach, in which each territorial unit was left to secure what constitutional advance it could.

As the British, Dutch and United States unions withdrew from the WFTU in 1949, the British government quickly brought pressure to bear on the unions in the colonies to follow suit. Divisions among some of the CLC’s leaders appeared in part because some of them were poised to benefit from proposed constitutional reforms in their own colonies and were consequently unwilling to offend the Colonial Office by promoting public agitation for a more radical program.¹⁰⁹

Bolland provides insightful clues of the British courtship of middle-class union leaders and these leader’s political evolution. He highlights Adams of Barbados, Manley of Jamaica and Gomes of Trinidad to show how they eventually rose to important administrative positions in the transition to decolonization. In what can be seen as *the conduct of conduct*, the Colonial Office thus attempted to shape decolonization in the manner of their preference. Albert Gomes, one of CLC’s founding members and a former Vice President formally denounced socialism and resigned from the CLC Council in 1949. One of the most influential politicians in Trinidad, Gomes’ radicalism faded after he became a member of Trinidad’s Executive Council in 1946. Following his CLC departure, he led the Political Progress Group (PPG), a middle-class party backed largely by white planters and businessmen, in the

¹⁰⁸ Mordecai, *Federation of the West Indies*.

¹⁰⁹ Bolland, “Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Struggle for National Liberation.” Pg. 104

1950 elections. As the quasi-minister for Labour, Commerce, and Industry, he played a leading role in the red-baiting and purging of the trade unions in Trinidad and Tobago in the early 1950s. ¹¹⁰

The 1920s to 1950s (In the Caribbean) highlights the internal struggles between colonizer and subjects, not only to quell public unrest but the deeper ideological (socialism vs neoliberalism) battles amongst labor leaders that were prompted and supported by imperial interests. This brought about the most important shift from the rule of the sword towards the “conduct of conduct”. By identifying this late epoch in British imperialism and its connection to disaster management differentiates this study from that of Scott and Duncan on called.

In the following chapters, the concept of late colonial governmentality is used to strategically pick catastrophes that occurred before and after this shift and to interpret systemic changes in disaster response practices. This study focuses on catastrophes during these periods which are qualitatively different to disaster.

4.3 Catastrophes versus Disasters

There are many benefits of utilizing disasters to assess major changes in societies. Sociologists have argued that disasters may expose the key values and structures that define communities and the societies they comprise. Social factors that encourage both stability and change may thereby be documented. Thus, both core

¹¹⁰ Ibid. Pg. 108

behavior patterns and the social factors that constrain them may be illuminated by the study of disaster.¹¹¹ According to Fritz,

disasters provide the social scientist with advantages that cannot be matched in the study of human behavior under more normal or stable conditions. By compressing vital social processes into a brief time span and by bringing normally private behavior under public observation, power configurations and social processes and linkages between social and personal characteristics become much more visible. Processes and cycles of human behavior that usually span many years are enacted in a matter of hours, days, or months during disasters. Because disasters disrupt social structures that serve to develop and perpetuate human difference and inequality, they also provide an arena for the observation of peculiarly human (as opposed to culturally unique) behavior.¹¹²

If what Fritz says about disasters is true, then one can safely assume these effects will be amplified in catastrophes. Given the nature of this project and the historical limitations on information sharing, this study will also include catastrophes as well as disasters. Catastrophic extreme events should increase the chances that the colonial government's response was documented, and provide me with more archival information to analyze. This monograph's definition of catastrophe is informed by Quarantelli differentiation between disasters and catastrophes¹¹³ and Bissell who

¹¹¹ Drabek, "Sociology, Disasters and Emergency Management: History, Contributions, and Future Agenda."

¹¹² Fritz, "Disaster."

¹¹³ In catastrophes most or all of a community built structure is impacted, including facilities of emergency response organizations. Local response personnel are unable to assume normal roles due to losses of personnel and/or facilities & equipment. Help from nearby or even regional communities is not available because all are affected by the same event. Most, if not all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and concurrently interrupted. News coverage is more likely to be provided by national organizations over a longer period of time. National government and top officials

defines a catastrophe as an event that directly or indirectly affects an entire country, requires a national or international response, and threatens the welfare of a substantial number of people for an extended period of time.¹¹⁴

become directly involved. Quarantelli, "Emergencies, Disasters and Catastrophes Are Different Phenomena."

¹¹⁴ Bissell, *Preparedness and Response for Catastrophic Disasters*.

Chapter 5

MULTIPLE CASE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

This study is a comparative historical study employing a multi-case approach that utilizes purposive sampling to strategically pick islands within the former British Empire administered historically in different types of colonization experiences and that have a range of current sovereignty statuses.¹¹⁵ John Creswell (2013) states that when “multiple cases are chosen, a typical format is to provide first a detailed description of each case and themes within the case, called a *within-case analysis*, followed by a thematic analysis across the cases, called a *cross-case analysis*.”¹¹⁶ This study follows his advice. According to Miles et. al (2012), one advantage of studying cross-case or multiple cases is to increase generalizability, to reassure yourself that the events and processes in one well-described setting are not wholly idiosyncratic. At a deeper level, the purpose is to see how mechanisms are qualified by local conditions, and thus to develop more sophisticated descriptions and more powerful explanations.¹¹⁷ This study uses Robert Stake’s (2006) guidelines to multi-case study analysis.

¹¹⁵ Sovereignty in this sense refers to the range of autonomy, from being a dependent territory/colony to having complete independence as a Republic or a Monarchy.

¹¹⁶ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, Third Edition (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2012). Pg. 101

¹¹⁷ Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*, Third Edition (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013). Pg. 101

Multi-case study allows researchers to understand what Robert Stake calls the quintain (pronounced kwin'ton).¹¹⁸ According to Stake, a quintain is an object, phenomenon, or condition studied. The case studies are the target of collection. The quintain is something we want to understand more thoroughly, and this is done through the study of cases, using a multi-case study. The quintain for our study is an inquiry into how State Political Autonomy can affect its methods of disaster response. Multi-case research starts with the quintain and selects cases that may each have a different relationship with it. The object is to study its' sites or manifestations. If two entities are similar in everything, in all their characteristics, then they are the same entity. If on the other hand, two entities are different in every respect, then their comparison is nonsensical. The comparisons in which we should engage are thus the ones between entities whose attributes are in part shared (similar) and part non-shared (and thus, we say incomparable).¹¹⁹ It is often better to pick cases that will enhance our understanding of the quintain than to pick the most typical cases. Highly atypical cases can often give the best insights. Robert Stake provides three main criteria for selecting cases for a multi-case study:¹²⁰

1. Is the case relevant to the quintain?
2. Does it provide diversity across contexts?
3. Does it provide opportunities to learn about complexity and context?

¹¹⁸ Stake, *Multiple Case Study Analysis*.

¹¹⁹ Sartori, "Comparing and Miscomparing." Pg. 246

¹²⁰ Stake, *Multiple Case Study Analysis*. Pg. 23

Following these insights, a typology of states is used for selecting cases using the criteria of current government structure and a British Colonial Typology. Understanding the political triumph of the state over those groups and institutions that became its competition help us to locate this study. Trading companies and religious institutions were among those competitors that also played a pivotal role in shaping a colony typology underscoring the importance of understanding colonial history. The occurrence of major disaster/catastrophe occurring before, during and after the interwar period of 1919-1940 was a vital criterion for island selection that limited possible choices. Initially (and ideally), Initially, the goal was to analyze six islands, three in the Atlantic Ocean and three in the Pacific/Indian Ocean. Since it is vital that the single cases share a common characteristic or condition, these islands should have a historical and current relationship with the colonial empire of Great Britain. It is their binding attribute. Preliminary drafts included the three former plantation colonies of Trinidad and Tobago, Montserrat, and Barbados in the Atlantic Ocean; the occupation colonies of Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and pure settlements of New Zealand in the Pacific Ocean. Trinidad and Tobago along with Vanuatu are today sovereign independent Republics; Barbados and Papua New Guinea are members of the Commonwealth realm and hold the British Crown as their figurehead. Montserrat is still currently colony or “territory” of Great Britain, and lastly New Zealand a member of the Commonwealth realm, achieved “Dominion” status in 1907. However, given the enormity of such an endeavor and the limited resources that were available, the final design included two island nations but three islands of varying degrees of self-government and sovereignty to assess our quintain. They are Trinidad and

Tobago, and Bermuda, respectively. This selection meets the criteria established by Robert Stake.

Table 1. Attributes of the Multi-case Study

| | TRINIDAD & TOBAGO | BERMUDA |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| Population | 1,328,019 | 64,319 |
| Colonial Typology | Settler Colony: Plantation | Settler Colony: Pure |
| Independence date | Independence- 31- Aug-62 Republic- 1- Aug-1976 | NA |
| Current Government Typology | Parliamentary Constitutional Republic | British Overseas Territory |
| Storm Events | Tobago Hurricane 1847 Trinidad Hurricane 1933 Hurricane Flora 1963 | Hurricane Reid 1839 Hurricane Arlene 1963 |

As a reminder, a plantation colony is identified by the exploitation of forced labor of imported workers. The indigenous population did not meet the needs of the colonizers nor did the white indentured labor, enslaved African labor often became the primary workforce. Trinidad and Tobago and much of the colonies in the Caribbean are a common example. The second case study, Bermuda, can be categorized as a Pure Settler Colony, although at times it was an occupation or plantation model. The Island contained a strategic Naval and Military Base for the British Empire and the U.S.A. A Pure Settler often occurs with indigenous displacement or extermination. Utilizing white labor and perpetuating European cultural homogeneity were its hallmarks. Bermuda did not have a native population upon capture but a European cultural homogeneity dominated its early inception. Over the years, enslaved labor was brought to the island but the plantation model was not the island's initial form. For more on colonial typologies see Section 3.2. The context for the case studies is represented in Table 2

Table 2. Colonialization and Sovereignty Multi-Case Study

| | OCCUPATION | PURE | PLANTATION | MIXED |
|--------------------|------------|---------|---------------------|-------|
| REPUBLIC | | | Trinidad and Tobago | |
| MONARCHY | | | | |
| COMMONWEALTH REALM | | | | |
| TERRITORY | | Bermuda | | |

The purpose of the case studies is to unveil how the state apparatuses within these island republic and territory responded to major disasters during critical historical periods of differing self-government, thus enhancing our understanding of the relationship between colonialism, state sovereignty, and disaster response.

Each case study has its problems and intricacies and to better understand the quintain we observe each case study in its ordinary manifestation. To examine a case we carefully examined its functioning and activities with the objective of first understanding the case itself. In time, we moved on to studying its functioning, and how the explanatory mechanisms related it to other cases. However, it is the quintain we seek to understand. We study what is similar and different about the cases to understand the quintain better.¹²¹ We hence move away from what helps us understand each case towards what helps us understand the quintain. Our interest in these case studies is therefore primarily “instrumental” as we seek to go beyond the single case.

We begin with each case study one at a time. It was not only a process of inquiry but also the product of that inquiry. Although the case study is singular, it contains subsections and research on multiple disaster events. The cases’ activities related to disaster are expected to be influenced by contexts, so contexts needed to be studied and described. The study of every disaster event within each case study considered the political and cultural contexts surrounding these event occurrences. Historical context is usually of interest, but so were physical contexts. Other dimensions of interest are the social, ethical, and aesthetic contexts. The case studies

¹²¹ Ibid. Pg. 6

developed deeper reflection and questions or issues specific to them. These issue questions were also asked of the other case study. Our within-case analysis of the themes and challenges raised is then followed by our cross-case analysis. The next chapters examine the Trinidad and Tobago case, to be followed by the Bermuda case.

The cross-case analysis focused on themes and issues raised through the within case analysis. Sifting down to thematic areas took an iterative process of content coding. This began with descriptive coding of documents and newspaper articles retrieved in the early process. In the end the areas of legislative policy and legislative process; military use and population control; population displacement and resettlement; healthcare; and financial assistance manifested. Utilizing these domains were expected to form and inform additional questions. These domains also help inform the theory of late colonial governmentality. Cross-case analysis revealed new domains of disaster subculture and employment. Through our review of the literature, it was expected that we would find a reactive state apparatus responding to these earlier events. However, the analysis unveiled the sophisticated techniques employed towards reconstruction and the burgeoning formal response; and informal disaster subcultures that evolved throughout the British Caribbean.

Case studies are arranged regarding situational issues. Interpreted patterns within each case and then these are analyzed across cases, to make assertions about the quintain. Quintain level interpretations were centered on the themes in the cross-case analysis. Emphasis is also placed on what was different between the cases, not just on what was similar in them. After the cross-case analysis, assertions are made about the quintain. Taking the evidence from the case studies to show its uniformity and disparity allows the quintain to become a mosaic rather than a coordinated system.

The cross-case analysis should be able to convey the most significant findings from each case study in the form of theoretical generalizations.

The first case study was the twin island republic of Trinidad and Tobago. This unique case study spans the pre and post-unification of the islands and their eventual independence from Great Britain. The responses to the events analyzed included the Tobago Hurricane of 1847, the Trinidad Hurricane of 1933 and Hurricane Flora that devastated Tobago in 1963. The Tobago Hurricane of 1847 occurred when the island administration was under the auspices of Barbados and before the island became a ward of Trinidad. This event also occurred shortly after the emancipation of enslaved Africans and the end of the plantocracy's free labor supply.¹²² The Trinidad Hurricane of 1933 took place during the beginning stages of the islands' transition into representative government and involvement of local people in executive, legislative and jurisdictional positions. The colony was also experiencing the effects of the global recession and to make matters worse, the event devastated the cash crop of cocoa. The final event, Hurricane Flora of 1963 occurred one year following the Independence of the island from Great Britain; the transition to an elected Prime Minister with executive powers and representative bicameral parliament.

The second case study was the British overseas territory of Bermuda. The application of the methodology described in the preceding paragraph is represented in Figure 2. The isolated archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean is one of the oldest and lasting British Colonies. This study reviewed the state responses to the events of the Reid Hurricane of 1839 and Hurricane Arlene of 1963. The Hurricane of 1839 was the

¹²² Also known as a slavocracy is a ruling class, political order or government composed of (or dominated by) plantation owners.

first under the new administration of Governor Reid and five years after the abolition of slavery. The 1963 Hurricane Arlene occurs during the same year universal suffrage was granted to the residents of the colony. The colony was still under the same system of government during its founding years and would only achieve its new constitution in 1968.




Figure 2 Case Study Bermuda

Some of the data were acquired through online retrieval of archival records. The project required extensive cite-specific archival research in some locations. All sites were contacted before visits to find out if digital copies could be sent via email or

if on-site access was needed. Before departing for said locations all official documentation and credentials were secured. The island of Trinidad was visited in January 2015 and included accessing the archives at the National Archives and the National Library of Trinidad and Tobago, both located in the capital city of Port-of-Spain. These were very fruitful visits, for they had documentation from Colonial Reports; Governor Dispatches to the Colonial Secretary; indigenous literature on said disaster events; and history newspaper prints. The Newspapers included the Trinidad Guardian and the Royal Gazette; The Eric Williams special collection at the National Archive was also beneficial in securing photographs of the 1963 Hurricane Flora. This also true of the Library at the University of the West Indies in the town of St. Augustine. Their West Indiana collection was very extensive and very useful. The quality of their collection is excellent.

While not part of the study, in February 2015, a visit to the island of Barbados allowed the search of their public records at a number of locations: the National Archives in St. James as well as the National Library in the capital city of Bridgetown. However, the greatest finds were at the libraries in the University of the West Indies, Cavehill. Newspaper records were in reasonable condition but their law library on campus, in particular, provided invaluable access to the colonial reports for islands in the region throughout the 20th century.

In June 2015, the visit to the island of Bermuda allowed access to their historical documents at their National Archives located in Hamilton. Their archives are in impeccable condition and their staff the most helpful of anywhere visited. Their National Library also located in the city of Hamilton, provided access to their historical newspaper collection on microfilm. The visit (opportunistically) also

afforded the honor of conversing with Pequot and Cherokee elders while at the National Archives. They were visiting for a bi-annual pow wow held at St. David's Island in solidarity with the locals connected through their ancestors brought to the isle as enslaved labor centuries earlier under British rule. It also gave the opportunity to engage in an in-depth discussion with local historians and a former police chief in the isle.

While it was not possible to visit The Public Records Office (PRO) located in London, UK which holds the Colonial Office reports as well as UK Parliamentary Minutes, fortunately, many of the UK Parliamentary minutes are at the U.S Library of Congress. Additionally, the Library of Congress had an extensive collection of documents from the Caribbean and Latin America that were also useful.

My adapted theoretical concept of *Late Colonial Governmentality* helped as well. It best explains the differences or similarities that were salient in response and recovery practices in these two island nations. The hypothesis is that the health and welfare of affected populations while a priority in all disaster responses, is interacted with and was modulated by the rationales of power as state autonomy or representative government increases. Concerning the decision-making process and policy recommendations over these periods, the hypothesis is that having dependent status was associated with a longer decision-making process and constraints to implement response/recovery methods. This study hypothesizes that having greater national autonomy and representative government resulted in the use of more drastic response and recovery methods that mitigated future vulnerabilities. Having greater autonomy may allow for rapid response with less bureaucratic red tape associated with British center-periphery intervention, but issues of resource limitations, diaspora interests, and

systemic inequity were also significant factors. The period before representative government with universal suffrage is assumed to be, in the words of Foucault, the period of the “Territorial State and its Rule of the Sword.” During this time the recovery of capital holders and other members of the financial oligarchy were the primary concerns of state administration during these disasters as shown in Figure 3. However, as we shifted into the second period entitled “Population State and the Rule of the Government” the hypothesis is that laborer interests and those of the general population are highlighted and that more projects focused on their wellbeing as shown in Figure 4

This shift in government highlights the new emphasis on the health and prosperity of all the people. Although the use of Military forces through laws as “the State of Emergencies” and the need for social control continue, the rationale for implementing such control methods are different, and the punishments for breaking the laws will also change from its practice of extreme severity. Elite panic and over militarization during the post-disaster periods are now a robust response feature of these islands. Sheltering and displacement, both short term and long term resettlement projects are also a featured topic in this research. Lastly, programs of compensation, insurance along with aid packages and their distribution are examined. Along with changing governing tactics, the colonialization settlement history explains how countries such as Barbados were motivated to implement a rudimentary phase of current department-specific disaster emergency management earlier than the other nations. The findings will show that previous studies are insufficient and that identifiable patterns in disaster response practices can be explained in part by differing

political regimes across time. Additionally, instead of an ad hoc or improvised reaction, recurrent policies and practices can be recognized.




Figure 3. Disaster Response and Recovery during the “Territorial State”




Figure 4 Disaster Response and Recovery During the "Population State"

Chapter 6

CASE STUDY #1: THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Trinidad and Tobago is one of only two former British Caribbean island colonies that have become Republics, the other being the island of Dominica. Trinidad and Tobago have the unique attribute of being one nation but two islands formerly administered separately before their unification. Both islands have a rich history before British colonization and are distinct from each other. Additionally, their British administration is also quite different. Tobago had its bicameral elective legislature as early as 1768, the Old Representative System- a democracy of free persons in which the slave owners/ planters were well represented. However, Crown Colony governance removed their bicameral legislature in 1874 and in 1877 became a purely nominative chambered Crown Colony.¹²³ Trinidad, the once Spanish colony with a French population, was also a British Crown Colony. Under this system, the Governor retained all authority, which the Colonial Office would argue was necessary for making slave reforms and the abolition of slavery without parliamentary opposition. The British unified the two islands as an administered colony in 1889 to reduce expenses with Tobago becoming a ward of Trinidad in 1899. For Tobago, this marked a notable decline in self-governance. For the following 36 years, an unofficial member represented Tobago in the single-chamber Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago. The unified colony's first elections under limited franchise occurred in 1925

¹²³ Trinidad and Tobago. Parliament., *Evolution of a Nation: Trinidad and Tobago at Fifty*. (Hertfordshire, United Kingdom: Hansib Pub., 2012). Pg. 5

with Tobago having one elected representative seat; only expanded to two representatives in 1961. 1961 also marked the introduction of bicameral (two chambers) Parliament to Trinidad and Tobago, a major change from the unicameral (single chamber) Legislative Council.¹²⁴ The two islands distinct history permeates to the present day for many, and there are often calls for greater self –government by some in the isle of Tobago.¹²⁵ Independence from Great Britain came on 31 August 1962. In 1976, the Republican constitution replaced the British Monarch as head of state with a President. The Prime Minister and Cabinet control the budget and general functioning of government and are answerable to the forty-one elected members of the House of Representatives. The President is responsible for appointing the thirty-one members of the Senate, sixteen on the advice of the Prime Minister and six with the advice of Opposition Leader while the remaining nine are chosen independently from outstanding members of the society. In 1980, Tobago was given a greater measure of self-government with the establishment of the Tobago House of Assembly.

In regards to demographics, Trinidad and Tobago is among the most diverse places in the region. Their 2011 census reveals 1.3 million residents. 63% are members of a vast array of Christian faiths including Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Seventh-day Adventists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Jehovah’s Witness and several Evangelical groups. 18% are members of the Hindu faith and 5% practice, Islam. Two African syncretic faiths Spiritual Baptist and Orisha are growing, and smaller communities of Jews, Buddhist, Taoist and Baha’i also coexist on the island. Through

¹²⁴ Meighoo, “From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?”

¹²⁵ “Tobago’s Self-Government - Tobago House of Assembly.”

its long legacy of European colonialism with its' plantation economy thirst for enslaved and indentured laborers, the islands have gained an unparalleled level of ethnic diversity. This plantation legacy explains the two largest ethnic groups East Indians at 35% and Africans at 34%.¹²⁶ The former were brought in as cheap labor to replace the latter on the fields following the emancipation and abolition of slavery. The influence of African, Indian, Amerindian (Taino), Chinese, Syrian, Corsican, British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese culture can all be identified. Although English is the official language, the Trini dialect reflects many of the aspects of these cultures. Its festivals, music, cuisine and annual celebrations attest to this diversity.

6.1 The Disaster Management Agency in Trinidad and Tobago

According to former Director of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) Colonel Mahendra Mathur, in 1988, when Hurricane Gilbert slammed Jamaica and caused widespread damage and deaths due to winds, floods, and looting, Trinidad and Tobago took notice and decided to create NEMA headed by a Director directly under the Prime Minister. By law, the Prime Minister was the Chairman of the National Emergency Management Board. In 1992, NEMA shifted from the Prime Minister's portfolio to the Ministry of National Security portfolio.¹²⁷ Mathur's declaration of this 1988 epoch supports the work of Jean Luc Poncelet (1997) highly cited piece stating that the region previously relied on an ad-hoc method to respond to

¹²⁶ "Census 2011 | Central Statistical Office."

¹²⁷ Colonel Mahendra Mathur, *Escape from the Acts of God*, 2006.

disaster before this period.¹²⁸ However, the research conducted for this case study reveals that the 1988 storm may have been the catalysts to creating NEMA but it certainly was not the first organization the island developed to respond to disasters. Specifically, the lessons learned from the experience of Hurricane Flora in Tobago in 1963 highlighted the importance of good pre-disaster planning if relief measures were to be effective. Because of this experience, the Government in 1965 established The National Emergency Relief Organization (NERO) which conducted workshops and conferences decades earlier to the inception of NEMA.

NERO was responsible for advice to Government, through the Minister of Home Affairs on all matters relating to disaster, and in charge of the organization and administration of all precautionary, emergency relief, and rehabilitation measures necessary to minimize or counteract the effects of the disaster in respect of the entire country. NERO.'s priority objectives were to bring to the attention of the public the fact that hurricanes can strike Trinidad and Tobago; and to co-ordinate the country's essential services on a national scale, and in close consultation with voluntary emergency services such as Red Cross and S.t John's Brigade, to proceed immediately with the preparation of up-to-date plans for meeting the threat of disaster.¹²⁹ NERO also engaged on the regional level an Inter-Regional Caribbean Conference held in March 1969 in Chaguaramas, Trinidad hosted by the Trinidad and Tobago National Emergency Relief Organization

¹²⁸ Poncelet, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean," 1997.

¹²⁹ National Emergency Relief Organization, *Hurricane Hazard*.

In 2005, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM) replaced NEMA. ODPM considers itself a coordinating and managing body that places equal emphasis on all phases of the disaster management cycle-prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. ODPM is a division of the Ministry of National Security, similar to FEMA being within the US Department of Homeland Security. ODPM has shifted from a response-centric approach to an approach which focuses on mitigation and preparedness. ODPM also places emphasis on integrating those it considers professional first responders' capabilities and managing their responses, public education and community outreach activities, prevention and mitigation initiatives, and consequence management and critical infrastructure protection.¹³⁰

Today, flooding is the nation's most common natural hazard but earthquakes are its biggest concern. With its precarious location near tectonic plate junctures, the occurrences of small quakes are felt and the fear of a major one does permeate the thoughts of many. A major earthquake measuring 7.9 in 1766 destroyed the then capital San Jose and in 2010, a 4.7 quake felt throughout the island, from Carenage to Moruga and Matura.¹³¹ Severe hurricanes have also visited the twin island republic. Mud volcano, or sedimentary volcanic activity, is also common in Trinidad. The most famous are the Pitch Lake that extends for 114 acres containing a unique composition of bitumen, mud, and salt water. Mud volcanoes are associated with petroleum

¹³⁰ "Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management : A Division of the Ministry of National Security."

¹³¹ Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management, "Earthquakes."

deposits and found where stratified rocks with cores of mobile sediment deposit rapidly and trap water which folds down from a crest.¹³²

A report done by C.B Daniel and R. Maharaj for NEMA in 1986 and updated in 2001 by G. De Souza, compiled all the hurricanes that affected the twin island republic from 1725 to 2000.¹³³ According to their report, cyclone intensity listed before 1945 was based on the damages associated with buildings, ships and the type of trees uprooted, among others; after 1944 instruments for measuring wind speed began to be used. The British Air Ministry established these tools and an excellent meteorological observing station started in Trinidad in July 1945. Although the authors stated that the report is comprehensive, it relied heavily on previous literature for events before 1945 but neglected everything before 1850. G. De Souza writes that during the period from 1850 to 2000, two hurricanes and five tropical storms made landfall on the islands. G. De Souza briefly highlights the 1933 Hurricane in Trinidad and the 1963 Hurricane Flora in Tobago discussed elsewhere in this study but fail to give an in-depth analysis of these storms. Nevertheless, G. De Souza et al. describes the function and structure of these storms for the first time in a comprehensive manner not found in any previous scholarly literature related to the island. Unfortunately, they ignored all events before 1878. Older documents state that the first recorded hurricane in Trinidad and Tobago was in October 1527. Other significant events also occurred in

¹³² Colonel Mahendra Mathur, *Escape from the Acts of God*, n.d.

¹³³ Daniel, Maharaj, and De Souza, *Tropical Cyclones Affecting Trinidad and Tobago 1725 to 2000*.

August 1810, June 1831 and October 1847.¹³⁴ Within the meteorological field, from 1950 Hurricanes were no longer designated by numbers alone and were also given aviators' letter-code phonetic alphabet e.g. A- Able, B-Baker, C-Charlie. In 1953, U.S pilots identified storms by women's names, a practice which persisted up to 1978. In 1979, names of both women and men were used for the first time in alternating sequences.

C.B Daniel, R. Maharaj and G. De Souza compiled the data in Table 3 following table from the Tropical Cyclones of North Atlantic Ocean 1861-1986 published by the U.S Department of Commerce:

This Case Study of Trinidad and Tobago's disaster responses will cover three major hurricane events that affected the islands and occurred in the 19th and early 20th century (See Figure 5). The first event is the hurricane that devastated the island of Tobago in 1847, several decades after Great Britain's repossession of the Island from the French. During this time, the island was a plantation economy suffering from an economic recession and under the colonial administrative arm of Barbados.

¹³⁴ National Emergency Relief Organization, *Hurricane Hazard*.

Table 3. Tropical Cyclones of North Atlantic Ocean 1861-1986. Source: Daniel and De Souza et. al. ¹³⁵

| Designated Name and/ Storm Number for the year | Date of Passage | Intensity TS=Tropical Storm H=Hurricane | Area of Centre Passage |
|--|----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| 3 | 1878 Sept 1-2 | TS | NE Tobago |
| 5 | 1886 Aug 12 th | H | 30km N of Tobago |
| 6 | 1886 Aug 16 th | H | 70 km N of Tobago |
| 8 | 1888 Nov 1 st | H | 70kn N of Tobago |
| 10 | 1891 Oct 12 th | H | 100 km N of Tobago |
| 7 | 1892 Oct 6 th | H | Between Trinidad and Tobago |
| 1 | 1928 Aug 3 rd | TS | Northern Tobago |
| 2 | 1933 June 27 th | H | Cedros, Trinidad |
| 6 | 1933 Aug 12 th | TS | 60 km NE of Tobago |
| 7 | 1933 Aug 16 th | TS | 30 km NE of Tobago |
| 2 | 1938 Aug 9 th | TS | 25km N of Tobago |
| 2 | 1944 July 24 th | TS | 60km N of Tobago |
| ANNA (1) | 1961 July 20 th | TS | 30km N of Tobago |

¹³⁵ Daniel, Maharaj, and De Souza, *Tropical Cyclones Affecting Trinidad and Tobago 1725 to 2000*.

| | | | |
|---------------|------------------------------|----|----------------------------|
| FLORA (7) | 1963 Sept 30 th | H | Tobago |
| FRANCELLA (6) | 1969 August 20 th | TS | 80 km NNW of Port of Spain |
| EDITH (6) | 1971 Sept 5 th | TS | 40km N of Tobago |
| IRENE (10) | 1971 Sept 13 th | TS | 100km NW of Tobago |
| ALMA (4) | 1974 Aug 14 th | TS | Southern Trinidad |
| GRETA (8) | 1978 Aug 10 th | TS | 70 km N of Tobago |
| CORA (4) | 1978 Sept 13 th | TS | 30km WNW of Port of Spain |
| DANIELLE (4) | 1986 Sept 8 th | TS | 90km NE of Tobago |
| JOAN (11) | 1988 Oct 14 th | TS | 70 km N of Tobago |
| ARTHUR (1) | 1990 July 25 th | TS | Tobago |
| FRAN (6) | 1990 Aug 14 th | TS | Southern Trinidad |
| BRET (2) | 1993 Aug 7 th | TS | Northern Trinidad |
| JOYCE (10) | 2000 Oct 1 st | TS | Tobago |




Figure 5. Case Study Analysis of Trinidad and Tobago

The second disaster to be covered will be the hurricane that hit the southern portion of Trinidad in 1933. This event is seldom discussed and is lost to the collective memory of the island. Its occurrence came during a crucial period of transition towards greater self-government in the island and during the infamous global recession.

Lastly, we will discuss the most devastating natural hazard event in the republic's history, Hurricane Flora which shattered the island of Tobago in 1963, a year after the island gained independence from Great Britain.

Before discussing the case and each of these events in detail, a brief history of the islands will be outlined to add to our understanding of the context in which this event occurred.

6.2 Historical Context and the Genocide of the Native Carib Population

According to Taino legend, the Goddess Atabei first created the earth, the sky, and all the celestial bodies. To continue her work, she bore two sons, Yucaju and Guacar. Yucaju created the sun and moon to give light, and then made plants and animals to populate the earth. Seeing the beautiful fruits of Yucaju's work, Guacar became jealous and began to tear up the earth with a powerful wind, renaming himself Jurakan, the god of destruction. Yucaju then created Locuo, a being intermediate between a god and a man, to live in peaceful harmony with the world. Locuo, in turn, created the first man and woman, Guaguyona and Yaya. All three continued to suffer the powerful winds and floods inflicted by the evil Jurakan.¹³⁶

Located approximately twenty miles to the northeast of Trinidad, Tobago is twenty-six miles long and seven and a half miles wide or one hundred and sixteen square miles. As of 2011, Tobago's population was 62,219, a 41fold increase from the 1,500 that inhabited the island at the time of its Spanish discovery in 1498.¹³⁷ Today, the population consists predominately of Africans in contrast to the native Carib (Charaib) Amerindian population that pre-dated European colonialization.

Tobago's colonial history is extremely dynamic and complex. It was intimately connected with the wars of Charles X of Sweden and the Treaty of Olivia; under Louis XIV, it became a barony of France and its inhabitants had a voice in the election of the

¹³⁶ Emanuel, *Divine Wind*. Pg. 18

¹³⁷ Archibald, *Tobago, "Melancholy Isle."*

First Napoleon as Consul for Life.¹³⁸ Between 1498 and 1814, the island was a battle zone for European interests. It exchanged possession 33 times between the Dutch, Spanish, Swedish, French, Courlander and British empires. The Treaty of Paris in 1814 ceded the island to the British under whose reign it remained until Independence in 1962. For the sake of brevity, this study will cover only some of the most important colonial transitions that transformed the island's administration before the occurrence of the 1847 Hurricane. However, we must begin with the Island's native population, the Carib.

Trinidad, originally called Kairi by the native Amerindians, was claimed as a property of Spain and renamed by explorer Christopher Columbus (Cristoforo Colombo) on his third voyage to the new world 31st July 1498. On his journey along the east coast of the island returning northward before taking a more western route, he spotted two islands, one to the east and one to the north, naming them Assumption and Conception which are now known as Tobago and Grenada respectively. Explorers in the wake of Columbus such as Ojeda, Vespucci and Juan de la Cosa would refer to Tobago on their charts as Madalena, while they gave Grenada the name of Mayo.¹³⁹ Spain neglected the island for over one hundred years until 1614 when Juan Rodriguez made a failed settlement attempt after four months. The reason for this avoidance of Tobago and failed settlement attempts was its fierce inhabitants, the "Caribs". The

¹³⁸ Woodcock, *A History of Tobago*. Pg. v

¹³⁹ Ibid. However, writing in the mid-1800s former Chief Justice of Tobago, Henry Iles Woodcock, claims that Tobago's discovery by Columbus is a mere assumption because of its close proximity and the explorer's inquisitiveness. He argues that the original work of Bryan Edwards and Fowley are among the first to make this claim but omit a specific date

island's original inhabitant, the Caribs, gave the island the name "Tabaco" for its resemblance to their long-stemmed pipe from which they smoked Tobacco or Kohiba. The Carib villages were in the western and low-lying areas.¹⁴⁰

The Caribs and Nepuyos¹⁴¹ of the twin islands were extermination by the colonizers under the authorization of the Catholic Church and King of Spain. In the 16th century, the Catholic Church began pressuring the King of Spain to protect the native Amerindians in his new dominions. On 23rd December 1511, the King of Spain compromised with the Church by issuing a Cedula that gave permission to all persons to wage war on and enslave only the Caribs, while the Arawaks' docility protected them. However, as the Spaniards in the western dominions could interpret the Cedula to suit their own needs, they considered a Carib to be any native that refused to submit to their desires.¹⁴²

6.2.1 Tobago's Vacillating European Colonizers

The Spaniards unsuccessfully attempted to either colonize Tobago or establish trade with the Caribs in the 16th and 17th centuries and no lasting settlements were made. However, other Europeans were slightly more successful in forming settlements

¹⁴⁰ The Caribs of Tabaco spoke three distinct languages: a universal language used by the men; another used amongst the women, and lastly a language of battle used mostly among the elderly men of the tribe. For travel by sea they developed three types of canoes, the smallest for fishing; a second for family and the third also the largest was a war-canoe.

¹⁴¹ Nepuyos are akin to the Carib and populated the northern portion of Trinidad.

¹⁴² Archibald, *Tobago*, "melancholy Isle." Pg. 8

establishing trading posts. What follows are brief descriptions of some of the most significant attempts.

In 1627, Captain Joachim Gijz visited Tobago on his return to Holland from Brazil and being impressed with its landscape recommended it for the establishment of a Dutch colony. The burgomaster of Flushing and a member of the State Council of Holland, Jan de Moor¹⁴³ obtained the exclusive right to settle the island from the Dutch West India Company. An expedition led by Jacob Maersz arrived in Tobago in April 1628 and settled on the northern side of the western end of the island in what is currently called the town of Plymouth. They named their settlement and town New Walcheren. It can be assumed that the settlement was to serve as a trading post for their commercial interests. On hearing of the successful Dutch settlement, the Spanish Governor of Trinidad Don Luis de Monsalves was determined to destroy it. He manipulated the Caribs of the neighboring island of Grenada and St. Vincent to join their brethren of Tobago in the harassment of the Dutch settlers. By the end of 1629, the Dutch settlers were forced to abandon their fields and dwellings, eventually seeking refuge in Guyana.¹⁴⁴

Another noteworthy settlement of the island was that of the Courlanders between 1639- 1690. Originating from the region considered a province of today's Latvia, the Duchy of Courland was a small and independent Baltic State. Courland was originally inhabited by the Kurs, or Cours, a Lettish tribe that converted to

¹⁴³ A famous Bay called Man of War bay in Tobago was originally named after Jan de Moor.

¹⁴⁴ Archibald, *Tobago, "Melancholy Isle."* Pg. 12

Christianity by the German military order called the Brethren of the Sword. By 1237, Courland was under the control of the Teutonic Knights, which came from an amalgamation with the Brethren of the Sword. Gotthard Kettler, Grandmaster of the Teutonic Knights became the first Duke of Courland in 1587. His direct descendant Jacobus who was also the godson of James 1 of England was the Duke of Courland during this period of Tobago settlement. Jacobus' interests in Tobago were two-fold. The first was its utility as a depot for the sale of enslaved Africans in the new world, the second reason was to ease his duchy of the strain of over-population by its fecund, frugal and illiterate peasantry.¹⁴⁵ In 1642, a colony was established on the northern shores of the island, at a place which was called Great Courland Bay that retains that name.

In 1654 opulent merchants of Flushing, Messieurs Adrian, and Cornelius Lamptius, sent a large contingent to the opposite side of Tobago to form a colony. They lived on terms of amity with the Courlanders until 1658 when the Duke of Courland was taken prisoner by Charles Gustavus of Sweden; the Hollanders immediately attacked the settlers at Great Courland and upon their surrender, the settlement came under the rule of the Dutch.¹⁴⁶

6.2.2 The Reign of the British and Plantation Economics

Early British colonial governments were extensions of the home country and governed as the metropolis was constructed. This Old Representation System (ORS)

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. pg. 25

¹⁴⁶ Woodcock, *A History of Tobago*. pg. 25

was installed in most of their earliest possessions, in which representative government legislatures with elected members formed the majority in law-making Assemblies, often presided over by the Governor who represented the Monarch.¹⁴⁷ With a slight twist of having a Lieutenant Governor instead of Governor, Tobago obtained such an elected assembly, ORS named the Tobago House of Assembly (THA) at the end of the 18th century until it was replaced in the late 19th century when the island was made a Crown Colony. As the hurricane event occurs in 1847, decades before the islands demotion to Crown Colony Status, in this section we will focus our attention on the ORS that was still in existence at the time of the storm.

Great Britain possessed the island of Tobago numerous times, but from the period of 1763-1771 transformed it into a truly British possession in its laws and in its administration. An initial attempt at settlement by the British was made in 1625 but resulted in failure as they were attacked by the Caribs upon landing. However, during the period of 1763-1771, the plantation economy developed further through the use of greater numbers of enslaved African labor. The island was exporting great quantities of rum, cotton, indigo, and sugar. On the 10th February 1763, The Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years war and through its terms, France gained St. Lucia while Britain took control over Dominica, St. Vincent, The Grenadines, Grenada, and Tobago. On the 7th October 1763, King George III erected four separate governments from the countries and islands ceded in the Treaty of Paris. These four governments were Quebec, East Florida, West Florida and Grenada; the Government of Grenada was composed of the islands of Grenada, the Grenadines, Dominica, St. Vincent and

¹⁴⁷ Samaroo, “From Unicamerlism to Bicameralism: Trinbago’s Constitutional Advances (1831-1962).”

Tobago. In November 1763, the King, 's speech to the two houses of Parliament declared the immediate intention for the colonization of Tobago and advised that the land is divided into lots and granted, on certain conditions of settlement to the best bidders at the public auction.¹⁴⁸

General Robert Melville was appointed to command the Government of Grenada and given the title of Governor General. The King granted the Governor the power to erect and constitute, with the advice of his council, courts of judicature and public justice according to the law and equity under the laws of England. The Governor of Grenada ruled over all the islands that comprised it and along with his councils in each island was authorized to make laws for the good government of the people. However, the Crown reserved to itself the right to disallow any laws it found objectionable. In his absence as the Governor from any of the islands under his command, a Lieutenant Governor was assigned in his role and in the absence of the Lieutenant Governor the senior member of the island, the council took command.

At first, Governor Melville found it a challenge to find purchasers for Tobago land because of the fear that the land was unhealthy for settlement. As a result, he confined settlement to the windward side of Tobago which attracted some buyers in Barbados in 1764. Alexander Brown was commissioned as Lieutenant Governor of Tobago on August 11th, 1763 and arrived in the island on 22nd November. Several persons came across with the Lieutenant Governor desirous of purchasing plantations, accompanied by their enslaved Africans, and immediately put them to work clearing the land and laying out the site of the proposed town. In 1765, the division of the

¹⁴⁸ Archibald, *Tobago, "melancholy Isle."* pg. 99

Island and the corresponding Parishes were established as shown in Table 4 and Figure 6. ¹⁴⁹ These Parishes are still in existence today.

Table 4. Parishes of Tobago in 1765

| Division | Parish |
|--------------|-------------|
| Sandy Point | St. Patrick |
| Rocky Bay | St. Andrew |
| Courland Bay | St. David |
| Barbados Bay | St. George |
| Great River | St. Mary |
| North East | St. John |
| Queen's Bay | St. Paul |

¹⁴⁹ Unknown, *English*.



Figure 6. Map of Tobago Parishes. Source: Wikipedia.¹⁵⁰

The early proprietors of the island soon grew adamant for representation and petitioned Governor Melville for the formation of a legislative council in the island. The British West Indies was considered a good place to improve one's fortune for the white population. Free whites in the Americas were worth twice as the average person in England or Wales. The average free white person in the British West Indies was worth £1,042 sterling. This wealth translated into real power and influence and West Indians formed the most powerful colonial lobby in London. Absentee planters and

¹⁵⁰ NordNordWest, "Map of the Parishes of Tobago."

merchants were integrated into the British elite. On the island, they would dominate the elected legislative councils where they existed.¹⁵¹

On the 15th February 1768, the Governor issued a commission that gave the island the beginnings of local government appointing much of the petitioners as members of the General Council. Following an inspection of the island, the Governor granted this Council to be the permanent legislature on 29th June 1768 at a meeting in James Simpson's home situated at Plymouth in Great Courland Bay. It was declared that the legislature would have an upper chamber consisting of appointed members and a lower chamber consisting of elected ones. The lower chamber/house consisted of thirteen elected members: two from each Parish and one from Plymouth. To be eligible for an elected seat to the lower chamber a candidate must be Protestant, British, twenty-one years old, and possess fifty acres of land, or a town property with an annual rental value of £50. Eligible voters had to be British, Christian, twenty-one years of age and possess at least six acres of land with an annual income of £20. During this time, there was only two hundred white men resident in the island and of those, only thirty-five were eligible for either chamber.

The British slave trade grew to prominence and eclipsed every other empire's trade. From 1740 through 1807, ships from the British Empire carried away 2.2 million men, women, and children from the African Coast. From the mid-17th century to the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, British ships took away over 3.5 million people into chattel slavery of the Americas.¹⁵²With Tobago, being a colony used as a

¹⁵¹ Brown, *The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery*. Pg. 16

¹⁵² Ibid. Pg. 25

plantation economy the number of Africans soon outnumbered the number of Europeans on the island. The Official Census of Tobago in 1770 shows a population of Europeans at 238 with 209 being men and Africans at 3,090. Land cleared for plantation listed at 5,084 but of 24,999 acres granted at this time.¹⁵³ The island's first legislative session on 11th July 1768 enacted the following five laws.

1. An Act to settle the Rate of Interest and Damage on Protested Bills.
2. An Act for declaring Slaves to be Real Property
3. An Act for the Establishing of a Register Office
4. An Act for the Good Order and Government of Slaves
5. An Act for the Regulating of Tippling Houses

These laws locate the priorities of the legislature to install a plantation economy without challenge and the maintenance of their safety against slave uprising.

Out of America's struggle for independence, Tobago again changed masters in the year 1781 to the French. However, a capitulation signed by Marquis de Bouille, Comte de Grasse, George Ferguson and H.F.R. Stanhope allowed the island to continue much of the same characteristics of a British possession in terms of their civil government, laws, customs and ordinances; and the persons who then administered justice were continued in their functions. The first Governor appointed under the rule of the King of France was Arthur Count Dillon, an Irishman in command of an Irish Brigade. The inhabitants were protected in their enjoyment of their possessions. Free Africans would maintain their liberty but no enslaved could gain their franchise without the consent of the Governor-General.

¹⁵³ Archibald, *Tobago, "melancholy Isle."* pg. 113

At this time, the native Caribs were no longer detectable on the island. Sir William Young, a major proprietor within the British Colonies of St. Vincent, Antigua, and Tobago, visited the island during this French occupation writing that *We now neither hear nor see anything of the Charaib*.¹⁵⁴ During this visit, he also describes the enslaved African houses of Tobago being superior to those in St. Vincent or Antigua.¹⁵⁵

During this French period of control, Napoleon Bonaparte submitted the question whether he should be elected Consul for life to the inhabitants of Tobago. On the 25th November 1802, the Council and Assembly returned the votes of Tobago unanimously for the ambitious aspirant, with a very loyal address with high-flown compliments. The Island switched back and forth between the French and British in 1793, 1802 and 1803 and remained with the British when ceded by the Treaty of Paris in 1814.

6.2.3 1814 Treaty of Paris and Governing from Barbados

The island was officially ceded to Great Britain under the Treaty of Paris in 1814. In 1833, the island amalgamated into the Windward Island Government, which then comprised of Barbados, Grenada, and St. Vincent. Barbados was the most

¹⁵⁴ Young, *Considerations Which May Tend to Promote the Settlement of Our New West-India Colonies*.

¹⁵⁵ These homes located on the plantations of the island he described as being built from boards uniform throughout the estate being 26ft long by 14ft wide, consisting of two apartments, besides a portico or covered walk, with a seat in front of which a closet from the end is taken from the portico to form a kitchen or store room. The roofs of these dwellings were made of shingles

populous and held the seat of government and the location of the Governor in Chief's residence. Tobago remained a member of the British Windward Islands until 1889 when it became a ward of Trinidad. Chief Justice Woodcock states that despite all of the empire shifts the population remained essentially British subjects and continued to retain their constitutional rights enacted in the island in 1763, the structure of command did not significantly change from that which was established then. Following the amalgamation with Barbados, Tobago was given a Lieutenant-Governor, Major-General Henry Charles Darling, reporting to the Governor of Barbados / Windward Islands, Sir Lionel Smith. The Governor was the viceroy of all the Windward island possessions reporting to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Henry Earl Grey who served under the Reign of Queen Victoria.

6.2.4 End of Slavery and the Post-Emancipation Period

Death was a common feature of slavery and the sugar plantations were the deadliest places to be enslaved in the Americas. The death rate of sugar plantation slaves was the highest among any other economic system with the average male death occurring at 42. Replacing dead slaves with new slaves was preferred to improving conditions. Harsh punishments for non-compliance with the slave owners and unsanitary slave quarters contributed to this death rate. Catastrophic events exacerbated these conditions with epidemics and famines frequently coupled with wars and hurricanes. Lethal conditions weighed heaviest on infants and children. Between 25 to 50% of children born into slavery died before their first birthday.

Lockjaw was a common killer as well as colic, whooping-cough, worms and other maladies.¹⁵⁶

The punitive rule by the sword is a tactic of the Sovereign and method used at this time in Tobago. However, resistance was not absent, and the enslaved often revolted both overtly and covertly. In the years, 1770 and 1771 there were no less than three slave insurrections that were put down by military force.¹⁵⁷ In 1801, the enslaved Africans on the colony planned a major uprising on Christmas night. They numbered in the several thousand and their success was probable as the Brigadier-General Carmichael could muster only 200 soldiers. However, the General obtained knowledge of the plot just before execution and stopped it from being carried out. He seized thirty of the ringleaders, ordered one of them to be hanged at daybreak the next morning on the signal staff, and the body to be thirty times lowered and re-elevated, a signal gun being fired at each elevation. Believing themselves to be without a leader, the remaining insurgents surrendered or dispersed.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, through the concept of social death, slaves were defined as a socially dead person. In the intrusive mode of representing social death, the slave was ritually incorporated as the “domestic enemy”; the view was that he did not and could not belong because he was the product of a hostile, alien culture.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Brown, *The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery*. Pg. 55

¹⁵⁷ Woodcock, *A History of Tobago*. Pg. 73

¹⁵⁸ As a reward for his firmness, the Brigadier-General Carmichael was applauded by the Legislature and presented with a gift of a sword.

¹⁵⁹ Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*.

British slavery in the West Indies officially ended in 1838.¹⁶⁰ However, this new period did not signal an acceptance of Africans into society nor did it end their role as labor on the plantations. They were still among the socially dead, and laws would continue to perceive them as a threat. They did not have the right to vote or hold any positions in the island’s legislature. This period continues to resemble Foucault’s rule of the sovereign and its disciplinary instruments.

Although emancipation of enslaved Africans and the abolition of slavery occurred, the object of rule continued to be the maximization of extracting wealth from the land and the circular rationale to protect the power structure. Concerns about the African population’s health and well-being are non-existent beyond the laborers that continue to remain on the plantation. Table 5 shows the number of laborers on pay lists in 1845.

Table 5. No. of Laborers on Pay Lists at 30th September 1845

| | Males | Females | Total |
|-------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| Windward District | 765 | 511 | 1,276 |
| Middle District | 824 | 557 | 1381 |
| Leeward District | 1426 | 872 | 2298 |
| Total | 3015 | 1940 | 4955 |

Kaye Dowland, owner of the Adelphi Estate, in the Parish of St. George and former Stipendiary Magistrate of the Leeward District, provides insight about the period after emancipation and the transition after apprenticeship. In July 1838, he wrote of a gradual change for the better, both in the character and in the condition of

¹⁶⁰ Abolition in 1834 and emancipation in 1838 following 4 years of apprenticeship

the peasantry. His descriptive accounts of the dwellings allow us to understand how laborers lived and what exactly the storm of 1847 destroyed.

Dowland describes the houses built on the plantations by laborers and the Proprietors expectation of occupants.

On each plantation, the Negro Houses are generally clustered together on some sheltered site near the SugarWorks, and may be compared to a small irregular Village of Huts. The Dwellings are erected and kept in order at the expense of the proprietor, and in some instances at the joint expense of the Tenant and Landlord. These Tenements are held together with half an Acre of provision ground to each rent free, in part consideration and compensation for the occupants' continuous service on the Estate over & above his money wages. The Managers System of letting an Acre of provision of Land for 40 days labour per Annum to Laborers from their Neighbours plantations (a Species of Kidnapping) is not so capable of being practiced as formerly as the Laborer generally found himself deceived by the apparent changes for the better-and entertained an uncontrollable desire to return to his old haunts and old faces. Attempts to adopt an English mode of renting the houses and ground were futile as they did not benefit the interests of the planters. On numerous occasions, they opposed anything that would introduce a more just liberal system. ¹⁶¹

Following the end of Apprenticeship in 1838, some former enslaved laborers quit working on estates and occupied land on rent, either as leaseholders or as freeholders. New hamlets sprung up in various areas, and the result of these changes was considered detrimental to some estates. Many former slaves instead of again reverting to cane husbandry found resources in their provision grounds, in shooting, fishing, making charcoal for the market, huckstering etc. but a majority of those who became free settlers returned to agricultural occupations.¹⁶² The population census of

¹⁶¹ Archibald, *Tobago "Melancholoy Isle" Volume III 1807-1898*. Pg. 113-114

¹⁶² *Ibid.* Pg. 113-114

June 1844 showed there were 6,152 males and 7,056 females, for a total of 13,208 inhabitants.

A significant reason to highlight this period as a *rule of the sovereign* were health concerns for the populace were largely absent, and the poorer classes suffered heavily. Paid professional medical attendants only visited plantation estates twice a week. Laborers who quitted estates suffered from a lack of access to medical professionals as the Islanders lacked any other reliable or cost effective way to access health care. The cost of paying the price (32/- Sterling per illness) was avoided unless the most eminent danger ensued. Unfortunately, this meant that during childbirth, the doctor was called when the mother or child was beyond help, resulting in many avoidable deaths. The same can be said for the poor and needy around the island. Though medical professionals were available, the decision not to pay for the expense was often chosen. There was no hospital or place for invalids or lunatics on the island. The island did not have a centralized registration of birth and death records. The common diseases among children were worms and diseased lung, but many deaths went uninvestigated among the poorer classes. Many old people died on estates and towns from starvation. There were no facilities for the aged, lunatics, lepers, nor laborers under contagious disease, nor was there a guardian of the poor and the needy despite the rise in hamlets throughout the island.

