WEAPONIZING GENDER: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 'GENDER IDEOLOGY' IN THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PLEBISCITE

by

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DEDICATION

A mi abuelita Leonor y mi amado Diego

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GLOSSARY

Anti-gender movement: collective action with a specific identity, ideology, meanings, knowledge, and sustained performances that contest elites, opponents, and authorities for their common purposes to control and discipline sexuality, gender, and minorities with forms of political homophobia for preserving traditional family and elites' political and moral orders.

Campaña en contra de la Ideología de Género[1] or Campaign against 'gender ideology' or anti-'gender ideology' campaign: an organized group of diverse anti-gender activists that mobilize ideas and thoughts through contentious action such as protests, sit-ins, meetings, digital groups on social media platforms to preserve 'human nature' and dispute social, sexual, reproductive, and minorities' rights.

Gender: social and performative construction that shapes subjective identities through which we explore and interpret social interactions, gendered order of power, and gendered expectations of actors and institutions in global politics (Runyan & Peterson, 2014). In campaigns against 'gender ideology,' gender is weaponized as an

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1 All translations of names, words, and phrases from Spanish to English and vice versa are mine.

'ideology' and an 'enemy' of the female and male difference and roles promoting unstable sexual orientations that can be modified across life (Catholic.Net, 2016).

'Gender Ideology' or 'Ideología de Género': terms that reject gender as a social construction and consider women's and LGBTI rights a threat to society's moral fabric. 'Gender ideology' ideas label 'gender' as a transnational political 'threat' through the erosion of any biological difference between male and female and the modification of women's gendered binary roles in society with their reproductive condition (Catholic.Net, 2016).

Gender ideologist: an individual who defends gender equality in social relations uses feminist language but is not considered feminist by anti-gender activists (Catholic.Net, 2016).

'Gender Ideology Messaging': Ideas and meanings from anti-gender movements against comprehensive sex education, recognition of diverse sexual orientations, gender identities, marriage equality, same-sex marriage, and same-sex child adoption spread massively through physical performances and digital actions such as mobilizations, protests, interventions in official institutions, social media platforms, virtual restricted groups, and media news stories.

'Gender ideology' narratives: discourse with a chronological storytelling structure that connects stories of events in a meaningful way while offering insights about the world and people's experiences. Narratives are constitutive structures of meaning (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2019). 'Gender ideology' narratives frame meanings about gender, sexuality, comprehensive sex education, gender identities, sexual orientations, women's and LGBTI rights as negative developments.

Heteronormativity: an ideology that assumes a binary construction of heterosexual difference, heterosexual union, and patriarchal families as given. This heteronormative ideology can be embedded in particular sociocultural, economic, and political relations (Runyan & Peterson, 2014).

Heterosexuality: Cultural, political, and a social phenomenon without specific borders that goes beyond the sexual preference of individuals (Rich 1980). Heterosexuality is also associated with "an economic and a political question about women's role to produce and reproduce the capitalist system in marital sex, maternity, and childcare" (Rich, 1980, p. 632).

Megachurch: a typically non-denominational Protestant church with more than 2,000 members and a "willingness to draw upon aspects of popular culture and modern consumerism as delivered by way of charismatic pastors and housed in familiar comfort-inducing settings" (Wade, 2016, as cited in Ferruccia & Nelson, 2019, 63).

Political homophobia: Form of a state strategy, social movement, and transnational phenomenon powerful enough that constructs experiences of sexual minorities and expressions of sexuality. Purposeful and often transnationally imported or borrowed by segments embedded in the scapegoating of an 'other' to build an authoritative notion of collective national identity and impede alternative collective identities (Bosia & Weiss, 2013).

Public Opinion: "action that legitimizes and rationalizes through public discussion the power distributed within society" (Vallespín, 2000; Habermas, 2005, as cited in Siad-Hung & Luquetta-Cediel, 2018, p.138).

Right-wing network or network against 'gender ideology' ideas: construction of local and national links between anti-gender activists, elite leaders, and campaigns against 'gender ideology' with local, regional, national, or transnational supporters from diverse fields of expertise, thinking, and cultural, religious, political, and economic backgrounds to contest public policies, the government, and authorities.

Women's and LGBTI Rights Activists: individuals that have historically advocated, organized, and fought for the protection, inclusion, and recognition of the different identities, roles, experiences, knowledge, and active participation of women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex communities as political actors in regional, national, and global politics.

ABSTRACT

The Colombian peace negotiations between President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC rebels between 2012 and 2016 were the first to mainstream gender in all areas of a peace agreement. Two months before the plebiscite elections, some Christian evangelical leaders and right-wing politicians portrayed gender as a 'dangerous ideology' that would introduce 'gender ideology' ideas against traditional family values into society. This research examines the role of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in shaping the national mainstream media coverage of the peace plebiscite elections. Methods included a set of 24 semi-structured interviews with key actors of the national political debate, an archival creation with materials from anti-gender activists and a right-wing Senator, and the content analysis of 301 randomly selected plebiscite news stories published online in the most popular Colombian newspapers, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*. Findings revealed that right-wing politicians, Christian evangelical pastors, and anti-gender activists identified the articulation of three main events as a political opportunity to dispute the inclusion of gender equality in education and the final peace agreement. These were the revision of the education manual '*Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación*' proposed by the Ministry of Education, the ECAS Survey of the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), and the 'No' vote campaign in the plebiscite.

The right-wing and religious actors reactivated a pre-existing right-wing national network that responded when they believe traditional social norms are threatened with the recognition and inclusion of women's and LGBTI rights in national politics. At the same time, this network was surprised by this political opportunity and found that disinformation was a powerful tool to mobilize people. Then, 'gender ideology' ideas took form in a national campaign that redefined political homophobia and anti-gender messages. This campaign took advantage of the lack of regulation from the National Electoral Council (CNE) to supervise the plebiscite campaigns on traditional media and digital media platforms. The right-wing leaders created a hybrid communication network with meanings about gender as a 'non-scientific topic' connecting followers through meetings and mobilizations in cultural spaces with 'private' groups on digital media networks.

Moreover, 'gender ideology' ideas were a blind spot in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*. Both newspapers supported the 'Yes' vote in the plebiscite but used confrontational coverage focused on elites' disputes against the final peace agreement. The main problem was that both newspapers lacked investigation on 'gender ideology' narratives and fake news. Therefore, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* reinforced disinformation in public opinion and became 'sounding boards' against gender equality. Consequently, this research offers insights into how the Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' was an organized counterforce to derail public initiatives for gender equality contesting the national consensus about the necessity of women and minorities for peace.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Colombia experienced one of Latin America's longest armed conflicts for more than 52 years. The 11th Colombian peace negotiations from 2012 to 2016 between President Juan Manuel Santos and the rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) were the first to mainstream gender in all areas of a peace agreement. The peace process had a gender subcommittee, and the final agreement has a gender chapter. The government recognized the relevance of equity of rights for men and women in their experiences at the peace negotiation table. In July 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved President Santos's proposal to hold a national peace plebiscite to ratify the final peace agreement on October 2. While the plebiscite elections attracted the international community's attention to end the armed conflict, elite right-wing leaders debated what they called the inclusion of 'gender ideology' in the education system and the transformation of traditional family values in the final agreement.

Therefore, this research examines the role of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in shaping the national mainstream media coverage of the 2016 peace plebiscite and how mainstream media plays a role in disseminating this campaign's agenda. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews in-person with key leaders of the plebiscite debate in Bogotá, Medellín, and Ibagué during Summer

2019. I also created an archive with PowerPoint presentations, questionnaires, and handwriting notes that I found during my interviews with a right-wing senator and anti-gender activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology.' Then, I conducted a content analysis of 301 randomly plebiscite news stories published in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* online between the plebiscite announcement on August 24 to the elections on October 2.

In Latin America, the term 'Ideología de Género' in Spanish is translated into English as 'gender ideology,' which is a narrative of transnational anti-gender movements that reject gender as a social construction and consider women's and LGBTI rights a threat to society's moral fabric. For consistency within the literature, this research understands 'Campañas en contra de la Ideología de Género' in Spanish to mean the same as 'campaigns against gender ideology' or 'anti-gender campaigns' in English (Arguedas Ramírez, 2020; Barrientos, 2020; Kóvats, 2015; Korolczuk, 2015; Oliveira Kalil, 2020; Patternote & Kuhar, 2018; Corrêa, 2018; Pető, 2015). 'Gender ideology' is associated with "the defense of the doctrinal principle that establishes sex differences as irrefutable truth. Gender conceptualization is seen as a danger for humanity, since it breaks the sacralization of sex differences, undermines women's mission within the family, and normalizes homosexuality" (Freire & Ferreira, 2020). The term gender is linked with "an ideological matrix of a set of abhorred ethical and social reforms" that provides an interpretative frame that connects actors with cultural, political, economic, and religious divergencies under the "frame of gender conspiracy" (Patternote & Kuhar, 2018, p. 11).

In August 2016, a right-wing network composed of politicians, such as former President Álvaro Uribe and former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez, Christian evangelical leaders from megachurches, and anti-gender activist groups across Colombia, included 'gender ideology' ideas in the 'No' vote campaign, organized national mobilizations, and penetrated plebiscite news stories in mainstream media. A set of 24 semi-structured interviews conducted in-person in Bogotá, Medellín, and Ibagué (Colombia) in Summer 2019 and collection of archives from anti-gender activists in the campaign against 'gender ideology' and Senator María Del Rosario Guerra from the right-wing political party Centro Democrático and supporter of the 'No' vote campaign, indicated that gender was considered a non-scientific topic before the plebiscite elections. Edgar Castaño, President of Colombian Evangelical Council (Consejo Evangélico Colombiano, CEDECOL) and leader of the church Iglesia Bautista Central (personal interview, June 26, 2019), explained that gender is "a populist term that has been transformed into an ideology with simple thoughts, decisions, analyses, and positions of people." The discussions against 'gender ideology' ideas concerning biological binarism of sex, the problematic social construction of gender in social interactions, the role of family, and recognizing diverse sexual orientations and gender identities jeopardize biological differences between women and men. Before the Colombia peace plebiscite elections, right-wing leaders weaponized gender as an ideology and declared it an 'enemy' of the difference between women and men. From this anti-gender perspective, gender can change sexual orientations across life (Catholic.Net, 2016).

According to a Colombian anonymous anti-gender activist and Catalina Moscoso, director of the non-governmental organization Ámalos (personal interview, July 19, 2019), 'gender ideology' ideas are tied to radical feminism and the LGBTI population's interests to impose their lifestyle and thoughts on homosexuality and gender identities on others. They claimed 'gender ideology' ideas create strategies worldwide based on a doctrinal platform that intersects sociopolitical interests from the state, political parties, influential international organizations, and minorities. For instance, Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos, OBED), Senator María del Rosario Guerra from the right-wing political party, Centro Democrático, Moscoso, and pastor Héctor Pardo from the megachurch, Tabernáculo de Fe (personal interviews, June 25 and July 18, 19, and 24, 2019; respectively) asserted that the inclusion of 'gender ideology' messaging in the education system and politics is a threat supported by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank.

In response to these globalized sociopolitical threats, anti-gender activists build campaigns against 'gender ideology,' which tend to be organized by supporters that usually come from upper-middle-class, right-wing political parties, and conservative groups. These activists share collective identities and ideals to coordinate mobilizations, events, and local, regional, national, and transnational groups. In doing so, they also construct local and national right-wing networks, which link them to international

networks against 'gender ideology' with social actors from diverse fields of expertise, religion, and political thinking.

My set of interviews, the archival creation, and the content analysis demonstrated that the right-wing network of opponents to the plebiscite identified a political opportunity structure in three main events before the plebiscite elections. The first event was the revision and redesign of the education manual[2] for teachers in public and private schools to include gender equality and prevent discrimination and bullying in Colombia, obeying the sentence T-478 ordered by the Constitutional Court in 2015. The second was the development of the 'Survey about Sexuality Behaviors and Attitudes in boys, girls, and teenagers' ('Encuesta sobre sexualidad en niños, niñas y adolescentes, ECAS) which targeted middle and high-school students by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE). The last event was the 'No' vote campaign against the final agreement between the government and the FARC. Also, this right-wing network detected that plebiscite campaigns on social media platforms lacked an effective government regulation and infrastructure for surveillance

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[2] According to Chaux, Vargas, Ibarra, and Miniski (2013) quoted in one of the presentations of the Ministry of Education of Colombia (See Appendix Figures B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 from the Ministry of Education Power Point Presentation about the revision of the Education Manual 2016), an education manual is a tool with the agreements of the school community that facilitates and guarantees harmony in the school life. This document defines the actions of the school community, and the resources and procedures to resolve conflicts, and establishes the consequences of breaking these agreements.

under the CNE Resolution 1733 to follow up the plebiscite coverage in traditional mainstream media two months before the elections.

Using their regional media contacts for outlets that are traditionally Catholic and right-wing political regions from Northern Colombia, anti-gender activists then started to spread fake images of the Ministry of Education's manual. They presented it as the 'original document' designed by three United Nations agencies, the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa, and the Ministry of Education. This explicit content labeled as 'pornographic' came from the Belgian book 'In bed with David and Jonathan' by Tom Bouden (Gil Hernández, 2020) and were disseminated to distract public opinion from the plebiscite discussion about emotional and affective issues. On August 10, 'gender ideology' messaging expanded across Colombia. The media reported the mobilization of parents, teachers, and prolife activist groups in 14 main Colombian cities with the support of right-wing politicians such as former President Álvaro Uribe and former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez, deputy Ángela Hernández, and three national megachurches, Iglesia Manantial de Vida Eterna, Iglesia Bautista, and Misión Paz a las Naciones, and Tabernáculo de Fe. My interviews and archival creation show that the 'gender ideology' messaging became a national campaign with a discrete but structured communication strategy using frames, meanings, and actions to dispute gender equality in the education manual and the gender perspective in the peace agreement.

