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SECRET

Mexico, D. F., January 11, 1946

Dear Dean:

I know that aside from the extraordinary number of immediate, difficult, and extremely important political problems before the Department every moment these days, the Department has the problem and the major responsibility of liquidating the programs of the OSS, OWI, CIAA, and NEA. In addition to liquidating the existing organizations it has the responsibility of formulating definite programs in the information and intelligence fields for our Government. While the responsibility for this cannot be a welcome one, it was, I believe, essential in the public interest that the Department be designated to carry through this function and the President, I think, was wise in placing this responsibility in the Department. All these matters, and the programs to be formulated, so definitely affect our foreign relations and the conduct thereof that the Department was the only one to carry through this task.

I am going to take the liberty of writing you some of my thoughts with regard to the information and intelligence programs, and more particularly the intelligence program; but one cannot consider the one without taking into account the other as in many respects they are related to each other and it is a good thing that the intelligence and information programs are being formulated at the same time and by the same agency of our Government as it should insure adequacy of the programs and at the same time avoid overlapping

and

The Honorable

Dean Acheson,

Under Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

and duplication of functions and of personnel. In presenting my thoughts to you, I am doing so with all modesty, but in view of the many years I have spent in the service of the Department and of the rather intimate knowledge I have of the activities concerned, some of the ideas which I may express may be of interest and, I hope, of use to the Department.

In the first place, we have to consider that so far as information and intelligence are concerned they are two separate programs which can be and must be kept entirely separate with respect to program, purpose, and personnel. With regard to information and intelligence as well, we have got to keep in mind, I believe, that for information gathering in certain fields we have already an organization within the Department of State and in the field which is doing and which should continue to do the gathering of information abroad for the Department.

I should like to advance the thought that the Department of State and its Foreign Service through its missions and consulates abroad must remain the reporting agency for our Government in the political, economic, and social field. By this I mean that all reporting for our Government, and agencies thereof, should be done abroad through our missions and consulates and their personnel, no matter what the type of information may be. Whether it is political intended mainly for the Department of State; or economic intended for the Department of State, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury; or financial intended for the Department, Treasury, and Federal Reserve; or agricultural intended for the Department and Agriculture; or minerals reporting intended for the Department, Commerce, Bureau of Mines, et cetera; or labor reporting intended for the Department, and Labor, and other agencies; or social reporting intended for the Department and other interested agencies of our Government; - in fact whatever kind of information gathering of this kind we find necessary must be done by our missions and consulates.

If these are not adequately staffed, and most of them are not adequately staffed to carry through the

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broad requirements of all agencies of our Government with respect to the responsibilities and position we now have before us, then the question is of staffing them adequately. In this respect we must have the permanent regular staff of the Foreign Service and use fully the statutory provisions which we already have which make it possible for us to use personnel from other agencies of our Government in Washington in our field establishments, for such limited periods of time as the services of specialists or technicians are needed for a particular task. The use of these specialists and technicians for special services will be found to be limited both as to time and place for the foreign establishments should be staffed with the permanent personnel which will be able to take care of the usual necessities of our Government abroad. This has been found to be the case before, and I am sure that the Foreign Service can do the same thing again. It is a question in that respect of expanded personnel.

This work must be done in our Foreign Service establishments because it is all open and above-board work and must remain so. Our Foreign Service officers have been able to do their work in the past in the reporting and representation field because they have been competent and have known how to form the relationships in government, in business, in financial, in industrial, and in professional, labor, social, and other circles in order that the establishment has contact in strategic circles all over the world with all sectors of the life of the particular area; they are able to feel the pulse of it, to report on developments for the present and to sense developments in the making. The capacity of the Foreign Service to meet the reporting obligations to our Government, therefore, depends upon the character of its personnel and its adequacy in number and the ability to make the contacts with all sectors of the people of the country to which they are accredited which enables them in a normal manner to get the information which our Government must have.

This is the field of information gathering and it is a field which should not be infringed upon by other agencies of our Government. It was with the greatest difficulty that we got rid of the separate foreign

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services of Commerce and of Agriculture. I know it because I did the job for then President Roosevelt and it was the most difficult task which I ever carried through. There are those who express some lack of satisfaction with the present single representation but they are being pressed on by departmental interests rather than by the national interest and in their hearts they know very well that we must have a single representation abroad and which is that of the Department of State. We cannot, under any circumstances, permit any other arrangement than the existing one in this sense of a single representation under the direction of the Chief of Mission in a country, for if we do we will bring about even a greater confusion than we had before which will be attended with even greater dangers than before.