6.3 Event #1 Tobago Hurricane of 1847

Before we delve into the storm of 1847, a few major political figures involved in the response and recovery process is discussed. It will help understand the political

hierarchy of the colonial experience and the statuses participating in the process. At the time of the 1847 storm, Britain was already a constitutional monarchy with restricted governing powers of the monarch by the terms of a constitution. Although we see the unlocking of the art of government in Great Britain, the political practice in the colonies remained steps behind the times. As an aside, it is important to note again that Foucault did not see governmentality fully displacing sovereignty. In fact, his view is that its emergence made sovereignty acuter.

The Governor or Lieutenant Governor ruled the Old Representative System (ORS), and in their absence, the monarch appointed someone on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. They ruled in the name of the Crown. The Right Honorable Henry Grey, 3rd Earl Grey was the British Empire's Secretary of State for War and the Colonies from 1846 – 1852. He is said to have been a proponent of greater self-government in the colonies.¹⁶³ At the time of the storm (1847), Tobago was under the administrative arm of the Windward Islands and its Governor, Major General Sir William Reid played a vital administrative role in the island's recovery. Reid was a highly accomplished British Army officer and the Governor of the Bermudas in 1839 before his appointment to the Windward Islands.¹⁶⁴ As the recovery period continued beyond the tenure in office of Governor Reid, Sir William

¹⁶³ The Department was created in 1801. In 1854 it was split into the separate offices of Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Secretary was supported by an Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.

¹⁶⁴ Governor Reid was also considered a meteorologist and an expert in the study of Atlantic Hurricanes. He was the author of *The Progress of the Development of the Law of Storms and of the Variable Winds* in 1849. In 1831 he was deployed to the Leeward Islands to help reconstruction after the Great Barbados hurricane and ultimately developed his interest in these storms.

MacBean George Colebrooke succeeded him and also became involved in the tasks of reconstruction and recovery. With Barbados as the headquarters for the Governor of the Windward Islands, Tobago had a Lieutenant-Governor in the Governor's absence. Major Laurence Graeme¹⁶⁵ was Lieutenant-Governor of the island of Tobago during the years 1845- 1851. All of these and other officials of the same rank were ultimately vested in fulfilling the wishes of the isle's plantocracy who controlled the legislative council. The need to rebuild the fledgling plantation economy was already a concern following the abolition of slavery and emancipation of African people, and the hurricane exacerbated the tensions in this archaic system. Rather than use the opportunity to transform the economy, the officials of this limited representative system insisted on loans or grants from the Colonial Office. The Lieutenant Governor would do nothing more than oblige.

6.3.1 Destruction of Indigenous Disaster Knowledge and Devastation Ensues

Before the storm of 1847, the last occurrence of a major Hurricane disturbing the island of Tobago was in 1790. As a result, the inhabitants persuaded themselves in thinking they were outside the range of these storms. Warnings went unattended. Colonial Chief Justice Woodcock writes, *the common signs of a sultry and oppressive day as the precursor of the storm to come were apparent; heavy clouds gathered to the west and north, and as the evening advanced, the wind freshened from the north*

¹⁶⁵ His official title was: His Excellency Major Laurence Graeme, Lieutenant-Governor, in and over the said island of Tobago, and its dependencies, Chancellor and Ordinary of the same.

*accompanied by torrential rains. The inhabitants did not prepare for the danger that was to come.*¹⁶⁶ Being 57 years removed from the previous storm and with no native Carib knowledge to rely on, ignorance of storms and complacency permeated the society.

The storm is said to have tracked from S.W to N.E from over the Continent and did minor damage to San Fernando and Southern Trinidad. Port of Spain, Trinidad was visited, but the storm gathered strength striking the northern portion of the island before proceeding in its full force to Tobago.

At eight o'clock pm on October 11, 1847, the hurricane passed over the island of Tobago causing severe damage. An earthquake is said to have preceded the first outbreak of gale. The wind was violent with thick torrential rains continuing until midnight driving the entire population of 14,000 from their homes until day break.¹⁶⁷ The lightning was so frequent that it *assisted escapees from falling houses in seeking places of refuge, and wild animals and birds were subdued and easily taken by the hand.* A great part of the peasantry of Tobago were, by then, free settlers, numbering from six to eight thousand. They resided in their own dwellings that had been built on lands that they rented or had purchased, and they suffered significant material loss as a result of the fury of the hurricane: there are estimates that 465 of their houses were totally destroyed and 182 severely damaged. On the 70 estates operating at the time, 30 of their great houses were destroyed, and 31 severely damaged. The storm destroyed 26 of the sugar-works and damaged 33, so that, out of 70, only eleven were

¹⁶⁶ Woodcock, *A History of Tobago*. pg. 106

¹⁶⁷ Government of Trinidad and Tobago, "Tobago Hurricane of 1847."

in a condition to continue to manufacture sugar. Scarborough and its suburbs suffered the destruction of 122 buildings, with 84 more severely damaged. According to the *Tobago Chronicle* of the 19th October, the number of lives lost on the night of the 11th amounted to twenty-six, and several persons died afterward from injuries then received.

Almost all cane fields were blown down or stripped, and it was estimated that at least one-third of the anticipated crop would be lost if it had not been already reaped and the produce shipped to Great Britain. Table 6 below shows the two-thirds decline in cane exports one year after the storm.

Table 6. Impact of the 1847 Storm on Exports

| Year | Sugar in tons | Rum in gallons | Molasses in gallons |
|------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|
| 1847 | 3,620 | 263,900 | 61,030 |
| 1848 | 2,670 | 139,980 | 23,380 |

The provision of the peasantry also declined. Indian corn and the plantain crop were badly damaged: a considerable portion was collected but did not keep fresh for very long. Destroyed was also the cassava crop, with only a small part of it sufficiently ripe to dig up and make into farine. Fortunately, yams, in general, had not been damaged very much: and, the livestock, generally, also had not suffered greatly.

According to Foucault, the Sovereign achieved obedience from their subjects through the punitive law and the sword as its primary instruments. No instrument has proven more efficient than the police and military as an arm of the sovereign. This case reflected it. With the destruction of the army barracks by the storm, the Lieutenant Governor took precaution to ensure the continued control of the

population. The barracks on Fort King George were entirely unroofed; some of the walls were on the ground. The troops were under canvas, and soon after the white troops that composed part of the garrison went to Trinidad. The commanding officer was afraid that they would become ill during the rainy season. Killed was one soldier of the 19th Regiment, with another injured. Several soldiers of the 1st W. I. Regiment received severe injuries from the falling buildings. Arrangements were immediately made to call out a company of the local Militia if necessary. Special constables were sworn in, and every precaution taken for the securing of the prisoners and the preservation of peace in the town of Scarborough.¹⁶⁸

Writing two decades after the storm of 1847, Judge Woodcock states that the island still felt the effects of the Hurricane. He emphasized that the economic recession had been aggravated by an act of the British Imperial Parliament to allow British colonial sugar to face competition from sugar produced by slave labor. It exacerbated the effects of the storm. He credits the perseverance of the inhabitants and the prompt assistance from the British Treasury for the eventual recovery of the island.

¹⁶⁸ On the 11th of January 1854, the garrison at Fort King George was withdrawn, the British Government deciding to concentrate the forces that were in the Windward Islands at Barbados. After their departure from Tobago the Legislature passed an Act entitled, 'An act to Augment the Police Force' creating an armed police consisting of an inspector-general, a superintending-sergeant, two sergeants, six corporals and twenty-four privates. Another Act was passed authorizing the formation of an armed volunteer force. *Archibald, Tobago Volume III Pg. 29*

6.3.2 Colonial Bureaucracy and Tobago's Disaster Recovery

On October 14th, three days after the storm occurred, Tobago's Lieutenant Governor Laurence Graeme (LG) wrote to Governor William Reid in Barbados requesting assistance. In his letter, he outlined the destruction of the storm, the economic cost of the needed reconstruction, and mentioned a new "ordinance" pending the Governor's approval. LG writes:

Two-thirds of the large dwelling-houses been razed to the ground or rendered either un-tenantable or unsafe; the sugar-works have equally suffered, and the majority of the peasantry reside with their families in their ruins."... "The courthouse, churches, mission-houses, and school-houses, were rendered unavailable for their purposes.¹⁶⁹

Even the Lieutenant Governor was unaware of the last hurricane to strike the island in 1790, for he claimed that it was the first major storm since the settlement of the Dutch and reiterated his belief that the Isle was not in direct track of hurricanes. The LG's family was forced to seek refuge in the cellars as the government house doors and windows were blown open. With the barracks destroyed. A notice was sent on the only remaining vessel to Trinidad to ask for a detachment of the 19th Regiment. At the time the men of the 1st West India Regiment were under canvas.

On October 19th, Laurence Graeme sent a more detailed notice to the Governor of Barbados. It detailed the wrecking of the ships and vessels in the harbor and those dragged onto the shore. Through the stipendiary aided by the local magistrates and the superintendent of police, the Lieutenant Governor provided a more detailed yet consolidated report of the devastations done to public and private property along with

¹⁶⁹ Government of Trinidad and Tobago, "Tobago Hurricane of 1847." Despatches No. 1 Enclosure 1 pg. 3

the loss of life. He provided this report not only for the information of his Lordship (the Governor) but also to the Secretary of State Grey. He writes:

Out of the 70 sugar plantations in cultivation, 26 sets of works and 30 large dwelling-houses have been completely destroyed, and 33 sets of work and 31 houses very materially injured; leaving only 10 sets of works through the island in a condition to carry on the manufacture of sugar.”... “The peasantry is mostly free settlers with six to eight thousand resided in dwellings of their own built upon rented or purchased land. Dwellings range from thatched hut to the more substantial shingled cottage. Considered out of the hurricane path houses were not built to sustain hurricane winds and as a result, 465 settlers houses were thrown to the ground and 180 unroofed or severely damaged... Churches and Chapels that escaped have been opened to receive the homeless.¹⁷⁰

His report claimed there were only 17 losses of life but singled out the importance of only a few of the deceased who were members of the upper classes: “*Mr. Tait. Of Montpelier, and Mr. Green of Cradley estate have each to lament the loss of two children*”. Unknown are the identities of those lost to less affluent families. Indicative of rule of the sovereign is that the lower classes’ well-being is not perceived as important. LG explains that he assumed the island of Barbados was also of a similar disposition, so with the destruction of the garrison at Fort King George he sent the regiment to Trinidad believing they escaped the storm. A Large part of the jail fell and a guard from the garrison was placed on watch.

The rule of the sovereign is the rule over the land, and ultimately, the goal is to maximize the extraction of its resources for increasing the wealth of its owners. In Tobago, a colony governed by plantation owners meant that the importance of the plantations’ profitability was paramount, much more important than the lives of

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. Despactches No. 1 Enclosure 2 pg. 4

former slaves. Therefore, with the destruction of the cane cultivation and the provision grounds, LG Graeme pleaded for substantial advances for their repair. Otherwise, they would not be in a fit condition to make sugar. He advised that the proprietors in England should consider the idea of using central factories for the manufacture of produce. He also suggested that it would be prudent if four or five adjacent plantations joined for the construction of one set of works out of their combined wrecks. Also included in his dispatch was the proclamation of October 16th cautioning the people to respect the scattered property.

Parties found in possession, or concealing, or carrying away, or aiding and abetting others in removing lumber or goods of any description, not belonging to them, will be given to prosecute every case in which offending parties may be detected. All magistrates, ministers of the gospel, constables, and peace officers, are hereby required to inform the people of this Proclamation ¹⁷¹

Widespread looting is one of the most common myths of antisocial behavior after disasters.¹⁷² 19th Century Tobago was no exception. The severe punishment inflicted to stop looting coincided with the rule of the sword and its tactics of mass intimidation. The official proclamation changed in the succeeding days as it passed through the council and house of assembly. By the time it was sent to the Governor of Barbados for his immediate approval, it called for public lashes not to exceed 20, with whipping not to extend to females. The operation of this emergency “Act” was limited to three months.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure 2 in Enclosure No. 2 pg. 7

¹⁷² Quarantelli, “Looting and Antisocial Behavior in Disasters.”

Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 documents the damage assessments to houses, public buildings and sugar estates “due to the storm of 11th October in the Town of Scarborough, its vicinity, and the various villages and Detached Settlements throughout the Island so far as the same has been ascertained” as included in the Lieutenant General’s report,¹⁷³ which in turn was put together by the Senior Stipendiary Magistrate, W.A Child, and his assistants.

Table 7. Damage to Houses. Source: Tobago Assembly. ¹⁷⁴

| Place | No. of Houses destroyed | No. of Houses damaged | Total |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| Detached dwelling houses, Windward District | 9 | 6 | 15 |
| Scarborough and suburbs | 122 | 84 | 206 |
| Rockley Vale, Wilson’s Road, Government House Road and Calder Settlers | 84 | 28 | 112 |
| Mount Grace, Harmony Hall | 60 | 21 | 81 |
| Mason Hall | 55 | 19 | 74 |
| Elsineur | 60 | 19 | 79 |
| Patience Hill | 70 | | 70 |
| Parletuvien Bay | 5 | 5 | 10 |
| | 465 | 182 | 647 |
| <i>Plymouth-No report. About half the houses destroyed</i> <i>Milford- No report. Many houses destroyed</i> <i>Hughley Bush- No report. Not much damage</i> | | | |

¹⁷³ Government of Trinidad and Tobago, “Tobago Hurricane of 1847.” Sub-Enclosure 3 in Enclosure No. 2 pg. 8-11

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure 3 in Enclosure No. 2 pg. 8-11

Table 8. Damage to Public Buildings and Chapels. Source: Tobago Assembly. ¹⁷⁵

| | |
|--|-------------------|
| Church of Scarborough | Roof injured |
| Church and Minister's residence at Lambeau Hill | Totally destroyed |
| Church at Delaford | Standing |
| Church at Mount Pleasant | Standing |
| Methodist Chapel, Scarborough | Slightly Injured |
| Charlotteville | Totally destroyed |
| Betsy's Hope | Totally destroyed |
| And house at Eleeineur | Totally destroyed |
| Mason Hall | Totally destroyed |
| Moravian Chapel at Moriah | Safe |
| Parish School at the Hope | Totally destroyed |
| Parish School at Les Coteaux | Safe |
| Schoolmaster's house at Les Coteaux | Destroyed |
| Memorandum-the greater number of the above chapels were also used as school houses | |
| The Courthouse in Scarborough | Damaged |
| Government House | Slightly injured |
| <p><i>Loss of Life- seventeen deaths chiefly of females and children</i> <i>Casualties- A great many severely bruised but none dangerously so far. One gentleman has had his leg broken</i> <i>Vessels wrecked- Six, five droghers, and one American Brigantine.</i></p> | |

Table 9. Damage to Sugar Estates. Source: Tobago Assembly. ¹⁷⁶

| Number of Estates in Cultivation | Estate's Great House | Works | Negro houses |
|---|----------------------|-------|---|
| Completely destroyed | 30 | 26 | About four-fifths destroyed, and all more or less injured |
| Severely injured, many nearly destroyed | 31 | 33 | |
| Safe, or injury trifling | 9 | 10 | |

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure 3 in Enclosure No. 2 pg. 8-11

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure 3 in Enclosure No. 2 pg. 8-11

| | | | |
|---|----|----|--|
| | 70 | 69 | |
| <i>Memorandum- number of sugar works in use, 69</i> | | | |
| <p><i>State of the Canes- Almost all blown down, or stripped; fully one-third expected to be quite lost</i></p> <p><i>State of Negro Provision-grounds- Indian corn and plantain crop very much damaged; a considerable portion being nearly ripe, may still be gathered and used, but will not keep long. Cassava crop considerably destroyed; such as was sufficiently ripe, may be dug up and made into farine. The yams, in general, are not much injured.</i></p> <p><i>Casualties to Stock- No complete report; believed not so numerous as might have been looked for.</i></p> | | | |

An additional report included in-depth damage reports for approximately 70 plantations on the islands. The information was presented by districts: Windward, Middle, and Leeward respectively. It included the damage to each of their plantation houses, *Negro* houses, and works. The damage to *Negro houses* is grouped under sugar estate assets and not included in the separate report listing damages to some houses. As mentioned earlier, these houses for African laborers were the property of the estate owners and as such would be counted as their assets and not those of the laborers occupying them. Calls for relief focused on the recovery of the estates and the welfare of estate owners, while the other concerns of the general population, such as the provision of health, food, and shelter, are neglected.

On October 20th the Lieutenant Governor sent the Governor a joint petition from the Tobago Board of Council and House of Assembly, addressed to Her Majesty the Queen, praying for relief.

That your Memorialists humbly approach Your Majesty's throne with feelings of attachment, loyalty, and confidence in Your Majesty's goodness, benevolence, and entire devotion to the happiness and prosperity of all Your majesty's subjects." ... "much misery has been entailed on all classes of Your Majesty's subjects, human life destroyed, property, consisting of houses and sugar-works demolished and the cultivation both of the staple and of provisions materially

injured in all places, and in some altogether devastated, and to such an extent that your Memorialists greatly fear that the proprietors and mortgagees in Great Britain will be deterred from re-establishing their estates here, and supplying the means of carrying on the cultivation of the staples.¹⁷⁷

6.3.3 Requests for Financial Assistance and Punishment by the “Cat”

The Lieutenant Governor’s expressed sincere regrets that he was unable to send an estimated value of the injury sustained in his October 19th Dispatch to the Governor. He did so in this dispatch, which was shared with the Secretary of State and Her Majesty the Queen, stating that: “*Your Memorialists have at present been enabled to learn, amounts to no less than from 100,000l to 150,000l Sterling*” in damage. The president of the Council and the Speaker of the House of General Assembly signed the letter. Also included in this dispatch was the detailed “Bill” for the protection of scattered property that was discussed in his previous dispatch. Again, he stressed the case of urgency for its passing, and considering that the duration of this bill would not exceed three months, he requested that the Governor approve his expedited passing of the Act. As mentioned earlier, the claim of widespread looting was notably present in the discussions that preceded the passing of this bill.

Corresponding with the rule of the sovereign, the public punishment of the offenders reinforces the sovereign’s authority over the population. The object of the rule is the territory of land (and associated wealth) while the target of the rule is its inhabitants. The goal of these exercises of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality. Instilling fear into the population is one of the sovereign’s essential

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure in Enclosure No. 3 pg.12

methods of exercising power and producing obedience. In comparison to the initial request of the governor, in Clause 1 of the Bill, the number of criminal acts to be punished has expanded as well as the length of punishment:

And be it, and it is hereby enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that if any person shall steal, take, and carry away any money or valuable security, or any goods or chattels, wares, or merchandise, or any lumber, shingles, staves, bricks, tiles, copper, zinc, lead, tin, iron, or other building materials in or from any store, shop, house, shed, or other building, or exposed in any street, highway, or other place, or attached or detached from any freehold wholly or partly destroyed or damaged in the late hurricane, it shall be lawful for any two justices of the peace either to send such person for trial to the ordinary tribunals if they shall think fit, or upon summary conviction of such person before them upon the oath of one or more credible witness or witnesses to adjudge such person to be guilty of felony, and thereupon forthwith to sentence him to be publicly whipped with a *cat o' nine* tails to any extent, not exceeding 39 lashes, or in the case of a female to sentence such person to be imprisoned with hard labour in any gaol for any time not exceeding three calendar months.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure to Enclosure No. 4




Figure 7. British prisoner on a penal treadmill being struck with a cat-o'-nine-tails.
Source: Photos.com/Jupiterimages.¹⁷⁹

The use of the cat o' nine dates back to Ancient Egypt. The cat o' nine tails, commonly shortened to the cat, is a type of multi-tailed whip that originated as an implement for severe physical punishment, notably in the Royal Navy and Army of the United Kingdom, and as a judicial punishment in the Britain Empire. The cat o' nine was widely used by the end of the 17th century. Also used on slave ships to punish prisoners. The cat was a whip made from heavy cable (rope). A four-foot length cable was split into its three component strands to produce a two-and-a-half foot tail, each strand being separated again into three to produce the requisite nine 'tails'. These were knotted at the free ends to prevent fraying and the handle part then

¹⁷⁹ Photos.com/Jupiterimages, "Cat-O'-Nine-Tails."

back-spliced to both provide a good handgrip and stop it unraveling, though the nine lashes could also be bound to wooden handles.¹⁸⁰

The whipping was often done ceremonially, with the public summoned to “witness punishment” and enhanced by a drum roll and dramatic pauses to untangle the tails. It was not unheard of for prisoners to receive over 100 lashes across the shoulders, back, and buttocks. Often a frame or triangle was used with the cat causing the prisoner to stand upright with his wrists secured to the top. Sometimes straps were added and a padded block which the prisoner was made to bend over, his wrists being secured to the back of the contraption and ankles strapped down. The effect would make the man’s waist immobile and unable to twist. Richard Henry Dana describes a flogging at sea in the mid-1800s

Swinging the rope over his head, and bending his body so as to give it full force, the captain brought it down upon the poor fellow's back. Once, twice - six times...The man writhed under the pain until he could endure it no longer, when he called out, with an exclamation more common among foreigners than with us - 'Oh, Jesus Christ, oh, Jesus Christ!' 'Don't call on Jesus Christ,' shouted the captain. 'He can't help you. Call on Captain T - He's the man! He can help you! Jesus Christ can't help you now!' At these words, which I never shall forget, my blood ran cold. I could look on no longer. Disgusted, sick, and horror-struck, I turned away and leaned over the rail, and looked down into the water... Everyone else stood still at his post, while the captain, swelling with rage and with the importance of his achievement, walked the quarter-deck.¹⁸¹

The legacy of colonialism and its draconian laws continued to linger as a method of rule. The last British soldier was flogged in July 1880, in Afghanistan, for

¹⁸⁰ Hopkins, “English Historical Fiction Authors.”

¹⁸¹ Richard Henry, *Two Years before the Mast: A Sailor’s Life at Sea*.

sleeping on sentry duty. Act of British Parliament confirmed the Military ban in 1881, although its use in judicial whippings was not prohibited in Great Britain until 1948. The practice continued in several Commonwealth nations and colonies. Trinidad & Tobago never banned the "Cat". Under the Corporal Punishment Act of 1953, use of the "Cat" was limited to male offenders over the age of 16. In 2000, the age limit was 18. Although very rarely used, it is still a form of punishment in Trinidad and Tobago, even after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered the country to pay a convicted rapist \$50,000 after whipping him with the device.¹⁸²

Through the writing of Inspector of Gaols, Kaye Dowland in 1845, we know that prisoners sentenced to hard labor worked nine hours per day between 6 am and 6 pm in carrying and breaking stones for the Public Roads, or in cleaning the Public Streets, or the Jail. It allowed from 8 to 9 am for breakfast and from 12 to 2 pm for dinner. The women were employed in washing and repairing the prisoners' clothes.¹⁸³ The untried and convicted were separated. Those confined for misdemeanors were separated from those who committed more severe crimes. The debtors had 'apartments' to themselves, and the females had rooms by themselves. There was no stipend for regularly constituted chaplain to the jail, and the prisoners had no other instruction besides an occasional visit from the clergyman of the Established Church.

¹⁸² Darren Bahaw, "State Must Pay Rapist for 'Cat-O'-nine' Beating."

¹⁸³ Archibald, *Tobago "Melancholoy Isle" Volume III 1807-1898*. Pg. 130

Table 10. Return of the Number of Prisoners confined in the Gaol of Scarborough 1st January 1847. Source: Tobago Assembly

| Nature of Offence | Male | Female | Total |
|-------------------------------|------|--------|-------|
| Convicts | 16 | - | 16 |
| For trial on charge of Felony | 7 | - | 7 |
| Petty Theft | - | 2 | 2 |
| Misdemeanors | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| Debt | - | 1 | 1 |
| | 29 | 4 | 33 |

The jail population began to grow, and with the Goal Yard being only 127 feet by 78 feet and surrounded by a wall averaging from 10 to 11 feet in height, inspectors began advocating for a new Gaol location and converting the current one into a Police Station or Hospital. The effects of the Hurricane of destroying the south side stone wall exacerbated this need. Loans were requested from her Majesty's Government. However, by 1850 there was overcrowding with 50 prisoners. The commanding officer believed that this overcrowding condition was not suitable for a European (White) population but that it was appropriate to an African population. Writing on the condition of the Gaol for Colonial Secretary Thornton, the officer stated that *I am not aware that the African Race of Prisoners has materially suffered from their confinement, but this is a question which, no doubt, could be answered by the Medical Attendant in a more Satisfactory Manner. As a place of confinement for Europeans, I should certainly not deem it healthy.*¹⁸⁴In 1854, the Garrison of Fort King George was permanently withdrawn, and the Imperial army consolidated in Barbados.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. Pg.143

¹⁸⁵ During the administration of Lieutenant-Governor W.J Shorthand, an Act was passed on 25th March 1856 to convert the military prison and cells at Fort King George into a convict prison. On the Arrival of Drysdale as Lieutenant Governor from

6.3.4 The Governor's dispatches to the Colonial Office and the Queen

The Queen's response to news of the devastation highlights a complex relationship between the Crown, the British Parliament and her subjects in the colonies even as it supports a Foucauldian theoretical framework. In these documents, she revealed her relief towards the fate of the laborers of the island and hesitation to assist the estate owners. Her concern can be considered a method of the art of government and the well-being of the population. The crown is always threatened by other sovereigns looking for territory or by inhabitants who refuse to accept its rule. The Queen understood and may have had a genuine concern for her subjects, as she knows their obedience and loyalty legitimizes her rule. The ruling elite of many colonies often was at odds with the crown and their loyalty much more questionable than the peasants'. Their cruelty to Africans forced the implementation of the Crown Colony System.¹⁸⁶

On October 23, a message was sent to Secretary of State with detailed reports from the Lieutenant-Governor of Tobago covering October 11th to October 20th discussed above. He briefed the Secretary about the petition to Her Majesty the Queen

1857-1864, all persons undergoing imprisonment were removed from the small, confined and unhealthy prison in Scarborough to a better accommodation at Fort King George. Drysdale also appointed a Chaplain on a permanent basis.

¹⁸⁶ As historian Ryan states on the implementation of crown colony system. There is good reason to believe that in the early nineteenth century the Crown was genuinely reluctant to hand over control because of the feeling that blacks would be savagely exploited by white settlers. Expatriate officials were far more liberal and humane than white settlers, and many well-meaning metropolitan initiatives were frustrated by the political representatives of the latter.

for aid, and the “Bill” to protect scattered property. He gave his approval of said bill, and the house of assembly of Barbados voted to aid the sufferers.¹⁸⁷

Secretary of State responded to Governor Reid on December 1847. His letter conveyed that the previous communications were laid before the Queen reporting the serious losses on the island as well as the petition from Tobago’s memorialist praying for relief. Her Majesty sent her deep concern and placed 5,000l. At the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor and Governor, to relieve the immediate and pressing wants of the laboring population who were suffering as the result of the storm. The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury sent instructions to the officer in charge of the Commissariat at Barbados, under whose direction the Commissariat officer at Tobago acted, to hold the sum of 5,000l. for their disposal and guidance. The letter also contained a message from the Queen stating her inability to recommend relief from Parliament due to the imperfect information sent by the Lieutenant-Governor of Tobago, and cautioned the Governors not to allow the colonists to expect further relief. ¹⁸⁸

On January 12th, 1848, the Lieutenant-Governor forwarded to the Governor updated reports of the injury sustained to the island. Having no access to professional surveyors, he had recourse to special justices who estimated the damages under the assumption of they were honest and would use sound judgment. In most instances, these estimates were approximated from the original values of properties. Total estimated loss is £84,853 using this approach, The report detailed the damages in the

¹⁸⁷ Government of Trinidad and Tobago, “Tobago Hurricane of 1847.” Despatches No.1 Pg. 2

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. Despatch from Earl Grey to Governor Reid Pg. 16

three respective districts of the island: Windward (19,844l.), Middle (28,441l.), and Leeward District (36,568l.).¹⁸⁹

The main summary report divided the nature of property destroyed or injured into four categories: buildings, machinery, Negro houses, and stock on sugar plantations. This classification again highlighted the reality of these houses as plantation property. Put in another category was all other real and personal property in the rural districts. Damages to the town of Scarborough and its immediate suburbs, located in the Middle District, was the third group. Lastly, damages to public buildings and Church of England and Wesleyan Mission's properties were also included in this other grouping. The monetary impact of these damages is summarized in Table 11. The table is based on an abstract from the Stipendiary Magistrates' returns, showing the estimated amount of damage done to Property in Tobago by the Hurricane of 11th October 1847

Table 11. Estimated Damage to Property in Tobago. Source: Colonial Dispatches.

| Nature of Property Destroyed or injured | Windward District | | | Middle District | | | Leeward District | | | Total Amount | | |
|--|-------------------|----|----|-----------------|----|----|------------------|----|----|--------------|----|----|
| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
| Buildings, machinery, negro houses, and stock on sugar plantations | 13,606 | | | 9,459 | 13 | 4 | 29,124 | 0 | 0 | 52,189 | 13 | 4 |
| All other real and personal property in the rural districts | 4,838 | 1 | 9 | 10,761 | 10 | 10 | 7,444 | 0 | 0 | 23,943 | 12 | 7 |

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. Enclosure in No. 3 Pg. 17

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|---|---|--------|----|---|--------|---|---|--------|----|----|
| Town of Scarborough and immediate suburbs | - | - | - | 6,970 | 10 | 0 | - | - | - | 6,970 | 10 | 0 |
| Public buildings and Church of England and Wesleyan Mission property | 1,400 | 0 | 0 | 1,250 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | 2,650 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 19,844 | 1 | 9 | 28,441 | 14 | 2 | 36,568 | | | 84,853 | 15 | 11 |

Supplementary reports detailed the estimated damages to plantations, private parties and laborers in each district. Within these reports, losses by laborers per estate are separated from those of non-laborers. Each of the three district reports was compiled by different Stipendiary Magistrates and had a slightly different format. A report on the middle district in the Town of Scarborough and its immediate suburbs and the villages and settlements not connected with sugar plantations, mostly established since emancipation, estimated losses at 17,491. In it, personal property was categorized separately from damage to dwellings and outhouses.

On January 24th, 1848, Governor Reid forwarded these updated reports with the new estimate of £84,853 sterling to Secretary of State. However, the dispatch was not received until February 25th, 1848. On January 26, the Lieutenant-Governor of Tobago forwarded a message from the President of the Board of Legislative Council, Edward D. Sanderson, expressing the grateful acknowledgments of the Board for the ready sympathy evinced by the Queen for Her Majesty's distressed Subjects in the colony. This message was sent by Governor Reid on February 10 and received by Earl Grey on March 27th

On March 28th, 1848, Earl Grey responded to Governor Reid's last dispatch with communications he received from the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury considering the estimates included in Tobago's total damage. The Lords

Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury conceived that so far as regards the most indigent portion of the inhabitants, it was *unnecessary to make any addition to the original grant of 5,000l.* Concerning the planters and other residents requesting assistance in the restoration of their buildings or machinery, upon approval of Parliament and depending on the island's capability of repayment, an amount not exceeding 50,000l was to be used. To enable Her Majesty's Government to make loans to individuals for the restoration of their property. The advances and loans were made in a manner similar to the relief of the sufferers in Antigua, Nevis, and Montserrat from the earthquake of February 1843.

6.3.5 Distribution of financial assistance and loan forgiveness

Through this Act, the Governor was authorized to appoint "Loan Commissioners" who were empowered to advance from this loan to owners, and others interested in landed property suffered from the hurricane sums no less than £50 each. As first written, the first lien on the property was to be repaid with 5% interest in the form of ten equal installments. The lump sum loan was the responsibility of the governing body to repay to her Majesty's Treasury made in 10 equal annual installments, with first installment by the island borrower due 1st August 1850, while the first installment payable to her Majesty's Treasury due on 1st August 1851. An "Act" passed on 23rd April 1850 deferred the payments to Home Government until the 1st August 1852 and each succeeding installment to the 1st day of August in each year after, and interest due on the loan up to the 1st of August 1850, was to be paid on the 1st August 1851. The island borrowers were to pay the interest due on first August 1850 and to pay the first installment of principal, with the interest at that time due on

the 1st August 1851, and the remaining installments, with interest, were to be paid on the 1st August each succeeding year.¹⁹⁰

Recitals to an Act of the Island passed on the 16th February 1856 show that of the £50,000 granted by way of loan to Tobago, only £20,000 was taken, and that of such sum only £13,222 was used by the sufferers of the hurricane. The debt due to the Home Government on 1st August 1854 reduced to the principal sum of 14,000 payable in seven annual installments of 2000 each interest at 4% and the sum due by the island borrowers to the loan commissioner amounted to £9255, 8s payable by seven annual installments of £1322.8s each with 5% interest.¹⁹¹ On the 1st October 1862, the balance due by the colony on the loan was £5000; and the balance due the Loan Commissioners, by persons borrowing money from them, was on the 1st August 1862, £2650.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. pg. 110

¹⁹¹ The object of this act was to extend the time for payment of these liabilities and reduced the rate of interest. It was therefore, provided that, at the expiration of three months from the passing of the Act, the Loan Commissioners should pay into her Majesty's treasury £500, being the interest due on the 1st August, 1854, and a farther sum of £1000 on account of the principal. And the residue of the debt, with interest reduced to 3.25%, was to be paid by fourteen equal annual instalments- the first on the 1st October 1855 and the remaining instalments on the 1st October in each succeeding year until the debt should be liquidated. Additionally, the island borrower was required to pay up the amount payable by him at the time of the passing of the Act; and the payment of the residue of principal, with interest at 4.5% was extended as in the case of the debt due the Home Government, over a period of fourteen years, to be discharged by equal annual instalments of principal money and interest- the payments to be made on the 1st day of August in each year, commencing with the year 1855.

¹⁹² The object of this act was to extend the time for payment of these liabilities and reduced the rate of interest. It was therefore, provided that, at the expiration of three months from the passing of the Act, the Loan Commissioners should pay into her Majesty's treasury £500, being the interest due on the 1st August, 1854, and a farther

Tobago Chief Justice Woodcock was very prideful in the level of sympathy shown by her majesty's government in their deferment of repayment.

Her Majesty's Government demonstrated much liberality in consenting to the insular enactments, by which the periods for payment of the loan were twice deferred, and the rate of interest on one occasion reduced. In addition to this, let us not forget the gracious acknowledgment that "the colonies had been suffering under a severe depression, occasioned to a certain extent by imperial legislation" and the great boon of immigration, free of expense for some years, granted in consequence. It is gratifying to be able to notice such instances in which the mother country comes forward as the mother indeed to nurture her colonies, particularly when it is admitted that the colonies have suffered from some necessary measure of general policy that has borne hard on their individual case. The sympathy renders the gift more valuable.¹⁹³

Woodcock writes that the colony was on the brink of ruin, and in its desperate condition, it might have been necessary to resort to the expedient of borrowing. But such loans, generally speaking, entailed much suffering on a community, were not always applied to the purposes intended, and should not be resorted to but under a pressure of most urgent necessity.

sum of £1000 on account of the principal. And the residue of the debt, with interest reduced to 3.25%, was to be paid by fourteen equal annual instalments- the first on the 1st October 1855 and the remaining instalments on the 1st October in each succeeding year until the debt should be liquidated. Additionally, the island borrower was required to pay up the amount payable by him at the time of the passing of the Act; and the payment of the residue of principal, with interest at 4.5% was extended as in the case of the debt due the Home Government, over a period of fourteen years, to be discharged by equal annual instalments of principal money and interest- the payments to be made on the 1st day of August in each year, commencing with the year 1855.

¹⁹³ Woodcock, *A History of Tobago*. Pg. 112

6.4 In-Case Analysis and Summary of Event #1

The response to the hurricane is summarized in Table 12. The table covers the governance and multiple dimensions of recovery: health response, financial assistance, population control, legislative process and population sheltering and resettlement. Each of these topics will be covered in more detail in the following subsections.

Table 12. Governance and Recovery from 1847 Tobago Storm

| Tobago 1847- Old Representative System Legislative Council Led by Lieutenant Governor Upper Chamber Nominated by Lieutenant Governor Lower Chamber Elected. Limited Franchise | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|
| Health Service | Financial Assistance | Police and Military Use | Legislative Process | Housing and Resettlement |
| No public health services. Limited access for those remaining on plantations. 26 deaths many injuries and unrecorded deaths. | Loan of £50,000 to plantation owners. £5,000 for laborers. Distribution by Loan Commissioners appointed by the Governor. | Company of Militia on standby. Swearing in special Constables. Law banning looting with punishment by the “Cat”. | Subordinate to Governor and Legislature of Windward Islands. Delayed correspondence with Colonial Office and law approval. | Assistance prioritized for laborer houses on sugar works. Laborers rebuilt houses as they were. |

6.4.1 The Rule of the Sovereign and Tobago's Disaster Recovery

According to Foucault, the art of government was blocked until the eighteenth century within the forms of the administrative monarchy.¹⁹⁴ At the time of 1847 Hurricane, Great Britain in many ways reflected the emergence of governmentality. Its political system was a form of Republican monarchy, where the terms of a constitution and the rule of law restricted the governing powers of the monarch. The monarch held some formal powers but did not set public policy. However, what existed in her colonies was something very different. In them, what existed was Colonial Governmentality, a term first used by David Scott.¹⁹⁵ This study adapts the term to highlight the dichotomous nature of the methods employed in mainland UK and its colonies.

Under the Old Representative System (ORS), select colonies were ruled by a Governor appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Governor in every practical way held supreme rule over the land. Although assisted by a locally established legislature, the Governor made the final determination in every aspect of political life and had at his disposal various forms of physical punishment. The Franchise was very limited, and only those with significant capital interest had a voice. In Tobago, a Lieutenant Governor was appointed in the absence of the Governor, who was stationed in Barbados and held supreme rule over the land. Although they were responsible to the Secretary of the Colonies, they dominated the local legislature by the nomination of the upper house members and the few elected members in the lower house. Although Africans comprised the majority

¹⁹⁴ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*.

¹⁹⁵ Scott, "Colonial Governmentality."

population and slavery had ended, universal suffrage did not exist and eligibility to participate in the legislative function was restricted to the white plutocracy.

Another sign that Tobago 1847 existed under the rule of the Sovereign was the severe punishments inflicted to those who opposed or did not follow the dictates of the law. The bill to protect property scattered by the storm morphed into a draconian tactic of instilling fear, for it reinforced the sovereign's rule with the punishment of a public whipping with a *cat o' nine* tails, in many cases up to 39 lashes.

The sovereign's rule over the land focused on the maximum extraction of wealth from the land for its benefit and those of white owners of capital. Although the storm ravished the entire island as well as those not associated with the plantation economy, the Lieutenant Governor's main concern reflected the interests of the legislative body comprised of local elites who longed for the reestablishment of the plantation estates. This preoccupation is reflected in all of his dispatches to the Governor and Colonial Office, begging relief for estate owners for use in the immediate repairs to their properties.

As a result, of these actions, we can ascertain that the rule of the sovereign not only defined this period in Tobago but also shaped the response and recovery tactics of the Government.

6.4.2 Health Response: Plantation Labor Access

The storm caused the loss of 26 lives, and many others died from their injuries. The official reports do not detail how those injured were helped, nor how they disposed of the bodies of the dead. Only mentioned are the injury to one broken leg and the death of the soldier from the fallen wall of the jail. However, we can ascertain

through the historical documents that the health and well-being of the general population were not a primary concern of the Lieutenant Governor nor the Governor. Hospitals were nonexistent, mental asylums non-existent and access to medical treatment prioritized for only those that remained on plantation estates. Nor is there in the record any information about food and shelter for the general population of former enslaved laborers, probably an indication that these programs did not exist. Access to medical treatment was probably at the request and expenses of the plantation owner and served as an incentive for peasants to remain or return as their laborers. The Government structure did not make freeing oneself from the estates easy. Education of the population was also not a priority for the government, but some were available through religious affiliations.

6.4.3 Financial Assistance: Loans for Plantation Owners

Lieutenant Governor's dispatch to Governor Reid on October 19th outlined the need for relief amounting to £100,000 to £150,000 to enable plantation recovery from the damages sustained by the storm. The request was sent to the Secretary of State. In his response, the Colonial Office denied this request because of the lack of specifics about the damages sustained. Such denials of funds illustrate a great skepticism towards the expressed needs of the planters. On January 12th, 1848, Lieutenant-Governor Graeme sent a modified report with in-depth analyses requesting the relief of 84,8531 pounds sterling, which was then relayed to the Colonial Office. Secretary Earl Grey's response to the Governor indicated that a loan sum of 50,000l. would be provided.

According to Measuringworth.com a website that calculates the purchasing power of the pound, £150,000 pounds in 1847 has an approximate value of £12,240,000.00 to £434,100,000.00 in 2014.¹⁹⁶ This range depends on the valuations of commodities, income/wealth, or a project. However, using the most conservative figure, it is clear that the local legislature was asking for an exorbitant amount of money for their relief. Ultimately, of the 50,000l provided by her Majesty's government for loans, only 20,000l were taken as loans for repairs. It is an equivalent 2014 valuation of from £1,632,000.00 to £57,880,000.00. The distribution of this loan was under the Loan Commissioners appointed by the Governor.

Her Majesty provided a grant of £5,000 for the relief of the laboring peasants who comprised the majority of the island's population of close to 14,000. In 2014, the relative value of £5,000 from 1847 ranges from £408,100.00 to £14,470,000.00. This sum was under the control of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. However, the distribution of the grant was unspecified.

6.4.4 Legislative Process: Delayed Action

Due to the administrative restrictions placed on the legislature in Tobago, all bills passed required further approval from the Governor and legislative body in Barbados. After passing the "bill" to protect scattered property in the Tobago Legislature, the Lieutenant Governor was required to not only inform the Governor in Barbados of this bill but also beg for its swift approval through the Barbados

¹⁹⁶ "Measuring Worth - Purchase Power of the Pound," accessed September 10, 2015, <http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/relativevalue>.

Legislature. Such measures undoubtedly were in place to protect the Empire's interest but delayed and inhibited disaster response abilities of the island's governing body. Additionally, these bureaucratic procedures significantly slowed the process of receiving financial relief from the Queen's government in England. Although there was a dire need for immediate relief, the Lieutenant Governor was required to alert the Governor of Barbados who evaluated this request before petitioning the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the Colonial Office on Tobago's behalf. As a result, the storm occurred on October 11th the Governor of Barbados relayed the message for relief to the Colonial Office 12 days later, on October 23rd, and the funds only arrived 24 weeks after the storm, after her Majesty's government approved the loan on March 28th.

Restricted by the nature of its subordinate status to a Windward Colony, within the Empire's chain of command, Tobago was unable to solicit assistance on its terms and promptly. Response for relief to the laborers occurred on December 16th with the Majesty's government granting the sum of 5,000l. As a dependency island with limited financial resources, the Islanders needed the Empire to assist in their recovery. However, because of the extended period involved in this involved legislative process, the assistance to laborers took nine weeks for approval from the day of impact, 11th October 1847

. Financial relief for plantation owners required continuous reiterations through the multiple channels and took much longer before approval. Twenty-four weeks after the storm, her Majesty's government approved the loan of £50,000 on March 28th. Logically this response time would have been a lot shorter if the additional channel of

corresponding with Barbados was not necessary or if Tobago was able to request a loan from neighboring empires.

6.4.5 Military Use and Controlling the Population

Under the colonial rule of the island at the time of the storm, the governing body used two methods of controlling the population. The first method was passing the bill above outlawing theft of materials found scattered by the storm as well as other properties and outlined severe punishment. All magistrates, ministers of the gospel, constables, and peace officers were required to help disseminate this proclamation turned law.¹⁹⁷ The justices of the peace had a great deal of authority. And any two of them could send a person for trial to the ordinary tribunals or if they thought fit, and with the oath of one or more credible witnesses they could sentence the individual to be publicly whipped with a *cat o' nine* tails are not exceeding 39 lashes, or in the case of females, they could be imprisoned to forced labour in any gaol not exceeding three calendar months.¹⁹⁸

The second tactic employed to enforce their rule over the population was the induction of new special constables to oversee the city of Scarborough. With the damage to the garrison of Fort King George by the storm, and because it was in the middle of the rainy season, the regiment was sent to Trinidad for health concerns. However, Lieutenant Governor Graeme reinforced the security of the property owners

¹⁹⁷ Government of Trinidad and Tobago, "Tobago Hurricane of 1847." Sub-Enclosure 2 in Enclosure No. 2 pg. 7

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. Sub-Enclosure to Enclosure No. 4

by swearing in special constables; moreover, if necessary, a company of militia could be called to secure the prisoners and to preserve the peace of the town of Scarborough. As historian Mulcahy writes, the fear of mass uprising was very common during colonial rule and following storms:

In Barbados, British troops patrolled the streets of Bridgetown devastated by the hurricane of 1780, keeping the island “quiet” and protecting [colonists’] property... hurricanes may have created chaotic conditions that terrified planters, but slaves could not act on such conditions in any organized fashion. As with other accounts of slave conspiracies and scares, concerns about hurricanes and social disorder reveal far more about the mentality of planters than the actions of slaves.¹⁹⁹

The swearing in of local militia was a common practice to quell the plutocracy’s fears of slaves and ex-slaves. To be part of the militia during this time the person had to be a white male and owned property.

The punitive rule by the sword is a tactic of the Sovereign and a method of population control used at this time. Perhaps due in part to the widespread horror whites felt in the aftermath of Haiti’s very violent and successful slave revolution, its most violent practice in Tobago occurred earlier in the century during slavery on those that opposed their enslavement. Within the technologies of security, resistance nevertheless was not absent, and the enslaved often revolted both overtly and covertly. In the years, 1770 and 1771 there were no less than three insurrections that were put down by military force.²⁰⁰ In 1801, the enslaved Africans on the colony planned a major uprising on Christmas night. They numbered in the several thousand, and their

¹⁹⁹ Mulcahy, *Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783*, 2008. (pg. 99- 100)

²⁰⁰ Woodcock, *A History of Tobago*. Pg 73

success was probable as the Brigadier-General Carmichael could muster only 200 soldiers. However, the General obtained knowledge of the plot just before execution and stopped it from being carried out. He seized thirty of the ringleaders, ordered one of them to be hanged at daybreak the next morning on the signal staff, and the body to be thirty times lowered and re-elevated, a signal gun being fired at each elevation. Believing themselves to be without a leader, the remaining insurgents surrendered or dispersed. As a reward for his firmness, the Brigadier-General Carmichael was applauded by the Legislature and presented with a gift of a sword.

6.4.6 Population Displacement and Resettlement

To summarize, the Hurricane of 11th October 1847 destroyed 465 houses, and 182 were severely damaged. On the 70 estates existing at the time, 30 of the great-houses were destroyed and 31 severely damaged. The reports stated that of the “Negro houses” on the plantations about four-fifths were destroyed or sustained damages. There is no information at present that indicates the presence of projects to relocate populations, and it is assumed that the laborers that received some of the 5,000l. in financial assistance, used their small shares to rebuild their homes in the same location. The, the greatest amount of funds was used in rebuilding sugar works and the great-houses of the plantations or for refinancing troubled estates; housing for indentured Africans on plantations would be repaired by themselves in the same location.

The next event discussed is the 1933 Hurricane that devastated the southern portion of Trinidad. Unlike Tobago, Trinidad was not governed by the Old

Representative System but as a Crown Colony for most of its British colonialization. The two islands were unified in the late 19th century under the Crown Colony System.

6.5 Event #2 Trinidad 1933 Hurricane

6.5.1 Brief History of Trinidad, a Plantation Economy, and a Crown Colony

Trinidad was colonialized twice by colonial empires, a stark contrast to the thirty plus conquests of Tobago. Christopher Columbus landed on the island of Trinidad on the 31st of July 1498 declaring it a possession of the King of Spain.²⁰¹ The Spaniards were obsessed with finding the gold of El Dorado and neglected the potential agricultural uses of the island, utilizing it merely as a source of slaves. The plantation economy developed following a royal decree that permitted French emigres to populate the island and bring with them their enslaved Africans. Spain reigned over the island until 1797, at which time the island was captured and integrated into the British Empire. Historian Selwyn Ryan classifies this as the first period in the island's history marked by the decimation of the aboriginal through enslavement, torture and death for resisting the conquistadores and forced conversion to Catholicism.²⁰²

The cultivation of the land grew after the visit of M. Laurent, a Frenchman from Grenada, to the Court of Madrid, which led to the *Cedula* (a royal decree) of 1783. This *Cedula* resulted in the populating of the Spanish colony in Trinidad with French subjects from nearby French Colonies, many of whom were on the losing side

²⁰¹ Great Britain Colonial Office, *Trinidad and Tobago*.

²⁰² Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972.

of the French revolution and were escaping to a slave friendly government. The island placed a premium upon slave imports and with it the rapid development of agriculture began. French émigrés were attracted by the liberal land grants offered in 1783 by the King of Spain to settlers of Catholic persuasion. The *Cedula* offered to white Catholics 32 acres of land, with 16 acres for each slave they owned, and these quantities were also proposed to free “colored” Catholics that owned slaves. French immigrants (and French Creoles) flocked to the island where they were given relief from taxation and duty-free guarantees for their importation of animals and agricultural tools. Trade with the French islands was permitted under special regulations. Prior to this, Spain excluded non-Spaniards from settling or trading with Trinidad. The Spanish and English war would bring an end to the Spanish rule and the beginning of the British rule in 1797. Thus, its late acquisition by the British Crown and the lack of agricultural development prior to the nineteenth century (beginning late eighteenth) distinguish Trinidad from other British West Indian colonies.²⁰³

After the British conquest in 1797, the population increased along with the expansion of the sugar industry, together with cacao, coffee, and cotton. In 1802, the Treaty of Amiens officially ceded Trinidad to the Crown of Great Britain. A British Governor ruled with a Council of Advice.

At the start of the 19th century, the British Government made a significant policy shift away from the Old Representative System in the West Indies colonies and implemented Crown Colony Governments. Trinidad and St. Lucia were the first two

²⁰³ Shephard, *Agricultural Labour in Trinidad*, 1926.

such Crown Colonies in the British West Indies.²⁰⁴ The island was governed by the pure Crown Colony system, not the Old Representative System existing in Tobago or an old democracy like Great Britain. Following the San Domingue Revolution (Haiti Revolution), European Empires increased methods to keep African populations under greater control, and Crown Colony System in non-white settler colonies replaced the ORS. This system placed centralized and more efficient and ruthless supervision in the hands of the Governor and nominated officials. Advocates of the system point to the fact that only a crown colony system would have been able to implement slave reform legislature and its eventual abolition in 1834-1838, as a representative system would be dominated by slave owner interests and would have experienced greater difficulties. In 1831, Trinidad's first legislature called the Council of Government, was introduced. It consisted of nominated officials including the Chief Justice, Colonial Secretary, Colonial Treasurer, Attorney General, Collector of Customs, and the Protector of Slaves, who was replaced after 1845 by the Protector of Immigrants. The nominated officials also constituted the Governor's Executive Council.²⁰⁵ Prof. Samaroo writes that after the Indian revolt of 1857, the British attitude toward non-white colonists hardened. In the aftermath of this revolt in India, on 26th July 1858, the Earl of Newcastle told the House of Lords that responsible government, that is a government in which ministers or heads of department are responsible for an elected majority, was

²⁰⁴ Ghany, "The Relevance of the Senate in a Modern Democracy."

²⁰⁵ Samaroo, "From Unicameralism to Bicameralism: Trinbago's Constitutional Advances (1831-1962)." Pg. 72

applicable only to colonists of the English race.²⁰⁶ During the 1850s, New South Wales, Tasmania, South Australia, and Victoria were granted representative assemblies, followed by New Zealand and British Columbia. Non-white colonies were transitioned the opposite route into Crown Colonies. African unrest and the need for administrative efficiency were convenient pretexts.

Prof. Ghany writes that the continuation and expansion of Crown Colony Government emerged again after the 1865 Morant Bay uprising in Jamaica. The British Government reformed Jamaica's constitution and removed the elected Legislative Assembly in 1866-1884 replacing it with a nominated one.²⁰⁷ This process was adopted in the West Indies, except in Barbados, the Bahamas, and Bermuda until 1878.²⁰⁸ Tobago which since 1768 was originally under the Old Representative System, became a crown colony in 1877. By Order in Council, under Act 50 and Act 51 Vict. on 1st January 1889, Tobago became part of the Colony of Trinidad.