Therefore, 'gender ideology' ideas took on the form of a national campaign with specific interpretations of gender as an 'internal enemy' to Colombian society with forms of 'political homophobia' (Bosia & Weiss, 2013), which structures experiences of sexual

minorities, perpetuate collective frames of gender and sexuality, and promote global homophobia (Bosia & Weiss, 2013). According to my findings from the collected archives and the content analysis of 301 plebiscite news stories published in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* two months before the elections, anti-gender leaders constructed a unified narrative based on Catholic and academic articles considering gender equality and diversity as 'perverted' terms that impose homosexualization and child indoctrination. The implementation of these 'gender ideology' narratives complemented what the right-wing elites assumed to be tripartite threats for constructing a peaceful society: the FARC impunity, the imposition of the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime,3 and the controversies around gender diversity. The plebiscite opposition stimulated potential voters to compare and mirror their current sociopolitical and economic contexts with Venezuela and Cuba's population conditions. Thus, fears and emotions were fundamental components of these meanings about their collective national identity and political representation.

The campaign against 'gender ideology' spread their messaging via a 'hybrid communication network' (Lim, 2018). This hybrid communication network combined anti-gender protests, mobilizations, and meetings in cultural spaces such as churches,

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3 Term constructed with Castro's last names, associated with Fidel Castro, former Cuban revolutionary leader, and Hugo Chávez, former President of Venezuela (Rodríguez, 2017). 'Castro-Chavismo' is a rhetorical invention of right-wing political sectors emphasizing the 'fateful future' for the left-wing political parties' votes and transformation of societies into communism (Serrano, 2017).

with restricted discussion groups on the most popular social media platform in Colombia, WhatsApp (Chevalier, 2020). The campaign against 'gender ideology' also used digital platforms due to their mistrust of Colombian traditional mainstream media's independence and autonomy. Pastors Eduardo Cañas and Edgar Castaño (personal interviews, July 4 and June 26, 2019; respectively) indicated Colombian media outlets are properties of corporate financial groups and that elite politicians restrict their freedom of expression and guarantees for impartial information production. Instead, the campaign against 'gender ideology' learned that social media spaces provided uncontrolled and unregulated free platforms to create specific groups and content based on their needs and goals.

According to pastor Cañas (personal interview, July 4, 2019), WhatsApp groups connected followers nationally and helped them share information against 'gender ideology' ideas and the peace agreement. 'Digital militias' (Dimenstein, 2019) supported this hybrid communication strategy in the circulation of meanings and frames about the protagonists and antagonists of the campaign against 'gender ideology.' These 'digital militias' targeted adult audiences and potential voters composed of middle-class and lower-class likely voters who could easily engage and forward this type of content within their social groups. This hybrid communication network combined the offline and online worlds to alter the factual public opinion debate to legitimize a disregard for a plural and inclusive society.

However, this hybrid communication network's content against 'gender ideology' also split pastors' ideals and thoughts around gender equality and the role of the LGBTI

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population in the revision of the Ministry of Education's manual and their final vote in the plebiscite. Pastor Diego Rodríguez from the church, Iglesia La Vida in Ibagué, located in the west of Colombia, explained he left the campaign against 'gender ideology' because of homophobic statements disseminated that altered his interest to protect parents' rights to educate their children and prevent the inclusion of 'gender ideology' ideas. This hybrid communication network of the campaign against 'gender ideology' openly bolstered and reinforced hostile attitudes and discrimination towards oppressed communities to benefit specific privileged sectors of right-wing groups. The Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' mobilized people to streets and social media platforms to undermine human rights protection, marginalize the experiences of minorities in the armed conflict, and limit their possibilities for self-representing in historical peacebuilding.

Despite the public and national mobilizations and disinformation strategies used on the most popular Colombian digital media platforms, 'gender ideology' ideas became the media blind spot in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*, the two highest read newspapers of the country. Both newspapers missed investigating the scope, expansion, and context of these gender issues. My content analysis revealed that 2.3% of the random sample of 301 plebiscite news stories referred to 'gender ideology' ideas. The most frequent sources of information were recognized right-wing leaders such as former President Uribe and former Attorney General Ordoñez, who have unlimited access to the media. Therefore, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* politicized the plebiscite elections with a confrontational coverage that made survivors, victims, minorities, women's, and LGBTI rights

organizations that worked historically for peace invisible. These popular newspapers openly supported the 'Yes' vote in the elections but overlooked the digital campaign's expansion against 'gender ideology.'

Consequently, this communication style and type of content overlapped the editorial interests of the newspapers. They destabilized journalism ethics and standards, which allowed elite politicians and opponents of the plebiscite to replicate fake news with a repetitive negative tone about peace and gender within public opinion. *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* showed their lack of knowledge and preparation for contextualizing gender issues and verifying disinformation regarding gender in education and the peace agreement.

The national network of the campaign against 'gender ideology' identified the confrontational coverage as another political opportunity and benefited from the government's lack of effective communication strategy to explain the prominence of gender equality in the education manual and the final agreement. Instead of demystifying fake news and providing empirical evidence, the government reinforced the circulation of the 'gender ideology' narratives using keywords and meanings from the campaign against 'gender ideology,' in what Minister Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) called "the same language of the enemy." *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* overlooked that the campaign against 'gender ideology' used them as 'sounding boards' for repeating the 'buzzwords,' such as homosexualization, child indoctrination, the family as the core of society, the imposition of the LGBTI community lifestyle to society, among others. As a

result, this campaign reaffirmed the mainstream newspapers' needed role as a confronter to a wave of disinformation combining actions from the offline and online worlds.

Beyond the 'momentum' of the right-wing opposition in the campaign against 'gender ideology,' the plebiscite context uncovered a national right-wing network of anti-gender activists intensely chasing political opportunities to defend their historically conservative agenda, elite privilege, protection of their private property, and perpetuation of gendered stereotypes and the traditional Christian constitution of the family by a man and a woman. The Colombian offline and online campaign against 'gender ideology' mirrored similar contentious action developed in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile during this decade. All these campaigns expanded their anti-gender messaging for gaining political validation and 'superiority' over alternative experiences, identities, behaviors, or performances that differ from their perspective and construction of social life.

The development of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in Colombia two months before the plebiscite elections reveals how a hybrid communication network with a persuasive public communication strategy mobilizing specific actors, audiences, emotions, and messages derailed public government initiatives in education and politics. This case shows that the campaign's growing power against 'gender ideology' became a transnational counterforce to the global consensus about the necessity of women's and minorities' participation, such as the LGBTI community for inclusion and recognition of gender equality in peace negotiations. The Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' is a global backlash against women and LGBTI rights promoted by elite right-

wing leaders that seek to preserve and strengthen their political leadership and power at the core of national politics.

Therefore, this research proposes methodological strategies to identify how the specific communication styles and journalists' selection of sources of information, frames, and tones uncover actions, methods, and hybrid communication networks of anti-gender campaigns in strategic political decision-making processes. Therefore, the Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' using its specific sociopolitical and cultural contexts interrupted public policies' development without depending on the media outlets' framing (Gamson, 2004, as cited in Tarrow, 2011).

Finally, with the victory of the 'No' vote in October 2016, the parties agreed to keep the gender perspective definition among the first pages of the agreement but deleted this term from the rest of the text. Additionally, the right-wing network has expanded its political representation and participation in national politics. In 2018, the coalition of pastors, which included Eduardo Cañas, Jhon Milton Rodríguez, and Héctor Pardo, participants of the peace agreement renegotiation, founded the right-wing political party Colombia Justa Libres. Now, Pastor Rodríguez is a senator and has worked closely with the Conservative political party and Centro Democrático. He has proposed to build a 'pro-life party legislator' with allies from other right-wing political parties in Congress. 'Gender ideology' messaging still stimulates fears through Colombian media news stories and social media platforms in discussions around abortion, diversity, parenting workshops, women's and LGBTI rights and their political participation.

The Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' evidenced a well-organized and structured right-wing network that weaponizes gender. These actions against peace undermined women's autonomy, stigmatized the LGBTI population's experiences and knowledge in armed conflicts, and interrupted equal access to fundamental rights such as education with equality and peace. Consequently, this case opens future discussions about the governmental regulation of digital campaigns, the use of personal data from social media platforms, and artificial intelligence to disseminate fake news and disinformation against gender, especially in the Global South. Future research needs to explore how these anti-gender transnational networks connect diverse audiences' sociopolitical interests from Latin America with Europe, Africa, and the United States.

This research is organized into six chapters. This first chapter explains step by step the research design, data, and methods to conduct the content analysis, the semi-structured interviews, the archival creation, and the use of quantitative and qualitative software to analyze results. The second chapter Literature Review includes the trajectories and central debates of the Latin American campaigns against 'gender ideology' as part of anti-gender movements with specific traditional and digital repertoires of collective action in contentious politics, networks, frames, and meanings disseminated, especially on social media platforms. This section also analyzes how the term 'gender ideology' involved political homophobia in achieving their political agenda while controlling and disciplining sexuality, gender, and minorities to preserve the traditional family and elites' moral and political order. The third chapter, The Build-Up of the Campaign Against 'Gender Ideology,' explores how 'gender ideology' ideas took

form into a campaign concentrated on identifying a political opportunity in the political context to dispute the gender perspective and equality. The fourth chapter, The Campaign Against 'Gender ideology' Prefers Social Media, explains the social media strategies that framed the digital campaign against 'gender ideology.' Moreover, this section explores how the government, women's, and LGBTI organizations lacked counterstrategies to face 'gender ideology' messaging in the final agreement and media news stories.

The fifth chapter, Media Blind Spots: How Newspapers, the Government, and the Women and LGBTI Organizations Overlooked the Digital Campaign Against 'Gender Ideology' and Enabled its Messages, illustrates how 'gender ideology' ideas were a blind spot for *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* in the randomly selected plebiscite news stories before the elections. The confrontation coverage and the type of communication style used in both newspapers created a strategic platform for the campaign against 'gender ideology' leaders to reject gender equality in the Ministry of Education's education manual and the final agreement. Finally, the Conclusion chapter illustrates how anti-gender activists are still searching for political opportunities to strengthen the right-wing elite power in Colombian politics with offline and online strategies. This section also suggests future topics of analysis regarding the governmental regulation of social media such as platforms of disinformation campaigns, international consulting firms' intervention in electoral campaigns, and the critical analysis of this anti-gender campaign's reception within diverse audiences by class, gender, and ethnicity.

In summary, this research calls the attention of politicians, scholars, practitioners, journalists, organizations, and civil society for the growing size and power of these

campaigns against 'gender ideology.' These anti-gender mobilizations include elite political forces to disrupt political processes and expose minorities to political exclusion, hate speech, vulnerability, and isolation that may provoke physical threats and global homophobia.

1.1 Research Design

The design of this research engages both quantitative and qualitative methods. I conducted content analysis, semi-structured interviews, and archival creation. Through the application of these multiple methods, I examined the following hypotheses:

H1) The campaign against 'gender ideology' played a significant role in the traditional mainstream media coverage of the peace plebiscite;

H2) The campaign against 'gender ideology' engaged the traditional mainstream media to influence the peace plebiscite outcome.

To test the first hypothesis, I conducted a content analysis on plebiscite news stories in the newspapers *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* online. Based on the theoretical frameworks of "Agenda-setting" and "Framing," this study combines sociological and psychological paradigms and is part of the Mass Communication Research tradition. To understand Agenda-setting, know that it starts with an 'agenda,' a set of issues that communicate in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time. Moreover, an agenda is a

broad set of political discussions viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting polity's attention (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). Therefore, Agenda-setting analyzes how the media and the production of news stories can influence audiences by choosing what stories to feature and how much prominence to give to particular events within these news reports (McCombs et al., 1997). The Agenda-setting process comprises the media agenda, the public agenda, and the interrelationships among these two elements (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). It means that any problem of social reality requires exposure and journalistic coverage in the media to be considered public issues.

According to Shah, McLeod, Gotlieb, and Jin Lee (2003), Agenda-setting has two levels. The first level analyzes the media's emphasis on topics; whereas, the second level explores the construction of news discourses based on two dimensions- affective attributes and cognitive attributes. Affective attributes are the positive or negative tones of the news story written by the journalist. Cognitive attributes are details of what includes the frame, such as the type of sources of information (if the source of information is institutional, extraofficial, confidential, or specialized). Hence, Agenda-setting can be considered a "political process that explains why information about specific issues is available to the public in a democracy, how public opinion is shaped, and why specific issues are addressed through policy actions. Other issues are not" (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 2). These effects of the Agenda-setting information within public opinion lie at the intersection of dominant political, cultural, religious, and social discourses of social reality through the media.

Moreover, news stories have frames that are attributes of Agenda-setting (Ghanem, 1997). In the media, framing is associated with selecting specific elements within a particular issue, such as the process of message and news text construction, a focus on journalists, and the related implications for audience understanding (Ghanem, 1997; Shah et al., 2003). Agenda-setting posits that the media tells the public what to think about, and framing deals with the media's issue, telling the people how to think about a subject. Therefore, Agenda-setting deals with selecting issues by news media and their impact on the public agenda. Framing deals with the selection of elements within a particular issue (Ghanem, 1997).

1.1.1 Content Analysis and Agenda-Setting

Based on this theoretical framework, I conducted a content analysis to test the first hypothesis. Clawson and Oxley (2017) explain that content analysis is one of the most common approaches used to assess public opinion and is one technique to analyze communication content. Content analysis "has been defined as a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (Clawson & Oxley, 2017, p. 39). Content analysis is a useful methodological tool to analyze the features and influence of mass media, such as online newspapers and television news, in electoral campaigns and elections across the world (Cushion et al., 2018). This technique also has provided an exploration of the influence of newspapers based on their features of private ownership, less state influence, ability to criticize the state for influencing the government and public agenda, and set agendas for

traditional and social media sources in the Global South (Adamkolo et al., 2019). The content analysis helps unveil relationships between traditional media outlets and popular social media, especially how social media platforms are more likely to influence newspapers' agendas in breaking news. In contrast, newspapers are more likely to organize social networks' agendas in ongoing discussions during non-breaking news debates, for instance, during the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017 (Su & Borah, 2019).

In this research, content analysis helps assess the peace plebiscite's media coverage between the announcement of this democratic mechanism and the 2016 elections. The content analysis was conducted in Spanish, Colombia's mother tongue, and the sampling entailed three main phases. First, I conducted an initial content analysis in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*, the political website La Silla Vacía, and the political investigative magazine Semana to identify a preliminary sample of relevant media coverage of the peace plebiscite between the announcement on August 24 and the elections on October 2, 2016. I collected 1,132 news stories concerning the peace plebiscite from these media outlets. I identified the news stories of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* with LexisNexis Academic. At the same time, I manually searched for La Silla Vacía and the magazine Semana news stories using filters for time (news stories published from August 24 to October 2, 2016) and the keyword 'Plebiscito por la Paz' (Peace Plebiscite) (See Appendix Table A.1.Sample of 1,132 Plebiscite News Stories).

