

721

Forma 291-S. M.L.F.

THE MEXICAN LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED

(COMPAÑIA MEXICANA DE LUZ Y FUERZA MOTRIZ, S. A.)

DIRECCION TELEGRAFICA }
CABLE ADDRESS } "MELIPOCO"

2A. CALLE DE GANTE No. 20.

APARTADO POSTAL }
P. O. BOX } 124 B18.

MEXICO 1. D. F.

July 19, 1950

H. 5421

REC'D: 25/7/50						
H	VdM	Sm	Ch	VI	Lo	VJ
Nm	Ste			Le	Sec	deN
						Du

Kessersmilk

AIR MAIL

[Signature]

Dear Dannie:

In a letter which I wrote you yesterday I said I would write you some of my views on the developing international situation for such interest as such views may have for you. I have been hampered in certain correspondence at the house, as Mrs. Hall has gone on a holiday and will be away for five or six weeks in the United States.

Several months ago you were good enough to read the last remarks which I made before the Air War College at Maxwell Field, and you had previously read the remarks which I made there in 1948. I do not think that I need go into much detail as to my views on developments in the general picture, for I think from these two documents which you read and from our conversations you appreciate that I have not been surprised in any way at these developments in the general picture and specifically in Korea.

As I see it, the Soviet, which is very realistic, hard-headed and practical in some respects as to its thinking, particularly with respect to the best ways and the surest ways of achieving its objectives, had come to the point in its thinking and in its planning that it had to know how we would react in certain circumstances. They had gone so far in Europe, and more particularly in the Far East, that they had to know just how far they could go without our reacting strongly, and whether we would react at all. In the first place, their objective is world domination as definitely, and if possible even more so than it was the objective of the Nazi government. They want to reach their ends without general war and even without localized conflict if they can do it, and they do not want general war if they can reach their objective without it. In this respect, the thinking of the Soviet is exactly like that of the Nazis, except that the Soviet leaders are more realistic and less inclined to let events run away with them or to become too drunk with success, or underestimating the the forces which may be against them and which have to be overcome if their objective is to be gained.

D. N. Heineman, Esquire,
Hotel Kronenhof,
Pontresina - Engadine,
Graubunden, Switzerland.

The Soviet had made such progress in Europe and in the Far East that they just had to know, before going into further adventure, what they could do with safety. In the Far East it looked as though the Far East was practically ready to fall into their hands and the time had come, if circumstances permitted, to precipitate the situation. The fact that things were not going so well for them in Europe made it all the more necessary for them to see how far and fast they could go in the Far East. That they should choose Korea as the testing ground was quite natural.

The State Department and certain elements in Congress had made it very clear that we would not aid Formosa in case of attack against it by the Chinese Communists. The discussions in Congress with respect to Marshall Aid and the arms program had made it very clear that considerable sectors in Congress were opposed to any action, or adequate action, in protecting Formosa or in aid to certain Far Eastern countries. The Soviet too, we can be sure, had plenty of information concerning some of the thinking in the State Department with regard to the Far East, or certain aspects at least of the Far Eastern problems. It was natural, therefore, that the Soviet should seek what they considered was the least dangerous point and if we did not react, the effect in the Far East and in Europe would be tremendous, and particularly at the outset in the Far East. If they could have the North Korean government absorb South Korea, the effect in the Orient would have been tremendous and the Soviet would have felt itself safe in going ahead more actively in those areas.

Our reaction at home was so immediate, so definite and so strong that it has left the Soviet in no doubt. The United Nations, which in some respects was practically in its death agony, came to life over night. The reaction of both our government and of the United Nations was so definite and adequate that I believe it has gone further than any one other single step to avoid the danger of general war, which has been and always will be with us until Soviet power is destroyed. I shudder to think of what would have happened if the United States Government had not reacted in the way that it did. It would have been the real beginning of the end--that is, it would have been an invitation to developments through the initiative of Soviet Russia that could only have precipitated a general war. Now I think there is reason to believe that there is less danger of a general war because the Soviet, in my opinion, is not yet ready for a general war. It does not, I believe, even want widely spread conflict in localized areas in the Far East. This does not mean that I think the danger of general war is averted. It is just as much present as ever, and I repeat will be until Soviet power to make such general war is definitely destroyed. In some respects there is, of course, greater danger that general war may be precipitated as a result of conflict in Korea. Once such conflict is