In this respect, I should like to say that the tendency to name all sorts of attachés to our missions and consulates abroad in connection with the representation and reporting functions is very bad. The naming of attachés should be limited to commercial, agricultural, military, and naval attachés. So far as all the work is concerned which has to be done in the way of reporting for other Departments and agencies of our Government, or for the Department itself, no matter how important the particular type of reporting may be, it can best be done by officers assigned to the establishment without any particular designation except that they are known as "Foreign Service officers" or "officers attached to the Embassy". The special designation of attaché is apt to injure rather than aid the person's doing this work adequately.

The next point I wish to cover is that of information. We are speaking of an information program. I think it should be accepted as a primary basis of that information program that its function is to get to our establishments abroad or through the information offices which we will maintain in the missions or separate from them a flow of background information with respect to the United States and world affairs of an objective character which will be useful to the press and periodicals in other countries and for the diffusion of

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objective ideas with regard to developments whether it be through the radio or motion pictures. The information program of which we are speaking these days should not be considered as an information gathering program but rather as an information diffusing program. For background of news there will be a very definite tendency in the formulation of the information program now going on to have this information service in Washington in the Department become an information gathering rather than an information diffusing medium. So far as information gathering is concerned, that is, as I have above-indicated, a function of the missions and consulates through their personnel, and it must be an open and above-board proposition. So far as information gathering is concerned, by the new information activities to be set up in the Department it must be confined to information concerning what is going on in the Foreign press of all kinds. In my opinion this function of the information program should remain in the missions also where it is today through the press officers which serve in the missions. The interpreting of the local press and publications in a country has to be done by trained people who have real knowledge of political and economic factors in the country and not by people who are trained as newspaper men only. For this reason, I am a strong partisan, and this is based on actual experience, of continuing in the press offices of our missions and in our missions and consulates, solely, the responsibility for giving to the Department the full information concerning developments in the press and periodicals in other countries. It is a part of the general reporting function of the mission and consulate. If it is done in that way, we are sure that it is done by officers who will have adequate understanding of the background of the news and can properly present and interpret it to the Department and to other agencies of our Government.

What is very fundamental is that the relations with the press abroad will have to be carried on by officers of our missions and consulates who do not have too much of a label attached to them. It has been my experience at every post where I have been that the useful relationships with the press and periodicals abroad have to be carried on with the editors and owners

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of these papers and periodicals and not with secondary personnel. This means that for the most part, the relationships have to be in the field between the Ambassador and the press officers of the missions and consulates and higher officers of the missions and consulates and with the editors and owners of the papers. We can understand that at home the contact of the Department with the New York Times and the Washington Post and other important papers so far as important things are concerned and the real valuable relationships, must be with Mr. Sulzberger or Mr. James, or Mr. Merz of the Times; with Mr. Eugene Meyer or Mr. Ellison of the Washington Post, et cetera. Newspaper owners and editors have their pride and position abroad just as they do at home and if you or the Secretary want to take up a very important matter with the Washington Post you do not do it with one of the people in the Press Division of the Department but you have that contact yourselves or through McDermott. The same applies in the field and our Chiefs of Mission themselves must have very close contact and friendly relations with the principal newspaper owners and editors and cannot leave it all to the press officer of the Embassy no matter how competent he may be.

The idea which some of the people have who are working on this information program in the Department that we can serve a useful purpose by sending all kinds of people to the field attached to our missions is based on wrong premises. We would be merely cluttering up the ground, complicating the problem, and in most cases destroying our influence with the press. It is a plan which would lay us wide open to attack of being engaged in a world-wide propaganda program and in an endeavor to influence ideas and culture in these countries and anyone who knows anything about other countries knows that that is one phase of activity which they resent fundamentally.

The most important function that the new information service can carry through is to continue the flow of useful, interesting, objective, background information of all kinds along the lines that we have been sending during the war and which we do not force down the throats of newspaper people and periodicals but which we make available

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in a convenient place where they know they can get it if they want it. If we supply the right kind of background material they will want it. Most newspapers and newspaper writers abroad are hungry for background information. They subscribe to the news services but they do not have the money to employ their own correspondents so that background information concerning developments in the United States and throughout the world is of intense interest to them.

