

REPORT SERIES

No. 2

THE FUNCTIONING OF EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONS
IN COMMUNITY DISASTERS

Russell R. Dynes

Disaster Research Center
University of Delaware

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FOREWORD

This document is one of a series of publications prepared by the staff of the Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University. This aspect of the work of the Center has been sponsored by the Office of Civil Defense under Contract OCD-PS-64-46 Work Unit 2651-A. Below is a listing of the materials which have been included in the monograph and the report series.

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CHAPTER I

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN DISASTER ACTIVITY

The concern of this monograph is with understanding organized activities in communities which experience disasters. Every year, many American communities as well as others in the countless countries around the world mobilize their resources to cope with the impact of various kinds of emergencies, including disasters. In particular communities, such emergencies may be almost predictable. While they are not anticipated in the sense that community members look forward to them, they do represent a somewhat repetitive experience. In other communities, such events are less repetitive but, when they do occur, they reveal a reality which makes them difficult to forget.

Like every significant drama in the life of a community, disasters can be viewed and described in a number of ways. For most purposes, the common descriptions of earthquake, hurricane, explosion, tornado, flood, epidemic, etc. give us insight into both the cause and some of the consequences of a disaster agent. If we wish increased understanding, we can note that disaster agents, themselves, possess characteristics which cause variations in their consequences. For example, such agents differ in their frequency, predictability, controllability, cause, speed of onset, length of possible forewarning, duration, scope of impact as well as in their destructive potential.¹ These dimensions allow one to consider similarities among agents which otherwise might be quite different. While such classifications and combinations add precision, it would also add a degree of unwanted complexity to the following discussion. We will assume here, unless otherwise noted, that the physical impact of the disaster event was created by an agent which possessed the characteristics of little forewarning, a rapid speed of onset and wide destructive potential. Such characteristics would best describe earthquakes and tornadoes. The major concern of this monograph is not in such characteristics of disaster agents nor in the physical consequences of impact. The primary concern here is in the sociological impact of such agents and in the attempt of organized community life to come to terms with its resulting social disruption.

The Social Impact of a Disaster Agent

The major emphasis throughout this monograph is on the sociological impact of a disaster agent. Disaster agents have particular sociological consequences. In fact, sociologically, a disaster can be defined as:

an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented.²

To clarify this rather verbose definition, the "self-sufficient subdivision of a society" considered here will be exclusively the local community. It is the locale of the disaster agent and its social impact. The major focus here will be on communities in the United States and, in particular, large urban communities. While much of the following would apply to small communities and to communities in other societies, this extension would add unnecessary complexity to the subsequent discussion.

The phrase "disruption of the social structure" suggests that a disaster event creates unplanned and unanticipated changes in the structure and functioning of the community unit. There are several dimensions of this disruption. Families may lose members. Many of the organizations within the community may lose resources, either material or personnel. Many of the organizations within the community will have to face the new tasks of handling injured and the dead, of restoring community facilities, of providing food, shelter and clothing for the victims. Community relationships which have been developed over a long period of time may be shattered or they may become difficult to implement since communication with others becomes problematic. For many, the knowledge of what is "real" becomes uncertain. In effect, the physical impact has wide-spread social consequences. The event has created, to varying degrees, disruption in the traditional social relationship in the community. For the community, the predictability that members counted on as a part of everyday life has been damaged or destroyed.

This destruction of social relationships within the community is particularly problematic since the community itself is the locus of action in responding to the disaster consequences. In actuality, individual community members do respond in a variety of ways: rescuing those they know and do not know, saving their own possessions and those of others, etc. It is, however, the network of organizations within the community which bear the major burden for emergency action. The resources of individuals, even large numbers of them, are insufficient to cope with the dimension of the impact. The community is not only the site of the disruption created by the impact of the disaster agent but, in addition, it is the locus of activity which attempts to overcome this disruption.

In understanding the response of a community and its organizations coming to terms with the impact and the resulting social disruption, it is helpful to see the community, even in its pre-disaster state, as a problem-solving entity. In most communities, over time, patterned social relationships develop around problems which are faced on a routine, regularized basis. Over years of experience, ways of coping with persistent and repetitive problems result in the development of social organization which, in its totality, constitutes the community. Meeting problems in the past leaves its residue of sentiment and organization within the community and, without these, future problems could not be solved. In this way, one can see a local community as the product of past problem-solving and also see its existing structure as oriented toward future problem-solving.

One can also view specific organizations within a community as problem-solving structures. A factory is organized around "solving" the problems of

the production of goods. Schools are organized to "solve" the problems of education. Hospitals, clinics, emergency rooms, first aid stations are organized to "solve" the day to day medical problems which emerge within the community. While many of the resulting organizations are concerned with "private" problems which have to be solved, other organizations are concerned with public problems or problems which touch on the interest of many of the members of the community. These are the organizations which become most involved in "solving" the problems created by a disaster agent within a specific community.

It is useful to indicate more clearly what types of organizations become involved in a disaster response. Every community has a wide variety of types of organizations which can be described in many different ways. Two dimensions are particularly important in the disaster context. First, as we have just suggested, organizations differ as to their orientation to the community. Some are organized to deal with problems relevant to the "whole" community while others have more "private" goals to which they are oriented. For example, a fire department has as its major responsibility protecting the community from fire while a manufacturing firm in the community is oriented to maximizing profit in making its particular product and marketing it wherever it might be sold. Second, organizations differ as to whether they possess what might be called emergency resources. Taking our previous example, the fire department has resources of equipment and personnel which are exceedingly important in an emergency, but, let us suppose, the private manufacturing firm produces phonograph records. While many items are unexpectedly important as emergency resources, it would seem unlikely that phonograph records would become a high priority item. A community might find a construction company with much heavy duty equipment to be exceedingly valuable during an emergency.

When we classify by these two descriptive variables, the degree of "community orientation" and the possession of "emergency resources," four different combinations appear (see Figure I). First, and most important in this context are what we will call community emergency organizations -- those having a community orientation and possessing emergency resources. (Later we will differentiate two types of these community organizations and our subsequent discussion will deal with only one type which we will call an expanding community service organization.) In certain circumstances, other kinds of organizations within the community may become involved in disaster activities. Organizations with a community orientation but with few emergency resources may still become involved. For example, a church group may undertake to collect and distribute clothing. Too, other organizations which possess emergency resources but have a "private orientation" such as the contractor mentioned previously, may become involved. Finally, there are many organizations "privately oriented" and with no emergency resources. Such organizations are rarely involved and often cease operations within the community during the emergency period. The major disaster involvement, then, is by community emergency organization.

It is in the relationships among these various organizations within the community where community stress is most evidenced as a result of the impact of a disaster agent. The customary relationships among these organizations

is disrupted since many organizations are "forced" to do new things or to adapt their previous patterns to the increased demands of the situation. In effect, we can see the emergence of stress in a community as a result of a disaster agent as being derived from unplanned change in the customary organizational relationships since:

1. the community emergency organizations are pushed beyond their capabilities and, because of this, they must supplement their capabilities with added resources, including personnel, which changes the nature of the organizations;
2. other organizations, either extra-community or supportive, must assume unusual activities and functions during the emergency period, which creates;
3. the necessity for new patterns of coordination and control among the involved organizations.

Perhaps this conceptualization of community stress comes closer to what was mentioned earlier as the "disruption of the social structure." The community emergency organizations, either because of their specific legal responsibility or because of traditional community expectations, can no longer fulfill these expectations. This may necessitate adding additional resources which modifies their organizational structures. In addition to this type of supplementation, organizations often find themselves involved with unfamiliar tasks and activities. The patterns of coordination and control among community service organizations developed prior to the event, or even specific disaster planning, become of limited value since the activities of various organizations have now shifted. This is accentuated if non-community emergency organizations enter the picture. Earlier arrangements which served as the basis of coordination can no longer be used since there are now new elements in the community system to be coordinated. These new patterns of coordination have to be developed when organizations are coping with great demands or are assuming new and unfamiliar tasks.

Community stress is produced by certain kinds of agents more than others. If an agent has a sudden impact, unanticipated in the experience of the community, the lack of opportunity for preparation is more likely to reduce the capabilities of these community service organizations and necessitate the supplementation of others. Most disaster events are, however, productive of community stress. They frequently create the objective conditions which push the community organizations beyond their capacity.

The Organization of the Community

Before further considering the impact of disaster agents and its social consequences, it is appropriate to introduce several additional notions about the organization of the total community. We have already suggested that the community can be seen as a problem-solving entity as can specific organizations within the community. We have identified those organizations which possess a community orientation and relevant emergency resources and labeled them community emergency organizations. These organizations and the rest of the

Figure I
Types of Community Organizations

Description	Examples	Organizational Characteristics	
		Community Orientation	Emergency Resources
Community Emergency Organizations	Police, Fire Red Cross, etc.	+	+
Community Relevant Organizations	Welfare, Religious & Service Organizations	+	-
Emergency Relevant Organizations	Contractor unit, heavy equipment; Department store with trucks	-	+
Non-relevant Organizations	Luxury Retail Stores Entertainment Organizations	-	-

formally organized structures within the community are the sources of much of the predictable behavior which one observes in a community. Individuals often forget the extent to which their daily lives are formally organized since the rules of various organizations, over time, become a part of their personal habits. The time and place of work, to say nothing of the work routines themselves, are largely determined by the rules and plans of formal organizations. The traffic signs and lights on the streets as one goes to work are controlled and maintained by formal organizations. The buses are also scheduled, owned and operated by organizations. Recreational facilities ranging from bowling alleys to movies are owned and operated. We play and enjoy on the organization's time and locale, seldom on our own terms. Newspapers, radio and television all have their contents established by the work of individuals in collective situations. The mosaic of such formalized organizations within the community is complex and its "density" is great.

Most of the activities of such organizations are, however, means to other ends within the community. Businessmen and industrialists are oriented toward the production and distribution of goods to gain for themselves and others a share of the price of the goods and services. Governmental officials seek to maintain order and public facilities within the community, as well as their own political tenure. Councils of social agencies attempt to maintain some overall planning and support for the various health and welfare agencies within the community. Those who own or manage newspapers, radio stations and television stations seek to maintain a sizable audience on which they can base advertising rates which, in turn, allow them to continue their operation. In actuality, the activities of a particular organization may be directed to several ends, not just one. To a certain extent what one sees when he looks at the "total" community is the activity of a wide variety of organizations seeking diverse ends and utilizing diverse means. The end result of the pursuit of the diverse goals is largely unplanned and unanticipated.

In addition to the formal organization in these major institutional sectors of the community, one can also discern another "level" of social organization within the community. These constitute the informal relationships based on the variety of individual and familial choices. These informal relationships develop outside formal organizations as well as in those areas of the organization which are less subject to rules and regulations. The office friendship or clique, the neighborhood gossip chain, the informal bridge club, the kin-oriented recreational relationships represent part of the scope of more private informal relationships which are patterned by choice rather than by design.

In effect, then, the observable patterning of activities within a community, whether they be more or less formalized, reflect the collective attempt to achieve many ends. In the normal day-to-day activities of the community, there is usually time, energy and other resources available to achieve diverse ends, and the question of relative value and choice between alternatives seldom is critical. At one time, resources of time, energy and materials can be spent in the pursuit of economic goals and, at other times, such resources can be devoted toward education, sociability, religious activities, etc.

A disaster event changes this situation rather drastically. No longer can the members of a community assume that the resources available to them will be in plentiful supply so that diverse ends can be achieved. Choices have to be made and priorities have to be established. Certain of the ends come to be seen as being more critical for the survival of the community. The problematic state of resources necessitates a different allocation of the time and energy of the members of the community. Certain ends and certain traditional activities of the community have to be neglected, at least until a somewhat normal state is reestablished. This establishment of priorities has been called the development of an emergency consensus.³

If one observes behavior after the impact of a disaster agent, it is apparent that the highest priority centers on the care of the victims. Immediate attention is given to rescue activities. Provision of first aid and transporting those who have been injured to sources of medical attention are given the most immediate attention. Rescue activities are initiated: extracting individuals who have been trapped or evacuating individuals from areas which have been made dangerous from impact effect. Somewhat later in time, attention is given to providing the basic necessities for those in the impact area. In many disaster events, people need housing, clothing and food resources. These specific activities seem to reflect the core values -- the highest priority of ends -- in the emergency consensus. In addition, those community activities which are supportive of and facilitate the attainment of these ends are positively sanctioned by the community. For example, if the impact has disrupted utilities, transportation arteries and communication facilities, the restoration of these to some functioning level is given high priority. Those facilities most directly related to the preservation of life seemingly are given the most immediate attention. Too, community personnel and facilities are committed to the tasks of guarding property, patrolling danger areas, directing traffic near the impact areas which facilitates the preservation of life and the restoration of services. In addition, information about the disaster event and its impact seems to have a high priority. Such information is necessary for guiding the action of various segments of the community and it also functions to maintain public morale in the face of the threat to the continued survival of the community.

While some ends and activities within the community receive high priority, other traditional community activities become irrelevant during the emergency. Such activities tend to be suspended or eliminated. Most production units, for example, within the community are shut down, except those which produce commodities essential to the disaster situation. Schools and educational institutions of all kinds often shut down and the resources and facilities of these agencies converted to shelter and feeding operations. Many normal avenues of social participation are blocked. Clubs, associations and cultural events are suspended.

The disaster event is felt differentially by the formal organizations within the community. We have already suggested that certain organizations which are community oriented and have emergency resources "automatically" become involved. Other organizations are irrelevant to disaster operations while others are marginal to it. For the individual, some roles become

irrelevant while others become extremely salient. One consequence of this is that community members who would normally be engaged in certain traditional activities can no longer carry them out, since there is a "moratorium" on non-relevant activity. This creates a rather paradoxical situation. On the one hand, for community emergency organizations in particular, certain resources, both materiel and personnel, may be in short supply, particularly until the actual dimensions of disaster impact are determined. On the other hand, there are certain types of community resources, both materiel and personnel, which have been "freed" by the cessation of types of community activity which has become irrelevant. These resources then can be used in other ways since they are no longer committed to their traditional use.

The availability of personnel for disaster activity during the emergency period is also encouraged by what can be called the expansion of the citizenship role.⁴ In most communities, the obligations which are attached to citizenship are minimal. No particular organization in the community has as its central function the cultivation of citizenship. It is generally assumed that growing up almost automatically inculcates the motives of citizenship and a genuine concern of community problems. Most members of a community exhibit their citizenship by occasionally voting and by obeying most traffic laws. After disaster impact, the citizenship role expands, in the sense that normative expectations now specify that a citizen should "do anything he can" to help the community. Such a broad mandate encourages participation in many areas of community life which were unavailable or undesired earlier. This provides a pool of volunteers which become both a resource and a problem for the community emergency organizations.

The utilization of these resources is clarified by observing how the various organizations within the community actually become involved and how they adapt to functioning in the emergency social system which develops after disaster impact. It is useful here to introduce a classification of organized activity in the community based on two important variables -- one, the nature of the disaster tasks which are undertaken by community organizations and groups and, two, the post-impact structure which these groups develop. These variables can be explained further.

In every emergency, groups carry out tasks, but these tasks may be old, routine, assigned, everyday ones. Or, instead of regular tasks, they may be new, novel, assumed or unusual ones for the groups involved. If a police department controls traffic, a fire department fights fires, a radio station transmits news or a hospital treats the injured, anyone recognizes them as regular or traditional tasks for such groups. On the other hand, the non-regular or newly created nature of tasks can be seen in situations where a National Guard battalion is charged with the responsibility for providing water for a community, an American Legion post begins to shelter evacuees, or nuns from a parochial school sort and distribute donated clothing from a relief center. Thus, it is possible to divide organizations and groups into those having regular or non-regular, traditional or disaster generated tasks.

It is also possible to distinguish between groups with an old or established structure and those with a new or emergent structure. The former

type of group is one in which the members have more definite pre-disaster social relationships with one another, especially in their work activities. Such groups may be highly bureaucratic in form as in a fire department, or they may be considerably less formal in nature as in a VFW Post. However, this is not the important distinction. More crucial is the existence of the groups as an entity prior to the disaster event. In such groups during a disaster, the members are in somewhat similar work relationships as they were prior to the emergency. Thus, the members of a city public health department or a citizen's band radio club which would be activated in a disaster normally have had work relationships prior to the community stress situation. These social ties, then, are maintained as the group engages in traditional or non-regular tasks during the emergency. In this way, there is a carry over of the pre-disaster social bonds into the work activity generated by the disaster.

On the other hand, a new group structure may develop or come into being during the emergency. Such groups may mushroom from a small pre-disaster core or they may involve the crystallization of some totally new entity. The crucial feature is that they have no actual pre-emergency existence, at least in the form that they take during the emergency. An example would be a local Red Cross chapter whose handful of full-time paid personnel provides the nucleus for large blocs of volunteers who undertake most of the group's work. Another example of an even more clearly defined emergent group would be the search and rescue teams that typically spring forth in the immediate post-disaster emergency period. The new social entities may be partly planned or they may be totally spontaneous but the actual group comes into being only during the emergency period. Much of the "staffing" of such groups comes from individuals "released" from other activities.

The particular types of organized behavior that appear in the immediate post-disaster period are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Types of Organized Behavior in Disasters.

		<u>TASKS</u>	
		Regular	Non-regular
STRUCTURE	Old	Type I (Established)	Type III (Extending)
	New	Type II (Expanding)	Type IV (Emergent)

Type I is an established organization carrying out regular tasks. This is exemplified by the official members of a city police force directing traffic around the impact zone after a tornado has struck a community.

Type II is an expanding organization with regular tasks. These are more often the result of community or organizational planning. The organization exists on "paper," but the core of it exists prior to the disaster event. This would be illustrated by Red Cross volunteers running a shelter after a

hurricane, supervised by a permanent Red Cross official.

Type III is an extending organization which undertakes non-regular tasks. This is illustrated by a construction company which utilizes its men and equipment to dig through the debris and assist during rescue operations.

Type IV is an emergent group which becomes engaged in non-regular tasks. An example is an ad hoc group made up of the city engineer, county CD director, a local representative of the state highway department and a colonel from the Corps of Engineers who coordinate the overall community response during a flood.