The 1889 Order in Council also abolished the Legislative Council of Tobago. Presumably, the unification was necessary for financial reasons. By a further Order in Council dated 20th October 1898, Tobago from the 1st of January 1899 became a Ward of the United Colony of Trinidad and Tobago.²⁰⁹ All laws in force in Trinidad would extend to Tobago and all laws in Tobago that differed with those in Trinidad would

²⁰⁶ Ibid. Pg. 67

²⁰⁷ . In 1884 this system was replaced by the New Representative System in which a minority of elected members and a majority of nominated members would sit in the Legislature

²⁰⁸ Ghany, "The Relevance of the Senate in a Modern Democracy." Pg. 80

²⁰⁹ Great Britain Colonial Office, *Trinidad and Tobago*.

cease to be. The Crown Colony system governed the unified islands until 1925 when the first limited franchise election was held finally transitioning the colony into the New Representative System.

Historian Ryan considers this period from 1797 to the end of the First World War in 1918 as the second major period in Trinidad's history. It witnessed the consolidation of British rule and the plantation system, the emancipation of enslaved Africans in 1834, the importation of Indian indentured laborers in 1845, and the first stages of the struggle for representative government. A merchant-plantocracy together with the Colonial Office staff and their families ruled this Crown colony.²¹⁰ Trinidad earned the reputation of having the greatest production of sugar per head of population and the heaviest mortality in the British West Indies. Following emancipation and the end of apprenticeship in 1838, Africans left the plantation and flocked to the towns or villages as artisans and petty traders, or squatted on Crown lands. To compel them back to the plantation, attempts were made to prevent squatting while their acquisition of land was rendered nearly impossible. Slave owners received £1,039,000 (2015 valuation of £83,790,000 to £3,517,000,000) in compensation, which was principally used for liquidating mortgages and also enabled planters to begin the new period free of debt. The emancipated Africans concentrated in towns were given nothing for their multi-generational productivity as enslaved laborers. Frantic attempts were made to replace the resulting labor shortage, and arrangements were made for the immigration of indentured laborers from India. The worldwide depression in the sugar industry caused by the competition of beet sugar diverted new capital and labor in Trinidad to

²¹⁰ Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972.

the expansion of the cacao industry.²¹¹ The cacao industry plays an integral role in the Hurricane of 1933.

The 1933 Hurricane event included in this study occurs within what Ryan calls the third period of Trinidad's history. During this interwar period, the reform movement gained momentum and was led by the African working class, who chose a radical European planter of Corsican heritage as its leader, Captain Arthur Cipriani. 1919-1936 also witnessed the introduction of elected representatives into the Governor's Legislative Council for the first time in 1925. The visit in 1921 of a Colonial Office investigatory commission also helped to crystallize this new development in the politics of the country. While many British colonies were allowed to enact popularly elected assemblies, this system never became part of British constitutional practice in Trinidad. Following the 1925 reforms, the Legislative and Executive Councils were progressively democratized by the addition of elected members and in 1961 bicameralism and responsible government were introduced.²¹²

According to the Census, the population on 31st December 1933 was estimated at 425,572.²¹³ The colony's Colonial Secretary provided the demographics and the categories used by the colony's administration. Those born in Europe; North America; China or of Chinese parentage; India or of East Indian parentage; Trinidad and Tobago

²¹¹ Shephard, "Agricultural Labour in Trinidad," 1934.

²¹² Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972. pg 5

²¹³ On 26th April, 1931, the population of the Colony amounted to 412,783 persons, of which Trinidad contained 387,425 and Tobago 25,358. This marked a 12.8% increase from 1921 when the population was 365,913, with 342,523 in Trinidad and 23,390 in Tobago.

including those of European parentage, African or mixed descent; and other West Indian colonies received their own separate classifications. The census report further delineates the East Indian Population by listing the natives of India at 23,312 and those born in the Colony of Indian Parents, or in whom Indian blood existed at 114,271.²¹⁴

Table 13. Trinidad and Tobago 1933 Census. Source: Colonial Reports.²¹⁵

| Census demographics | Population |
|--|------------|
| Born in Europe (of whom 1,454 were born in the United Kingdom) | 1,891 |
| Born in North America and the United States of America | 614 |
| Born in South America (of whom 4,244 were born in Venezuela) | 5,082 |
| Born in China, or in the Colony of Chinese parentage | 5,208 |
| Born in India, or in the Colony of East Indian parentage | 137,583 |
| Born in Colony, including those of European parentage, and people of African and mixed descent | 216,138 |
| Born in other West Indian Colonies and elsewhere | 46,267 |
| Total | 412,783 |

British currency and the United States gold were legal tenders. The Government kept accounts in sterling and dollars; the coin in circulation was almost exclusively British silver and bronze. Under the Government Currency Notes Ordinance, \$1.00 and \$200 notes were issued, and the total value in circulation on 31st December 1933 was

²¹⁴ Grier, “Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Trinidad and Tobago 1933-1935.”

²¹⁵ Great Britain Colonial Office, *Trinidad and Tobago*.

\$525,440.²¹⁶The revenue for 1933 amounted to £1,687,079, a decrease of £7,068 from 1932. Expenditure for 1933 amounted to £1,683,086 of which £14,331 was used for the repairs to roads and buildings damaged by the hurricane, and assistance to proprietors. £45,000 was given to the Reserve Fund,²¹⁷, which had a total of £330,000 at the end of the year.

6.5.2 Trinidad and Tobago's New Representative Political Structure

By the late 19th century, some United Kingdom colonies achieved semi-independence Dominion status. With the Balfour Declaration of 1926, they became autonomous communities within the British Empire. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, further cemented their autonomy as a statutory embodiment of the Balfour declaration that effectively established the legislative independence of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire from the United Kingdom but bound them all to seek each other's approval for changes to monarchical titles and the common line of succession. It thus had the effect of making the Dominions sovereign nations. This liberality was not extended to Trinidad and Tobago

Soon after the British occupation by 1807, Trinidad's planters asked for some form of Representative Government. However, until 1925 Trinidad and Tobago continued to be a crown colony ruled by a Governor in whom all authority rested.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ A reserve fund is an account set aside to meet any unexpected costs that may arise in the future as well as the future costs of upkeep. In most cases, the fund is simply a savings account or another highly liquid asset, as it is impossible to predict when an unexpected cost may arise.

Over the decades, the legislature was opened to local merchants and planters to occupy non-official positions as a way to appease their calls for representation. However, these nominated unofficial members would not be allowed to vote as a bloc to supersede official members and the Governor's vote. In contrast, the autonomous Dominions had a Governor-General as the representative of the Crown, but he was not responsible for the administration the island; this task was the duty of an elected Prime Minister. In a Crown Colony, in contrast, the Governor status was a combination of Governor General and Prime-Minister. The Governor held three main roles. He was the representative of His Majesty the King; the officer responsible for the proper administration of the government; and during sessions of the Legislative Council, he was Chairman of that body. In this triple position, he exercised a disproportionate influence over the government of the colony, embodying the supreme rule of the Sovereign within a façade of democracy. His most important instrument of the rule was the Legislative Council, which became Parliament in 1961, and the Executive Council, which would become Cabinet in 1959. The Crown Colony Legislative Council was a single chamber with ten official members, usually the heads of departments of the colony. The chamber also included eleven designated members who represented different groupings in the society. The Governor held a double vote to guarantee a Government majority. The numbers sometimes fluctuated, but the principle remained and with the routine support of his "official party", the Governor could always count on a majority of one; in practice, the majority was always larger, since the unofficial members rarely operated as a single unit. The Executive Council was merely an advisory body to the Governor and consisted of the Governor, Attorney General, the Colonial Secretary, and the Colonial Treasurer.

Table 14. 1889 Trinidad and Tobago Crown Colony Legislative Council. Source: Meighoo 2012.²¹⁸

| | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Governor (President) | |
| Official Members (6) | Unofficial Members (6) |
| Colonial Secretary | Fred Warner |
| Attorney-General | Dr. LAA de Verteuil |
| Solicitor | Dr. JV de Boissiere |
| Auditor | L. Guiseppi |
| Protector of Immigrants | T.A. Finlayson |
| Director of Public Works | G. Garcia |

Writing of the rule of the Governor in crown colonies such as Trinidad, historian C.L James indicates that though he acts with the advice of the Executive Council, nothing can prevent him from doing what he pleases, for he is the absolute ruler of the Colony. In James' analysis, an autocratic alien governed such colonies with three or four other aliens and one or two local men chosen by the Governor as representatives of the people. The deliberations of the Executive Council were secret and authorized by the constitution. The more representative interests of the public were centered on the Legislative Council, even though it was an advisory body.²¹⁹

Major E.F.L Wood, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, toured the British West Indies from 1921-1922. He recommended the re-introduction of elected representation in the legislatures on a minority basis. He noted that there was a considerable driving force for reform, and felt it was impossible to withhold concessions which had been granted to Grenada. He also recommended that this dynamic be reversed over time, eventually to have a majority of elected representation

²¹⁸ Meighoo, "From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?" Pg. 29

²¹⁹ James, *The Life of Captain Cipriani*. Pg 97

in relation to nominated membership.²²⁰ He feared that if granted immediate representative government an oligarchy would control the legislature. The argument of the radicals that the sugar interests controlled the governing class did not appear to impress him. In 1924, the first reforms towards elected representation into the Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago were made and subsequently these reforms were amended in 1928, 1941, 1942 and 1945, before being replaced by a new Constitution in 1950.

By Letters Patent and an Order in Council that came into operation on 21st August 1924, the legislative body of the colony was reconstituted. The new Legislative Council then consisted of the Governor as President, twelve officials, and thirteen unofficial members. The official members consisted of the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, Treasurer and nine others nominated by the Governor. The thirteen unofficial members of the Council consisted of six appointed by the Governor and seven elected. Trinidad contained six electoral districts, each returning one member, with Tobago forming the seventh electoral district.²²¹ The Crown Colony essence remained with the official members and the Governor's double vote continuing to control the majority. It was Governor Supremacy, not popular representation, and the franchise was limited. The right to vote was limited to those who had substantial property or high incomes. Candidates for elections were required to have even more substantial holdings in the real and fluid capital. A provision which

²²⁰ Ghany, "The Relevance of the Senate in a Modern Democracy."

²²¹ Grier, "Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Trinidad and Tobago 1933-1935."

served to close its doors to all but the well-to-do was that members of the Legislative Council worked gratis. As a result, these initial reforms left political power in the oligarchy which Major Wood had stated would be the principal beneficiaries of responsible government.²²² Major Wood was mainly concerned in quelling the fears of the capital holding class and felt that ‘no action should be taken which would disturb the confidence felt by capital in the stability of the local government’ (Wood Report pg. 7).

The official members were comprised of Englishmen with a few white creoles, originating from other colonies.²²³ The logic of using foreigners according to the government was that local men did not get respect from their colleagues. Thus, these officials were strangers to the community which they governed. C.L.R James provides greater insight into the oligarchic culture of these ruling officials and their associations with the local white Creole financial elites. For James, the white creole, especially those in business, was quite satisfied, knowing that he and the Official Englishmen could exert influence on the actions of the Colonial Office in Downing Street.

These heads of departments’ men mix almost entirely in clubs and social gatherings with the more wealthy elements of the white creoles whose interest lies with the maintenance of all the authority and privileges of the officials against the political advancement of the coloured people. Sometimes their children intermarry with the white creoles; their sons and daughters get employment in the big business houses. For all practical purposes, and indeed by the very nature of the circumstances, it is impossible that these officials who form the largest single group on the Legislature should do otherwise than support the white commercial classes and the unofficial Englishmen... Whatever it

²²² Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972. Pg. 34

²²³ Creole was a term used to describe those born in the new world

may be in theory, in actual fact these heads of departments on the Council represent to-day nothing but the other white people in the Colony, perhaps about three percent.²²⁴

James describes the Englishman, who comes to the colonies, especially from the smaller colonies as being neither highly placed at home nor, judged by European standards, of first-class ability.²²⁵

The legislative council starting in 1925, consisted of six unofficial members nominated by the Governor and seven members elected by the public. Formerly the Governor nearly always appointed white men representing business interests. The Governor has occasionally appointed men of color to these positions but according to James, these men are never black, and by choice, they never represent the interest of their own colored people.

The career of these fair-skinned men, from their point of view, seems to depend to a large extent on the way, whether openly or covertly, they dissociate themselves from their own people. They have been nominated or selected from high office chiefly because along with their ability or lack of they have shown a willingness and capacity to please their rulers. The result is that a more or less intelligent and aspiring minority occupy a position in which they do much more harm and no good, for to the Colonial Office and the ordinary observer, being men of colour, they represent the coloured people, while the government

²²⁴ James, *The Life of Captain Cipriani*. Pg. 99

²²⁵ According to James, if the European was of exceptional ability he would never leave the opportunities of living in one of the great centers of civilization or enjoying the rewards which a great country like England could offer. According to James the exceptionally able local man, especially if he is a man of color, stays at home. The Englishman who can match him also stays at home in England. In his assessment, there was nothing exceptional about these alien rulers and local men of greater quality could lead the country if granted self-government.

and the white creole know that when it comes to a crisis, these their henchmen are more royalist than the King.²²⁶

At the time of the 1933 storm, Trinidad had only experienced two legislative elections since its inception. Eligibility to participate in these elections required a man be either a resident in his constituency or to own property in it amounting to \$5000 pounds. The few that were elected by the public had a minority voice in the council and could not effect change with such a lopsided system in place. James writes in detail about one such elected member who fought tirelessly for the common man. He was Captain Arthur Cipriani, who fought countless battles and participated in countless debates in the legislative chambers or with Governor Hollis. Captain Cipriani was a white man from an elite Creole family of Corsican descent.



Figure 8. Captain Cipriani. Source: GenI.²²⁷.

²²⁶ James, *The Life of Captain Cipriani*.
pg. 103

²²⁷ “Arthur Andrew ‘Tattoo’ Cipriani, Captain.”

He rose to prominence defending against the discrimination of the West Indian Regiment enlisted in the British Military during WWI. By the 1920's he was the leader of the Trinidad Workingmen's Association and responsible for advocating for shorter hours of work and the establishment of an agricultural bank. As a Council member, he battled for workmen's compensation laws, old age pensions, the eight-hour day, minimum wages, and compulsory education. He fought against the Habitual Idlers Ordinance which the planter-dominated Legislative Council had enacted to curb vagrancy on the part of the East Indians, and against the continuation of child labor on the plantations and for the nativization of the electricity company.²²⁸

He played a central role in the eventual granting of the rights to Trade Unions and for self-government. He had a strong dislike for the West India Committee (an organization which represented an absentee interest in London), the Chamber of Commerce, and British officials- 'wire-pullers at the Colonial Office'. For him, the Crown colony system was a grand conspiracy of local and alien capitalists, a system under which the colony was being bled white, and the worker defrauded, pilloried and exploited. A staunch advocate of West Indianization, Captain Cipriani died in 1945. One year later, the colony held its first elections under universal suffrage.²²⁹ Eric Williams, the first Prime-Minister in 1962 names Captain Cipriani as the first of the great trinity among the country's movement towards self-government, the others being Uriah Butler and Patrick Solomon. Captain Cipriani's election to and presence in the legislative council of the island signified a shift in the tactics of the colonial power to

²²⁸ Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972. Pg. 35

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

quell the voices of opposition. These tactics are what this study, following Foucault, conceptualizes as (late) colonial governmentality.

In 1933, the year of the second hurricane under review occurs following these initial reforms of the legislature. Trinidad’s Governor was Sir Alfred Claud Hollis and his Executive Council comprised of seven members who administered the Colony.²³⁰ The first meeting of the Special Session of the Legislative Council took place in the Council Chamber on Friday the 20th October 1933. The members of the council are listed below, and will be mentioned in the following pages.

Table 15. 1933 Legislative Council Trinidad and Tobago. Source: Colonial Reports.

| | |
|---|--|
| His Excellency Sir Claud Hollis K.C.M.G., C.B.E Governor, President | |
| | |
| The Honourable the Colonial Secretary Mr. S. M. Grier, C.M.G | The Honourable A.B. Carr, M.B.E. |
| The Honourable Attorney-General Mr. F. Gordon Smith | The Honourable Dr. A. H. McShine, O.B.E. |
| The Honourable Acting Treasurer Mr. E. L. Dos Santos | The Honourable L. A. P. O’Reilly, K.C. |
| The Honourable Dr. K. S. Wise M.B., B.S., Surgeon-General | The Honourable C. Henry Pierre, O.B.E., K.C. |
| The Honourable J. Strachan, C.M.G Director of Works and Transport | The Honourable T. M. Kelshall, O.B.E |
| The Honourable F.C Marriott, M.A., O.B.E., Director of Education | The Honourable Captain A.A Cipriani |
| The Honourable A.P. Catherall, B.Sc., Inspector of Mines | The Honourable F.G. Grant |

²³⁰ The Executive Council comprised the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, and Treasurer, and such other persons the Governor in pursuance of instructions from His Majesty through the Secretary of State may appoint.

| | |
|--|------------------------------|
| The Honourable A.E.V. Barton, O.B.E., Collector of Customs and Excise | The Honourable I.A. Hope |
| The Honourable J.L. Devaux, Solicitor-General | The Honourable M.A. Maillard |
| The Honourable St. Y. D. De Verteuil, M.B.E., Protector of Immigrants and Warden, St. George | The Honourable S.W. Fitt |
| The Honourable Lt.-Col. J. W. Wilson, M.C., V.D. Acting Inspector- General of Constabulary | |

6.5.3 Late Colonial Governmentality in the Inter-war period

During this pivotal inter-war period in colonial rule, new tactics or projects of the rule were increasingly being introduced to maintain colonial power. The rule of Governmentality begins to emerge and gain in prominence over the strict use of the standard of the sword. Whereas the Sovereign achieved obedience through his law in both cases, here the method of soliciting obedience is through the art of employing tactics and persuasion rather than punitive laws, or, of as far as possible arranging things so that this or that end can be achieved through the minimum number of means.

As Foucault explains

Whereas the end of sovereignty was internal to itself and got its instruments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs; it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics than laws. ²³¹

²³¹ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*. Pg 99

Foucault theorizes that this art of government was blocked until the eighteenth century as it was imprisoned within the forms of the administrative monarchy. However, his analysis neglected the realities of the colonies and his work rarely made mention of them. His theory is valid, except for the colonies and, in particular, the crown colonies, as the more advanced contemporary forms of government was blocked until the Inter-war period of the 20th century. Then, ongoing dissidence from the laboring masses intensified as well as magnified the effects of the great worldwide economic depression of the 1930s, with the entrenched demands for greater self-government rattling the strict rule of the colonial office.

With the Great Depression intensifying already dire conditions, the 1930s social and economic conditions in the West Indian colonies were worse than in the previous decade. Economic problems and racial discrimination persisted and lay at the root of social and political unrest. There were strikes and riots in the West Indies throughout the decade, and they were widely reported in the popular press as well as in the weeklies. More unrest occurred in other “colonies,” with deadly strikes occurring in Northern Rhodesian and Mauritius. Jewish immigration into British mandated territory of Palestine led to conflict with the Arabs leading to strikes and riots in April 1936. West Indians were also agitated and in strong opposition to the Italian War in Ethiopia.

In the 1930's The Labour Party emerged in the United Kingdom elections better prepared, organized and informed to analyze and transform colonial matters. Captain Cipriani took the case for the introduction of trade union legislation in the colonies to the British Labour party's Commonwealth Conference in 1930. His ideas challenged the widespread refusal to promote the trade-union movement in the

colonies and to grant them their fundamental rights. The U.K Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald ultimately responded to this and similar appeals, and Sidney Webb urged the colonial governments to introduce trade-union ordinances. However, the government of Trinidad and Tobago ignored this request until 1932.

Historian Stephen Constantine writes that the 1930s were a watershed during which the morality of colonialism and the record of Britain's achievements were subjected to fierce criticism at home and from abroad. In response to this challenge was a change of tactics and the shift to *constructive trusteeship* to better address the social conditions of the colonies. This change is the art of government and what for Foucault is Colonial Governmentality.

The stability of the empire was also threatened, initially from within by social disturbances and burgeoning nationalist movements, but later from outside with German, Italian and Japanese attacks and even from unsympathetic scrutiny by the United States. In these circumstances traditional justifications of colonial rule looked increasingly shoddy: protective trusteeship and the civilizing mission in the colonies had sown economic stagnation, social unrest, and political dissent. In response, a new policy of constructive trusteeship with the explicit purpose of improving social conditions in the colonies was devised, as a method of removing legitimate grievances in the colonies, reestablishing the empire and defusing criticism of British colonial rule.²³²

Government purpose was still to ensure that the greatest possible amount of wealth was produced, but now the people must be provided with sufficient means of subsistence so that the population could survive. Its ultimate end was not to protect or reinforce governmentality: but rather *the general welfare of the population, the*

²³² Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940*. Pg. 259

improvement of its condition, and the increase in its wealth, longevity, and health.

The interests of the people were incorporated into the interest of the ruler to quell dissidence and to maximize their health and efficiency so as to increase wealth and maintain power. Granting of the right to form labor unions, expansion of universal suffrage and campaigns to improve the health of the populace occurred later in this decade. Postcolonial scholar Thijs explains the art of government at this time in the following passage,

Acting on the population through campaigns, or indirectly, by for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region of activity. Population then appears as the end and instrument of government rather than as the sovereign's strength: it is the subject of needs and aspirations, but also the object of government manipulation; vis-a-vis government, [population] is both aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to it.²³³

It is important to note that that Foucault did not see governmentality fully displacing sovereignty. In fact, he stated that its emergence made the need for sovereignty more sensible, *we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has a population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.*²³⁴

Trinidad's crown colony status had evolved to include elected officials in its' legislature but with restriction of the franchise to only 6% of the population, reinforced the antagonisms in the society. Sir Anton Bertram tells us, crown colony meant *the direct personal rule of the Governor*. All power and all responsibility are

²³³ Thijs Willaert, "Postcolonial Studies after Foucault." Pg 105

²³⁴ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*. Pg. 108

centered in him under the close and continuous control of the Secretary of State. It is in essence still the rule of the *Prince*. Violent shootouts involving the police were commonplace, and a heavy-handed militaristic response to labor unrest often occurred. Bans on public gatherings were frequent during this time continuing to enforce *the rule of the sword*. Historian Hewan Caig writes that the old doctrine of trusteeship was better suited to the conditions in the West Indies of the nineteenth century, but that in the 20th century it was increasingly difficult to apply. *During and after slavery, the government could intervene to prevent exploitation of Negroes in its more brutal and obvious forms. It was not equipped ideologically or technically, to combat the more subtle forms of exploitation that occur in a modern economy.*

Before proceeding to the storm of 1933, the next session will highlight some significant advances in the campaigns to improve the well-being of the population at the time of the storm. This context helps us understand how projects are undertaken in response to the storm mesh with the governing philosophy at the time and how utilizing the concept of late colonial governmentality can assist us in understanding the differences in the responses to the Tobago storm of 1847.

6.5.4 Trinidad and Tobago in the 1930s and the Expansion of Government Interests

In the previous century, the colonial government took little interest in the health of the laboring masses; it was not a government task. However, reviewing the colonial documents of this period reveals the multiple offices and policies associated with the government were created to monitor and improve this sector of the population. Foucault writes that one of the technologies of security that government

uses is bio-politics. In his appropriation of Foucault's theory author James Duncan uses bio-politics to explain the efforts of the government to control the spread of diseases among the immigrant Tamil laborers in Sri Lanka, which, due to malnutrition and starvation, are especially vulnerable.²³⁵ In this case study of Trinidad and Tobago, we see the heightened use of bio-politics by the colonial government during the inter-war period. Unlike the period covered in the Tobago Hurricane of 1847, birth and deaths were recorded, pregnancy outcomes were counted and housing and sanitation conditions were examined. Government offices and officials monitored and evaluated these areas. Expanding colonial governmentality placed the health of laborers and sanitation as a primary responsibility of the government. For Foucault, sanitation is also specifically noted as a central element of governmentality.

6.5.5 Birth Rates and Health Services

During the inter-war period, colonial records for birth rates, deaths rate, and infantile mortality were all collected. Detailed causes of death were analyzed along with causes of death, and the government expressed pride in reporting the reduction of infant mortality and the expansion of healthcare. It is very different than the situation during the Tobago 1847 Hurricane when access to medical care was not a priority of the government and was expensive for the average person not under the control of plantation owners. During the latter period, we see the government making a concerted effort to address infectious diseases and increasing the number of healthcare professionals throughout the colony.

²³⁵ Duncan, *In the Shadows of the Tropics*.

Beginning in the early 1900s midwives received training in public hospitals. This training expanded to two years during the 1920s. In the larger hospitals, special maternity wards started. Also, a Child Welfare League took an active part in improving the standard of infant and child care in the Colony by supplying midwives and house visitors, and by maintaining infant clinics and ante-natal welfare workers. However, despite these improvements, the child mortality rate per 1000 living births rose to 131.34 in 1933. The increase was due to the extensive prevalence of a *whooping cough* throughout the Colony in the latter part of the year. Nevertheless, the general death rate was reduced: the rate from 1921-1925 was 21.57 per 1000 and from 1926 to 1930 were 19.79, while the rate for 1933 was 19.57. A school medical service working along similar lines to that in England began to operate in Port-of-Spain, San Fernando and the district of St. Joseph-Tunapuna. During 1933, 5000 children were examined and 3,700 treated.

The sanitary organization covered the whole colony and in every district, there was a local sanitary authority and a medical officer of health, together with their staff. Oiling, filling, drainage and other temporary anti-mosquito measures were maintained by these officers, in villages and other populated sections. According to colonial reports, their campaigns against fly breeding and sanitary control over food stopped intestinal disorders. Tuberculosis decreased steadily and by the 1930s, campaigns against hookworm were in effect for 20 years.²³⁶

In each district, the Government maintained a resident medical officer and in the more populated areas, private practitioners were also established so that medical

²³⁶ The drug principally used was Carbon Tetrachloride, but Santonine, Thymol and others were also used when advisable.

aid was, prevalent. The Colonial Hospital located in Port-of-Spain had 380 beds. The Colonial Hospital in San Fernando had 190 beds. The Colonial Hospital in Tobago had 75 beds. District Hospitals at St. Joseph, Tacarigua, Arima, Couva, Princes Town and Cedro, had 204 beds. At Sangre Grande, Mayaro and Toco small emergency hospitals opened.

This transformation in the priorities of the government also occurred for those mentally and terminally sick. At St. Ann's a mental hospital started with accommodation for 700 persons. For the destitute and those suffering from old age or incurable disease, a House of Refuge at St. James was also established with 700 beds, as well as a House of Refuge at Scarborough, Tobago for 40 occupants.

Outside of the government structure, there were a large number of charitable institutions and associations in the colony. These included Les Amantes de Jesus, The Nazareth House, the L'Hospice, and Institute for the Blind, among others. Those providing cheap lodging and food for the poor included the Bethany Hostel, St. Zita's Home for Domestic Servants, The Salvation Army Sailors Home and Men's Metropole among others.²³⁷

6.5.6 Housing Sectors and the Plantation Estate

The Official Colonial reports of the 1930s differentiated housing reports between the urban and rural districts. The urban districts were the capital City of Port-of-Spain and the towns of San Fernando, Arima, Tunapuna and Princes Town. The rural areas included large and small villages, estates and sparsely inhabited areas in

²³⁷ Great Britain Colonial Office, *Trinidad and Tobago*.

and near the forests. In most ways, the housing ownership resembled that of Tobago 1847 especially for those near or on plantation estates. However, the government was actively engaged in administering greater regulation to improve conditions.

Rural wage earners occupied mud or tapia huts covered with carrat or grass (timate), small 2 or 4-roomed houses and ranges of rooms known as barracks built of wood or concrete. Barracks were made up of 10 or 12 rooms each and built on estates to house laborers. Barracks also housed many working people in the towns. Mud huts were the lowest type of dwellings and supplied the housing needs in remote settlements or villages.

The proprietors of the plantation estates owned all the workmen's dwellings on the estates. Outside of estates in settlements and villages, the workmen owned comparatively fewer houses and these were of poor quality. Landlords in towns and villages were either businessmen, owners of shops or real-estate investors. At this time, an increasing number of wage earners lived in houses of their own erected on occupied lands or less frequently on lots of lands owned by them. Some oilfield companies also provided cheap homes for their workers.



Figure 9. Cocoa Estate, Trinidad 1930s (Source: UWI West Indiana Collection)

In remote districts, there were not many latrines of any kind. In villages and towns, privy cesspits were the common form. In Port-of-Spain, where fresh water and sewage installations existed, the owners in the sewage portions of the City supplied water closets.

Regulations required houses for human habitation on healthy sites, and that plans for sites for buildings should be approved by Local Sanitary Authorities before building began. Regulations encompassed the height of the ground floor, foundation, walls, partitions, flooring, ventilation of rooms, windows or roof, sanitary arrangements, air space around buildings, surface drainage.²³⁸

These reports also indicate the central government policies to improve conditions. Inspection by Sanitary Officials on dwellings in their districts in town or country, to bring to the notice of Local Sanitary Authorities all defects in the building of new houses and to take summary action in court where actual nuisances arose. The second was enforcement of sanitary laws through three ordinances: Port-of-Spain Corporation Ordinance Chapter 224; The Street and Building Ordinance (Chapter 112); and the Public Health Ordinance (Chapter 98). Section 51 of this Ordinance²³⁹ dealt with these dwellings.

²³⁸ The colonial reports revealed the housing and sanitation defects as deficient ventilation built before regulation; insufficient supply of pure drinking water; privies constructed badly; deficient drainage of surface and slop waters; and the overcrowding of buildings on lots and insufficient air space.

²³⁹ Grier, "Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Trinidad and Tobago 1933-1935."

6.5.7 Public Education and Child Labor

During the mid-1800s at the time of the 1847 storm, education for the masses was available only through religious affiliations; in contrast, in the 1930s, the government became an active central player in this area. Legislative debates held during the early 1900s would define exactly how education would affect the economics of the plantation economy. The plantocracy strongly opposed the idea of early mass education, which would deter laborers from joining the plantation system. During a major debate concerning child labor on the plantations and their rights to education, one of the colony's wealthiest and most influential sugar-planters, E.A. Robinson gave the following testimony against their education.

This is an agricultural country, unless you put children on to working in the fields when they are young, you will never get them to do so later. If you want to turn all these people into a lot of clerks, caneweighers, and people of that sort, all you have to do is to prevent them from working in the fields until they are 16 years old; then I guarantee you will have but very few labourers in the Colony.²⁴⁰

Ryan summarized the aim of the plantocracy to deny educational opportunities to Africans and Indians. Mr. Robinson like many of the plantation oligarchy believed that the education of the whole mass of the agricultural population would ruin the country. The plantation oligarchy were only interested in maintaining their cheap supply of labor. Mr. de Verteuil's, point of view was simple to grasp. Representing the Cocoa Planters' Association, he said that he had never heard one complaint from laborers, and everybody was perfectly satisfied.²⁴¹ The plantocracy opposed

²⁴⁰ Government of Trinidad and Tobago, "Minutes of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council- Trinidad".

²⁴¹ James, *The Life of Captain Cipriani*. Pg 91

compulsory general public education until they were forced by the British government in 1935. The Indian laborers on the plantations were the principal victims of their negligence. Ordinance No. 8 of 1933, known as the young persons (employment) ordinance, restricted the jobs in Industrial undertakings of children under the age of 14 years and prohibited with certain exceptions their jobs in the industry at night of persons under the age of 18 years.

For Trinidad, education like that of Tobago for the masses was previously given through religious affiliation, but with the expansion of the state, we see its triumphs in the realm of public education. As the interests of the citizenry come to be paramount, the state begins to organize public schools built on the language used in government offices forming a common national language. A Compulsory Education Ordinance was on the Statue Book in Trinidad since 1921 but according to Secretary Grier's report, due to lack of funding, it was not enforced.

A Director of Education and a staff of officers appointed by the Governor, with an Advisory Board of 14 members nominated by the Governor, now administered the educational system. Primary education was free, but it had to be paid in the intermediate and Secondary Schools. Schools recognized by the Department of Education were maintained either by the Government or by religious denominations assisted by grants from public funds. There were 284 primaries, six intermediate and 7 secondary schools. Enrolled in Primarily schools were 68,961 pupils, in middle Schools 2,228 and 1,692 in Secondary Schools. The Education Board prescribed the course of instruction, and only books sanctioned by the Board were used. One of the most powerful tools the State can use to control a population is under the control of the school curriculum, which reflects the governing ideology of those in power. As

such, it is a tool of governmentality. Financial assistance in the form of a grant was given to denominations schools to pay teacher salaries under the condition that they would allow all students without distinction of religion, nationality or language. Many private schools were neither registered nor controlled.

6.5.8 Police and Law Enforcement

With the emergence of Governmentality, tactics of discipline and sovereignty do not dissipate. The police and military enforce the rule of the law regardless of any advances made in covert tactics of discipline. As such, the police force in Trinidad expanded during this time but the use of volunteer vigilantes shrunk, the work of these infantry volunteers, from slavery to indentured labor, did not receive high praises.

A very controversial force at the time was the 2nd Battalion Trinidad Light Infantry Volunteers comprised of 26 or 28 officers. It was a force condemned by Capt. Cipriani to the Governor. In his criticism, he stated that it was a battalion of employers made up of prominent cocoa planters and sugar planters whose main purpose was to destroy labor rights. Similar vigilante forces were prevalent during colonial times; they existed during the Tobago 1847 hurricane period and in slavery.

All of them are well-known gentlemen, and white men; and these men have been formed into that band for the purpose of quelling any attempt at industrial unrest. They have been given the privilege to use arms and ammunition without any license being paid on these arms. Since 1919, they have been enjoying the privilege afforded them. Those gentlemen who form that 2nd Battalion- I don't suppose Your Excellency has been let into this secret yet-are known as the "Vigilantes," and those "Vigilantes" are for the purpose of being called out to put down industrial unrest, or more, simply put, a collective bargaining of Labour for a living wage. If tomorrow Labour bargained for a right wage, or

attempted to bargain, or argued with their employers, the “Vigilantes” would be called out.²⁴²

The Constabulary Force was composed of the Inspector-General, Deputy, Inspector-General, Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, Non-commissioned Officers and men. There were 55 Stations in Trinidad and 4 in Tobago. 1522 fingerprints were taken during 1933, bringing the total on record to 25,437.²⁴³ The Detective Inspector kept a careful record of undesirable immigrants, and their movements was watched.

The Prisons of the Colony included the convict prison at Carrera Island, the preventive detention prison, the juvenile prison, convict depot in Tobago and four district prisons which detained persons sentenced for one month and under. The total number of prisoners committed during 1933 was 2,882 consisting of 2,650 men and 232 women. Prisoners were employed on works of public utility and in remunerative industrial labor. There were carpenters, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, tailors and shoemakers, and workers of shops and furniture making.

6.6 1933 Hurricane Event of Trinidad

On Tuesday 27th June 1933, the southern portion of Trinidad was devastated by a hurricane destroying large tracts of land, homes and cultivations. The violent storm swept over the south coast from Icacos and Cedros to Guayaguayare extending inland for a distance of one to five miles. At Moruga, it was about 6:30 pm on Tuesday night when the district began to experience the storm. Torrential rains

²⁴² James, *The Life of Captain Cipriani*. Pg. 95

²⁴³ 367 persons were traced or identified by this means during the year.

accompanied by terrific north-easterly wind prevailed for over two hours. More than two dozen houses were thrown to the ground at La Lune and Marae while scores of others had their roots completely blown away. Many escaped death from the falling Immortelle trees on their roofs. Those that evacuated their homes had to dodge flying galvanized sheets.

The following day the villagers were busily occupied recovering their homes or removing their belonging. On Thursday, gangs turned out to clear the Main Road and re-establish communication with the outside world.²⁴⁴ Dr. Austin the D.M.O with the assistance of the nurses of the District Hospital. attended to calls and injured up to Friday afternoon non-stop. The Government dispatched hospital supplies and food supplies on the SS. St. Patrick, which reached Cedros on Friday. His Excellency the Governor instructed all Wardens to spend money as necessary for the relief of sufferers.

The Governor toured the devastated areas from the sky onboard a Pan American airplane and was accompanied by some Government Officials and Mr. Louis Tucker, who took photographs from the air.²⁴⁵ By Friday afternoon when news of the clearance of the roadway was broadcast, several persons from the city traveled by car to the stricken areas, among who was His Lordship the Bishop of Trinidad, and amateur and professional photographers. It was reported in the gossip pages that major

²⁴⁴ "In the Path of the Hurricane."

²⁴⁵ Governor A.C Hollis sent telegrams # 58 and 60 on the 30th of June and the 3rd of July, respectively to the Colonial Office but his dispatch # 308 on the 20 July, 1933 was the most detailed in the destruction leveled on the island. This report was improved upon and submitted as dispatch # 357 on 22 August, 1933.

estate proprietor Frank Agostini cut his family holiday vacation in France early to survey his damaged estate.²⁴⁶ The storm would later be immortalized in song by Calypsonian Wilmoth Houdini in his calypso titled the Trinidad Hurricane.

Most of the public buildings in the area were damaged. Completely destroyed were The Anglican Church at Cedros, The Roman Catholic Church at La Lune, Moruga, the Government School at Cedros, and the Roman Catholic schools at Fullerton and La Lune. The Director of Public Works reported that fallen trees blocked 205 miles of public roads and that the number of trees cut and cleared by 20th July exceeded 24,000. Communication centers were re-established within 48 hours.²⁴⁷

In comparison to other storms in the region, the loss of life was small at 7, with one man being electrocuted. Eighty-one persons were injured and treated. Available throughout the emergency period were hospital and health services. Although the sanitary conditions were badly disturbed no unusual sickness was reported. The considerable destruction occurred to private houses and plantation estate buildings. Most of the peasantry were unable to cope with the loss they suffered. Their homes were made of flimsy construction that completely collapsed from the storm's winds. Approximately 86,000 acres of Crown Forests (55,000 being forest reserves) suffered damage. In 75 percent of this area, the damage was severe, trees being uprooted or broken off near the crowns and numerous young trees crushed by the fall of the larger ones. There was substantial damage done to the oilfields and derricks.

²⁴⁶ Humming Bird, "Talk of Trinidad."

²⁴⁷ The total damage to public works, including roads, buildings, waterways, water supplies was estimated at £5,000.

Table 16. Damage to oilfields reported to the Colonial Office. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. ²⁴⁸

| Oilfield | £ |
|--|--------|
| Trinidad Petroleum Development Company (out of 105 derricks, 94 collapsed) | 10,850 |
| Trinidad Leaseholds Limited | 4,950 |
| Trinidad oilfields Operating Company Limited | 2,090 |
| United British Oilfields of Trinidad Limited | 1,805 |
| Apex (Trinidad) Oilfields Trinidad | 1,500 |

It was the first major storm to strike the island since 1810, and the unified colony since 1847 (Tobago). The devastation from the 1933 hurricane was estimated at \$3 million, with \$2 million dollars estimated loss in coconuts and cocoa, and thousands homeless from the areas covering Icacos to Cedros.²⁴⁹ In total, 26,780 acres of crops were damaged with over 14,000 acres heavily damaged. The Cocoa industry saw over 17,000 acres damaged, and the coconut industry suffered over 8,000 acres of damage. These industries were significant employers of labor and a source of financial revenue for the colony and empire. The colonial government was deeply intertwined with the well-being of the plantation estates, and it was deeply invested in re-establishing these estates. In particular, the colonial government response placed a high focus on returning the labor to the plantation. The tables below show the

²⁴⁸ De Freitas, "Report of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee."

²⁴⁹ "Hurricane Disaster to Cost Trinidad \$3,000,000."

devastation of the main agricultural crops in each southern district.²⁵⁰ Heavy damage means over 60% destruction. Medium damage means 30%-60% and light being 10%-30% destruction.

Table 17. Level of crop damage per district from 1933 Hurricane. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. Source: Colonial Dispatches.²⁵¹

| Cocoa | | | |
|------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| District | | | |
| | Heavy (acres) | Medium (acres) | Light (acres) |
| Moruga | 5,208 | 802 | 507 |
| Erin and Siparia | 4,748 | 1,817 | 1,181 |
| Cedros | 600 | 1,020 | 1,350 |
| Total | 10,556 | 3,639 | 3,038 |
| Coconuts | | | |
| District | | | |
| | Heavy (acres) | Medium (acres) | Light (acres) |
| Moruga | - | - | 450 |
| Erin and Siparia | 214 | 84 | 398 |
| Cedros | 3,500 | 1,000 | 3,000 |
| Total | 3,714 | 1,084 | 3,848 |
| Coffee | | | |
| District | | | |
| | Heavy (acres) | Medium (acres) | Light (acres) |
| Moruga | - | 70 | 250 |
| Erin and Siparia | 100 | 25 | 13 |
| Total | 100 | 95 | 263 |
| Citrus | | | |
| District | | | |
| | Heavy (acres) | Medium (acres) | Light (acres) |
| Moruga | - | - | 60 |
| Erin and Siparia | 15 | 94 | 134 |

²⁵⁰ Hollis, "Trinidad Government House Despatch No. 357."

²⁵¹ De Freitas, "Report of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee."

| | | | |
|-------------|--------|-------|-------|
| Cedros | - | 140 | - |
| Total | 15 | 234 | 194 |
| | | | |
| Grand Total | 14,385 | 5,052 | 7,343 |

A review of the Monthly Produce Report and Statistics, compiled by the secretary of the Agricultural Society reveals the devastating blow the Hurricane had on the Cocoa Industry by cutting exports from 41,871,447Lbs in 1932 and 51,311,274lbs in 1933 to only 26,863,149lbs in 1934.²⁵²

The public was much more involved in the relief efforts than in the 1847 Hurricane. Response to the disaster had multiple layers including government grants to help estate proprietors clear their lands for replanting; a public relief fund of donations coordinated by the mayor of Port-of-Spain and the central government; and loans to plantation proprietors and estate owners. A review of the financial assistance to estate owners in particular cocoa proprietors reveals an ongoing effort to salvage the cocoa industry and to control the labor and employment nexus.

6.6.1 Trinidad and Tobago Colonial Government Response and Recovery Efforts

There were four major aspects of the Hurricane relief efforts. The first was the immediate response to the public works and reestablishment of communication centers. The second were loans in the sum of \$2.50 per acre of cocoa and \$2.00 per acre of coconuts granted by the Government for clearing purposes. These loans were converted into a subsidy, which resulted in a Government contribution of £7,240. The

²⁵² Secretary of the Agricultural Society, "Trinidad Monthly Produce Report and Statistics."

third was the public's generous response to appeals launched by the Mayor of Port-of-Spain. These donations helped fund a large re-housing program for those affected by the storm with its distribution controlled by the central government. Lastly, the *Hurricane Relief Ordinance* was passed authorizing the expenditure by way of loans of £150,000 to enable planters to re-stock their plantations with the most suitable crops.²⁵³ The following year 1934 the cap on these loans was increased to £200,000 and deadline for application extended.

6.6.2 Project #2 - Loans for clearing debris that became grants

Immediately after the disaster, the Department of Agriculture organized a preliminary general inspection of the impacted area. It was found essential to undertake the immediate clearing of drains, opening of traces and removal of trees and limbs of trees that might do further damage. With the approval of the Finance Committee, the Governor agreed to advance loans to proprietors of cocoa estates who were unable to meet the expenditure from their resources to enable them to clear their estates of fallen trees, broken branches, and other damage. These advances were stated to be free of interest for three to five years, and the Governor conveyed in a secret correspondence with the Colonial Office in London that he was prepared to write off these loans entirely shortly.

These economic advances were first extended to cocoa proprietors calculated at \$2.50 an acre but were later extended to coconut proprietors as well at the rate of \$2.00 per acre. The deadline to apply for these loans was September 15th, twelve

²⁵³ Great Britain Colonial Office, *Trinidad and Tobago*. Pg 52- 53

weeks after the storm occurred. In dispatch no. 357 sent on 22nd August, Governor A.C Hollis revealed his plan to turn these loans into grants against the Reserve Fund and his reasoning for the deception:

The matter of treating this preliminary assistance as a loan in the first place has served a useful purpose as it has discouraged applications by those who can afford to meet the expenditure from their own resources, and the fact that no free issue of funds was made in the period immediately subsequent to the occurrence of the disaster has tended to stiffen the morale of the sufferers.²⁵⁴

These loans converted into a free grant resulted in a Government contribution of £7,240.

6.6.3 Project #3 Hurricane Relief Fund- Central Relief Committee and the Rehousing program

Most of the peasants' homes were made of flimsy construction that completely collapsed from the storm's winds. In response, to assist the peasantry in rebuilding, the Mayor of Port-of-Spain initiated a hurricane relief fund. It was the major relief effort towards the peasantry with its distribution coordinated by the central government with local committee assistance. Donations came from all facets of society and totaled an impressive sum of \$36,104.58. The 2015 relative value of £36,104 (1933) ranges from £2,081,000.00 to £15,590,000.00.²⁵⁵ These donations included some of the most creative methods of raising funds including one of the world's earliest uses of relief

²⁵⁴ Hollis, "Trinidad Government House Desptach No. 357."
Pg. 2

²⁵⁵ "Measuring Worth - Purchase Power of the Pound,"

concerts and a dance marathon.²⁵⁶ Appeals for donations were also answered from England, Venezuela, British Guiana, and neighboring West Indian Islands. The Legislative Council of the island on 20th April 1934 received a summary of the activities of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee.

Mayor of Port-of-Spain, Alderman H. A. de Freitas, acting on a suggestion from the Acting Colonial Secretary, appealed to the public to donate generously to a relief fund named “The Mayor’s Relief Fund” to be used for the benefit of sufferers in the hurricane. Subscriptions were received at the Town Hall, Port-of-Spain, and at the offices of the Port-of-Spain Gazette, the Trinidad Guardian, and the Daily Mirror newspapers. The Mayors of San Fernando made other appeals and Arima, whom then donated to the Mayor’s Relief Fund.

July 1, 1933,

As Mayor of Port of Spain, I appeal to all members of the public to come to the assistance of those who have =been so hard hit by the terrible hurricane that visited our shores on Tuesday last and devastated large tracts of our beautiful island. From all accounts public and private the storm played havoc with the homes and cultivations of the poor inhabitants of the stricken districts. These people are urgently in need of immediate assistance and I appeal with confidence to the kind hearted public to subscribe generously to the Mayor’s Relief Fund which will be used for the benefit of the sufferers.

Subscriptions will be received at the Town Hall, also at the offices of the Port-of-Spain Gazette, the Trinidad Guardian, and the Daily Mirror, who have kindly agreed to receive subscriptions to the Fund.

H.A. De Freitas

Mayor of Port of Spain²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ “Hurricane Relief Show.”

²⁵⁷ “Trinidad Hurricane Sufferers- Mayor’s Relief Fund.”

On July 6th, 1933, His Excellency the Governor A.C. Hollis appointed a Central Hurricane Relief Committee to control the money subscribed to the Mayor's Fund and to superintend its allocation to the Local Hurricane Relief Committee. It worked with the Local Committees to keep the Central Committee in touch with their activities and report how the money allocated was expended. The Governor also appointed the Local Hurricane Relief Committee. It centralized all assistance efforts as much as possible, including the independent collections of clothing and food distribution.²⁵⁸

On 7th July 1933, the Central Hurricane Relief Committee's first meeting was held. It held 11 meetings until dissolution.²⁵⁹ The members of the central committee were also members of the colony's Legislative or Executive Council.²⁶⁰ The Central Committee decided that besides immediate relief, the funds would be applied for the reconstruction of homes destroyed. Although most of the houses destroyed were of low quality, their guideline for housing recovering was to replace houses with the same type that existed before the hurricane. Direct gifts of money were avoided, and

²⁵⁸ Members of the Local Committee were: Chairman, Mr. W. F. Knowles (Warden, Victoria and St. Patrick); The Hon. Timothy Roodal; Mr. A. J. Bernard, Assistant Warden; Mr. M. De Verteuil, Assistant Warden; Mr. W. L. Rowland, Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department; Major C. B. Golding; Mr. Romer Johnstone; Mr. A. Fahey; Mr. Robery Seheult.

²⁵⁹ De Freitas, "Report of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee."

²⁶⁰ Committee Chairman Alderman H. A. De Freitas, Mayor of Port-of-Spain; The Honorable The Acting Treasurer; The Director of Public Works (Mr. M.A. Murphy succeeded by Mr. G. M. Gordon and Mr. J. Stachan Director of Works and Transport); The Acting Director of Agriculture (Mr. S.M. Gilbert replaced by Mr. E.J. Wortley); the honorable S.W. Fitt; Mr. J. Pendrich; Mr. C. Hicks; and Colonel A.S. Bowen.

the sufferers were to be encouraged to help themselves. The funds were used as follows:

1. To be advanced in small sums from time to time, where advisable as building were being replaced.
2. For supplying materials
3. To reimburse those who had already repaired their homes for their labor²⁶¹

Contributions came from all segments of societies and the major newspapers participated in these efforts. The country’s largest newspaper, The Trinidad Guardian closed its collection on July 14 and donated a check of \$10,000 to the relief fund.²⁶² See Table 18 for additional donors.

Table 18. Notable donations from the business and civic society. Source: Central Hurricane Committee. Source: Central Hurricane Committee.²⁶³

| | | |
|--|---------|----|
| Apex (Trinidad Oilfields, Ltd | \$7,200 | 00 |
| Trinidad Leaseholds, Limited | \$7,200 | 00 |
| The Bruce Stephens Trust Fund | \$1,000 | 00 |
| The Trinidad Turf Club | \$1,000 | 00 |
| The New Union Park Turf Club | \$1,000 | 00 |
| The United British Oilfields of Trinidad | \$1,000 | 00 |

²⁶¹ De Freitas, “Report of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee.”
Pg. 3-4

²⁶² “Guardian Hurricane Relief List Closed with Total of \$10,000.”

²⁶³ De Freitas, “Report of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee.”

| | | |
|--|---------|----|
| The Sugar Industry of the Colony | \$1,182 | 00 |
| Fui Toong On Association | \$140 | 00 |
| St. Andrew's Hurricane Relief List | \$235 | 43 |
| Members of the Chinese Community | \$627 | 10 |
| Collected by certain ladies at Cedros | \$193 | 75 |
| Tobago Hurricane Relief Fund | \$480 | 82 |
| The Anjuman Sunnat Ul Jammat | \$174 | 05 |
| The St. David-Toco Relief Fund | \$151 | 13 |
| The Nariva-Mayaro Relief Fund | \$249 | 37 |
| Princes Town List | \$65 | 75 |
| The Mayor of Arima's Fund | \$80 | 06 |
| The St. Joseph and Tuinapuna Relief Fund | \$27 | 00 |
| The Mayor of San Fernando's List | \$851 | 49 |

6.6.4 Clothing and Food Donations Convergence and Denial

Mrs. De Freitas, the wife of the Mayor of Port-of-Spain, made an appeal for clothing gifts and received from all classes of the community and several merchants. Over 200 bundles of clothing were sent to the various districts, with S. A. Achong, Co. providing the boxes and the Trinidad Government Railway providing free transportation. The Local committees did not spend any money on clothing but coordinated their distribution along with the Salvation Army, whom also helped with food distribution.

At first, the Local Committee engaged in the allocation of food and clothing. However, this was discontinued, as they found that this form of relief tended to delay

the return of laborers to work. Although food donations were received, by the middle of August all forms of food relief were stopped and redirected. Therefore, it is not surprising that when The Chamber of Commerce of Georgetown, British Guiana donated 100 bags of rice, it was converted into cash when the Local Hurricane Relief Committee reported there was no further need for food relief. Some of the rice and other food donations were diverted to the Surgeon-General for use in various institutions under his control and paid for at Government contract prices.

6.6.5 Rehousing Program: Build it Back the Same

The Local Committee worked on re-establishing both Carat Houses and Board Houses in the area affected by the hurricane; these areas were three districts for administering relief. The first district was La Brea and Cedros under the supervision of Mr. M. de Verteuil, Assistant Warden. The second district was Siparia-Erin under the supervision of Mr. A. Bernard, Senior Assistant Warden. The third district was Moruga district under the supervision of Mr. W. F Knowles, Warden of the Counties of Victoria and St. Patrick. Mr. L. Rowland, Assistant Engineer of Public Works, supervised rebuilding in the first two districts while the Moruga district was under the control of Mr. C. Sellier, Assistant Engineer of Public Works. The Warden of the Eastern Counties supervised an additional district of Guayaguayare. Only ten houses were damaged or destroyed in this district and compensation to victims was at the cost of \$352. The funds did not cover the loss of furniture and household effects, nor did they cover repair to religious buildings. The Committee decided to repair barracks which were used solely as dwellings. Some assistance was also given to peasant proprietors in connection with repairs to cocoa-houses.