In the second phase of the sample selection, I conducted a preliminary (quantitative) content analysis of these 1,132 plebiscite news stories to explore the

Agenda-setting construction. This step was done by considering the most frequently covered themes, the most frequently used words, and the information's positive and negative tone. The preliminary analysis intended to identify the subset of plebiscite news stories that were as comparable as possible. The collection of stories from *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*, as collected through LexisNexis, provided a reasonably comprehensive and balanced representation of plebiscite information. By contrast, my manual collection of news stories from La Silla Vacía and Semana websites provided less certainty and comprehensiveness regarding the entire continuum of relevant plebiscite news coverage and discourse.[4]

Finally, in the third phase, I worked exclusively with 588 plebiscite news stories from these mainstream newspapers: 426 plebiscite news stories from *El Espectador* and 162 news stories from *El Tiempo* from August 24 to October 2, 2016. I needed to ensure a comparable and manageable corpus of articles regarding their similar technical characteristics, such as type of media outlet, national circulation, and ownership features. To ensure that the content analysis was thorough, I focused on a random subsample of the 588 news stories. I specifically retained random subsets of 50% of the stories published within each news source, leading to a total combined subsample of 301 news stories: 217 from *El Espectador* and 84 from *El Tiempo*.

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[4] To this end, there was less certainty that these latter two news sources' online repositories provided the full population of relevant articles, which contrasts with *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* each of which had comprehensive archives of relevant stories on LexisNexis.

El Espectador and *El Tiempo* are the most widely read national Colombian daily newspapers. According to the Comscore report from September to October 2019, these traditional national newspapers are also the top news websites in Colombia (*La República,* 2019). *El Tiempo* is the newspaper with Colombia's largest online audience, with 9.2 million monthly readers, and *El Espectador* has 5.9 million monthly readers online (*La República*, 2019). Media outlets are economic enterprises with financial, political, and religious interests in their coverage and struggle with social media competition. *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* have traditionally framed news stories as reports, interviews, chronicles, analyses, and opinion columns. Since the 1990s, both newspapers have been properties of two of the most potent Colombian corporate financial groups: Santodomingo and Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo. They have had historical and significant economic relationships with elite Colombian politicians.

El Espectador is considered the oldest newspaper in Colombia. This newspaper was highly recognized for its liberal and independent ideas about world politics, morality, human rights, the national Constitution, and the law in the era of a conservative government in Colombia (Acosta et al., 2017). However, in the 80s' the newspaper suffered an economic decline and circulated once per week (Acosta et al., 2017). Since 1997, the Santodomingo group has been the major shareholder of the newspaper company, and the newspaper restarted a daily circulation in 2008. The history of El Tiempo is similar. Eduardo Santos bought a portion of El Tiempo shares. This media outlet became a journalist legacy across generations and property of president Juan Manuel Santos' family, the 11th peace process leader. In 2012, the Colombian billionaire

banker, Luis Carlos Sarmiento, bought a significant portion, 88%, of this printed newspaper's shares (*La Silla Vacía*, 2017). Although Santodomingo group and Sarmiento have not participated directly in Colombian politics, they have invested actively in presidential elections of key actors of the peace process: the presidential campaign of Uribe in 2002, his presidential reelection in 2006, and President Santos' reelection in 2014 (*Semana*, 2006; *La Silla Vacía*, 2014). Moreover, both powerful financial corporate groups openly supported the peace process and a final peace agreement with the FARC in 2016 (*Dinero*, 2016).

1.1.1.1 Analysis

The content analysis was concentrated on two main categories: construction of Agenda-setting and framing dimensions of the plebiscite information, as the following Table 1.1 shows:

Table 1.1. Categories of the Content Analysis

Sample	Categories	Description
	Construction of Agenda-Setting	Most frequent covered themes Scope plebiscite news stories
	Framing	Affective Attributes

Full set 301 News Stories *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* online		Positive/Negative sentiments Correlation Positive/Negative Sentiments Cognitive Attributes Sources of information

In the content analysis, I followed three steps. First, I used the qualitative software NVivo to organize the 301 news stories in 10 clusters for coherence. I classified the most frequent themes across both media sources, which were essential in that they allowed me to compare and recognize how each media source framed the plebiscite coverage. The 10 cluster themes were: political disputes against the peace agreement and the plebiscite; plebiscite elections as a historic vote; effects of the peace agreement and peace plebiscite; the FARC seeks forgiveness for armed conflict; organization of the peace plebiscite; Colombian voting intentions; economy effects after the plebiscite, transitional justice system; freedom of speech; and debates on the dismissal of former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez (See Appendix Table A.2. Cluster Themes of the 301 Plebiscite News stories).

Second, to explore the framing dimensions, I studied specific words to understand this information's scope through the software NVivo 12 Plus. I distinguished the 1,000 most frequently used words used across both printed media online using word clouds. To analyze the positive or negative sentiment or tone implicit in the plebiscite news stories written in Spanish, I needed a Spanish dictionary of positive and negative sentiments and

quantitative software for measuring sentiment valence. I updated the specialized dictionary ISOL (TIMM) in Spanish with the most frequent words found in the plebiscite news stories (See Appendix A.1.1. ISOL Specialized Dictionary and Table A.8. ISOL Dictionary Examples of Positive and Negative Words). This Spanish-language sentiment dictionary has more than 2,509 positive words, such as competent (competent), liberado (liberated), magnífico (magnificent), optimista (optimist), etc., and 5,626 negative words defined in its sentiment score dictionary such as borroso (blurred), condena (sentence), denigrar (denigrate), egoísmo (selfishness), interferir (interfere), etc. (See Appendix A.1.1. ISOL Dictionary: Examples of Positive and Negative Words). Then, I incorporated the ISOL dictionary and four groups of key terms such as homosexualization, LGBTI, family, gender perspective, among others; associated with the fake news of 'Castro-Chavismo,' FARC impunity, gender diversity, and 'gender ideology' ideas as the basis of my quantitative analysis of the plebiscite news stories with the software Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). Third, I measured each article's levels of positive or negative attention to 'Castro-Chavismo,' FARC impunity, gender diversity, and 'gender ideology.' This exercise provided a proportion-based score for each of these four fake news topics for all articles in my corpus.

Finally, I manually analyzed the type of sources known as cognitive attributes in the news stories. These sources can be persons, documents, or institutions that have privileged information on a specific topic (Armentia & Caminos, 2009). According to Pankov, Mihelj, and Bajt (2011), sources of information are powerful voices for shaping opinions and determining the public agenda and can be classified as institutional, private,

confidential, and specialized, corresponding with their specific knowledge of concrete topics to correctly interpret the circumstances of events; for instance, sociologists, economists, psychologists, philosophers, etc. Moreover, these sources can be non-institutional, such as spokesperson of information close to the government. These specific sources lack political and economic power, but they maintain social relations with elites and get information from them, like politicians, political assistants, activists from non-governmental organizations, journalists, etc. Finally, any media outlet can use documental sources and social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., where readers can find institutional information on the internet like official web pages, public documents online, etc.

1.2 Semi-Structured Interviews

To examine the second hypothesis of this research, I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews. Kevin Dunn (2016) defines semi-structured interviews as "a face-to-face verbal interchange in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another person or persons" (p. 149). Semi-structured interviews encouraged a more robust debate about how the campaign against 'gender ideology' framed the Colombian plebiscite coverage. These findings identified correlations, similarities, divergencies, transnational networks, meanings, and repertoires of collective actions against the accused inclusion of 'gender ideology' for peace. These interviews' findings also allowed me to examine these counterforces' transformation

against women's rights and the LGBTI population into an elite right-wing social movement.

My background as a journalist in Colombia in the local newspaper La Patria and the national newspaper El Tiempo in Manizales (Caldas) between 2007 and 2009 assisted the organization, structure, and development of my semi-structured interviews. Additionally, my former colleagues supported my search and helped me to update my database of contacts for this research. In 2018, I conducted preliminary conversations in Bogotá with experts, professionals, and a pastor who was also an activist in the campaign against 'gender ideology.'

Using the content analysis findings, literature reviews, and academic publications about the plebiscite and transnational movements, I identified the most prominent leaders of news stories, plebiscite campaign events, and discussions. In total, I found 24 diverse and influential primary sources composed of elite right-wing political senators, ministers, Christian evangelical leaders from megachurches, anti-gender activists, women's and LGBTI organizations, and editors of *El Espectador* and El Tiempo. All these selected interviewees were adults over 18 years old. Most importantly, they all take public stances on these issues.

Table 1.2. Interviewed Leaders of the Peace Plebiscite National Debate

Affiliation	Interviewee	Description
The 'No' Vote Campaign	María del Rosario Guerra	Senator, right-wing political party, Centro Democrático
	Juan Carlos Vélez	Coordinator, 'No' vote campaign in Centro Democrático
	Jhon Milton Rodriguez	Pastor and senator, right-wing political party, Colombia Justa Libre
The 'Yes' Vote Campaign	Gina Parody	Former Minister of Education
	Juan Fernando Cristo	Former Minister of Interior
	Roy Barreras	Senator, Partido de la U
	Armando Novoa	Judge, Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)
	Diego Rodríguez	Pastor, Iglesia La Vid (Ibagué)
Activists Campaign against 'gender ideology'	Anonymous activist	Anti-gender activist
	Catalina Moscoso	Director, non-governmental organization, Ámalos
	Lila Palacio de Martínez	Pastor and director, Red Internacional de Familia y Educación
Christian Evangelical Pastors	Edgar Patiño	Former President OBED private schools (Asociación de Colegios y Educadores Cristianos de Colombia)
	Edgar Castaño	Pastor and leader, Confederación Evangélica de Colombia (CEDECOL)
	Héctor Pardo	Pastor of the megachurch, Tabernáculo de la Fe
	Eduardo Cañas	Pastor of the megachurch, Manantial de Vida and co-president, right-wing political party Colombia Justa Libres
Catholic Church	Monsignor Pedro Mercado	Former secretary, Episcopal Catholic Conference in Bogotá
Non-governmental organization leaders	Wilson Castañeda	Director, non-governmental organization, Caribe Afirmativo
	Marcela Sánchez	Director, non-governmental organization, Colombia Diversa
	Fabián Hernández	Coordinator of Media Research, non-governmental organization Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE)
	Beatriz Quintero	Director, non-governmental organization, Red Nacional de Mujeres

	Olga Sánchez	Director, non-governmental organization, Casa de la Mujer
Journalists	Marisol Gómez	Former editor, El Tiempo
	Jhon Torres	Editor, El Tiempo
	Alfredo Molano Jimeno	Editor, Political Section *El Espectador*

Then, I conducted these semi-structured interviews in-person in Bogotá, Medellín, and Ibagué in Summer 2019, three of the main cities where the campaign against 'gender ideology' spread their offline and online activities that congregated key leaders, participants, and anti-gender activists. These semi-structured interviews followed the regulations established by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the University of Delaware. Following these interviewees' selection, I recruited them with a direct introduction and initiated a conversation via email, WhatsApp, and phone calls. I sent a formal recruitment letter, which explained why they were considered public and recognized information sources within public opinion. Therefore, they talked about a general/public theme such as gender ideology and plebiscite coverage in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*. I created a questionnaire in Spanish with a one-on-one semi-structured interview guide containing broad and flexible questions related to the relationship between 'gender ideology' ideas and the plebiscite campaigns, the government reactions to face these anti-gender and anti-peace ideas in the electoral campaigns, and organization of the 'No' vote campaign before elections, and also, the use of digital platforms to disseminate the campaign against 'gender ideology.' Moreover, the interview also asked

for *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo's* coverage of the plebiscite and their editorial position regarding the elections.

1.2.1 Analysis

I conducted these interviews in Spanish and then analyzed them in NVivo 12 Plus following four steps. First, I manually transcribed each of the interviews in Word. I removed 138 words from these Spanish texts, such as filler words, nouns, conjunctions, and prepositions in Spanish that were not meaningful for the analysis (See Appendix Table A.3.Stop Words in Spanish).

Second, I sorted the semi-structured interviews as cases in NVivo. Cases are the people I interviewed in my research. I automatically coded my cases by speaker name. Then, I created a project map to organize my analysis categories to explore and compare my interviews. This map allows me to explore the connections of my data (NVivo 12, 2021a).

Third, visualizing the connections between my findings, I constructed a codebook based on my categories of analysis Agenda-setting and 'Gender Ideology' ideas. I sorted the interviews' results by category, topic, and themes nodes, in which I collected references from my files about a specific idea from my interviews (NVivo 12, 2021b).