Looking at these types in the context of our earlier discussion of community organizations, Types I and II are clearly community emergency organizations. Type I is community oriented with manifest emergency resources. Type II organizations are community oriented with latent emergency resources. Type III organizations most likely come from among those which either have a community orientation or have emergency resources which become relevant for the community. Therefore, their involvement is not "expected" but they "extend" their organizational activities in the emergency social system. Type IV groups are much less formalized since they are emergent. It is perhaps inappropriate to label them "organizations" in the same fashion we have Types I, II and III. They have no pre-disaster existence and, therefore, no degree of continuity or formality. Their activities, however, while less discernable than the other types, are patterned and observable. In addition, understanding the activities of these groups is crucial in grasping the total response of the community. These groups emerge, in emergency activity, in the intersections of the more formalized and the informal segments of the community. They are often based upon both earlier friendship patterns and formal positions within the various organizations which are involved in disaster activity. In this context, while it is useful to talk about Types I, II and III as "organizations," it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to Type IV by the label of "group" which suggests less formalism and less continuity. These groups and organizations, then, constitute the range of organized activity within the community in attempting to cope with the impact of a disaster agent.

There is a definite pattern to the sequential involvement of these organizations and groups in disaster activities. The sequence appears to be as follows:

Type I organizations are initially involved in any community emergency. There is a public expectation that they will become involved and therefore they are notified. There are also organizational expectations of becoming involved either on the basis of previous activity or by the definition of the emergency relevance of the organization. Because of their existing structure, these organizations can mobilize quickly and efficiently. They have mechanisms for assessing the demands which will be made on the organization. If the demands made on the community can be handled primarily by Type I organizations, the activating event tends to be treated as a "localized" community emergency.

Type II organizations become involved next. They are organizations with latent disaster resources. They are in a state of readiness, and both the community and their own expectations move them towards mobilization and involvement. These organizations, however, generally have only a small, central, permanent cadre of workers during non-emergency periods. Also, while these organizations have emergency responsibility, their normal time activities are not directly related to existing or current community emergencies. It is clearly expected, however, that these organizations will become active in a different way during a disaster. In one sense, they can be seen as the nucleus with standby functions to be activated for anticipated needs in large scale disasters. When the disaster occurs, the pre-emergency cadre provide a name and a core of permanent workers for the "new" structure of expanding organization. These organizations tend to be mobilized in the event of anything but a most localized emergency, but their mobilization is slower and usually more difficult than for Type I organizations.

Type III organizations are probably the most numerous of all groups involved in major disasters. Often they do not stand out as clearly because their members frequently work in conjunction with or intermixed with Type I and Type II groups. Thus, a citizens' band radio club may help staff or provide the operators and equipment for a local CD communications network, or a church group may staff and operate a shelter under nominal Red Cross supervision. The participants, however, act primarily on the basis of their pre-disaster organizational affiliations. In fact, they become involved because of their organizations' formal or informal participation within the emergency system. In other words, their participation in the community emergency response is the result of their pre-disaster group membership.

Some Type III organizations may become involved at the same time as do Type II organizations. In general, however, most of them become involved later since community expectations of their involvement is less institutionalized. These organizations become involved primarily because they are "community oriented" and want to help, or because they possess certain resources which become relevant in the emergency. This means that their participation tends to be delayed until there are tasks identified which they can undertake, or until their resources become relevant for some task within the emergency social system. A major factor in the "speed" of their involvement is the time it takes to make an assessment of the ways in which these organizations can be of assistance.

Type IV groups are by far the most difficult to conceptualize since they have no pre-disaster existence and, when the emergency is over, they tend to dissolve. They are usually small and ephemeral groups which bear no name. Often they develop no clear cut boundaries; yet they emerge in large scale disasters and play an important role in the overall collective response.

Type IV groups tend to become involved last. In part, this is true because their emergence is dependent upon the involvement of the other three types of organizations. While Type I organizations might be able to cope with a localized emergency situation, the increased scope of the disaster event tends to assure the involvement of Type II and III organizations. With the

involvement of all three types of organizations, there develops a lack of coordination among them. There also may be no overall control of the various activities taking place. Additionally, there may be a lack of information during the inventory period. All of these tend to be new tasks which have not been anticipated and therefore cannot become the basis of an expanding Type II group, nor are they tasks which are felt to be within the previous experience of extending organizations (Type III) in the community. In other words, there are new tasks, and to deal with them, new groups emerge. Figure 3 indicates schematically the typical sequence of organization involvement.


The preceding classification allows some degree of clarity in viewing the myriad of groups and organizations which become involved in disaster activity. The major focus in this monograph will be on Type II or expanding organizations. We will have, on occasion, the opportunity to refer to the other types in discussing organizational interrelationships.

Outline and Sources of the Monograph

We have introduced certain themes in this initial chapter which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In Chapter II, illustrations will be given in the form of case studies of specific Type II organizations. Chapter III will deal with similarities and differences among expanding organizations. Chapter IV will contain a discussion of the types of disaster related tasks such organizations typically undertake. Chapter V will deal with the forms of adaptation which take place among these organizations when they engage in disaster related activities and with some of the organizational consequences particularly on the structure and functioning of these types of organizations which result from their adaptation. The sixth chapter will deal with inter-organizational relationships among Type II groups and among the various organizations which become involved in disaster activities within a community.

This report is based on two different sources of information. First, there does exist a body of literature -- narrative descriptions, reports, studies -- which contain references to organizational activity in disaster conditions. The most valuable of this literature is found in the more systematic scientific studies. These studies have emerged in recent times. Concerted efforts to study disasters systematically -- especially in the field -- are only a little over a decade old. Thus during 1950-54, a disaster research project was undertaken by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Similar but somewhat less extensive projects have also been conducted at the University of Oklahoma, the University of Maryland, Michigan State University, Louisiana State University and the University of Texas. However, a major source of disaster research in this country undoubtedly has been the Disaster Research Group (formerly the Committee on Disaster Studies of the National Academy of Sciences -- National Research Council). Starting as a clearing house, DRG (NAS-NRC) moved into supporting field research as well as conducting some of its own. The professional scientific literature which these and other research groups have produced contains significant observations of human behavior under crises conditions. While the Disaster Research Group is no longer in existence, the continuity in research in

Figure 3
Typical Sequence of Organizational Involvement



disaster was re-established by the founding of the Disaster Research Center at The Ohio State University. Founded in September, 1963, this Center had as its purpose the study of organizations experiencing stress, particularly in disasters and during the emergency period. Among its objectives was to collate and synthesize findings obtained in prior studies of organizational behavior under stress. The Center obtained the files of the DRG (NAS-NRC) and the extent to which they still existed, the original data sources, i.e., the actual tapes, interviews, preliminary reports, etc., of research done elsewhere. These files contained almost all of the professional literature as well as a great number of organizational reports and popular literature. Concentrating primarily on the professional and, to a lesser extent, on the report literature, each relevant item was examined to note how various organizations had been involved in a disaster and what they had done. If, in a specific study, a great deal of information was provided on a particular organization, a specific organizational analysis was made. For example, if the Red Cross issued a report on their activities on a specific disaster, it would probably contain sufficient information to make a specific analysis of the Red Cross unit; but, if a study were made of panic reactions in a particular disaster, the material on the Red Cross report might only be peripheral and would not merit a specific analysis.

The method used for this literature analysis was as follows: Any available report on a disaster was analyzed. Reports were classified according to the specific disaster. In some instances, several reports might have been written on the same event by different groups and for different purposes. Some of the studies encompass as many as four volumes while others were only four pages in length. They also varied in the methodological approaches. Some of them were carefully designed surveys based on probability sampling while others were observations of a single person in a particular event. A total of 250 studies were analyzed. These studies and the analyses based on them, then, constitute one basis for this monograph.

While part of the emphasis in this monograph is on this literature analysis, another source has been the field work of the Disaster Research Center. Since its inception, field work has been conducted at some 47 disaster sites. High priority has been given to those disasters which are quick and unexpected, which affect more than one major industrial community, where there is heavy property damage, where there are heavy personal casualties and which elicit the participation of national organizations during the emergency period. Since primary concern is with the emergency period, the field team attempts to get to the disaster site as soon as possible to act as observers. Once in the field, the initial attempt is to gather data on the total pattern of the emergency response of the community to the disaster. This data is collected through semi-structured tape recorded interviews. Usually at least two people (the head of the organization and the person in charge of the operation at the time of the disaster) are interviewed in those community organizations most critically involved during the emergency period, usually such organizations as fire, police, civil defense, hospitals, mass media, etc. In organizations less centrally involved, perhaps such as the school system, one person would be interviewed to determine the organization's role during the disaster.

After this initial interviewing, an assessment is made of those organizations which experienced the greatest degree of organizational stress during the emergency period. Such organizations, then, may be more intensively studied. All top personnel within the organization are interviewed as well as a systematic sampling of lower level personnel. These two procedures provide, on the one hand, an extensive record of organizational involvement within the community during disasters and, on the other hand, an intensive analysis of particular organizations in specific disasters. While the field work has provided a range of data on different types of organization, only the material on Type II organizations will be included here.

The data derived from this field work plus the analysis of the previous disaster literature, then, serve as the base for this monograph. When quotations are used from studies done elsewhere, they will be cited. Otherwise, the conceptualizations and the illustrations are drawn from the field experience of the Disaster Research Center.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter I

1. For a further discussion, Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization (Columbus: College of Administrative Science, The Ohio State University, 1968), chap.iii.
2. Ibid. The definition was derived from the work of Charles Fritz.
3. Ibid., chap.iv.
4. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONS: CASE STUDIES

In the introductory chapter, a classification was presented of organizations which typically became involved in disaster activities. The focus in this monograph is, of course, on one specific type of organization which we have called an expanding one. It is perhaps only necessary here to define an organization as a social arrangement by which people's activities are planned to achieve certain purposes. While there are many different entities within any community which can be identified as an organization, expanding organizations have certain distinctive characteristics when compared with others. The distinctive features are as follows:

1. Such organizations are expected to act as a stand-by to be activated for particular tasks in case of a community emergency.
2. Such organizations are expected to engage in tasks which they organizationally anticipate, but which are somewhat different than those in which they engage prior to the emergency.
3. Such organizations possess a pre-emergency cadre of personnel and a "stockpile" of resources.
4. This pre-emergency core of personnel and material resources is supplemented by:
 - a. organizational personnel from outside the community.
 - b. volunteers who have a "regular" relationship with the organization.
 - c. volunteers who have little or no previous relationship with the organization.

In effect, such organizations deal with new tasks which come about in the emergency as well as serve an overload function within a community. In the normal day-to-day activities of a community, repetitive problems are dealt with by existing organizations but, for emergency contingencies, expanding organizations attempt to cope with the new tasks and the overload placed on the other organizations whose capacity is built around "normal" expectations. Realizing that normal expectations cannot always be expected, many communities develop certain social arrangements which combine flexibility with a degree of continuity. The personnel and the other resources in expanding organizations provide continuity, but these resources also provide a base which can be supplemented. The rapid increase in additional resources provides flexibility to accomplish the increased tasks. Such an organizational "design," while not common, is not unique. It should be noted that this design bears a close parallel to specific types of military organizations. For example, military organizations often have to shift from peace-time tasks to wartime ones. In addition, certain types of military cadre organizations serve as the basis for the rapid mobilization of personnel when the tasks confronting the organization increase, such as in wartime. While this military analogy is useful in

certain respects, there are differences in the base of authority of a military and a "civilian" community organization. In any case, there are examples which can be drawn from the whole range of organized activity within a community which possess the characteristics mentioned previously. The concept of expanding organizations is, then, not restricted to disaster activities. Disaster involvement by such organizations, however, provides an opportunity for studying them in a situation where the stimulus for expansion is clearly seen and the problems which result from this particular type of social arrangement are clearly seen as well.

Throughout the report, we will be discussing such organizations as types, but it is often easier to illustrate particular points by citing specific organizations. Three predominant illustrations of Type II expanding organizations will be used throughout. They possess certain similarities. The distinctive features were mentioned earlier. Their involvement in disaster activities is predictable in most American urban communities. These three organizations are Red Cross, Salvation Army and local civil defense.

It is useful to present "case studies" of each of these organizations. These case studies are drawn from the same community and from the same disaster event so that there is similarity in the stimulus which evoked the response which they made. The community, in the southern part of the United States, was a large metropolitan area, and its emergency organizations are mobilized often in response to hurricane threat and damage. In this respect, these organizations probably have more "practice" in expansion and in disaster operations than do comparable organizations in similar size cities. The following case studies present organizational descriptions and a brief summary of their disaster activities.

The American National Red Cross

The Red Cross is involved in local disaster as a result of its somewhat unique quasi-governmental status. In its congressional charter, the organization was directed "to continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and to apply the same in mitigating the suffering caused by pestilence, famine, fire, flood and other great national calamities." At the local level, Red Cross activities are organized around chapters. The territory assigned to a chapter is usually a single county. Local chapters usually have a small group of full-time employees and are supplemented by a series of committees staffed by local volunteers. Each chapter is called upon by the national organization to organize a special disaster-preparedness and relief committee. The chapter attempts to recruit volunteers having skills and organizational connections which would be of value in an actual emergency. When a disaster occurs, the local chapter is mobilized for action. The services it renders are varied, but often includes: canteen trucks with food supplies for disaster workers, establishing and maintaining shelters if evacuation is necessary, compiling master lists of injured and dead, establishing information centers where individuals may learn where friends and relatives are, providing volunteer medical teams for emergency service at the impact area, organizing blood donations for victims, mass

feeding of homeless, organization of volunteer help, etc. As of 1965, there were 3,446 chapters in the United States. In nearly every disaster -- and always in the case of major disasters -- the local chapters are assisted by area and national personnel. The national organization administers its services from Washington, D.C. The continental U.S. is divided into four regional areas with headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; St. Louis, Missouri, and San Francisco, California. At both the national and area levels, there is a disaster services staff. Generally the area office will send, to a disaster scene, administrative and supervisory personnel to assist the local chapter. In some instances, national personnel supplement area personnel in assisting local chapters on large operations. In disaster-prone areas, such as the Gulf Coast which is subject to frequent hurricanes, area personnel are moved into the threatened area prior to impact. When actual impact occurs, there is a high probability that they are already assisting local chapters or will be able to within a very short time.

In addition to their functions during the emergency period, the Red Cross has a continuing responsibility in the period of permanent rehabilitation. Families which have suffered from the disaster and do not have sufficient resources to re-establish themselves may apply for assistance. This assistance may take various forms, including subsistence allowances, repair and rebuilding of homes, provision of essential household furnishings, hospital and medical care and occupational tools and equipment. Assistance is based on the need of the person and not the loss they might have sustained during the disaster. Assistance is given outright without any obligation for repayment. The Red Cross does not make loans to disaster sufferers. When assistance is given during the rehabilitation phase, it is considered a gift on the basis of need. The needs of the particular individual or family have to be evaluated. This phase of Red Cross activity often is the subject of misunderstanding since immediate emergency aid is provided without question to anyone in apparent need. The following description concerns the operation of one local chapter in its activity in relation to a hurricane. It concentrates on the emergency period.

The city chapter of the Red Cross is a 30-man organization, capable of expanding during an emergency with upwards of 700 "trained volunteers." Of the 30 full-time paid employees, 20 are "professional" Red Cross personnel; the remaining 10 are clerical and maintenance staff. The organization is headed by a manager and his assistant; the latter serves as manager of disaster services and, during emergencies, assumes the direction of chapter's disaster activities. Rather general emergency assignments are made during the summer before the annual hurricane season begins in September.

Twelve shelters in the area are maintained by the chapter for use in the event of hurricanes. All of these shelters are public schools; eight are located in the city itself, four in the adjacent area on the south bank of the river which intersects the city. Volunteer personnel are

assigned to each of these shelters, most of whom have had some experience in shelter operations. A fan-out calling system is employed to notify staff and volunteers in the event of a hurricane threat.

By noon of September 8th, it was apparent that the area would be affected by Hurricane Betsy, a storm which had moved west along the tip of Florida into the Gulf of Mexico and which ultimately moved inland and north to the Ohio River Valley. Anticipating a certain amount of evacuation from the winds and the rain, the Red Cross, in association with municipal authorities and the local civil defense, announced on Thursday afternoon that all twelve of its shelters would be open. These shelters were staffed and supplied by 7:00 p.m. At 10:00 p.m. winds in excess of 100 m.p.h. were recorded; the eye of the hurricane passed 35 miles southwest of the city at midnight. An "average" number (about 5000?) refugees were sheltered by the Red Cross on Thursday night. For many, the danger seemed to have passed by the morning of the 9th. Indeed, some of the shelters were closed down that morning.

The tidal surge which followed the hurricane was, apparently, unexpected; but by the evening of the 9th, as the waters continued to rise, overflowing the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and the Intracoastal Waterway east of the city, flooding the low-lying land of that area, it became clear that the worst was yet to come. By midnight of the 9th, the water had risen to 12.4 feet and 3,660,000 acres of coastal land had been flooded in the southeastern part of the state. In the parish itself, which was not the most heavily damaged area of the metropolitan area, 77,600 acres were flooded, affecting 141,600 of the population.

The Red Cross shelter program, expanded to its fullest capacity, was prepared to receive about 22,000 evacuees. They received some 7,000 more in the course of the flooding. In addition to the use of stand-by shelters, like the city hall and the civic auditorium, many other public and parochial schools were also opened, frequently unofficially by neighborhood persons who required shelter from the rising waters. In all, Red Cross personnel estimated that by the weekend of the 10th, 11th, 12th, there were approximately 40 shelters operating in the area.

Given the tasks of providing food, clothing, medical supplies, as well as trained shelter personnel, cooks, doctors and nurses, and adequate police or military protection, over a wide area in which communication and transportation was exceedingly difficult, city, military and Red Cross personnel determined that the simultaneous operation of

40 shelters was an untenable situation. Plans were made during the weekend to begin the re-evacuation of the evacuees to two large military installations. The registration problem alone, in the context of so many separate shelters, was enough to prohibit such an operation. In addition, some of the shelters were themselves surrounded by water and accessible only by boat or helicopter. The re-evacuation was begun on Sunday, September 12th. While it was hoped that this transfer would be completed by the following day, it was not until Wednesday -- and the opening of two more installations to the evacuees -- that the re-evacuation was completed.