Carat Houses, like those described earlier and typical on plantations, were made of round wood, karat and the materials gathered from the nearby forests. On the completion of the frame of the building an advance of 50 cents, and it was paid in full at the completion of the building. The Assistant Wardens assessed the cost of their labor to rebuild their homes and only in exceptional cases; a small advance was given at the start of the work.

Board Houses, were of greater quality than carat and their materials not readily available. Materials were ordered by the Assistant Engineers and supplied free. Under the supervision of Assistant Engineers of the Public Works Department, to each house was supplied with one carpenter. The owners had to clear the site and sort all useful materials. Wages for their labor was determined by the Assistant Engineers and paid weekly.

Exclusive of the Guayaguayare district, 1853 houses were repaired or rebuilt at a cost of \$33,191.32. With repairs in Guayaguayare of 10 houses, the total rises to 1863 houses and a total cost of £33,543.32, the 2015 relative value of £1,934,000.00 to £14,480,000.00.²⁶⁴ Additional compensation was given for the loss of working animals and cows totaling \$247, and for lost boats and repairs to damaged boats totaling \$151.20. To assist peasant proprietors in clearing their lands and planting fresh crops in place of those destroyed, the Department of Agriculture purchased and loaned agricultural tools to the sum of \$768.72.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ "Measuring Worth - Purchase Power of the Pound."

²⁶⁵ On August 1st the City of Port-of Spain was flooded by a tremendous downpour particularly along the banks of the Dry-River, causing damage to the stocks of merchants. The Chairman, also the mayor of Port-of-Spain, asked the Committee to divert a portion of its funds to their relief as raising another relief fund was not

Table 19. Rebuilt houses per district and cost. Source: Central Hurricane Committee.
Source: Central Hurricane Committee.²⁶⁶

| District | Carat Houses | Wooden Houses | Total No. of Houses | Cost £ |
|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|------------------|
| La-Brea-Cedros | 308 | 419 | 727 | 18,850.12 |
| Siparia-Erin | 892 | 39 | 931 | 12,420.79 |
| Moruga | 134 | 61 | 195 | 1,920.41 |
| Total | 1,334 | 519 | 1,853 | 33,191.32 |

The surplus balance of \$176.13 was donated to the Director of Education and provided school books in place of those which were lost or destroyed in the hurricane. The data for housing are summarized in Table 19 and the data for items are based on the Financial Statement of the Hurricane Relief Fund prepared by H. W. Farrell Secretary and H. A. De Freitas Chairman and reproduced in Table 20.²⁶⁷

advisable. A sum of \$490 was distributed through the advice of the Chief inspector of Poor Relief, who had already performed similar relief work on behalf of the Bruce Stephens Trust Fund.

²⁶⁶ De Freitas, "Report of the Central Hurricane Relief Committee."

²⁶⁷ Ibid. Pg. 7

Table 20. Financial Statement of Hurricane Relief Fund. Source: Central Hurricane Committee.²⁶⁸

| Receipts | \$ | Payments | \$ |
|--|------------------|--|------------------|
| Subscriptions received at the Town Hall | 22,936.29 | <u>La Brea-Cedros</u> Amounts advanced to Warden (£2,780 19s 10d) | 13,348.76 |
| Subscriptions received at the Trinidad Guardian Office | 10,000.00 | Merchants account for materials and cartage | 6,358.58 |
| Subscriptions received at the Port-of-Spain Gazette Office | 2,316.46 | | |
| Subscriptions received at the Daily Mirror Office | 444.55 | <u>Siparia-Erin.</u> Amounts advanced to Warden (£2,254 15s 10d) | 10,823.00 |
| Sale of rice received from Demerara | 407.28 | Merchants account for materials and cartage | 1,911.27 |
| | \$36,104.58 | | |
| | | <u>Moruga</u> Amounts advanced to Warden (£400) | 1,920.00 |
| | | Merchants' accounts for material and cartage | 57.30 |
| | | | |
| Balances unspent by Warden: | | Agricultural tools | 768.72 |
| La-Brea-Cedros (£30 13s. 9.5d) | 147.31 | Relief to flood sufferers | 490.00 |
| Siparia-Erin (7s 10d) | 1.88 | Repairing buildings-Guayaguayare | 352.00 |
| Moruga (1s. 5.5d) | .35 | Honorarium to Secretary | 48.00 |
| Sale of returned agricultural tools | 57.84 | Miscellaneous | 58.20 |
| | | Balance | 176.13 |
| | | | |
| Total | 36,311.96 | Total | 36,311.96 |

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

6.6.6 Project #4 Loans to the Cocoa Estates

The most significant legislative policy enacted in response to the devastation of the hurricane was the passing of *The Agricultural Industry Hurricane Relief Ordinance, 1933*. This ordinance revealed the colonial government's priority in reestablishing the estates and controlling the labor and employment nexus. Except short periods of unusual activity, such as during the reaping season, planters had experienced great difficulty in providing employment. The government attempted to ameliorate the situation by the provision of loans to sugar and cacao planters to enable them to continue the cultivation of their estates. The almost complete dependence of the agricultural community upon export crops rendered it especially sensitive to the variations in prices which were caused by factors beyond its control. Within a few years, Trinidad passed from a shortage of labor to the scarcity of employment.²⁶⁹ However, this concern over employment forced relief efforts to stop the collection and distribution of food donations. This assistance to the agricultural sector was part of a long ongoing trend by the colonial government whose council members were often owners or investors in these estates.

Governor Hollis submitted the Bill to the Secretary of State through dispatch No. 357 of 22nd August and his telegram No. 85 of 21st September. Approval was given, confirmed by his Dispatch No. 378 of the 25th September. Dispatch No. 452 transmitted to the Colonial Office changes made to the ordinance. These included the expansion of the definition of Owner to company and corporation. The Colonial

²⁶⁹ Shephard, "Agricultural Labour in Trinidad," 1934.

Office then approved these changes.²⁷⁰ Governor Hollis presented the following three reasons for the financial assistance to agricultural proprietors in his dispatch No. 357 to the Colonial Office dated August 22. The bill was approved on Oct 12 and posted in the *Royal Gazette* for the public on November 2nd.

1. To enable planters to maintain and improve their existing cultivations while crop returns are very low.
2. To assist planters to bring into bearing other crops where change is considered desirable.
3. To ensure that estates shall not be abandoned and that employment of labor shall be maintained.²⁷¹

In his plea for the approval from the Colonial Office, as the representative of the colony, the Governor was very concerned with the continued prosperity of the plantation estates and returning laborers to the plantation estates. He also feared the dangers that unemployed laborers in the island, potentially added to the growing labor disputes already brewing on the island. This tactic of maximizing the workforce for the safety of the ruling power, not just its financial prosperity, is an aspect of governmentality that does not occur during the time of the 1847 Hurricane. The ordinance justified loans to the proprietor without funds and to estate owners to discourage them from seeking loans from commercial sources on terms that are more arduous. Further justification stated that assistance to estate owners was to discourage vast areas from deteriorating with the consequence of loss of production wealth and capacity to employ labor.

²⁷⁰ Hollis, "Trinidad Government House Despatch No. 452."

²⁷¹ Hollis, *An Ordinance to Authorize the Governor to Make Advances to Owners of Agricultural Properties Damaged or Destroyed by Hurricanes*.

The Acting Treasurer prepared the bill contemplated by the Agricultural Policy Committee and approved by the Executive Council and the Finance Committee. The bill provided monetary advances for multiple purposes including outstanding debt for a previous Cocoa Relief Ordinance:

- a) The re-establishment of agricultural cultivations damaged or destroyed by the hurricane of the 27th June 1933, by replanting them with similar crops to those destroyed or by interplanting them with secondary crops or by replanting them or a portion thereof with other crops;
- b) The maintenance and improvement of the owner's land, including the payment of labor and the purchase of supplies required to plant, cultivate and manure such land and to reap and make merchantable the crop or produce thereof;
- c) The payment of rates and taxes on lands and buildings under the provisions of the Lands and Buildings Taxes Ordinance;
- d) The payment of premiums on insurances in so far as such insurance relates to the productions of the crop and to the buildings, factories and machinery erected and standing on the land and used in connection with such land;
- e) Subsistence allowance to the owner when the Committee is satisfied that he has no other means of subsistence;
- f) The repayment of any outstanding advance under the Cocoa Industry Relief Ordinance, 1930.

It was a very generous loan to the agricultural sector, and the repayment was equally magnanimous but the penalty for non-compliance severe. According to the Ordinance, advances were charged on the land of the owner and its produce. The Ordinance provided for control and disposal of crops while estates were required to be properly maintained and monitored by appointed inspectors who were paid through the general revenue. At its passing, the bill stated that Interest was to be charged on the advances

at the rate of 2.5% per annum for the first five years and thereafter at the rate of 3.5% per annum until the advances are repaid, provided that:

- I. After examination of the income account of any owner that he is unable to meet from his resources the interest charges, the committee shall have the power to make advances free of interest during the first five years
- II. That an owner can afford to pay the annual interest charges during the first five years but through some unforeseen contingency is unable to meet such interest charges as they become due, the Committee shall have the power to debit such interest charges to the owner's account.

Repayment required that proceeds be taken from the sale of crops during the first five years. At the end of that period, the amount outstanding was to be capitalized, the owner being required to pay an annual installment of £7 per centum including the 3.5 % interest until the loan was paid. The owner was also required to pay one-fourth of any profits realized from the sale of produce. Applicants were required to submit specific planting programs and subject to the Agricultural Department agreeing to the suitability of the crops which were proposed to plant. Small proprietors were also required to plant at least half an acre of food crops.

Within his dispatch to the Colonial Office outlining the justification for the advances and the repayment method, Governor Hollis prioritized a maximum of £150,000. He explained that funds could first come from the loan funds raised for the construction of the Central Waterworks, which were earning 2.5% per annum, the same rate being charged. The Acting Treasurer claimed that taking into account the amount which would be collected from the sale of the crops, the total loss of interest would amount to approx. £5,000 spread over a period of five years. For Governor

Hollis, this was a small price to pay for ensuring that cultivations would be re-established and that the demand for labor in the affected area would be satisfied.²⁷²

Concerning negligent debtors, or if for any reason the Committee was dissatisfied with the management of the land, the Governor on the recommendation of the committee, could direct the treasurer to make an account showing the amounts advanced to the owner together with interest thereon and delivered it to such owner. Upon the delivery of such account, the account was immediately payable to the Treasurer, and in default of payment, it was lawful for the Governor to order a sale of the land, or any part thereof, at such reserve price as the Governor would in each case fix, free from encumbrances. Every sale made was to be by public auction and conducted by the Crown Solicitor²⁷³

6.6.7 A Legacy of Cocoa Bailouts and Government Collusion

In the early 20th century, the cocoa industry was affected by a global fall in prices and Witches' Broom disease that plagued the crops. In the 1930s London, the banking center of the world had forsaken the Gold Standard, and there was a series of worldwide financial upheavals. However, since 1921 both the sugar and cacao industries were involved in the worldwide economic depression. The sugar companies with their wider financial resources were able to survive this period more easily than the cacao estates. The depression that lingered scourged the industry. When the fall in

²⁷² Hollis, "Trinidad Government House Despatch No. 357." Pg. 6

²⁷³ Hollis, *An Ordinance to Authorize the Governor to Make Advances to Owners of Agricultural Properties Damaged or Destroyed by Hurricanes*.

cocoa prices came, many plantations became seriously neglected, while others, on the edge of the sugar belt, were converted to sugarcane. Many of the estates planted coffee in their cacao fields as a subsidiary and more profitable crop. Most cocoa farmers were heavily in debt in the early twenties, and the industry was plummeting. In 1920, cocoa accounted for 31% of total exports and was thus a paramount factor in the economy of the country. The Colonial Government came to the aid of the industry, and several schemes were attempted leading into the Hurricane of 1933.²⁷⁴

On December 9th, 1921, *The Mortgages Extension Ordinance* was passed to protect cocoa planters from losing their heavily mortgaged plantations. This ordinance sought to prevent *mortgagers from foreclosing or demanding repayment of the principal unless both parties were in agreement or if the interest payments became, at least, six months overdue*. The law expired on 31st, March 1925 only to be replaced by the *Agricultural Relief Ordinance*. This Ordinance empowered a relief committee set up by Government to make advances from public funds to plantation owners so that the necessary cultivations, reaping, and processing of cocoa as well as marketing may be feasible. It was also intended to help the farmers to pay interests on mortgages and other debts and even to defray some considerable personal expenses. Thus, the interest of mortgagers was also protected. The Ordinance failed to recover enough money to pay off the accruing interest. Another method to assist planters was the creation of the Agricultural Bank in 1924 to help planters through long-term loans to developing, maintain and improve agricultural lands in general and the cocoa industry in

²⁷⁴ The Agricultural Industry *Hurricane Relief Ordinance of 1933* allowed advances for the repayment of any outstanding advance under the *Cocoa Industry Relief Ordinance, 1930*.

particular.²⁷⁵ Because of the reduced rate of interest, low prices of cocoa, and the damage caused by the hurricane, the bank had very little liquid funds to advance to proprietors on a short-term basis in 1933. Between 1934 and 1936 the bank had very little to invest and by 1939, it was in further distress.

The Cocoa Relief Ordinance, passed in 1930-1932, was a modification of the previous *Agricultural Relief Ordinance*. It permitted the issue of loans for the payment of premiums on insurance, subsistence to the indigent cocoa farmers and the cultivation of secondary crops and their expenses. The borrower was to refund the loan at the end of the season. The Ordinance was modified in 1931 and limited to the maintenance and improvement of cocoa land. It included the payment of labor, the purchase of supplies required to plant, cultivate and manure such land and the reaping and processing, thus making the produce ready for sale. But it also failed and thus in 1931/32, assistance was provided for only 4 percent of the total cocoa acreage. In 1932, the Governor appointed a Committee to administer the scheme. The Committee took over the control of the Cocoa Relief Ordinance and the Agricultural Industry Hurricane Relief Ordinance, which was due to expire in 1936. Nevertheless, because the condition of the farmers was pitiable at the time, money was still advanced to them until 1939.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ The bank had an authorized capital of £250,000 for both long and short term loans. By 1931 the bank had started to run into difficulties since £1,877 have become overdue as interest on mortgages. Many farmers failed to repay the money borrowed. Interest rates were lowed to help.

²⁷⁶ Olatunji Aina, "An Appraisal of the Effectiveness of the Cocoa Rehabilitation Scheme (Trinidad & Tobago) in Bringing about the Adoption of Improved Farm Practices." Pg. 12-16

In 1934, the Legislative Council passed the mortgages extension ordinance to postpone the payment of the principal sum secured by mortgages and other encumbrances on land situated in the area damaged by the hurricane of the 27th June 1933 attached to the advances made by the Government to owners of such lands for the purpose of re-establishing same. A Mortgage Extension Board was created and empowered to deal with applications for relief, and to make an order restraining an encumbrancer when satisfied that no undue hardship would be occasioned.²⁷⁷ Another subsidy scheme was attempted and failed in 1936-1939 when the depression became more intense. As the 1936-1939 Cocoa Subsidy Scheme could not help the industry thrive; needed was a more comprehensive long-term scheme.²⁷⁸

While the Cocoa Relief Ordinance was struggling to survive, Gerald Wight of Alstons and Company Limited suggested the Cocoa Production Restriction Scheme (Z-scheme). The British Government supported this move, which was repeated in 1936 and 1938. It failed because Venezuela, San Domingo, and Brazil did not cooperate. Previously detailed was the intimate relationship between the local business class and the colonial government. Nowhere is this relationship more evident than

²⁷⁷ Great Britain Colonial Office, *Trinidad and Tobago*. Pg 52- 53

²⁷⁸ In 1938 a Committee was empowered to study the situation and make recommendations to the Government. They recommended that the government should provide high yielding planting materials free to proprietors and give out cash subsidy to help the planting and maintenance until they came into bearing. Fertilizer was also issued free to farmer for cocoa rehabilitation between 1952 and 1958. Under the scheme free planting material and or a cash subsidy were paid to farmers for, the complete replanting of cocoa; Partial replanting of coca; Planting new cocoa field in suitable areas which are not sugarcane lands; and In areas unsuitable for cocoa, replacing this with other specified crops or livestock.

reviewing the members of the legislative council and the Directors of the Cocoa Planters Associations Board.

6.6.7.1 The Cocoa Planters Association of Trinidad Ltd. in the Legislative Council

The Cocoa Planters Association of Trinidad Ltd. (CPA) was founded in 1905 by a small band of estate owners located in central Trinidad who realized the immense advantages to be derived from the co-operative principle. Only proprietors of Cocoa estates were eligible for membership, and each agreed to market his entire crop through the Association.²⁷⁹ The C.P.A itself notes that it had always been fortunate to have amongst its directors, members and advisers, the leading legal luminaries of the island²⁸⁰ often giving freely and generously of their time in the interests of the Association.²⁸¹

In the colony's legislative council of 1933 at the date of the storm, no fewer than three members were former or future Directors of the Cocoa Planters Association. Council member The Honourable A.B. Carr, M.B.E served as a CPA Director from 1917-1947 which included not only the period of the 1933 storm but also the passing of all the ordinance of cocoa plantation financial relief. Legislative member The

²⁷⁹ The original Working committee consisted of Chairman J. Gaston De Gannes Esq., Hon. R.S. A. Warner, K.C, Hon. Carl De Verteuil, C.M.G, Joseph D'Abadie Esq and Joseph De Verteuil Esq.

²⁸⁰ These included the Hon. Sir H.A. Alcazar, K.C., Edgar Agostini, Esq., K.C., the Hon. Charles Henry Pierre, K.C., O.B.E., the Hon R.S.A. Warner, K.C., Anthony Hamel-Smith, Esq., D.F.C. and Sir Joseph Mathieu-Perez, Kt, L.L.B.

²⁸¹ De Silva, *Cocoa Planters' Association 60th Anniversary*.

Honourable F.G. Grant served as a Director from 1934-1946. Legislative member the Hon. Charles Henry Pierre, K.C., O.B.E. served as a Director from 1924-1937 and Legislative member The Honourable St. Y. D. De Verteuil family members have served on the CPA board throughout its entire existence. Previous Legislative Bodies also reflected this incestuous union of political and economic interests. James highlighted this relationship between the white creole, especially the one who is in business, and the official Englishman controlling the Colonial Office in London.²⁸² The continuous financial aid to salvage the cocoa industry including the Hurricane Relief Ordinance of 1933 and illustrates this relationship of convenience.

6.7 In-Case Comparative Analysis of Disaster Events

Table 21. The Art of Government in Trinidad's Disaster Recovery: A Comparison of Two Hurricanes' Disaster Response

| Disaster Response and Recovery | Tobago 1847 | Trinidad 1933 |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| Health Care | No Public Health is available. | Public Health Care is available. Government sends medical supplies to impact zone |

²⁸² James, *The Life of Captain Cipriani*. Pg. 99

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| Financial Assistance | Colonial Office small grants to laborers. Large loan to estate proprietors to reestablish plantations | Immediate Colonial Government grant to poorer proprietors. Public Relief Fund coordinated by the central government for the rehousing project. Loans to estate proprietors |
| Legislative Bureaucracy | Lieutenant Governor in resident. Delayed communications and decision-making | Governor in resident. Quicker communications and decision-making |
| Policing the population | The passing of Anti-Looting with public whipping. Activation of new constables | Grants to encourage poorer farmers. Cutting off of food relief |
| Rehousing and resettlement | Limited Funds given by her Majesty. Returning to status quo | Significant Funding obtained from Public donations. Returning to status quo |

During the 1847 Tobago hurricane, we highlighted how the rule of the sovereign shaped the colonial government during this period as well as the projects administered by the colonial government in response to the hurricane. By 1933 in Trinidad, this theory can no longer fully explain the methods and tactics implemented by the Colonial Government in neither their overall governing philosophy nor their recovery efforts to the hurricane damage. The emergence of projects and tactics better explained by Foucault's Governmentality defines the rule of the colonial government and its response to the devastation of the storm. The rule of the sovereign still lingers with the Governor exerting supreme control, but the emergence of policies and projects geared towards improving the health and well-being of the population is apparent.

Biopolitics has become an explicit task of the government. These bio-politics tasks include concerns about birth rates, medical care along with projects aimed at improving sanitation and housing standards, all concerns absent during the 1847 storm timeframe. Governmentality is a form of power that operates through socialization in apparent freedom; the population is both aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to it.²⁸³ It presents a highly efficient mode of power that does not have to control resistance, but rather succeeds in eliminating the need for resistance altogether. Trinidad and Tobago were just emerging from a pure crown colony system in 1933 but from the constitutional changes that burgeon from 1925 onwards, the voice of the population took a stronger presence in the Legislative Council; Captain Cipriani being the main elected figure and champion of the masses at that time. Slowly the priorities of having a healthy, educated and prosperous population became part of the Colonial Government's focus.

Simultaneously, the inter-war period saw the Labor Party rise to power in Great Britain and introduce significant changes in the colonies, with their *Colonial Development Acts* signifying a fundamental shift in ruling practices. As author Stephen Constantine documents, the emphasis on colonial development and welfare was a defensive operation, to provide a new justification which would legitimize the perpetuation of colonial rule. It was the essence of the arguments advanced by MacDonald to the Treasury and Cabinet. Civil unrest in Trinidad from laborers would be quelled by force and by accepting labor unions to exist on the island. By allowing Labor Unions to have collective bargaining through a union leader representative, the

²⁸³ Thijs Willaert, "Postcolonial Studies after Foucault." Pg. 105

government was also able to control unrest with less use of force. Also possible was the manipulation of the unions' leadership, a tactic analyzed in the studies of Nigel Bollard.²⁸⁴ These tactics worked in England, and their practice was expanded to the colonies.

In 1933, the Governor's residence on the island of Trinidad streamlined the response to the storm that was not possible under the rule of a Lieutenant Governor in Tobago 1847. Both response efforts displayed the colonial government's high priority of saving the plantation estates and favorable treatment to estate owners. The Loans to the estate proprietors following the 1933 storm was one in a line of numerous attempts at saving the cocoa industry. The advances to the estates following the 1847 storm also was one of the similar efforts that occurred following emancipation, even the importation of Indian indentured laborers itself being a means of economic assistance to these industries. Many prominent legislative officials were heavily involved in the plantation industry in 1933 and likewise in 1847, co-integration that may be indicative of plantation colonies.

A public relief effort focused on assisting the laborers occurs after the 1933 event that was not present in the colonial reports following the 1847 Hurricane, although it should be noted that privately organized aid campaigns have a long history of practice in the wake of West Indian disasters. As documented by historian Muchaly, colonials brought the system of charity briefs with them to the New World, and it was

²⁸⁴ Bollard, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Struggle for National Liberation."

a practice that was very customary among the various Christian contingents.²⁸⁵

However, the most notable aspect of the distribution of these public donations was the colonial government's urgency to send laborers back to work. This urgency altered their relief efforts, stopped the delivery of food relief, and diverted food donations. The policy was justified as a means to encourage laborers to return to the plantations. Of the many tactics employed by the government, this best illustrates the difference between the 1847 and 1933 hurricanes. The maximization of labor for wealth extraction is still the primary concern of the rule, but here now we see a greater concern for controlling the labor employment-agricultural nexus and making sure that people have jobs preempting them from engaging in public unrest and violence. It is the new art of government.

6.7.1 Health Response

In review, compared to the storm of 1847 the direct deaths and injuries attributed to the 1933 storm were a lot smaller. The hurricane storm of 1933 caused the deaths of seven individuals. One man was electrocuted in an accident. Eighty-one persons were injured and treated. During the period covered in 1847, public health was not a concern of the colonial government. The number of deaths was 26, but those that died from injuries sustained are unknown. In 1847, the government did not provide medical services to the Tobago public, and access to private health care was best available for those who remained entangled in the plantation system. It may have been

²⁸⁵ Matthew Mulcahy, *Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008)

a tactic to encourage laborers to stay on the plantations. By contrast, at the time of the 1933 storm, Colonial Hospitals were already established at major locations all over the twin island colony. The central government maintained a resident medical officer in each district along with the presence of private practitioners.

Table 22. Comparison of health care system and response by the government

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane |
|---|--|
| Health System | |
| Public Health is nonexistent. | Public health is prevalent and a priority of the government. Public hospitals and doctors are available across the island. |
| Private access only to the affluent and limited access to laborers remaining on plantations | Medical school on the island and Government campaigns against diseases and sanitation |
| Disaster Response | |
| Reports on the storm focused on the affluent injuries and never mentioned the peasantry | Health officials were very active during the response phase and treated the injured |
| 26 direct deaths and many others from injuries | Seven direct deaths and 81 injured but treated |

A different biopolitical strategy was used in the two periods. Thus, in the 1930s a medical school was initiated, in 1933 5,000 children were examined, and 3,700 treated. Campaigns against hookworm were in effect for 20 years as well as campaigns against malaria fly breeding and improving public health and sanitation. As a result, hospital and public health services were maintained throughout the emergency period and, although the sanitary conditions were considered badly disturbed, no unusual sickness or plagues were reported. Dr. Austin the D.M.O, with the assistance of the nurses of the District Hospital, is credited with attending to calls

and injured up to Friday afternoon following the storm. The Government also dispatched hospital supplies and food supplies on the SS. St. Patrick.

6.7.2 Financial Assistance from the Colonial Government

Following the 1847 storm, the colonial government did not advance loans to proprietors for clearing debris off their land. It was one of the first actions of the government immediately following the 1933 storm. Instead, they passed a harsh law banning the appropriation of materials that were the property of others. The 1933 loans were calculated at \$.250 an acre for cocoa estates and \$2.00 an acre for coconut estates. These were provided for proprietors unable to meet the expense on their own and designed to prohibit those that could afford it. Also, as there was no free issue of funds made in the period immediately after the occurrence of the disaster this was intended to stiffen the morale of the sufferers. The Governor revealed in secret communication with the Colonial Office in London that he always intended and did eventually write these loans off as a grant. The purpose of this initial deception was to scare off the richer plantations from abusing this generosity. It is possible that this information was also kept from the legislative council on the island in which many members had ties to agricultural estates. This grant resulted in an expense of £7,240 which has a relative value ranging from £417,400 to £3,125,000 in 2015

Table 23. Comparison of financial assistance provided by the government

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane |
|---|---|
| Financial Assistance | |
| £5000 from her Majesty for distribution to the island’s laborers. | £7,240 from reserve fund as grants to assist poorer proprietors to clear land of debris |

| | |
|---|--|
| £50,000 in loans provided by her Majesty's government and distributed by the Governor of Barbados and Lieutenant Governor of Tobago | Public relief fund collected \$36,104.58 supervised by the central government committee to help laborers rebuild homes |
| | The agricultural industry hurricane relief ordinance provided proprietors access to \$200,000 in loans to help with restoration. |

The greatest difference in the financial assistance following the 1933 storm was the advent of a public relief fund that was initiated by the mayor of Port-of-Spain. The fund was a great success, and members of all occupations on the island contributed. The island's major newspapers were used as headquarters for collection. Donations came from all facets of society and totaled an impressive sum of \$36,104.58 which has a relative value ranging from £2,081,000 to £15,590,000 in 2015.²⁸⁶ Governor A.C. Hollis appointed a Central Hurricane Relief Committee to control the money subscribed to the Mayor's Fund and to superintend its allocation to the Local Hurricane Relief Committee, also appointed by the Governor. It also worked through the medium of the Local Committee who would keep the Central Committee in touch with their activities and report how the money allocated was expended. These funds were used to reimburse laborers for rebuilding their homes or supply them with materials to rebuild their home. 1863 houses were rebuilt at a cost of £33,543.32. The surplus balance was used to buy needed school books. In contrast, following the 1847 storm the lieutenant governor was only able to secure £5000 from her Majesty for distribution to the island's laborers.

²⁸⁶ "Measuring Worth - Purchase Power of the Pound."

The third form of financial assistance initiated was “*the agricultural industry hurricane relief ordinance*”. Governor Hollis was able to convince the Colonial Office that advances to cocoa proprietors were of vital importance for the colony to recovery from the hurricane. The sum of £150,000 (increased to £200,000 in 1934) was made available to estate owners for not only recovery purposes but to refinance previous debt and pursuit into another crop besides cocoa. Although their relative values are different, the Lieutenant Governor Graeme also initially requesting a figure of £150,000 for advances to estate owners following the 1847 Hurricane, but his request was only approved at £50,000. As with the advances in 1847, these advances were also very lenient in their interest rates and adjustments to repayments were made in the seceding years. The 1933 Hurricane relief ordinance was itself a reinvention of the 1930 Cocoa Relief Ordinance but with conditions and profits remaining low money continued to be advanced until 1939. The presence of influential financiers of the cocoa estates in the legislative council most likely assured this continued financial assistance. A similar plantocracy relationship also existed in the Tobago Legislature following the 1847 advances.

6.7.3 Legislative Policies and Bureaucracy

Trinidad and Tobago in 1933 were emerging from a pure Crown Colony system and starting a new phase into a New Representative System initially with a minority of elected seats (limited franchise) in the single chamber council. As Trinidad and Tobago in 1933 was a unified colony with a Governor in resident on the island, his presence on the island undoubtedly hastened the legislative process and only

required final approval from the Colonial Office. By comparison, Tobago in 1847 was under the Old Representative System, a bicameral parliament with elected members in the lower chamber (limited franchise) and nominated members in the upper chamber. Tobago was administered as part of the Windward Islands with their Governor in residence at Barbados. In his absence, a Lieutenant Governor was appointed and had a legislative council under his control. All bills passed in Tobago were required to be approved by the Council in Barbados and then approved by the Colonial Office in England. The majority of both legislative bodies contained the ruling plantocracy or represented their interests. However, the legislature in 1933 differed with the inclusion of Captain Cipriani, an outspoken opponent of much colonial interest and representative of the only labor entity. His inclusion can be seen as a method of quelling dissent on the island by inclusion into the governing body wherein many debates his vote would unquestionably be overruled.

Table 24. Comparison of Legislative Council and Policies in response to Hurricane

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane |
|--|---|
| Government structure | |
| Old Representative System- Two chamber parliament | Crown colony and start of New Representative System- one chamber parliament |
| Lieutenant Governor in residence. Under the administration of the Windward Islands and Governor in residence in Barbados | Governor in residence. Head of Legislative Council and Executive Council |

| | |
|---|---|
| limited franchise elected members in the lower chamber and nominated members in the upper chamber | limited franchise for a minority of elected members majority of nominated members |
| Policy enacted in response | |
| Bill to ban looting | Bill to assist estate proprietors in restoring crops |
| Delayed Process for approval for financial assistance (24 weeks for loans) | Quicker Process for adoption for financial assistance (11 weeks for loans) |

Following the 1847 storm, Financial Relief to the laborers occurred on December 16th with the Majesty’s government granting the sum of 5,000l. As a dependency island with limited financial resources, the Islanders’ needed the Colonial Empire to assist in their recovery. However, because of this legislative process, the assistance to laborers took nine weeks for approval. By comparison, in 1933 in resident, Governor was able immediately to release funds for the clearing of debris and initiate a public relief fund that made it unnecessary to request aid from the Queen. His dispatch sent on July 20th less than a month after the storm revealed detailed records of the devastation, the repair of public roads and noticed that the public relief fund had already raised over £30,000.²⁸⁷

Concerning the loans to proprietors, following the 1847 storm it took the Lieutenant Governor many reiterations of requests to Her Majesty’s government and twenty-four weeks before final approval was received for a loan of £50,000 on March 28th. In contrast, following the 1933 storm the in resident Governor secured funding to

²⁸⁷ A.C Hollis, “Trinidad Government House Despatch No. 308,” Colonial Despatch, (July 20, 1934).

proprietors in less than 11 weeks through the cocoa relief ordinance that utilized funds from the loan funds raised for the construction of the Central Waterworks.

6.7.4 Controlling Population Movements

Following the 1847 storm under the colonial rule of the island, the governing body elected two methods of controlling the population. Both tactics resemble and signify the strict rule of the sovereign. The first method was passing the bill outlawing the appropriation of materials found scattered by the storm with severe punishment. The 2nd tactic employed to enforce the rule over the population was the induction of new special constables to oversee the city of Scarborough.

The methods the colonial government pursued following the 1933 Storm closer includes projects of governmentality and not just the stern rule of the sword. We know the art of governmentality acts on the population *through campaigns, or indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, or direct the flows of the population to this or that region of activity*. The colonial government greatest concern following the storm was avoiding the further abandonment of the struggling agricultural estates, in particular, the cocoa estates. The immediate loans to poorer estates were intended to boost their morale and ensure they remained involved in the sector. Additionally, their rehousing project coordinated by the central government did not provide funding for anyone intent on moving out of the region. Another tactic employed to control the population was the stopping of food relief to the sufferers with the explicit intent of ensuring their return to their work. Despite the continued food donations, the committee chose to divert them away from the area.

Table 25. Comparison of Control Methods

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane |
|--|---|
| Bill outlawing the appropriation of materials found scattered by the storm with severe punishment. | Ending food relief to force laborers back to work on estates. |
| induction of new special constables | |

6.7.5 Population displacement and resettlement

The storm of 1847 destroyed approximately 465 houses and additional 182 severely damaged. On the 70 estates that were in operation, 30 of the great-houses were destroyed and 31 severely damaged. For those not connected to the plantations, her Majesty issued £5,000 for their recovery. Those still living on plantations were also required to rebuild their homes, even though the owners of the estates were their owners. In 1933, thousands were made homeless and through the public relief fund, 1863 houses were repaired or rebuilt at a cost of \$33,191.32. However, in both instances, the rebuilding effort did not aim at fundamentally changing the structures of these often flimsy homes. Nor were there any efforts to move these victims to a new location. All focus was placed on returning to the exact conditions that existed before the storm occurred, a rationale that benefited the status quo of the plantation economy.

Table 26. Comparison of rehousing projects

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane |
|--|-------------------------|
| 465 houses and additional 182 severely damaged | 1000s made homeless |

| | |
|---|--|
| For those not connected to the plantations, her Majesty issued £5,000 for their recovery. Houses on plantations were considered plantation owner responsibility and funded through loans. | Public relief fund paid for the 1863 houses repaired or rebuilt at a cost of \$33,191.32 |
| Built back as it was before the storm | Built back as it was before the storm |

6.8 Event #3 – Hurricane Flora 1963

In the previous sections, we covered the Crown Colony System (1831-1925) and the New Representative System that governed Trinidad before the 1933 Hurricane. In contrast, Tobago was governed by the Old Representative System during the 1847 Hurricane but was unified as a ward under Trinidad Crown Colony System at the end of the 19th century. The 1925 reforms introduced the New Representative System, with elected members allowed into the Legislative Council of the unified colony. However, these few elected members were outnumbered by the Governor and official members' power. In this section, we continue the discussion of the unified colony's progression towards a greater representative legislative council, the adoption of bicameralism and final Independence from Great Britain. These reforms are evidence of the colony's continued transition towards representative government and occur immediately before our third hurricane event under study Hurricane Flora 1963. These reforms also coincide with the theoretical framework used in this study that positions the emergence of Colonial Governmentality or Late Colonial Governmentality of the Inter-war period.

Following the economic calamity of the World War II, Great Britain philosophy towards holding onto its' numerous colonies changes. For the West Indies colonies, what occurs is a transition from a foreign alien rule towards a local elected

rule by popular vote. The apparatus of State control and tactics of governmentality passed onto the local ruling class as the British transition away from the colony.

The period covered in this section will include relevant parts of what Trinidadian Historian Selwyn Ryan calls the fourth, fifth and sixth period of the islands' political development. His fourth period begins in 1937 and ends after the World War II in 1946. This period witnessed the seizure of political leadership and initiative by Africans and Indians following a general strike against the old colonial system. The first meaningful safeguards introduced in 1943 was to allow the right of peaceful picketing by trade unions. The Forster Commission recommended the creation of a department of labor which would be responsible, among other things, for promoting the conciliation of disputes between management and labor, for providing statistical and other information on wage and price movements, job opportunities or the lack of them. Ryan's fifth period of political importance lasted from the post-WWII 1946 until 1955. This period shepherds in the introduction of universal suffrage, the maturation of the trade-union movement, the transfer of a considerable degree of executive authority to elected officials (1950) and the intensification of the movement for self-government and federation.

The sixth period begins with the rise of Eric Williams and culminates with the Black Power movement of the 1970s.²⁸⁸ This period witnessed the establishment of a West Indian Federation, the struggle between the PNM and the American government for the return of territory which was leased to them in 1941 for the establishment of a naval base (and was now required for a federal capital), the withdrawal of Jamaica

²⁸⁸ Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*.

from the West Indies Federation in 1961 and the collapse of the federal experiment. Incorporating the work of Norwegian Historian Koht on the advancement of the state, by the time of the 1963 Hurricane, we see now a government that has assumed a plethora of new duties, one of the most influential and successful being the duty to provide work for the entire population. Although we see the burgeoning stage of this during our 1933 event, during this 1963 disaster the state has fully developed from being merely a judicial state to what is arguably a welfare state. Thus, the state is *employing its power for the promotion of happiness among all people; becoming an instrument for the new economic enterprise, a true driving force in progress.*²⁸⁹ Much of these characteristics are exemplified in the government's Hurricane Flora 1963 relief efforts while the tactics of control somewhat increase.

6.8.1 Trinidad and Tobago Political Development at 1963: The Crown Colony becomes Independent

On September 1961, the unicameral (single chamber) legislature of the colony dissolved after 130 years replaced with a bicameral (two-chamber) parliament system of government. This establishment ended an extended period of Constitutional Reform occurring seven times in thirty-six years, 1925, 1941, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1959, 1961.²⁹⁰ In the previous section, we detailed the reforms of 1925; here we discuss the major reforms that lead to the introduction of bicameralism and independence of the colony.

²⁸⁹ Koht, "The Advancing Power of the State."

²⁹⁰ Meighoo, "From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?"




Figure 10. Trinidad and Tobago Legislative Council Evolution

Following the social uprisings in the mid-1930s covered in the previous section, a 1938-1939 Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Moyne visited the region to investigate and report. The report exposed the horrendous living conditions of the laboring class but the report's publication was delayed until 1945.²⁹¹ There were fears that the report would destabilize the British standing during the war. The Commission recommended: i) introduction of universal suffrage; ii) increased elected membership of legislatures; iii) introduction of elected members to the executive council; iv) greater responsibility to the Executive Councils. The Commission also felt that a West Indies Federation was worth trying although not likely to succeed.

The period of the 1940s and 1950s were politically intense, and one of the main issues at the forefront was the ending of the nominated persons to the legislature, a hallmark of the single chamber Council for over 100 years.²⁹² Universal adult suffrage began in 1945, allowing all adults to vote for their representatives, the elected unofficial members increased to 9 and the official members decreased to only 3. In 1950 another reform increased the elected members to 18, the nominated unofficial reduced to 5 and the officials remained at 3. For the first time in the country's Legislature, elected members were in a majority signifying greater representative government. The Governor no longer sat in the Legislative Council, replaced by the Speaker, who had no casting vote. The Executive Council now included five elected members of the Legislative Council, one nominated unofficial members and three

²⁹¹ Fraser, "The Twilight of Colonial Rule in the British West Indies: Nationalist Assertion vs Imperial Hubris in the 1930s."

²⁹² The Governor controlled the nominated system for 160 years.

officials. The Legislature, more importantly, the elected members of the Legislature now held an unprecedented authority to choose the Ministers of Government.

Further reforms in 1955 continued to diminish the powers of the Governor and increased legislative power. Elected members rose to 24; the Speaker now elected by the Council and an elected Minister of Finance replaced the British civil servant position of Official Financial Secretary. It reduced the “official” members to two with five nominated members remaining. The Governor was no longer the head of Government. The Executive Council was now led by a Chief Minister chosen by the elected members of the Legislative Council. The Executive Council with the Chief Minister was joined by two British civil servants (official members), and seven elected members, no longer were nominated members part of the Executive Council. In 1955, Dr. Eric Williams appeared on the scene and began galvanizing the population into an approval of bicameralism.

Table 27. Transition to responsible legislature and Chief Minister. Source: Meighoo 2012.²⁹³

| 1941 | | 1956 | |
|---|---|--|----|
| Governor President (Casting Vote) Power of Certification (Veto) | 1 | Elected Speaker (Governor removed) (Casting vote) | |
| Official Members | 3 | Official Members | 2 |
| Nominated Unofficials | 6 | Nominated Members | 5 |
| Elected Unofficials | 9 | Elected Members | 24 |
| | | | |

²⁹³ Meighoo, “From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?”

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | Election by secret ballot to appoint Chief Minister and 7 Ministers to Executive Council. Ministers could be removed by the Legislative members in secret ballot | |
|--|--|--|--|

6.8.2 The Emergence of Eric Williams and the People’s National Movement (PNM)

Dr. Williams was a renowned scholar and professor.²⁹⁴ For reformers on the island, Williams had unmatched leadership capabilities and with his position at the Anglo-American Caribbean Economic Commission provided him with authoritative insight. Dr. Williams became the head of the People’s Education Movement of the Teacher’s Economic and Cultural Association, embarking on a nationwide lecture series advocating this idea of bicameralism. To support his case he referenced the framers of the 1776 American Constitution who opted for two chambers²⁹⁵ and most pertinently a 1957 British Guiana Constitutional Commission Report recommending a bicameral legislature.²⁹⁶ His proposed upper house was a return of the nominated element but now separated from the elected members in the lower chamber. He believed that experienced persons void of political restraint removed from the lower house into the upper house would empower the public with an additional

²⁹⁴ His doctoral thesis *Capitalism and Slavery* and many of his later works such as *From Columbus to Castro: The history of the Caribbean 1492-1969* continued to be highly praised.

²⁹⁵ Although the American constitution does provide for two chambers, both are elected positions.

²⁹⁶ Williams, “Constitutional Reform in Trinidad and Tobago.”

constitutional check.²⁹⁷ For Eric Williams, the adoption of a bicameral system would define a true end to colonialism.

The single chamber legislature is colonialism, in conception, in form, and in operation. If you want to get out of colonialism, you can do so only by abolishing the single chamber legislature...The single chamber must go, or it must stay. If it stays, you must stop talking about ending colonialism. If you wish to have self-government it must go ²⁹⁸



Figure 11. Dr. Eric Williams Chief Minister and First Prime Minister 1956-1981.
Source: Information Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communication.

His Senate proposal was a 16-member chamber made up of 6 Industrial interest, 5 Religious heads, three officials and two persons of distinction appointed by the Governor. His petition signed by 27,811 signatures throughout the island got rejected by the Colonial Office, who instead went with the 1955 Constitution Reform

²⁹⁷ Identifying more with a Republican model than a populist democratic tradition, Williams often referenced Alexander Hamilton for the needs for checks on the popular assembly.

²⁹⁸ Sutton, *Forged From the Love of Liberty: Selected Speeches of Dr. Eric Williams*.

Committee recommendations. However, this broad appeal was a solid platform for the launch of a political movement, and bicameralism would become a major contesting point during the 1956 Elections. Eric Williams was now the leader of the new leading political party People's National Movement (PNM) and the movement towards the two chamber system went further into motion.

6.8.3 Demise of the Governor's Power and Rise of the Prime Minister's

In 1958, the PNM government brought proposals before the Colonial Office to; eliminate the power of the Governor and the Crown to veto laws passed by the people's representatives relating to the internal affairs of the colony; the creation of a Ministry of Home Affairs to control inter alia the police, and for the introduction of cabinet government based on the Westminster model. The Colonial Office met many of the PNM's demands but not the transfer of the police or the veto power of the governor. It would eventually capitulate on the police issue. In 1959, Cabinet government was introduced by PNM whereby the Chief Minister became the Premier. In 1959, the government appointed a Select Committee on Constitutional Reform with far-reaching reforms. The introduction of a bicameral system, the redrawing of electoral boundaries for the addition of six seats in Legislature and the appointment of a West Indian Governor on the advice of the Cabinet. The PNM made it clear that the Governor be a constitutional monarch who would act only on the advice of his ministers. There was no patience for a Crown-appointed Governor having power or authority to speak on behalf of the West Indian people. The Prime Minister was to be the keystone of the Constitution. The Governor General, as the Queen's representative, must act only on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Governor

General advises and warns but never commands.²⁹⁹ The position would be left as a symbolic office only. The Prime Minister would be answerable to his cabinet, to the Legislature and the country.

In 1961, Trinidad and Tobago were granted a Constitution that conferred full internal self-government to the Colony within the framework of the Federation of the West Indies. That year the PNM won the electoral election in Trinidad and Tobago and instituted a bicameral legislature. Its' composition consisted of 21 members and expanded to 24 members in 1962 following independence. Slightly different to the criteria proposed in 1955, the composition in 1962 would include 13 members nominated by the ruling party; 4 by the opposition; 7 by religious, social and economic interests chosen by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. In between the inception of the Senate and Independence from Great Britain, the colony was part of the short-lived West Indies Federation.

6.8.4 West Indies Federation 1958-1962

The Federation of the West Indies established in 1958 was the preferred decolonized method for West Indian statehood. The Federation was to be the

²⁹⁹ According to Ryan, getting the public and civil service to accept policy-making as ministerial work and not that of civil servants and the Governor as chief decision maker was one of the earliest obstacles. Civil service positions, once reserved for whites with strong families, would change becoming more native. Whites still retained a great deal of influence and economic privileges more entrenched with the influx of Anglo-American capital and technological expertise. But in the political arena African and now Indian peoples attained positions of power.

independent sovereign nation; Trinidad and Tobago Territorial Legislature was to be part of the Federation. Its' demise came quickly. In 1947 Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones presided over a conference at Montego Bay, Jamaica to discuss the prospect of a West Indies Federation. A standing committee was formed from this conference and in 1953 recommended a Federation with a weak center and strong individual units to the British Government. In 1956, the British Caribbean Federation Act was passed by the British Parliament Order in Council and in 1957 its Constitution came into effect. Elections were held in 1958, and a Federal Government was constituted with Sir Grantley Adams of Barbados as the first Federal Prime Minister.³⁰⁰ In 1961, the British Government convened a conference at Lancaster House in London to discuss independence for the Federation consisting of Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.³⁰¹

Key issues of contention that could not be resolved was the sources of federal revenue, freedom of movement of people and goods, and the question of the division of responsibility for the economic development of the Federation units. A land-acquisition ordinance passed by the Federal Government in 1958 intensified opposition and an old refinery proposed in Jamaica was objectionable to Trinidad. Relationship with the Federal government became more contentious over disputed

³⁰⁰ There was contention against Federation within Trinidad until 1956 among the Indian contingence that feared political domination in a majority African region. However, concessions made for greater constitutional protection in the federal system relieved their fears and by 1958 their skepticism was evaporated.

³⁰¹ Ghany, "The Relevance of the Senate in a Modern Democracy." Pg 82

negotiations over the Chagaramas Naval base which Eric Williams saw as a betrayal. The Opposition Party in Jamaica was strongly opposed to Jamaica becoming part of the Independent Federation, and a referendum among the Jamaican electorate on the subject resulted in a vote for secession. On September 19, 1961, the Jamaican electorate voted against Federation by 54-46 percent. Undoubtedly, these politicians stoked public fears of “small island” immigrants taking their jobs and were more interested in seizing total power over their island’s affairs. With the withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation, Trinidad announced it too would withdraw in January 1962 and pursue its Independence. Others soon followed, and the Federation was terminated in April 1962. A Caribbean Economic Community would become the remnants of the Federation CARICOM. The current Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency CDEMA is an inter-regional supportive network of independent emergency units throughout the Caribbean region that stems from the work of CARICOM in the 1990s.

6.8.5 Independence from Britain 1962 and Bicameralism

In 1962, Attorney General Sir Ellis Clarke drafted the Independence Constitution which provided for Trinidad and Tobago’s territorial independence from the Federation. There were changes in the number of elected MPs in the lower house and nominated senators in the Upper House. The Premier, Eric Williams became the Prime Minister. The Leader of the Opposition was recognized, and the Legislative Members had freedom of speech in Parliament, the authority to regulate its business by Standing Orders, and freedom from civil or criminal proceedings for words spoken or written by Members before their respective House and in Committee. The Senate

increased to twenty-four with the Prime Minister appointing 13, the leader of the opposition allowed four nominations with seven appointed by the Governor General.

302

Table 28. Parliament Composition Transition to Independence. Source: Meighoo 2012.³⁰³

| 1961- Internal Self-Government within the West Indies Federation | | 1962 Independent granted from Federation and Great Britain | |
|---|----|--|----|
| House of Representatives (Elected MPs) | 30 | House of Representatives (Elected MPs) | 36 |
| Senate (Appointed) | 21 | Senate (Appointed) | 24 |
| Premier | 12 | Prime Minister | 13 |
| Governor | 7 | Governor | 7 |
| Leader of opposition | 2 | Leader of Opposition | 4 |
| Premier appoints Cabinet Max. 2 Senators appointed as Ministers Legislature cannot remove Ministers | | Prime Minister appoints Cabinet Max. 2 Senators appointed as Ministers Legislature cannot remove Ministers | |

Present day bicameralism is often believed to find its origin in the English Parliament's division into the House of Lords and the House of Common in 1339. Although Trinidad and Tobago bicameral parliament are fashioned after the UK, there

³⁰² In 1976 Trinidad became a Republic within the Commonwealth and a President replaced Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as the head of State.

³⁰³ Meighoo, "From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?"

are a significant number of differences.³⁰⁴ The Upper House at Westminster consists of persons with lifetime appointments often of hereditary gain with no upper limit. The House of Lords includes senior Bishops of the Church of England, as the Monarch is also the head of the Church of England.³⁰⁵ By Contrast, Trinidad's Senate and the majority of West Indian Senates are temporary positions with no security of tenure, subordinate to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, and some appointed by the President or Governor-General.³⁰⁶

Presently there are eight bicameral Parliaments in the Commonwealth Caribbean, each is called Senates and are wholly nominated. Pr. Ghany attributes their presence to the region's Crown Colony history that expanded the nomination process in the British West Indies in the 19th century leaving the Old Representative System that preceded it. He also states that the new Commonwealth Caribbean Senates also found their origin in the UK 1918 Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber in the United Kingdom under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce. The proposed reforms of the House of Lords were never implemented in Britain and instead were

³⁰⁴ In the UK, Westminster has no written constitution and their majority vote decides everything. Trinidad as does most West Indian countries has a written constitution.

³⁰⁵ It is feasible to argue that there is no separation of Church and State as the Lords Spiritual Church Measures must be tabled within the House. Until recently a committee of the House of Lords was also the highest court in the UK, with the Lord Chancellor being a member of Cabinet (the Executive), Speaker of the House of Lords (the Legislature), and Head of the Judiciary.

³⁰⁶ Meighoo, "From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?" pg. 27

apparently exported to their colonies India 1935 and Ceylon 1945 as examples.³⁰⁷ He further states that these policies had a significant influence of Eric Williams along with the 1950 Waddington Commission.³⁰⁸ Dr. Williams himself cites the Waddington Commission visit in a public lecture in 1955 advocating for a Senate.

In 1951, the two university members of the three-member British Guiana Constitutional Commission, one of whom supervised my doctor's these at Oxford, recommended the establishment of a bicameral legislature for British Guiana, What they had to say is of direct concern to the people of Trinidad and Tobago.

Trinidadian researcher Kirk Meighoo believes that the new Senate resembled the old Crown Colony legislature being wholly nominated and guaranteeing a government majority. The Prime Minister in effect became the new Governor, and Parliament was subordinate to the Executive. The Legislature no longer had the power to appoint and remove Ministers. He argues that the bicameral system represented a backward step in the country's democratic evolution with the Legislature losing its power over the Executive. ³⁰⁹ Pr. Samaroo agrees that too many vestiges of Crown Colony government persist and calls for more devolution and decentralization to allow

³⁰⁷ Ghany, "The Relevance of the Senate in a Modern Democracy."

³⁰⁸ In 1950 British Guiana, Sir John Waddington, the chairman of the Waddington Commission visited and advocated for a unicameral system for the colony. However along with him were two other members, Professor Vincent Harlow and Dr. Rita Hinden, advocated a bicameral system of a Senate consisting of nominated members. Professor Vincent Harlow was the member who had supervised Dr. Eric Williams' thesis at Oxford.

³⁰⁹ Meighoo, "From Legislative Council to House of Representatives: Promoting or Hindering Democracy?" pg 35

greater participatory government.³¹⁰ Other critics of the bicameral process cite the increased length of time of the legislative process for the passing of laws being a waste of time.