Table 1.3.Codebook Semi-Structured-Interviews

Categories	Description	Themes Nodes
Agenda-setting	Affective Attributes	The average tone in plebiscite news stories
		Correlation sentiments, 'Castro-Chavismo,' FARC impunity, gender diversity, and gender ideology
	Cognitive Attributes	Sources of information in plebiscite news stories
	Traditional Media Coverage	Traditional media in the campaign against 'gender ideology'
		Traditional media in the 'Yes' and 'No' vote campaigns
	Use of Social Media	Social media in the campaign against 'gender ideology'
		Social media in the 'Yes' and 'No' Vote campaigns
'Gender Ideology' Ideas	Coalitions	Catholic Church
		The opposition, private schools, and religious and right-wing coalitions
	Context Gender Ideology Campaign	Education Manual Ministry of Education (MEN)
		Protests on August 10, 2016
		Survey ECAS from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE)
	Implications	'Gender ideology' ideas in the plebiscite coverage
		'Gender' in the plebiscite coverage
	Organization	Organization and strategies of the 'Yes' and 'No' vote campaigns
	Reactions	Government, women's, and LGBTI organizations' reactions to facing the campaign against 'gender ideology'

Fourth, I coded the responses from each interview to each of the 17 questions from the questionnaire. Coding allowed me to gather references to specific questions and topics (NVivo 12, 2021c). An example of this can be seen in Table 1.4 as it shows the coding of the interview of Alfredo Molano, editor of *El Espectador*:

Table 1.4. Matrix of an Interview Coded

Interviewee	B: Correlation sentiments 'Castro-Chavismo,' FARC impunity, gender diversity, and gender ideology	C: Sources of information in plebiscite news stories	E: Traditional media in the Yes and No vote plebiscite campaigns
1: Alfredo Molano, editor *El Espectador*	AM: Muchas cosas las tratamos de contextualizar, porque el "Castrochavismo" en verdad no existe como una corriente política, es una invención de sectores de dicha que han tratado de calificar cualquier discurso que sea progresista o de izquierda, lo han tratado de enmarcar dentro de eso para darme una connotación negativa porque naturalmente que la situación de Venezuela más exactamente porque los Colombianos ni siquiera saben que pasa en Cuba, lo que trataba de hacerse es, utilizar la tragedia venezolana como un falso espejo de lo que le iba a pasar a Colombia, y yo creo que en parte se habrán hecho algunas …	pero si tratamos de hacer eso mucho, de hablar con expertos, creo que de cumplir una función de verdad de pedagogía del acuerdo, yo no me acuerdo exactamente qué fue lo que hicimos, pero si me acuerdo de que la línea siempre fue la de explicar los acuerdos.	tratamos fue de hacer un poco de pedagogía del acuerdo de paz, con la intención de que la gente pudiera tomar una decisión con la mayor cantidad posible de elementos que se derivaban del acuerdo de paz, del significado que tenían de las rectificaciones que tendrían y yo diría eso, como que el rol de verdad fue el de hacer pedagogía del acuerdo de paz, tratamos en lo más posible de hacer eso.

To make sense of my data, I ran a cluster analysis, searching for the most frequent words in the interviews, such as 'WhatsApp,' 'gender,' 'family,' and 'gender ideology.' The interviews searched were that of right-wing politicians, Christian evangelical leaders, the Catholic Church, and anti-gender activists to explore their interpretations, meanings, and narratives around their political goals (See Appendix Table A.2.Cluster Themes of 301 News Stories, Figure A.2. Most Frequent Words 100 Words Associated with 'Gender Ideology' and Figure A.3.Most Frequent Words Associated with Agenda-Setting). Finally, I designed a framework matrix that summarizes the complete interviews coded, which helped me revise, compare, and conclude my interviews' findings.

1.3   Archival Creation

During my visit to Colombia in 2019, I manually collected and organized a set of archives that I found during my interviews with a Senator and supporter of the 'No' vote campaign and activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology.' According to Mayrl and Wilson (2020), an archive is a methodological opportunity to understand the "geographical centers" of the social world in a single place to facilitate interactions and share knowledge. Archives also contributed to this study's triangulation and decreased the biases from any single method (Hales, 2010). These documents enhanced and clarified my research results. As the following Table 1.5 shows, I collected documents and digital archives as primary sources from activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology and senator María del Rosario Guerra, from the right-wing political party Centro Democrático and supporter of the 'No' vote campaign.

Christine Borgman, Andrea Scharnhorst, and Milena Golshan (2019) explain that digital data archives provide knowledge infrastructures as entities that facilitate data flow between parties, often over long periods. These digital archives have diverse missions and provide immediate access to replicate data sets for long-term preservation (Borgman et al., 2019). In this research, I digitally collected PowerPoint presentations, a questionnaire from the survey "Behaviors and Risk Factors Within Boys, Girls, and Teenagers From Schools" (Encuesta de Comportamientos y Factores de Riesgo en Niñas, Niños, y Adolescents Escolarizados, ECAS), and handwritten notes. These archives were organized and analyzed manually (See Appendix B. Materials about the Education Manual in the Plebiscite).

Table 1.5. Archives Associated with 'Gender Ideology' Ideas

Source of Information	Archive Description
DANE (National Administrative Department of Statistics)	PowerPoint presentation for revision of the education manual
	Ministry of Education questionnaire for schools' principals about the education manual
	Education manual '*Ambientes Escolares* Libres de Discriminación'
	ECAS Survey questionnaire Comportamiento y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad 2016
	A press statement about ECAS suspension in 2016

Red Internacional por la Familia y la Educación (International Network for Family and Education, RIFE)	Letter from CEDECOL requesting a meeting with President Santos against the final peace agreement.
	RIFE PowerPoint presentation against gender ideology
	RIFE statement to protest against abortion in Bogotá, in February 2019
Pastor Diego Rodriguez	An official statement from Pastor Diego Rodríguez to participate in the protests against 'gender ideology' ideas
Senator María del Rosario Guerra (Centro Democrático)	PowerPoint presentation against the peace plebiscite at the Congress
	Theoretical analysis inclusion of the gender perspective in the Colombian peace agreement (comparative table)
	Definitions of gender ideology from the Catholic website Catholic.Net
CNE	National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) Resolution 1733 with rules and standards for the 2016 peace plebiscite elections

My archives provided additional contextual information about the role of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in the media coverage before the elections, the build-up of this campaign, communication strategies, the official rules for the dissemination of information through the media, and overall, the transformation of 'gender ideology' ideas as a blind spot for social actors in the country. These documents were a significant source in my research, facilitating the triangulation of the collected information in the semi-structured interviews and the content analysis in the plebiscite news stories.

1.3.1 Analysis

To analyze my findings from the content analysis, the set of semi-structured interviews, and the archival creation, I followed three steps. First, I examined each of my source results and sorted them by the research categories of analyses. Using NVivo 12 Plus, I explored the content analysis data and my semi-structured interview findings separately. Simultaneously, I also sorted the physical and digital archives collected from Senator María del Rosario Guerra's office of the right-wing political party, Centro Democrático, and activists from the campaign against 'gender ideology' in PDF format by categories of analysis. Then, I wrote notes and summarized my findings by each source type (the content analysis, the semi-structured interviews, and the archival creation). Second, I conducted a comparative analysis of the data collected from the three sources to identify differences, similarities, discrepancies, and commonalities. I wrote notes of these connections between my three sources' results and linked them by each analysis category.

Moreover, I designed comparison diagrams in NVivo 12 Plus to interpret the connection between these ideas from the three different sources (See Appendix Figures A.4., A.5., and A.6., related to comparison diagrams of ideas and meanings about the campaign against 'gender ideology' between interviewees). Next, I summarized and interpreted these findings from the three sources to solve my research questions. As a result, this analysis provided me with insights to approach my research problem from different perspectives, including the voices of the major actors of the plebiscite debate, the plebiscite news stories, and the campaign's archives against 'gender ideology.'

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Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In political processes, the media is a major player that can redefine the role and experiences of women and minorities, such as the LGBTI population, during the construction of peace. The media can represent and interpret national political procedures and the collective action of elite actors, institutions, and campaigns that may protect or contest the inclusion of minorities, diversity, and equality. This chapter explores the trajectories and central debates around the media's role in promoting public dialogue and proposing political thoughts for peace. During the development of campaigns against 'gender ideology,' the media is a powerful institution preventing or ending up disseminating disinformation against gender. Media outlets have reported that the Latin American campaigns against 'gender ideology' are part of anti-gender movements with traditional and digital contentious action, networks, frames, and meanings meant to reproduce and permeate political contestations and peace decision-making processes in Latin America. Therefore, the media and campaigns against 'gender ideology' are contentious toward peacebuilding, gender equality, and social justice complexities for sustainable development.

Since the 90s, Latin American media outlets reported how elite politicians, religious groups, pro-life organizations, teachers, and parents protest against gender equality and gender studies. 'Gender ideology' narratives come from the Vatican as a

response to the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights in the United Nations' rights system and the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women (Case, 2019; Cornejo-Valle & Pichardo, 2017; Fassim, 2011; Patternote & Kuhar, 2018; Viveros Vigoya, 2017). Since the Vatican's response, 'gender ideology' ideas are considered a transnational threat to societies that define children's and teenager's identities based on cultural constructions rather than biological perspectives. These campaigns against 'gender ideology' globalize the family as the primary unit to be defended to maintain heterosexuality and moral values.

Anti-gender movements organize these campaigns for specific claim-making against gender equality through public performances, marches, demonstrations, meetings, and lobbying. Anti-gender activists are interested in challenging existing conditions of political systems, polarized public opinion, and identify political opportunities for elite actors to achieve their goals for social change. They construct unified narratives that provoke emotions with framings and meanings of gender. These campaigns against 'gender ideology' treat gender as a basic basket that can be adjusted to the contextual conditions of gender scholars and women's and LGBTI rights activists to invade political power (Corrêa et al., 2018). 'Gender ideology' as a term became a political category to block social and legal reforms that affect the LGBTI population and women's political representation (Garbagnoli, 2016). Moreover, 'gender ideology' messaging contests abortion, sexual orientation, gender identities, diversity, and comprehensive sex education

Influential public figures with access to elite networks, the media, official institutions, and cultural spaces impact the circulation of 'gender ideology' messaging. In Latin American campaigns, the key actors of this anti-gender collective action are right and left-wing leaders, Christian evangelical and Catholic representatives, and secular actors. The campaign against 'gender ideology' is an opportunity for these recognized actors to strengthen their national and transnational networks to operate against alternative notions of collective identities across Latin America. These networks' strategies include forms of political homophobia across campaigns to delegitimize rights, gender policies, and contest minorities' rights, and promote exclusion from national politics.

To achieve their goals, these campaigns against 'gender ideology' reinforce hybrid communication networks (Lim, 2018) between offline manifestations in schools, streets, and churches, with repertoires online on WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter against women and LGBTI rights (Corrêa et al., 2018). In Paraguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina, anti-gender activists organized and mobilized widespread protests such as #CMHNTM (Do not mess with my children, Con mis hijos no te metas) to prevent the inclusion of comprehensive sex education in the education system. The printed media also reported performances of these transnational campaigns in Uruguay, Colombia, and Costa Rica, where the campaigns supported life and family and disseminated information against feminism.

Consequently, the campaign against 'gender ideology' is a transnational network that takes advantage of inequalities and homophobia to consolidate the elite's power and

form a collective identity against women and minorities. Beyond the news stories of these campaigns' performances, the media is a powerful institution that should evaluate their role in disputing the anti-gender collective action, frames, and networks of these transnational movements that prevent peaceful societies' construction.

2.1   Media and Peace

The media coverage has the ability to suggest a dominant order of reality and represents tensions in political processes with specific, powerful actors, such as politicians, religious leaders, and secular actors. The media outlets also have the ability to generate a plurality of understandings and enable individuals to reinterpret their experiences, conceptions of society, and human nature in their dominant cultures (Curran & Gurevitch, 1996). The media's interactions between political processes and news are symbiotic in nature. Journalism functions not just as an extension of political power but also as a potentially disruptive influence on that power (Hall, 1978, as cited in Spencer, 2015). Consequently, media sources contribute to policy discussion and resolution, "not only in so far as they set public agendas or provide platforms for politicians to make their views known to the public but also in judging and critiquing the variety of political viewpoints in circulation" (McNair, 1995, as cited in Spencer, 2015, p.17).

In contentious politics, media outlets play an important role. First, the media can operate as an intermediary between politicians and the audience. Second, the technical news stories' production involves political legitimacy, articulation, mobilization, and conflict management (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995, as cited in Spencer, 2015). Therefore,

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news coverage reflects how media content can provide cues for constructing meanings, political events, and agreements' decision-making processes (Imtihani, 2014; Wolfsfeld, 2004). However, the media are recognized for making "an excellent tool for waging war but a poor one for bringing peace" (Wolfsfeld, 2018, p.110). Armed conflicts are considered public issues and peacebuilding can go on for years, and peace negotiations can occur behind closed doors (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

This media's role in peace processes "depends on the nature of the conflict, the media position or stance to a particular issue and the involvement of global actors in a conflict" (Saleem & Ahmad Hanan, 2014, p.181). As Wolfsfeld (2008) explains, it is essential to recognize the media's impact on any political process through its: 1) significant role in defining the political atmosphere in which the process takes place; 2) substantial influence on the nature of the debate about a peace process; 3) impact on antagonists' strategy and behavior; 4) ability to raise and lower the public standing and legitimacy of antagonists involved in the process and their positions. Although media outlets can stoke conflict, they also have the opportunity to emphasize the benefits that peace can bring by documenting the rise of groups' legitimacy or highlighting leaders working for peace and transforming the enemy's images (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

The media's representation of conflicts and their ability to identify the 'good' and 'bad' actors suggest that audiences exposed to media belong, re-establish shared conventions, and supply the illusion of being part of a struggle for change (Lowenstein-Barkai, 2020). These binary narratives of conflicts or political issues are significant for political interventions, policies, and force use because "the authorities have regular and

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almost automatic access to the news media as legitimate sources, while weaker antagonists must prove their newsworthiness, often through acts of disorder" (Wolfsfeld, 2018, p. 109). Therefore, more powerful actors are more likely to be covered as legitimate, while their less powerful opponents are more likely to be portrayed as deviants (Wolfsfeld, 2018, p. 109). The media is a major player that shapes the representation of the conflict and peace negotiations' reality.

The media enjoys a unique position among crucial players of peace negotiations based on six main features: 1) media is a source of information for all key players and the world outside; 2) the media can create channels for communication if these are absent; 3) any of the key players can manipulate media to achieve their objectives; 4) media as a watchdog may make a stakeholder accountable by criticizing and creating awareness; 5) media can act as a central pillar in the dynamics of the conflict resolution process, and any player can refer toward it, and 6) media can escalate or de-escalate conflict (Saleem & Hanan, 2014). The media can be an escalation agent that initiates tensions and sensationalizes events and false propaganda against opponents. On the other hand, a de-escalation agent that pursues conflicting parties, governments, and communities to resolve conflicts and shape public opinion (Saleem & Hanan, 2014). Additionally, "media can also work as a 'mirror' in a conflict when it is only concerned in transmitting fact to people without taking any position" (Saleem & Hanan, 2014, p. 181).