Another factor to bear in mind in the information program is that most of the important newspapers outside of the United States have special writers whom they do not employ on a fixed-fee basis but whom they pay for space. These writers cover every conceivable subject, political, economic, and social. Very often they are people engaged in some other occupation. They do not conduct a column such as we know them in the United States, but they are regular contributors to a specific paper on a certain subject. These writers are almost all independent in thought and any attempt to influence them directly is useless. I am not speaking of those whose pen can be bought for we have them at home as we do abroad; even though they may be more numerous abroad, they are in the minority. Although these writers of special articles are men of independent thought for the most part they are eager for background information and one of the best things we can do in our information program is to get out a flow of material on political, economic, social, and other subjects of a background character which these people can use for their information. Of course, it influences them, but that is just the point. As long as they seek this background information and we do not thrust it on them, that is the important thing. As soon as we start thrusting it on them they will refuse to have anything to do with it and turn against us. I do not wish to burden this letter with details, but I could give you scores of examples of this from contact with the press in a dozen foreign countries.

We do not need the large personnel either at home or abroad which so far as I know is envisaged by those who are formulating this information program. The value

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of the information program will not depend upon the number of people we have at home or abroad. If we have too many people at home and abroad we will only be destroying the possibilities that lie in a useful information program. I am one of those who is strongly convinced of the necessity for our carrying on such an information program. It is one of the types of insurance against war and for peace and for understanding that we have to carry. The number of people needed at home is dependent upon the number which are necessary for the reception, digesting, analyzing, and dissemination of press reports received from the field in the Department and to other agencies of the Government. The number of people needed abroad in this information program is limited to the people necessary in our missions and consulates, or in certain places in the separate information offices which we maintain, to make available this information to the press and periodicals and writers, and this personnel must be small for only a few people are needed for this service as we are not going to flood newspaper offices with this material. We will keep the material available for them at a place where they know they can find it, and as I have indicated above, they will seek it. So far as information gathering is concerned concerning the press and periodicals, that, as I have already indicated, should be carried on in our missions and consulates as it is now done and in most cases it will require only small expansion in present staff and nothing like the ambitious program which I understand is being planned for sending people abroad. For instance, in this Embassy where we have been keeping the Department adequately informed of press developments in Mexico and interpreting these developments, we do not, I believe, need any addition to our present staff because we have been doing it adequately. It is not being done adequately in some missions and there something may have to be done with further staff; but any endeavors to force all these people that are now in mind upon our missions is bound to produce just the contrary effect that we are after.

The foregoing is a very summary sketch of the views which I have on the information program and the mechanics thereof, and I shall be very glad to expand on any part thereof should you and the Department so wish.

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I now wish to take the liberty of giving you some ideas which I have with regard to intelligence which are based on long experience and which, I believe, are sound and which I hope may have careful consideration. There is no program in which we can make more serious mistakes than in an intelligence program. It is difficult to write about it because it is so complicated and at the same time, so important a subject, but I shall try to give you in as brief as possible form some of my thoughts.

First of all, I would like to say that I am very much convinced of the necessity of a sound, well-considered intelligence program. We had some intelligence before the war, but it was very sketchy and not very effective and the lack of it was not so serious. During the war we went into this vast intelligence program, the various ramifications of which you will be more familiar with, I am sure, than I am; but even what little I know indicates to me how tremendous the activity was. The circumstances justified every effort in the way of getting so-called "intelligence". Now that the war is over, the position in which we are in as the first world power is such that we have to have not only the reporting activities of our Foreign Service officers and establishments which I have indicated in this letter and not only the information program I have briefly covered above, but a very much more effective program in what is called "the field of intelligence".