Throughout the five-day period of greatest emergency (Sept. 8th-13th), the Red Cross personnel and volunteers were largely concerned with the safety and comfort of the large numbers of evacuees in both official and unofficial shelters. Red Cross personnel often assumed the management of unofficial shelters, provided for the acquisition and delivery of food and other necessary supplies, and coordinated as much as possible the activities of the great number of volunteers who assisted in these operations. Estimates of the number of these volunteers range as high as 10,000, including such diverse groups as high school and college students, nuns, and "bunny girls." Not since the hurricane of 1947 had the Red Cross been faced with such massive shelter operations; their program, in the words of one person, "had to be made up as we went along." With the loss of much electrical power, the location and installation of emergency generators became a crucial problem. When these were not available, even the providing of sufficient ice to insure the preservation of foodstuffs was difficult. The perennial problems of supplying disposable diapers and sanitary napkins was aggravated by the large number of evacuees. Ten million disposable diapers were required before the emergency was over. Additionally, the communications by telephone were erratic at best. Red Cross personnel at the shelters were frequently unable to communicate with their co-workers at the chapter headquarters.

Red Cross and civil defense have a traditional division of labor in local emergencies: the former taking charge of the shelters; the latter, of the evacuation and transportation. Red Cross workers also provide -- with the Salvation Army -- immediate food supplies for disaster workers, the coffee and doughnut syndrome. But the major responsibility of the Red Cross during the emergency period (that is, prior to the organization's second phase of operations, rehabilitation) is the operation of shelters.

In this activity, the local chapter was assisted by area and national staff who began arriving in the city on

Thursday before the impact of the hurricane. These personnel, along with local personnel, were established in the chapter building from which they operate whenever the city is struck by a major hurricane. Area and national staff assumed the responsibility for the military shelters once the re-evacuation began on September 12th. On the 15th of September, the local staff, augmented by large numbers of case workers from other agencies and by volunteers, began the enormous process of interviewing individuals and families who had suffered irredeemable losses in the hurricane, thus moving into the rehabilitation stage.

Sept. 8:

Afternoon -- Volunteers alerted.

By evening -- Red Cross shelters equipped for 24 hours.

Sept. 9:

Board room in chapter house set up for arrival of national staff.

Afternoon -- Additional telephone lines installed.

4:00 p.m.

Chapter chairman attended a meeting with the mayor and others; order issued to open the shelters.

7:00 p.m.

All but one of the Red Cross shelters were open.

9:00 p.m.

Hurricane refugees began arriving at the shelters. At the chapter house, the area-national staff had arrived by this time.

10:00 p.m. -

1:00 a.m.

Impact of hurricane.

Sept. 10:

5:00 a.m.

Beginning of the floods, but obviously not perceived as a threat. During the day the Red Cross shelters were closed; refugees returned home. However, the removal of emergency supplies was not accomplished.

p.m.

Late evening -- Red Cross received word from the police that the water was rising

and that refugees could be expected.
From this time until,

Sept. 11:

3:00 -

4:00 a.m.

Red Cross engaged in re-opening the shelters. By 4:00 a.m. all but one shelter functioning again.

a.m.-p.m.

During the day the chapter chairman attended a meeting with representatives of the military and other relevant organizations to make plans for long-term shelter operations.

During this time the opening of the "unofficial" and back-up shelters took place. A total of some 40 shelter operations at the peak of the floods. (Officially, the Red Cross was prepared to operate 15 shelters.)

Major task for Saturday and Sunday was the supplying of these shelters with food and other emergency supplies and with experienced personnel.

Sept. 12:

a.m.-p.m.

Shift of disaster responsibility from local to national Red Cross personnel. Plans made to re-evacuate flood refugees to secure "super-shelters" and thus reduce the logistic problems of supply and coordination.

Re-evacuation begun. CD "back-up" shelters re-evacuated first; then the official Red Cross shelters and the "unofficial" neighborhood shelters. This process was not completed until Sept. 15th.

Sept. 15:

Registration begun for the rehabilitation phase of Red Cross relief.

Salvation Army

The Salvation Army is a national and international organization with multiple functions. It is not, strictly speaking, a disaster relief organization but is more properly seen as an emergency relief organization. When an emer-

gency involves a great many people in a particular locale, the Salvation Army may be involved in a variety of activities such as emergency feeding facilities, both fixed and mobile, emergency shelter, emergency clothing distributions, recording and identifying victims and survivors, comforting the bereaved and providing religious and case work services. In most communities where it operates, the Army is recognized by police and fire departments as providing emergency canteen services. They are frequently called to major fires, explosions, wrecks and other events to provide such services. In some communities, the Salvation Army even has a quasi-official relationship with the police and/or fire department, and such help is expected, as a matter of routine, in certain types of events.

The organizational pattern of the Salvation Army is, of course, based on a military model. The United States, with national headquarters in New York, is divided into four major geographical areas -- Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern (which includes Mexico). Each of these areas has a territorial commander called a commissioner. The second in command is called chief secretary. Within each of these areas, the corps is the basic local organizational unit. It is a post, generally with a central meeting place, under the leadership of one or more officers. A number of corps grouped together is called a division and is under the direction of a divisional commander. Divisions may cover a state or several states. Divisional commanders usually have the rank of lieutenant colonel or brigadier. Other titles used for field officers are lieutenant, captain and major, and for staff officers, colonel, and lieutenant commissioner. The officer who is elected to the supreme command of the Army throughout the world is called general.

Salvation Army officers usually come into the organization after a long training program. They usually are career officers and are salaried. Distinctive uniforms identify the rank of each person. Rank is no necessary indication of the specific duties of a person.

In many of the communities served by the Salvation Army, social service centers are located which operate to provide shelter, food and clothing for homeless men. Many of these men work in the centers in various capacities so they often provide a cadre of trained help in disaster situations along with the Army officials. If a corps has a mobile canteen, it may be housed at such a center, and many of the personnel who operate it may come initially from there.

Army personnel are expected to reflect the religious concerns of the organization. Its ideological system emphasizes religious values, hard work, dedication and unselfishness. The interests of humanity are seen as the primary concern of the activity of the Army. It is not surprising, then, to find the Army involved -- particularly during the emergency phase of a disaster. Unlike the Red Cross, the Salvation Army usually has a minimum involvement in long-term rehabilitation. Its emphasis is on immediate emergency aid. The following case study depicts the activities of Salvation Army units in the same city and the same disaster event.

In the city, there were three different types of Salvation Army units. The city command was the center of most of the disaster activities, but, in addition, the city was the location of a division command and a unit of the men's social rehabilitation. Division command was an administrative unit of nine personnel directly under the territorial headquarters which performed the tasks of coordination, financial control and general supervision of its division which included two city commands and eleven corps commands. The city command is, in effect, under the authority of this division command. The other unit, men's social rehabilitation, is directly under territorial headquarters and has no specific authority relationships with the other units except in emergency. Its function is to rehabilitate men and it is self-supporting through such activities as furniture collecting and refurnishing, and sales.

Although technically the city command was under division command, it maintains a high degree of autonomy. The city command is a relatively new concept that enables Salvation Army activities in a larger city to be under one authority rather than being split up into several corps units. The cadre personnel of the city command is shown in the following chart. It included eleven personnel under the city commander. This core was supplemented over the emergency period from the division command, men's social rehabilitation, Army personnel outside the area and volunteers from many sources. The following chronological account of their activities prior, during and after the hurricane provides a perspective of the major events and activities during this period.

BEFORE

Time prior
to Sept. 8:

General alerting of Salvation Army personnel in southern territory. Specific alerting by phone, telegraph, etc., by division office when radio weather reports indicated hurricane was going to hit in Gulf Coast area.

Sept. 8:

Meeting of civil defense organizations (Red Cross, city government agencies, etc.) at mayor's office attended by city commander.

Sept. 9:
a.m.

General preparation
1. Supplies and sources for possible

- additional supplies obtained --
coffee, sandwich materials, etc.
2. Red light placed on Salvation Army car, and police permission obtained to use light.
 3. Radio and television announcements of services, possible need for help and preparation made.

Meeting of organizational personnel at civil defense command center. The Salvation Army reported, " . . . all of our local personnel as well as Salvation Army personnel throughout the neighboring states have been alerted and are on stand-by. Also, contact has been made with divisional commanders in more distant states requesting that they alert some of their personnel and vehicles to be moved into the city in case they were needed."

After meeting at civil defense. The city commander held meeting with Salvation Army personnel, made definite assignments and was advised that three mobile canteens were enroute from other cities.

7:20 p.m.
to Sept.
10, 4:30
a.m.

City commander acted as Salvation Army liaison at civil defense command center.

Sept. 9
9:00 -
11:00 p.m.

Corps assistant delivers doughnuts and coffee to sewage and water board personnel after official request made to city commander.

DURING

Sept. 9-10:
12:00

Civil defense command center loses communications with outside except two phones to coronor's office (at this point most relief work in all organizations was at a standstill because of storm intensity).

Sandwich-making increases to point beyond that reached in any previous local disaster.

Sept. 9-10:

4:30 -

5:30 a.m.

Requests received from officials to furnish coffee and sandwiches to workers and also to some centers where evacuees had reported.

Sept. 10:

a.m.

Salvation Army city headquarters receives some evacuees from neighborhood.

Salvation Army helps in evacuations of flooded area but lacks proper equipment and personnel.

4:30 a.m.

City commander returns to headquarters from civil defense command post and has conferences with Salvation Army personnel staff to clarify functions at this point.

6:00 a.m.

First outside canteen arrives.

AFTER

a.m.

Personnel and equipment outgrow Salvation Army facilities.

p.m.

Night demands of Salvation Army are met without too much difficulty.

Ice obtained to meet problems of lack of electricity, refrigeration, etc.

Sept. 11:

5:00 a.m.

Salvation Army disaster center moves from headquarters to large warehouse.

7:00 a.m.

Sandwich assembly line set-up escalates to approximately 17,000 sandwiches in a 12-hour day.

Fork lifts obtained to handle increasing receiving and dispensing of supplies at disaster center.

News media requests for Salvation Army volunteer help result in individuals and groups, Y.M.C.A., Scouts, college organizations, high school groups and church groups, reporting to disaster center.

a.m.

A total of 18 canteens arrive (throughout afternoon) and, with police help, are led to areas where most needed.

Some prepared foods are received at disaster center headquarters.

Initial preparations for food box distribution to families made and some boxes distributed at center and by police.

Initial preparations and some distribution of clothes at center. (Clothing distribution and food box distribution completely set up by afternoon next day, Sept. 12.)

Sept. 13-29:

Special water purification equipment arrives from nearby state. At first, it is used in flooded areas in city (mainly industrial canal area) but is later sent to out-lying area.

Sept. 15 -
Oct. 9:

Catholic convent with help of local groups in nearby town (location of Salvation Army summer camp program) began making and sending all sandwiches to units at this point. The center became primarily a distribution center. After demand decreased below 1,000 sandwiches per day, commercial sources were relied upon.

Meals fed to evacuees returning home.

Cleaning equipment, soap, mops, brooms, etc., distributed to evacuees returning home.

Food boxes, clothing and equipment are distributed through vans, temporary distribution centers and police department personnel to evacuees returning home.

Oct. 9:

Canteens discontinue operations.

Oct. 15:

Clothing and food box distribution ended.

Summarizing the chronology of Salvation Army activities, we see that activities before the hurricane were concerned with general preparation -- obtaining supplies, readying equipment and assigning general tasks. Just prior to the most severe part of the storm a canteen trip was made, some evacuees from the neighborhood were taken in and there was preparation of sandwiches and coffee. Most activity, as well as outside communications, ceased during the height of the storm. After winds decreased, canteen runs were begun along with increased sandwich-making, coffee-making and related tasks. Operations soon exceeded facilities and equipment at local headquarters. A warehouse was donated by an advisory board member, 18 canteens arrived from outside of the city and food and clothing distribution facilities were set up on Saturday, Sept. 12th. In the next week, prepared sandwiches were received from a convent and distributed, cleaning materials were received from various firms and distributed, and food boxes were made up and distributed by Salvation Army personnel and police to evacuees as they returned home. Between Oct. 9th and 15th, all operations, excepting welfare, were ended; and thus the period of intense involvement of the Salvation Army in disaster relief for the hurricane was over.

During emergency operations there was a tremendous gain in personnel from Salvation Army personnel from outside of the city and volunteers. The city commander was the Salvation Army disaster director in the area with the division commander and division secretary aiding and advising him. Men's social service, operating out of their headquarters, provided, through the orders of their director, trucks and personnel for the city command.

In the emergency operation, original personnel from the city command, as well as division personnel and wives of officers, took on supervisory positions in charge of expanding emergency tasks. New personnel manned the operations and occasionally aided in supervision.

No accurate records were kept of individual volunteers. All that can be said is that the number was exceedingly high and that it included such diverse types as teenagers, transients, businessmen and housewives. Most agree that these volunteers performed well, with the exception of some transients and the house of detention people. The main problem was coordinating and supervising these volunteers to insure that they worked safely and did not overextend themselves. Without these volunteers who worked canteens, made sandwiches, organized and distributed clothing, delivered messages, etc., the Salvation Army would not have been able to perform as it did.

Civil Defense

In a disaster event, civil defense, on a local, state and regional level, becomes involved. In such situations, civil defense plays an important role in providing material and human resources and frequently provides a focus for coordinating various activities. While civil defense is primarily associated in the public mind with wartime activities and with nuclear attacks and since its activities are newer than the other two expanding organizations, it is perhaps useful to briefly indicate some of its history in the U.S.

The concept of civil defense became a separable problem apart from military defense with the development of the airplane as a weapon of war. Before the airplane, civilian and military defense were synonymous. Since an air attack on civilians could have an effect on the military operations, civil defense became a necessity above and beyond the usual responsibility of military missions. During World War II in the United States, the increase in the air war in Europe stimulated various municipal governments to suggest the formation of a civilian defense to provide air raid protection. An office of civilian defense was created and, in many local communities, a protective service core was established. As World War II drew to a close and the fear of air attack decreased, the office was abolished without any provision for a peacetime successor.

Since that time, the government location and the policy of civil defense has undergone a number of changes and shifts based in part on changes in the nature of the threat and weapons system. While it is not necessary to review them here, one can only point out that in these shifts certain issues have predominated. One issue has been the proper nature of the relationship between military and civilian defense, including the problem of defense mobilization. Another issue has been the proper location of responsibility for civil defense planning. Some federal programs have emphasized planning for, assistance to and guidance of state and local efforts for civil defense, while others have attempted to organize and coordinate the resources of the federal government. More recent programs have concentrated on the use of federal resources to develop protective capabilities on local levels. In recent years, the emphasis has been on the development of a nationwide fallout-shelter system through the dual-purpose use of available resources, both public and private. Along with this fallout-shelter system, there have been other preparations for effective use of the system. These preparations have included equipment and procedure for warning, emergency communications and information, radiological communications and information, radiological monitoring, as well as training people with skills for conducting emergency operations in periods of extreme stress.

Current policy sees civil defense as basically civil government, prepared for effective action in the event of nuclear attack. The chief executive of any governmental unit needs a trained staff in preparing for emergency action. So civil defense provides these skilled people as a nucleus. Then, emphasis is placed on training and planning for the use of all personnel and resources available to the community to meet emergencies. In effect, this policy views civil defense as being an emergency system of civil government rather than as being a specialized group which operates on a stand-by basis to become operational in a single-purpose event of a nuclear attack.

Because of its history of association with military and potential nuclear attacks, personnel of other community emergency organizations see civil defense as a separate community organization with certain emergency skills and equipment which can be useful in the event of disaster impact. They do not perceive civil defense as the equivalent of the emergency activity in which they and other community organizations are engaged in. While local CD directors may define all activities within the community related to emergency activity as constituting civil defense, others in the community act toward him and the others identified as CD personnel as constituting a separable organization.¹ While national policy may define all emergency activity in the event of nuclear attack as civilian defense, observation of a wide variety of disaster situations suggests that CD is clearly a Type II organization in the community -- an organization that possesses certain skills and resources and which expands to cope with the increased tasks of a disaster event.

While there are a number of similarities between CD and the other two organizations illustrated here, CD expands primarily by adding "organizations" rather than individual volunteers. The following case study indicates a situation where CD was well integrated into disaster operations.

The city civil defense organization under the direction of a civil defense director is directly responsible to the office of the mayor. CD is basically divided into two functional departments. The administrative part of the organization is under the direction of a deputy director while the operational part is headed by a coordinator working out of an emergency operations center (EOC). Under normal circumstances, the administrative end of the organization is responsible for planning effective emergency operations, training and informing the public, establishing shelters and stocking them with the necessary supplies and, finally, the general overall budgeting and finance. Each of these functions has one individual directly responsible for its successful completion. The operational part of CD is responsible for keeping the EOC, which is a bunker unit containing emergency facilities, on 24-hour preparedness along with maintaining the siren warning system located throughout the city. The overall activities of CD come under the direction and coordination of the CD director. However, in times of emergency and whenever the director is incapacitated, the deputy director relieves the director in coordinating the operations of the CD office.

While the main functions of CD are directed toward man-made disasters, CD easily slips into a somewhat dominant position during a natural disaster as in the case of the hurricane. The main function of CD is the coordination of emergency activities. Receiving and relaying information comprised the bulk of the activities performed by CD during the hurricane. On Sept. 9th, when it became evident that

the hurricane was to strike the coast of the state, CD issued a full alert to the population in and around the area. This warning initiated a barrage of calls requesting information from individuals wanting to know where to go and what to do. Much of the pre-disaster time was spent in preparing the public as to the best methods of protecting themselves and families. On the morning of Sept. 9th, the mayor held a meeting for all departments and allied agencies in order to specify and make sure that each organization knew what to do in the impending disaster. For a period from 10:00 p.m., Sept. 9th, to about 4:00 a.m., Sept. 10th, activity was at a complete standstill while the hurricane passed over the city. During this period all power and communications were cut off in the EOC.

With communications and power gone in the EOC, the mayor and CD director decided to move operations back to city hall and the mayor's office. This occurred on Sept. 10th, 7:30 a.m. At city hall the regular CD staff was supplemented by volunteer help. Much of this help came from the family members of the regular staff people. The main job done in the city hall office was the answering of telephones which rang continually night and day for the next three days. Many of the incoming calls were from individuals or organizations volunteering their help. The CD staff would take the names of these volunteers and direct them to the appropriate agency needing their assistance. The Salvation Army, in need of a number of volunteers to help prepare food boxes, called the CD office to see if they could get any volunteers to come over. The CD staff would note this and, when church organizations offered their assistance, CD would direct them to report to an appropriate Salvation Army station. Individuals would also call in asking for assistance in finding missing family members, to report down telephone lines, injured persons and small fires. In each case CD staff would either personally tell the individual where he could get the needed aid, or the staff member would personally relay the information to the appropriate agency.