Indeed, peace and conflict are likely to grow with increasing media coverage (Haider, 2016; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This strong relationship between the quantity of media coverage given to an issue and the public's perceived salience can reinforce conflict-

supporting beliefs and serve practically to increase conflict: "by performing the opposite action. For instance, emphasizing the benefits of peace, raising the legitimacy of groups or leaders working for peace, and transforming images of the enemy, mass media can also play a central role in promoting peace" (Lowenstein-Barkai, 2020, p. 452). Although media can emphasize strategies that promote peace, information about adverse developments can capture audiences' attention far more than content on positive outcomes (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010). In summary, media provides information to explicitly or implicitly intervene in people's attitudes. There is a possibility to transform journalism into a tool for reconciliation or adverse reactions towards forgiveness and actors of conflicts (López-López et al., 2016).

Political processes such as the ideal to achieve peace involve a democratic challenge for the negotiated parties and society of armed conflict. All peace talks and deals are different depending on their own cultural, political, religious, and historical contexts (Loizides, 2016). Peace negotiations are impactful in any society because this process does more than a shift from war to peace (Hudson, 2010). Peacebuilding represents the transformation of intergroup interactions, forms of government, forms of economy, and a national constitution. Moreover, peace negotiations can establish a transitional government in the short term and executive authority in the long term, strengthen legislature, promote local governance and transparency, and also develop measures to combat corruption and participation in the form of elections, political parties, civil society, and media (Anderlini, 2007).

These negotiations imply substantive political commitments to provide social transformations during and after the sustainable peace processes. Peacebuilding can depolarize society and individuals (Jester et al., 2018) because this process "(re) humanized others, meaning (actors, victims, and survivors) establishing contact with the appointed enemy, engaging in positive, helping, cooperative relations. Thus, peacebuilding moves people not only into new actions, but also new speech and new thoughts" (Galtung, 2007, p. 29). This framing of a new way of thinking peace must include a debate about the complexities of gender equality and social justice for sustainable development (Porter, 2007). Gender informs how actors and survivors of the conflict can access power during conflict and peacebuilding processes because women, men, minorities, and children suffer the effects of war differently through traumas, loss, pain, and radical political insecurity (Porter, 2007). However, peace practices still reflect the absence of marginalized groups that should be taken into account froman intersectional perspective, considering that people can be members of more than one identity group (Jester et al., 2018). In addition, the state's intervention, private groups, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations with their political ideology can shape definitions and interpretations of gender in peace dialogues and establish initiatives for peacebuilding. Under these circumstances, media sources carry the fundamental work of representing and interpreting national political debates for sociopolitical campaigns protecting or contesting human rights, diversity, or equality. In the last decade, the mainstream media outlets have reported on how anti-gender movements develop and expand the campaign against 'gender ideology' endorsed by elite

actors, institutions, and transnational networks in Latin America. These campaigns are mainly focused on chasing political opportunities that provide anti-gender activists reasons against authorities.

2.2 A Political Opportunity

Since the 90s, Latin American mainstream media outlets have reported how elite politicians, religious groups, pro-life organizations, teachers, and parents protest against gender equality and gender studies that they believe disseminate 'gender ideology' ideas. 'Gender ideology' has been analyzed as a transnational phenomenon that articulates political and cultural horizons in each country (Korolczuk, 2015; Viveros Vigoya & Rodríguez, 2017), and a 'war on gender' (Kováts, 2015a) with mobilizations against 'genderization,' 'gender ideology,' or the 'gender lobby' (Korolczuk, 2015). This term is associated with 'anti-gender campaigns' in which their activists contest the called 'gender ideology' (Corrêa, Patternote & Kuhar, 2018; Patternote & Kuhar 2018; Pleyers, 2018, as cited in Freire & Ferreira, 2020). 'Gender ideology' statements reveal reactionary activism with a relationship between religious discourse, protests, and campaigns against social, sexual, and reproductive rights in a conservative agenda (Freire & Ferreira, 2020). These campaigns promote mobilizations on the defense of 'human nature' and have expanded to other diverse fields of gender and sexuality, such as politics, to discredit politicians' reputation and political processes for sexual education in schools (Viveros Vigoya & Rodríguez, 2017). Anti-gender movements oppose what they consider the dissemination of 'gender ideology' ideas. It became "the basis for social mobilization in

the streets, the political battle in Congress, judicial claims, and widespread discussion in the media" (Rousseau, 2020, p. 28). The collective action of anti-gender movements revolves around a shared cause (George & Leidner, 2019) at their base with protests, rebellions, riots, strikes, etc. This action becomes contentious when ordinary people confront opponents, elites, or authorities (Tarrow, 2011a).

According to Dough McAdams, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2004), social movements combine sustained campaigns of claim-making; public performances, including marches, demonstrations, creation of specialized associations, public meetings, statements, petitions, and lobbying; and repeated public displays of unity, numbers, and commitment by wearing specific colors, marching in disciplined ranks, displaying signs, etc. (McAdams et al., 2004). Anti-gender activists act in the name of any social movement considering new or 'unaccepted' claims and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities (Tarrow, 2011a). The collective action implicit in these anti-gender narratives and protests against 'gender ideology,' reproduction, sexual autonomy, and diversity goes beyond an interest for public representation or religious defense, and fights for the exercise of power and legitimacy for its actions (Freire & Ferreira, 2020). This collective action is the basis of the transnational anti-gender movement, and their activists demonstrate their claims through campaigns against 'gender ideology.'

The interest of governments to debate or include gender equality, improve education projects for comprehensive sexuality education, and gender perspective in their public policies creates a political opportunity for anti-gender movement supporters, coalitions of elite politicians, religious groups, pro-life activists, and opinion leaders for

shaping a campaign against 'gender ideology.' This organized group of diverse anti-gender activists stimulates a countermobilization against the prominent recognition and inclusion of gender in politics. Like any political opportunity, Latin American campaigns challenge the political system's existing conditions, increase the division between elites, and create an opportunity for others to achieve what they assume as a social change (Lim, 2018). In the anti-gender movement, elite politicians and religious leaders, like in any social movement, bring people together around cultural ideas and construct social networks and solid interactions for contention (Tarrow, 2011a).

Some scholars (Corrêa, 2018, as cited in Patternote & Kuhar, 2018) argue that 'gender ideology' actually started earlier in Latin America than in Europe, where a significant amount of research has been conducted about this issue (Kóvats, 2015, Patternote & Kuhar, 2018). However, mass demonstrations against gender appeared in the last years (Corrêa, 2017; Miskolci, 2018a; Viveros Vigoya & Rodríguez Rendon, 2017). Overall, 'gender ideology' statements are a functional political category implemented by different groups to block social and legal reforms that affect LGBTI communities (Garbagnoli, 2016). Some of these groups are religious and propose the restoration of social order centered on the traditional values surrounding family, women, and sexuality, which is a narrative that activates the mass rejection of women and LGBTI rights and public policy aimed at supporting them.

'Gender ideology' ideas have also been analyzed as a political-religious transnational movement to recover the Catholic Church's privilege in primary and secondary school (Arguedas Ramírez, 2020). 'Gender ideology' narratives come from

Catholic circles in the mid-1990s as a response to the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights in the United Nations rights system at the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women (Case, 2019; Cornejo-Valle & Pichardo, 2017; Fassim, 2011; Patternote & Kuhar, 2018; Viveros Vigoya, 2017). The Vatican promoted 'gender ideology' as a new rhetorical device to delegitimize feminist and LGBTI studies and their struggles while reaffirming that sexual norms transcend historical and political arrangements (Garbagnoli, 2016). Therefore, the notion of 'gender ideology' was a significant component of the Vatican's and its allies' counterstrategy.

At the beginning of 1998, the term 'gender ideology' was disseminated in a text written by the Peruvian bishop Óscar Alzamora Revoredo called 'La Ideología de Género: Sus peligros y alcance' (Gender Ideology: its perils and scope) (Corredor, 2019; Cornejo-Valle & Pichardo, 2017, as cited in Rousseau, 2020). Other scholars consider the article 'What does gender mean?' written by theologian Jutta Burggraf who is close to the Vatican, published in Costa Rica in 2001, as a piece in Spanish often quoted by opponents to 'gender ideology' (Viveros Vigoya, 2016). Later, in 2001, Pope John Paul II declared that "specific ideologies drive misleading concepts concerning sexuality and the woman's dignity and mission on gender." In 2003, the Pontifical Council for the family published its 'Lexicon: Ambiguous and Debatable Terms regarding Family Life and Ethical Questions,' a compendium of articles that clarifies issues concerning family and life" (Corredor, 2019, p. 616).

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Three popes -Pius XII, John Paul II, and Ratzinger (before becoming Benedict XVI) were engaged in these theological elaborations and indicated how 'gender' is central to the doctrinal reviews (Corredor, 2019). Since 2013, Pope Francis has continuously used decolonial positionality to attack the colonial nature of 'gender ideology,' including in the Encyclical Letter Amoris Laetitia (Corrêa, 2016). Pope Francis prefers the expression 'ideological colonization' when he refers to 'gender ideology' in several Vatican documents (Patternote & Kuhar, 2018) and its promoters, including governments, donors, multinational or supranational organizations, and non-governmental organizations from the United States and the European Union. Pope Francis combines warm receptivity to individuals with "continuing opposition to their rights" (Case, 2019, p.659).

This political-religious anti-gender movement in Latin American has strategically shaped a repertoire of collective action in campaigns against 'gender ideology.' The repertoire of collective action refers to a "set of various protest-related tools and actions such as, but not limited to, public meetings, pamphleteering, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, petition drives, boycotts, and strikes" (Tilly, 2010, as cited in Lim 2018, p. 113). A social movement engages effective social networks, cultural frames, meanings, and recognized opponents for confrontational forms of action. Therefore, the dissemination of the Latin American campaigns against 'gender ideology' suggests a coordinated collective effort, which unveils trust and cooperation among participants that share understandings and identities (McAdams et al., 2004). The construction of contention is based on collective action frames. Framing is associated with the

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"generalization of a grievance and defines the 'us' and 'them' in a movement's structure of conflict and alliances" (Tarrow, 2011a, p. 31). It is an interpretative schema that simplifies the world by encoding situations, events, experiences, and actions in a specific environment or context (Tarrow, 2011b).

Beyond texts, frames involve constructing a collective identity and costumes in the public arena, delimiting boundaries, and defining roles for campaigns' enemies and supporters. The anti-gender movement and the campaigns against 'gender ideology' have collective identities that define who they are and their borders (Tarrow, 2011a). These identities are the key to frame and legitimize actions based on anti-gender activists' culture, values, and goals. The campaign's followers would alienate the campaign's ideals, even when they have a different 'reading' of events constructed by their leaders (Tarrow, 2011b). With a defined provisional homogeneity in their identity and frames, these campaigns propose meanings for opening access to new actors' participation, achieving the alignment of followers within the movement proposals, and taking action (Tarrow, 2011b).

For these campaigns, the construction of meanings through emotions is one of their key components, which can escalate transnationally. According to Taylor (1995, as cited in Tarrow, 2011b), "emotions are the site for articulating the links between cultural ideas, structural inequality, and individual action." Anti-gender activists socialize specific ideologies and mobilize meanings for the term 'gender ideology' within their members to create or transform actors' identities or diffuse contention (Tarrow, 2011a; McAdam et al., 2004). In addition to the distribution of meanings against 'gender ideology,'

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movements are also recognized for creating a 'culture of emotions' (Tarrow, 2011b) that may help followers justify their acts. The transnational campaigns against 'gender ideology' has attracted the media's and public opinion's attention around fears and anxiety surrounding the inclusion of women's and LGBTI's rights in global politics, homosexualization, and the idea that fundamental rights may be threatened (Freire & Ferreira 2020; Corrêa et al., 2018; Miskolci, 2018a; Patternote & Kuhar, 2018; Serrano, 2017).

The campaign against 'gender ideology' is considered a global phenomenon since different countries question the universal human rights framework of politics based on their cultural exceptionalism (Peto et al., 2015). Elizabeth Corredor (2019) explains that 'gender ideology' statements as a rhetorical counterstrategy deny claims concerning the hierarchical construction of the raced, gendered, and heterosexual order; essentialize and delegitimize feminist and queer theories of gender, frustrate global and local gender mainstreaming efforts, and reaffirm heteropatriarchal conceptions of sex, gender, and sexuality. Anti-gender activists frame and spread these specific discourses in their local, national, and transnational networks.

2.2.1   Transnational Frames and Networks
Anti-gender activists in campaigns against 'gender ideology' share unified meanings, narratives, and emotions within their followers. They consider 'gender' as a basic basket that can be easily adjusted to each context condition and is a component of a totalitarian plan made by radical feminists, LGBTI rights activists, and gender scholars

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to invade political power (Corrêa et al., 2018). "Gender operates as a 'symbolic glue' that facilitates cooperation between actors despite their divergences" (Peto et al., 2015, as cited in Corrêa et al., 2018, p.5), presenting an empty and adaptable signifier encompassing a broad range of demands such as the right to abortion, sexual orientation, gender identity, education in gender and sexuality, HIV prevention, and sex work (Corrêa et al., 2018).

This collective action varies amongst countries concerning cultural contexts, networks, resources, and mobilization tools, depending on specific regimes, political actors, and political opportunity structures (McAdams et al., 2004). Context matters to understand anti-gender ideology manifestations because of policy implications within specific national contexts that circulate transnationally (Corredor, 2019; Corrêa, 2016). The effects of these campaigns are different in geographical and cultural areas where gender and feminist movements have a strong history of consolidation, rather than places that barely participate in this political and academic discussion (Serrano, 2017). For instance, the first campaign against 'gender ideology' was in Paraguay in 2011, Ecuador followed in 2013, but anti-gender movements have been active in other countries since 2014 (Corrêa et al., 2018) that are predominantly Catholic states facing progressive developments to women and LGBTI rights in Latin America and Europe (Antića & Radačić, 2020). These mobilizations against 'gender ideology' did not present the same intensity, although they happened everywhere in the Catholic world due to the current position of the Church and the Church's historic role in each country (Patternote & Kuhar, 2018).