Advocates for the wholly nominated Upper House or Senate cite that it allows one additional arena for interest representation and provides an institutionalized check on the abuse of legislative power and improves legislation and policy stability. Acting as a check on the abuse of power, namely the executive branch usually curtailed in a unicameral system.³¹¹ Arvind Kumar lists the following merits of the bicameral system. Checks on hasty legislation; acts as a safeguard against tyranny and despotism of a single chamber legislature; provide representation of interest groups, intellectual elements, and others with special interest such as fields of art, science, literature and social service; provide an opportunity for persons of some expertise and experience who would normally not face an election; crystallize public opinion by delaying the passing of a legislative measure, which allows the people enough time for reflection and expression of their opinion; allow for better legislation because all or many of the members are experienced and comparatively free from popular passion and rigid discipline.³¹²

In staffing the ministries and Senate of the new Nation, the PNM tried to express a multiracial philosophy (the members of the House of Representatives and

³¹⁰ Samaroo, "From Unicamerlism to Bicameralism: Trinbago's Constitutional Advances (1831-1962)."

³¹¹ Reddock, "The Effectiveness of Parliament as An Organ of State in Scutinising Exeutive Action."

³¹² Kumar, "What Are the Merits & Demerits of Bicameralism ?"

the Executive Cabinet are listed in Table 29). Where they failed the Governor's appointees would address the ethnic omission. Therefore, at the time of the storm of 1963, the Government was the most diverse and representative in the twin island's history. A vibrant opposition existed in both the lower and upper chamber but without a doubt, the government ruling party and the power of the Prime Minister were dominant. Executive powers were no longer solely in the hands of an alien Governor but with a popularly elected Prime Minister. These powers working in conjunction with the Governor-General would prove to be essential tools in responding to Hurricane Flora.

Table 29. The Members of the House of Representatives and the Executive Cabinet

| House of Representatives | | The Cabinet | |
|---------------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|
| The Honorable C.A. Thomasos | Speaker | | |
| Dr. the Hon. E.E. Williams | Member for Port-of-Spain South (Prime Minister- Ministers of External Affairs) | Dr. the Hon. E.E. Williams | Member for Port-of-Spain South (Prime Minister- Ministers of External Affairs) |
| Dr. the Hon P.V.J. Solomon | Member for Port-of-Spain West (Deputy Prime Minister- minister of Home Affairs) | Dr. the Hon P.V.J. Solomon | Member for Port-of-Spain West (Deputy Prime Minister- minister of Home Affairs) |
| J.H. O'Halloran | Minister for Diego Martin (Minister of Petroleum and Mines) | J.H. O'Halloran | Minister for Diego Martin (Minister of Petroleum and Mines) |
| A.G. Montano | Member for San Fernando East (Minister of Public Utilities) | A.G. Montano | Member for San Fernando East (Minister of Public Utilities) |
| R.E. Wallace | Member for San Juan (Minister of Labour) | R.E. Wallace | Member for San Juan (Minister of Labour) |
| A.N.R. Robinson | Member for Tobago East (Minister of Finance) | A.N.R. Robinson | Member for Tobago East (Minister of Finance) |
| S. Mohammed | Member for San Fernando West (Minister of Local Government and Community Development) | S. Mohammed | Member for San Fernando West (Minister of Local Government and Community Development) |
| L.M. Robinson | Member for Toco-Manzanilla (Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce) | L.M. Robinson | Member for Toco-Manzanilla (Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce) |

| | | | |
|---------------------|---|--------------------------|--|
| Mrs. I. Teshea | Member for Port-of-Spain East (Minister of Health and Housing) | Mrs. I. Teshea | Member for Port-of-Spain East (Minister of Health and Housing) |
| A.C. Alexis | Member for La Brea (Minister without Portfolio) | D.R. Pierre (Senator) | Minister of Education and Culture |
| A.A. Thompson | Member for Tunapuna (Minister without Portfolio) | G. A. Richards (Senator) | Attorney General |
| Mr. V.L. Campbell | Member for Ortoire-Mayaro (Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister) | W.J. Alexander (Senator) | Minister without Portfolio |
| Mr. B. Pitt | Member for Tobago West (Deputy Speaker) | A.C. Alexis | Minister without Portfolio |
| Dr. R. Capildeo | Member for St. Augustine | A.A. Thompson | Minister without Portfolio |
| Mr. A.S. Sinanan | Member for Siparia | | |
| S.C. Maharaj | Member for Princes Town | | |
| S. Capildeo | Member for Couva | | |
| L.F. Seukeran | Member for Naparima | | |
| Bermudez | Member for Port-of-Spain | | |
| P.G. Farquhar | Member for Pointe-a-Pierre | | |
| Dr. M. A. Forrester | Member for Nariva | | |
| Mr. T. Hosein | Member for Chaguanas | | |
| V.A. Jamadar | Member for Fyzabad | | |
| C.K. Johnson | Member for Point Fortin | | |
| Ramdeen | Member for Caroni East | | |
| | | | |

6.8.6 PNM Politics, Education, Economics and Social Change

The PNM charters' premise was to create a welfare state- well housed, well educated, well fed, healthy population. In 1957, the PNM government introduced its first five-year development program. These projects included subsidies to cane farmers, peasants, and fishermen, hospital and housing construction, better access roads for agricultural areas, rural electrification, harbor improvement, increased expenditures on education with the ultimate goal of free education. Their fundamental beliefs, for progress in the modern world, the provision of social services was a matter of right and not of grace. Further beliefs include respect for all cultural contributions to the West Indian *mélange*, interracial solidarity and an enlightened and self-confident public. They believed that academic opportunities be widened according to individuals' capabilities and not their social or economic class. Under their leadership Education would be free up to secondary school level.³¹³ PNM pledged to eliminate illiteracy and develop Caribbean art, literature, and culture.

A staunch critic to the PNM's Education plan was the Catholic Church who controlled the island's best schools and considered state-controlled curriculum non-negotiable. A mandatory condition of receiving government grants was school amalgamation under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. The history of Catholics on the island dates back to Spanish colonization and French colony migrants that predated the British arrival. Catholic school history of discriminating against children who did not have the "proper" social or ethnic qualification had to be

³¹³ The emphasis on classical education altered; economic development required concentration on technical, vocational, and business training rather than grammar school.

changed to fulfill the PNM's vision. The PNM and the church would eventually come to a compromise called the *Concordat*.³¹⁴ Another major PNM initiative that garnered early opposition from the Catholic Church and other religious entities was the question of the state's role in birth-control programs. Williams viewed family planning as essential to the economic goals of the country, a view widely shared among middle-class intellectuals. In his compromises with the church, the PNM government in many ways defeated its fiercest rivals for power in the land. By seizing a greater level of control of the secondary school system, the state was now able to organize the entire system in an unprecedented manner. This power helps cater curriculum to the needs of the state interests and foster a collective identity for mobilization.

On the economic front, Dr. Williams was a staunch critique of the island's dependency on the sugar and oil industry. These industries could not expand fast enough to absorb the vast numbers of the unemployed and the need to diversify the economy was adamant. He agreed with economist Dr. Arthur Lewis that *'new forms must be created which will take West Indian sugar industry "out of politics" in the sense of earning general acceptance, or the West Indian community will sooner or*

³¹⁴ The church would have the right to veto in introduction of books, apparatus and changes in the curriculum in their school. Their religion would be the only one taught in the school though students would not be compelled to take the class. The churches would be allowed to access the state schools to give instruction to children of their flock. The rights of appointment, retention, promotion, transfer and dismissal of teachers were to be vested in the Public Service Commission as was the case with other civil servants, but denominational boards could refuse immoral teachers according to their doctrine. Eighty percent of students entering first form will be determined by the state on the basis of a common entrance examination. The principals of church schools were allocated the remaining 20 percent to their discretion.

later simply tear itself in pieces, and destroy the sugar industry in the process.

Williams felt tariffs were necessary to allow embryonic industries in establishing industries that did not seem sufficiently profitable to private investment. A high powered industrial development corporation with a dynamic program aimed at attracting private capital. He believed that a sensible program of peasant proprietorship would have significant, political, social and economic advantages. He was not a socialist and did not want to repeat the experiments of Puerto Rico nor the fury of Britain and the U.S if they ventured into that experiment. “Operation Jobs” was a rallying cry in which he mobilized a nationalist movement and not a class politics.³¹⁵

A Puerto-Rican-style program of ‘industrialization by invitation’ begun by the quasi-ministerial regime of 1950-1956 resulted in the creation of 35 industries, the creation of 2,195 jobs and investment totaling \$35 million (tt). The first five-year development program was a framework of priorities designed to provide the infrastructure for servicing the program of privately financed industrialization. The emphasis was on expanding electric and water supply, improving road communication and health and education facilities, and on the preparation of industrial estates to attract capital. There was a calculated shift away from the plantation sector of the economy where ‘old world’ interests were entrenched. Only 2.1percent of the \$218.5

³¹⁵ Despite the economic success of the first 5-year plan, the chamber of commerce and business elite felt disdain towards PM Williams for blocking access to the arenas of public policy. Williams made no qualms about giving no special treatment to the old lobbies, and in public expressed contempt for the old privileged groups and their cocktail parties where they influence decisions.

million development budget was spent directly on agriculture and most of it mainly on small-scale farming operations. Despite the efforts of diversification, the oil industry (1% of the world's output) was responsible for 27% of the government revenues, 28% of GNP, 81% of the value of total gross exports, but only 5% of total employment (15,000). From 1956-1967, crude oil production soared from 29million barrels to 65 million barrels per year. From 1951-1961 agriculture sector grew by 4.2 percent per year and contributed to 12% of the real total output in the latter year.

6.8.7 Control and Discipline of Labor

Despite the gains in representative and responsible government, the island continued to face growing labor militancy mainly in the oil and sugar industries. Between 1960 and 1964 there were 230 strikes involving 74,574 workers and the loss of 803,899 'man-days'. Though the PNM in election campaign professed support for labor rights, while in Government they embarked on a policy of *disciplining the labor movement*, something it vowed it would never do. Williams believed that labor needed to accept its part of the establishment and respect national interests. Acting under the pretext of a communist-inspired plot to create chaos in the country, the government declared a state of emergency in the sugar-belt in March 1965 and steam rolled a bill (Industrial Stabilization Act) that circumscribed the freedom to strike.³¹⁶ Intense strikes would continue throughout the decade and radicals believed the country had become a police state. Besides regarding all criticism as communist and the passage of the Industrial Stabilization Act, there was the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry

³¹⁶ Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972. Pg. 409

into Subversive Activities in 1965, the house arrest of C.L. R James³¹⁷ in 1965, the ban on all publications considered subversive in 1967, the declaration of Stokely Carmichael³¹⁸ as a prohibited immigrant in 1968, the harassment of radical University lecturers and trade unionists. Ryan compares the old ruling class use of imperial power to control and the new elite's use of invoking the authority of the Party and the people to do the very same things. *In the name of administrative efficiency and financial rationalization, the system has in fact become even more centralized than it was before.*³¹⁹

6.9 Hurricane Flora: Government Preparation, Response, and Recovery

“An incredible, almost an indecent picture of devastation and death, with the most dreaded threat of all, disease, hanging over it in the future”³²⁰

On Monday, September 30th 1963, Hurricane Flora thumped the island of Tobago with 110 M.P.H. winds sweeping towards the direction of Grenada as shown in Figure 12. Storms damaging the twin island country were so few; most Trinidadians

³¹⁷ Once mutual friends, James became a staunch critic of Williams disciplining policy

³¹⁸ Also known as Kwame Turé, was a Trinidadian-American revolutionary active in the USA 1960s Civil Rights Movement. first as a leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), later as the "Honorary Prime Minister" of the Black Panther Party, and finally as a leader of the All-African Peoples Revolutionary Party

³¹⁹ Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, 1972. Pg. 431

³²⁰ PM Eric Williams addresses the nation on Radio “New Tobago Programme Underway.”

believed that they were immune to the hurricane.³²¹ However, unlike the previous disasters covered in this study, the government enacted extensive preparations prior to the storm's landfall.




Figure 12. Path of Hurricane Flora. Source: Trinidad Guardian.³²²

³²¹ Liz Cromwell, "Even the Skeptical Rushed to Get out of Flora's Way," *Trinidad Guardian*, October 5, 1963.

³²² Guardian Staff Reporter, "Flora Batters and Cuts off Tobago."

6.9.1 Preparations

Preparations for the storm in Trinidad began the previous day. The Minister of Education closed schools at noon and most businesses dismissed their employees early. The Prime Minister, Eric Williams, called together the top officials of Ministries, the Police, the Fire Services, the Red Cross and the St. John's Ambulance Brigade. The Prime Minister was the liaison between the Commissioner and other Ministries whose services might be required. The Commissioner of Police assumed overall charge of relief and other arrangements necessary. Arrangements made for the opening of schools and churches to receive evacuees. The Prime Minister appealed to the country to remain calm and avoid making telephone calls. On the waterfront in San Fernando, Sea Scouts of Presentation College assisted owners of small craft and fishermen getting their craft off the jetty and out to sea. Trinidad Piarco Airport closed to air traffic. The Police recalled personnel on leave and put the entire force on duty, as did the Electricity Commission and Fire Services. Red Cross, a newly independent body in the country requested their personnel to report to headquarters or police stations and solicited relief supplies of all kinds on radio stations. In Port-of-Spain, there was jammed traffic with everyone attempting to get home. At the "Green Corner", the taxi junction, hundreds of men, women and children silently stood waiting for the rare empty taxi. The Trinidad Guardian reported that the radio stations and the regional hurricane-warning system performed a magnificent service.³²³

Throughout the island, they waited with flashlights, batteries, bread and tinned foods but the storm did not affect Trinidad beyond small floods and short power outages. Towns of Morvant, San Juan, and Petit Bourg were flooded with three feet of

³²³ "A Blow at Tobago."

water while the smaller north Trinidad estates were slightly damaged. Nevertheless, the preparation done on the island was unprecedented and even the Opposition leader, Mr. Stephen Maharaj took the time to pen a letter thanking the Prime Minister for *prompt and efficient* action.³²⁴ A later editorial by the Guardian would criticize the Piarco Meteorological services and that radio stations for giving no warnings to Tobago and then warning Tobago about the hurricane approach after it already struck Tobago. A reliance on international reporting still existed with the Piarco station still in its infancy.³²⁵ In his memoirs, former soldier Clement Burkett writes

there had been a mix-up between the media and the Meteorological Office at Piarco, about the time when Tobago would be hit by Hurricane Flora. Around mid-day, the media began broadcasting a hurricane warning for Tobago, but at that time, Tobago was actually recovering from the hurricane, which had earlier that morning almost destroyed the island. If the timing of the information had been more accurate, some damage could have been avoided.³²⁶

³²⁴ Guardian Staff Reporter, “Dems Back PM’S Action.”

³²⁵ “Warning of Disaster.”

³²⁶ Burkett, *Reflections of a Soldier: A Memoir of 1970 and Events Before and After*. Pg. 35




Figure 13. Flora destroys villages in Tobago. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives.

6.9.2 Devastation

Tobago was not as fortunate as Trinidad and after 3 pm, communications between the islands were quickly knocked out. Before communication with Tobago was lost, word received from the heavy blow to Crown Point; Tobago's airport inundated and its Terminal along with the Crown Point Hotel wrecked. The storm blasted the island ward for more than three hours with 110 mph winds. Even less fortunate were Eastern Cuba and Haiti that suffered greater death tolls in the thousands.³²⁷ Cuban leader Fidel Castro would later accuse the U.S of withholding information about Hurricane Flora from Cuban meteorologists during the hurricane, an

³²⁷ "4,000 Die in Haiti; Cuba Disaster."

allegation the Bureau strongly denied.³²⁸ By October 10, Flora sped towards her death in the Atlantic Ocean soon after lashing Bermuda and little damage to the Bahamas.³²⁹ The combined death toll surpassed 6,000 and was the most deadly storm spawned in the tropical Atlantic.³³⁰ The destruction from Flora was so severe and of such historical significance, the United States Weather Bureau would never use the name again. In addition, it was too similar to Florida and created problems in the Press and Radio.³³¹

The following day in Tobago, it was reported that the death toll reached 30; several hundred were injured; thousands were left homeless with villages destroyed (see Table 30 and Table 31) along with a heavy loss to the farming industry. The death toll was confirmed at 24.³³² Among the dead reported in the newspapers, included Tootie Pope, 92 of Kendal Village; Maynard Gray, 31 of Delaford; Dale Davidson, 3 of Ten Chains Village Roxborough; Mrs. Bee des Vignes of Moriah, and Louisa George of Craig Hall.³³³ The hardest hit areas were Mount St. George and Bethesda,

³²⁸ “Fidel Accuses US on Flora.”

³²⁹ “Flora Speeds to Her Death.”

³³⁰ “Death Toll Passes 6,000; Cuba- 1,000.”

³³¹ “Weathermen Ban Flora.”

³³² Guardian Correspondent, “Death Toll Rises to 24.”

³³³ Harewood, “\$45M. Hurricane Loss in Tobago.”

where villages were completely demolished included Mason Hall, Moriah (see Figure 14.), Les Coteaux and Patience Hill.



Figure 14. Historic Moriah Church Destroyed. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives.

Villages of Concordia, Argle, Richmond and Mt. St. George suffered 100 % destruction. Among the houses destroyed included Minister of Finance ANR Robinson³³⁴, a Tobago resident, and future Prime Minister and President of the twin-island republic. Forty percent of the houses on the island damaged with every building from Crown Point to Scarborough touched by the hurricane. Severe damage was done to the north-western section of the island with Fort George destroyed and all public buildings in Scarborough except the General Hospital damaged. The houses were built

³³⁴ Harewood, "Robinson Returns to Find Home Ruined by Flora."

mainly of timber and in many cases constructed by the owner- occupiers themselves, but a number were built out of clay or concrete blocks. Of the population 34,500 persons, approximately 17,000 were rendered homeless. Of the islands’ estimated 7,500 houses, only 16.7% received no damage.³³⁵ In districts of the significant damage, the percentage of devastation was over 90%. In Moriah 68% of houses were destroyed. To house the homeless ad hoc arrangements worked with schools, churches, government buildings, fire brigade headquarters and the general hospital.³³⁶

Table 30. Table Destruction level of houses in Tobago. Source: Tobago Planning Team. ³³⁷

| Total # of Houses | Completely Destroyed | Major Damage | Minor Damage | No Damage |
|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| 7,500 | 2,750 | 1,000 | 2,500 | 1,250 |

Table 31. Housing-Destruction by Districts- Selected Districts. Source: Tobago Planning Team.³³⁸

| Districts | Houses enumerated | Houses totally destroyed | Houses badly damaged | Houses slightly damaged | Houses not damaged |
|-----------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | | | | | |

³³⁵ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.”

³³⁶ Harewood, “Tobago Hurricane Death Toll 30.”

³³⁷ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.”

³³⁸ Ibid.

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Zion Hill | 122 | 81 | 18 | 13 | 10 |
| Mt. St. George | 264 | 114 | 87 | 29 | 34 |
| Patience Hill | 106 | 25 | 40 | 21 | 20 |
| Moriah | 335 | 228 | 31 | 46 | 30 |
| Des Vignes Road | 57 | 33 | 16 | 5 | 4 |
| Whim | 72 | 28 | 20 | 12 | 12 |
| Mason Hall | 280 | 124 | 59 | 60 | 37 |
| John Dial | 46 | 9 | 3 | 20 | 14 |
| Hope | 40 | 12 | 8 | 12 | 8 |
| Plymouth | 149 | 11 | 21 | 60 | 57 |
| Bethesda | 198 | 55 | 40 | 70 | 33 |
| Total | 1,670 | 720 | 343 | 348 | 259 |

Cocoa trees were stripped of their leaves and many being uprooted; the tall spreading immortelle trees which formed the essential shade for cocoa suffered the same fate. Vast tracts of forest laid waste and took on the appearance of matchwood and a danger of a tinder box. Before the storm 30,000 acres of land was under cultivation with cocoa (7,000) and coconuts (10,000) being the principal crops. A spokesman for the cocoa industry reported that the storm “*eliminated Tobago completely as a cocoa producing area*” with an estimated 2,000,000 lb. loss.³³⁹ 51% of the approximately 1,000,000 coconut trees blown down with a further 16 % suffered damage to their crown causing their death. Since the damage was greatest among the heavy bearing trees the effect on the copra industry was significant. All minor agricultural crops, such as bananas, vegetables, and food crops suffered. The island’s forest reserves suffered tremendously. 78% of the trees forming the upper story blown

³³⁹ “\$m UN Food For Tobago.”

over with the remainder having their crown removed or severely damaged. This sudden removal of the protective canopy of trees would have secondary effects. Increased humidity levels; soil moisture, increased run-off from rainfall would cause erosion and soil loss on slopes; flooding of rivers and silting up of dams in the lower reaches of valleys. In the fishing, sector suffered 27% to the fishing fleet, an industry that employed many independent workers.

Of the 200 public buildings on the island, only nine had no visible damage.³⁴⁰ Out of the island's 38 government schools, two Primary Schools destroyed while 32 primary and 2 secondary schools suffered significant damage. Debris from fallen trees blocked access to major and minor roads. Damage to water supply and distribution system but were restored within 48 hours.³⁴¹ Agricultural credit societies and credit unions were concerned about their loans going unrepaid. Many land and property owners were in debt when the hurricane struck and was now facing the threat of losing their property.³⁴²

By October 2nd, unofficial estimates of the loss to Tobago amounted to \$45 million. On October 13th in an address thanking the United Nations for their reply in assistance, Mr. Reginald Dumas, Alternate Representative of Trinidad and Tobago on

³⁴⁰ The Post Office and Postmistress's house at Charlottesvillle along with eight other building destroyed. Included in complete destruction was the Governor General house near Scarborough with an estimated restoration cost of \$60,000.

³⁴¹ In Scarborough and the immediate vicinity, the power supply was restored by October 18th. The telephone communication was restored by October 23rd.

³⁴² Fears were stoked knowing that the hurricane of 1847 caused a fall in prices of property and a mass selloff of land.

the Fifth Committee of the United Nations put the official damage at \$30 million US (\$50million TT).³⁴³

6.9.3 Initial Response



Figure 15. PM Eric Williams, GG Solomon Hochoy and team of officials "Tobago Relief Work". Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives.

The Government Relief Committee met on Oct 1st at the main relief center, the Government Central School, with Prime Minister Eric Williams to coordinate relief measures.³⁴⁴The Government-owned ship "Bird of Paradise" arrived the following day from Trinidad with thirty-four police personnel and eight members of the Red

³⁴³ "UN Thanked for Prompt Storm Aid."

³⁴⁴ Dominion 011 Company supplied a helicopter to the government and captained by Henry Johns to fly government personnel for aerial survey.

Cross³⁴⁵ together with 300 parcels of food and clothing and members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, Fire Services and Press and Radio personnel. On October 3, 80 additional policemen were flown over to help maintain law and order. According to Assistant Commissioner Bernard, they were also sent to assist in rehabilitation work. Top Priority was given to clearing the main roads of fallen coconut trees. One hundred regiment members were clearing roads experiencing constant landslides, an effect from the loss of the Forest Reserve. Clement Burkett reflects in his memoirs that he decided to join the National Guard, now called the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment because of its' response to Hurricane Flora.

after the storm had passed, the Army arrived. Splitting into three groups, it immediately started to clear the roadways of fallen trees, electricity poles and mud slides. Some of the soldiers began repairing family homes and clearing debris from their yards while others attended to damaged Government buildings. In a matter of a few days, the soldiers were able to change Tobago from a disaster area back to a normal island.³⁴⁶

Food relief was under the control of the Police with active collaboration with the Red Cross and officers of the Community Development Department. Mr. D. Alleyne of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mines was tasked to ensure a more rational and equitable distribution. Schools and churches converted into decanting areas welcoming the homeless at night. Between October 3 and 5 over 5,000 families

³⁴⁵ The Red Cross established their relief center at Scarborough secondary school with Mr. Kenneth Diaz in charge.

³⁴⁶ Burkett, *Reflections of a Soldier: A Memoir of 1970 and Events Before and After*. Pg. 36

involving 25,000 persons registered at a relief center. Over thirty relief centers established at that time dispensed food and clothing.




Figure 16. Police help transport injured to Trinidad using US Navy airplane. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives

Dr. Edward Moses, the secretary of the Territory's Medical Association, recruited "mercy" doctors. The Minister of Health and Housing, Mrs. Isabel Teshes issued a special appeal to all county medical officers, district medical officers, district nurses, public health nurses, druggists and ambulance services to be at their posts to cope with any emergencies. Radio stations gave whereabouts of missing persons and up-to-the-minute reports of the hurricane.³⁴⁷ The doctors at the Scarborough General Hospital worked around the clock treating patients. They performed 75 operations of seriously injured following the storm. Before Trinidad doctors arrived, Dr. Moses and Dr. Francis Dominique worked without a break.³⁴⁸ Dr. D. Marchant and Dr. G O D

³⁴⁷ Guardian Staff Reporter, "Flora Batters and Cuts off Tobago."

³⁴⁸ Guardian Correspondent, "Doctors Work Non-Stop 75 Operations."

Busby announced the start of a mass inoculation program to begin October 3rd in. To avoid an epidemic they advised Tobagonians to boil all drinking water and to drink coconut water when possible. By October 5th, the Prime Minister's office reported that water supply was restored and there was no longer a need to boil water.



Figure 17. PM Eric Williams GG Hochoy and team of officials inspect temporary sheltering camps. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National.

After meeting with the Minister of Labour and his top Advisors, PM addresses the nation on October 7th about his plans to maximize potential jobs and rehabilitate

agriculture as it was planting season. Particular attention was given to the revitalization of small farmers.³⁴⁹

6.9.3.1 Short Term Program: Restoration Work and Maximizing Employment

Providing employment and creating jobs have not only become the narrative of the administration but now the recovery efforts. PM Williams estimated that a period of six months would be required to restore the main roads. In his address to the nation, he stated that the restoration program would provide employment for many hundred people above the normal labor force of the Works Department and the County Council for conventional maintenance.³⁵⁰ Beginning on October 11, thirty-three labor exchanges were set up at decanting centers to facilitate the recruitment of labor and began accepting registrations. The short term plan included the following plans

1. Maximum employment is to be provided. With this end in view, apart from permanent workers adequate opportunity to work on the rehabilitation of their homes and agricultural holdings. As far as possible the non-permanent workers will be recruited from the villages in which the works are being carried out
2. The Ministry of Labour will work out suitable arrangements to prevent any one person not on the permanent labor force from securing employment on more than one project in a fortnight
3. Because of its relation to the urgent problem of the Forest Reserve, arrangements are to be made to resume construction on the North Coast Road, Roxborough end, within a fortnight

³⁴⁹ "PM Warns 'Tobago Today Is One Vast Tinder Box.'"

³⁵⁰ "New Tobago Programme Underway."

4. Development subsidies for food crops in agriculture under the Five Year Programme are to be reintroduced immediately expanded with priority to bananas
5. A Tractor Pool of three tractors is to be set up immediately from the number already agreed upon for the Better Village Programme for Trinidad and Tobago
6. Planting material from Trinidad is to be immediately mobilized together with supplies of fertilizer for distribution to farmers free of charge for a three month period to enable them to establish quick growing food crops
7. All pigs are to immediately to be vaccinated against any possible outbreak of swine fever (The free Swine fever vaccination program ran until Nov 29)
8. Female stock will be purchased in necessitous cases from those farmers in need of cash, and who would otherwise dispose of such stock to butchers. This stock will be kept and used to upgrade the cattle population.
9. Chicks will be imported on a large scale into Tobago for distribution to small farmers
10. The whole short-term program will be reviewed at the end of the year in the light of the proposed Development Plan for Tobago.



Figure 18. PM Williams and team of officials visit Bothel relief center. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives.

In his 2nd address to the nation on the following Wednesday, PM Williams stated 3,000 jobs were provided in public works since the storm. Most of these jobs were part-time. Rehousing and reconstruction of demolished buildings addressed under the long-term Tobago Development Program. However, in the short term, he advocated for a method of self-help using local materials preferred to the importation of pre-fabricated materials, as it may not be suited for Tobago's terrain and less expensive.³⁵¹ In his address to the nation on October 9, PM Williams called for a regional response agency for future disaster headquartered at Chaguaramas, Trinidad which at the time was occupied by the U.S Naval Base.

³⁵¹ He estimated that with the self-help method an average house could be built for \$1,000. In his third address to the nation, the PM appealed to the nation to help rebuild 500 houses in the devastated areas by advocating for cash donations and building materials to the Tobago relief fund

6.9.3.2 A Caribbean Association for Relief Against Hurricane: Hurricane Center and U.S Chaguaramas base

Dr. Eric Williams described hurricanes as Public Enemy No. 1 in the Caribbean Areas, urging a hurricane center should be set up at Chaguaramas which he feels is an “ *a logical centre in the campaign of hurricane relief, for the location of helicopters and small boats and the storage of materials*”. A measure he planned to advocate with neighboring countries. He stressed the dire need for collective action against future disasters, recognition by international bodies of the Caribbean’s vulnerabilities and intelligent mobilization. He emphasized the present U.S Naval Station at Chaguaramas as a key location and the need to revise the 1941 Anglo-American Agreement. Both the Coast Guard and the Trinidad Regiment already based at Chaguaramas while the US Naval Base already had 22 large storehouses and 11 million cubic feet of covered storage. *Chaguaramas, therefore, becomes a logical centre in the campaign of hurricane relief, for the location of helicopters and small boats and the storage of materials.* He furthermore suggests that the Netherlands communities of Curacao and Aruba could be additional centers. The PM proposes A Caribbean Association for Relief against Hurricanes and suggests that it draw significantly from the United Nations agencies.³⁵² This suggestion received support from the Commander of the US Naval Station at Chaguaramas, Captain John H. Dinneen, calling it a constructive idea and a fresh novel approach to the problem in the region. However, it will be up to both Government negotiations, not his. ³⁵³ In an editorial piece, the Guardian endorsed the PMs idea for The General Caribbean Association for

³⁵² “PM Urges Chag Hurricane Centre.”

³⁵³ Delph, “Chag Chief Backs PM’s Hurricane Centre Plan.”

Relief against hurricanes while suggesting a legal requirement for insurance against hurricane damage so that insurance companies can take up the slack in rehabilitation.³⁵⁴

6.9.3.3 United Kingdom and Regional Aid

The Governor-General Sir Solomon Hochoy received a correspondence from the private secretary to Her Majesty the Queen.

Her Majesty would be grateful if you would convey an expression of her sincere sympathy and that of the Duke of Edinburgh to the relatives of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been injured or rendered homeless in this disaster.

Although the twin-island was now an independent nation, Great Britain, and the U.K population still played an important role in the response to the storm. The Acting UK High Commissioner made the ship H.M.S. Castor, available for assistance following its arrival on October 4th. On October 9 the H.M.S. Tarter, a British hurricane relief ship arrived with a large stock of tents from British army supplies in British Guiana. 42 tents collected from the British Army in British Guiana with each tent being able to hold ten persons.

On October 14, the British Government contributed a gift of \$100,000 to the immediate relief of distress and donated to the Prime Minister's Tobago Relief Fund³⁵⁵ a further gift of \$21,000 given the following month. (See Tobago Relief Fund section for more on the Fund) Another donation came in the form of 10,000 doses of

³⁵⁴ "Flora's Aftermath."

³⁵⁵ "Britain Donates \$100,000 to Fund."

anti-typhoid vaccines. (See emergency powers section for more on anti-typhoid inoculation) Additional responses came from the Methodist Church of Britain and the West India Committee in London. The British Red Cross on behalf of the British Government sent 10,000 doses of anti-typhoid vaccine with necessary syringes and needles to the Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross in answer to an appeal received from the Acting British High Commissioner in Trinidad.³⁵⁶

Sir Ellis Clarke, now Trinidad and Tobago representative to the United Nations makes an appeal for assistance to the devastation. In response, the United Nations Secretary-General appealed to the body and by October 10, the UN approved aid of W.I \$1,000,000 in the form of foodstuffs including more than 30 tons of butter, powdered milk, rice, wheat products, edible oils and canned foods.³⁵⁷ This appeal was only made possible being a recognized independent state by the international community. Previous appeals under colony status would only be possible through the British Government discretion.

At the regional level, great aid came from neighboring islands and countries. Grenada and St. Vincent sent 200 tons of foodstuffs; the Dominican Republic sent clothing and food; Montserrat sent 12 boxes of clothing; Antigua sent clothing and foodstuffs, and Barbados sent 14 cartons of clothing. The Government of Suriname through the Netherlands Embassy in Port-of-Spain also offered the services of one doctor and several nurses. Jamaica sent 14,000 pounds of relief supplies including food, fuel, bedding, clothing, tonic and tents transported by the United States Navy

³⁵⁶ “Thant Sends Envoy’s Plea To Agencies.”

³⁵⁷ “\$m UN Food For Tobago.”

DC4 aircraft.³⁵⁸ Jamaica was also affected by Hurricane Flora with damages estimated over \$2million. In reciprocation for their help, after a meeting on October 10, Trinidad government sent \$50,000 in aid to Jamaica.³⁵⁹ Contributions came from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.³⁶⁰ Even the Government of New Zealand contributed \$1,000 but the most significant assistance came from the United States Government and the U.S Navy in particular.

6.9.3.4 U.S Navy and U.S Government Assistance

At the time of the storm, the U.S Navy had a base located in Chaguaramas in the North of Trinidad. The base was leased for 99 years from the British Government during WWII and colonial occupation in the 1941 Anglo-American Agreement also known as the Destroyers for Bases Agreement.³⁶¹ Under the arrangement, America would provide Britain with 50 of its older naval destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases on areas to be used for bases in eight of the United Kingdom's colonies.³⁶² The base's existence was of great conflict with the Trinidad government and PM Eric

³⁵⁸ "Jamaica Rushes Relief Supplies."

³⁵⁹ "\$50,000 Trinidad Aid to Jamaica."

³⁶⁰ Douglas, "Debates of the House of Representatives."

³⁶¹ Department of the Navy, "Bases in South America and the Caribbean Area, Including Bermuda."

³⁶² These leases would be rent free leases located in the U.K colonies of Newfoundland Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, British Guiana and Bermuda.

Williams who saw it as a new form of colonization.³⁶³ Nevertheless, their presence on the island proved to be a great asset in responding to the disaster.



Figure 19. PM Eric Williams with US Navy "Tobago Relief". Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives.

From the onset of the disaster, the US Navy along with B.W.I.A. flights transported supplies to Tobago. The United States Navy airlifted from Chaguaramas to Crown Point Airport, substantial quantities of medical and food supplies. Supplies included splint and bandages, and inoculations against the possible epidemic. On October 3, the U.S Navy airlifted nine seriously injured persons from Tobago to

³⁶³ 1960 negotiations amended the lease until 1977 and the U.S agreed to release unconditionally most of the unused land surrounding the base and other locations in the north-west and all lands outside of that peninsula. Withdrawal in 1977 would be conditional on global conditions. By these negotiations, Chagauramas would not be considered for the capital of the Federation and in return, the U.S would assist in the country's development of ports, roads, airport, and construction of an arts and sciences faculty at the Trinidad branch of the University of the West Indies.

Trinidad.³⁶⁴ The U.S gift tug boat cleared Scarborough harbor of seven sunken schooners, allowing the Government coastal vessels, Scarlet Ibis and Bird of Paradise to enter the basin and berth.³⁶⁵ U.S. Navy also requested a chlorination plant from their Station in San Juan, Puerto Rico to assist in water purification in Tobago.

Top officials of the U.S Embassy were in touch with the Prime Minister and top Government officials to determine urgent supply needs. In addition to naval activities, financial donations were made to the PM Tobago Relief Fund. The US agency for International Development (USAID) donated 2,000 cots and 400 tents following requests by the Trinidad government. The US Red Cross also sent 200 tents to the Trinidad government. This immense donation allowed for the clearing of schools and resumption of classes.

The response from the international community was unprecedented and commendable. However, it was undoubtedly the response and recovery projects enacted by the government of the nation and, in particular, the Prime Minister's vision of recovery that most extraordinary and transformative.

6.9.4 The Government's Major Response and Recovery Projects

Discussed earlier, on October 1st following a short 15-minute emergency meeting of the Prime Minister's Cabinet, the decision was to send a team of Ministers and top officials headed by the Prime Minister to Tobago immediately *to take all*

³⁶⁴ "Seriously Hurt 9 Airlifted."

³⁶⁵ "Tobago Harbour Cleared."

*necessary steps to deal with the emergency.*³⁶⁶ Cabinet discussion on the government's Draft of the Second Five-Year Development Plan for the nation was postponed. The Relief team included Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Minister of Works, Minister of Health and Housing, the local government and community development and the Minister of Labor. Other Ministers were required to stand by for emergency summons at the discretion of the Prime Minister. An additional team was appointed to investigate damage in Trinidad. The Relief Mission left Piarcro on a B.W.I.A. aircraft for Tobago at 5:35 pm followed by the Red Cross. The Government Relief Committee met on Oct 1st at the main relief center, the Government Central School. The Attorney General, Senator George Richards consulted with Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams on the legal aspects of possible hurricane relief projects. PM solicited experts from international agencies to visit Tobago and monitor their response activities and the needs of the people.

The decisions made following this emergency meeting are discussed in detail below. This study will cover the State of Emergency and other executive actions taken by the Government that focused on the security and health of the population; the Tobago Relief Fund opened by the PM to collect funds almost identical to the Fund opened by the Mayor of Port-of-Spain following the 1933 Hurricane; lastly, this study will outline the work of the Tobago Relief Planning team that was appointed to provide a long-term recovery plan for the island.

³⁶⁶ "Williams Heads Relief Mission."

6.9.4.1 Tobago Relief Fund

Immediately after the October 1st emergency meeting was the opening of a Relief Fund to collect financial donations for the victims of Hurricane Flora. A similar Fund was opened after the 1933 Hurricane by the Mayor of Port-of-Spain and likely served as a blueprint for this effort. As with the 1933 Fund, the 1963 Fund would also be controlled by the central government. Contributions were received from White Hall and all District Revenue offices, the Treasury, Post Offices and commercial banks. Newspapers were not involved in the collection process as they were in 1933. All donations were required to be forwarded to Mr. H.E. Nelson Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister and not sent to any unauthorized persons. The donations were then accepted by the Accountant General and other Government agencies.³⁶⁷

The 1963 Tobago Relief Fund initiated by the PM Eric Williams opened with his own donation of \$1,000. Other initial donors included Chairman of the Electricity Commission of Enquiry, Mr. Phillipe Schereschewsky, NUGE and members of the Good Samaritan Friendly Society. By the following week, the Fund topped \$200,000. Early subscriptions came from the nation's biggest industries and foreign oil corporation subsidiaries. Civic groups of all kinds and individuals gave. The Chinese Association of Trinidad and Tobago and the China Society donated \$14,000. The South Trinidad Chamber of Commerce donated \$2,000 to the fund. The US Embassy in Trinidad contributed \$3,400 to the Fund. The U.K British Government contributed multiple times with an amount surpassing \$100,000. The Jamaican government

³⁶⁷ "PM Opens Fund with \$1,000."

donated \$24,000 with their Prime Minister Bustamante and Lady Bustamante donating \$480.³⁶⁸

A unique fundraising attribute of the 1933 Fund was the use of variety shows and relief concerts, the 1963 Fund included the same. That Saturday night following the storm there was a telethon pledge, hosted by Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT), Junior Chamber of Commerce and some of Trinidad's best entertainers raising over \$47,000.³⁶⁹ On October 11th, the Opportunity International Talent Organisation presented a variety show in Woodford Square and an open-air steel band jamboree was held to aid hurricane victims planned by the National Association of Trinidad and Tobago Steel bandsmen on Sunday, October 13. The jamboree was free of charge to the public but collected a donation for the PM Tobago relief fund.

By December 4th the Fund had grown to over \$707,000 ³⁷⁰ and on December 15th the last mention of the Fund, its amount had grown to over \$732,000.³⁷¹ By June 1964, the fund had surmounted to \$863,000.³⁷² Using the formula of $\{(1.0745)^{53\text{years}}\} \times \$863,000$ the 2016 relative value of donations are approx. \$39,000,000 TTD or £4,205,412 or \$6,168,36 USD. The Trinidad and Tobago Dollar's inflation

³⁶⁸ "Jamaica Govt. Sends \$24,000."

³⁶⁹ "Non-Stop Tv Aid Show."

³⁷⁰ "Tobago Fund at \$707,000."

³⁷¹ "Tobago Fund Now \$732,000."

³⁷² Ottley, *The Story of Tobago: Robinson Crusoe's Island in the Caribbean*.

rate 7.45%³⁷³ was collected from the website Tradingeconomics.com and the formula compounds the inflation rate over the number of years.

Table 32. Prime Minister’s Hurricane Fund. Source: Tobago Planning Committee.³⁷⁴

| | |
|--|----------|
| Act. U.K. High Commissioner | \$1,000 |
| Angostura bitters | \$5,000 |
| Archbishop of Port-of-Spain | \$1,000 |
| Bermudez Biscuit Co | \$5,000 |
| British Paints | \$1,000 |
| British Petroleum Ltd. | \$5,000 |
| Governor-General and Lady Hochoy | \$1,200 |
| Grell & Company | \$1,000 |
| Jamaica Government | \$24,000 |
| Neal & Massy Holdings | \$1,000 |
| Oxford Famine Relief Committee | \$14,400 |
| Prime Minister | \$1,000 |
| Sandbach Trinidad | \$1,000 |
| Save-the-Children Fund | \$9,600 |
| Shell Trinidad | \$5,000 |
| Sir Alexander and Lady Bustamante | \$480 |
| Syrian & Lebanese Community in Trinidad | \$1,550 |
| Tate & Lyle | \$25,000 |
| Texaco Trinidad | \$5,000 |

The Mayor of Port-of-Spain, acting on a suggestion by the Colonial Secretary, opened the 1933 hurricane relief fund. A committee appointed by the Governor

³⁷³ “Trinidad and Tobago Inflation Rate | 1957-2016.”

³⁷⁴ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.”

controlled that previous relief fund. A Central Hurricane Relief Committee worked through the medium of a Local Hurricane Relief Committee to ultimately disperse the raised funds to assist households in rebuilding their destroyed homes. By 1963, relief funds were a common occurrence following disasters in the region and as argued previously, their origin can be traced to the system of charity briefs brought to the New World by the various Christian contingents.³⁷⁵ However, the administration of this new Relief Fund would not be identical to the one held in 1933. The 1963 fund was initiated by the Prime Minister not the Mayor of Port-of-Spain, although the fact that both men held elected seats may be of note. Subscriptions were not collected by newspapers as they were in 1933, but instead at specific government offices and commercial banks. There was no Central Hurricane Relief Committee placed in charge of overseeing its expenditure. In fact, for a lengthy time, there was no mention of how the funds would be used and dispersed. In the end, Cabinet decided to spend the Prime Minister's Relief Fund by converting it into specific grants within the development plan put together by the Tobago Development Planning Committee. These grants would have a wide focus and not limited to the rebuilding of damaged homes. The allocation listed below included grants for poultry allocation, labor hours for clearing fields and church repairs.

- Free grants and materials up to \$100 for the repair of houses on present sites, that would be repaired except in areas selected for early relocation
- Free distribution of approximately 200 chicks to each of 500 small farmers

³⁷⁵ Matthew Mulcahy, *Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008)

- Granting up to \$12.50 per acre for clearing of coconut fields
- Grants for repairs to damaged churches
- Grants to fishermen to rebuild and repair fishing boats
- Grants for repairs to cocoa fermenters and dryers.

6.9.4.2 State of Emergency: Travel Ban and Other Executive Powers

In this section, this study will cover the origin of the State of Emergency Acts and their evolution at the time of Independence. This will be followed by its utilization by PM Eric Williams and Governor General Hochoy Solomon in response to Hurricane Flora. Through its use of executive orders, a travel ban in and out of the island was enacted; an anti-squatting and ban on fires was put into effect, and an obligatory typhoid inoculation campaign enforced. These executive powers were the decisions of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, although the Governor General signature was needed. As we documented previously, the executive powers of the Prime Minister (chief elected position) rose exponentially and at the time of the storm, the Governor was merely a figurehead representative of the Crown tasked with enacting the bidding of the Prime Minister.

6.9.4.3 Origin of Act

The Emergency Powers Act or the Declaration of a State of Emergency originates during colonial rule and the Defence of Realm Acts of Great Britain. The Law itself evolved over the years and the wording reflects the changing governmentality of the Empire. The Defence of Realm Act, 1914 and the Emergency Powers Act 1939 was passed during World War 1 and World War 2 respectively.

However, the former focused exclusively on security while the latter expanded to include the quality of life. The Defence of Realm Act, 1914 powers to make regulation states that its use is for securing the public safety and the defense of the realm.

“1. His Majesty in Council has power during the continuance of the present war to issue regulations as to the powers and duties of the Admiralty and Army Council and of the members of His Majesty’s forces, and other persons acting in His behalf, for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm; and may, by such regulations, authorize the trial by courts martial and punishment of persons contravening any of the provisions of such regulations designed”³⁷⁶

By contrast, the Emergency Powers Act 1939 states that the act may be engaged for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.

“1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, His Majesty may by Order in Council make such Regulations (in this Act referred to as “Defence Regulations”) as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.”³⁷⁷

This qualitative difference reflects this study’s hypothesis that the ruling tactics changed during this time period and although the stern rule of law continues additional provision is made for the needs of the population. Additionally, this expansion of usage is also an expansion of state power to use the law at wider discretion. The stern punishments for non-compliance are still enforced.

³⁷⁶ The Law Reports 1914 the Public General Acts, *Defence of the Realm (No.2) Act, 1914*, sec. Chapter 63.

³⁷⁷ The Public General Acts, *Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939*, sec. Chapter 62.

Both laws were passed and ratified by Trinidad and Tobago's legislature during colonial rule; similarly in all of Great Britain's colonies. See section 10 (3) of the law for the clause of dissemination to the colonies

10 (3) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that any reference in this Act to Defence Regulations includes a reference to regulations made under any provision of this Act as extended to any country or territory by an Order in Council under this Act, and that any reference in this Act to any country or territory includes a reference to the territorial waters, if any, adjacent to that country or territory.³⁷⁸

A review of the Ordinances passed by the legislative Council in Trinidad and Tobago in 1947 show the same expanded language allowing the then Governor to call a state of emergency if the public was threatened on so extensive a scale as to be "*likely to endanger the public safety or to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of any of the essentials of life.*"³⁷⁹ Failure to comply made persons liable on conviction before a summary court to a fine not exceeding \$500 or to imprisonment with or without hard labor for a period not exceeding six months or to both such fine and imprisonment.

With the uniqueness of the Caribbean natural hazards vulnerability, the British Act evolved and its usage following such events was added. From archival research on Caribbean Law, it appears that Barbados was the first to make this modification and utilized it in the devastating 1955, Hurricane Janet. The rest of the Caribbean followed in adaptation and even the short-lived West Indies Federation 1958-1962 included this

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ B.E.H. Clifford, *Emergency Powers Ordinance 1947 (Trinidad and Tobago)*.

provision in their laws. Under the short-lived Laws of the West Indies the Emergency Powers Act, 1960 Section 2. (1)

“If the Governor-General is satisfied that a public emergency has arisen as a result of the occurrence of any earthquake, hurricane, flood, fire, outbreak of pestilence, outbreak of infectious disease or other calamity whether similar to the foregoing or not, or that any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any person or body of persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety or to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community of supplies or services essential to life he may by proclamation (hereinafter referred to as a proclamation of emergency) declare that a state of emergency exists.”³⁸⁰

6.9.4.4 Use of Executive Powers following Hurricane Flora

On October 2nd, 1963, Governor-General Solomon Hochoy, declared a State of Emergency authorized under the Emergency Power Ordinance. Ch. 11. No.10. Section 3 of the Ordinance authorized George Lushinton Bowen, Esq, Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister-1) to assume control and regulate- a) All means of communication and transport. All fuel, buildings, plant and materials necessary to the working of the same: b) All food and liquor supplies, and all necessaries; c) All electric, water and other power stations; d) All arms, ammunition and explosives. 2) to take all other measures which he deems essential to the public safety and the life of the community, in and over the Island of Tobago during such period as the state of Emergency exists in that Island.

³⁸⁰ Laws of The West Indies Federation, *Emergency Powers Act 1960*, sec. Chapter 102.

Government Notice No. 111
No.13 of 1963

By His Excellency Sir Solomon Hochoy, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Trinidad and Tobago

SOLOMON HOCHOY- Governor-General

The Emergency Powers Ordinance, CH. 11. No. 10

A Proclamation

Whereas it is enacted by subsection (1) of section 2 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance, that if at any time it appears to the Governor-General that any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any person or body of persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety or to deprive the community or any substantial portion of the community of any of the essentials of life, the Governor-General may by proclamation declare that a state of emergency exists in Trinidad and Tobago or any portion thereof:

And Whereas it appears to me that arising out of the occurrence of a hurricane action has been taken and is immediately threatened by certain persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety and to deprive the community in the Island of Tobago of supplies and service essential to life:

Now, therefore, I, Solomon Hochoy, Governor-General as aforesaid, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon me by subsection (1) of section 2 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance, do hereby declare that a state of emergency exists in the Island of Tobago

Given under my Hand and the Seal of Trinidad and Tobago at the Governor-General's Office, St. Ann's, this 2nd day of October 1963
God Save the Queen

As of October 2nd, travel to Tobago was prohibited and no commercial passengers were allowed on flights without permission from the Prime Minister's office. According to an official release from the Prime Minister's office, there was great concern that the volunteering medical professionals spontaneously traveling to

Tobago created a dislocation in the Medical Services of Trinidad. The statement continues that on no account should they leave their posts and travel to Tobago without the permission of the Ministry of Health.³⁸¹ Officially, The Emergency Powers Tobago Prohibition of Travel Regulations, Government Notice No. 117 of 1963 was published on October 3rd, signed by H.E. Nelson, Acting Secretary to the Cabinet. The prohibition banned departure from Tobago and landing in Tobago. The official notice also drew the attention of the fear against a typhoid epidemic. Proof of Inoculation was now a prerequisite for gaining permission to travel to the and from Tobago.

Government Notice No. 117

2. No person shall depart from the Island of Tobago unless he has first obtained and holds a written authorization issued by the Permanent Secretary, Tobago Affairs.
3. No person shall land in the Island of Tobago unless he has obtained and holds a written authorization issued by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs.
4. A person who seeks an authorization under these regulations shall produce a certificate under the hand of a medical officer in the service of the Government indicating that he has been effectively inoculated against the disease of typhoid.
5. The owner, agent, master or person in charge of any vessel or aircraft shall not carry or convey any person to or from the Island of Tobago unless such person has in his possession the documents required by these Regulations.
6. notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations a person who-

³⁸¹ Guardian Airport Correspondent, "Clampdown on Travel to Tobago."

a) holds a return ticket to travel between Trinidad and Tobago; and

b) has obtained an authorization issued under these regulations in respect of the outward voyage,

shall not be required to obtain any further authorization in respect of the return voyage on the same ticket.

7. These Regulations shall continue in force until such date as the Governor-General declares that the state of emergency proclaimed by Proclamation No. 13 of 1963 has ceased to exist

Dated this 3rd day of October 1963,

H.E. NELSON- Acting Secretary to the Cabinet

This travel prohibition caused a raucous at the Prime Minister's Office, where a number of Tobagonians gathered in protest after they were forcefully taken off boats and denied the right to go help their friends and family in Tobago, among them was well-known entertainer Calypso Rose.³⁸² Despite the ban, people hired north coast fishermen to smuggle them into Tobago across the dangerously choppy 18 mile stretch between the twin islands. With the Police and Coast Guard occupied with recovery efforts, they were unable to stop this traffic raising government officials' fears of typhoid spreading.³⁸³

On October 11th, the proof of inoculation clause was amended to allow international visitor certifications and not only Trinidad and Tobago medical board proof of certification.³⁸⁴ With the influx of aid from foreign personnel, the amendment

³⁸² "Tobagonians Invade White Hall."

³⁸³ "People Defy Ban on Tobago Travel."

³⁸⁴ The Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) Regulations, 1963 was amended by substituting for regulation 4... *A person who seeks an authorization under these Regulations shall produce-a) certificate under the hand of a member of the Medical Board of Trinidad and Tobago, or b) An International Certificate of*

was a need and The Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) Regulations, 1963 was amended and posted in the Gazette.³⁸⁵ On October 27th, in light of the progress made in repairing the buildings, the Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister met with hoteliers and discussed the possibility of reviving the tourist trade of the island. By November 2nd, the tourist industry was ready to reopen with substantial repairs done to roads, utilities, beaches, local transport, airline services and hotel repairs. Unrestricted entry permitted to tourists from abroad while Trinidad tourists required proof of hotel accommodations. The vaccination requirement would be removed on November 15th.³⁸⁶

The Travel Ban was finally revoked by the Governor-General on December 12th, The Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) (Revocation) Regulations, 1963- Government Notice No. 134 of 1963)³⁸⁷

Government Notice No. 134

Made by the Governor-General under section 4 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance, Ch. 11. No. 10

These Regulations may be cited as the Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) (Revocation) Regulation, 1963

Vaccination or c) other satisfactory documentary proof of Vaccination, Indication that he has been effectively inoculated against the enteric fevers, that is to say, typhoid and paratyphoid

³⁸⁵Nelson, "Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) Regulations 1963."