Another function of CD was the accurate mapping and plotting of the hurricane starting intensively when it shifted direction. During the emergency period, Sept. 7th to Sept. 12th, weather reports were received every two to three hours. These reports were then plotted on a large map located in the EOC. Accurate mapping of the flooded areas, as well as the pumping stations in operation, aided in directing the entire emergency operations. Contour maps were also made available to a board concerned with levies to aid in their work of controlling the flood. In general, all pertinent activity was mapped so that those in charge

could make quick referrals to what was being done and what needed to be done.

CD also aided in the transportation and organization of refugee shelters. During the first hours of the storm, city hall became a crowded makeshift shelter. The facilities available were entirely inadequate for the number of people seeking shelter. Contact was made with a near-by U.S. Naval station in hopes that refugees could be transferred from city hall and other overcrowded shelters. This was accomplished on Saturday, Sept. 10th. The following is a brief summary of the day-to-day activities.

Sept. 6-8:

p.m.

Daily mapping of the activities of the hurricane. Tuesday (Sept. 7th) afternoon meeting called for department heads and other allied agencies.

Sept. 8:

p.m.

All night watch with reports coming in at 7:00, 9:00 and 12:00. Evening meeting held in the mayor's office. Hurricane moves toward coast -- entire complexion of the impending disaster changes.

Sept. 9:

a.m.

Further weather reports came in at 2:00, 4:00 and from then on at two-hour intervals. At 6:00 the condition was critical so director called meeting at EOC. At this point, hope was that the hurricane would hit west of the city. Late morning, most CD staff moved over to EOC.

p.m.

At 4:00 they held a final check of all department heads and allied agencies. It was decided to issue a full alert. Reports were continually plotted. Evacuation orders given to west side areas. Public buses transported evacuees to shelters. Up until 10:10, CD acted as information center. At 10:10, EOC lost power and all communications.

Sept. 10:

a.m.

At 12:00, the hurricane hit from the east. From 12:00-4:00, EOC inactive. At 7:30 operations moved back to city hall where coordination and mapping continued. Un-

expected flooding in west end reported.
At 11:00, warnings lowered.

p.m. Shelter opened. CD main function was coordination of emergency activities. Attempt was made at transferring refugees that gathered in city hall over to civic auditorium.

Sept. 11:
a.m.-p.m.

General transfer of refugees from overcrowded shelters to the Naval station. Shelters that lacked supplies were furnished. Continued activities of coordination.

Sept. 12-17:

Continued job of receiving information and relating it to the proper agencies.

CD, throughout the entire emergency, acted as a coordinating center for all activities involving the immediate disaster situation. It had close contact with local organizations, both private and public, along with state and federal agencies. Many private organizations volunteered their services during the emergency. One large company, for instance, offered to lend its marine department in order to provide additional weather information. Local businesses donated the services of their trucks in order to haul clothing and supplies that were flown in from outside the state. Churches, nursing school students and Boy Scouts all called CD to offer their services, and they were then directed to where they could be the most help. The public agencies had specified functions that each carried out during the emergency. CD would take calls for assistance and then relay them to the police or fire departments, sewer and water board, Red Cross chapter and the public transportation system. The local radio and T.V. stations, along with the press, provided the initial warning alert and were also later used to ask for volunteers with small boats to aid in the rescue of those stranded by the flood.

Many state and federal agencies (i.e. state CD office, power and light, state police, Coast Guard, U.S. Weather Bureau, Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Naval Station) lent their services to the disaster work. On Sept. 10th, the President made a visit to the area to see what assistance the Office of Emergency Planning could make. When he left, four aids stayed behind in order to assist in getting the necessary funds that were needed from the Office of

Emergency Planning. CD acted throughout the entire emergency period as a sounding board where information was relayed and activities coordinated to meet the demands of the emergency.

The case studies just presented will provide illustrations for particular points which will be discussed throughout the report. The next chapter begins with a discussion of the similarities and differences among expanding organizations.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter II

1. Throughout the following pages, Civil Defense is viewed in this fashion -- as a separable organization. From the viewpoint of national policy, this is not how CD operations are anticipated. From the viewpoint of other involved community organizations and from the observations of actual disaster operations of CD, it is more appropriate to consider local CD as one of the various community organizations which becomes involved in disaster activities.

CHAPTER III

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES AMONG EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONS

In Chapter II three illustrations were used of expanding organizations: the Red Cross, the Salvation Army and local civil defense. The following discussion of the type will also be pertinent to other examples, such as certain sheriffs' departments and volunteer fire departments, which also become involved in disaster activities. It is also applicable, in non-disaster contexts, to military units which mobilize, political parties which expand to meet the "crises" of elections and certain types of production units, such as single-crop farming, which have to expand to meet the "crises" of harvest. Expanding organizations typically have many problems in a disaster. Many of these stem from the fact that all Type II organizations have characteristics in common which "pre-dispose" them to certain problems. These we will discuss below in the context of similarities. It also is true, of course, that there are differences among expanding organizations, and later we will comment on some of them.

Similarities

First, expanding organizations are somewhat weakly institutionalized with the community. In particular, this is true of their latent emergency functions. To the degree an organization gains acceptance within a community depends in large part upon its day-to-day activities. Expanding organizations tend to be viewed as somewhat necessary but still not "essential" to the day-to-day operation of the community. In this sense, then, these groups are somewhat marginal and marginality tends to be productive of insecurity. The contrast can be seen with established organizations. The police, for example, are seen as crucial to the daily operation of the community, and, since there is continuity of their tasks into activity, this cruciality of the organization tends to be carried over. Expanding organizations, however, tend to be less well institutionalized in the daily round of the community, and their "usual" activities often bear little resemblance to the type of activities in which they become involved during a disaster. This also means that they are often unable to develop secure interorganizational relationships during "normal times" which can be carried over to their disaster activities.

Second, expanding organizations generally have extra-community ties and obligations. This is both a cause of its weak institutionalization and an effect of it. Since the community does not recognize the "importance" of such organizations, often they depend quite heavily on "outside" support and advice from state, regional and national units. While this provides a degree of continuity and support, it also tends to give these organizations the appearance of not being "local."

Third, expanding organizations have tasks during disaster activities which are general and, since they are general, they tend to be vague. It was suggested earlier that, while these type organizations are expected to

participate in disaster activities, their "mandate" tends to be quite general. Even the formal directive which legitimates their activities may be no more specific than to specify that the organization is to "coordinate disaster activities" or "to help disaster victims." This vagueness has several consequences. It "allows" such groups to go beyond even their commonly understood tasks and to initiate and attempt to accomplish many different tasks. Established organizations often restrict their activities to those "traditional" with them, but expanding organizations are "forced" to undertake unplanned and unanticipated tasks which are no one's responsibility within the community. Their directive "to help" then necessitates becoming involved in a wide variety of "unwanted" tasks.

Another consequence of this vagueness is the common occurrence that several expanding organizations may become involved in the same activities simultaneously. For example, in one disaster, the Red Cross, the local CD and Salvation Army were all involved in putting together a list of missing persons. Duplication of effort is also encouraged by the weak institutionalization of such organizations within the community. Such organizations have a tendency to move into many different areas of disaster activity, not only because their "directives" are vague, but because they see disaster activity as a means whereby their position within the community might be strengthened in the future. While expanding organizations tend to be marginal to the established organizations within the community, their latent responsibilities in a disaster allow them to participate at that time in somewhat equal status. In this participation, they may move into many areas, some of which duplicate the activities of others. The more central an organization can become to the whole range of disaster activities the greater claim it can make for continued support after the emergency. Even during the emergency operations, expanding organizations often seem preoccupied with obtaining "social credit." They utilize public relations opportunities which are viewed by the other more "established" organizations as being opportunistic. Given this organizational insecurity and lack of legitimacy within the community which leads to duplication, expanding organizations are often the focus of conflict since they encroach upon the established or desired domains of other organizations. The attempt to gain social credit for one's product is, of course, characteristic of all organizations, but, because of their weak institutionalization, expanding organizations are particularly likely to maximize their claims. One can suggest, then, that since expanding organizations are designed for flexibility in action, this often leads to over-committment and duplication encouraged by their weak institutionalization within the community.

Fourth, expanding organizations change their major functions at the time of a disaster event. Earlier, expanding organizations were characterized as having regular tasks but developing a new structure to implement them. This must be qualified somewhat. The major tasks in which they engage are anticipated by the organization, and there are community expectations that they will carry them out. In this sense, they are regular tasks for the organization. Their disaster tasks, however, are latent for the organization prior to the disaster event. The pre-disaster existence of such organizations centers in its permanent personnel -- its cadre -- and this cadre is ordinarily involved in pre-disaster activities related to, but not identical with, their disaster

tasks. When such organizations move into disaster activities, the activities of the cadre shifts. For example, the administrator of such an organization may be concerned day-to-day with administration fund-raising and organizational maintenance, but, in a disaster, his activities may shift to one of operating a mass shelter and feeding program. While prior to the disaster event he may have spent time preparing for such responsibilities, the opportunity to carry them out occurs, at best, infrequently and therefore, while they may be anticipated, they are still somewhat unfamiliar to him and to the organization.

Fifth, expanding organizations radically change their structure. The cadre, of course, is the major focus of the expansion of the organization. Since these organizations are considered from the viewpoint of the community to be standby, the cadre -- the permanent full-time personnel -- cannot handle the tasks created by the disaster event. The contingency is covered by the plans for adding personnel to help with the increased tasks. There are several sources of these personnel. It has been suggested that expanding organizations tend to be somewhat weakly institutionalized in the community, and they also have extra-community ties. One way such groups attempt to gain greater acceptance within the communities is by the establishment of community advisory boards. Such boards are often known by a variety of other designations. These boards are generally composed of individuals within the community who have skills, organizational connections, power, money, prestige or some combination of these. These attributes are, in effect, potential resources for the organization's operation either on a day-to-day basis or in its emergency activities. While the pre-disaster activities of these boards may be only causal and supportive, personnel from these boards often become a part of the operating structure of the expanding organization when it moves into disaster activity. Because of their skills, abilities and possessions, such people often participate as a part of the "management" structure of the expanded organization. Joining the personnel from these sources during emergency activity are often other personnel from "higher" levels of the organization located outside the community. As we indicated, expanding organizations often have units on the state, regional and national levels which provide them with different types of support. One type of support is to provide certain personnel resources in time of emergency. For example, the state "director" may come to the community to assist as he would come to other communities needing assistance within his particular jurisdiction. They often bring with them high prestige and, therefore, tend to participate as a part of the management structure of the disaster operation. In effect, then, the management volunteers of such organizations tend to be composed of administrative personnel from the cadre supplemented by personnel from community boards and segments of the organization outside the community.

Although there is a tendency for permanent members of the organization to assume management roles because of their greater familiarity with the organization, its tasks and resources, not all of the cadre participate as a part of the management structure. Much of the "work" of the organization comes from lower level cadre members who are supplemented by what can be called regular volunteers. These regular volunteers are those who have some continuing relationship with the organization. In other words, they are affiliated with the organization in some fashion and have the expectation of becoming involved when

the organization expands. Some of the regular volunteers may be organized in sub-groups which meet periodically under the auspices of the organization and may receive in-service training for the tasks they anticipate they will undertake. For example, a group of volunteers may be organized to operate a shelter. They have their permanent assignment which will be activated during an emergency. During the period of de-activation, they may attend classes, participate in simulated mobilizations and keep informed of changes in resources and procedures to be used in the emergency period. These regular volunteers, the management volunteers, plus the cadre compose what we will call the core organization. These are the types of personnel resources that an expanding organization can anticipate when it moves into disaster operation.

The core organization, however, is expanded even further. Expanding organizations are also the focus of emergency volunteers. Since other organizations within the community have no legitimate role in disaster activity, their personnel are often available and are volunteered either collectively or individually. In addition, there are many individuals who are motivated to "help" in the community, and, since help is seen to be most effective within the context of an organized effort, expanding organizations become the "collection" agencies for these volunteers. They walk in and offer their services to Type II organizations. They may be sent by other disaster involved organizations. In other words, expanding groups are expected by others, as a part of their disaster involvement, to utilize the resources, both in material and personnel, which are "donated" to the community.


Expanding organizations, then, are composed of both permanent and volunteer personnel. The volunteer personnel come from a variety of sources. They also participate at different levels of the organization. We have identified, initially, management, regular and emergency volunteers. These various sources are summarized in Figure 4.

Sixth, expanding organizations' previous experience as a work group is minimal. This is obvious from the preceding discussion. Since they are stand-by organizations, this implies infrequent activation. The point to be emphasized is that the cadre, supplemented by the varieties of volunteers, form a work group expanded many fold which has never previously worked together as a unit. It may be more accurate to see them as "collections" of people rather than as an "organization." The cadre, of course, has worked together on other tasks. The management and the regular volunteers may have worked earlier with the cadre, but also in another context. The emergency volunteers are, in large part, new to the organization. The cadre, then, in addition to the increased tasks which confront the organization, are confronted with the additional problem of trying to utilize the skills which have become available to them. In effect, then, it is a new organization which has to confront difficult and often immense tasks.

Seventh, expanding organizations have vague boundaries. For most organizations "membership" is simply determined. In industrial organization, one's membership is indicated by having one's name on the payroll. In voluntary associations, one is a member if he meets membership qualifications and has paid his "initiation" fees and dues. Most organizations develop a number of

FIGURE 4

PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL RESOURCES FOR EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONS



ways of determining membership in order to arrive at some degree of clarity and definition. In expanding organizations there are difficulties in determining the boundaries of even the core organization, and this is accentuated by the influx of emergency volunteers. This means that the cadre often has a limited idea of the number of people who consider themselves as members and are operating in the "name" of the organization. Membership in such organizations is largely a matter of self-identification evoked by the act of volunteering. In fact, persons may operate in the name of the organization without the knowledge of or the control of the cadre or any member of the core organization. It is not rare, then, for the cadre of such organizations to have little knowledge about the mass of volunteers of all varieties who have become associated with the organization. The importance of this lies in the fact that the cadre often have little control as to the activities which are being carried out in the name of the organization.

Differences

In the previous discussion, similarities among expanding organizations have been emphasized. At the same time there are obviously differences among them. Expanding organizations differ as to their degree of pre-disaster institutionalization within a community. There will be differences as to how and in what ways each is expected to become involved in disaster activities. Sometimes the major disaster activity of an organization has a close relationship with its pre-disaster activity, but, for other organizations, it may not. In expanding organizations there are differences in the degree of expansion. Some organizations expand many fold, others only modestly. The various kinds of personnel become involved in different ways. Many volunteers in particular expanding organizations are there because they are committed to the purposes of the organization and they wish to help. In others, the bulk of the volunteers may be "walk-ins" with no previous connection with the organization or its purposes. Also, some organizations have only emergency responsibilities, while others have, in addition to their emergency responsibilities, added and perhaps different responsibilities in the rehabilitation period. Those organizations with rehabilitation responsibilities have to shift their activity again after the emergency period, prior to returning to their non-disaster tasks.

It is useful, since we have previously used the Red Cross, the Salvation Army and local civil defense as examples of expanding organizations, to give some attention to some of the differences among them which, in part, accounts for the particular "advantages and disadvantages" each has in its disaster activities. Comparisons will be made first between the Red Cross and the Salvation Army and, second, between local civil defense and the two "welfare" organizations.

Red Cross and Salvation Army

Both the Red Cross and the Salvation Army are familiar organizations within American communities of reasonable size. While local units are part of a larger state, regional and national network, these local units are embedded in

the structure of particular communities. In most American communities, various private welfare agencies have made cooperative agreements concerning mutual fund raising and, to a large extent, problems of responsibility and jurisdiction. While both the Red Cross and Salvation Army are a part of these agreements, often called United Funds, Federated Funds, Community Chests, etc., they retain also a degree of autonomy in additional fund raising. When United Funds developed, these organizations were able to maintain earlier private sources of financial support in addition to cooperative funding. The financial status of these organizations is dependent on, but not determined by, cooperative fund raising. For example, while the Salvation Army may receive money from United Funds sources, their Christmas activities which are traditional and independent provide, in most instances, the largest percentage of their total support. These private and community sources of support provide one indication of institutionalization within various communities. Other types of organizations which deal with day-to-day functions and which have continuous funding are perhaps better institutionalized.

In general, both the Red Cross and the Salvation Army are typically involved in small-scale emergencies, and these organizations are expected to become involved in future emergency, crisis and welfare situations.¹ In addition, the cadre members of the organization have the clear expectation of becoming involved in such situations. The definition of organizational responsibility by the cadre is more precise and definite as to the extent and the limits of organizational involvement than is that of community members, but the involvement of the organization in disaster situations is expected both on the part of community members and organizational personnel.

Both Red Cross and Salvation Army have broad welfare responsibilities. In many ways they parallel one another, complementing, sometimes duplicating and occasionally conflicting. These broad responsibilities are oriented to survivors of disaster impact and, to a lesser extent, those involved in disaster activities. For example, the Red Cross may be involved in the provision of personnel with first-aid training for search and rescue activity. It may set up first-aid stations in the impact area. It may become involved in feeding operations both for survivors and rescue workers. The organization may open shelters for those who have been displaced by disaster impact. It frequently becomes the focus of inquiries from those outside the community as to the safety of friends and relatives. The organization may provide the locale for the listing of those who have been killed and injured by disaster impact. The Red Cross often becomes the focus of contributions of resources from within and outside the community and so it becomes a major distribution center for clothing, food, household furnishings and other diverse contributions. It often becomes the focus of information about the event, and, therefore, it is often the focus of community activity concerned with responding to the emergency. In some instances, it actually becomes the locus of the coordination emergency activity.

In addition to its emergency activity, the Red Cross also has responsibilities for certain aspects of rehabilitation. Financial assistance is provided for victims, and the attempt is made to replace and compensate those affected by the disaster for losses of household goods, housing and even

income-producing occupational tools. This continued rehabilitation responsibility often means that the Red Cross remains "involved" in disaster activities for a long period of time, long after most other agencies have returned to their "normal" activities.

By contrast, the Salvation Army seldom has first-aid responsibilities or continuing rehabilitation activities. It very often delimits its activity to feeding survivors and rescue workers through its mobile canteens. In addition, it seldom becomes involved in sheltering and feeding large number of people, but it often acts as a distribution center for contributed food and clothing. In effect, then, Salvation Army is involved in a narrower scope of activities than is the Red Cross. The only area in which Salvation Army becomes involved in which the Red Cross does not is in the religious and spiritual aspects. Its activities, in both emergency and non-emergency times, are seen by the organization to be an outgrowth of the Christian faith, and the officers are considered clergymen. Members of the Salvation Army are often called upon, particularly by members of other community organizations, to provide reassurance for bereaved survivors often in the context of the identification of victims. This religious function is, of course, unique to the Salvation Army.