The anti-gender movements' cooperation is based on networks, understood as central organizational forms and core organizations that enable identity expression and navigate complex and changing political landscapes (Castells, 2000, as cited in Bennett & Segerber, 2012). 'Traditional' networks are face-to-face groups, social networks, and connective structures to interests, production of collective action frames, and supportive identities that sustain contention against opponents (Tarrow, 2011a). In these networks, movement entrepreneurs have a prominent role in stimulating mobilization consensus. They are leaders who "create a social movement when they identify the feeling of solidarity and identity" (Tarrow, 2011a, p. 11). The campaigns against 'gender ideology' have visible and recognized leaders from politics, religion, and non-governmental organizations that frame action and intersect their goals, aspirations, beliefs, and values with the target population's inherited culture. These influential public figures have full access to creating robust networks, control the government, participate in the media, official institutions, and cultural rituals.

The campaigns against 'gender ideology' create networks with both conservative Catholics and the emergent voices of Evangelicals due to the increased role of dogmatic Evangelism, which has grown since 2016 in Brazil and Colombia (Corrêa, 2016). The Catholic Church has developed anti-gender discourses and anti-gender formations around anti-abortion structures. Evangelical groups from the United States have an influential role in international missions and training workshops for pastors and send funds (Corrales, 2020), suggesting the formation of transnational evangelical activism (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p. 4). Catholic, Christian evangelical, and Adventists created alliances

with whom they agree with in their need to fight 'gender ideology' ideas, organize

massive protests, postpone the protection of the LGBTI population, modify the term

'gender' to 'women' in Ley Orgánica Integral para Prevenir y Erradicar la Violencia de

Género contra las Mujeres (Comprehensive Organic Law to prevent and eradicate gender

violence against women), and the language and curriculum of new masculinities and

women in their diversity (Case, 2019).

Nevertheless, anti-gender movements and their campaigns are not exclusively

religious and have secular actors with profiles that differ across countries. Anti-gender

activists hire consulting firms inside and outside the country and recruit teenagers through

scholarships to shape their communication strategies (Viteri & Marmol, 2020). In Brazil,

secular actors "include politicians playing electoral games, extreme-right actors, center-

liberals articulating anti-state arguments alongside anti-gender arguments, middle-class

activists longing for social order and transnationally connected Jewish right-wing

activists (Corrêa et al., 2018, p. 4). Campaigns against 'gender ideology' reveal a

political-cultural alliance of Catholic neo-integralism[5] and neo-Pentecostal

fundamentalism[6] to fight theories and activisms that refute the understanding of gender,

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[5] Resurgence of a social movement linked to the Catholic religion groups of Spain, which claimed the central place of Catholic traditions in community of faith practices, institutional and social life (Arguedas Ramírez, 2020).

[6] According to Javier Corrales (2020), it is difficult to find a perfect definition of Evangelicals and Pentecostals versus mainline protestants. In Latin America, people use

sexuality, and reproduction from the Catholic doctrine as part of the ultraconservative rhetoric (Corrales, 2020).

In Latin America, 'gender ideology' debates are shared by right and left-wing groups and political parties and religious groups against gender equality (Dubslaff, 2015; Kováts, 2015b). For instance, left-wing former president Rafael Correa from Ecuador was one of the first to attack 'gender ideology' in 2013 when he denounced it as an instrument aimed at destroying the family in one of his weekly TV programs. The left-wing Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the general elections with the support of a political coalition involving the Evangelical party Encuentro Social that opposes the inclusion of 'gender ideology' in Mexico (Patternote & Kuhar, 2018). Other cases evidence the competition of the anti-gender movement with campaigns against the media and authorities. Between 2015 and 2016, Chile had an intense anti-gender ideology campaign against what activists assumed was the imposition of 'gender ideology' ideas in the school system. During her left-wing presidential period, Michelle Bachelet proposed a law provision to strike down the prohibition of abortion established during the Pinochet era (Barrientos Delgado, 2020; Corrêa, 2016). The problem is that these

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the term 'Evangelical' and/or 'Pentecostal' to describe all protestants. Evangelicals and Pentecostals are Christians take very literal meaning of selective passages in the Bible, conversions and missionary work, and take a "hard-line posture on issues of sexuality and family affairs" (Corrales, 2020, p. 213).

manifestations against what anti-gender activists called the inclusion of 'gender ideology'

are forms of political homophobia to contest minorities' rights.

2.2.2 Homophobia as a Political Force

The hatred and hostility manifestations of campaigns against 'gender ideology'

are forms of 'political homophobia' in global politics. Political homophobia debates

"sexuality as an object to be governed when specifying how sexuality is constituted

(through knowledge, norms, and institutions, and subjectivities) as itself a procedure or

modus operandi of governance" (Blasius, 2013, p. 224). Homophobia becomes a

powerful political 'force' to delegitimize rights, police gender and sexuality, and

authorities' threats to discipline individuals' bodies (Bosia & Weiss, 2013; Lind, 2013;

Weis, 2013). Consequently, political homophobia is "a state strategy, social movement,

and transnational phenomenon powerful enough to structure the experiences of sexual

minorities and expressions of sexuality" (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p. 2). The expansion of

the anti-gender movement and its massive campaigns unveil the globalization of

homophobia, activating people and perpetuating frames about gender and sexuality.

Political homophobia deconstructs identity construction and becomes a modular part of

the process of state and national self-definition and legitimation (Bosia & Weiss, 2013).

Elites are interested in creating a temporal 'we' and frame minorities as outsiders for a

collective identity, political traditions, and practices among these anti-gender movements.

While anti-gender activists tend to avoid acknowledging any frame of their

mobilization as being founded on homophobic actions (Weiss, 2013), homophobia is used

with transnational political purposes, even when this pattern does not reflect local or national sexual minorities and their cultural dynamics of socialization (Bosia & Weiss, 2013). State actors participate in these transnational networks with their political frameworks to debate the positionality of 'the other' based on the construction of collective identity, static religious values, and traditional attitudes about sexuality, as a product of transnational influences, alliances, and colonialism legacy (Bosia & Weiss, 2013). Their goal is to contest diverse and alternative notions of collective national identities and mobilize and empower actors around what they frame as contentious issues. The problem with these politically charged homophobic actions is that their leadership enforces a dogmatic heteronormativity to fear "a new category in the complex categories of gender and sexuality, as a natural part of state making an interstate intervention" (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p. 3). Therefore, political homophobia is a powerful strategy beyond partisan perspectives because "homosexuality and gender identity have become terrains of dispute for broader struggles concerning national sovereignty, westernization, and cultural modernity" (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p. 129). As a result, this political homophobia "incites a Western sexual binary" to reactive organizing among sexual minorities, targeting sexuality with politics of exclusion and violent intolerance (Bosia & Weiss, 2013) beyond traditional, temporal, and spatial borders.

2.2.3 A Hybrid Offline/Online Movement

An example of how spatial borders have been expanded is seen in the anti-gender movement's ability to grow its narratives, collective action, and networks to the online

world.). In these campaigns, "gender ideology activists and political actors make strategic use of mass and social media to attract popular support to their cause by spreading fear and anxiety" (Miskolci, 2018a, p. 47). Communication processes are essential components in campaigns against 'gender ideology' with actors from different political or religious affiliations, who share a common ground to collaborate against women's and LGBTI rights (Corrêa et al., 2018). Communication strategies are vital to connecting their supporters, activists, and organizations beyond physical borders. Hence, social media plays a meaningful role as platforms in the configuration against sexual and reproductive rights as "a moral crusade" (Miskolci, 2018b, p.11). The campaigns against 'gender ideology' use social media networks to disseminate slogans and strong images that allow individual access and transform political discussions into moral issues, trans ferring forms of behavioral surveillance, etc. (Miskolci, 2018b).

In Latin America, gender mobilizations have escalated from a local to a national and regional scale through local debates on laws and legal policies associated with gender violence, abortion, marriage, adoption by the same sex, etc. (Martínez, 2018). There is a digital movement building with entrance into digital activism or 'cyberactivism' (Sorj, 2016). In the digital sphere, individuals and organizations can meet, including their differentials of initiative, power, values, and interests (Martínez, 2018). Cyberactivism unites the online and offline worlds and representation and direct participation of individuals and groups (Sorj, 2016). Latin American campaigns against 'gender ideology' are skilled in using social media networks as powerful, fast, and cheap international instruments to produce and effectively disseminate messages (Corrêa, 2018).

According to Tarrow (2011b), social media's conditions to spread updated information of contentious politics have even changed physical or traditional performances' effectiveness of protests, public squares manifestations, mobilizations, etc. Online communication within movement networks can allow distant mobilization or offer repressive regimes to suppress protests closing internet access (Tarrow, 2011b). Although a smaller number of digital activists can create a substantial impact through "the efficiencies of technology" (George & Leidner, 2019, p. 5), digital movement building is also an opportunity for marginalized communities that lacked a voice in the public opinion and national political debates in comparison to traditional activism. Although marginalized communities may benefit from having access to a platform where they are allowed to have a voice, these digital movements are also opened to individuals with opposing causes, such as the campaign against 'gender ideology,' which does not always protect these women, minorities, or human rights.

This digital movement creates a 'moral platform' as a mobilization strategy to polarize feminist and LGBTI movements, religious actors, and supporters (Miskolci, 2018). Like in the traditional social movements, emotions provide a meaning for participants to organize themselves. These digital movements create an emotional connection to an issue that transforms individuals into activists. Their participation and emotions connect to others who share not necessarily the same goals but their ideas or feelings across time (George & Leidner, 2019; Selander & Jarvenpaa, 2016). However, it is essential to consider that "digital media are neither a revolutionary driver nor a cause of the protests" (Lim, 2018, p. 103). Digital platforms provide information to followers

about their political, economic, or social contexts' conditions. Thus, digital movements produce virtual networks with diverse communities united by persuasive reasons or ideas that bridge them with others that may feel similarly about a common problem. Digital interactions like texts, tweets, social networks, sharing or posting YouTube videos involve personalization and digital connections (Bennet & Segerber, 2012). The campaigns against 'gender ideology' circulate, especially on social media, to attract the most attention and the highest number of followers. These messages are sensationalistic and based on common sense while connecting and creating conservative activist networks, in which the main actors and leaders belong to right-wing political interest groups (Miskolci, 2018).

The goal of these authorities' networks and alliances with similar organizations in social media platforms are to defend their values. Anti-gender activists achieve their objectives with digital action repertoires in which supporters engage over multiple issues across organizational boundaries (Bennet & Segerber, 2012). Internet platforms offer the construction of a temporal or permanent collective identity to create connectedness and a relation of trust among social actors in any movement. According to Gerbaudo and Treré (2015, p. 866, as cited in Barbosa & Milán, 2020), "chat apps and social media are today the key site where protest identities are created, channeled, and contested." Nowadays, digital movements have social platforms with diverse options such as 'likes,' 'share,' and 'voicing' with impersonal engagement and interaction. Nevertheless, social media is "structured in a way that does not favor debate based on argumentation"; instead, simplification and polarization are predominating (Sorj, 2016). Anti-gender ideas are

proliferating online and offline, which allow citizens to create various communicative spheres: private, public, private-public by dis/connecting, "embracing the interplay of being connected and disconnected. This notion of dis/connecting is an ability to perform politics of disguise and anonymity" (Lim, 2018, p. 108). Thus, social platforms are used privately to discuss public issues, coordinate dates and places to protest, and mobilize people; these digital movements cultivate imaginaries in these multiple spheres to start mobilizations in contentious politics. Furthermore, digital actions unveil the possibility of online and offline interconnectivity between social media and protest sites such as public squares, streets, and other public spaces that help sustain the life cycle of a social movement in its trajectory (Lim, 2018). Hence, internet-based movements disseminate their messages through digital action repertoires with artifacts and activities used for social change on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter (George & Leidner, 2019; Bennet & Segerber, 2012). These repertoires depend on space, time, and available technologies.

In Latin America, right and left-wing political parties, conservative and religious groups have used these digital platforms to spread their messages against 'gender ideology' (Beltrán & Creely, 2018; García & Chicaíza, 2018; Gómez-Suárez, 2019; Faur, 2020; López, 2018). Consequently, the popularization of the social media use in movements includes digital repertoires such as 'hashtags protest' or 'hashtag activism,' defined as "a collective effort to intervene in public discourse by curating a massive amount of Twitter statements by using hashtags to cluster social media conversations around a certain issue or topic" (Lim, 2018, p. 114). Hashtag campaign mobilizations allow oppressed voices to be heard in situations of aggression and provide an immediate

response. "A hashtag is created as a means of structuring content in social networks, is increasingly used to attract attention to social and political issues and events" (Andreevskikh & Muravyeva, 2021, p. 213). These hashtag campaigns also create a platform of protest against gender policies taking the form of 'discursive activism' as "a speech or texts that challenge opposing discourses" (Shaw, 2012, as cited in Andreevskikh & Muravyeva, 2021, p. 214). An example of a hashtag campaign took place in 2016. The transnational religious right movement called #ConMisHijosNoTeMetas (Do not mess with my children) (#CMHNTM) started in Peru by non-governmental organizations associated with Catholic and Christian evangelical organizations, such as Red ProVida, Profamilia, Red de Restauración Civil, A mis Hijos los Educo yo, Red Familia, and the civilian movement Vida y Familia. Their goal was to prevent the imposition of 'gender ideology' ideas. The most visible Peruvian leader of this movement is Christian Rosas, who often visits Latin American capitals. The #CMHNTM's goal is to reject 'gender ideology' statements and defend the family's dignity (Yañez, 2020, as cited in Moragas, 2020).

This campaign organized protests against the Ministry of Education of Peru and placed banners on pedestrian bridges against gender equality. In 2017, this Peruvian campaign used their social media platforms and Christian media outlets such as Bethel TV to organize a massive national mobilization in Lima and four other cities with around 68,000 people. The Peruvian followers of #CMHNTM are active users of Twitter (Moragas, 2020). The campaign maximizes its follower's technology savvy by using social media platforms to teach society what they consider 'good' and 'correct' behavior

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through specific strategies. The #CMHNTM campaign constructs national and transnational networks, shares names, publications, and guidelines, and their leaders are mainly senior men, and some spokespersons are young women (Viteri & Marmol, 2020). Similarly, in Argentina, #CMHNTM emerges against sexual education (Faur, 2020). This campaign promoted a 'cultural battle' with messages such as "comprehensive sexual education imposes homosexuality, shows pornography in kindergarten, and teaches boys and girls to choose their sex" (Faur, 2020, p. 33). Additionally, this campaign was recognized for disseminating 'basic' but convincing messages through active campaigns on social media such as WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube (Faur, 2020).