³⁸⁶ "Tobago Set To Receive Tourists."

³⁸⁷ Nelson, "Government Notice No. 134 Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) (Revocation) Regulations, 1963."

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein, the Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) Regulations, 1963 hereby revoked.

Dated this 12th day of December 1963

H.E. Nelson- Acting Secretary to the Cabinet

6.9.4.5 Anti-squatting Laws and Banned Fire

On October 8th, 1963, The Governor-General, Sir Solomon Hochoy, acting under Section 4 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance made an entrance onto Crown Lands³⁸⁸ in Tobago prohibited unless a permit in writing issued under the hand of the Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister.³⁸⁹ With thousands of trees and branches left to dry in the heat, an inflammable mass of materials made the island susceptible to fires. The Prime Minister's official statement was because of this fire risk, the Forest Reserve and Crown Lands were made prohibited areas. This fire risk was claimed to be greater than famine, shelter or typhoid outbreak.³⁹⁰ However, the headline in the Guardian was "Squatting on Tobago Lands Prohibited".³⁹¹ This aligns with the island's long history of anti-vagrancy and anti-squatting laws that have been enacted since the time of slavery. As we will see in the Tobago Long Term Recovery plan, this

³⁸⁸ "Crown Lands" included the waste or vacant lands of the Crown in the Island of Tobago and all lands vested in Her Majesty the Queen, whether by forfeiture, escheat, purchase or exchange but does not include such lands if dedicated to the public or in the lawful occupation of a private individual

³⁸⁹Nelson, "Emergency Powers (Tobago) (Prohibition of Travel) Regulations 1963."

³⁹⁰ "PM Warns 'Tobago Today Is One Vast Tinder Box.'"

³⁹¹ "Squatting on Tobago Lands Prohibited," *Trinidad Guardian*, October 9, 1963.

ban also helps with the urban planning scheme which sort to relocate the population to optimal economic locales.



Figure 20. PM Dr. Eric Williams inspects damage to Tobago forestry reserves. Source: Trinidad and Tobago National Archives.

Government Notice No. 119

Crown Lands prohibitions of entry

2. No Person shall enter upon or be or remain upon any Crown Lands situate in the island of Tobago unless he has in his possession a permit in writing so to do issued under the hand of the Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister.

3. For the purpose of these Regulation the expression “Crown Lands” includes the waste or vacant lands of the Crown in the Island of Tobago and all lands vested in Her Majesty the Queen, whether by forfeiture, escheat, purchase or exchange but does not include such lands if dedicated to the public or in the lawful occupation of a private individual

Dated this 8th day of October 1963.³⁹²

³⁹² Nelson, *Emergency Powers (Crown Lands (Prohibition of Entry) Regulations, 1963.*

6.9.4.6 Inoculation Campaign

Immediately following the storm, a massive inoculation campaign was launched. The public health fears of a typhoid epidemic spurred the government to enforce vaccination before island entry.³⁹³ The level of bio-politics is absent in the previous disaster responses under study. A special isolation ward was established at the Scarborough Hospital. By the Saturday following the storm over 14,000 people were inoculated against typhoid and more than 16,000 by that following Tuesday. The quick restoration of the water supplies was said to greatly reduce the typhoid threat. Medical Officer in charge of Tobago General Hospital, Dr. David Busby assured that only a few suspected cases of typhoid existed by that following Tuesday and there was no cause for panic. In his 2nd broadcast to the nation, ten days after the storm, PM Eric Williams stated that 25,700 persons were inoculated against typhoid. Thirteen immunization centers were established throughout the island, there was no need to panic, as there were no confirmed cases since the storm.

Despite the lack of cases, the inoculation campaign continued in full swing. World governments sent donations of needles and vaccines. The Ambassador of the Netherlands Mr. I. C Debrot, presented to the Government 1,500 samples of anti-Typhoid and paratyphoid serum. The British Red Cross on behalf of the British Government sent 10,000 doses of anti-typhoid vaccine with necessary syringes and

³⁹³ Typhoid fever is an acute illness associated with fever that is most often caused by the *Salmonella typhi* bacteria. It can also be caused by *Salmonella paratyphi*, a related bacterium that usually leads to a less severe illness. The bacteria are deposited through fecal contamination in water or food by a human carrier and are then spread to other people in the area.

needles to the Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross in answer to an appeal received from the Acting British High Commissioner in Trinidad.³⁹⁴

The travel restriction required anyone without proof of vaccination to be barred from entry or exiting Tobago.³⁹⁵ For Medical Officials, they were required to document whomever they inoculated and report it to the county medical officer in Tobago. Non-compliance was harsh and could result in a \$500 fine and 6 months in prison.

3. A medical practitioner who has between the 3rd day of October 1963 and the appointed day administered or cause to have been administered an inoculation against the enteric fevers to any person in the Island Tobago shall within three days of the appointed day make a return of any such inoculation to the County Medical Officer, Tobago.

5. A medical practitioner who contravenes or fails to comply with paragraph 3 or 4 of this Order is guilty of an offense and liable on summary conviction to a fine of five hundred dollars or six months imprisonment or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

6. This Order comes into operation on the 18th day of October 1963

Dated this 16th day of October 1963

H.E. Nelson- Acting Secretary to the Cabinet³⁹⁶

³⁹⁴ “Thant Sends Envoy’s Plea To Agencies.”

³⁹⁵ Under Regulation 4 of Government notice 117 also known as the Travel Ban anyone attempting to travel to Tobago had to be inoculated. (4). A person who seeks an authorization under these regulations shall produce a certificate under the hand of a medical officer in the service of the Government indicating that he has been effectively inoculated against the disease of typhoid.

³⁹⁶ Nelson, “Emergency Powers (Returns of Inoculation) Order, 1963.”

Also launched by the government was a health education campaign to guide people on how to live in such a situation. By Oct 21st, over 30,000 were inoculated against typhoid, 17,000 received their second dose, and by Mid-November, the proof of inoculation for visitors was revoked to reignite the tourist industry.

The use of Emergency Powers by the Prime Minister's Cabinet was unprecedented as for the first time this power was not in the complete control of the Governor but elected members of society. Surprising its usage was expanded to ban travel to and from Tobago; ban squatting and entrance onto Crown Lands; ban fires and enforce an inoculation campaign. The Government has thus expanded its arm of responsibilities towards the health and well-being of the entire population and in so doing expanding its power to control the movement and behavior of the population. The Governor merely plays the ceremonial role of signing such declaration initiated by the Cabinet.

In the recovery phase of the storm, the Cabinet embarked on a revolutionary development initiative to transform Tobago and create a more vibrant and diverse economy less vulnerable to future disasters. Although it would be erroneous to say that the storm initiated this idea, as the development plans for Tobago were already somewhat in line with this framework. The storm exposed further vulnerabilities that were taken into account and expanded the Government's 2nd Five Year Plan for the nation.

6.9.5 Tobago Planning Team: Long Term Recovery and Mitigation

With an estimated 75% of coconuts and crops destroyed by Flora, potentially taking 25 years to rebuild stock, voices were emerging that Tobago should take this opportunity to build its agriculture on more sound and wider scale. Over 8,000 small

farmers were in urgent need of rehabilitation.³⁹⁷ Eric Williams was privy to these cries for change before the storm and were reinforced afterward through numerous caucus style conversations held with Tobagonians in his “Meet the people tour”. On October 6th, PM Eric Williams gave a radio announcement that he will create a new separate development program to help hurricane-wrecked Tobago, a long range *Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme*.

The Prime Minister appointed his team on October 8th, 1963 to *formulate the broad outline of a long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction program for Tobago and to report to the National Planning Commission within four weeks*.³⁹⁸ In his address to the nation, PM Williams stated that Government policy toward the rehabilitation of Tobago would be based on two principal considerations. The maximum encouragement of private investment to assist in the restoration of Tobago’s production, but on the other hand, the larger interests of the community must be protected and anti-social activities would not be permitted. Daily meetings were held until 30th October and the team consulted published and unpublished works on Tobago, various specialists in the Government Services and the University of the West Indies.³⁹⁹ The devastation was so severe and created a need to modify previous development plans laid out for the island. Thus, what was ultimately proposed was a modification of the Trinidad and Tobago Development Plan 1964-1968. The new

³⁹⁷ “Team to Report in Four Weeks.”

³⁹⁸ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.”

³⁹⁹ The official team members included R.J Cooks (Chairman), St. Cooper, F. Rampersad, P. Roach, H. Adams, Dr. Brown, L. Paul, F Assam, A. Taylor, H. Murray, F. Dowdy (Secretary).

objectives were not just recommendation towards repairing the damage done by the hurricane but also to re-equip and reshape the economy of Tobago so that it would be able to follow a growth path above what was previously possible.

Another significant component was the PM's appointment of a Tobago Advisory Committee whose principal responsibility was to provide the National Planning Commission and the Parliament with Tobago's views on the Development proposals being worked on.⁴⁰⁰ Parallels can be drawn to the local relief committee formed during the 1933 recovery efforts that assisted the central relief committee in the reconstruction of houses and dissemination of funds. In a similar light, this Tobago Advisory Committee would be that local committee that assisted the PM Planning Team. On October 28th, the Tobago Advisory committee met to review the proposed plans. Members of the committee were nominated by or elected to represent their respective organization.⁴⁰¹

⁴⁰⁰ Eric Williams stated that Tobago interests must be represented on the Committee along with representative from the Chamber of Commerce, Agricultural Society, The Hotel's Association, Trade Union Movement, Village Councils, Agricultural Credit Societies, Cooperative Societies and Credit Unions, Women organizations of Tobago, Youth Groups and two prominent members of society nominated by the committee. Ready to mobilize at the formulation of the Development Plan

⁴⁰¹ Members included Village Councils: Mr. E. McPherson Agricultural Credit Societies: Mr. Rhodii Taylor, Co-operatives Mr. W. Archer, Women Groups: Mrs. Zena George, Youth Groups Mr. Lennox Dennon, Tobago Chamber of Commerce: Mr. J. A Scott, Tobago Agricultural Society: Mr. Mayo Short, Tobago Hotels Association: Mr. Walter Mendez, Mr. Blanckett and Mr. Neville Gibbes.

6.9.5.1 Fears of Land Reform

A great fear emerged among the large plantation owners that the government would seize this opportunity to carry out certain land redistribution measures to their detriment. With Trinidad, importing 28,000,000 gallons of milk per year reasonable calls for cattle rearing in Tobago's fertile lands for beef and milk production was discussed in newspapers.⁴⁰² Rumors of the new overall plan were pervasive and caused a wall of silence among the multitude of civil servants in the island. A non-government survey done by Dr. Fenwick, Director of Research of the Trinidad and Tobago Coconut Research Ltd and his colleague, Mr. Lincoln Goberdban plant pathologist stated that much of the land under coconut cultivation was uneconomical but believed good coconuts could replace them along with a sound fertilization program copra could be recovered from the trees in six years.

October 20th, in his fourth broadcast to the Nation, PM Eric Williams announced that alien land holdings in Tobago were under review by the government team assessing Tobago development following the storm. In his words, *if there is any "back to the land" movement there must be ensured there is land to go back to;* continuing on to cite then U.S. President Kennedy recent statements on land reform as an important condition for economic aid under the Alliance for Progress. He recalls in his meet the people tour that the problem of landlessness and demand for government redistribution kept coming up. He stated that farms 100 acres and over-represented less than 1% but constituted 50 percent of the total farm acreage.

⁴⁰² Vieira, "Flora May Well Be a Blessing in Disguise."

At the other extreme, 9 out of the 10 farms were less than 10 acres in size, and comprised more than one-quarter of the total acreage in farms; the average size of these 3,000 farms was less than four acres.

He believed there was great scope for reasonable reconciliation between private investment and social needs.⁴⁰³ These figures also showed the abandonment of the land over the previous three decades and migration to Trinidad creating a food trade deficit with Trinidad.

PM Williams then raises the earlier devastating hurricane of October 11, 1847, as a useful guide in dealing with this event and as evidence for the need to diversify the economy. With then sugar as the principal export crop in 1847, the legislative council fought to bring back the sugar industry at an enormous cost but ultimately then went bankrupt 50 years later. He would not repeat the same pattern with the coconut industry.

In 1963, it was not sugar but coconuts. Are we, therefore, to go back to coconuts after September 30, 1963, as they went back to cane after October 11, 1847? Or are we to attempt a greater measure of diversification and seek a better pattern of land use? Within two decades of the 1847 devastation, no fewer than 50 estates exchanged hands many of them being purchased by absentees in the United Kingdom. One individual alone buying as many as 17 estates.

Land reform was already under consideration before the storm occurred with nine estates offered to the Government for sale or negotiation. Alien ownership of lands lead to a severe abandonment and neglect of some of the most fertile lands and Williams's government planned to communicate with Britain to renegotiate the treaties made with the island in respect of the rights of their nationals to own land in

⁴⁰³ "Land Reform Planned: Alien Holdings In Tobago for Review by Govt."

Tobago. He states to the public that his government will not permit private investments which would involve the wholesale alienation to non-nationals of the island simply because the rights of the people are insufficiently protected by the Aliens Landholdings Ordinance, which was inherited with independence.

6.9.5.2 Long Term Plan Presented and Debated in Parliament

The Long-Term Development Plan for Tobago was completed in 23 days, five days ahead of schedule and enabling the modification of the nation's draft 2nd Five-Year Plan. The Plan along with the Trinidad Development Plan was reviewed by the Prime Minister scheduled for Cabinet discussion on November 16 -17th and then Parliamentary Discussion on the week of November 23, leaving the month of December clear for the 1964 Budget.

The proposed plan for Tobago was a \$43.4 million plan over the ensuing five years. A sum of \$12 million was earmarked for housing and \$8 million for agriculture, \$3 million for roads, \$3.2 million for electricity and \$3.6 million for the redevelopment of Scarborough. Local resources would provide 31% of the cost with the remaining 69% coming from external loans and grants. The plan had three objectives: to rehabilitate the social aspects of Tobago; to develop the economy of Tobago through increased employment and greater productivity, and special attention given to agriculture and tourism; and to restore and conserve the national assets.⁴⁰⁴ On November 27th, the \$43.4m sum was presented with the overall Five-Year Development Plan to the House of Representatives which totaled \$320m. An original

⁴⁰⁴ Delph, "Tobago's D-Plan to Cost \$43.4m: Agriculture and Housing to Get \$19m."

sum of \$17 million was planned for Tobago before the occurrence of the Hurricane and alteration to the five-year plan. In whole, the development program aimed to achieve a diversification of production in Trinidad and Tobago over the following five years. Other notable features of the plan included 19% devoted to Agriculture and large-scale distribution of Crown Lands aimed at settling some 7,000 farming families, a continuation of subsidies to the Cocoa Scheme, low-cost housing in rural and semi-urban areas and the crucial need for employment alternatives.⁴⁰⁵

Following debates in the House of Representatives, the plan was decreased to \$38 million and on November 29th the Government used its majority vote to pass the bill.⁴⁰⁶ Another controversial matter debated was proposed changes to the aliens land holdings ordinance. PM Eric Williams laments that renegotiation of this treaty is needed as this ordinance passed in 1920 or thereabout allowed for those in Romania or Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Chile to obtain land exempted from securing permission. The proposed policy would require anyone that is not a citizen of the country to apply for a license to hold lands and no exemption for specified foreign countries would exist under the existing law. Maximum encouragement would be given to tourist development and industrial and agricultural development.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁵ Delph, “\$320m. D-Plan’s Aim Is Production.”

⁴⁰⁶ The PM Cabinet reduced the figure by deleting recurrent expenditure and transferring to the Better Village Programme the provision for tractor pools, the ambulances, the homes for the aged, the bookmobiles, the mobile health unit, the provision for the community centres, the Youth Camp and marketing trucks. Also eliminated under Community Development were provision for radio and television sets while adding the further development of parks and landscaping for the improvement of tourist attractions.

⁴⁰⁷ Delph, “\$38m Tobago Rebuilding Plan Passed.”

The Opposition members found many contentions and condemned the bill while commending its overall purpose. Opposition Leader Mr. S.C Maharaj made a point to align himself with the Prime Minister’s praises of foreign assistance in fear of being misquoted by the *Trinidad Guardian*. In a long rebuttal, Opposition member Mr. T. Hosein mirrors this dichotomous position of support and condemnation.

Mr. Speaker, you must forgive me for speaking so long, but Tobago is as dear to me as it is to the Prime minister; the only thing is that we do not agree on the approach.⁴⁰⁸

A very contentious debate occurred that evening with the harsh accusation of “Hitlerism” and “supporting the plantocracy” thrown around. The House adjourned at 7:41 pm putting the question to rest with a vote approving the Report of the Tobago Panning Team. The House divided Ayes 11, Noes 6 (See Table 33)

Table 33. House of representative vote outcome. Source: Trinidad and Tobago Parliament. ⁴⁰⁹

| Ayes: | Noes: |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| O’Halloran, Hon. J. H. | Maharaj, Mr. S.C. |
| Williams, Hon. Dr. E. E. | Forrester, Dr. A. |
| Mohammed, Hon. K. | Seukeran, Mr. L.F. |
| Wallace, Hon. R. E. | Hosein, Mr. T. |
| Teshea, Hon. Mrs. I | Farquhar, Mr. P. |
| Mohammed, Hon. S | Jamadar, Mr. V |
| Alexis, Hon. A. C. | |
| Thompson, Hon. A.A. | |
| Pitt, Mr. B. | |
| Campbell, Mr. V.L. | |
| Johnson, Mr. C. K. | |

⁴⁰⁸ Douglas, “Debates of the House of Representatives.” Pg. 467

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

| | |
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The bill then moved to the Upper Chamber where the Senate voted to pass the Fiver-year plan on December 3rd, with a majority 13 to 8 vote. The major dissent did come from the opposition and independent senators. Senator J.B. Stollmeyer charged that the Plan was “*sacrificing the present for the obscurity of the future, the substance for the shadow.*” Opposition Senator Liliias Wight criticizes the lack of info on the current banana growers and the lack of information on disaster fund allocation from prior disasters. The leader of the Opposition Senator Thomas Blensdell condemned Government’s intention to acquire land owned by aliens. Senator the Rev. Roy Neehall dissent was that the immediate relief should not be tied to the reconstruction of a whole society.⁴¹⁰

The legislative reforms that preceded the Nation’s Independence made the power of the Prime Minister rule almost supreme and very similar to the power of the Governor during Crown Colony rule. Out of the 24 seats in the newly created Senate, the composition included 13 appointments of the Prime Minister and, therefore, the passing of the Five-Year Plan was never in doubt.

The rehabilitation plan was a comprehensive development and welfare plan that aimed to completely transform Tobago. It entire framework represented the new welfare state and the need to provide employment, education and less vulnerable society. For the sake of efficiency, this study will discuss the main pieces of the plan in the section below.

⁴¹⁰ “Senate Passes Tobago Plan: Stollmeyer Says Present Sacrificed.”

6.9.5.3 The Population State and Disaster Recovery

Their framework of the rehabilitation plan exemplifies the paradigm shift of the Government from the simple rule of the sword and territorial State to a Population State and working to maximize the potentialities of the population.

the economic assets of Tobago were shown to lie in its people, its agricultural resources including fishery, and forestry, which are the main economic support, and in its natural endowments which make it an attractive tourist centre.⁴¹¹

The plan further states that agriculture and tourism will be the two important primary generators of employment and output in Tobago in the private sector. Tourism would assist the development of agriculture and manufacturing while providing incomes, jobs, and foreign exchange.⁴¹² They describe the only natural resources of Tobago as its people, its land, and its natural endowments. They stress that the interaction of these two resources- land and people- produces the maximum benefit for both. Almost by definition, the ruling PNM has embraced governmentality and its goal of population wellbeing for maximization while efficiently continuing the extraction of wealth from the land.

The pattern must be on whereby there is continuous economic growth firmly based on agriculture, forestry, fisheries and tourism, with associated side industries; a pattern where the living standards of a hard-working people are gradually raised to satisfy increasing standards of comfort.

⁴¹¹ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.” Pg. 43

⁴¹² They argue that given internal sector limitation and competition from Trinidad, secondary manufacturing would not be an important pillar in the economy in the near future.

Governmentality implies a rise in the technologies of discipline. It is important to note that Foucault did not see governmentality fully displacing sovereignty. *In fact, its emergence made sovereignty acuter. In fact, we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has a population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.* ⁴¹³ In the rehabilitation plan, the planning committee continuously stressed the need to change the minds and behavior of the people to accomplish their goals. In their analysis, these goals can be achieved partly through the mechanics of proper land use but more so, through a change in the attitude of the people who are actively engaged in working the land.

The most important asset, and also the focal point of the whole exercise of the plan is the people of Tobago; their role in the execution of the plan, their enthusiasm and cooperation in the implementation of the various components of it and the extent to which the people are identified with the plan are probably the most important single ingredient for its success. Consequently, a most pressing need is to rehabilitate the people; this involves not only the provision of homes to replace those destroyed by the hurricane, it involves education of both children and adults, it involves extension services to improve output and yields and it involves the fostering of a community spirit. Provision must, therefore, be made in this direction.⁴¹⁴

In the arena of security, the plan was dedicated to improving adequate services for the protection of life, property and the enforcement and maintenance of law and order. It called for the replacement of existing police building and the construction of new stations around the island.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹³ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*. Pg. 108

⁴¹⁴ "Report of the Tobago Planning Team." Pg. 44

⁴¹⁵ Rebuilding of the Scarborough Station at \$350,000 and construction of a Police and Launch Station at Plymouth - \$85,000 along with police Quarters at \$75,000.

The second guiding factor for the future development of Tobago was acknowledging that Tobago does lie in the Hurricane belt and the design of houses and buildings must mitigate this vulnerability. Community centers as well should take this into fact and built to be used as a shelter when necessary. In summary, the plan sets broad targets within a period varying from 2 years for certain projects to 18 years in the case of the regeneration of the forests. It devised the recovery and reconstruction into three separate phases. At the time of the plan's creation the first phase, in the initial response, was the provision of places to sleep and food to eat, the clearing of roads and the restoration of a minimum supply of utilities; this phase was already well advanced. The second phase concerned putting the population back on its feet; this covered the reconstruction and repair of homes, the abolition of decanting centers, the restoration of some source of income earning the power to the population and the general return to the routine of life. The third phase being the super-imposition of a more permanent and efficient structure to raise levels of income and consumption above those previously existing.⁴¹⁶

In areas of greatest opposition, the plan advocates that the government use its power of laws to guide the behavior of the population to fulfill their plan. New

Following the temporary measures used following the hurricane and drought the plan highlighted the need for a permanent Fire Station at Roxborough

⁴¹⁶ Town and country planning outlined the physical framework of economic use and employment potentialities of the island. The location of population related to employment and the resulting pattern of village and urban settlements incorporated with main communications and public utilities required to effectively serve the pattern of settlement and the centers of economic activity.

acquisition laws would be amended to compensate any lands acquired for implementation of the proposals and paid in part in land bond. Lands in private ownership leased or rented by the government for public purposes. A new land tax law would provide incentives for development, curbing speculation, discourage idol land holding and increase revenues. They viewed land protection and conservation as protection for the agricultural economy and increasing tourism.⁴¹⁷

6.9.5.4 Agriculture Goals

The ambitious goals of the plan first begin with the creation of a LAND CAPABILITY MAP, the first of its kind in Tobago. The map divides the land into eight capability classes pictorially. Classes, I through Class IV designated as soils suitable for cultivation of common crops and the introduction of new crops such as radish, sweet peppers, and carrots.

Cocoa

For the Cocoa industry, the overall goal was to establish and regenerate 6,750 acres as compared with 7,000 before the hurricane. The plan called for the introduction of an Advisory Cocoa Committee to look after the affairs of the industry. The government would assist by clearing free of charge all areas suitable for cocoa up to a maximum of 50 acres on any holding. Fertilization and herbicides for the first year would be provided free of charge and after the first year, medium term loans

⁴¹⁷ Historic, scenic, scientific and recreational potential of the island

should be provided to all farmers. Subsidies and loans for the rehabilitation and development of cocoa would be restricted to lands which have been declared suitable for cocoa according to the Land Capability map. In the total \$1,947,000 would be provided for the industry

Table 34. Cocoa Industry Grants and Loans over next 5 years. Source: Tobago Planning Committee.⁴¹⁸

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Grant to clear lands (five years) | \$175,000 |
| Grant of fertilizers and herbicides (five years) | \$224,000 |
| Loans for purchase of fertilizers and herbicides (five years) | \$288,000 |
| Subsidy for planting cocoa (five years) | \$685,000 |
| Loans for developing cocoa (five years) | \$400,000 |
| Cost of plant propagation (five years) | \$175,000 |
| Total | \$1,947,000 |

Coconuts

The plan calls for the regeneration of 7,500 acres of coconuts compared to the 10,000 acres used before the hurricane. No government assistance will be given to coconuts growers on unsuitable soils according to the land capability map. A combination of cattle rearing and coconuts is recommended with large landholders expected to assist small landholders in their cattle expansion by providing communal pastures. To maximize soil potential, coconuts growers are recommended to shift to

⁴¹⁸ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.”

Class III and Class IV soils instead of Class I and II. The government will supply a tractor pool to assist in the clearing of lands. For owners able to clear their own lands, a rebate of ½ the cost will not be beyond 12.50 per acre. Insecticides and herbicides provided free of charge for the first year.

Bananas

The plans called for the increased production in pure and mixed stands up to 2,000,000 stems as compared with 700,000 stems before the hurricane. Bananas were considered the quickest way of restoring income and a means of providing shade for young cocoa plants. The plan advocated for the formation of a Statutory banana growers cooperative and with government underwriting loans where necessary. They believed that ancillary services would be created that will increase employment opportunities in transportation and greater circulation of money.

Livestock and Dairy

The plans called for the major expansion of meat and dairy industry, in the poultry market to increase production to £1.5million pounds live weight as compared with £.3 million pounds before the hurricane. They advocate the free distribution of chicks to increase egg production to 50,000 dozens as compared with 15,000 dozens before the hurricane. Increased beef production 1,000 cattle head per year and 1,500 gallons of milk per day as compared to 500 in 1961. The government would construct and operate breeding herds to breed 2,000 weaners a year to produce £1.8 million pounds per year as compared to £.6million in 1961. In sheep and goats to produce

3,000 head per year as compared with 1,000 in 1961 and to construct 50 miles of access roads to agricultural holdings.

Table 35. Livestock and dairy loans and grants. Source: Tobago Planning Committee.⁴¹⁹

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| Poultry | Loan for a period of 2years Other- free distribution | \$285,000 \$41,000 |
| Pigs | Capital- Construction of sites on Government Farms Loan Other subsidies for industry Operation of Government Farm | \$40,000 \$20,000 \$80,000 \$40,000 |
| Dairy Cattle | Capital-Construction of pens on Government Farm Loan- Breeding stock Other | \$10,000 \$50,000 |
| Beef Cattle | Loan for acquisition of cattle Other- for subsidized fencing material | \$70,000 \$20,000 |
| Sheep | Capital for five years | \$5,000 |
| Extension and Irrigation of Pastures on Government Farm | | \$100,000 |
| Establishment of Communal Pastures | | \$170,000 |
| Subsidy for water winning | | \$30,000 |
| Free feeding stuff for three months for all livestock and poultry | | \$20,000 |
| Total | | \$1,051,000 |

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

Reforestation

The program would reforest the Forest Reserve and Catchment Area in the shortest possible time with sound silvicultural practice by the introduction of economically valuable species. Experimental plots would give information on the suitability of a range of species likely to succeed including Cedar, Cypr, Mahogany, Pink Poui, Araucaria, Eucalyptus, Pine, and Khaya. The program aimed to produce as much commercial timber as is silviculturally feasible without impairing the primary protective function of the forests. Total area for reforestation was 10,976 acres with Forest Reserve Main Ridge at 9,776 acres and 1200 acres in the Hillsborough Catchment. 200 acres in Little Tobago game sanctuary was also prioritized.

Fisheries-

Loans were provided to fishermen whose boats were destroyed by the hurricane. These loans would encourage modification to their boats and acquisition of better fishing nets. There will also be a concerted effort to train younger men to encourage them into fishing as a career. The plan also recommends fisheries co-operatives to safeguard the vital interests of the fishermen.

Tourism

The tourism sector played an integral role in the Tobago Plan. Since WWII, tourism became an important employer and generator of income for the island. The draft development plans 1964-1968 set the goal of 600,000 tourist days, 50% higher than 1962, achievable by increasing tourist length of stay or the number of rooms available. For Tobago, a 75% increase in tourist days was set for the 5 year period at

150,000 tourist days. This meant increasing occupancy of rooms from 50 to 66% and the construction of additional 100 rooms. The government would provide loans for repairs and new construction on the Island. The plan states that increasing tourist length can be achieved by improving beauty spots on the island (eg. Buccoo Reef and Bird of Paradise Island). Tourist length of stay can also be achieved by the demarcation and preservation of historical landmarks. The government would pay for both. Publicity or Advertisement in promoting and selling the island as a holiday spot for Trinidad residents will be improved as well as greater promotion among South and North Americans. The government will also investigate rumored airline discrimination towards the twin island and fare disparities for the visiting the island.

The objective of promoting tourist development was to create employment and income opportunities for the people of Tobago. Hotel and tourist development would integrate itself into the entire economy of the island. Those that take loans would be required to utilize local art and handicraft for the decoration of their establishments and for sale to visitors.

Table 36. Tourist sector loans and grants. Source: Tobago Planning Committee.⁴²⁰

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Loans funds for repair, additions and new construction of hotels and guest houses in Tobago over five years | \$500,000 |
| Advertising in tourist reservoirs- 2 to 3 years | \$25,000 |
| Improvement of tourist sites- over 5 years | \$37,000 |
| Historical sites and landmarks- 5 years | \$5,000 |
| Loan funds for boat owners- 5 years | \$25,000 |
| Branch of Catering School- 5 years | \$50,000 |
| Miscellaneous additional expenditures | \$50,000 |

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| Total | \$692,000 |
|-------|-----------|

6.9.5.5 Education and Community Development

Over \$2 million dollars dedicated to the repair and improvement of elementary and secondary education, expansion of vocational schools and library services. Restoration of the damaged school buildings and facilities. However, the plan advocates for the construction of new schools and the improvement of the standards and provision in Tobago to conform to national norms in Trinidad. The reforms also call for modification of post-primary syllabi to give a bearing on the environmental needs. Other recommendations include equipping all elementary schools with agricultural tools and equipment; expansion of facilities of home economics and science; establishment of a farm school to produce 80 persons per year, and the erection of new centers in selected areas to teach home economics and industrials arts to primary school pupils. In addition, a grant to the Scarborough library to restock and expand their book collection and to provide branch library services in main centers and bookmobile service in villages.

Table 37. Loans and grants to Education. Source: Tobago Planning Committee.⁴²¹

| Elementary Education | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| Repairs and rebuilding | \$130,000 | |
| Furniture, visual aids equipment 35 x 2,000 | \$70,000 | \$200,000 |
| Addition of 2 new schools at \$45,000 | | \$90,000 |
| Secondary Education | | |

⁴²¹ Ibid.

| | | |
|--|----------------------------------|-------------|
| Repairs | | \$6,500 |
| Roxborough new school (600 places) \$500,000 basic \$30,000 for extra labs \$60,000 for extra practical subject rooms | | \$590,000 |
| Scarborough (770 places) 4 additional classrooms 1 additional Science Lab 1 additional room for Home Economics | \$50,000 \$15,000 \$40,000 | \$105,000 |
| Bishops high school | | |
| 1 additional Science Lab | \$15,000 | |
| 3 additional workshops for practical subjects | \$60,000 | \$75,000 |
| Vocational Training | | |
| Practical centers for Primary Schools Home Economics 5 x 10,000 Industrial arts 5 x 12,000 | | \$110,000 |
| Farm School | | \$650,000 |
| Libraries | | |
| Books | \$200,000 | |
| Charlotteville Branch | \$10,000 | |
| Roxborough Branch | \$20,000 | |
| Bookmobiles | \$42,000 | |
| Library building Scarborough | \$100,000 | \$372,000 |
| Total | | \$2,198,500 |

The plans called for a community development and social welfare structure with deliberate emphasis on the adult education as the most feasible and practical medium through which the human resources of Tobago can be mobilized and trained for the task of reconstruction.⁴²² High priority was given to the establishment of an Adult Education Workshop as part of a Cultural Centre in Scarborough with

⁴²² A Development of a Social Development Council of volunteers from churches businesses and interest groups for the purpose of rallying the community, coordinating action, and providing effective leadership as a basis for an intensive programme of re-educating the population to its new responsibilities in the post-hurricane rehabilitation programme.

equipment and facilities for training in leadership, specialized phases of community development, handicraft, home economics, co-operation and other allied subjects for the what the plans calls *the development of an enlightened industrious, self-sufficient community*. Community centers would be supplied with canning and home economics equipment and equipped with facilities for handicraft, and capable of being used as relief centers in times of disaster. Utilizing Better Villages Programs to establish youth camps for the unemployed job training and building Houses for the elderly.

6.9.5.6 Rehousing Program

The rehousing program aimed at constructing 4,100 new homes that were destroyed by the storm and varying degrees of repairs to the 2,500 damaged homes, which do not need reconstruction or relocation. The program also aimed at relocating 1,200 families and to construct homes for the elderly in the main population centers of the island. In the short, term the tent denotations were given to families on their present house sites with free materials worth up to \$100 as shelter.

Of the 4,100 houses, 500 will be for lower middle-class housing and will utilize the household's own resources and supplementary loans of up to \$5,000 at a total cost of \$2.5 million. Relocation of 1,200 families will cost \$1.5million considering land acquisition cost of development and supply of utilities. For 2,500 damaged houses loans of \$300 per household provided. With the need for a speedy recovery, the following construction methods were adopted.

1. Aided self-help or community effort in construction
2. Construction of completed houses by contract

3. Government construction using paid labor working on basic materials or on pre-fabricated parts
4. Making loans to individuals who can supplement these loans with their own resources and arrange for their own construction

Three different types of housing units considered for reconstruction and prepared by the National Housing Authority.⁴²³ The first unit being a two bedroom concrete prefabricated structure and considered the most desirable as it would also be protected against fires. At a min cost of \$2,000 and because of it, flat land suitability requirements would only be limited to one-third of new units built. The second type of rehousing was a wooden prefabricated structure prepared by the National Housing Authority and suitable to lands with extremely steep slopes which cannot support concrete prefabricated structures. These wooden units will have 3 types; 1) Unit with a bed/sitting room and kitchen at the cost of \$800; 2) Unit 1 with a bedroom added at the cost of \$1400; 3) Unit 2 with a second bedroom added at the cost of \$1800. These costs are estimated by family labor without pay.

The third design prepared by the National Housing Authority described as the community effort plan would exploit community self-help principles. Manufacturing of building blocks with materials and equipment supplied on a loan basis from Government, leveling of building sites carried out either by the individual or community effort and material and technical assistance was given by the government. The sizes and design of this type would be similar to the wooden prefabricated units at an added cost of \$300-\$400 each.

⁴²³ The rehousing model emphasized low cost and also having durability against hurricane winds.

27% would be Type I using small community effort; 33% for type II houses using large community effort; 40% for type III concrete prefabrication structure and largest community effort.⁴²⁴

Table 38. Loans and Grants for housing. Source: Tobago Planning Committee.⁴²⁵

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| Loans for lower middle-class housing | \$2.5 million |
| Prefabricated buildings excluding cost of site preparation | \$6.5 million |
| Relocation of 1200 households | \$1.5 million |
| Repair of damaged houses | \$.75 million |
| Grant of materials | \$.4 million |
| Total | \$11.65 million |

The householder will be borrowing the particular amount from Government secured by a mortgage on the house, and repaying interest and principal over 20 years. To the neediest people, interest rates charged on the loans should escalate upwards with the size of the loan; the minimum interest rate 15% per annum for loans of less than \$1000 and the maximum rate should be 5% per annum for the middle-class housing loans. The question of land titles will, therefore, require an ad hoc solution.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁴ Public notice included the types of housing which are going to be provided and the obligations of the householder in each case. i.e. whether assembly is by family labour, community labour or whether completed house will be offered.

⁴²⁵ “Report of the Tobago Planning Team.”

⁴²⁶ Ibid. Pg. 92

Eight months after the hurricane, the Government distributed these loans. The people of the island organized themselves in co-operative groups to rebuild their homes. The massive program of reconstruction rehabilitated the island within two years. The island rose from the ashes with new houses, new roads, new public buildings and restoration of the plantation.⁴²⁷ Today, a thriving tourist industry exists on the island with historic and scenic areas well preserved.

6.10 With-In Case Multi-Event Analysis of 3 State Responses to Disasters

The three events occurred within very different administrative times and possession of the British Empire. In 1847, Tobago was administered as a possession of the Windward Island colony with their Governor residing in Barbados. As his substitute, a Lieutenant Governor was stationed in Tobago. The Lieutenant Governor ruled the island with the council of his Executive and Legislator. The Legislative council was two chambers with elected members in the lower house and nominated members in the upper house. The franchise was extremely limited and the plantation interests well represented. This system was called the Old Representative System (ORS). Bills passed in Tobago's ORS also needed the approval of the Windward Island Governor and council and ultimately the Colonial Office and U.K Government.

For simplicity we define a typology of governing structure of Trinidad and Tobago in Table 38. Before describing the structures in detail. In 1933, Tobago and Trinidad were a united colony of Great Britain and administered as a Crown Colony (CC) entering the New Representative System (NRS). The Governor ruled the colony with the aid of the executive and legislative council. The single-chamber legislative

⁴²⁷ Ottley, *The Story of Tobago: Robinson Crusoe's Island in the Caribbean*.

council had seven of the thirteen members elected and remainder appointed by the Governor. These nominated men and many of the elected men had major ties to the plantation economy and other major financial interests of the country. A vote and tie breaker vote going to the Governor allowed the Governor to maintain his majority rule over the island. The Island did not have self-rule or true representative council. The NRS was still accountable to the Colonial Office and the U.K Government.

By 1963, Trinidad and Tobago was an Independent Nation (N). The Prime Minister was the head of the Executive Council now called the Cabinet. The Governor General was now a figurehead position with no executive powers without the request by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s political party maintained a majority seat in the Legislative Council. The Legislative council was now two chambers with elected members in the lower house and nominated members in the upper house. The voting franchise was open to all adults. The N had a true representative system of self-rule.

Table 39. Governing Typology of Trinidad and Tobago

| ORS | CC | NRS | N |
|---------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Old Representative System | Crown Colony | New Representative System | Independent Name of country |

In 1963, the power of the Governor as the representative of the Crown a supreme ruler of the colony has been reduced significantly. In most ways, this power has transferred to Prime Minister, elected by the electorate of the nation. The Governor now Governor General is himself appointed by the ruling government and conducts his duties following the requests of the ruling government. With his majority

seat, lead in the legislature the Prime Minister is as powerful as the Governor once was.

Following the 1933 storm, the NRS created a Central Hurricane Relief Committee to work with a Local Committee in the administration of the relief fund and house rebuilding project. The Prime Minister lead a relief team of major officials to assess the damage in 1963. Other committees were created to help with the rebuilding efforts. A lot of cooperation and collaboration among the population was required to rebuild their island. A permanent government body dedicated to disaster management occurs soon after the tragedy of the 1963 Flora. Because of this experience, the N Government in 1965 established The National Emergency Relief Organization which conducted workshops and conferences decades earlier to the inception of NEMA. N.E.R.O was responsible for advice to Government, through the Minister of Home Affairs on all matters relating to disaster, and in charge of the organization and administration of all precautionary, emergency relief, and rehabilitation measures necessary to minimize or counteract the effects of the disaster in respect of the entire country. N.E.R.O. two priority objectives were to bring to the attention of the public the fact that hurricanes can strike Trinidad and Tobago; and to co-ordinate the country's essential services on a national scale, and in close consultation with voluntary emergency services such as Red Cross and S.t John's Brigade, to proceed immediately with the preparation of up-to-date plans for meeting the threat of disaster.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁸ National Emergency Relief Organization, *Hurricane Hazard*.

Prime Minister Eric Williams can arguably be credited for the vision behind the current Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency CDEMA, the inter-regional supportive network of independent emergency units throughout the Caribbean region that stems from the work of CARICOM in the 1990s. However, the Caribbean Association for Relief against Hurricane Centre located in Chaguaramas that Williams suggested in 1963 was a more advanced entity than today's body.

The governing structure during each event is summarized in Table 39.

Table 40. Governing Structure During each Event

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane | 1963 Hurricane Flora |
|---|---|--|
| Government structure | | |
| ORS Old Representative System- Two chamber parliament | NRS Crown colony and start of New Representative System- one chamber parliament | N Independent Nation Two chamber parliament |
| Lieutenant Governor in residence. Under the administration of the Windward Islands and Governor in residence in Barbados | Governor in residence. Head of Legislative Council and Executive Council | Prime Minister head of Executive Council. Governor General a figurehead representative of the Crown |
| limited franchise elected members in the lower chamber and nominated members in upper chamber | limited franchise for a minority of elected members. majority nominated members | Full franchise. Entire lower chamber elected seats. Upper chamber nominated members |

6.10.1 Legislative Process and Bills

A few significant bills were passed in response to all 3 storms and each bill reflected their eras. The ORS government of 1847 was severely handicapped by the process requiring their bills get approval from the Windward Governor and the Colonial Office. State Sovereignty of N did not require approval from any external body. The process was quick and could have been quicker if the Cabinet decided to present their plan sooner. The NWS government was also burdened with final approval from the Colonial Office. In both the ORS and NRS, the financial interests of the colony are represented in the Legislative Council and loans at favorable rates to these plantation industries are the focus of the bills or requests. Under the N government, bills take a wider range of purpose reflected the rule of governmentality to maximize the political economy. The policies are summarized in Table 40.

Table 41. Legislative process and bills passed following storm

| 1847 ORS | 1933 NRS | 1963 N |
|---|--|--|
| Policy enacted in response | | |
| Bill to ban looting | Bill to assist estate proprietors in restoring crops | Tobago Development Plan within the 1964-68 5 Year Plan |
| Delayed Process for approval for financial assistance (24 weeks for loans) | Quicker Process for approval for financial assistance (11 weeks for loans) | Bill debate and pass both chambers within 9 weeks |
| | | |

6.10.2 Financial Assistance

With expanded population interests and the task of lowering unemployment and maximizing the country's revenue, the N government initiates a rehabilitation plan that revolutionizes the economy of the island. The financial assistance administered by N government further validates the hypothesis. A major difference found among the three was the manner in which money was allocated to rebuild houses. Under the NRS government compared to N and ORS, peasant houses damaged were rebuilt with the money donated by the public. Following Flora, the 1963 N government provided loans for families to rebuild their homes. The peasants in 1847 were awarded a small grant by the Crown but most rebuilt at their own expenses.

Another difference among the three was the N government of 1963 access as a member to international bodies like the United Nations to request assistance. One of the benefits of state sovereignty and a characteristic that was not granted to them under NRS or ORS.

The public relief funds under NWS and N government were both initiated and dispersed by the Central Government following the 1933 and 1963 storms. When converted to a 2016 evaluation both funds were in the range for 1-14 million pounds. There is no public record of such a fund following 1847 by the ORS government but private ones by religious groups was most likely present. Although N was no longer under the administration of Great Britain, the new nation received significant financial contributions from the UK Government and population.⁴²⁹The financial assistance provided for each event is summarized in Table 41.

⁴²⁹ At this time a significant Trinidadian and West Indian community was residing in England. With the end of colonization the previous loose immigration laws would

Table 42. Financial Assistance Provided for each Event

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane | 1963 Flora Hurricane |
|---|--|--|
| Financial Assistance | | |
| £5000 from her Majesty for distribution to the island's laborers. | £7,240 from reserve fund as grants to assist poorer proprietors to clear land of debris | Public Relief Fund collected \$863,000. Grants for poultry allocation, labor hours for clearing fields and church repairs. |
| £50,000 in loans provided by her Majesty's government and distributed by the Governor of Barbados and Lieutenant Governor of Tobago | Public relief fund collected \$36,104.58 and was supervised by the central government committee to help laborers rebuild homes | \$38 million development bill to rehabilitate and diversify Tobago's economy. Also, improving education and social services. |
| | The agricultural industry hurricane relief ordinance provided proprietors access to \$200,000 in loans to help with restoration. | Money to rebuild homes was not grants but loans. |

6.10.3 Health Response

The biopolitics of Governmentality rule that was present during the 1933 era has become a permanent fixture. As hypothesized a “population state” N is invested in the health and well-being of its entire population and, as a result, the number and range of tactics the government employed in response to the hurricane increases. In 1847, the ORS government provided no health services for the peasants of Tobago and as a result, many died from injuries sustained during the storm. In 1933, NRS

come to an end causing a significant number of West Indian migrations to the metropole before the new law was enacted.

government had arranged public health services around the colony and many lives were saved. Likewise, following 1963 Flora, N Government had a public health service system available to treat hundreds of all those that were injured. Additionally, the government's response included a typhoid inoculation campaign. This campaign to protect the health of the remaining population included a travel restriction for anyone entering or leaving the island without proof of inoculation.

In all three cases, the direct death attributed to the storm was low but the count that died from injuries dropped. Even the media and a government report on the deaths of the population whereas during ORS only the 'higher class' individuals were mentioned.

Table 43. Public Health Services Provided for Each Event

| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Trinidad Hurricane | 1963 Flora Hurricane |
|--|---|---|
| Public Health Services | | |
| Public Health nonexistent. Private access only to the affluent and limited access to laborers remaining on plantations | Public health prevalent and a priority of the government. Public hospitals and doctors available across the island. | Public health prevalent and a priority of the government. Public hospitals and doctors available across the island. |
| Private access only to the affluent and limited access to laborers remaining on plantations | Medical school on the island and Government campaigns against diseases and sanitation | |
| Disaster Response | | |
| Reports on the storm focused on the affluent injuries and never mentioned the peasantry. Many injured go untreated | Health officials were active during the response phase and treated the injured | Health officials were very active during the response phase and treated the injured. Typhoid inoculation campaign is conducted after the storm. |
| 26 direct deaths and many others from injuries | 7 direct deaths and 81 injured but treated | 24 deaths and 100s injured and treated. |

6.10.4 Policing of the Population Associated with Disaster Response

The tactics the government employed during all 3 events exemplify an institution that places population control and the rule of law first. However, as we previous highlighted the NRS government of 1933 used tactics that worked to indirectly force people back to work on the plantations. This was done by cutting the food relief early. The N government of 1963 utilizes further new methods to control the population. Through the Emergency Powers Acts, the N government was able to place a travel ban to and from the island, an inoculation requirement for entrance. The

N government also passed anti-squatting laws and a ban on fires; these are all methods to control population activities or direct people into activities the state finds more beneficial. Throughout the eras, the state maintains a strict anti-squatting policy and anti-vagrancy policy.

The draconian punishments for non-compliance of laws passed continue regardless of the Government type. ORS, NRS, and N show a steady progression in the number of police and military used by the state. The militia regiment available during ORS and NRS is no longer acceptable for N government. The form of punishment has also changed. The whipping from a cat o nine was a public display of the State supreme power to punish the population for non-compliance. By N government of 1963 and the NRS government of 1933, used the punishment of months in prison and a fine instead of the public whipping.

Another method to direct the population in the places the states prefers is through the rebuilding efforts. Unlike the storm under the ORS and NRS, the rebuilding effort under the N government used the opportunity to relocate families to other areas and subsidized industries to push employment into a number of new areas for the benefit for the entire economy.

Table 44. Use of Military and Police Force

| 1847 ORS | 1933 NRS | 1963 N |
|--|---|---|
| Bill outlawing the appropriation of materials found scattered by the storm with severe punishment. | The State of Emergency | The State of Emergency Travel ban Inoculation requirement |
| induction of new special constables | Ending food relief to force laborers back to work on estates. | Anti-squatting laws Ban on Fires |
| | | Population housing relocation Urban Planning |
| | | |

6.10.5 Housing and resettlement

All 3 storm events caused thousands of people to become homeless but only the N government rehousing program included mitigation efforts towards future storm damage. According to this study’s hypothesis, under a government of a “population state,” even tactics employed in rehousing will reflect the expanded interest of the government in the well-being of the population. The N government response in 1963 included the method of relocating 1,200 families to new locations better suited to the economy and physical terrain. Following Flora 1963, the N government acknowledged the nation’s vulnerability to hurricanes and designed the rebuilding efforts to be more resistant to the elements. Community centers were also built with the possibility of their use as a temporary shelter in future storms. New lands laws passed to facilitate these projects. During the ORS and NRS eras, the rehousing projects were only

interested in returning laborers to their same locations with the same building materials.

Table 45. Housing and Resettlement Effort for each Event

| ORS | NRS | N |
|--|--|--|
| 1847 Tobago Hurricane | 1933 Hurricane | 1963 Hurricane Flora |
| 465 houses and additional 182 severely damaged | 1000s made homeless | 6,250 out of 7,500 houses on the island receiving damage |
| For those not connected to the plantations, her majesty issued £5,000 for their recovery. Houses on plantations were plantation owner responsibility and funded through loans. | Public relief fund paid for the 1863 houses repaired or rebuilt at a cost of \$33,191.32 | 4,100 new homes that were destroyed by the storm and varying degrees of repairs to the 2,500 damaged homes |
| Built back as it was before the storm | Built back as it was before the storm | Relocating 1,200 families |
| | | Homes designed to withstand elements with a low cost |
| | | 11.5 million in grants and loans allocated the rehousing program |

Chapter 7

CASE STUDY #2 THE UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF BERMUDA

Our second case study is Bermuda, an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom located off the east coast of North America. Prior to January 1983, the Kingdom's territories were officially referred to as British Crown Colonies.⁴³⁰ Bermuda was also referred as the Bermudas or Somers Isles, is an archipelago in the North Atlantic Ocean consisting of many islands divided into nine parishes: Pembroke, Hamilton, Smith's, Sandys, Warwick, Devonshire, Southampton, Paget and St. George's.⁴³¹ The territory has considerable autonomy, with the power to make its own rules and regulations in a parliamentary style government. The head of state is the British monarch. The Queen on the advice of the British Governments appoints a representative Governor to exercise her executive power in the island; his power has through time been reduced to a primarily ceremonial function. The Governor was responsible for internal security and external affairs, the police and the Bermuda Regiment. Bermuda's system of government consists of two legislative chambers; the House of Assembly and the Senate. The House of Assembly consists of 36 members elected by eligible voters every 5 years. The leader of the political party winning the most seats in the House of Assembly is appointed Premier. The Governor instructs the Premier to form a Cabinet composed of 14 members. The largest minority political

⁴³⁰ The name "British Overseas Territory" was introduced by the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, replacing the name British Dependent Territory introduced by the British Nationality Act 1981.

⁴³¹ Bermuda is the most populous of the British Overseas Territories,

party becomes the Opposition with its own leader. The Senate called the Legislative Council before 1980 consists of 11 senators: five appointed by the governor in consultation with the premier; three in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition; and three at the governor's discretion. Bermuda was settled in 1609 and granted self-government as early as 1620.

In this chapter, this study will review two historic hurricanes that significantly damaged the colony. The first storm covered will be that of the 1839 hurricane also known as Reid Hurricane as it was the first hurricane under the rule of Governor Reid. Coincidentally, Governor Reid was also in charge of the Windward Islands Colony of which Tobago was a member during the 1847 Tobago hurricane covered in our first case study. The second hurricane event covered will be Hurricane Arlene of 1963 which takes place during a transition period for the colony and culminates later in the decade towards a new constitution in 1968. This storm presents us with a contrast to the 1963 hurricane Flora that devastated the newly independent country of Trinidad and Tobago covered in our first case study. However, to truly understand how disaster response and recovery has changed over the centuries we must also discuss the political, social and economic changes that have shaped the colony over 400 years.




Figure 21. Case Study #2 The Overseas Territory of Bermuda.