Many of the activities in which both the Red Cross and Salvation Army engage are, in certain respects, continuous with their pre-disaster activities. For example, the local director of a Red Cross chapter may spend a considerable amount of his pre-disaster time in activities directly related to anticipated disaster tasks -- i.e. holding training sessions for regular volunteers, the development of procedure for the operation of shelters, the acquisition of provisions for shelters, etc. The Salvation Army has perhaps even greater continuity in their pre-disaster and their disaster-related tasks. This is primarily because of the organization's more narrow involvement in disaster activities. Since the Salvation Army is often involved in emergency feeding and limited relief work in the sense of distribution of resources to those who have lost household equipment, these are tasks which bear close resemblance to their previous pre-disaster activities.

While both of the organizations expand, Red Cross usually experiences the greatest expansion. While both organizations are points to which community volunteers come, perhaps the Red Cross has a clearer image among community members as being "open" to added members. The Salvation Army with its more identifiable uniforms and its religious tradition perhaps gives the impression of being a "closed" unit. Even though it is open to the problems of others, it is perhaps viewed as being self-sufficient. Red Cross, on the other hand, has a stronger image of being a community rallying point for volunteer help. The tradition which the Red Cross has developed concerning emergency help provides a rather clear image which anticipates involvement in disaster and the fact that volunteers will be needed. As a result of this, the ratio between volunteers and cadre personnel tends to be much greater in the Red Cross than it is in the Salvation Army.

In addition to the differences in the extent of expansion between the two organizations, there is a different "mix" of volunteers which comes to the two organizations. The Salvation Army tends to be much more a "familistic"

organization. Wives hold the same rank as their husbands and often have specific pre-disaster tasks within the organization. In emergency operations, not only wives, but, often children of the members come to play important roles in activity. Too, many of the volunteers who work for the Salvation Army may come from men who are staying at social centers run by the Army. These men often have types of responsibility in the operation of these centers in return for room and board. They often become "volunteers" in an emergency, but they have had a greater degree of involvement in the organization than do most other "regular" volunteers. With this larger cadre organization and the fewer number of volunteers, the Salvation Army tends to have greater similarity to its pre-disaster structure than does a Red Cross organization.

There is another difference between the two organizations. Even in its pre-disaster operations, the Red Cross tends to be more bureaucratic in its operations than does Salvation Army. Most of the decisions to extend Red Cross aid are made in the context of rules which are set at the national level and then become policy at the local level. Decisions to extend aid from the Salvation Army occurs in a more personalized context. This is in keeping with the more familistic orientation of the organization. To over simplify the difference, the decision is made on the basis of need rather than on qualifications under rules. These differences also carry over into the disaster operations of these two organizations.

Local Civil Defense and the Two Welfare Organizations

The first obvious difference between CD and the two welfare organizations is that CD is supported by government funds, usually both local and federal, while Red Cross and Salvation Army are funded primarily by private contributions. There is also a difference in the length of tradition among the organizations. The two welfare organizations have a longer tradition of community service than does CD, which is a specialized newcomer. The two welfare organizations cultivate this tradition of community support through the development of citizen advisory boards. These advisory boards, variously named, provide the organizations assistance in the form of influence for continued support and also provide material and personal aid in times of crises. While in some communities local CD has somewhat of a parallel advisory structure, these groups are more likely to include representatives of organizations that have relevance to CD operations than those who have an interest in the continuity of the organization itself. Consequently, the roots of community support for the welfare organizations are much deeper than for CD.

Red Cross and Salvation Army typically become involved in small-scale emergencies such as major traffic accidents, fires, etc. within communities in which they operate. This is not true of CD since their legal mandate precludes this. Too, the involvement of the welfare organizations in disaster situations is expected and anticipated by community members more often than is CD. The role of CD in community disaster activity is more ambiguous. The identification of CD with wartime results in certain expectations of its involvement in peacetime disasters, but its role is less clear. Other organizations within the community are less certain if and how CD will become involved. Its lack of visibility in disaster situations often adds to the initial

ambiguity. This is particularly true in communities with infrequent disaster experience and, consequently, less opportunity for observation of CD involvement.

Another difference among the organizations is in terms of the type of expansion they undergo. The Red Cross and, to a lesser extent, the Salvation Army expand primarily by adding personnel. To a large extent, they add volunteer workers for task accomplishment in overload situations. While CD often expands in personnel, it also "expands by adding organizations." In an attempt to coordinate organizational activity, CD often develops points of contact and becomes a focal point for the transfer of resources to task-oriented organizations. In this sense, CD brings organizational units into the scope of its activity rather than increasing personnel for the accomplishment of specific tasks.

This implies that there are differences among the organizations in their involvement in coordination. Carrying over its responsibility in wartime, local CD sees as its primary role to facilitate civil government in emergency situations, and this makes it central in coordinating activities. A legal justification is often presented by CD for this role. The Red Cross, at times, sees itself in a central coordinating position. This claim is based on its wide ranging disaster activities. With such wide scope, other organizations within a community necessarily must coordinate their activities. Its claim for a central position in disaster operation is frequently made in terms of its advantage of experience as well as its quasi-legal status. This Salvation Army is seldom seen as central to disaster operations but content to play a more delimited role. Its activities seldom go beyond its religious-welfare aspects and are unlikely to extend past the emergency period into rehabilitation.

One other difference which can be made is on the basis of the reasons why individuals participate in organizational activities. Some organizations such as prisons obtain compliance on the basis of coercion. Other participation is utilitarian in the sense that people are remunerated for it. Other types of participation are normative in that they are a result of the belief that the demands which an organization makes are legitimate. In disaster activity, most participation in organizational activity is based on normative compliance. Volunteers work because they believe what the organization demands of them is legitimate. There is, however, some difference in their pre-disaster setting among personnel in the three organizations. Personnel in Salvation Army are seen to be involved for normative reasons. Their altruistic motives seem evident. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, of the Red Cross. The permanent personnel may comply for utilitarian reasons, but there is still a strong normative element. CD is seen, however, to have a stronger utilitarian element in its activities. CD personnel are "doing" a job they are paid for rather than acting in accordance with their firm belief of the purposes of the organization. This is not to demean the motives of CD personnel but only to suggest that among the members of the various organizations, Salvation Army and Red Cross personnel are more likely to comply on the basis of their belief in the purposes of the organization than are those in CD.

Since CD is a governmental organization, it is more politically involved than the activities of the two welfare organizations. In some specific communities, CD may become the subject of political controversy; and the concept of civil defense, itself, is more controversial on ideological grounds than is the altruistic actions of the welfare organizations. While all three of the organizations operate on altruistic grounds, American culture seems to evaluate private altruism as expectable but governmental altruism with a degree of caution and suspicion.

These are some of the similarities and differences among the three groups which have been used as illustrations for the type of expanding organizations. These are summarized in Figure 5. Before we turn to the general operational problems such organizational types have in disaster operations, the next chapter will discuss the various tasks which are created by a disaster event and the way in which expanding organizations become involved in these tasks.

FIGURE 5

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES AMONG THREE EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONS

FACTORS	LOCAL CD	RED CROSS	SALVATION ARMY
Pre-disaster institutionalization community	weak to medium	medium	medium
Community expectation of disaster involvement	vague to clear	clear	clear
Organizational expectation of disaster involvement	vague to clear	clear	clear
Scope of disaster involvement	narrow to wide	wide	narrow
Continuity of pre-disaster tasks	medium to great	medium to great	great
Degree of expansion of organization	medium	great	medium
Units of expansion of organization	organizations and individual volunteers	individual volunteers and few organizations	individual volunteers
Pre-dominant mode of involvement of: cadre regular volunteers emergency volunteers	utilitarian (normative) normative (utilitarian) normative	utilitarian (normative) normative normative	normative normative normative
Identifiability of cadre personnel	medium	medium	great
Rehabilitation responsibility	yes	great	slight

FOOTNOTES: Chapter III

1. These statements concerning expectations are made on the basis of a wide variety of interviews with persons in a number of American communities. Since precise quantitative measures are not available, these statements must remain as impressions, albeit educated ones.

CHAPTER IV

DISASTER CREATED TASKS

The primary reason for expanding organizations within a community is that they act as the major mechanism for handling overload demands. Disaster events create such overload demands. The "results" of a disaster event become the objective tasks for the range of community organizations. Some of these tasks represent continuity for certain organizations since they are similar to their day-to-day ones. Hospitals have experience daily with accident victims but, they seldom have the number which they are likely to have subsequent to certain kinds of disasters. Other tasks may be totally new and, therefore, are unfamiliar in the usual daily operation of some community organizations. For example, warning community members of an impending threat is infrequent and thus unfamiliar in most communities. Regardless of whether the tasks are familiar or unfamiliar to specific community organizations, they "have" to be accomplished, and thus they become the primary concern of the community during the emergency period. Prior to observing how expanding organizations become involved in these tasks, the range of tasks which are created by the disaster event will be discussed.

Range of Tasks

Within a community there are certain activities which can be initiated prior to impact. In certain disasters, notably floods and hurricanes, periods of forewarning are possible. Such forewarning allows for preparation for impact.

After impact, other predictable activities are produced. The victims of the disaster must be rescued. Those who have been injured and killed must be cared for. If the threat is sustained, certain protective actions may have to be continued. In order to operate as a social system, disrupted community services must be restored to some minimum operating level. Also, the survivors in the impact area must be cared for. If loss of housing, possessions and food supply has been a by-product of the disaster, some arrangements must be made for temporary supply of these amenities.

Engaging in such activities accentuates other community processes. In order to accomplish such tasks, there is often a preoccupation with problems of order within the community. In addition, there is attention given to the morale and motivation of those individuals and organizations which have become involved in the tasks. The increase in the scope of community activity as well as the fact that the tasks are relatively unfamiliar among community organizations necessitates the collection and transmission of information. This also evokes concern with controlling activities and coordinating the involvement of acting individuals and organizations.

These activities and processes are summarized in Figure 6. Each of the activities will now be discussed separately before we return to direct concern with the involvement of organizations and its consequences.

FIGURE 6

DISASTER ACTIVATED ACTIVITIES AND PROCESSES

Group and Organizational Activities

Community Processes

Accentuated by

Generated by

Group and Organizational Activities

<p>Warning</p> <p>Preparing for impact</p> <p>————— IMPACT —————</p> <p>Rescuing</p> <p>Caring for Casualties</p> <p>Protecting against continuing threat</p> <p>Restoring Minimum community services</p> <p>Caring for survivors</p>	<p><u>Maintaining</u></p> <p>Community Order</p> <p>Group and organiza- tional motivation and morale</p> <p><u>Collecting and trans- mitting information</u></p> <p><u>Controlling activities</u></p> <p><u>Coordinating involve- ment</u></p>
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Warning

In many ways, warning can be the most important phase of any disaster. It may mean the difference, on the individual level, between avoiding a disaster and falling victim to it. Warning, of course, is possible only in specific kinds of disasters. In particular, time periods in which warnings can take place occur in floods and hurricanes. In other disaster events where the period of forewarning is short, such as in tornadoes, it is still possible, with the development of a warning technology and a disaster sub-culture, for warning to take place. It is possible to view warning as a series of concrete tasks performed by particular organizations. No single community organization has responsibility for warning, but several organizations may become involved. While the warning process does involve the activities of persons acting as individuals, the complexity of the process and the technology necessary to accomplish these tasks in modern society inevitably means that organizations with collective skills and pooled resources must bear the major responsibility for such activity.

Preparing for Impact

With the possibilities of forewarning in some disasters, a limited amount of time may be available to avoid the worst consequences of the impact of a disaster. In the instance of hurricanes, objects which might be blown away can be secured or placed in a sheltered place. Large plate glass windows may be boarded up or taped to withstand high winds. Hanging objects such as traffic lights or signs may be taken down. Supplies such as food, fuel, as well as substitute heating and cooking arrangements may be obtained. Much of this activity involves individuals and family groups or employees of organizations acting in terms of their own "self" interest. In certain types of disaster events, evacuation is a major way of preparation to avoid the worst consequences of impact. Particularly in those areas which have repetitive experiences with certain disasters, evacuation may become regularized and become the responsibility of several community organizations. In some instances this may result in the establishment of standard evacuation centers, evacuation routes and warning procedures.

Rescue

After impact, the initial task for the community is rescue work. One of the most consistent findings in the disaster literature is the fact that the initial rescue work is done by individuals who are in the impact area. Those who are there obviously can engage in these activities. Soon they may be assisted by others, but people who live in the impact area have more accurate knowledge about what potential damage might occur, which individuals in the area might need help and the location of immediately necessary equipment.

As a part of the initial rescue activity, however, notification is usually made of the event to local emergency organizations. Such notifications may come about in a variety of ways: phone calls, observation by some organizational member, etc. Generally there will be a convergence of information (and inquiry) at such organizations. Gradually these organizations become involved

first as somewhat supplemental to the informal rescue, and, as time goes on, they come to dominate the disaster activity. The fact that disaster activity becomes organized occurs for several reasons. There is the necessity for developing an overall picture of the disaster situation. This cannot usually be done by a particular individual or small groups of individuals since their observations would of necessity be limited. Too, the tasks to be accomplished require resources which no aggregate of individuals could possess. Also, individual energy levels cannot sustain activity as easily as can organized forms of cooperation and assistance.

Search and rescue activity is seldom considered a major responsibility of any existing community organization. As a result, many organizations do become involved initially. After this initial involvement, some organizations withdraw to their more traditionally expected tasks. For example, the police and fire department may become involved but gradually pull back to their more traditional control and fire readiness functions. This results in certain aspects of the tasks being delayed or overlooked which then have to be assumed by other organizations with less initial involvement.

Caring for Casualties

In most American communities, the hospital is assumed to be the primary locale of medical treatment. While the normal range of illnesses can be handled by a visit to a physician, any injury or "out of the ordinary" medical problem is usually "handled" by the hospital. Such attitudes tend to carry over into disaster situations. Several studies of disaster operations have shown that established first-aid stations are often by-passed because judgments are made by those transporting the injured that they need "more" than first aid. This means, then, that hospitals bear both the major and also the initial responsibility for handling the injured from a disaster event.

Protecting Against Continuing Threat

The initial impact may be only the beginning of a set of tasks for a community. The initial impact may create conditions which make remedial activity for the community difficult. For example, power lines may be broken and fall across streets and sidewalks endangering the lives of those in the area who survived the initial impact. Also common is the creation of secondary effects which may, in the long run, be more destructive than the original disaster agent. For example, earthquakes create tsunami waves and hurricanes often create floods.

Many disaster agents disrupt water, sewage and utilities facilities. The disruption of water lines then raises the possibilities of contamination and subsequent risks through epidemic disease. The disruption of sewage creates the problem of seeking alternative methods of disposal. And the disruption of utilities necessitates finding alternative ways of storing and preparing food. All of this necessitates action of various community organizations, either in terms of direct action or becoming involved in spreading information to reduce the threat.

Restoration of Minimum Community Services

Many of the remedial activities in a community after a disaster impact utilize "normal" community services. Casualty care, for example, depends upon the continuation of electric, water and gas supplies for hospital operations. Roads need to be cleared sufficiently so that the injured can be brought to the hospital and so that employees can get to work. Many of these services normally provided by the community and necessary for continued and efficient operation are disrupted with impact. A significant part of community activity during the emergency period is aimed at restoring these services to some minimum operating level. Certain streets may be opened. Certain buildings will be provided electricity or gas. In most instances, certain community organizations have such activities as their normal responsibilities. There is, thus, a degree of continuity in organizational activities since they can apply their pre-disaster experience to the disaster-created tasks. Prior to impact the telephone company is responsible for installation, repair and operation; after impact it concentrates on repair of its facilities. Certain repairs may be made quickly while other repairs in less critical areas may be delayed for months. Personnel from outside the community may be brought in to assist in these tasks with high priority.

Caring for Survivors

Disaster events often create the conditions where large groups of people must obtain food, shelter and clothing from different sources. If evacuation has taken place, it may be days or weeks before it is possible to re-establish normal living habits. Too, in many instances, a disaster agent such as an earthquake or a hurricane may create damage which ranges from complete destruction to minor and remedial effects. Different losses create different needs. Much of the care for survivors is provided by friends and relatives; but, particularly when impact is widespread, dependence upon community organizations for help is essential.

The preceding activities in which organizations become involved are in most instances "objective" tasks. This is particularly true of the post-impact activities. A specific person needs to be rescued. A particular type of injury needs to be treated. A dangerous electric wire needs to be neutralized by cutting off current. The lines to the hospital needs to be restored. A particular family needs shelter and food because their house has been destroyed. These are immediate, observable tasks, and, as we have indicated, many different community organizations become involved in seeking to accomplish these tasks. Such involvement, however, evokes and necessitates other processes within the community which are less observable but not necessarily less important. These processes also become specific tasks for organizations, and some of them are similar to those which normally "go on" within a community. Others are "new" so most community organizations have no experience in dealing with them. Two processes which are accentuated by the groups and organizational activities within the community are maintaining community order and maintaining group and organizational morale. Three other processes are, in effect, generated by the disaster event. These are collecting and transmitting information, controlling activities and coordinating involvement.

Maintaining Community Order

Carrying out disaster related activities requires a degree of order within the community. The order of the community is soon "threatened" after disaster impact by convergence. In large part, this is frequently unanticipated by community officials, some of whom probably retain a popular image of a highly fearful or "panicky" mass of survivors who flee from the scene of destruction. In actual disaster situations, the survivors themselves are much more cooperative and easy to control than the persons who begin to converge from outside on the disaster area immediately after impact. Those who converge on the impact area have a variety of motives. Some may be those who have evacuated earlier but wish to return. Some may be looking for friends or relatives to ascertain their safety. Many come to help; others are simply curious. The culmination of these individual motivations, however, creates congestion around the impact area. Attempts then are usually made to block access to the impact area and to develop techniques to screen personnel. This often means developing roadblocks and perimeter guards. It may also mean the development of a pass system. These are concerns, however, which seldom lead to previous planning within the community and, consequently, they are activities which are unfamiliar to most community organizations. Since they directly impinge upon the ability of organizations to carry out their tasks, remedial action becomes a focus of confusion and controversy during the emergency period.

Maintaining Community Morale

One consequence of the disaster event is the creation of community solidarity. While part of this occurs somewhat "spontaneously," there is an element of conscious effort to sustain morale and much initial concern is expressed whether the disaster event will have a serious effect on the continuity of the community. While most reassurance occurs at the personal level, some organizations do become involved in activities which relate to maintaining morale.