In Ecuador, the #CMHNTM campaign is a key strategy against 'gender ideology' ideas and anti-LGBTI rights focused on education. According to Ecuadorian media outlets, Frente Nacional por la Familia (National Block for the Family) organized this campaign and mobilized around a million people in the country's streets in 2017 (Viteri & Marmol, 2020). Elite political and conservative factions financially support these Ecuadorian campaigns against 'gender ideology.' In sum, these organizations invested in disinformation campaigns on the internet and evidenced the prominent role of fake news and promoted hate against minorities, such as the LGBTI population on social media (Case, 2019). The circulation of this 'gender ideology' messaging on Facebook and other platforms such as WhatsApp with 'private' or more 'personal' access to reach their base constituency is called a 'hybrid network' (Lim, 2018, p. 121).

WhatsApp has an exceptionally high penetration rate in the Global South, where people usually have political conversations (Barbosa & Milán, 2020). This hybrid

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communication network supported by cellular phones with WhatsApp and social media platforms shows the communication evolution in digital movements. These platforms allow people to update information and increase awareness of how others are doing their own long-term political, social, and economic conditions and short-term causes. WhatsApp "is considered a 'semi-public platform' that merges into a single digital platform the private and intimate sphere (of interpersonal exchanges) and the public realm (of a group of interactions)" (Barbosa & Milán, 2020). Even the WhatsApp 'private groups' are associated with a stronger sense of belonging than network-based Facebook because people reproduce conversations and articulate a collectivity. WhatsApp messaging creates a sense of familiarity and intimacy, even between individuals who have not met in person (Barbosa & Milán, 2020).

An example of WhatsApp messaging is demonstrated before the 2016 Colombian plebiscite elections when the political magazine Semana revealed a WhatsApp message supposedly from pastor Eduardo Cañas, from the megachurch Manantial in Bogotá, co-president of the right-wing political party Colombia Justa Libres and supporter of the 'No' vote campaign. The message stated that the framework of 'gender ideology' was negotiated in Cuba during the peace process (Semana, 2016). This statement implied that if voters approved the plebiscite, the country would lose religious freedom (Gómez-Suárez, 2019).

Simultaneously, a report of the non-governmental organization Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) revealed how the social media audience reacted to the plebiscite elections with negative, disrespectful, and intolerant content while supporting

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the 'Yes' and the 'No' vote campaigns in Twitter and Facebook (MOE, 2016). Likewise, an analysis of the most popular social media networks of religious groups and official documents of political leaders during the mobilizations of these campaigns in Colombia and Mexico in 2016 revealed that the conservative activism raised administrative costs of institutional changes (López, 2018). The electoral activism before the Colombian plebiscite mobilized approximately 500,000 followers, "who were decisive in the victory of the 'No' vote in the plebiscite on October 2, 2016" (López, 2018, p. 176). These reactions to the plebiscite were also analyzed from political junctures connected to social media (Beltrán & Creely, 2018; García & Chicaíza, 2018; Gómez-Suárez, 2019).

In addition to 'gender ideology' messaging on digital platforms, anti-gender activists' public interventions appeal to emotions, dogmatism, and hatred on social media networks through haters, trolls, and new websites with verifiable and unverifiable accounts (Iglesias et al., 2020). In Uruguay, diverse politicians, media outlets, scholars, journalists in interviews, and social movements allied with feminism and sexual diversity have used the term 'gender ideology.' The Uruguayan campaign invests in training their recognized representatives and spokespersons and developing their leadership, using their testimonials, opinions, news stories, and social media networks as 'pressure tools' (Iglesias et al., 2020). In doing so, anti-gender activists often distort information to discredit their opponents and use fake news and biased interpretations to disqualify their claims and proposals. This campaign against 'gender ideology' spread messages underestimating women, feminist revindications, freedoms demanded by gender

dissidence, and sexual diversity movements, especially on social media, parliamentary interventions, and public statements by political representatives (Iglesias et al., 2020).

As a result of this Uruguayan digital campaign, the mobilizations of gender ideology ideas on social media networks have also provoked online harassment, threats, and violent physical attacks of women's and minorities' rights activists (Soto & Soto, 2020). In 2010, in Paraguay, a proliferation of anti-gender campaigns, which coordinated their fights against the term 'gender ideology' in alliance with political sectors and narratives; even against the Organizations of American States (OAS) and the United Nations, with strong attacks on the left-wing and in line with the rise of the right-wing governments in the continent (Soto & Soto, 2020). Later, in 2011, the term 'gender' was contested by the Catholic right during discussions on the Paraguayan national education plan (Corrêa et al., 2018). In October 2017, the parliamentary group for Childhood and Adolescence stated the materials promoted by the Ministry of Education taught 'gender ideology' ideas. Like in the Colombian case, the Paraguayan Ministry published a resolution prohibiting the distribution and use of printed and digital materials containing 'gender ideology' in schools (Morán Faúndes, 2019). These Paraguayan groups mirrored other Latin American movements that spread their messages on social media, had spokespersons with political power, created groups for supporting life and family, lobbied to prevent laws modification, organized massive protests, and distributed information against feminism.

2.3   Traditional Media Matters

Followers of these Latin American campaigns against 'gender ideology' also disseminate their arguments globally through literary publications, articles, books, blogs, news outlets online, and forums (Viveros Vigoya, 2017). Anti-gender activists use traditional media outlets such as printed newspapers, radio, and television news with low frequency compared to social media. For instance, news stories including the term 'gender ideology' circulated repeatedly between traditional printed newspapers and Catholic and Evangelical websites. In Brazil, in 2007, an analysis of the use and content of gender ideology in the two most popular printed newspapers *Folha de São Paulo* y *O Globo of Sao Paulo*, reveals that 'gender ideology' ideas were associated with 'ideology of toxic men,' 'ideology of the sovereignty of the subject over his body,' 'ideologies for deconstructing the Brazilian family,' 'gay ideology,' and 'ideology that seeks to give freedom to all forms of sexual behavior that may exist' (de Castro Gómez, 2020). Later, in 2011, this term was associated with pedophilia, abortion, homosexuality, lesbianism, marriage, gay, gay adoption, transgender, transexuals, gender transition, drugs, end of the family, leftism, communism, etc. (de Castro Gómez, 2020).

Similarly, in Chile, the newspaper *El Acontecer*, which defines itself without political and religious affiliations, instead of a pro-life position and protector of the family stance, criticized President Bachelet's government in 2016. The news story explained the government would implement an education program with a 'gender perspective' and secular sexual education in Chilean schools (Barrientos Delgado, 2020). Thus, Padres Objetores de Chile was organized to inform and prevent 'gender ideology'

implementation in Chilean education and protect the parents' rights to educate their children (Barrientos Delgado, 2020).

In other countries, such as Costa Rica, the campaign against 'gender ideology' combined the properties of printed newspapers, news media outlets online, and WhatsApp to disseminate the first articles against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' ideas. In the newspaper, *La Nación*, a news story was published about gender based on the biological characteristics of woman and man, written by Dr. José Miguel Goyenaga; and another article called 'Gender and equality, from the ideology to reality,' was written by Ángela Aparisi, adjunct professor of Law philosophy at the Universidad de Navarra (Spain) (Arguedas Ramírez, 2020). The media websites such as *El Mundo CR* and *CR Hoy* shared opinion articles against 'gender ideology' written by professors and conservative activists from the group Despierta Costa Rica, which defended life, family and fight against this ideology. Furthermore, the neo-Pentecostal political parties, the second most potent legislators of the country, have spread fake messages on the destruction of moral and religious values massively to their followers, who are at the same time, their filigrees (Arguedas Ramírez, 2020). These massive fake messages circulate in religious and non-political spaces, such as worships, masses, and Catholic and protestant rituals, making it challenging to confront evidence that proves such comments' falseness. These chains of messages became intensified fake news by using WhatsApp (Arguedas Ramírez, 2020).

In addition to these massive communication strategies, these Latin American campaigns organized international congresses that attracted worldwide attention to their

allies and networks on social media platforms. In 2017, the VII International Pro-life Congress in Guatemala congregated 1,200 representatives from Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Spain, United States, Italy, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Polonia, United Kingdom, and Dominican Republican. The hashtag #SoyGeneraciónVida (#IAmLifeGeneration) was a trending topic on Twitter during the first day of the Congress, with 6,000 tweets and 1.4 million reproductions, predominantly from Guatemala, United States, and Spain (Moragas, 2020). Therefore, the media plays a significant role as an institution with the power to dispute anti-gender collective action, frames, and networks of these transnational movements that prevent peaceful societies' construction.

CONCLUSION

The global transformation of campaigns against 'gender ideology' suggests future research focused on these movements' fundamental role and power to influence gender politics and institutions to strengthen homophobic and discriminatory politics in the Global South. Future research can improve our interpretation of the relationship between anti-gender movements and its campaigns offline and online with right-wing elites based on the specific Latin American countries' political, economic, social, and cultural features. This exploration of campaigns' dynamics will prevent the elite right-wing's hostile behaviors and meanings against marginalized communities to control of gender and sexuality and gain power in global politics.

Additionally, this transnational anti-gender movement is also challenging the standards of offline and online political activism and their relationship with the media to face massive 'gender ideology' messaging, which is defined as "a kind of fake news in itself by one of our subjects, given its scaremongering nature, superficial understanding of feminist and queer theory, and misrepresentation of the gender focus in the agreements" (Beltrán & Creely, 2018, p. 418). The analyzed Latin American context indicates that media coverage is one of the keys in political processes because information can reproduce 'tactical dissent' and a 'sphere of legitimate dissent' leading to the counter perspectives of actors legitimated politically and visible in the coverage (Montoya Londoño & Vallejo Mejía, 2018). Thus, media criticisms can cover strategies, actions, or

people, rather than fundamental criticisms of the system (Montoya Londoño & Vallejo Mejía, 2018). Based on these media's prominent functions for achieving peace, this analysis suggests an urgent reflection on the media's interpretation and contextualization of the gender distortion in Latin American political contexts.

Future research also needs to explore how middle-class and marginalized audiences are prepared to understand this hybrid communication network in the campaign against 'gender ideology' to construct peace. Traditional mass media in the Global South is a prominent power structure to represent political realities and create meanings around the inclusion of gender and social dynamics of equality, diversity, and social justice in public opinion for political transitions.

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Chapter 3

THE BUILD-UP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 'GENDER IDEOLOGY'

After four years of the peace process in Havana, Cuba, President Juan Manuel Santos proposed a peace plebiscite election to ratify the FARC's final peace agreement. In July 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia approved a national peace plebiscite election on October 2, 2016. According to the National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016), a plebiscite is a consultation conducted by the President with the approval of Ministers and the Congress to approve or reject a decision from the executive power. The Colombian plebiscite had a general question to answer, "do you support the final accord to end the conflict and build a stable and lasting peace?" (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016). More than 34 million residents could vote, and 13% of registered Colombians were required to validate the plebiscite result. Therefore, Colombia was in the middle of historic and divided campaigns between President Juan Manuel Santos and the peace process's opposition and the final agreement from August to October.

This chapter examines how the campaign against 'gender ideology' built a "momentum" against the plebiscite (G. Parody, Minister of Education, personal interview, July 23, 2019) with an established national right-wing network that was reactivated during the plebiscite campaigns and promoted by recognized politicians, including former President Álvaro Uribe, former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez, and influential Christian evangelical leaders of national megachurches. Based on my archival creation and 24 semi-structured interviews with right-wing politicians, anti-

gender activists, and Christian evangelical leaders, my findings demonstrated that the opposition articulated three main events as a political opportunity to dispute the inclusion of gender perspective and gender equality: the revision of the education manual for the inclusion of gender equality proposed by the Ministry of Education, the FARC impunity, and the survey about 'Sexuality Behaviors and Attitudes in boys, girls, and teenagers' ('Encuesta sobre Sexualidad en niños, niñas y adolescents, ECAS) conducted on middle and high-school students by National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE), and the 'No' vote campaign.

Since 2015, right-wing politicians, Christian evangelical pastors, and private schools with religious affiliations reactivated a pre-existing national network to mobilize teachers, associations of Christian and private schools against gender in the national debate for gender equality recognition in Colombian schools. This right-wing network framed gender as an 'enemy' of education for building alternative collective identities in Colombian society. Thus, anti-gender activists strengthened their narratives and symbols against gender and sexuality to preserve their traditional social norms. 'Gender ideology' ideas took the form of a national campaign that organized nationwide protests, meetings, and spread messages in official institutions and allied media outlets in traditionally conservative and right-wing political regions of the country. Moreover, the right-wing network expanded their protests against the education manual to the gender perspective in the final peace agreement. From their perspective, the key component to healing the Colombian society after the armed conflict should be prioritizing the family and emphasizing women and children as the primary victims. Hence, Christian evangelical pastors proposed to the government that gender should be replaced by 'respect for gender'

and victims of the conflict should be repaired for being 'human,' instead of considering 'personal conditions.'

Consequently, the campaign against 'gender ideology' consolidated homophobia and gendered stereotypes while disputing their recognition and inclusion in national politics for peace. This campaign provided an identity and a collective authority to their followers through beliefs on religion, homeland, and family, which contributed to the projection of 'enemies' and 'allies' for children's protection. Simultaneously, anti-gender activists were skilled to identify and name grievances that connected people to other sensitive issues such as the ECAS survey and the 'No' vote campaign that resonated within public opinion. In the conjunctural plebiscite context, the campaign against 'gender ideology' took advantage of their elite right-wing network's power to confront the government and public institutions. This campaign infiltrated national interest in the education system to alter the recognition of diversity and equality with their belief systems and frameworks of understanding sex, gender, and sexuality.

These anti-gender activists' actions against the revision of the education manual, the development of the ECAS survey, and their connection with the 'No' vote campaign reflected their forms of oppressing marginalized communities to benefit privileged sectors of Colombian society, such as private schools with religious affiliation, Christian evangelical churches, and the elite power of right-wing actors. Beyond the disputes in education, the campaign against 'gender ideology' provided Christian evangelical pastors of national megachurches and anti-gender activists the opportunity to resignify their participation as political actors of the peace agreement. The government rejected the education manual's publication and has suspended the development of the ECAS survey since 2016. Four years later, there is no news or updates on revising the education manual in Colombian schools.