The term "intelligence" is one which we shall have to very carefully define and limit for the abuse which can come, and the dangers which can grow out of what may be considered by some as an effective intelligence service, are very grave. So far as the definition of this term is concerned, we only need to consider the problem which we have had for years and still have with respect to military and naval attachés. The primary function, and in my opinion the sole function of military and naval attachés, should be to maintain contact between our own armed forces and the armed forces of the particular country and to report on all developments of a technical, organizational, and other character in those armed forces which are of interest to our country and our armed forces. In spite of this, military and naval attachés have instructions to report on economic and political subjects. Some of them

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do not do it because they know they are not competent to do it. Others do it and in nine cases out of ten these reports are of no use for they are written by men who are trained in an entirely different sense, and the interpretations of political and economic events which they send in to the War and Navy Departments are usually based on inadequate, unfounded, and very often on planted information. Very often their reports in this field are based on paid information, and I am frank to say that I have found that paid information is usually useless. What is even more important is that this political and economic reporting of military and naval attachés is altogether a duplication of the functions of our other officers in the mission who are specially trained for this purpose. One of the fundamental considerations which should be laid down is that if the Army or Navy or other agencies of our Government other than the Department want political and economic information then arrangements should be made by the Department for making available to them the information which the Department's officers gather, rather than having these officers in the field of the Army and Navy do a kind of reporting for which they are not trained, for which they should not be trained, and for which they should not be asked. This is one of the longstanding problems of our foreign representation, and the question should be settled now. The answer of the Army and Navy will be that they need this kind of "intelligence", but it is not intelligence in the sense of the definition which we should have of that word and the information which they want in these fields is open and above-board information gathered by our Foreign Service officers made available to State and which State can make available to other agencies.

The term "intelligence" really applies to what may be called "secret" and "confidential" information concerning certain types of activities in other countries. It may relate to the subversive activities of officials or natives of a certain country with reference to their own government or against our Government or against the government of other countries. It may relate to the activities of individuals of a nationality other than that of the country in which they reside and which may be of a character directed against the government or interests of the country in which they reside or against

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the Government and interests of the United States, or those of another country. It may relate to the activities of governments or organizations and individuals of that government in another country, knowledge of which may be important to us as well as to the country in which the activities take place. Intelligence may relate to information with respect to secret, underground movements of all kinds which are taking place in a country. It may relate to clandestine shipments of arms, the clandestine sale of arms, the plotting of insurrection or revolutionary movements; in other words, the term "intelligence" covers a very large scope of information which may be in some respects political or economic in character, but which has relation to all forms of undesirable activities by governments, organizations, and individuals.

Now a great deal of this type of "intelligence" material comes to the Department in the normal course of the reporting of our missions and consulates. No matter how many secret agents we may have abroad in the future acting under-cover, I am convinced that our missions and consulates will continue to be the principal source of sound intelligence even in this field for our Government including the Army and Navy. I know that this may seem somewhat presumptuous and will be objectionable to any Army and Navy official to whom it is repeated, but I stand by it because I am confident that all those who have had close contact with the operation of the Department and our Government for a long period of years know that this is the case and we have been doing this without employing any under-cover or paid agents and without using any methods which any government or any people can consider improper. The very character of the work of a Foreign Service officer is such that he has close contacts with all kinds of people in the country and in our larger establishments the number of contacts is relatively broader in scope. If these contacts are of the right type and if our officers are of the right type then the information which comes to officers of other friendly governments and to all kinds of people in the country who are close to the life of their country comes to us and it comes unsolicited, unpaid for, and as friendly cooperation.

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It is, therefore, my thesis and one which I think we must bear in mind as fundamental that the Foreign Service must remain the principal source of sound intelligence just as it must remain the sole source of political, economic, and social reporting.

Our military and naval attachés have for years had the function of doing intelligence work, and I think their performance has been relatively disappointing. For the most part, they have conducted their intelligence work through agents who are usually citizens of the country and who receive a fee. Sometimes these agents are citizens of other countries living in the particular country. In all cases, they are people working for a fee, and in order to justify their existence they have to bring in something. They are not concerned with whether what they bring in is well-founded or not. The principal thing is to bring something in. The officers who analyze this in the offices of the military and naval attachés frequently and more often are not in a position to do so properly because they do not have the background of all that is happening in the country. Then this information goes to MID or ONI in Washington where it has to be analyzed by people who have less information about the real conditions in the country than the military and naval officers who send it in. It is the easiest thing in the world, therefore, for the State Department and for the Army and Navy to have completely conflicting information with regard to what is happening in various countries, as one can readily understand.