While the mass media is involved in such activities, officials with particular organizational responsibilities often supply the content of the material the media transmits. Political officials, such as mayors, governors, congressmen, senators and even presidents, make visits to reassure those in the impact area and those involved in the remedial activity of continued interest, material aid and moral support. Organizational officials within the community often express concern for their employees and devote time to building morale. To a certain extent such activity is a continuation of "boosterism," characteristic of most communities. Because it is assumed that a stricken community must have a greater need to be reassured, more time and effort than usual is devoted to these activities.

Information, Control and Coordination

Three other processes are generated within the community by a disaster event. While somewhat similar processes are evidenced in the community prior to the disaster event, the form is somewhat new. While the three are somewhat separable, they will be discussed together here. First, there is a need to know just what effect impact has had on the community. Collecting information

about a community prior to a disaster event is usually done leisurely and with specific purposes, perhaps of a particular organization. "Control" of diverse community activity is seldom necessary. In most instances, every community organization has traditional tasks which are understood by others. Such tasks are usually carried out independently without conflict or confusion. Thus, there is little impetus to coordinate activities within the community. The occasional jurisdiction disputes are settled through negotiation over a period of time.

A disaster event accentuates all of these processes considerably. There is a need for information about impact. This is necessary to understand the dimensions of the tasks which the community face. How many people are injured? How many people are still to be rescued? What areas of the community have suffered impact? What is the nature of the damage in these areas? What meaning does this damage have for the future operation of the community? Disaster activity, of course, is most often initiated without such information. There is a general tendency to over-estimate the consequences of the event. The community then mobilizes what has been called a "mass assault." To a degree, everyone starts doing everything at the same time. As actual needs become apparent, some mechanisms are necessary to allocate the resources of the community in terms of these high priority needs. Accurate information is so crucial to the control of activities that they go hand in hand. In other words, as accurate information is pooled, its location tends to become the locus of the control of disaster-related activities within a community. And because many individuals and organizations within the community become involved in unfamiliar activities, the whole problem of coordination becomes problematic.

Organizational Involvement

In the preceding discussion, certain tasks for the community were seen as an expectable consequence of a disaster event. These tasks are activated by threat or impact and represent potential demands for the various organizations within the community. Consequently, a specific organization may become involved in several different disaster-related tasks. For example, a police department may become engaged in warning, rescue, information gathering, control and the maintenance of community order. Also, several organizations may become involved in the same activity. For example, both the Red Cross and the Salvation Army often become involved in caring for survivors.

One cannot always predict with certainty that a particular organization will become involved in identical tasks in every kind of disaster event or in every type of community. The actual course of involvement of a specific organization depends on a number of factors. Among these factors are the expectations for involvement on the part of top organizational officials. By definition, certain organizations build into their structure procedures to be used in cases of emergency. They may have emergency and disaster plans, including techniques for assignment of responsibility, for rapid mobilization of men and materials and for the organization of work. Such expectations may be a result of the explicit policy of the organization's national headquarters which then becomes implemented in specific communities. This may be reinforced by

expectations toward the organization on the part of other individuals and organizations within the specific community. Members may feel that others expect their organization to become involved. Thus, the involvement of the organization may be somewhat "opportunistic" since officials may feel that the organization has much to gain or much to lose if it does not become involved.

Involvement in specific tasks can come about in different ways. It should not be assumed that all the various tasks created by disaster impact will necessarily be quickly assumed by community organizations. Some may be, while others may be neglected. Neglect may result from the extent of the tasks which have been created. Communities may be "overwhelmed." Another factor leading to "neglect" is the degree of obviousness of the task. Certain activities necessitated by a disaster event are obvious -- rescue and casualty care -- while others are not obvious -- collecting information, control and coordination. The less obvious tasks tend to be neglected initially. Later, however, such tasks become obvious since their problem character becomes aggravated by inattention. These tasks then may become the responsibility of organizations already involved in related activity which accept them by default. Some organizations may be "assigned" the responsibility for certain tasks by the coordinating group which has emerged.

Because of this process of involvement, it is difficult to talk with certainty about the specific tasks with which expanding organizations become involved. Several comments can be made, however, about their involvement.

1. Expanding organizations become involved in those disaster tasks which no other organization within the community deals with on a day-to-day basis. There are both organizational and community expectations for Type II involvement. The tasks with which they are to be concerned usually goes beyond the necessities of handling routine day-to-day emergencies. The police and fire department within a city deals everyday with emergencies, but such emergencies do not involve tasks such as warning and evacuation.

2. Expanding organizations generally become involved in post-threat tasks. Since such organizations are structured to respond to overload tasks, something has to happen to evoke their mobilization and participation. In general, their major tasks are in the post-impact period. If the disaster event provides a long period of forewarning, such organizations may become involved in evacuation and shelter operations. Less frequently do they become involved in warning.

3. Expanding organizations are often at the center of resource reallocation within the community. When a disaster event creates widespread impact, many parts of the community close "down." Certain types of activities which are not central to the overall disaster effort, such as business and education, are suspended for the emergency period. This means that the resources of personnel and materiel from these segments of the community can be utilized in different ways in the emergency effort. Since organizations concerned with these less central activities are not well-integrated into the emerging pattern of disaster-related organizations within the community, expanding organizations often become brokers since they become aware of needs, and they also are more

aware of the "stockpiling" of resources in other segments of the community. Through this shifting of resources toward need, they perform a brokerage function within the community.

This brokerage function is also performed by expanding organizations for resources outside the immediate community. Many of these type organizations have state, regional and national ties. This allows them access to resources outside the community. If extra-community resources are needed, these organizations are more centrally involved. Along with procuring resources, these organizations also attempt to provide a "filtering" function for resources coming from outside the community. Certain resources may not be needed, but others outside the community may assume that particular needs are critical. For example, it is often assumed that every community impacted by a disaster event requires massive medical supplies. In few instances this might be true, but for the vast majority of disaster events, casualty rates are low and existing medical supplies are more than sufficient to handle this temporary overload. It is also frequently assumed that clothing is an item of critical shortage in many disasters. Again this is seldom true for the mass of the population, but it may be true in a few isolated cases. Drives to collect used clothing which spring up in communities all over the nation often produce quantities of goods which overwhelm the damaged community. Much of the clothing collected may be inappropriate, and, in addition, the sorting, distribution and storing of clothing often requires the efforts of many who would be more effectively used in other disaster-related tasks. Because of these factors, expanding organizations with their extra-community ties often attempt to control the flow of these extra-community resources assisting the procurement of resources to meet realistic needs and filtering out resources which would divert community energy to minor and even non-existent needs.

CHAPTER V

PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION IN DISASTER CONDITIONS

It is useful to initially consider an overall and generalized view of how organizations adapt to the tasks which result from disaster impact. This view is one which sees organizations as having certain demands made upon them and as having certain capabilities to meet these demands. The demands made are the tasks which the organization attempts to accomplish, and the capabilities are those resources and techniques which the organization utilizes to meet the demands. One can assume that, in pre-disaster conditions, the mode for most organizations is that the demands made on the organization and the capabilities to meet these demands are in relative balance. To illustrate this balance, one can point to problems and actions of organizations engaged in the production of goods. The demands made on such organizations are set, in part, by market conditions. There is usually an attempt to stabilize these demands or, at least, to make increases gradual. For example, if the demands fall below the capabilities of an organization, price might be lowered or the activity of the sales force might be increased. These actions attempt to bring demands and capabilities in balance again. In instances when the capabilities of the organization exceed the demands, production may be continued at the same rate, but the output might be held in warehouse inventory until the demands increase again. Future increase in demand can then be handled without changing the production capabilities of the organization. Another way of keeping the demands and capabilities of an organization in relative balance is for the organization to stockpile resources so that they do not have to be acquired when demands increase. In this fashion, fluctuations in demands can be handled with a minimum of problems. This analogy, while based on production organizations, does have its counterparts in the operation of expanding organizations in disaster conditions.

In general, what happens when a disaster strikes a community is that the demands on certain organizations increase suddenly and dramatically. Too, it is not unusual for the capability of an organization to decline sharply as a result of the disaster itself. Members of the organization may be killed or injured and material resources, including communications equipment and records, may be destroyed. In disaster, it is often difficult for organizations to anticipate such an increase in demands and it may be impossible for them to regulate them by keeping inventories of their outputs which can be used later in a period of high demand. Organizations under disaster conditions, then, generally experience great increase in demands, and this is accompanied, at times, by a loss in capabilities. It is in this context that expanding organizations must adapt to these changing demands and capabilities.

Strategies in such situations are either to make an attempt to control the demands or to increase the capabilities so the organization can meet the increased demands. Almost by definition, an expanding organization adopts the strategy of rapidly increasing capabilities to keep up with demands. It is useful, prior to discussing this major strategy in more detail, to look at ways in which demands can be reduced on an organization, and some of the

reasons this option is not often taken in disaster activities.

Three major techniques can be used to reduce demands. First, the new demands made can be rejected as not within the purview of organizational responsibility. Second, rationing of the services of an organization may be instituted. Some increase in activity may be planned but the operational level would be below that necessary for accomplishment of the demands. Third, regular demands of the organization can be eliminated, and the new demands accepted in their place.

The first two techniques are difficult to implement in expanding organizations. Since these organizations are designed for those situations of high demands, it is difficult to reject the tasks for which the organization was established. Control of demands is also difficult since actual organizational responsibility tends to be unclear. This hampers the ability of organizational officials to discriminate between those demands which are legitimate and those which are not. Such judgments usually cannot be made on the basis of the previous experience -- the tradition -- of the organization. (In situations where there are repetitive disaster events and, therefore, repetitive and perhaps cumulative experience, this may be possible.)

This lack of clarity of the scope of organizational responsibility is also complicated, of course, by the absence of knowledge of what actually happened. It is difficult enough to make a rational decision in controlled conditions, but the absence of information regarding the scope and the nature of the tasks plus the pressure to act in some fashion precludes the rejection of demands.

Rationing of services tends to be rejected for the same reasons. Since the disaster tasks seem to fall within the vague boundaries of organizational responsibilities and since these activities have high priority in the emergency consensus, most expanding organizations opt for rationing services only as a temporary expedient until other capabilities can be obtained. In other words, rationing is usually only a situational decision, not an organizational directive.

The third technique, dropping regular tasks, is more common in the disaster activities of expanding organizations. This action is consistent with the emergency consensus since their regular tasks may have low priority. There are certain inherent limitations to this, however. Some organizations such as the Salvation Army can do this only within limits. For example, certain regular program activities might be dropped, perhaps religious services, but other regular activities, as feeding some dependent population, would still be necessary. In general, most expanding organizations do drop or temporarily suspend some of their regular tasks so that they are able to accept new demands created by the disaster event.

The major adaptive technique used by expanding organizations is to increase their capabilities through the rapid acquisition of new resources. Many of these organizations stockpile materials which can be quickly put into operation. For example, cots and feeding supplies may be stockpiled by the

Red Cross and the Salvation Army. Local civil defense may have generators and communications equipment which can be placed at strategic locations quickly. The major resource of expanding organizations, however, is increased personnel. These personnel can be used in the accomplishment of the new tasks as well as to procure material resources. We will now turn to a consideration of the problems associated with the mobilization and recruitment of such personnel.

Mobilization and Recruitment

Expanding organizations draw on diverse sources for personnel support. Persons from these sources present different types of problems in the mobilization and recruitment process, as well as differences in their ability to function within the organization itself. Two broad categories of personnel will be mentioned initially -- the cadre and the volunteers -- who constitute the personnel for expansion. We will first discuss the cadre and later differentiate several types of volunteers.

1. Cadre Personnel. These are the permanent full-time pre-disaster personnel who represent the major focus or perhaps the "heart" of the expanded organization. They identify themselves as part of the organization. Such persons have a clear knowledge of their potential involvement in disaster activities. Since these organizations are expected to become involved, notification of disaster threat or impact usually comes early. These organizations often possess communication facilities whereby they can monitor emergency calls. In addition, because of previous pre-disaster planning, such organizations would be notified by others routinely. Also, because of previous planning, procedures for the notification of key members within the organization are likely to be routinized. Thus the necessity for participating in emergency situations is clear to the cadre members. There is no evidence from the observations of the DRC staff in a wide variety of disaster situations that cadre personnel are likely to neglect their occupational obligations. Such personnel, then, can be mobilized quickly, and there is little personnel loss. In this respect, the cadre are very similar to personnel in police and fire departments.

Expanding organizations differ from groups such as the police and fire departments in that their pre-disaster activity seldom involves shifts. In other words, they are usually eight-hour organizations, not 24-hour ones. Without multiple shifts, additional permanent personnel are not as readily available to the organization. In addition, the loss of specific persons, perhaps as casualties, is more serious. In shift organizations the loss or absence of specific individuals is minimized by the interchangeability of personnel. Since expanding organizations move to a 24-hour disaster operation, the lack of replacements often results in great fatigue among workers. Other organizations may be able to reduce fatigue by double shifting, but this is less likely in expanding organizations.

These problems are somewhat minimized, however, since many of the cadre personnel move into "new" positions during the emergency period. In many instances their previous training may have little to do with the skills required

for the new position. Replacement of missing permanent personnel then is perhaps less disruptive than would ordinarily be the case.

Replacement and supplementation of cadre personnel usually comes from two major sources. Some expanding organizations bring in "professional" help from state, regional and national levels. For example, the American National Red Cross may supply local chapters with personnel drawn from all over the United States. In some communities with recurrent disasters, there is a periodic, almost seasonal, need for such assistance, and the same individuals, over a several-year period, may be assigned to the same chapter several times. This continuity allows personnel to develop experience in specific social contexts. In addition, of course, "outside" personnel do bring with them experience from other community disasters. (These personnel, however, are still "outsiders.") They can be mobilized quickly and, in some cases, primarily disaster events which provide warning, personnel from extra-community sources may even be on the spot when impact occurs. The mobilization of cadre personnel, then, tends to be accomplished without too much difficulty. In addition to the kind of supplementation from extra-community sources, the major source for expansion comes from adding community volunteers. They present a different and more complex set of problems for expanding organizations.

2. Volunteers. Most of the personnel in expanding organizations have to be "recruited" and mobilized. In the broad sense, these persons are volunteers although this is a heterogeneous category encompassing several different types. Some clarity is achieved when one takes two variables -- previous organizational connection and training -- and cross classifies. These four types of volunteers exhibit different characteristics and present different problems for mobilization and recruitment.

FIGURE 7

TYPES OF VOLUNTEERS

		Training	
		Yes	No
Previous Organizational Connection	Yes	Regular Trained	Regular Untrained
	No	Emergency Trained	Emergency Untrained

a. Regular Trained Volunteer. This type volunteer has had previous organizational connection and has training and/or skill for his position. This can be illustrated by a private physician whose position in the paper plan for mobilization of the local Red Cross is that of chairman of the committee on medical and nursing aid. His medical training is obviously relevant and he may have attended training sessions at local, state or national levels with others in similar positions in other chapters. He may have participated in rehearsals

of the disaster activities of the group. He may have been involved in Red Cross activities within the community in various capacities over several years. He is aware of the organization's need for him during the disaster. His connection with the organization, however, is not as salient as with the full-time employees, so he may become diverted from such participation by immediate rescue work, hospital duty, etc.

An important source of regular trained volunteers come from the community advisory boards of expanding organizations. These boards are generally composed of individuals within the community who have skills, organizational connections, power, money, prestige or some combination of these. They are, in effect, potential resources for the organization's operation either on a day-to-day basis or in its emergency activities. While the pre-disaster activities of these boards may be only supportive, personnel from these boards often become a part of the operating structure of the expanding organization when it moves into disaster activity. It is also likely, however, that members of these boards would have multiple memberships in other organizations which also would become involved. The physician mentioned above might also be needed at a hospital.

b. Emergency Trained Volunteer. This type volunteer has some training and skill but lacks previous organizational connection. Using a parallel example with the previous one, this would be illustrated by a private physician who "walks in" to the Red Cross headquarters and volunteers his services. He has no position in the organization's plan since he has had no previous contact with the group, nor does he have specific training for a particular position in it. He is not mobilized by the organization and his appearance is based on a motivation to help rather than his organizational responsibility. While he may be familiar with elements of the tasks demanded of him, organizational procedures will have to be learned and the time of other organization members used to provide such an orientation.

c. Regular Untrained Volunteer. This type volunteer is represented by those without training or skill but who have had some organizational connection. The terms "training and skill" are, of course, relative since all persons bring some skills to any situation. These volunteers are "unskilled" persons who form a pool of personnel who can be utilized in a variety of ways depending on momentary need. They are the "casual, unskilled" labor necessary as tasks emerge. They may carry papers or casualties. They may be called auxiliary volunteers or helpers. Their names are perhaps available to the organization as possible "sources of labor." There may be some understanding that they will report automatically, or perhaps they will wait to be notified of their need. Their connection with the organization is thus perhaps more tenuous than the first type. If they do not report for duty, others will and can be assigned to tasks without loss of efficiency.

d. Emergency Untrained Volunteers. These volunteers are the "walk-ins" -- those individuals who appear on the scene of organizational activity. In many instances, they may not realize they are "organizational" volunteers. The fact that certain activities are the responsibility of particular organizations may not be known to someone whose motivation is to help. There are indications in

the disaster literature that such volunteers are important resources in most disasters. Many come from the fringe area or from those who converge on the impact area. Another source of these volunteers is from the "affected" population in the impact area. For example, in most shelter operations, the evacuees themselves may provide the major source of personnel for operation.

In addition to individual volunteers, expanding organizations seek out or are offered "group" volunteers. Many service groups such as church auxiliaries, youth clubs, men's service clubs and veterans associations have manpower and other resources which can be used in disaster operations. They can participate most effectively through the auspices of some organization which is integrated into the total community effort. Expanding organizations often provide that entree and, in turn, benefit from these additional resources. Most other involved organizations such as police and fire departments cannot easily absorb such volunteers. In part, this is because they need specialized help but also because they are cohesive work groups which exclude "outsiders." Expanding organizations then become the medium to integrate this group participation.

One final comment needs to be made on mobilization and recruitment in expanding organizations. It usually results in overstaffing. Overstaffing is understood here as the inefficient utilization of manpower. In the early stages of the emergency period, the dimensions of the tasks are unknown. Too, expanding organizations are less certain their regular volunteers will respond quickly to mobilization. As a result, they tend to try to collect every "available" volunteer. The end result is a conglomerate including regular cadre personnel, extra-community cadre, the regular volunteers with previous connections with the organization but who vary in the skills they have, the emergency volunteers who also vary in their skills and the group volunteers who are bound together by a different organizational identity. This heterogeneity results from attempting to anticipate personnel needs to meet unknown demands. The heterogeneity also leads to a number of operational problems.