7.1 Overview of Bermuda

It was named after the Spanish sea captain, Juan de Bermudez, who never boarded the islands but claimed it as a Spanish territory in 1503. The islands and their treacherous reefs were avoided but were used as a nautical mark for the Spanish galleons to turn eastwards for Spain. The islands were called “YA de Demonios” – “Islands of Devils.” Their encircled reefs were a potential graveyard for anything afloat. Natural Disasters have defined this island from its first inhabitants to their present day. A Hurricane interrupted a sea voyage to the Virginia Colony and was

responsible for landing the British castaways on the island in 1609. Today, the legend of the Bermuda Triangle still circulates about natural and the supernatural nature of its treacherous seas. Unexpected by many is that today the territory is a financial powerhouse with a thriving tourist economy. Bermuda enjoys the fourth highest per capita income at \$85,700 in the world with an economy primarily based on international business, including reinsurance companies, financial services to that sector, and tourism.⁴³²

Bermuda's present status as an overseas territory seems contradictory to post-colonial scholarship and represents an upside down decolonization.⁴³³ UN Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 1960 provided support for the granting of independence to colonial countries and "peoples" and peoples' right to self-determination.⁴³⁴ Yet Bermuda and a number of overseas territories/departments are re-defining "post" in post-colonialism and are driven by extended colonial relationships to keep and preserve the colonial powers in an "enforced colonial condition". These are colonies

⁴³² "North America: Bermuda."

⁴³³ Baldacchino, "'Upside Down Decolonization' in Subnational Island Jurisdictions."

⁴³⁴ United Nation's Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 Irrespective of what constitutional option is chosen by a non-self governing territory in respect of its future constitutional status -- be it free association with the administering power, or another state, by integration with another administering power or full independence -- the decision must be determined as a result of a free and voluntary choice by the people of the territory. This must be clearly expressed through an informed and democratic process. The most transparent process is through a referendum

that object if the mother country tries to free itself from parts of its Empire, reminding her of past atrocities and continued responsibilities.⁴³⁵

Bermuda's political status validates the political science theory that there is a correlation between population size and year of independence, with the smallest populated islands taking the longest to gain independence. Bermuda is a relatively smaller colony with a population of 70,196 compared to Trinidad and Tobago's 1,222,363.⁴³⁶ It is more comparable to Tobago's population of 60,874 (Trinidad Central Statistical Office 2011). Scholar Baldacchino summarizes the benefits of continued colony status as: free or concessionary trade with, and export preference from, the parent country; social welfare assistance; ready access to external capital through special tax concessions; availability of external labor markets through migration; aid financed infrastructure and communications; higher quality health and educational systems; natural disaster relief; and provision of external defense. However, the dependence for assistance in natural disaster relief is an untested hypothesis even if commonly echoed. Trinidad and Tobago's sovereignty status during the response and recovery from 1963 Hurricane Flora allowed it to access the United Nations and receive assistance from it, an advantage not available to dependent territories.

As internally self-governing, Bermuda represents *Autonomy without Sovereignty*, which Baldacchino argues might be beneficial to tourism economies and

⁴³⁵ Miles, *Elections and Ethnicity in French Martinique*.

⁴³⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, "Central America and Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago."

facilitate access and security.⁴³⁷ Advocates of Bermudan independence argue that there would be psychological and cultural gains by freeing Bermuda from the *demeaning nature of colonialism*.⁴³⁸ On occasion, some within the island have supported independence which has been exacerbated by racial tensions throughout its history. Most notably the 1973 assassination of the British Governor, Richard Sharples along with his ADC, Captain Hugh Sayers, the assassin, Erskine Burrows, was associated with Black power militants and regarded it as a blow against colonialism. He was hanged in 1977, after which 3 days of rioting occurred.⁴³⁹ Mass demonstrations were held to protest the death sentences and thousands of Bermudians petitioned to stop it. Denied by the Court of Appeal many Bermudians felt that the decision was the last straw in a record of unequal treatment of black people by the island's white leaders.⁴⁴⁰ A 1995 referendum in Bermuda, although hampered by a PLP boycott and low voter turnout at 58%, was resoundingly rejected with only 25% voting for Independence. The Bermuda Independence Commission was established in 2004 to encourage further discussion. In 2006, Bermudian Premier Alex Scott, of the Progressive Labor Party declared 2006 as the year for an independence dialogue. However, there are undeniable economic pressures from special interests like the

⁴³⁷ Baldacchino, “‘Upside Down Decolonization’ in Subnational Island Jurisdictions.” Pg. 193

⁴³⁸ Robert Aldrich and John Connell, *The Last Colonies* (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴³⁹ Royle, “Postcolonial Culture on Dependent Islands.”

⁴⁴⁰ Commission for Unity and Racial Equality, *400 Years of Bermuda's Race Relations: Bermuda 1609-2009*.

Association of Bermuda International Companies (ABIC) who insist on their right to bring judicial appeals to the Privy Council in London and see the current Overseas Territory status as essential to island stability and their continued business presence on the islands.⁴⁴¹

Historically, Bermuda has been an essential asset for the British military; once coveted by the US during the General George Washington era and the location of a Royal Dock Yards during the Civil War. The Dock Yards construction also shaped Bermuda's early demographics. A shared characteristic between our two case studies is their 20th-century use as US military bases in the *Base for Tankers* deal between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1940. This deal transferred the British military bases into U.S possession on the colony. In our first case study, Prime Minister Eric Williams regained the U.S bases for Trinidad and Tobago in the 1960s however, Bermuda did not regain possession until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. The USA renounced its base associated emergency right of seizure in 2002.⁴⁴²

Although both case studies represent slaveholding societies, the Overseas Territory of Bermuda stands in stark contrast to our first study of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago in both their colonial development and present-day sovereignty. Present levels of political development among former British colonies have historical roots and been shaped by the extent to which they were ruled either directly or

⁴⁴¹ Kim and Rodriguez, "Bermuda: Independence by Any Means; Governance as an Obsession."

⁴⁴² Tunbridge, "The Churchill–Roosevelt Bases of 1940."

indirectly during the colonial period.⁴⁴³ These distinctions also influence the methods employed following natural disasters. The most significant difference between our case studies is that unlike Trinidad and Tobago, two plantation colonies that became one, Bermuda was never able to sustain an agriculture-based economy and thus, its development closer resembled that of a pure settler colony. Another way to differentiate this distinction is between the broad categories of settlement and extractive colonialism.⁴⁴⁴ As a result, when major disasters occurred (hurricanes) there were no efforts in Bermuda to rebuild an extractive economy. There were no powerful plantation owners or foreign financiers pressuring the colonial government to send advances or loans to recover, loans that often placed the colony at financial risk. In our first hurricane covered in 1839, we see a push by the Governor for self-reliance in rebuilding damaged homes. This method of self-reliance followed in other disasters, a principle that may also stem from the colony's isolation in the Atlantic Ocean and their history of wanting to avoid *quid-pro-quo* deals with the British Government.⁴⁴⁵ The second storm covered of Hurricane Arlene 1963, was a catalyst for the current emergency coordinating system that currently exists on the colony today. Other distinctions in response and recovery methods will be discussed later in the chapter but with first covering the historical, economic and social aspects that defined this overseas territory, giving greater context to their disaster management practices.

⁴⁴³ Lange, "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development."

⁴⁴⁴ Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development."

⁴⁴⁵ This dynamic was stated to me through discussion with local Bermudian Historian, Jonathon Land Evans in June 2015.

7.1.1 Current Disaster Management Structure

Bermuda's disaster management arrangements are not as centralized as the USA FEMA or Trinidad and Tobago's NEMA nor do they take an all-hazards approach. While visiting island, some residents would remark that they just knew what to do during a disaster and knew how to coordinate with each other. Bermuda's Ministry of National Security lists Quasi-Government Agencies of Disaster Preparedness and of Emergency Measures Organization (EMO). Officially, according to the government website, the EMO strives to increase resident and government departments and non-government agency preparedness in the event of an emergency. It provides up-to-date information and announcement about severe weather and disasters and coordinate emergency response and recovery.⁴⁴⁶ Further information could not be obtained from the EMO website, as it was not temporarily in service.⁴⁴⁷ This site operates in conjunction with the Government's emergency radio station 100.1 FM and represents one of the two locations for official information dissemination used by the Government of Bermuda. EMO does carry an ongoing presence on social media with a Facebook page.

<https://www.facebook.com/emoBermuda/>. In the event of an emergency, the EMO is enacted and keeps the public informed as information is available. After reviewing the archives at the Bermuda National Library and National Archives located in Hamilton, the EMO was birth after the devastation of Hurricane Arlene in 1963. Following the

⁴⁴⁶ <https://www.gov.bm/department/emergency-measures-organisation>

⁴⁴⁷ This EMO website is operated by the Department of Communication and Information and is the OFFICIAL site for Government information during an emergency.

storm, Colonial Secretary Sykes commissioned a committee *to set up a centralized organization to disseminate information to the Public before a hurricane and to co-ordinate the efforts of Government Departments, Utility Services, and Private Agencies after the storm to repair damage and enable the community to resume normal life as soon as possible.*⁴⁴⁸

Bermuda is not a member of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) as is Trinidad and Tobago. The regional body would surely welcome the Archipelago, which is a member of the CARICOM, once minimum requirements are met.

Bermuda's internal meteorological history was originally kept at the Centre Signal Station by the Army, and later at Gibbs' Hill Light erected in 1846. The Canadian Weather Bureau set up a weather station at Prospect in September 1890 with Fort George being the next headquarters. In 1932, the Bermuda Government Meteorological Station was opened and remained in operation until the end of 1958.⁴⁴⁹In December 1958, the Bermuda Government Meteorological Station was closed and on January 1959, as a result of a special arrangement between the governments of the United States and Bermuda, the Weather Bureau at the then U.S. Air Force Base was transferred to the U.S. Navy, and the Base became the United States Naval Air Station. The Navy Weather Office at the Air Station provided weather forecast service to the civilian community.

⁴⁴⁸ "Bermuda to Have Co-Ordinated Hurricane Service Set-Up."

⁴⁴⁹ Tucker, *Beware the Hurricane!: The Story of the Cyclonic Tropical Storms That Have Struck Bermuda 1609-1995*. Pg 11

7.1.2 Disaster Sub-culture

Terry Tucker, a Bermudian Historian has the most in-depth documentation of hurricanes that have impacted the archipelago and some adaptive measures employed by the residents.⁴⁵⁰ These adaptations have given the island a visible disaster subculture and greatly aided these residents living in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. The earliest inhabitants learned to build their cabins in the most sheltered nooks of the island. Today's Bermudians can recall certain outstanding dates of storms remembered from their childhood or told to them by elders, some handed down for generations. The barometer was invented in 1643 and was a rare commodity in Bermuda. Its usefulness limited to the imminent presence of the storm, the nautically minded Bermudians became adept at forecasting storms evolving their own island lore. This disaster sub-culture is especially stronger among the residents of St. David's Islanders, many being the descendants of Native American "Indians" captured and sold in colony centuries earlier.

The greatest adaptation made by the islanders can be seen in their architecture. At first, the arrivals used spacious cedar cabins and timber houses that proved susceptible to the high winds and hurricanes.

By the end of the 17th century certain characteristics peculiar to Bermuda were evident: the stone-slab roofs which are pitched not over forty-five degrees to the horizontal, because of the hazards of the hurricane; "bottled" chimneys employed as quasi buttresses on the southeast side of the dwellings for a support against hurricanes⁴⁵¹; the natural "coral" stone abundant on the islands were used for

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. Pg. 11

⁴⁵¹ Forman, *Architecture of the Old South*. Pg. 170

permanent materials. This coral is a true Aeolian-limestone of wind-drifted shell-sand with a small admixture of coral material. The building stone hardens when exposed to the air.⁴⁵² Bermudians have continued to utilize the Aeolian limestone to build their homes. The rock is exposed and leveled for a foundation, the walls are also made of the coral-limestone block and the roof is put on of beveled oblong slates of the same material. Surveying the current houses on the island you can immediately see a pattern of white roofs, an icon of Bermuda. As the island has no springs or streams, their water supply is limited to rain catchment. These roofs are coated with cement-wash followed by layers of limewash and used as a water-catch. The water slides down the roof and is collected in water tank below ground level.⁴⁵³ The Department of Health has provided manuals for the maintenance and cleaning of roof and water tanks. They advise roofs be painted every 2 years and tanks cleaned at least every 6 years or more frequently if necessary.⁴⁵⁴

During the months of July, August, September, October, and November if the words *Listen to the South Shore roaring!* are spoke everyone stops and strains to hear an intermittent booming of heavy swells very different than the usual break of the ocean, signaling there is a hurricane south and this can be heard long before the wind has risen. The sound is said to be unmistakable and the severity of the approaching storm measurable by the length of time between each swell, the longer periods

⁴⁵² In 1620, The Sessions House or State House in St. George's is among those that used this material and is still standing.

⁴⁵³ Tucker, *Beware the Hurricane!: The Story of the Cyclonic Tropical Storms That Have Struck Bermuda 1609-1995*. Pg. 17

⁴⁵⁴ Government of Bermuda, *An Emergency Plan for the General Public*.

betokening severer storms and the water feels hand warm to the touch. This potentially gives the islanders five or six hundred miles of warning.⁴⁵⁵

St. David islanders developed their own natural barometer made from the liver oil of a shark. Once the shark is captured the white liver is hung to dry in the sun for five hours and collected into individual glass bottles four to eight inches long and one-half inch wide and set on a cedar plinth.⁴⁵⁶ If the oil is extracted in other ways the smell will be unbearable. When the oil gets cloudy at the bottom of the bottle, it indicates bad weather and if the oil is clear it is safe to venture out to sea. For centuries, fishermen have relied on shark oil and often during the Hurricane Season Governors stationed on the island have called on it's' reading. Other lore includes silk spiders seeming to spin their webs low when a storm is approaching and some older residents believe they can smell the hurricane.

7.2 Historical Context: Spanish Discovery and Neglect before British Arrival

The British were two centuries late to the Europeans' 'Age of Exploration,' after the Spaniards got lost on their journey to India and were 'discovered' by the indigenous or native peoples who lived in the Americas.⁴⁵⁷ However, Bermuda did not have any indigenous population when the British crash landed on the shunned island

⁴⁵⁵ Tucker, *Beware the Hurricane!: The Story of the Cyclonic Tropical Storms That Have Struck Bermuda 1609-1995*. Pg. 14

⁴⁵⁶ Tucker, *St. David's Island, Bermuda Its People, History and Culture*. Pg. 130

⁴⁵⁷ Howard, *Recollection and Reconnection: Voices of the St. David's Islanders and Their Native American Relatives*.

in 1609. Bermuda's recorded history begins with Juan de Bermudez, a native of Palos, in Spain, who visited Bermuda fortuitously in 1503, and returned in his ship, La Garza (the heron), in 1515 to explore as a possible settlement.⁴⁵⁸ The name "la Bermuda" can be traced to this discovery and recorded on Spanish maps of 1511.⁴⁵⁹ Other early visits include a Portuguese vessel stranded for 6 months in 1543 and 50 years later a French ship stuck to the coast for 5 months, neither made a permanent settlement. A 1603 fleet of Don Luis Fernandez de Cordova commanded by Captain Diego Ramirez driven onto the Bermuda reefs, the crew went ashore for 22 days and the captain would draw a map and detailed account of its' natural resources but they as the others before also did not consider it worthy for Spanish colonization.

By 1607, Britain had established a colony in Virginia chartered to The Virginia Company and the following year Sir Thomas Gates was commissioned to sail there as deputy governor. On June 2nd, 1609, The Virginia Company sent a fleet to its settlement at Jamestown Virginia with a Deputy Governor. The fleet contained nine ships in total (seven tall ships and two pinnacles) left from Plymouth England, stocked with supplies, food, five hundred people and a deputy governor. Rounding the coast off the Azores the fleet got scattered from a sudden storm and on July 24, a violent storm/hurricane in the Atlantic completely dispersed the fleet. Of the nine ships, seven made it to Virginia. One vessel was lost at sea and the other called the *Sea Venture*

⁴⁵⁸ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*.

⁴⁵⁹ Bernhard, *Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782*.

shipwrecked off the coast of Bermuda.⁴⁶⁰ Among the one hundred and forty to fifty shipwrecked was the captain of the *Sea Venture*, Sir George Somers, for whom the Somers Islands of Bermuda would be named. On Friday, July 28, 1609, the passengers went ashore at present-day Gates Bay, St. Georges and remained a British possession ever since.⁴⁶¹ From the wreckage of the *Sea Venture*, the survivors salvaged the materials and created two ships *Deliverance*, and *Patience*. The following year all but three men boarded the ships and sailed to Virginia. When word of Bermuda reached England it spurred great interests among businessmen in its commercial potential as an English settlement. For the British, St. George's spanning over 400 years is the first successful town established and continuously inhabited settlement in the New World.

7.2.1 The Bermuda Company Charter to Crown Colony and the structure of Government

With the growing interests in colonization, in 1612, the Virginia Company of London's charter was extended to include the Bermuda archipelago. The Company dispatched sixty settlers on a small ship named *Plough* for Bermuda under Governor Richard Moore. There they would find the three men, Carter, Chard and Waters that were left behind. The rule under the Virginia Charter would come to an end in 1614 and relinquished to the Crown. In 1615, King James granted a new charter to 118 members of the original company, incorporated under the name of "The Governor and

⁴⁶⁰ A castaway William Strachey would send an account of the storm by letter from Virginia to England the following year. The letter is said to have inspired William Shakespeare to write *The Tempest*.

⁴⁶¹ This day is celebrated annually on the Island as Somers Day in memory of the "Father of the Colony"

Company of the City of London for the Plantacion of the Somers Islands”⁴⁶² or simply the Somers Isles Company or Bermuda Company. The Somers Isles Company would administer Bermuda for another six decades.⁴⁶³ That Company would use the design of the hurricane-wrecked ship as their coat-of-arms and in 1910; Bermuda would revive this Coat of Arms for the whole colony.⁴⁶⁴

The colony was founded on co-operative principles; landlords were mostly absentee in the first generation with the majority of proprietors living in England leasing their estates in Bermuda to be cultivated by tenants or indentured servants to work it. As payment for rent, these laborers worked *on halve*, paying half their crop yield to the landlord and keeping the other half for themselves. Tenants were also obligated to contribute to the colony’s public workforce. Most individual holdings were small with the 156 separate properties listed in 1622, 56 % were two shares or less. The largest slaveholding by one individual was 17. Each tribe or parish had its own social and political structure similar to an English parish. Headed by a handful of prominent and rich merchants or sea captain who held office, served on vestries and juries and drilled the militia. Below them were the small planters and farmers and at the bottom were the servants and enslaved.

Royal charters allowed Trading Companies legal title, a monopoly of trade and governmental and military jurisdiction. Under the Somers Isles Company (1615-

⁴⁶² Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*. Pg 6

⁴⁶³ The adventurers (shareholders) of the Virginia Company formed a second company, the Somers Isles Company

⁴⁶⁴ Tucker, *Beware the Hurricane!: The Story of the Cyclonic Tropical Storms That Have Struck Bermuda 1609-1995*.

1684) Bermuda was subdivided into eight equal shares, later called parishes, named after the shareholders in the Company, Devonshire, Hamilton, Paget, Pembroke, Sandys, Smith's, Southampton and Warwick. A ninth subdivision comprising of the capital St. George considered the King's land and not sold by the Company. A Governor appointed by the Company would administer the islands with his 14-member council composed primarily of the leading merchant families of the Colony from each of the eight tribes, plus the colony's four clergymen and the sheriff.⁴⁶⁵ In 1620, a colonial parliament was created known as the House of Assembly. This was a single chamber Parliament with limited suffrage restricted to male landowners. The Assembly was composed of two elected representatives and a bailiff (later known as Justices of the peace) from each of the eight tribes; its first session held in 1620 with Governor Nathaniel Butler presiding. The Assembly was later increased from 24 to 40 members, with five members from each of the tribes. They originally met at Saint Peter's Church in Saint George's until its own building was completed. These early Governors focused on protecting the colony from Spanish attacks, built forts, and raised militias throughout their administration.

Due to its small size, the colony's development was heavily dictated and everything from profits to wages, to the killing of young tortoises, was regulated either by the Somers Island Company or the colonial legislature. Fifteen laws regulating the growing of tobacco and corn and the hiring of servants engaged the first legislative session, reflecting the concerns of the landlords. The tobacco crazed colonists were required to grow a certain amount of corn while the colony's craftsmen-carpenters,

⁴⁶⁵ By 1650 the Governor Council was appointed directly by the Somers Island Company.

bricklayers, blacksmith, coopers were each allotted two acres for a house and garden and were forbidden to grow any tobacco.

By the end of the 17th century, the islanders had turned away from agriculture and embraced maritime activities to the disdain of the Bermuda Company. Attempts to impose a tobacco quota were met with protests and a great friction resulted in the Company's charter being abolished with the colony moving under direct control of the British Government in 1684. After Bermuda became a crown colony in 1684 the Governor's council was reduced from 14 to 12 appointed by the Lords of Trade. Justices of the peace, at first called bailiffs were now appointed by the council and served as the principal officers in the parishes, calling parish meetings, conducting elections for the House of Assembly and jury service, and officiating over courts to decide parish disputes and petty crimes.

As Emancipation approached laws passed in 1827 granted the colored population the right to own property but the enslaved and free Africans did not enjoy the same rights and privileges including the right to vote and to hold public office. The law did allow enslaved the ability to marry in a church with their owner's permission. Seven months before emancipation day in 1834, a group of free Africans drew up a petition requesting the removal of these discriminatory practices. In response, the Assembly amended the laws with new provisions:

An Act to repeal the Laws exclusively applicable to free black and free coloured persons, and to extend to them the laws applicable to white persons, and to fix the qualifications for jurors, voters and the electors and candidates for certain offices and places of trust.

These new laws were put in place to bend to demands for equality while changing the eligibility laws for public office in the colony revealing the Assembly's intentions of securing the status quo in matters of government. Similar changes were made in most

colonies allowing the government to continue to represent the interest of the white minority. The following changes were made in Bermuda with emancipation imminent:

4. A member of the House of Assembly had to own a freehold valued at £400 (instead of the old rate of £200)
5. To be entitled to vote for a mayor, alderman, or common councilor (for the towns of St. George's and Hamilton) a person had to own a freehold in the town rated at the last parish assessment at not less than £100
6. A mayor, common councilor, and alderman had to own a freehold valued at £400
7. To be entitled to vote for a vestryman, churchwarden, or constable, a person had to own a freehold valued at £100
8. A vestryman or churchwarden had to own a freehold valued at £200
9. Jurors had to possess freeholds valued at £100. A register had to be kept in each parish of all parishioners qualified to vote as jurors.

Following emancipation, these laws allowed only 34 Africans the ability to vote for members of the House of Assembly and only 3 were eligible to run for election. Only 33 African voters were eligible to vote for members of the parish vestry and 18 were entitled to serve as jurors. Only 17 could become churchwardens, 12 were qualified to vote for corporation officers, and only 2 were eligible to fill such offices. The state of affairs perpetuated a white oligarchic government and encouraged the development of segregated communities, where the richer white population held the choicest lots of land and where the black population congregated in less desirable and more heavily populated areas. Poverty was an additional deterrent to African advancement given their lack of political power.⁴⁶⁶ In many ways, the structure of Bermuda's government

⁴⁶⁶ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*. Pg. 292

was the same as that of Tobago before its absorption as a ward of Trinidad. Many of Britain earliest possessions installed Old Representative System (ORS) governments. This similarity allows us to make a better comparison of the tactics utilized by the two colonies following natural disasters.

7.2.2 Early Demographics

Unlike our first case study of Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda never had an indigenous population yet by 1622, a decade after British settlement the population had risen to 1,500 along with a functioning system of government. Unlike plantation economies like Trinidad and Tobago, that relied heavily on slave labor and held only a minority of the white population, Bermuda remained majority Anglo-Saxon/ white well into the 18th century. Their earliest population also included Africans and Atlantic Blacks, Native Americans and Amerindians, along with indentured servants, Irish prisoners-of-war, and convicts from Britain. Whereas Africans were from their arrival associated with enslaved labor in Trinidad and Tobago, in Bermuda Africans were first held under servitude before slavery became ubiquitous in the mid-17th century. However, African (and Native American) servitude was very different than their European counterparts. European servants and indentured laborers usually served 5-10 years while Africans and Native Americans were given *four score and 19 years* (99years), Africans and Native Americans were further reduced to chattel slavery.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁷ Packwood, *Chained on the Rock*. P. 8

Table 46. Census of the Eight Tribes, 1622 (Does not include public lands in St. George's approx. 700 total pop 1500. Source: Bernhard 1999.⁴⁶⁸

| Tribe | #shares | Able Men | Women & Children | Population |
|--------------|---------|----------|------------------|------------|
| Hamilton | 24 | 19 | 13 | 32 |
| Smith's | 35 | 41 | 39 | 80 |
| Devonshire | 15 | 55 | 59 | 114 |
| Pembroke | 40 | 74 | 52 | 126 |
| Paget | 37 | 24 | 30 | 54 |
| Warwick | 36 | 59 | 55 | 114 |
| Southampton | 51 | 71 | 73 | 144 |
| Sandys | 50 | 70 | 72 | 142 |
| Total | 321 | 413 | 393 | 806 (1500) |
| St. George's | | | | 700 |

The first African and Native American⁴⁶⁹ residents arrived within four years of the colony's founding in 1612 and by 1699 most of them enslaved – made up 38% of the population.⁴⁷⁰ In 1616 the Somers Islands Company officially sought Africans for they possessed two skills especially valuable and unknown to the English colonists: they knew how to swim, and they knew how to grow tobacco and other plants.⁴⁷¹ These early Africans and Native Americans were not given perpetual slave status as their later counterparts would be subjected to.⁴⁷² Their skills as pearl divers were

⁴⁶⁸ Bernhard, *Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782*.

⁴⁶⁹ In the 17th century, colonial records distinguished between Native Indian and African slaves with Native Indians called “colored”. This separation ended in the 18th century and all were considered “Negroes”

⁴⁷⁰ Bernhard, *Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782*.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.* Pg. 23

⁴⁷² Of approximately 11 million Africans brought to the New World from the 1500s to the 1800s, only about 5,000 are said to arrived in Bermuda.

especially coveted by the Company. Some of these early African men were among the “Atlantic creoles,” Africans with a knowledge of trade and language skills from years of contact with Europeans in the coastal towns along Africa’s west coast.⁴⁷³ By the 1640s Bermuda was a participant in two major transatlantic slave trades. The *Middle Passage* for Africans, the transatlantic slave trade route from Africa to various destinations in the Americas. A steady stream of slaves flowed into the colony, mostly from West Indian ports or ships captured from the Spaniards. However, *The Other Middle Passage* that of the Native Americans is seldom acknowledged: The trafficking of indigenous peoples from their Atlantic homelands along the Atlantic coast and the interior of the Western hemisphere into transoceanic slavery.⁴⁷⁴ British expansion in New England brought the genocide of the Native population. Wars between Native peoples and the British in New England, USA- particularly the Pequot War (1636-1637) and King Philip’s War (1675-1676)- resulted in the defeat of native peoples and their enslavement in various European colonies, including the British colony Bermuda.⁴⁷⁵ The Pequot Nation was reduced to half their population by a smallpox epidemic in 1633 and would enter into war with the Colonials in 1636. The Colonials joined forces and allied with the Narragansett tribe to defeat the Pequot in a

⁴⁷³ In the Spanish colonies these individuals were sometimes called “white Negroes” because of their acculturated mannerism and speech

⁴⁷⁴ Welburn, *The Other Middle Passage: The Bermuda-Barbados Trade in Native American Slaves*. Pg. 20

⁴⁷⁵ According to St. David’s Islanders’ oral history, King Phillip’s (aka Metacomet) wife and son were shipped to Bermuda along with a large number of Native Americans and sold to slave owners. King Phillip was beheaded by the British and his head stuck on a stake in Plymouth Colony Fort.

brutal war. The King Phillip War 1675-1676 caused the death of three thousand Native Americans and eight hundred Europeans. A Massachusetts Bay Colony law stated that Indian war captives *were either to be sold or shipped off to the Bermudas and other ports or reduced to slavery in New England.*⁴⁷⁶ After the 1640s chattel slavery was the fate of all “Indians” both Caribbean Amerindians (Taino) captured earlier and brought from Jamaica and the Native Americans brought to the colony members of the Pequot, Mohican, Cherokee, Wampanoag, and Narragansett tribes from New England and Virginia; sold in St. George’s Square to mostly colonists owners in St. George’s and St. David’s Island. From 1644 to 1716 the Native American population in Bermuda is estimated to range from 400-500.

Many of the European early arrivals were recruited from the London slums and jails, and their behavior taxed the patience of early Governors.⁴⁷⁷ King James I, allowed for convicted prisoners to be spared on condition of overseas service.⁴⁷⁸ Prior to the 17th century in Britain, prisoners convicted of serious offenses were either executed or whipped while the houses of correction were used primarily to house vagrants and petty offenders. Transportation provided the state with an intermediate form of punishment.⁴⁷⁹ It was usually seven years in length and served as a deterrent

⁴⁷⁶ Welburn, *The Other Middle Passage: The Bermuda-Barbados Trade in Native American Slaves.*

⁴⁷⁷ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda.* Pg. 10

⁴⁷⁸ The first 17 convicts were pardoned in 1615 and handed over to Sir Thomas Smith, Governor of the East India Company. 20 % of the British Army in the windward and leewards islands between 1799 and 1802 were civil and military offenders

⁴⁷⁹ Maxwell-Stewart, “Convict Transportation from Britain and Ireland 1615–1870.”

to crime while providing a mechanism for populating potentially dangerous corners of the Empire.⁴⁸⁰ The British practice of convict transportation did not formally cease until the penal settlement on the Andaman Islands closed in 1945.⁴⁸¹ From 1823-1863, it is estimated that 9,000 convicts were sent to work in the Royal Navy dockyards in Bermuda.⁴⁸² Also among this early convict population were a number of Irish captives from the Cromwell conquest of Ireland. The English Civil War between 1649 and 1655 led to 12,000 political prisoners/ prisoners-of-war from England, Scotland and Ireland escaping execution by being instead sent to the English colonies. Those sent to Bermuda signed seven-year contracts to their masters for servitude. This Irish population were persistent trouble-makers and flouted the law quite openly often manhandling officers of the law. They also were involved in a conspiracy in 1661 in collaboration with the enslaved Africans to destroy the entire English population. Once freed after their seven years of service these former convicts were provided with land and encouraged to stay. Also sent early on to the colony were a number of *younge*

⁴⁸⁰ The Portuguese invasion of Ceuta in North Africa in 1415 may be the chronological beginning of the use of convicted labor to aid the process of European colonization of overseas territories.

⁴⁸¹ For 330 years 1615-1945, the British transported convicts to many parts of the world. These included: most of the north American colonies; the Caribbean islands of Barbados, Jamaica, Montserrat, Nevis and St Kitts; the slave factories at Goree and Cape Coast Castle in West Africa; the Australian colonies of New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land and Western Australia; the Indian Ocean Island of Mauritius; Bencoolen, Penang, the Tenasserim Provinces (Burma) and the Strait Settlements (Singapore) in South East Asia as well as Bermuda and Gibraltar

⁴⁸² From 1718 to 1776, 50,000 convicts were sold into servitude in chiefly Virginia and Maryland

maydes, sent by the Somers Island Company for the colony’s single men to purchase at the price of one hundred pounds of tobacco.

Africans were not a majority until well into the nineteenth century which stands in contrast to plantation colonies like Trinidad and Tobago that held a small minority European population. Bermuda was a more close-knit society, the land was scarce but slaveholding was widespread, and enslaved families and white families were the normal order of society sometimes living in the same house. Wealth was often measured in slaves and not land. For many enslaved, the *kitchen chamber*, a chamber adjacent to the kitchen were their living quarters, some lived in the washroom, and the cellars on the basements or sometimes separate slave quarters. The population density surpassed those of the mainland colonies at 18 families per square mile.

Table 47. Census of St. George’s and the Tribes, 1764. Source: Bermuda Assembly.⁴⁸³

| Tribe | White Men | White Women | White Boys | White Girls | Black Men | Black Women | Black Boys | Black Girls | Total |
|---------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| St. George’s | 154 | 244 | 128 | 150 | 125 | 176 | 138 | 134 | 1249 |
| Hamilton | 131 | 191 | 132 | 90 | 135 | 148 | 139 | 125 | 1091 |
| Smith’s | 106 | 163 | 85 | 87 | 94 | 116 | 104 | 125 | 880 |
| Devonshire | 114 | 149 | 115 | 81 | 82 | 117 | 100 | 82 | 840 |
| Pembroke | 142 | 236 | 154 | 116 | 131 | 157 | 128 | 92 | 1156 |
| Paget | 115 | 180 | 102 | 77 | 145 | 152 | 117 | 109 | 997 |
| Warwick | 206 | 294 | 234 | 199 | 160 | 191 | 172 | 152 | 1608 |
| Southampton | 350 | 419 | 0 | 0 | 187 | 213 | 198 | 149 | 1516 |
| Sandys | 202 | 302 | 166 | 166 | 167 | 243 | 232 | 202 | 1680 |
| Totals | 1520 | 2188 | 1120 | 966 | 1255 | 1513 | 1328 | 1135 | 11,025 |

⁴⁸³ “A General List of All the Inhabitants of His Majesty’s Bermuda or Somers Islands.”

On large plantation colonies like Jamaica (or our first case study of Trinidad and Tobago), economic dependence on a single crop and importation of large labor force resulted in a more oppressive and impersonal system. In Bermuda, the harshness of slavery was mitigated by the personal and individual nature of contacts between the races. The greater presence of women and children compared to plantation colonies exerted a moderating influence on their development of slavery. Bermuda only had one slave conspiracy in the eighteenth century an uncommonly low number among slave societies. For Bermuda's men, an inevitable bonding occurred at sea with some ships being majority enslaved labor; for the enslaved women, the harshness of the maritime economy meant sharing in their mistresses' anxieties of their men at sea. Enslaved women tended to do the cooking, laundering, and mending work. Young enslaved male children in the household did gardening, tending livestock, fence-building, fishing and running errands. In a household with white children, the enslaved child would also serve as a companion and playmate.

Circumstances had succeeded in perpetuating slavery in Bermuda, and despite the impractical and uneconomical nature of the institution, the local legislature could not abolish it outright without first receiving sanction from Great Britain. When emancipation was sanctioned, many Bermudians were thankful and relieved both black and white. For 200 years, those enslaved were used in Bermuda as domestic servants in the homes, as craftsmen and laborers on the land, and as trusted and competent sailors and pilots on the sea. Regardless of the comparably moderate treatment as compared to those on plantation colonies, does not alter the fact that the slave was *an oppressed being, a tool of his master, possessing few legal or civic rights*

and susceptible to the psychological scars which accompanied a state of bondage.⁴⁸⁴

Resistance was commonplace, and many oppressive laws tried to control every aspect of the slave's existence. The population in 1839 was listed at 8,933 with the unusual characteristics of having a majority of the colony residents being women. The colored population held a slight population majority to the white population with 4,867 to 4,066.

Table 48. The population of the Colony of Bermuda 1839. Source: Bermuda Assembly.⁴⁸⁵

| County, District or Parish | Area in Sq. Acres | Whites | | Coloured Population | | Total | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| St. George | 1580 | 231 | 352 | 347 | 532 | 578 | 884 |
| Hamilton | 1651 | 132 | 201 | 231 | 340 | 363 | 541 |
| Smith | 1281 | 62 | 115 | 94 | 113 | 156 | 228 |
| Devonshire | 1281 | 133 | 219 | 129 | 169 | 262 | 388 |
| Pembroke | 1281 | 394 | 401 | 378 | 511 | 772 | 912 |
| Paget | 1281 | 172 | 250 | 172 | 238 | 344 | 488 |
| Warwick | 1281 | 212 | 293 | 180 | 229 | 392 | 522 |
| Southampton | 1281 | 126 | 259 | 225 | 266 | 357 | 525 |
| Sandys | 1507 | 176 | 338 | 330 | 383 | 506 | 721 |
| Total | 12424 | 1638 | 2428 | 2086 | 2781 | 3724 | 5209 |

⁴⁸⁴ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*. Pg. 298

⁴⁸⁵ *Blue Book- Colony of Bermuda 1839*. Pg. 134

7.2.3 Rise of the Maritime Economy and Slave Emancipation Compensation

The Bermuda colony was one of the healthiest places in the New World. Its remote location kept the residents free of malaria-bearing mosquitoes and contagious diseases, and its mild weather mitigated fevers and ague. The occasional instances of yellow fever epidemics were attributed to the mosquitoes' importation on ships from the West Indies or coast of the Americas; this includes an outbreak in 1837 that killed 84.⁴⁸⁶ These milder conditions assisted in European settlement whereas the harsher conditions in Trinidad and Tobago may have deterred greater European settlement. Bermuda's water came from fresh-water wells and rainwater; it had no rivers to be contaminated by sewage and other organic waste. The warm climate and oceans encouraged swimming in which Europeans immersed their body in water, a previously uncommon experience for Europeans.⁴⁸⁷

The transformation from an agricultural to a maritime economy took place gradually and incrementally over the decades in the seventeenth century. By the end of the 17th century, most Bermudians were not agricultural laborers like their counterparts in other Atlantic colonies. From the inception of their charter, the Somers Company and slaveholders in the colony sent their slave labor to be trained in other skill sets beyond field work and as tobacco-growing declined⁴⁸⁸ slaveholders sought

⁴⁸⁶ Hughes-Hallett, "Yellow Fever."

⁴⁸⁷ Bernhard, *Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782*. Pg. 96

⁴⁸⁸ Ravaged by high winds, salt spray and high humidity, tobacco never flourished in the colony

other occupations for their enslaved.⁴⁸⁹ These skilled slaves were leased out to others for their masters' profits. Males slaves were known to serve as crewmen on their master's vessels, fished, traded, kept the island's forts, roads, and bridges in good repair. Many became sailors themselves and ship builders in the booming sloop industry. This was not the norm on the plantation colonies of Trinidad and Tobago where most enslaved were forced into field work. This diversity of occupations would lead to an easier transition to Emancipation for Bermuda. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, many of Bermuda's poor became involved in the salt trade, which was to become the mainstay of Bermuda's economy for more than a hundred years while stimulating their shipping industry. Agriculture fell into disrepute, and farming and gardening became occupations for children and old people. The colonists would begin to import a large proportion of their food a condition that continues today.

The rivalries and wars between France, England, Spain and the Netherlands for trade and territory spurred in a considerable period of privateering. Commissioned under the authority of a letter-of-marque to prey on the commerce of England's enemies in times of war, many Bermudians increased their fortunes by taking the booty from wrecked ships in the Bahamas as well as in Bermuda waters.⁴⁹⁰ At sea, there were many instances of bravery and sacrifice among the African crewmen.

⁴⁸⁹ Apprentices to carpenters, smiths, coopers, and other handicraft trades from 8 until 16

⁴⁹⁰ Owning property near the offshore reefs where wrecks occurred, or property with a secluded access to the sea, away from the inquisitive eyes of government officials, was almost a prerequisite to the acquisition of wealth in Bermuda

There are perhaps no better swimmers, I have seen them display enough ability, coolness and audacity to attack sharks while swimming and to kill them with their knives at the moment when the monster is obliged to turn on his back to seize his prey.⁴⁹¹

The demise of the cedar and the shipping industry made an unemployment problem for the enslaved that lingered into emancipation. At the turn of the 19th century, the colonial government made belated attempts to widen educational and religious opportunities to help transition from slavery. Reviewing the session proceedings from 1839 reveal conversations between the Governor and elected officials in the Bermuda House of Assembly in a concerted effort to increase education to the entire population.

We refer with satisfaction to the various efforts we have made for the diffusion of Education; and are anxious that the Poor of all classes, should participate in the assistance it may be in our power to afford.⁴⁹²

The blue book for 1839 documents a limited number of public and free schools.⁴⁹³

Bermuda's strategic location had made the island a base for many years and provided some employment relief. In 1810, the Crown bought one hundred and forty-one acres of land on Ireland Island for their Dockyard. The Dockyard establishment at Ireland Island helped to ease unemployment problem by absorbing numerous enslaved artisans and laborers but at lower rates than masters' preferred. However, after 1824 the job opportunities for enslaved declined when scores of convicts were introduced

⁴⁹¹ Crèvecoeur, "A Description of Bermuda. Extract from *Lettres D'un Cultivateur American* (1784)."

⁴⁹² *Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Assembly of Bermuda*. Pg. 3

⁴⁹³ *Blue Book- Colony of Bermuda 1839*.

into the island and supplied the nucleus of the labor force at the Dockyard for about forty years.⁴⁹⁴

On the eve of Emancipation proprietors in British plantation colonies like Trinidad and Tobago feared the demise of their industry having to compete with enslaved labor crops of Spanish colonies. As mentioned previously, Bermudian slaveholders did not have these concerns and gained greatly from emancipation. *The Emancipation Act* made provisions for the sum of £20 million in compensation money to be distributed amongst the slave-owners in the Cape, Mauritius, and the Caribbean, with about four-fifths of this sum going to the Caribbean slaveholders (See Table 49). The compensation was based on the estimated value of the colony's enslaved and as a result, Bermudian slave-owners were compensated less than slaveholders in other colonies. Bermudian proprietors received over £50,584 from that sum for approx. 4,203 enslaved Africans. The Bermudian General Assembly of the colony felt aggrieved about this amount and sent a petition to King William IV showing its dissatisfaction which had no effect. However, given the lack of employment opportunities and the social obligation to see after your enslaved after their physical utility, less financially secure Bermudian slaveholders were welcoming of emancipation. Conversely, Tobago a plantation colony in which there were 11,621 enslaved at last registry, their slaveholders were compensated over £275,000, almost twice the value in Bermuda.

⁴⁹⁴ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*. Pg. 216

Table 49. Slave Owner Compensation. Source: Royal Gazette of September 1st, 1835.

| Colony | Avg. Value of a Slave from 1822-30 | Number of Slaves by the last Registration | Proportion of the £20,000,000 to which the colony is entitled |
|------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|
| Bermuda | 27.4.11 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 4,203 | 50,584. 7. 0 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Bahamas | 29.18. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 9,705 | 128,340. 7. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Jamaica | 44.15. 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 311,692 | 6,161,927. 5. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Honduras | 120. 4. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,920 | 101,958. 19. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Virgin Is. | 31.16. 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 5,192 | 72,940. 8. 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Antigua | 32. 12. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 29,557 | 425,866. 7. 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Montserrat | 36. 17. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 6,355 | 103,558. 18. 5. |
| Nevis | 39. 3. 11 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 8,722 | 151,007. 2. 11. $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| St. Christophers | 36. 6. 10 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 20,660 | 331,630. 10. 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Dominica | 45. 8. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 14,384 | 275,923. 12. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Barbados | 47.1.3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 82,807 | 1,711,345. 19. 7. |
| Grenada | 59. 6. 0 | 23,536 | 616,444. 17. 7. |
| St. Vincent | 58. 6. 8. | 22,997 | 592,508. 18. 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Tobago | 45. 12. 0 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 11,621 | 234,064. 4. 11 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| St. Lucia | 56. 18. 7 | 13,348 | 335, 627. 15. 11 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Trinidad | 105. 4. 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 22,359 | 1,029,119. 1. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| British Guiana | 114.11. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 80,915 | 4,297,117. 10 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Cape of G. Hope | 73. 9. 11. | 38,427 | 1,247,401. 0. 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Mauritius | 69. 14. 3 | 68,618 | 2,112,632. 10. 11 $\frac{3}{4}$ |

Emancipation among plantation colonies was very divisive and there were fears of assimilating a huge unskilled labor force into a diversity of unfamiliar occupations but in Bermuda, the former slaves were already employed in a variety of occupations for which special skills were required. Unlike Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda skilled ex-slaves did not have an apprentice period 1834-1838 and was given full freedom in 1834. With the advent of Emancipation in 1834, the ex-slave entered into a state of liberty with nothing to show for their labors and with Bermuda's limited land area being owned by the white population, made it tough for him to acquire land. Some of the freed slaves continued to live in the quarters provided by former owners,

and others were given land after Emancipation, others eventually found lodgings elsewhere, which led to overcrowding and poverty. Many of the former enslaved continued in the occupation they were trained. This resulted in an increase in wages and engendered an alarming degree of unemployment. The decline in navigation and commerce exacerbated the unemployment problem pushing a large number of into the labor market unable to provide for their own subsistence. In an effort to alleviate this problem, the government launched a public works scheme designed to improve the roads in the colony, and in 1840 a new impetus was given to agriculture under the direction of Governor Reid.

7.2.4 Rule of the Sovereign and Social Control

The presence of an active State apparatus has always played a significant role in the daily lives of this very old colony. Studies have shown a strong positive effect of colonial duration on democracy.⁴⁹⁵ Bermuda administration of direct rule boasts well as an indirect rule has a strong negative relationship with postcolonial levels of political development.⁴⁹⁶ In settler colonies like Bermuda, Europeans were more likely to develop institutions of private property being affected themselves by these institutions. With a larger percentage of European settlers, even the lower strata demanded rights and protection equal to those found in their home country. From its inception, everything was closely regulated, and early Bermuda's colonial laws also reveal a State attempting to control the behavior of black and white bodies. *Rule of the*

⁴⁹⁵ Olsson, "On the Democratic Legacy of Colonialism."

⁴⁹⁶ Lange, "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development."

sword is quite evident during this early era in its draconian punishments. Although Bermuda was not a plantation colony, resistance to enslavement was strong, and the Governor and Assembly passed bills to subdue revolutions and interaction with poor whites, Irish and convict settlers.

The early obsession with laws on sex and reproduction is not uncommon in slaveholding societies, and Bermuda was no exception. The closeness of the colony's occupants had created a significant *mulatto* population by 1650. As a response, laws were passed forbidding *miscegenation* in 1663. Harsher punishment being given to the African males when he fathered a child with a European woman. Marriage was the desired state for everyone on the island, and fornication was punishable by the law, sometimes whipping or hanging. Bermuda's Africans married and formed families from the beginning of their arrival in the colony, and if separated through their sale, the small colony made families still accessible to each other. This is opposite to most plantation colonies in which high fertility was not common as the labor would cause high mortality and spur fresh importation of enslaved Africans. Reproduction among slaves of different masters had its own protocol for off-spring ownership, and the puritan colonists found time to outlaw the Baptism of *bastards or negroe children*. Class lines were not barriers to the censure of moral offenses. Failure to attend church brought public censure; fornication, adultery, and bastardly were publicly punished. In general whipping, branding, mutilation, and even death were inflicted on petty offenders, often on unreliable evidence.

This early obsession with sexual reproduction and fornication may have spurred the colony's sophisticated recording keeper. Unlike the lack of birth and death recording in Tobago, by contrast, Bermuda was well versed in practice.

Table 50. Marriages, Births and Deaths of the colony of Bermuda 1839. Source: Bermuda Assembly.⁴⁹⁷

| County, District or Parish | Persons employed in | | | Births | Marriages | Deaths |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | Agriculture | Manufacture | Commerce | | | |
| St. George | 142 | 139 | 117 | 73 | 19 | 37 |
| Hamilton | 118 | 206 | 36 | 16 | 6 | 6 |
| Smith | 20 | 3 | 9 | 29 | 1 | 13 |
| Devonshire | 17 | 22 | 31 | 22 | 3 | 17 |
| Pembroke | 22 | 61 | 45 | 33 | 6 | 23 |
| Paget | 106 | 35 | 83 | 11 | 6 | 15 |
| Warwick | 264 | 12 | 137 | 6 | 2 | 7 |
| Southampton | 126 | 52 | 52 | 17 | 7 | 8 |
| Sandys | 343 | 129 | 102 | 28 | 13 | 28 |
| Total | 1158 | 659 | 612 | 235 | 63 | 154 |

Despite the claims that Bermuda had a milder form of slavery compared to plantation colonies like our first case study of Trinidad and Tobago, the enslaved were never content under these conditions and as the slave population grew unrest and rebellions occurred. Most if not all of Bermuda's slave conspiracies were discovered before they occurred and grotesque executions were given to those involved; no whites lost their lives and more stringent laws passed to control the population. As early as 1623 laws were passed to *restrayne the insolencies of the negroes*, Masters were required to pay treble damage to the aggrieved party. Bernhard contends that severe penalties on masters forced them to provide better accommodation to their enslaved.⁴⁹⁸ Many laws aimed at controlling African and Native American bodies

⁴⁹⁷ *Blue Book- Colony of Bermuda 1839*. Pg. 135

⁴⁹⁸ Bernhard, *Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782*. Pg. 32

would also serve to control European bodies. The first slave rebellion in 1656 would spur lawmakers to forbid whites from barter or trade with blacks and fines masters who give *lisence to their negroes, mulattoes or musteses to plant Tobacco and trade or barter awaie the same*. Another act would restrict *evil events of Negroes, Mulattoes or Mustese walking abroad on nights and meeting together*. Africans walking around at night without a ticket from their masters were to be *well whipped and officials who failed to enforce this law were to be fined 10 shillings*. A second offense leading to the cutting off *a piece of his ear*, the third offense, a whipping and a branding with the letter R on the forehead.

Additional slave plots of organized resistance occurred in 1656, 1661, 1673, and 1682. There were two executions in 1656 and laws were passed that outlawed enslaved from wandering from their master's house after an hour of the setting of the sun. Any Englishman, who met a wandering African without a ticket, was given the authority to kill the offender *then and there without mercye*; failure to report a wandering African to the magistrate would cost an Englishman the forfeit of one hundred pounds of tobacco.⁴⁹⁹ Irish malcontents were involved in the failed plot of 1661 spurring laws further outlawing black and white trade. A poisoning scare in 1730 resulted in the burning of an African woman. and another failed uprising occurred in 1761. After the conspiracy of 1761 the office of “jumper” was created for punishing disobedient slaves (so-called for his whipping made slaves jump).

In the summer of 1681, Indian John was executed for a plot to murder his slave master. He was hanged, and body quartered, the parts placed on exhibit in four

⁴⁹⁹ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*. Pg. 53

different locations from one end of the colony to the other: Somerset Bridge in Sandys, Cobler's Island, the Flatts, and Stokes Bridge, near St. George. His head was displayed at Stokes Bridge. Another tactic of punishment by the colonial government was utilizing slaves as the executioner. In 1664, Peter and John two slaves were seized for stealing a boat and sentenced to death. Governor Florentius Seymour gave John a pardon and instead of being hanged was made executioner. The following month he was forced to hang his friend and accomplice. Governor Seymour ordered Peter's head to be severed from his body and fixed upon a pole's end at Stokes Point. Heads placed on spikes in St. David Island was a common tactic to scare all the enslaved inhabitants.

There is an absence of slave conspiracies from the 1760s to 1834 which is contrast to the rebellious nature of plantation colonies at the time. However, severe punishment for crimes continued. In the 1820s, the treadwheel (or treadmill) was introduced into the colony and was used quite extensively.⁵⁰⁰ When a slave or a free man was sentenced to hard labor, this usually entailed a series of sessions on the treadwheel for stated periods of time.⁵⁰¹ Recording kept on the conditions and treatment of prisoners at the jails in Hamilton and St. George's are very in-depth. The detail divides prisoners white or black/colored persons and includes information about those committed before; those employed at hard labor inside and outside the goal; the number of sick and deaths. In total, the prisoners committed for that year were 151.⁵⁰²

⁵⁰⁰ The use of treadwheels was abolished in Britain by the Prisons Act of 1898.

⁵⁰¹ Smith, *Slavery in Bermuda*. Pg. 234

⁵⁰² *Blue Book- Colony of Bermuda 1839*.

These are the conditions that shaped the pre and post-Emancipation colony during our first event under investigation, the 1839 Hurricane.