In this connection, I want to give an example of how dangerous this type of intelligence can be and which I have given the Department in previous letters in the past. When I was in Germany in 1933 and Chancellor Bruening was at the head of the German Government, I had very close and friendly relations with him, in fact an intimate friendship. I recall that one day he said to me that he was having quite a problem as the Army and Navy were insisting on sending out military and naval attachés again and his Government was against it. He said that it was bad intelligence which for the good part had actually brought Germany to precipitate the

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first World War. He called my attention to the fact that the German Ambassador in London had been consistently reporting that if Germany took certain action England would go to war and that the Foreign Office was of that opinion also. He said that the German military attaché in London, however, was reporting at the same time that no matter what Germany did he had the most definite assurances and knowledge from certain high persons in England that England would not go to war under any provocation. The Emperor believed what the military attaché said. The result was that when the decision had to be made it was the Emperor and the German military attaché and the German Army command on one side and the Foreign Office and the German Ambassador in London on the other side and that I knew what the result of the fateful decision was. Obviously, the German Ambassador in London was in a better position to know the real situation than the German military attaché.

Chancellor Bruening said that although under the Treaty of Versailles they could send out attachés, he and his associates were against it because they didn't want anything like that to happen again. I, naturally, followed the matter closely and within a couple of months the Army had its way and the new military attaché to Washington came in to call on me before his departure.

You know what a vast organization the OSS and the OWI had during the war, a good part of the function of which was "intelligence". Our military and naval attachés in most countries including Mexico City have a secret fund for securing paid-for information. In addition to this, the Army and Navy have had all over the world including the Americas men not in uniform as under-cover agents. Every once in a while here in Mexico, I got a report of some man getting drunk in a public place and saying he was a secret agent of our Government. In some cases they were, and in some cases they were not.

The FBI has not operated in Europe and the Far East and has confined itself insofar as foreign operation is concerned to the American countries. I want right now to say that the FBI operations here in Mexico City have

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been carried on with a discretion and understanding and with an effectiveness which has aroused my admiration. They have selected a group of young men admirably fitted for the purpose and they have really furnished our Government and this mission with useful information and in certain cases with information of value which we would not have been able to get in any other way. To a large extent they do this work themselves, but I am sure that they too have paid agents who are natives of Mexico and nationals of other countries living here, but I think they have used very great discretion in the use of these people and in the interpretation of the information which they get from them.

At this point, I must tell you something of immediate importance and interest in our situation here as it points up so definitely what the dangers are in this system of gathering "intelligence" used by our military and naval and FBI agents, through under-cover men. I have in the last ten days been getting definite information from reliable sources that Lombardo Toledano and the Communist editors of the "Voz de Mexico", which is the organ of the Communist Party in Mexico, have got knowledge that the military attaché and the civil attaché of the Embassy (FBI) are employing paid agents who are nationals of Mexico. This information has come to me through reliable sources in close touch with Lombardo and the editors of "La Voz de Mexico". I know that Lombardo has been planning to use this as ammunition against our Government and this Embassy and particularly against me in a speech which he has been planning to make. He wants to use this information saying that I am employing these secret agents, most of whom are Mexicans, in order to watch the activities of Mexican government officials, et cetera. So far he has refrained from making this speech because, I think, restraining influences have been placed on him, but I am confident that in some way or other, whether by Lombardo or by someone else, we are going to be accused of doing this sort of thing.

I made inquiry and I found that the office of the military attaché is still using a Mexican here who is known as "Colonel Fort". Already three-and-a-half years ago and shortly after my arrival in Mexico City, I found

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that the office of the military attaché was using this man, Colonel Fort, and I told them that he was utterly irresponsible and that they should stop using him. It appears that they are still using him and paying him a quite sizeable sum every month. He maintains a sort of espionage system and has at least five regular agents in his employ, all of whom, I believe, are Mexicans. He furnishes information to the military attaché of this Embassy. At the same time, I know that he is working for the Mexican Government including the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Gobernación, and the Ministry of Defense. I have information that one of his agents who is a major in the Mexican Army furnishes a copy of every report which he makes to Colonel Fort to be delivered to the military attaché of this Embassy, to the Ministry of Defense as well; and I know that he tells the Ministry of Defense that he is giving us the same information. This is apparently the type of information which the office of the military attaché has been using for the basis of political and other reports which it has been making to the War Department. I happen to know that this man, Colonel Fort, is highly prejudiced so far as the internal political situation in Mexico is concerned, and like every other paid agent he is altogether capable of, and I am sure has been, planting information with the military attaché.