Additional Operational Problems

The disaster event itself creates a radically different context for all organizational activity within the community. A number of factors contribute to this radically changed environment.

Immediately after impact, all organizations have to operate under conditions of great uncertainty. A disaster event initially provides only a tentative suggestion as to the scope of its impact, and thus an organization has little knowledge of the magnitude of its future tasks. In addition, organizations may also experience uncertainty as to the status of their personnel and their material resources as well as the status of other organizations upon which they must depend.

All organizations have to operate under conditions of urgency. Even with the lack of knowledge of what happened, there is pressure to act quickly. Pre-disaster routines become unnecessary luxuries and are usually eliminated or

or ignored in initial emergency activity.

All organizations have to operate in the context of the emergency consensus. This can mean that some traditional activities are no longer relevant for an organization. Given the change in community priorities, those personnel within organizations whose normal duties concern activities with low priority may be shifted to new tasks with higher priority. Shifting these personnel radically changes pre-disaster organizational patterns.

All organizations lose autonomy in disaster conditions. There is a decrease in the ability of the organization to control its environment so that its significant activities can be determined internally. In the emergency period, organizations must work in a larger community context in which traditional relationships have to be reworked since they cannot be assumed.

These factors affect all organizations within the community in their disaster operations, but the major operational problem for expanding organizations is the unanticipated changes which occur with the addition of personnel. Since cadre personnel move into new and unfamiliar positions within the expanded structure and since such organizations depend so heavily on volunteers, all personnel are in new and unfamiliar positions and have new social relationships.

Growth, of course, is characteristic of many organizations. In normal times organizations which experience growth adapt to it gradually and develop institutionalized ways of handling the problems created by it. Growth, for example, increases the channels of communication, but, over time, specific channels of communication come to be defined as appropriate. Growth creates complexity, consequently, problems of coordination emerge. Over time certain positions are given responsibility for coordination. In general, growth results in the greater development of rules and clearer specification of duties for various personnel. Sudden expansion, however, does not allow for the development of such institutionalized patterns. Nor are these consequences usually anticipated through pre-disaster planning. Expansion is usually seen as increasing capabilities by simply adding personnel. Expansion, however, does have a number of unanticipated consequences for operations. In addition, the role of expanding organizations within the pre-disaster community and in post-impact involvement has certain consequences for their operation. The listing below presents a number of other problems in the disaster operations of expanding organizations. Many of them have been alluded to previously, but some are mentioned here for the first time.

1. Disaster plans usually move cadre personnel into new positions within the organization. This means that even cadre members occupy new roles with unfamiliar and unclear responsibilities and work with others with whom they have had little previous contact.
2. Most disaster planning for expanding organizations centers on the expansion of personnel and the acquisition of resources, but it often ignores the physical space necessary for expanded operations.
3. Since an increase in size drastically increases the potential channels of communication, appropriate channels of communication are seldom worked out.

This means that persons in crucial parts of the organization are flooded with "irrelevant" information. A characteristic of post-impact is the emergence of somewhat equalitarian relationships between those involved in emergency activity. This status leveling accentuates the flow of information along increased channels of communication.

4. Expanding organizations are characterized by a number of authority problems. While there is status leveling process in the emergency context, the lack of previous operational experience of expanding organizations results in an initial authority vacuum. While cadre personnel usually fill new authority positions, the addition of volunteers from the community with high status and experienced organizational personnel from outside the community (i.e. state, regional and national staff) confuses anticipated lines of authority. These "authorities" are often adopted as normative in the still unstructured situation.

5. In the emergency context, there is an increase in the number and importance of decisions which have to be made within the organization. The openness of communications channels and the questionable validity of available information complicates the decision-making process. Decision making becomes increasing situational, responding to immediate demands. Major decisions are often made by those who have some temporary organizational identity but little ultimate organizational responsibility.

6. Expanding organizations have increased personnel but decreased means of social control over their "members." The activities of many volunteers are beyond the scope of personal observation, and the organization has minimal ability to define rights and responsibilities. Consequently, many individuals act in the name of the organization and commit resources to "irrelevant" tasks.

7. Expanding organizations have many workers but few managers. This perhaps seems paradoxical since, often in situations of high demands, the accusation is made that "everyone wants to manage and no one wants to work" or, more graphically, "all chiefs and no Indians." It is useful, initially, to make a distinction between three levels of responsibility and control within an organization -- the technical, managerial and institutional. The technical level deals with the actual performance of the organization. The second level, the managerial, mediates the actual performance and obtains the resources necessary to carry out the tasks. The organization, however, is also involved in a total community effort and the articulation of the organization, and the community is the responsibility of the institutional level of the organization. Cadre personnel in expanding organizations perform at all three levels in their pre-disaster responsibilities. In disaster operations, however, many of the cadre who normally have managerial duties are "moved" up into positions where their time and effort has to be spent on "institutional" duties. In other words, they become the major contact with personnel in other involved organizations and to the overall "community" effort. In addition, since many expanding organizations are parts of a larger national organizational network, these same personnel have to deal with relationships to these units. Too, since the disaster role of expanding organization is more vague, more time and energy has to be spent in articulating its efforts with others. Cadre personnel are

the only type of personnel who can do these jobs effectively. They have had pre-disaster experience with the organization, and they are more experienced in the anticipated operations. Their preoccupation at the institutional level leaves a gap at the managerial level and, as a consequence, many of the volunteer workers are ineffectively utilized in the accomplishment of tasks.

The next chapter explores the relationships of expanding organizations to each other and to the other organizations which become involved in disaster activities.

CHAPTER VI

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Organizations do not function in isolation during the emergency period after a disaster event. Other organizations are a part of the disaster environment as well as the tasks created by the event. The activity of any organization is embedded in an environment of other organizations as well as in the context of the community at large. The functioning of any organization, then, is dependent upon this larger context of other organizations.

Every organization has some degree of autonomy. When it is autonomous, it has few relations with other organizations. Autonomy is facilitated by isolation, both in the geographical and the social sense. But in addition to being somewhat autonomous, organizations are interdependent and various types of interaction may take place among them. Some of this interaction takes place by the interpenetration of groups by persons who hold simultaneous memberships in several organizations. Interaction among organizations also occurs through positions on the boundaries of organizations. Inherent in the responsibility of particular positions is continuing contact with personnel in other organizations. Interaction among organizations also takes place when there is mediation in the affairs of certain organizations by processes which are above and beyond each individual organization. Sometimes this may be expressed by regulatory agencies or, in the instance of a disaster event, when co-ordination among organizations becomes "necessary." A disaster event does reduce the autonomy of organizations since they no longer have the same control over their environment that they had previously.

Various forms of interaction among organizations can be observed. Two major modes are evidenced in disaster activity. One form is interaction through material objects and can be seen in the exchange of goods and services. This can often be observed through transportation patterns. The other form is interaction by means of symbols and is evidenced by the critical nature of the communication process during the emergency period.

The interdependency created among organizations by the disaster event can lead to co-operative action or to conflict. In actual situations, there are obviously mixtures of both. Co-operative relations among organizations are, of course, encouraged by the emergency consensus. With the development of this consensus, goals are often shared. Too, co-operative relations in the emergency period may be an extension of pre-disaster patterns of interorganizational relationships. If a set of organizations within a community have frequent interaction, it is likely that such relationships will become institutionalized. This is often evidenced by the development of boundary personnel and other forms of regularized interaction. If the relations among such organizations are highly specialized and their activities are clearly differentiated, this would result in symbiotic relationships which minimize conflict.

There are other conditions, however, which lead to conflict. Scarcity, either imagined or real, leads to conflict over resources. With an abundance of resources, organizational claims often are recognized with little conflict.

The uncertain status of resources also means that the expansion of organizations can create greater scarcity. The involvement of expanding organizations in disaster activities indicates that forms of institutionalized relations are absent, and these have to be developed as the organizations are involved in disaster tasks. The involvement of expanding organizations moreover creates the possibility that they will become engaged in largely identical actions and this leads to competition and conflict. Such conflict relations often point to the need for co-ordination. But even efforts to co-ordinate, particularly by domination or by an organization that lacks legitimacy, may intensify conflict. The disaster event itself, however, tends to solidify the community through the development of the emergency consensus and thus, to encourage co-operative relationships.

Specific Problems of Expanding Organizations

Expanding organizations seemingly have more difficulties in interorganizational relationships than do most other type organizations. Some of the reasons for this are suggested in the following observations.

1. Expanding organizations have less stable organization-sets than do established organizations. The concept of organization-set refers to the characteristic relationship an organization has to others. These relationships are evidenced by (1) the existence of boundary personnel who have continuing relationships with personnel in other organizations, (2) the flow of products and services from one organization to another, (3) the flow of information from one to another and (4) the flow of personnel from one to another. One of the organization-sets of most importance is the input-set since the organization must depend on it for resources, material, capital, legitimacy and legality.

Established organizations have generally built up a stable input-set on the basis of previous experience in community activities. The disaster event, of course, creates the possibility and, in some instances, the actuality of a reduction in the size of the input-set. Certain organizations which traditionally have been suppliers of resources may now be incapacitated. With resources problematic, the operation of an organization may be jeopardized. Expanding organizations, however, have a more unstable input-set. Since they have "never" operated in full capacity, the estimate of the resources needed may be incorrect and alternatives may not be immediately apparent. The major point is that established organizations, because of their day-to-day operation, build a more stable organization-set than do expanding organizations which have to anticipate their development.

2. Given the less stable organization-set, expanding organizations are more likely to engage in attempts to control resources. This leads to conflict with other organizations.

There are certain aspects of the behavior of organizations during the emergency period which can be seen as an attempt to control their resources. The disaster literature notes with some frequency certain repetitive conflict

situations. These center on the activities of organizational personnel attempting to control resources in the fluid situation in the emergency period. Two different illustrations will suffice here -- first, attempts to control scarce resources, and, second, attempts to control excess resources.

a. Control of scarce resources. One of the initial reactions by many organizational officials is the concern for the possible reduction in the capacities of the input-set for their organization. Initial attempts may be made to obtain information about the status of other organizations. Initial information may not be encouraging. The heavy demands made upon a particular organization, if it is in the input-set of many different community organizations, might quickly deplete its existing resources. In a variety of ways, then, the status of an input-set as a source of resources is likely to be initially problematic. One way to control this potential problem is for an organization to assert exclusive jurisdiction over particular segments of disaster activity. If "rights" are established, this allows an organization to legitimize its claim on resources necessary to accomplish these tasks.

This claiming process seems to be characteristic of expanding groups. These groups expand and, with expansion, one would anticipate the necessity of an increase in the size of their input-set. The disaster conditions, however, also create the possibility of a reduction in the existing input-set. In addition, the scope of activity of expanding groups does not have the support of tradition and experience within the community in the same way as the more established groups. In order, then, to gain a degree of control over potentially scarce resources, jurisdiction over certain aspects of the disaster activity is claimed. This claiming process, however, may conflict with the activities of other organizations involved in the same process. Several expanding organizations may expand in the same "direction" and claim jurisdiction over the same type of disaster activity. The following excerpts point to this happening.

A considerable amount of conflict was reported between the two organizations (Red Cross and Salvation Army), particularly in the Judsonia area where they initially shared headquarters in the same building. Red Cross officials complained that the Salvation Army was attempting to take over or duplicate normal Red Cross functions.¹

Both in Worcester and in the smaller towns there was some misunderstanding between Red Cross and civil defense authorities as to which organization properly had jurisdiction over relief measures. Local civil defense authorities and Red Cross authorities agreed that the Red Cross should assume responsibility for disaster relief . . . and a number of jurisdictional disputes developed among various agencies and persons engaged in relief and medical activities. In the smaller towns civil defense turned to removal of debris and repair of physical damage, leaving the problems of financial and social rehabilitation to the Red Cross.²

b. Control of excess resources. One recurrent theme in the disaster literature has been the spontaneous generosity of people which results in unsolicited aid. A deluge of supplies come into the disaster area and into organizations which are assumed to have some connection with disaster relief. Fritz and Mathewson, who have studied this problem, suggest that while precise quantitative data on such material convergence is not available, it is clear that such supplies: (1) normally arrive in volumes far in excess of the actual needs; (2) in large proportion, are comprised of unneeded and unstable materials; (3) require the services of large numbers of personnel and facilities which could be used for more essential tasks; (4) often cause conflict relations among relief agencies or among various segments of the population; (5) materially add to the problem of congestion in and near the disaster site and (6) in some cases, may be disruptive of the local economy.³

Attempts to exercise control over such resources, much of it unneeded, is extremely difficult. One of the major reasons, in the previous vocabulary, is that many groups often outside the community become a part of an input-set with the "knowledge or consent" of the organizations in the community. In some instances, offers are made in a context which makes it almost impossible to refuse. Organizations may feel refusal would alienate donor groups from providing other resources in the future. In other instances, they may be informed that certain resources are on the way but have no information as to how to divert them before they converge on the disaster area. They may become recipients because other organizations have refused the inputs. Since these questionable resources create such important consequences for organizations that must deal with them, conflict often emerges when one organization feels that the activities of other organizations have contributed to their problems. When this occurs, attempts are made to fix blame for the initiation of unneeded requests.

Efforts to control unneeded resources often involve conflict centering on the behavior of the mass media. Radio stations may receive calls from individuals asking where they should donate materials. Station personnel might inquire or "guess" where such materials should go and suggest a recipient organization over the air without the advice or consent of the organization. For example, a person may inquire where to donate blood and the radio station might suggest over the air that the Red Cross or local hospitals would be the appropriate place. Others hearing the direction may infer that blood is needed and that donors are needed at the Red Cross or the hospital. The recipient organization may be overwhelmed with donors who become indignant at the refusal of aid which they "know" is needed. The donors are aggravated by the time and effort they went through to "help." Faced with such indignation, many organizations use time and personnel to accept such aid even though this diverts attention away from more crucial and immediate tasks.

3. There are added operational difficulties since the organization-set of an expanding organization also expands. A further problem in the control of the input-set for an organization is the difficulty experienced in the potentially rapid increase in the size of this set and the problems which inhere in incorporating new and unfamiliar organizations into it. On the basis of past experience, organizations develop certain ways of relating to those organiza-

tions in their set. Certain boundary personnel may either formally or informally be designated as the focus of mediation between the organizations. The difficulties of incorporating new organizations into the set can be seen in the previous illustration of the mass media being confronted by new inputs. In any communication among organizations, it is a major problem to identify and place the person who is talking. The problem of identification is not solved by a name but the more critical determination of the person's position within the organization, the legitimacy of that position and organization, and the competence of the person who occupies that position. This problem is particularly complex in disaster activities since expanding organizations, by very definition, create new position and people with unknown (at least to other organizations) competence. This difficulty would seem to explain the observation, in disaster activity, that people tend to restrict communication to others within their own organization or to those in similar organizations, i.e., members of a fire department communicate with those in another fire department, hospital to hospital, etc. This would suggest that, since communication is basic to interorganizational relationships, the most effective and co-operative relationships develop among organizations that are similar in function and among those to whom knowledge of persons and positions is available prior to the disaster event. With such knowledge, messages can be understood and material exchanged between organizations in an atmosphere of trust based on experience and predicability. Major difficulties come, however, in relationships with expanding organizations which create new positions and utilize new personnel. With little previous experience in routine contacts with these organizations and with the difficulty inherent in assessing legitimacy and competence, there is a tendency to avoid communication which, in turn, hinders co-ordination.

4. Expanding organizations are involved in two different and somewhat contradictory sets of interorganizational relationships. Organizations typically have other organizations which act as a source of goals and values for them. For example, if an organization needs a particular product and another responds by providing the product, the first organization becomes the focus of reference. It sets the norms and values for the other. One might suggest that, for all organizations within a community which had experienced disaster impact, the community itself becomes the normative reference organization. The immediate goals of all organizations are derived from the goals of the total community in the emergency period. Since the total community is not organized in similar ways as other organizations, interorganizational relationships always have a degree of unclarity. This, in large part, accounts for the usual development of co-ordinating groups as a concrete entity to provide a greater degree of structure to the "total community." The personnel in such an emergent group cut across different organizations so that some collective definition of the needs of the community can be evolved. In many cases, of course, political and civil service personnel of the local governmental units provide the core of this salient community reference group.

A particular problem occurs when an organization has two different and divergent reference groups. This is often true of expanding organizations. Those organizations which are a part of a larger structure which extends beyond the local community are confronted with the possibility of conflict. The

larger organization, i.e., state or national, provide the goals and values for the local unit. In order to maintain close interorganizational relationships between these elements of the "same" organization, there is a constant flow of information between them, and there may be overlapping members. Local officials may also be members of the national organization.

With such close identification, the organization's pre and post-disaster operations come to be dependent upon the national organization for advice, information, and often material and personnel support. The goals of the national organization are accepted, and standardized procedures used by the national organization may also be binding. On the other hand, the unit at the local level has to take other organizations into account, and, as we suggested earlier, with the disaster event, the "total" community becomes the normative reference. This is complicated by the fact that, while the actions are directed toward the local community, the national organization may become increasingly important to the organization by its increased input of resources of materials and personnel. As an illustration, there seems to be a tendency, evidenced in much of the disaster literature, for segments of the local population to view the performance of the local Red Cross in a negative way. The accuracy of such judgments is not necessarily assumed here but such a recurrent judgment, even if false, requires some explanation. Part of the explanation is indicated by the kinds of complaints that arise. One point of misunderstanding is that the Red Cross is both a relief and a rehabilitation agency. These goals are defined by national organization and accepted by local units. The goal of disaster relief is consistent with the community definition of the goals to be sought in the impact, but the goals of rehabilitation often seem out of place. In part, this conflict is a matter of timing and is more acute if the Red Cross moves toward rehabilitation tasks when other community organizations which are still involved with immediate relief problems. Another point of contention is the degree of bureaucratic formality which characterizes Red Cross activity. Much of this formality is defined by national procedures so that expenditures can be justified and controlled. The reasons for these procedures often seem strangely out of place in the context of the more general informality which characterizes most post-impact activity within the community. The point to be made is that the local Red Cross chapter is caught between two conflicting demands -- following formal procedures "demanded" by the national organization and following sympathetic informality "demanded" by the local disaster context. The conflict is especially acute in expanding organizations since they are more likely to have this dual identification. Most other community organizations have their sole referent within the impact population.