7.3 Disaster Event #1: Governor Reid's Hurricane of 1839

Governor William Reid, who was discussed in the previous case study, also plays a central role in Bermudan history and the Hurricane of 1839. Before serving as the Governor of the Windward Islands (1846-1848), he was the Governor of the Bermudas (1839-1846). Governor Reid was the first governor to be dispatched after the accession of Queen Victoria. The Governor became a Fellow of the Royal Society for his publication of "Law of Storms" in 1838. While stationed in Bermuda, Reid was adamant about constructing a lighthouse to warn mariners from her reefs. On his arrival, the Governor was supplied with a map of the island with depictions of 39 recent wrecks around the coast which could have been saved with a beacon light. The map was provided by pilot Commissioner Daniel Robert Tucker an expert on the pilots, channels and shoals of the colony. Thoroughly impressed by the Map, the Governor sent it with its description to Her Majesty's Government to influence them in building a lighthouse in the colony. H.M. Government agreed and dispatched celebrated engineer George Grove to construct a lighthouse at the chosen site of Gibbs' Hill. The light was first displayed during the last year of Governor Reid's tenure on the night of May 1st, 1846.⁵⁰³

A meteorological register was published weekly in the "Royal Gazette" a month before the Governor's arrival to the colony. In his first autumn in office in

⁵⁰³ Tucker, *Beware the Hurricane!: The Story of the Cyclonic Tropical Storms That Have Struck Bermuda 1609-1995*. Pg. 52

Bermuda on the night of the 11th and morning of 12th of September, a hurricane struck the colony. Although he was involved with the aftermath of the hurricane and also studied the phenomenon, this was his first time experiencing one. With his arrival and the publication of “Law of Storms” the descriptions and accounts of the storm in the newspapers depicted a heightened sense of knowledge

7.3.1 Description of the storm

On September 9th, the storm approx. six thousand miles away, swells began to roll on the south side of the island and break on the south shore with a loud noise heard from miles away. As is the case whenever such a sound is heard, conversations began of the impending storm. Other natural signs were noticed and heightened fears. The Royal Gazette posted stories from individuals seeing strange activity in the sky and weather.

for several days before, the appearances of the Heavens indicated, in the opinion of many, that some great change was about to take place in the weather... a singular luminous appearance resembling somewhat the pale light of the Aurora Borealis in an ESE direction, emerging from a common centre, spread itself to a width of about 10 degrees and rise to an altitude of about 15. On the South and North sides of this singular light, the clouds were of a purple colour, - whilst at the same time, those further to the South emitted frequent and vivid flashes of lightning.⁵⁰⁴

These natural signs were validated by barometers readings on the night of the storm. On September 11, the barometer fell rapidly at 1am and the Hurricane winds commenced at 2am and only subsided at 7am. The storm broke a severe drought

⁵⁰⁴ “Dreadful Gale.”

occurring from a long summer, its genesis to the eastward of the West Indies and passed over the colony with violent winds at ESE and ended at WSW. The salt spray from the south shore was carried overland upwards of a mile. The sea on the south coast rose eleven feet higher than usual tides and carried boats into fields 13 feet above usual high water mark, 20 cubic feet of bedrocks were removed.⁵⁰⁵

The storm was unprecedented in violence and calamity on the colony and even though considered less violent than the October 1780 storm, the devastation was beyond its magnitude. The recollections of that night were fixed in the memory of the people for years to come and known as Reid's Hurricane. Scarcely a house escaped damage; many were completely levels and other unroofed. Thousands of cedars torn up or uprooted, agricultural trees (orange, lemon, lime, peach, and bananas) equally devastated. The potatoes and other vines all looked black and withered as if destroyed by a severe frost. Portions of verandahs, shutters, blinds, sign boards found in every direction while the front street of town was covered with fallen trees of the Pride of India.

Every house in the Bermudas shared in the general destruction. Families were driven from their homes during the storm and exposed to the elements forced to seek shelter in cellars beneath their tottering and falling houses; some found refused with more fortunate neighbors. The roads were rendered impassable by the fallen trees and walls. The reports estimate the loss sustained by private individuals alone amounting to £80,000. Considerable damage occurred to the vessels in the ports. Sailboats and

⁵⁰⁵ Tucker, *Beware the Hurricane!: The Story of the Cyclonic Tropical Storms That Have Struck Bermuda 1609-1995*. Pg. 53

row boats were driven on shore, sunk or entirely destroyed. Damaged to boats were estimated at £20,000

On Ireland Island, most of the public and private residence were damaged, many blown down and families rendered houseless. The Commissioner's house was left nearly entirely unslated. The Naval hospital and Hospital Building suffered severely. The breakwater suffered a great extent with an estimated 2 years needed for its repair. In St. Georges most of the Houses were seriously damaged with many destroyed. The Government House and Offices along with the Royal hospital, the Ordinance Storekeeper's residence on Ordinance Island, and the Town Hall all sustained damages

7.3.2 Response to the storm

In the Monday, September 16th issue of the Royal Gazette, a letter signed by Mercator employed wardens to assess the damages in their parishes and present them to the Vestries and then forwarded to the Governor. Private relief was considered insufficient, and public relief would be a necessary resource for recovery.

I beg therefore to suggest that the churchwardens of the different parishes at once visit the abodes of all and ascertain the actual damages sustained and the sum that would be required to put the injured tenements in similar order to what they were previous to the hurricane and let them lay their report before the vestry the members of whom in this small community are conversant with the circumstances and means of the parishioners and would then select such objects as are deserving of assistance.⁵⁰⁶

Overwhelmed by the devastation in their Parish of St. George's, petitioners sent a letter to Governor Reid On September 27th, requesting that an early session of the

⁵⁰⁶ "Dreadful Gale."

Assembly be called in hopes of addressing the body about their devastation and requesting relief.

That from the testimony of several individuals, together with the personal observation of your Petitioners, it is quite clear that this Parish has sustained so much damage generally as to require more assistance than private charity could either afford or relieve. (Governor Dispatches pg. 6)

From the minutes of this meeting, we also get an insight into the level of aid given to the troops stationed in the colony. The parishioners write a thank you letter to Lieut-Colonel Henry F. Robinson commander of the forces in this garrison for the *very kind and humane manner in which he offered the use of the troops to the assistance of the parishioners and for the timely and efficient aid afforded by them.*⁵⁰⁷

Governor Reid responds to these petitioners by encouraging the inhabitants to utilize their individual exertion for speedy restoration and advises great caution in expecting claims for public charitable aid. He reminds them that care of the indigent and helpless falls upon the Parish Authorities and only if these parishes cannot handle the need then it will receive his further attention, and such requests must be accompanied by detailed reports. His response disseminated to the parishes.

If further support is needed then detailed reports would need to be presented, containing the names of the helpless; and satisfactory reasons given, in each individual case, why further relief is required. And these reports should show that in the first instance everything possible has been done within the Parish. (Governor Dispatches pg 7)

Likely hearing the word of his response for public aid from petitioners of St. George's, the Vestry of Pembroke Parish met on September 23rd and sent the

⁵⁰⁷ "For the Royal Gazette- Parish of St George Sept 14 1839."

proceedings from their meeting to the Governor on September 24th.⁵⁰⁸ Their churchwardens provided a detailed report to the Vestry of those in need and their estimated aid for recovery. £1250 was the estimated aid required to repair the Houses throughout the parish. However, after deliberations the Vestry took the situation of those in need and those with liens on their properties into consideration and only presented a modified list to the Governor for public relief (see Table 51). The Vestry sent assurance to the Governor that they would use their best mean to repay the amount for the repairs. They authorized the churchwardens to raise £100 pounds on the credit of the parish for the purpose of repairing the houses damaged.

Table 51. Request for aid sent by the Vestry of Pembroke Parish

| Name | Estimated damage | Proposed for assistance |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Estate of Zacch. Beek | 25 0 0 | 20 0 0 |
| Rebecca Hodson | 15 0 0 | 12 0 0 |
| Tatem, Hodson, and Adams | 30 0 0 | 17 0 0 |
| Martha A. Rawlins | 20 0 0 | 6 0 0 |
| Content Rawlins | 20 0 0 | 10 0 0 |
| Jeremiah Yates | 5 0 0 | 5 0 0 |
| Thos. Dickson | 5 0 0 | 5 0 0 |
| Martha Harvey | 12 0 0 | 12 0 0 |
| Estate Downing Dunscomb | 25 0 0 | 100 0 0 |
| Total | £157 0 0 | £100 0 0 |

This report and method for repayment were approved by the Governor and transmitted to the Pembroke Parish through Colonial Secretary Robert Kennedy. However, the Royal Gazette publication on September 24 somewhat mistakenly

⁵⁰⁸ Present- Sir Wm. C. H. Burnaby, H. Frith, Senr., Jos. J. Dill, Thos, J. Tucker, Thos. Hall, Benj. J. Tucker, Saml. Nash, Thos F. Ewing, John Eve, Wm. B. Perot,

reports that the governor simply repaid the advanced £100 without mentioning intricate details.

we are happy to learn that great exertions are making in different parts of the country to relieve the distress amongst the poor and destitute occasioned by the late storm; and we understand that his excellency the governor has placed the very munificent sum of one hundred pounds sterling from his private purse in the hands of a committee to assist in this charitable work.⁵⁰⁹

On September 21st, the Parishioners of Hamilton met to discuss their losses for over 45 residents had lost their shelters. In a similar fashion to the Parish of St. George's, the Vestrymen and magistrate of Hamilton send their petition to the Governor and assured him that the parish was unable to care for the indigent and required his legislature's relief. They compared their plight to those of Barbados following the 1831 storm and its' precedent of diverting public works money.

Your Memorialists, therefore, beseech your Excellency, that as the only remedy which appears to them feasible; that Your Excellency will be please to convene the Legislature and to direct its attention to the immediate relief of the indigent sufferers. (pg 8 Governor Dispatches)

Governor Reid, writing from Mount Langton, responds on September 24th with the same answer he gave to the Parish of Hamilton in denying their request to convene the Legislature and reiterates that the care of the indigent belongs to the Parochial Authorities. The Governor was against the introduction of a forced (tax) upon the general inhabitants for repairing the damage to homeowners unless confined strictly as charity to indigent house-owners. He advises Hamilton to follow the example set by Pembroke Parish and take the responsibility upon themselves first before he can assist

⁵⁰⁹ "The Storm." Pg. 2

and rejects the comparison to Barbados 1831.⁵¹⁰ He also states again that any further requests must be presented with detailed reports, giving the names of the helpless and that the Parish efforts towards their relief.

In my opinion, the House-owner who has property can have no claim upon the Public for repairing his dwellings; on the contrary, it seems to me most desirable that such persons should rely upon their own exertion. I cannot hold the opinion that the Bounty of Bermuda to Barbados in 1831, should in any way be allowed to influence our judgment in the present case. (pg 9 Governor Reid to the Representatives of the Parish of Hamilton)

In a similar vein to the other parishes, Southampton Parishioners met to consider how best to obtain aid for their distressed conditions. Committees were appointed to ascertain the extent of the damages to the houses and those that were without means to rebuild. On September 25th, the Magistrates of Southampton sent their request to Governor Reid in which they proclaimed their need greater than their means, the estimated damage to the parish being £1379 10s. of which £596 13 4 sustained by those unable to assist themselves. The Governor does not budge from his stance and reiterates his position. Relief should be confined to indigent House-Owners and if the parish is unable to meet this need then a proposed distribution list should be presented with the lists of persons and sums for each. He encouraged them to follow in the footsteps of Pembroke Parish which deemed £100 sufficient and borrowed at Interest. The Governor firmly believed that the precedent of relief through public money must be avoided in the interests of the colony.

⁵¹⁰ In the aftermath of the Hurricane of 1831 that devastated the plantation colonies of Barbados and the Windward Islands, Parliament responded with a grant of £100,000 for the victims of the storm and made a loan of £500,000 available for the restoring of buildings and works on estates.

In many parishes, laborers were discontinued on public roads and made available for the stone pits to obtain materials for repairing the damaged buildings. Public auctions were common to raise funds for the less fortunate. There was relief from abroad as the December 24th, Royal Gazette states that Bermuda Natives residing in Demerara opened subscriptions for the benefit of sufferers in Bermuda from the September Hurricane. The following February 18th 1840 Royal Gazette mentions a vessel arrived at Portsmouth on the 16th of December and returned with new convicts dispatched to the colony to assist in Government Works and in repairing the damages to buildings from the hurricane.⁵¹¹

7.3.2.1 Colonial Office Dispatches

Through the Governor's dispatches to the Colonial Office and the Marquis of Normandy, we gain more insight into his stance to continue to reject the parishioners requests. On the 19th September, after speaking with his Council, the Governor sends communication (dispatch No. 60) to the Colonial Office and the Marquis of Normandy concerning the level of destruction caused by the hurricane and that he has done his utmost to induce everyone except the indigent and helpless to look solely to their own exertions for getting over the calamity.

Two-thirds of the houses have been more or less injured some destroyed or unroofed, and all the Commercial Wharves at St. George's destroyed except one (pg10 Governor to the right Honorable the Marquis of Normandy No.60)

⁵¹¹ "For the Royal Gazette- Parish of St George Sept 14 1839."

In dispatch No. 63 dated October 15th, Governor Reid writes that utilizing public expense to help homeowners would do more harm than good, especially when considering distribution.

the introduction of a right of having damage caused by storms repaired at the public expense would be bringing a very serious evil upon the community; and should Public money be granted, the difficulty in the distribution of it amongst, individuals might cause more harm than even the storm itself. (Governor Dispatch No. 63)

In this dispatch, the Governor also discusses how the troops are assisting in the repairing efforts. *Every exertion seems to be making to repair the damage. The Troops under Lieut-Colonel Robinson have given every assistance desired.* During this ordeal and communications with the Colonial Office, there was a changing of the guard. Constantine Henry Phipps, 1st Marquess of Normanby former Governor of Jamaica and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 1835-1839, would reign as Colonial Secretary from only 20th February 1839 – 30th August 1839.⁵¹² In place of the Marquis, Lord John Russell became Secretary of State for War and the Colonies from 30th August 1839- 30th August 1841. Before this role, Lord Russell served as Home Secretary from 1835- 1839.⁵¹³

The new Secretary of State, Lord Russell, responds to Governor Reid in dispatch No. 17 dated November 11th from Downing House. Lord Russell acknowledges the previous dispatches and notice of the destruction brought to the island and commends the Governor for his sound judgment and the colonists for

⁵¹² During his reign he wrote a letter of instructions to William Hobson, in which the government's policy for the sovereignty of New Zealand was set out.

⁵¹³ Lord John Russell was the principal architect of the great Reform Act of 1832 and would go on to serve as Prime Minister twice in the 19th century.

relieving themselves through their own energies. In dispatch No. 25 dated December 11th, Lord Russell responds to Governor Reid’s dispatch No. 63 and commend the governor for his staunch stance on not utilizing public expense for aiding the colony’s home-owners, the position bringing him delight.

I have in reply to express the satisfaction with which I have received a report so honorable to the enlightened views and public spirit of the parties concerned. (Governor Dispatch No. 25)

7.4 Cross-case Analysis of Disaster Response and Recovery under the Old Representative System: Bermuda Hurricane 1839 and Tobago Hurricane 1847

Table 52. Colony Profiles during Disaster Event #1

| | Bermuda 1839 | Tobago 1847 |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Government Structure | Old Representative System | Old Representative System (Lieutenant Governor in residence) |
| Franchise | Limited | Limited |
| Colonization | Settler Colony (Former Slaveholders) | Plantation Colony (Former Slaveholders) |
| Economy | Maritime based Economy | Sugar Cane/ Extractive Economy |
| Demographics | Majority European until 19th Century. Significant Military presence | Majority African (formerly enslaved labor) |

Bermuda’s role as a British possession began 150 years before that of Tobago. The two colonies are in many ways an antithesis of each other and provides us with an

ideal comparative study. Although both colonies were slaveholding societies, the ways slaves were utilized were very different. Bermuda started off under a plantation style company charter, but the lack of natural resources soon put an end to that idea and soon resembled a settler style colony. Tobago was a plantation colony for its entire juncture under British control; extractive industry purposes were more important than European settlement. At the time of our first Hurricane events under investigation Bermuda 1839 and Tobago 1847, the two colonies continued to represent different social and economic structures. Even demographically, with Tobago being an extractive plantation colony, it was densely populated by former enslaved Africans and their descendants. Bermuda was one of the few colonies that held a majority European population well into the 19th century. However, in regards to their political structure both colonies were ruled under the Old Representative System (ORS). Tobago, unlike Bermuda, was part of a bloc of islands known as the Windward Islands Colony and administered by a Governor stationed in Barbados while a Lieutenant Governor resided in Tobago in the Governor's place. Besides this difference the structure of the ORS in the two colonies was the same. Coincidentally, Governor Reid presided over both Bermuda in 1839 and the Windward Islands in 1847. The Governor/Lieutenant Governor ruled with his Council, and their Legislative Council were bicameral with elected members that represented the interest of the wealthy elites. Tobago's status as a member of the Windward island made their Legislature powers answerable to the Barbados Assembly as well as the Colonial Office in England. Bermuda's House of Assembly and Governor had no intermediary force between them and the Colonial Office in England. On both colonies, the franchise was limited to the wealthier individuals in the colony mostly white males, and the

threshold for participation was raised following emancipation. In Bermuda a sophisticated local vestry system existed in each parish while in Tobago, the government continued to be overtly violent towards Africans.

7.4.1 Public Health Response

Under the ORS of Tobago, health care was only available through private means, those that remained on the plantation system were more likely to receive a limited level of assistance at the expense of the proprietors. The state did not provide health services to the general public nor was there a significant apparatus for the monitoring of births and deaths in the colony. Hospitals were nonexistent as well as mental asylums. Considering the lack of public health services and the generally harsher environment on plantation colonies, it isn't surprising that the Tobago hurricane of 1847 caused the death of 26 lives and many others later died from their injuries. By contrast, Bermuda's mild temperature and labor conditions made it one of the healthiest places in the new world. The government strongly monitored the births and death of the colony. A robust parish and vestry system looked after their indigent in ways not available in Tobago at the same time. Although there was widespread devastation in Bermuda following the 1839 Hurricane, there were no reported deaths of direct or indirect consequence.

Table 53. Health Response to the Hurricane

| Tobago 1847 Hurricane | Bermuda 1839 Hurricane |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 26 deaths many others from injuries | No deaths |

| | |
|--|---|
| <p>No public health is available. Only private care is available. Those remaining on the plantation had limited access</p> | <p>Parochial Authorities looked after helpless and indigent</p> |
|--|---|

7.4.2 Financial Assistance to Hurricane victims

The most significant contrast in the state’s role in facilitating recovery efforts following the Bermuda 1839 Hurricane and the Tobago 1847 Hurricane was the disparity in funding. Although both hurricane events caused significant damage to the respective colonies, the colonial typology of extractive/plantation vs. settler created a different need for financing devastated plantations in Tobago; it was enabled by the membership of the legislative council and the power of the local plantocracy in Tobago and in England. The Tobago damages were estimated at £84,853 to restore the damage to the sugar plantations; her majesty’s government issued an advance of £50,000 to the proprietors of the island. The interest rates of these loans were lowered multiple times to assist repayment. £5,000 was granted to the poor inhabitants. In contrast, following the Bermuda storm the estimated damage was £80,000 to personal property. Governor Reid, the same Governor in charge of the administration of the Tobago colony 9 years later, would deny any attempts of utilizing public funds in Bermuda’s recovery. There is evidence that only £1,000 was possibly refunded to a Parish after it proactively assisted its most indigent residents.

Table 54. Financial Assistance to Hurricane Victims

| Bermuda 1839 | Tobago 1847 |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| Damage Estimate at £80,000 | Damage Assessed at £84,853 |
| Loans were denied by Governor | Loans granted for plantations £50,000 |
| Vestries/ Parishes implored to see about indigent | Grant of £5,000 for colonies indigent |

7.4.3 Military Use and Population Control

The government in both colonies of Tobago and Bermuda exhibited a hostile position towards people of African descent. Many laws passed following emancipation eg. the vagrancy laws, gave the state greater latitude of penalizing imprisonment and enforced labor. This violent stance, early laws and growth in prison population being quite similar to those in the United States.⁵¹⁴ The former enslaved Africans of both colonies were forced to seek residence in the most physically vulnerable areas of the islands increasing their risk to natural hazards and suffered disproportionately with loss of life and injuries.

The use of military following these storms highlights some differences between the two colonies. Following the Tobago 1847 storm the colonial government utilized two methods to control the activities of the population. The first tactic involved the immediate passing of a bill outlawing the acquisition of materials scattered by the storm which was punishable with severe public whipping and jail time. The 2nd tactic involved swearing-in of new constables in overseeing the activities

⁵¹⁴ Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*.

and behavior of the public. By contrast, no such bill was passed in Bermuda following the 1839 storm. Additionally, the heavy military presence on the island played an integral role in the rebuilding of homes in Bermuda. The Royal Dock Yards was a major employer on the colony of Bermuda and many residents had ties to it. In contrast, the regiment's presence in Tobago was not a stable segment of its society and was sent away following the storm. It is possible with Tobago being a plantation colony, existing for the purpose of extracting wealth and not as a place for European settlement, a greater social divide existed exhibited by this legislative difference.

Table 55. Military Involvement and Policing following the storms

| Bermuda 1839 | Tobago 1847 |
|---|--|
| No bills passed | Bill outlawing of material acquisition |
| Military heavily involved in rebuilding | Swearing-in of new constables |
| | Military sent away |

7.4.4 Legislative Process

Both Tobago and Bermuda were ruled under the Old Representative System at the time of these storms. The only difference in structure was the replacement of the Governor with a Lieutenant Governor in Tobago. Additionally, Tobago was still part of the Windward Islands with its Governor in resident at Barbados. As a result of this structure, bills passed in the Tobago, Assembly also had to be approved by the Governor and his Council in Barbados. We see this process taking place in the passing of the law to protect property and requests for financial assistance to the Queen both needing approval before being sent to the Colonial Office in England. In contrast,

Bermuda was its own colony with its Governor and council in residence. This slight difference allowed Bermuda’s colonial government to enact laws in a swifter manner if needed without the necessity of an intermediate force between it and the Colonial Office in England. However, it was Tobago and not Bermuda that passed significant legislature in the aftermath of their hurricane. Additionally, it was Tobago and not Bermuda that sent official requests for financial assistance to the Colonial Office. The Governor in resident in Bermuda denied any request to reconvene his council, which was in recess during the storm. The Lieutenant Governor in Tobago appears a lot less powerful or more in-line with doing the bidding of the financiers of the plantation economy and their requests for assistance. At first, it seems that this is an individual preference or leadership style, but considering that the Governor in charge of Bermuda and the Windward Island was the same man, Governor Reid, the reality of the power of the plantation owners is manifest. Although Governor Reid was adamant about not utilizing public funds to repair the damages in Bermuda, he was quite ready to forward the requests from Tobago and assist in obtaining loans for Tobago. The findings thus align with historical accounts of the influence of the financiers located in England on the Colonial Office.

Table 56. Legislative Process of the two colonies

| Bermuda 1839 | Tobago 1847 |
|---|---|
| Government Structure Old Representative System | Government Structure Old Representative System (Lieutenant Governor in residence) |

| | |
|--|--|
| Governor and Council resident in the colony. | Approval needed from Windward Island Governor and Council located in Barbados |
| Approval needed from Colonial Office | Approval needed from Colonial Office |
| Did not request loans or pass bills | Requested loans and approval of new “bill.” |

7.4.5 Population displacement and resettlement

Mass devastation befell the homes on both colonies following these disasters. In Tobago over 500 houses were destroyed and 4/5 of the “negro houses” on the plantations were destroyed. Through the acquisition of advances from the British government, the proprietors were afforded resources to rebuild their plantations. They were rebuilt by African laborers and rebuilt in the same manner as they were before. Those Africans off the plantations were likely left to their own devices and fortunate if given some of the limited grant money allotted by her Majesty’s Treasury. There were no efforts to move the population to another location or utilize better building materials. The devastation in Bermuda following the 1847 storm was equal in severity. Quite similarly, the rebuilding efforts were of the same type as in Bermuda. No efforts to move population were done nor were new building materials introduced. However, the limestone structures already in abundance were relatively much stronger than the materials used in Tobago. This architecture is an area worthy of further research, considering the modern consensus against stone houses and yet their safety in

Bermudan life. In Bermuda, there was also no advance of loans to the residents to assist in rebuilding. However, the military presence aided in the rebuilding efforts and the following year more indentured convicts were brought to the colony to help in rebuilding. Both colonies decided to rebuild the homes devastated in the same manner as previously built.

Table 57. Population Sheltering and Resettlement

| Bermuda 1839 | Tobago 1847 |
|--|---|
| Widespread Destruction | Widespread Destruction |
| No Relocation plans | No relocation plans |
| No Retro-fitting/ Mitigation plans | No Retro-fitting/ mitigation plans |
| No public funding/loans provided | Loans provided to plantations |
| Individuals, military and convict labor assist in rebuilding | Individuals rebuild themselves. African labor likely used on plantations rebuilding efforts |

7.5 Disaster Event #2 Hurricane Arlene 1963

Our second event within this case study occurs in 1963 during a period of change and a few years before the colony’s new constitution was enacted. These changes would continue to evolve Bermudian society in the following decades as resistance to racial inequality came to a climax and the state had no choice but to evolve new tactics. Both case studies represent governments that once prescribed

discrimination as law and exploitation of labor by force. Undoubtedly some obstacles remain for both societies but today they possess governments with dedicated ministries or departments to address the legacies or former policies it once enacted. The health and well-being of the population have now more than ever become a priority of the government. The initial introduction of tactics aimed to create a population state rose during the period following emancipation that was covered in the previous section. However, and in line with the theoretical concept of Late-Colonial Governmentality, a significant influx of these tactics occurs in the early to mid-20th century. An analysis of the colonial experience is missing from Foucault original conceptualization of Governmentality.⁵¹⁵

In many ways, the relationship of Africans and Native Americans with the government in these colonies is symbolic of how the state has moved from a strict rule of the sword to the rule of government. Moving from ruling over the land for maximization of extracting wealth to also maximize the potentiality of human capital. In Bermuda, laws in the 17th and 18th century covered in the previous section highlighted how Africans were banned from buying or selling anything without the consent of their master and 19th laws prevented free Africans and persons of color from possessing and inheriting land; abortive slave conspiracies would often result in the banishment of all free Africans from the colony. Today, they have risen to the highest levels of the colony's governing systems.

Legal segregation lingered longer in Bermuda than in Trinidad and Tobago. While Trinidad and Tobago was introducing its first African Premier and Prime

⁵¹⁵ Foucault and Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population*.

Minister, Bermuda only passed a law ending segregation at restaurants in 1961. It wasn't until 1965 that the Bermuda Regiment was formed by the amalgamation of the white Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps and the black Bermuda Militia Artillery. Much of this change came as a response to the increased protests of the population against racial injustices like the 1959 boycott to end segregation in theaters organized by the "Progressive Group" which coincided with Bermuda's 350th Anniversary. The Theatre Boycott further helped eliminate discriminatory practices in hotels, restaurants, and other establishments throughout the island. Clashes between black workers of the Bermuda Industrial Union and the white police force increased with a strike by dockworkers, stevedores, and longshoremen. Fighting for better wage and benefits saw the riot squad called out to subdue crowds. Bermuda's first trade union, the Bermuda Union of Teachers was established by black teachers in 1919. In 1941, Bermuda Workers' Association was founded with Dr. E.F. Gordon becoming the President in 1944 and presented a petition to the British government protesting the social, economic and political conditions in Bermuda. This Association was the forerunner of the Bermuda Industrial Union established in 1947. The tension is highlighted by the 1973 assassination of Governor Sharples and the protests that followed.

Further progress has since been made. The Newman Report of 1994 highlighted the existence of racial discrimination and institutional racial discrimination in Bermuda. The Commission for Unity and Racial Equality Act was passed and the code of practice for the elimination of racial discrimination and the promotion of equality of opportunity in employment was produced and circulated. Under the Ministry of Culture and Social Rehabilitation Department of Human Affairs CURE

was established in 1995 to promote the equality of opportunity and good relations between persons and work towards the elimination of racial discrimination in Bermuda. In 1999, CURE was amended requiring all employers with 10 or more employees to register with CURE. CURE was given the authority to collect information about employees and applicants for employment from those registered employers on a range of race-related employee information. Including the racial background of employees, salaries and wages, benefits and hiring and promotion information.⁵¹⁶

7.5.1 Education

Strides in educating the general public were earlier in Bermuda than Trinidad and Tobago. Early colonization saw Africans in Bermuda skilled in many trades while those in Trinidad were mostly used as labor. An Anglican day school for African children opened in St. George's in 1811 and a regular system of education to instruct Africans expanded in 1825. The colony created a Board of Education in 1858 with an inspector of schools while increasing grant allocation. In the early 20th century the government was still involved in school segregation, separating the white black and Portuguese. In 1927, Sandy's Secondary School became the second school to offer a secondary education to black students. Free primary school was introduced in 1949. However, Segregation remained longer in Bermuda than in Trinidad and Tobago. In

⁵¹⁶ Commission for Unity and Racial Equality, *400 Years of Bermuda's Race Relations: Bermuda 1609-2009*.

1965, the Bermuda colony withdrew funding to racially segregated schools.

Integration of primary schools was only achieved in 1970-71

7.5.2 Governance

From 1959 to 1964 the Governor of Bermuda was Major-General Sir Julian Alvery Gascoigne. Eligibility to elected seats in Parliament were modified once Emancipation took place but it wasn't until 1883, William H.T. Joell became elected as the first African member of the House of Assembly in Bermuda. This is an achievement that would not occur in Trinidad and Tobago for another 50 years later. Trinidad and Tobago were granted Universal Suffrage in 1946, Bermuda granted women landowners the right to vote in 1944 and only until The Parliamentary Act of 1963 introduced Universal Suffrage for all Bermudian whether they owned property or not.

Although the government structure remained intact from previous centuries, the introduction of universal suffrage qualifies Bermuda in 1963 as governed under the New Representative System (NRS). However, the act for universal suffrage was very similar to the act passed preceding emancipation which modified voter eligibility. The 1963 Act raised the minimum voting age to twenty-five and gave landowners a "plus vote"- those with two thousand square feet in area in any part of the island possessed an extra vote in elections. A method to appease the white populations' minority status and maintain power. This law would change again with Bermuda's new constitution in 1967 passed by the UK government. The plus vote was abolished and the voting age lowered to 21. In 1968, the constitution became operative with a Westminster style of government with responsibilities transferred to the party holding

the majority of seats in the House of Assembly. This was the first general election under universal adult suffrage with Sir. Henry Tucker becoming the first Government leader.

These are the historical, political and social conditions that defined the mid-20th-century Bermudian society. As we delve into the storm of 1963, this context will better frame the response and recovery activities of the government.

7.5.3 Hurricane Arlene 1963

Hurricane Arlene formed 1300 N.M to the S.E. of Bermuda on August 2, 1963, recorded at 85-knot winds before downgrading. On August 8, 340 N.M S.W. of Bermuda, she increased to 50 knots moving towards Bermuda. By noon she increased to 65 knots and hurricane status. The 53rd Weather Recon Sqdn Hurricane Hunters breached Arlene to record her details. On the Afternoon of the 8th, the Kindley Base gave orders to batten down and to begin aircraft evacuation. At 6:30pm Colonel, Edward declared Hurricane Condition II, which meant hurricane force winds within 24 hours. At 6:45 am on August 9th all non-essential Kindley personnel were sent home. At 8:30 am Colonel Jones declared Condition 1 which meant hurricane force winds within 12 hours.⁵¹⁷ Kindley Air Force Base sent eight U.S.A.F. aircraft to Puerto Rico and the United States to avoid the devastation the day before, and daytime air traffic at the civil Air Terminal was non-existent with commercial airlines

⁵¹⁷ Jones, "Hurricane 'Arlene.'"

cars stalling. The police towing truck itself broke down.⁵²⁰ Telephone communication was disrupted during Arlene. The lines were clogged with people calling for taxis. The famed Shark oil of Bermuda gave no indication of a hurricane, possibly due to the fact that the pressure showed little drop until the hurricane was upon them.

7.5.4 Damage

In the space of two hours, hurricane Arlene caused thousands of pounds' worth of damages. The damage though mostly minor was extensive and no injuries or deaths were reported during the storm. According to the Director of Public Works, the velocity of Hurricane Arlene made the damage less severe. Had she been moving at a slower speed the devastation would have been greater.⁵²¹ Arlene's damage to the island was approximate \$300,000. Mr. Roland Lines, head of the Bermuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company was quoted in The Royal Gazette on the lack of preparations by the colony's residents.

Bermudians don't have enough respect for the power of a hurricane... we are just not prepared. People leave their houses to look after themselves and anchor their boats with a minimum of safety. I do urge them most strongly to respect hurricanes and learn from this close brush with a real disaster.⁵²²

⁵²⁰ "Big Rush for Home Headed Band into Worst."

⁵²¹ Director of Public Works, "Letter to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary."

⁵²² "Hurricane Arlene May Cost Colony More Than £100,000."




Figure 23. Destruction caused by Hurricane Arlene. Source: Bermuda Royal Gazette.⁵²³

The colony's farmers were spared as the season's crops were already harvested expect for the citrus. The salt spray caused severe browning of plants and most of the general damage was to trees and other vegetation. With so few trees on the colony, this loss of vegetation was significant. Trees were uprooted, boats smashed, windows shattered and roof slates sent spinning. Downed Trees were everywhere, taking with them hundreds of telephone cables and power cables, over 2000 lines were knocked out of order out of 11,000.⁵²⁴ Electricity was also disconnected due to the fallen trees and with it, the television stations on the colony were knocked off the air.

The north shore road from Hamilton to blue hole was the hardest-hit area receiving the brunt of the storm. The little boats suffered most property damage; at Spanish Point, several dinghies were swamped and dismantled; a similar faith befell

⁵²³ Ibid.

⁵²⁴ "May Be 2,000 Phones Knocked Out, Say Tel. Co."

Sailboats at Red Hole. The Mid-Atlantic Boat Club on the North Shore in Devonshire was wiped out including every boat. A conservative estimate of their boat loss was £5,000.⁵²⁵ More than one hundred boats were damaged and many were uninsured. Of the colony's 8000 houses less than half had wind-storm insurance. According to a representative of the Bermuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the average damage to houses were £150 and boats just under £100

7.5.5 Response and Recovery Efforts

In St. George's residents played a central role in cleaning up the hurricane damage. The Mayor suggested that the City Fathers could help the community and trucks began running around town all day for the week collecting rubbish debris and tree branches. Residents were asked to place all their rubbish at the front of their properties for collecting. Damage was confined to the odd roof and trees.⁵²⁶ A similar process is assumed followed in other parishes.

On August 26th the Director of Public Works sends a damage assessment from Hurricane Arlene to the Colonial Secretary. In all, the cost of clearing public highways and repairing government buildings amounted to £13,400, but half unable to be covered by existing funds.⁵²⁷ The Finance Committee agreed to the request of £7000 on September 9th. The awarded amount of £7000 was requested for the following

- a. £3000 for the replacement of the retaining wall on approach to St. Catherine
- b. £1000 for the shoreline at Civil Air Terminal

⁵²⁵ "Large Pile of Rubble All That Is Left of Club and Its Boats."

⁵²⁶ "St. George's Proceeds with Clean up."

⁵²⁷ Colonial Secretary, "Letter to the Clerk, House of Assembly."

- c. £3000 for repair to government buildings

Following the approval of the Finance Committee, the Governor and Assembly informs the Colonial Treasurer to pay the Board of Public Works the sum not exceeding £7,000 by December 31st for the cost of repairs to Government owned properties and the clearance of public highways as a result of the passage of Hurricane Arlene.⁵²⁸

On September 17 the Bermuda Electric Light Company Ltd. sends a request to the Colonial Secretary for the services of a helicopter to assess their overall damage. On October 12th the Acting Colonial Secretary approved the Bermuda Electric Light Company's request for a helicopter to survey their company's damage property; the American Consul, George W. Renchard loaned the helicopter from their resources at US Kindley Air Force Base. ⁵²⁹

A glaring criticism that reverberated throughout the colony was the lack of central direction at the moment of crisis. In response, Colonial Secretary, Hon. J. W. Sykes called a conference for August 15th for a post-mortem on Hurricane Arlene. Invited representatives would include the executive level of the colony's public utility services, police and fire departments, disaster organizations and communications systems. Secretary Sykes felt everyone had done a tremendous job under difficult conditions but wanted to examine how an improved liaison between the various organizations and departments primarily concerned could be better effected, particularly with regard to communications. A three-man committee was appointed by

⁵²⁸ "The Hurricane Damage Expenses Resolve."

⁵²⁹ Acting Colonial Secretary, "Letter to General Manageral, Bermuda Electric Light Co."

the Colonial Secretary to formulate an operational plan following the suggestions put forward at the meeting.⁵³⁰ While the final plans were being considered a new storm threatened Bermuda shores, hurricane Beulah. With the co-ordination system still not in place, the committee posted precautionary tips for before the storm; during and after in the newspaper that week.⁵³¹ Hurricane Beulah was also a moment for scientific experimentation for the U.S with nine hurricane hunter planes flying into the storm to drop silver iodide crystal around the center cloud.⁵³² The controversial practice developed from studies performed by the US Weather Bureau's National Hurricane Research laboratory in 1956.⁵³³ Scientists report saw no immediate effect of their cloud-seeding aimed at softening the blow of Hurricane Beulah. The colonial secretary decreed a 500-mile area within Bermuda land as too dangerous for the activity.

With word spreading that a special study was being undertaken to adopt safety measures for future hurricane threats to the colony, the Bermuda Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd sent recommendations to the Colonial Secretary that public holidays be issued when a hurricane is imminent to avoid congested roads which occurred during "Arlene".⁵³⁴ In his response which was forwarded to the Chamber of Commerce, the Colonial Secretary suggested that the private sector follows the

⁵³⁰ "Bermuda to Have Co-Ordinated Hurricane Service Set-Up."

⁵³¹ "Precautionary Hurricane Procedures Are Spelt Out."

⁵³² "Cloud-Seeding Has No Immediate Effect on Beulah."

⁵³³ U.S. Weather Bureau, "Project Stormfury Fact Sheet" (United States Department of Commerce, July 1965).

⁵³⁴ "Letter from the General Manager, Bermuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd."

protocol of the U.S Bases in advising all non-essential personnel to remain home during these times.⁵³⁵ The Insurance Co. also produced a number of recommendations for boat owners to better secure vessels.

7.5.6 Emergency Measures Organisation (EMO)

By August 24th the hurricane alert committee produced a working draft of the colony’s new Emergency Measures Organisation. On September 9th, the committee released their finalized Operational Plan to be followed in the event of another hurricane coming in proximity to Bermuda. The plan was vitally concerned with the maintenance of essential services. The object of the committee was *to set up a centralized organization to disseminate information to the Public before a hurricane and to co-ordinate the efforts of Government Departments, Utility Services, and Private Agencies after the storm to repair damage and enable the community to resume normal life as soon as possible.*

Table 58. Hurricane Alert Committee. Source: Public Information.⁵³⁶

| Name | Affiliation |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| J.W. Sykes Esq. | Colonial Secretary |
| Major Mansell | Kindley A.F.B. |
| Captain Mezey | Kindley A.F.D. |
| M. Grimes, Esq. | Fire Commissioner |
| Jones, Esq. | Radio Society |
| Representative | R.N.O. |

⁵³⁵ Colonial Secretary, “Letter to Secretary, Bermuda Chamber of Commerce.”

⁵³⁶ Public Information Officer, “Hurricane Alert Committee Now Have A Plan.”

| | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| J. Smith, Esq. | Public Works Department |
| J.J. Outerbridge, Sr. | Disaster relief |
| J. Lightbourn | Disaster relief |
| G.H. Robins | Commissioner of Police |
| L. Harmer | Telephone Company |
| L. Vorley | Electric Light Company |

The alert system utilized by the Kindley Air Force Base was the blueprint for the alert system adopted for the colony.

- Condition V- Season from June 1st through 80th November
- Condition IV- Hurricane exists within hurricane boundary and winds may increase within 72 hours
- Condition III- Winds on the Island may increase to hurricane velocity within 48 hours
- Condition II- Winds on the Island may increase to hurricane velocity within 24 hours
- Condition I- Winds on the Island are forecast to reach hurricane velocity within 12 hours.

When Condition II is reached, a Command Post will be set up at Police Operations, Prospect, with the Commissioner of Police in charge. In addition, the Public Information Officer, representatives of the Disaster Relief Organization, the Radio Society, the Hamilton Fire Brigade, Public Works Department, Telephone Company, and Electric Light Company will report to the Command Post and ensure that their communication links by line and radio are functioning. The Public Information Officer will be responsible for keeping the public advised of the various conditions of alert, through the media of radio, television and the press. Advice to householders and owners of small craft in the form of precautionary procedures will also be carried on all media.

The Disaster Relief Organizations (mainly Red Cross) would be responsible for casualty and relief organization. This included organizing the first-aid centers, sheltering and feeding halls in all Parishes. Public Works Department was tasked with compiling a list of private firms willing to supply heavy equipment, lifting gear, bulldozers useful in rescue and clearance work. The Fire department and the Public Works Department would be responsible for rescue and clearance. The committee also requested that residents stay off communication unless necessary to ease the clogged telephone lines.⁵³⁷

On November 2nd the Colonial Secretary agreed that the Hospital would be included in direct contact with the Police Headquarters; having been left out of disaster relief organization conference. Additionally, the Hospital would obtain its own emergency plant; and power lines to the Hospital would be laid underground. On October 1st communication exercise “twist” tested the existing communications in the advent of a disaster. The practice Exercise also places the Boys Scouts, St. John’ Ambulance Brigade, Red Cross Nursing Reserve personnel attending the Command Post. The exercise also provided an opportunity for insight into the process and areas for improvement.⁵³⁸ The EMO was very active in the following 1964 Hurricane season that saw a number of storms enter the Bermuda Waters. Around 1965- 1966 the Bermuda Government released the Pamphlet Hurricane Precautions to the public explaining the Emergency Measures Organisation and Hurricane Warning System. The pamphlet included precaution for householder at the beginning of the Hurricane

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ Outerbridge, “Communications Exercise ‘Twist.’”

Season; when a hurricane warning is issued; during a storm and after a storm. The pamphlet also included the precautions for boat owners, originally prepared by the Insurance Co.⁵³⁹ It soon became apparent that the USAF system of Condition II at 50 knots instead of hurricane winds of 64 knots mph caused conflict. To avoid confusion and redundancy the USAF alert system continued to be publicized for the guidance of off-base United States military personnel and the general public. In 1967, the EMO would become activated only if full hurricane winds may be expected on the Island within 24 hours.⁵⁴⁰

7.6 Cross-case analysis Disaster Response and Recovery of Bermuda and Trinidad & Tobago in 1963

Table 59. 1963 Government Structure of Case Studies

| | Bermuda 1963 | Trinidad and Tobago 1963 |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Government Structure | New Representative System | Independent Nation |
| Franchise | Land owners plus vote | Universal |
| Colonization | Settler Colony (Former Slaveholders) | Plantation Colony (Former Slaveholders) |

⁵³⁹ “Hurricane Precautions.”

⁵⁴⁰ Hill, “All Editors and News Directors.”

In 1963, the Bermudan government was structured very identical to what proceeded it for centuries. Their Governor and Commander-in-Chief Sir Julian Gascoigne was appointed by the Queen to administer the colony with the aid of his executive council and the single chamber House of Assembly and an appointed Privy Council. This stands in stark contrast to our first case study of Trinidad and Tobago which by 1963 was an Independent Nation with executive powers now resting in the hands of a Prime Minister, elected from the ruling political party. Trinidad and Tobago also adopted the bicameral chambers of Parliament; along with party politics are features which would not appear in Bermuda until 1968.

Both colonies experienced a lot of social change in the early 20th century that were brought about by social unrest, protest and changing governmentality. For Bermuda, their changes were more gradual and at 1963, universal suffrage (with a plus vote) elections were introduced some 17 years after its introduction in Trinidad and Tobago. The hypotheses that smaller populated colonies take longer to gain independence holds true when comparing these two case studies. It is also possible that the greater inequality and longer history of exploitative labor in the plantation colony spurred its residents for true electoral representation and independence. Bermuda's settler colony maintained a level of representative government from its inception and chooses to continue its status as a British colony.

7.6.1 Public Health Response

In 1963, both societies respectively were much more invested in the health and well-being of their population. The struggle for and the expansion of civil rights, labor rights, universal suffrage, mass education and access to public hospitals defined the early to mid-20th-century era. Regardless, no major casualties or deaths occurred under

any of the Bermudian disaster events in 1963 or 1847 or any in between. This is a testament to the strength of their limestone houses which usually rebound from the occasional storm with only minor damages. Trinidad and Tobago similarly invested greater resources into the health of its population. However, the housing in (Independent Nation, N) Trinidad and Tobago was of lower quality and often collapsed during hurricanes with their flying debris also contributing to the island's greater death toll following hurricanes. Disaster response methods following hurricane Flora in Tobago also included a mass inoculation program against typhoid. This is a missing aspect of the response in Bermuda. This could be that the devastation in Tobago was at a higher level than Bermuda and made conditions less sanitary. However, we know from the hospital reports that there were no cases of typhoid following the storm and few if any before. However, the 1963 N Trinidad and Tobago displayed a level of biopolitics not present in NRS Bermuda 1963.

7.6.2 Financial Assistance

A unique feature of Bermudian disaster recovery is the lack of loans given from the public purse. Their Governors displayed a disciplined consistency rejecting attempts to issue advances at the financial risk of the colony. The response in 1963 Bermuda is no different. However, as many as half the victims of the storms had insurance issued on their house or boat. The only additional money the NRS Bermuda gave was to the Public Works Department.

By contrast, the PNM Government of N Trinidad and Tobago invested \$38 million dollars into a development plan diversifying their production, land distribution, housing, and employment alternatives. The motivation behind these investments addresses the systemic vulnerabilities inherent in an extractive based

colony. Undoubtedly, there were systemic problems and vulnerabilities in Bermuda in 1963, this is evident by the continued protests and racial inequality of the following decades. Yet the NRS government did not utilize the rebuilding efforts of the storm to mitigate any of these problems.

7.6.3 US Military Presence

The presence of the US Naval and Air Force Bases greatly assisted the response and recovery efforts in 1963. Their presence was granted by the *bases for tankers* deal by Churchill Roosevelt in 1940. The British no longer held a significant military presence in the region and relied on their alliance with the USA to fulfill some of their duties. Their presence and activities also help shape the future of disaster management in the region.

The US Air Bases in Bermuda provided meteorological services to the Bermuda civilians and the alert system utilized by the Kindley Air Force Base was the blueprint for the alert system adopted by the colony Hurricane Alert Committee. Likewise, in Trinidad and Tobago in response to hurricane Flora, the US military stationed in Chaguaramas was essential in rescue operations in Tobago, airlifting numerous victims to the hospital in Trinidad and flying relief supplies to the island.

7.6.4 Legislative Process and non-financial Policies

The executive power given to the Prime Minister of N Trinidad Tobago were on par with those of the Governor of NRS Bermuda. Their parliaments less identical but shared versions of universal voting franchise. Bermuda 1963 laws did allow additional votes for landowners and therefore their representation in the Assembly catered to wealthy interests. The NRS Bermuda colony was also still answerable the

Colonial Office in Downing Street and the British Parliament. N Trinidad and Tobago was a sovereign nation whose decisions did not need additional approval and were Also able to access financial assistance through the United Nations. This opportunity is unavailable to colonies like Bermuda that must go through British representatives.

Through the Emergency Powers Acts, the N government of Trinidad and Tobago placed a travel ban to and from the island of Tobago contingent on an inoculation. The foreign absentee land ownership laws were revised and the N government also passed anti-squatting laws and a ban on fires. In Bermuda, the creation of EMO following Hurricane Arlene in Bermuda was to maintain essential services. Their government did not use the disaster as an opportunity to mitigate systemic inequality.

7.6.5 Population displacement and resettlement

The N Trinidad and Tobago government in 1963 included relocating 1,200 families to new locations better suited to the economy and physical terrain. This required new laws for land redistribution, family relocation and improving building materials. Following Flora 1963, the N government acknowledged the nation's vulnerability to hurricanes and mandated rebuilding efforts to be more resistant to the elements. Community centers were also built with the possibility of their use as a temporary shelter in future storms.

The displacement of residents has a long history in Bermuda. In 1920 African Tuckers Town landowners lost their fight to remain on the land after the government determined that Tucker Town would be used as an "exclusive enclave" for mega rich visitors. A Development Company Act passed that expropriated the remaining land for

the use of a Golf Club and Hotel. The government of Bermuda did not use the disaster of Hurricane Arlene as an opportunity to alter existing laws or relocate anyone. Their limestone homes were relatively steady and a massive rehousing project following a storm is a rare occurrence.

Chapter 8

EVOLUTION OF CARIBBEAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT & CONCLUDING REMARKS




Figure 24. Dissertation Model

The hurricane response and recovery efforts within our case studies greatly evolved following the governmental changes experienced in the first half of the 20th century. The findings of this research continue to fill a knowledge gap in the Disaster Studies field and improve upon previous findings. Disaster Sociologist Thomas Drabek highlights two key themes that are relevant to this study: the need for alternative theoretical perspectives and a focus on global, rather than national (US)

practices.⁵⁴¹ Additionally, this study follows the recommendation of McEntire and Mathis who suggest utilizing comparative politics to help increase our understanding of disasters in other countries as well as promote more effective emergency management institutions and practices internationally.⁵⁴² This study also sheds new light on the many ways the USA and British Empire participated and influenced Atlantic/ Caribbean disaster management, a historical legacy omitted from both USA and British accounts of their national emergency management development. Figure 24 illustrates this dissertation's theory and findings. The left side shows the colonial typology of the British possession that is modified by late colonial governmentality which led to the creation of official emergency management agencies. The model further illustrates that an island's sovereignty status of "independent" allows for the greater use of transformative projects that are less utilized by islands of "territory" status.

Previous work focusing on the historical development of disaster management in the region has tended to focus much more on Latin America than the Caribbean.^{543,544} When the Caribbean has gained center attention any disaster response and recovery methods utilized prior to the 1960s has often been dismissed or

⁵⁴¹ Drabek, "Sociology, Disasters and Emergency Management: History, Contributions, and Future Agenda." (pg22)

⁵⁴² McEntire and Mathis, "Comparative Politics and Disasters: Assessing Substantive and Methodological Contributions." Pg. 178

⁵⁴³ Coppola, *Introduction to International Disaster Management*.

⁵⁴⁴ Lavell and Lopez-Marrero, "Disaster Risk Management in Latin America and the Caribbean- Four Decades of Evolution and Change, 1970-2010."

conceptualized under a largely improvised experience *Special powers were simply handed over to heads of state, defense or police forces once a state of emergency had been declared.*⁵⁴⁵ Much greater attention has been given to the disaster management development from the 1980s onward.⁵⁴⁶

This dissertation, through a historical multi-case analysis provides an in-depth account of how the region's emergency management practices fully emerged into their government entities. For Bermuda that is its Emergency Measures Organisation (EMO). For Trinidad and Tobago it is the National Emergency Relief Organization (N.E.R.O), a predecessor for of its Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM). The findings help us better understand how colonial history and colonial typology affected older disaster response and recovery tactics. Whether a colony was a settler colony or an extractive colony played the most significant role in how their government reacted. Extraction colonies were more likely to receive large loans to the plantations that often placed the colony in financial risk. This study gives additional insight on how the late colonial period of the early to mid-20th century introduced new methods of governmentality that continue to feature in the region's governments. This dissertation provides empirical evidence for populations considering a referendum on decolonization and concerns towards natural disaster relief. Greater State sovereignty enables disaster management tactics that can modify systemic vulnerabilities in the Caribbean. Responding to the 1963 hurricane Flora, independence gave Trinidad and

⁵⁴⁵ Poncelet, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean," September 1, 1997. Pg. 277

⁵⁴⁶ Jeremy Collymore, "Disaster Management in the Caribbean: Perspectives on Institutional Capacity Reform and Development," *Environmental Hazards* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 6–22, doi:10.3763/ehaz.2011.0002.

Tobago the power to diversify Tobago's vulnerable agricultural economy; land reforms previously exploited by alien land holders granted during colonialism; the retro-fitting of structures capable of withstanding future storms; and a massive education project that increased the island's human capital. Independence also grants membership into international bodies (United Nations) that give further assistance. For semi-autonomous states, disaster management tends to utilize the path of least resistance and the-return-to-status-quo is the guiding philosophy. This study creates a conceptual framework that is replicable by other researchers interested in the interplay of colonial history, politics and disaster management.

There are some limitations to this study. The original intent of the study, to compare Pacific Ocean islands and Atlantic Ocean islands along a spectrum of colonial typologies and current levels of state sovereignty, proved to be an endeavor too large. Such a study would give greater cross-sections of case studies and further insight into the legacy of British colonial history and emergency management (e.g. a federal monarchy of Malaysia compared to territories like Monserrat). Others may embark this worthy project to fill in the areas this study was unable to discuss. Additionally, this study only looks at the British Empire and no other European empires. Surely, the practices and legacies of the Spanish, French, and Dutch etc. can provide us with more insight. Financial and time constraints also limited the ability to make multiple trips to island sites and England locations to review additional archives and secure more interviews.

As the field of disaster studies continues to grow and mature, scholars must continue to challenge previous knowledge and investigate neglected regions. Researchers should also aim to tell these stories from the region's perspective so that

their struggles and triumphs puts them at the forefront of history, rather than in the backdrop. How islands have dealt with these constant threats of natural disasters can, in turn, teach lessons to the rest of the world. As concerns for island vulnerability to natural hazards continues to grow with increased climate change, it is also important for researchers to highlight their often overlooked resilience, capacities and capabilities in surviving and in many cases thriving in such high-risk natural hazard zones.

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