This particular situation which makes us extraordinarily vulnerable here I am taking closely into account and I am watching it carefully, but you will readily see that if statements are made by anyone to the effect that we are employing Mexicans through this Embassy or any dependency thereof for under-cover work that the Mexican Government may have to take note of it and you can see the position that I am in. The State Department doesn't use such under-cover people in Mexico to my knowledge. This Embassy does not, of course, to my definite knowledge. I am, however, in the unhappy position of knowing that the military attaché is paying monthly a certain sum to Fort and if Fort gets into hot water with the Mexican authorities, he will, of course, to protect himself say that he has been receiving money from us. I am in the unfortunate position of not being able to tell the military attaché to stop paying Fort immediately, because

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if the military attaché does stop using him and paying him immediately this puts Fort in the position of blackmailing us.

I have referred to the foregoing only incidentally, although it is of immediate importance, to show how dangerous this whole business of using under-cover agents is.

I should like to add that the present military attaché of this Embassy has had nothing to do with the setting up of these paid agents, and I think he realizes the dangers in the use thereof. I should also add that the naval attaché has done very little in this field of using paid agents. However, we are in the unenviable position where during the war, and I find now even today, one or more of the officers acting under the wing of this Embassy are buying information and are using agents of the nationality of the country, and you will appreciate how vulnerable a position we are in. My own conviction is that all officers of our Government regularly assigned to one of our missions, whether they be military, naval, or civil attachés (or legal attachés as they are called in some places) should be formally prohibited by their principals in Washington from engaging any agents and paying for any information. This, I think, is fundamental for if we do not we will injure the prestige and usefulness of our missions, and that we cannot afford. We are in so vulnerable a position for if we stop paying any one of these agents he can go to the Mexican authorities and can establish a good case and furnish pretty good proof that he has been working for us. My own opinion is, therefore, that we should make the appropriate arrangements to stop all this sort of "intelligence" activities by our military, naval, and civil attachés so far as it applies to paid agents and information.

We are entering into a phase of military collaboration with our neighbors in this hemisphere which is very important for the defense of all of us. It seems to me that our military and naval attachés will have a very broad and useful field if they will work only in that field which is so properly theirs. I think they should abandon some of the intelligence activities with which

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they have been charged by their Departments. If they don't, their influence is going to be lessened in a very broad field of usefulness and whatever affects the prestige of the military and naval attachés will affect our prestige in the Embassy as a whole, and of the Department, and of our Government.

My own feeling is that the term "intelligence" should be interpreted in the sense that I gave in an earlier paragraph of this letter and that the work which we do in such types of intelligence through agents should be done from Washington and not from here or any one of our missions or consulates. I think we have to have under-cover men in other countries. I think our safety makes it necessary. I don't think we really get the best information from them, no matter how good the under-cover service may be. I think our best information will continue to come from the open and above-board activities of our Foreign Service establishments. I believe that we have to follow the policy that has been followed by certain other countries and is being still followed by them. We must have agents abroad working for certain types of intelligence who have no ostensible contact with our Government nor contact with our missions and consulates abroad and whom we can disown if the occasion arises. We can't disown our missions and consulates and our military and naval and civil attachés. We can disown people who have no connection with our establishments and against whom no connection with our Government can be established, except by their own word or some accusation by someone in another country. Even the British system of using the passport officer to head espionage activities in various countries is generally known.

My own opinion is that the so-called "intelligence" work so far as the actual gathering thereof and the control of secret agents abroad should be vested in the FBI in Washington. The FBI has made a magnificent record in the United States. In its foreign activities which has so far been confined to the American Republics, it has carried on its work with unusual discretion and understanding, and I must say with greater discretion and understanding than our military and naval attachés and the War Department and the Navy Department. I do not

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like to make invidious comparisons but the facts are there.