5. Expanding organizations experience great difficulty when they attempt to co-ordinate disaster activity since they seldom possess organizational legitimacy. Organizations possess different degrees of legitimacy. Having legitimacy does not imply legal status but implies being accepted by the community as a valid institutional form for carrying out a course of action. When issues of jurisdiction, power and authority are raised in the course of relationships among organizations during their disaster-related activities, they are often resolved on the basis of the legitimacy of organizations. Since organizations have to establish their legitimacy, understanding how this

comes about assists in understanding its operation in the disaster context. If the objectives of an organization is congruent with the emergency consensus, this contributes to its legitimation. We have suggested several times previously that many organizations suspend operations if they cannot contribute in some way to the on-going disaster activity. Practically all organizations which are involved are seen as being consistent with the emergency consensus. Since problems of security and control are important, organizations such as the police have clear relevance. Since the need for medical care is probable, medical personnel and the operation of medical organizations are accepted. Since food, shelter and clothing are needed, organizations such as Salvation Army and Red Cross are considered legitimate if they perform these services.

An organization can also develop legitimacy by the character of its leadership. An organization whose leaders occupy positions of power and influence in other parts of the community have already validated their claim to leadership in other situations. With such involvements, leaders can make contacts with others in positions of power, and this contributes to the legitimation of the organization that he represents. This, of course, is one reason for overlapping memberships among organizations. The fact that a leader of an organization will serve in some capacity in another organization implies, in part, that he attributes legitimacy to it.

The importance of this concept of legitimacy is that relationships tend to develop between organizations that consider each other as being legitimate. Interorganizational contact previous to a disaster event, then, contributes to the legitimation of established organizations. While some legitimation may be attributed to the cadre of expanding groups, rapid expansion and new leadership reduces the legitimation which comes from stable leadership. Too, the lack of prior contact with other organizations in pre-disaster times casts doubts upon an organization's legitimacy in a disaster context.

The question of legitimacy is seen most clearly in the operation of civil defense in disaster activities. At least in the United States the operation of civil defense is seen to be most legitimate during wartime action, particularly when involving possible nuclear attacks. The appropriateness of its involvement and operation during a natural disaster is not clear. (Too, in terms of CD's own organizational goals, such involvement has low priority.) Given this definition within a community, there is a tendency for other organizations to exclude CD from their pre-disaster organizational-set or to see it only as a emergency source of materials.

Civil defense may, however, become involved in disaster by the actions of their full-time personnel who feel compelled to act. To "impose" the legitimacy of an organization on a community may lead to conflict or to ignoring even well-intended efforts. Civil defense also, on the local level, is unable to develop legitimacy by the quality of their leadership. Civil defense directors on the local level are often seen as persons with a job to do but whose job does not require qualities of imagination and leadership. This evaluation of civil defense leadership becomes critical if the local civil defense sees itself as being especially suited for the task of community co-ordination. Co-ordination is a task, however, which in many ways either validates or invalid-

ates the legitimacy of other organizations. Other organizations are extremely reluctant to allow an organization which has little legitimacy within the community and even less within a disaster context to act as the major determiner of their own functioning and legitimacy. As a consequence, actual co-ordination is often delayed, obscured and, as we have suggested earlier, only resolved by an emergent group within the community. While the civil defense director may be a part of this emergent group, he seldom plays a dominant role. The co-ordination, in fact, usually rests in such groups as the police whose legitimacy and competence is more accepted, or to political officials who constitute a source of legitimate authority over all community organizations. Similar difficulties arise when the Red Cross attempts to co-ordinate disaster activities. Both Red Cross and local civil defense tend to be viewed as "outside" organizations. Since they have extra-community ties, they are not seen as being firmly embedded in the community as are other "local" organizations. Co-ordination is a particularly delicate task since, of necessity, to allow one's organization to be co-ordinated means a loss of autonomy. Most organizations in the disaster context are willing to do this, but they are most willing when the "directive" comes from an organization which is fully embedded in the local tradition. The fit with local tradition seems more important than skills or access to important resources. This may be characteristic only of American communities, but the tradition of local responsibility seems so ingrained in disaster activities that even those organizations with an element of outside control are suspect. The disaster event becomes the "property" of the local community, and "outsiders" are not going to tell them how it should be "run."

FOOTNOTES: Chapter VI

1. E. S. Marks et al., "Human Reactions in Disaster Situations," Report No. 52 (unpublished report, National Opinion Research Center, The University of Chicago, 1954), p. 266.
2. Henry J. Bakst et al., The Worcester County Tornado -- A Medical Study of the Disaster (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1955), pp. 39-40.
3. Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1957), pp. 22-23.

CHAPTER VII

IMPLICATIONS FOR A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE

In these concluding pages, implications concerning the operations of expanding organizations will be projected in a more inclusive context of events which might occur in a nuclear catastrophe. The basic assumption made here is that the range of problems experienced by expanding organizations in a natural disaster are similar to those which would be encountered subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe. Where there are differences, they can be visualized primarily as one of degree. With the exception of the specific form of secondary threat, i.e. radiation and the probability that a wider area will be involved, a nuclear explosion would not create essentially different problems for community response.

It is assumed here that the delivery of a nuclear agent would come about by some type of military attack. Such attacks typically serve to activate and unify the civilian population in a collective effort to maintain community life, paralleling similar efforts observed after the impact of a disaster agent. There is no reason to doubt that the basic problem-solving units which would respond after a nuclear impact would be based in the local community. The burden of response would be assumed by existing organizations and by the expansion of others within the community. In general, then, the most appropriate assumption is that the pattern of response and involvement which would develop after a nuclear impact would not be radically different from that which is seen in response to disaster impact. Based on these assumptions, the following comments can be made about both the effectiveness and the problems of expanding organizations potential in a nuclear context.

First, it is important to underscore the fact that activity during the emergency period of a disaster is not hampered by the personal disorganization of members of organizations. Too, most organizations function effectively in the disaster context, if we measure effectiveness by the ability to accomplish tasks in a time of high demands. Expanding organizations accept many crucial tasks. They act as a community safety valve since their tasks are usually above and beyond those which are handled by the more traditional emergency organizations. The type of tasks expanding organizations accept are difficult to accomplish. Organizations which had continuous responsibility for these unique tasks would of necessity be oriented to future situations, not daily ones. Most other community organizations, however, deal with tasks which are both obvious and current. To develop an organizational form to meet "problems" which are probable in the future is difficult. To maintain skills of personnel when the opportunity to "practice" them is absent is difficult. To motivate members of an organization which seldom has the chance to act is difficult.

Given such difficulties, the expanding organization becomes a remarkable social invention. In a technological age we are conscious of technical advances -- new products and new machines. Social inventions, however, may be less frequent, but certainly they are less obvious. Obviousness is not the same as importance. To design flexible organizational forms to meet periodic but recurrent problems represents, just as technological advances do, man's

attempt to come to terms with his threatening environment. Such ingenuity, however, will be inadequate if the "design" is not based on understanding the situations to which such organizations must respond or if it is not based on an understanding of the organizational processes involved.

There is no doubt that in a community which must respond to emergency actions expanding organizations have greater difficulties in disaster operations than do the other established ones. It is useful to explore the reasons for this by examining certain problematic characteristics of expanding organizations, using those of established organizations as a base line. The implications of these comparisons for actual operations are, in most cases, obvious.

1. Expanding organizations have diffuse ambiguous disaster tasks while established organizations have limited, clearly-defined ones. As we have already indicated, expanding organizations have somewhat a "residual" role in disaster activities. They accept those tasks which are the responsibility of no other organization or those for which there is little precedent in the pre-disaster experience of the community. By contrast, most established organizations stick to tasks identical to or similar to their pre-disaster activities. There may be certain instances when they do become involved in new and unfamiliar tasks early in the emergency period but these are given up as soon as they become the "responsibility" of others in the community. Generally, these "excess" tasks come to be the focus of activity of expanding organizations.

There is no reason to suspect that this would be different in a nuclear catastrophe. Established organizations would restrict themselves to more familiar tasks and the overload tasks, perhaps greater and more diverse than in disaster conditions, would become the responsibility of expanding organizations. This would indicate that in these conditions an even greater burden of community responsibility would fall on these types of organizations.

2. Expanding organizations operate with personnel who vary in their motivation, previous organizational connection and degree of skill while established organizations are more likely to have regular, motivated personnel with skill and training appropriate for their disaster tasks. By expanding above and beyond the cadre, expanding organizations have to depend on volunteers. These volunteers come with diverse motives and skills but are not likely to have familiarity with organizational procedures. This means time must be given for some orientation to the "new" members at a time when their involvement in tasks may be urgently needed. The other alternative is that "orientation" is not provided and personnel immediately become involved in tasks. Either alternative has its social consequences -- the delay of high priority tasks or their inappropriate handling.

In addition there is the possibility that the circumstances created by the disaster event will prove a major barrier to mobilizing volunteers. Volunteers are less predictable since they have less organizational identification and therefore are more difficult to mobilize. This fact leads to the recruitment of "excess" personnel which increases the difficulty of their proper utilization. There is no reason to suspect that this would differ from in a nuclear catastrophe. In fact there is the possibility that greater segments of organ-

ized community life might be destroyed so that a greater dependence would be placed on organizations which could utilize volunteers and build a working structure to accomplish the tasks which now confront the community.

3. Expanding organizations have minimum experience as a work group while established organizations usually have member cohesiveness. Most organizations have both a formal and an informal structure. The formal structure depicts how the organization is supposed to operate while the informal structure more closely reflects the actual operation since it is based on relationships between persons, not positions. Expanding organizations usually have a formal structure based on pre-disaster planning which specify the duties and responsibilities of persons. The implementation of this, through actual operations, never comes to fruition. Consequently, the prior development of an informal structure is an impossibility. On the other hand, established organizations have both the definition of responsibilities from the formal structure plus the earlier experience of working together as persons. These previous interpersonal relationships usually create a degree of cohesiveness which sustains individuals in reacting to difficult disaster tasks. It is obvious that the chances of maintaining an intact work group would be even more difficult after a nuclear catastrophe.

4. Expanding organizations have emergency plans known only to part of their total "members" while those of established organizations are known to most of their members. The notion of plans here includes different levels of planning and preparation. At one level would be the detailed written plan describing accurately the operating conditions of the organization plus the specification of duties and responsibilities of various organizational personnel. Knowledge of such a plan would be wide-spread among organizational members since it had been periodically rehearsed. These rehearsals have provided sufficient learning so that actual implementation of such plans becomes automatic. This type of planning is descriptive of an "ideal." Much more likely would be various approximations. These approximations would include standardized emergency operational procedures, standard notification for mobilization, planning for the stockpiling and acquisition of resources, etc. The point made here is that in established organizations planning is much more likely to become actual practice. Such planning is much more likely to be known and understood by a greater percentage of the members of the organization than one would find in expanding organizations. In expanding organizations, the cadre may have similar knowledge and understanding of emergency procedures, but they represent only a small part of the total manpower in the actual operating organization. The same conditions would hold subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe.

5. Expanding organizations are less likely to be at the center of communication necessary for emergency operations than are established organizations. In part, this lack of centrality is a matter of the availability of communications facilities. Many established organizations, such as police and fire departments, have extensive communications facilities which are useful and used in emergency operations. (But these facilities are also used by the respective organizations in their own tasks, so the extra-communication loads increased by disaster demands sometimes decreases effectiveness internally.) The lack of availability of similar equipment and facilities for expanding organizations

often reduces the opportunity to monitor the environment and receive needed information.

In addition to the sheer physical aspects of communication, expanding organizations are considered peripheral, not central, to the overall effort and, therefore, tend to be excluded from the mainstream of shared information concerning the status of events in the community. There is no reason to suspect that this would change subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe. This peripheral nature of expanding organizations is also related to the next difference.

6. Expanding organizations have less legitimacy within the community than do established organizations. This is a point which has been made several times previously. Established organizations, primarily because of their pre-disaster operations, develop a firmer base within the community in the sense of being accepted as the proper mechanism for the accomplishment of tasks. This also means that in the more frequent emergencies, types of realistic co-operation do emerge which then can be carried over into more complex situations. If the major involvement of expanding organizations is only in widespread emergencies such as disaster or nuclear attack, their participation at that time does not have the benefit of earlier realistic experience at co-operative relationships. Integrating expanding organizations in the emergent pattern of interorganizations relations is made more difficult because the core organizations -- the established ones -- have greater community legitimacy. There is little reason to expect that the degree of legitimacy would change subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe since legitimacy is developed primarily of the basis of pre-impact activity.

7. Expanding organizations have less clear organizational boundaries than do established organizations. With expansion to cope with overload tasks, the boundaries of organizations and the meaning of organizational membership constantly changes. This means an organization often has little knowledge of who their members are and thus has little control over their activities. Segments of the "organization" may become involved in particular tasks without the advise and consent of organizational officials. By contrast, established organizations have more clearly delineated boundaries created by clearer membership ties and consequently have greater control over their members and their activities. These conditions would not change subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe. In fact, the greater need for expanding organizations in that context would increase the problems associated with this unclarity.

8. Expanding organizations have less clear lines of authority than do established organizations. This difference is not just a consequence of the fact that many established organizations have a semi-military model of authority relations. It is primarily a consequence of the rapid expansion of the organizational structure and the lack of knowledge of new personnel concerning the previous patterns of authority or the planned changes anticipated in expansion. This is also a result of the shifting of cadre personnel to new positions within the organization so that knowledge of their previous position and its authority is no longer relevant in the new situation. It is complicated by the fact that many of the cadre personnel become heavily involved in establishing and maintaining interorganizational relationships and consequently

have less time to devote to the task performance of the organization itself. By contrast, established organizations show a greater continuity to their pre-disaster patterns of authority. There is little reason to suggest that the lines of authority would be clearer subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe. A greater degree of expansion would probably be necessary, and this would have the anticipated consequence of greater diffusion of authority.

The comparison just made between expanding and established organizations are to a large extent inherent in the two differing forms of organization. The costs -- both in human and material resources -- are great to maintain an organization on a permanent basis for tasks which are only possible and, at best, periodic. This alternative is to improve expanding organizations so they can meet future and periodic tasks with greater effectiveness. Four areas of possible improvement are suggested here.

1. Since expanding organizations act as the safety valve in that they accept overload tasks in community-wide emergencies, they often become involved in the duplication of effort. While identical efforts perhaps cannot be avoided, particularly if some tasks are beyond the capabilities of any one organization, duplication can be minimized by giving greater clarity in an organization's task assignment prior to the crises event, whether it be a disaster event or a nuclear catastrophe. In other words, major responsibility for search and rescue, acting as an information center, feeding survivors, etc, should be assigned through previous planning. Duplication can also be minimized by the establishment of mechanisms for co-ordinating organizational activity early in the emergency period. Many tasks cannot be anticipated in pre-planning with precision. If there is social machinery to make "assignments" and to resolve jurisdictional problems based on a knowledge of the actual results of impact and an understanding of extant organizational capabilities, the accomplishment of the range of tasks is facilitated.

2. Expanding organizations become the major channels through which volunteers within the community have the opportunity to express their altruism. In large part, the effectiveness of the overall community response to disaster or nuclear impact depends on the proper utilization of these sources of manpower. More thought should be given to the proper utilization of the volunteer, including exploring potential sources as well as how to provide necessary "training" of these volunteers. It has been the observation of DRC, in a wide variety of situations, that the shortage of personnel is seldom problematic, but the proper utilization of personnel available is. Cadre members, in expanding organizations, become so preoccupied with immediate tasks and with interorganizational relationships that they cannot devote proper attention to the integration of volunteers. Certain cadre members should be assigned "full-time" responsibility to articulate these personnel sources into the functioning unit. Personnel needs can seldom be anticipated by plan but, if certain members with a knowledge of the functioning of the organization were allowed to concentrate on this in the early emergency period, a much better utilization of volunteers could be made.

3. Expanding organizations, of necessity, become deeply involved in the patterns of co-ordination which develop within the community. Since the

activities and the interrelationships among established organizations tend to follow their pre-crises patterns, the elements new to community co-ordination are the tasks and the personnel of those organizations which carry the overloads. Since these have less legitimacy within the community, this makes their participation more difficult. It is particularly difficult when one of the expanding organizations attempts to assume the responsibility of co-ordination itself. Greater attention should be given to the development of mechanisms and facilities for co-ordinating wide-spread emergencies. Established organizations are more autonomous and operate more independently, but the operations of expanding organizations depend upon co-ordinating with other community agencies.

4. Expanding organizations are often caught between two conflicting reference groups -- the other organizations within the community and units of the organization of the state and national levels. There are a number of ways in which this conflict can be resolved, but it seems from the observation of disaster activities that the local community emerges as most dominant. A disaster event in the local community becomes "our" disaster and "interference" from extra-community sources is resented. National units should evaluate whether the standards which they "impose" on the local community are actually essential. Perhaps in times of crises, certain traditional norms or standards should be relaxed. This happens in the local community and, perhaps, it should also on the national level. It would reduce another source of strain on already difficult conditions within the impacted community.

The involvement of expanding organizations in a community response to crises is most likely to occur in those events which are wide spread. It would follow that, in a nuclear catastrophe creating wide-spread impact, much of emergency activity would fall on expanding organizations. These cadre organizations provide the base of personnel and materials which become the heart of a functioning unit. From observations in the disaster context, the availability of volunteers to fill out the structure of the unit is not difficult, but their proper utilization in handling the overload tasks is more complex. Planning for expansion is useful to the extent that the planning properly identifies problems. The precise identification of problems which can be anticipated is difficult in a disaster impact and is even more complex in a potential nuclear attack. Since the value of these organizations is in their flexibility, it is perhaps necessary to build into the planning greater flexibility. It would be useful, for example, to institutionalize, in each expanding organization, cadre personnel who have no immediate task responsibilities except those of creating a functioning organization. In other words, to plan for positions in the organization in which the responsibility is defined only as observation and suggestion for operations. Perhaps one might draw on diplomacy for a parallel. In each expanding organization, at least one position of "roving" ambassador should be institutionalized. His concern should be internal relations, not interorganizational ones. He should be aloof from immediate duties but observing all. The genius of expanding organizations is their flexible form. While some might argue that flexibility is closely related to chaos, a "tight" organization is predicated on a stable environment. Neither disaster events nor nuclear catastrophes are likely to provide this stability. This being so, the alternative is to increase the organization's flexibility and hence its effectiveness.