started there is always the possibility of acts by either side which may precipitate the general conflict without either side wishing it. Once there is armed conflict in even a localized area such as Korea, where the major interests are really aligned, the major parties to a certain extent lose control of the situation, and irresponsible and unpremeditated acts may take place which may precipitate general conflict. I am inclined, however, to minimize for the present this danger, because I do not believe that Soviet Russia yet desires a general war, and certainly we and our friends will not precipitate it.

It is, of course, unfortunate that we should be meeting these reversals temporarily in Korea, because they do affect some people who do not think too much and do not take into account adequately all the factors. The Soviet took good care, before starting the North Koreans on this venture, to see that they were well advised, well prepared and well equipped. I do not know to what degree we knew what the Soviet plans were in Korea, but even if we had known, we could hardly have moved in sufficient men and material immediately we had such information, in order to adequately meet the North Korean attack. By so doing, we would have placed ourselves in a position which would have weakened the position of the United States and of the United Nations. The military events, therefore, in Korea were inevitable, for the Soviet had vastly superior forces on hand.

My own feeling is that the conflict will be localized in Korea and that it will be ended without general war, simply because the Soviet is now more sure than ever that it does not want general war now. Whatever will happen, however, is really in the hands of the gods, for no one can really tell what will happen and not even the Soviet itself.

You may have been somewhat shocked by the remarks which I made in some of the things of mine which you have read on preventive war. What we are now doing in Korea is really fighting a preventive war in order to avoid a general war. My own feeling has been always, as you know, that we should take the initiative while we could. In this case we are fighting a preventive war which has been provoked by Soviet initiative in a limited area.

The well-meant efforts of Nehru cannot be permitted to deviate the United States and the United Nations from the sound and safe course they are on. I have great respect for Nehru, but he is mixing up in his well-meant proposals an internal problem of his in a matter which has world-wide implications and consequences, and the problem is too big and too serious for the world to have it influenced by any localized, internal situation such as that in India. In the same way the probably equally well-meant efforts of the British cannot be supported, and I do not think the British will press them.

I would like to go into further analysis of the sit-

Mr. Heineman

- 4 -

uation, but I have wanted to send you these few lines without delay. I do not know how much interest these very roughly expressed views will have for you, but I have neither been surprised by what happened in Korea nor by the way we met it at home. So far as the support of our people at home of this decisive policy of our government is concerned, there is no doubt. The great majority of our people at home have been more forward, more courageous and more sound in their thinking than most of our people in the executive and legislative branches of our government. In any event, I think so far as one can be on the right path in this disordered and dangerous world in which anything can happen, we are on the right path.

Jimmy tells me that he knows the name of the hotel where you will be staying in Switzerland, so I am sending this letter directly there. I certainly wish Marion and I could be with you and Hettie there. I would just love to spend a month lying in the sun and not thinking and doing anything. I hope you will get a good rest. I know you will be thinking a lot and doing a lot, because you can't help it, but in any event, it will be a change of scene, and I do hope that you will take it as easily as it is possible for a dynamic person like you to take it easy. Some of us condemn ourselves to the kind of life we lead, but perhaps after all we are happier and healthier that way. In any event, we can't help it. I have spent few holidays in Switzerland, but the few that I did spend there while we were stationed in Antwerp were really delightful. I think I like everything about Switzerland except the Swiss, and there are a few exceptions which I make even to that. Give our best to Lida and Stephen. I am sure you have abandoned the premium for the pounds gained by Lida's baby, or even your resources will be strained! Tell Hettie that Marion and I have been very remiss in writing her, but I am sure you have been giving her the news of us which we have sent. Marion called at Jimmy's and June's house yesterday afternoon hoping to see June and the baby, but June was out and she will try again today. I think all is going well with Jimmy and June and I understand the baby is prospering.

With love and good wishes to you all,

Cordially and faithfully yours,