I do not believe the FBI should formulate the intelligence program. I think this should be formulated by State, War, Navy, Treasury and FBI. There could be a secret committee of these agencies to formulate and to direct the program. The FBI should be the agent to carry through the program at home and abroad. Abroad their agents should not have any connection with our missions or consulates or even with the civil attaché. They should be paid by some method which will be devised other than through our missions or consulates or through the FBI representative. All this is very feasible. They should report directly to the FBI in Washington. There are any number of ways by which their reports can be transmitted. There should be in every mission an FBI representative who doesn't need to be known as "civil" or "military" attaché. He may, to all intents and purposes, be some officer or employee of the mission or consulate engaged in entirely different kind of work. He may be the medium through which instructions are issued or through which reports are received and transmitted through the pouch. This is a very summary sketch, but it can be worked out in such a way that we can have a very effective under-cover abroad without anyone being able to tie it up to us either so far as our establishments abroad are concerned or our own Government at home. If any one of these agents gets caught, we can simply disown him.

So far as the machinery is concerned, it will be useless to try to have agents of Army and Navy and FBI doing this work. It should be confined to the FBI. I am not going to put on paper some of the effective devices which they have already developed, but they have really developed fine techniques and they can refine on these.

So far as the ~~analysis and~~ *Joseph* distribution of intelligence is concerned, it should, of course, go to the FBI but then there should be an organization controlled by State, War, Navy, Treasury and FBI which will analyze and distribute this information according to well-determined and clearly-defined procedures.

There is

There is going to be a lot of difficulty in getting various government agencies to agree to give this work to one agency. I think no one seriously thinks it should be in the State Department. I can't conceive of anyone who has any knowledge of the conduct of foreign relations who would think of putting such intelligence in State or admitting that State has anything to do with it. The first thing to do, I think, is to stop all talk in the newspapers and to the press about intelligence. There is no use in spreading what we are thinking of and planning in this field to all the world as we are now doing. If we will stop talking about it, people will soon forget about it and then we can go quietly ahead with the formulation and carrying through of a program. I do not think it should be in Army or Navy. I think it should be in FBI. I think there should be this committee above-indicated for the supervision of the analysis and distribution of the material. There should naturally be no policy function in such a committee. The State Department must make policy on the basis of all the information it gets.

I should like to repeat that I have been greatly concerned as I am sure are all of our Chiefs of Mission and Foreign Service officers who have had long connection with these problems and knowledge of their implications in the field and of field problems and practices. I am sure that this preoccupation is shared by many in the Department and particularly high officers of the Department. As a result of present conditions following the war, many people have been temporarily absorbed into the Department and are now part of its operations who have had no contact with the conduct of foreign relations and who cannot be expected to have any knowledge of so much of the broad background which is necessary to understand what we can and cannot do usefully. Some of these people are good people who may be useful to our Government on a permanent basis in the programs which may be outlined and determined upon both in the field of information and that of intelligence. But even those who have this competence have had this connection with our Government only under war conditions when operations of certain kinds are possible which are not possible under normal conditions.

So far as the information program is concerned, I have been greatly concerned with regard to the plans for sending people to our missions and consulates when

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in most cases all that is necessary is a very slight augmentation of staff within the mission. If we were to proceed with the program as I understand has been at least considered in a preliminary way, we would be setting up in our missions abroad organizations which would create suspicion and distrust both in government and among newspapers and periodicals and among the peoples of the countries themselves. We would be setting a precedent which would be followed by other countries and their people would not work with the discretion and the correctness that ours would at least try to observe. We would, in my opinion, practically destroy our contact with the press through such large personnel as has in some cases been contemplated in our establishments abroad, and I could give, out of experience, as can many others, many facts to confirm this statement. I hope in the near future to write you another letter giving you some very pertinent, basic observations in this particular respect showing how our operations in Mexico even during the war would have been completely handicapped and destroyed if we had not carried on with the small staff that we did and with such circumspection. As it was, we did here a very effective job as is well-understood here among informed persons if it is not adequately recognized by some who are working on these information programs.

I must apologize for inflicting so long a letter on you. I know how important this problem is. I know that you all know how important it is. I know how much it must be preoccupying you. I have, out of my experience and observations over the years with this problem, wished to give you this unvarnished and completely frank statement of my views in the hope that it may be helpful. What I have said about military and naval attachés does not in any way detract from their position and value in the field in which they operate which I consider will be more important than ever before, but if they are to do their work, just as we, without danger of losing prestige by being hampered in our major responsibilities, we all must be divorced from any possible connection at home or abroad with this particular type of "intelligence".

With all good wishes,

Cordially and faithfully yours,

George S. Messersmith