3.1 'Gender Ideology' Ideas Takes Form

3.1.1 Education

'Gender ideology' meanings take form in overarching aspects related to gender, family, sexuality, politics, and education. Two months before the elections, gender was a contested category and framed as an 'enemy' of traditional values in the plebiscite context. 'Gender ideology' strategies worldwide are based on a doctrinal platform that intersects sociopolitical interests from the state, political parties, influential international organizations, and minorities. In Colombia, pastors like Edgar Castaño from the Christian evangelical church Iglesia Bautista Central (personal interview, June 26, 2019) assumed that 'gender ideology' ideas disseminate and impose certain minorities' lifestyles among society. Therefore, the unregulated plebiscite elections were a political opportunity for right-wing actors to connect their overarching backlash sentiment against decades of women and the LGBTI rights gains since recognizing guarantees for diversity and effects of armed conflict in the Colombia Constitution of 1991.

From the perspective of Christian evangelical leaders, right-wing politicians, and anti-gender activists, 'gender ideology' ideas are considered powerful tools that may overthrow 'stable' nationhood under the traditional scope of Christianism and Colombian historic right-wing governments. Education is one of the fields where the term 'gender ideology' infiltrates children's civic and moral formation and jeopardizes parents' power to educate them. For pastor Lila Palacios, President of the International Network of Family and Education (Red Internacional por la Familia y Educación, RIFE) (personal

interview, July 11, 2019), gender ideas are part of an international strategy of indoctrination and LGBTI recruitment that started in 1983, and 'gender ideology' narratives would approach children through education and government support. Hence, pastor Palacios indicated in the interview that governments develop 'ideological' education projects such as the revision of manuals and comprehensive sex education programs, and the construction of civic society with competencies, for instance, in mandatory national exams such as 'Saber Pro.'[7]

In 2016, right-wing leaders identified a political opportunity to mobilize people against gender due to the national debate about the significant recognition of gender equality in public and private schools across the country. The Colombian Constitutional Court ordered the sentence T-478 to the Ministry of Education for revision and adjustments to ensure that all school codes of conduct protected all sexual orientations via specific clauses to ensure the absence of discriminatory language in 2015. This sentence was in recognition of Sergio Urrego, a sixteen-year-old student who died by suicide in 2014. He left a letter in which he explained he suffered bullying due to his homosexuality in the Catholic school Gimnasio Castillo del Norte y Campestre in Bogotá (Colombia Diversa, 2015).

Gina Parody, as Minister of Education, complied with the legislation and started a curricular reform in alliance with UNICEF, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA),

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7 Saber Pro is a national exam in Colombia that qualifies higher education within students who are about to complete their college education (Delgado-Ramírez, 2013).

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the non-governmental organization

Colombia Diversa (focused on the defense of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender

Rights) to revise and redesign the education manual[8] for teachers in public and private

schools to prevent discrimination against homosexual students and parents in Colombia.

This education manual was called: '*Ambientes escolares Libres de Discriminación.*

Orientaciones Sexuales e Identidades de Género no Hegemónicas en la Escuela'

('Scholar environments free of discrimination. Non-hegemonic sexual orientation and

gender identities in schools'). Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this

book emphasized the significance of understanding 'non-hegemonic' sexual orientation

and gender identities in schools. Therefore, the Ministry of Education stressed that

schools and communities should recognize and promote human, sexual, and reproductive

rights, preventing multiple schools' discrimination for a fairer and more equal society

(See Appendix Figures B.1, B.2, B.3,B.4, and B.5 about the PowerPoint Presentations of

the Ministry of Education and the Revision of the Education Manual).

     While the Ministry of Education discussed the revision of the academic education

manual across the country, the government chief negotiator of the peace process,

Humberto de la Calle, released an official statement in Havana about the guaranteed

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[8] According to Chaux, Vargas, Ibarra, and Miniski (2013), as cited in one of the presentations of the Ministry of Education of Colombia in 2016, an education manual is a tool with the agreements of the school community that facilitates and guarantees harmony in the school life. This document defines the actions of the school community, and the resources and procedures to resolve conflicts, and establishes the consequences of breaking these agreements.

gender perspective included in the first version of the peace accord on July 24 (See

Appendix B.3. Official Statement from Humberto De la Calle, Chief Negotiator of the

Government in the Peace Process about the Inclusion of the Gender Perspective in the

Final Agreement) stressed the engagement and commitments of the government and

FARC in the subcommittee of gender for the inclusion of the gender perspective in the

peace agreement:

> The government delegation tried to ensure that the discussions went beyond the traditional conception of gender. Gender does not refer only to women but to the differentiated impact of specific situations on men and women and LGBTI people. Gender is respect for the difference and the particular condition in individuality. The possibility of living in harmony with the difference is reflected in the agreement reached on this matter. In this sense, we understand that linking the gender perspective to achieve a stable peace in Colombia makes perfect sense. (See Appendix B.3. Official Statement from Humberto De la Calle, Chief Negotiator of the Government in the Peace Process about the Inclusion of the Gender Perspective in the Final Agreement; translation mine)

De la Calle explained that the gender approach is considered a challenge with

values that crossed the peace table and sex as a given condition. He pointed out that the

gender approach is related to cultural conceptions that generate social behavior structures

because they are non-deterministic social products. Then, de la Calle quoted the French

philosopher Simone de Beauvoir: "you are not born a woman, you become one. And

today, we could also add: 'you are not born a man, you become one.' As for the LGBTI population, it is about assuming diverse sexual orientation and identity approaches" (Presidencia de la República, 2016). De la Calle emphasized the Colombian Constitution of 1991 recognizes various forms of family configuration and the cornerstone in the right to free development of personality: "based on which the rights of the LGBTI population have been built. This change has also been reflected in new forms of family and couples. I support the struggle for the recognition of their rights" (Presidencia de la República, 2016). Although the chief negotiator explained these statements reflected his perspective of these gender issues and prevented compromising the delegation, the 'No' vote campaign's coalition targeted these statements concerning gender ideology in national debates.

Based on this emphasis on gender equality for the prevention of bullying in schools and the construction of a peaceful society, some schools started a dispute against the circulation of the education manual in the northern Colombian coast (D. Rodríguez, personal interview, July 14, 2019). An anonymous activist of the campaign against 'gender ideology,' who is also a Principal in a private school with religious affiliation, explained that a group of teachers found an invitation letter from the Ministry of Education, a PowerPoint presentation, and the manual '*Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación*' during a workshop session. This group of teachers complained about the promotion of what they labeled as 'unusual activities,' such as the organization of a cultural week in schools for a 'gay pride week':

> Phrases as morality and preservation of good manners must be removed from the education manual. The 'blue book' (education manual *'Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación'*) says the recognition of sexual orientations and gender identities are an expression of human identity. (Anonymous activist, personal interview, July 26, 2019; translation mine)

Viewing an opportunity in this situation, the right-wing political party Centro Democrático, public and private schools, and the most prominent Colombian Christian evangelical churches reported publicly that this manual would attempt to change children's sex and 'homosexualize' them (M. Sánchez, personal interview, July 4, 2019). Weeks later, in August 2016, the newspapers *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* started to disseminate reports and complaints of teachers and parents from some private religiously affiliated schools due to the manual's publication with comics illustrating intimacy between same-sex couples. These images were fake and presented as the 'original' document, constructed by the Ministry of Education, three UN agencies, and the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa. According to Professor Franklin Gil Hernández from Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2020), the images about family diversity circulating within the public opinion came from digital material from the Chilean books' Nicólas tiene dos papás' (Nicolas has two fathers) and 'Anita y sus dos mamás' (Anita has two mothers). The explicit contents labeled as 'pornographic' came

from the Belgian book 'In bed with David and Jonathan' by Tom Bouden (Gil Hernández, 2020).

This event uncovered a significant relationship between anti-gender activists and specific local mainstream media to disseminate moral panic through 'gender ideology' ideas and fake news. The anti-gender activist contacted two of Barranquilla's media outlets. According to this anti-gender activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019), two journalists read the education manual '*Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación*' and wrote the news story in a newspaper, publishing the controversial fake images as part of the education manual. In this sense, the media losing objectivity enabled the right-wing network to be against 'gender ideology' ideas. According to the anonymous anti-gender activist, "those images circulated across Colombia. Yes, the images were not from the manual. The images were taken from a Belgian book, but the journalists said the images referred to the education manual" (personal interview, July 26, 2019). Moreover, this activist participated in seven interviews on radio stations in this region of the northern state of Atlántico. Anti-gender activists identified specific media outlets from traditionally conservative and Catholic areas that could permeate the national plebiscite debate and public opinion. Additionally, this incident's evolution also suggested that the anti-gender activists' confrontation was concerned with the inclusion of 'gender ideology' ideas in the education manual. Their distorted claims also reflected an established interdisciplinary persuasive network working on education, politics, and the media that confronted comprehensive sex education, women's, and LGBTI rights previously in national discussions.

3.1.2 Networks and Strategies

Before 2016, the Ministry of Education already developed education manuals to promote gender equality and prevent bullying and discrimination in classrooms with diverse titles, names, and social concepts. Former Minister Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) indicated these education campaigns started in 1998 with conservative President Andrés Pastrana, and these materials circulated in Colombian public and private schools. Marcela Sánchez, director of the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa (personal interview, July 4, 2019), explained that the Ministry of Education had led the sexuality, gender, and civics project for 15 years. However, private religiously affiliated schools, associations of parents, and anti-gender activists used this event as a political opportunity to reactivate their national networks with right-wing leadership to prevent the inclusion of a gender perspective and the recognition of minorities in the peace agreement.

In the field of politics, Moscoso (personal interview, July 19, 2019) and the anti-gender anonymous leader (personal interview, July 26, 2019) pointed out that Ángela Hernández, a municipal deputy of the north-central state of Santander who Centro Democrático supports, met up with the Principals of some private schools to debate 'the colonization of schools by the government to impose gender ideology' in the days that followed. Additionally, Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) indicated that the non-governmental organization called 'Red Familia Colombia' uploaded a petition on a website urging the Ministry of Education to stop the imposition of gender ideology in

school manuals. According to Parody in my interview, the petition reached over 2,000 signatures.

This network created a national collective action to prevent the recognition of sexual orientation and gender diversity as crossed components in courses and study plans for Colombian schools. To build up these counterarguments against gender equality, the Anonymous leader (personal interview, July 26, 2019) and Moscoso (personal interview, July 19, 2019) recognized that anti-gender activists collected what they called their 'evidence' from their teachers, peers, and network members across the country. To start, they collected the education manual in PDF format and materials from the Ministry of Education workshops for the revision of conduct codes in schools, including invitation letters, PowerPoint presentations, photos, and a questionnaire with 34 questions with 'Yes' and 'No' answers about the inclusion and recognition of diversity and plurality[9] in the education manual's revision (See Appendix Figures B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 from the Ministry of Education).

Based on these materials, activist Moscoso, pastors Pardo and Castaño (personal interviews, July 19, June 26, and July 24, 2019; respectively) framed their 'gender

[9] This set of questions was based on the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and the sentences T-994 2000, T-478 Sergio Urrego 2015, and T-565 2013 related to self-determination, equality rights, and personality development. This question guide was designed for schools' principals and circulated within 50 Colombian schools. Then, principals shared their answers with the Ministry of Education delegates during workshops (Anonymous activist of the campaign against 'gender ideology,' personal interview, July 26, 2019).

ideology' concerns with how these Ministry of Education practices would address affectivity, emotions, or eroticism, and the sociocultural construction of gender supported by de la Calle in the peace agreement, as well. From their lens, these manuals would establish 'gender ideology' lifestyle, even with a 'different name':

> Since kindergarten, they (education manual) tried to teach it ('gender ideology' ideas), especially for 6- and 7-years old children, to teach them about their freedom, without consulting their parents how they had to dress up as man or woman […] Then, we saw an interference in homes, a total change in the educational agenda of children. We agreed with them (the Ministry of Education) to teach about sexuality, but in the way that we have understood as Christians that it should be taught. (H. Pardo, personal interview, July 24, 2019; translation mine)

However, the workshop materials evidenced the Ministry of Education's emphasis that sex is a biological condition based on the human sex chromosomes, the reproductive organs, and the meaning of being intersexual. Meanwhile, gender was defined as a set of rules, attitudes, values, expectations, and roles assigned by the culture to human beings based on their sex (See Appendix Figure B.3 from the Ministry of Education). The Ministry indicates that "gender is learned" (Vargas Trujillo, 2007, as cited in Ministry of Education, 2016) and used the 'genderbread person' to explain how gender identity, gender expression, and behavior do not match or conform to the assigned sex at birth. For Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian

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Schools (Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos, OBED), Moscoso, and the anonymous anti-gender activist (personal interviews, June 25, July 19 and 26, 2019; respectively), the genderbread person became one of the most controversial images to describe 'gender ideology' ideas.

Figure 3.1. The Genderbread Person Included in the PowerPoint Presentation of Ministry of Education about the Revision of the Education Manual

These anti-gender activists' claims showed how this network of political and religious actors labeled gender as an 'enemy' of education which concerns the teaching of morals and good manners during the plebiscite campaigns. Their reactions to the revision of manuals evidenced their concerns about constructing alternative collective identities into Colombians' conservative national imaginary. These ideas maintain education as an institution of power to keep controlling and disciplining individuals under political and traditional social norms of right-wing groups, which promote discrimination and invisibility of marginalized communities in societies. First, anti-gender activists pointed out that gender would jeopardize their autonomy as school leaders by accepting diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. For Moscoso (personal interview, July 19, 2019), Colombian schools would promote the LGBTI population rather than defend students' rights. Second, pastor Patiño and Palacios (personal interviews, June 25, and July 11; respectively) argued that comprehensive sex education, diversity of gender identities, and sexual orientation would bolster a 'wrong' interpretation of students' free development of personality:

> The problem is comprehensive sex education came from a child's development process, and each child has a different evolutive development. When you give information in another moment, you are attacking; if the child is not asking for information, there is no reason to give it until they ask for it. (E. Patiño, personal interview, June 25, 2019; translation mine)

Third, anti-gender activists pointed out that parents must freely choose their children's schools regarding their academic, religious, and cultural preferences. Therefore, families should obey and respect schools' parameters to frame their children's education. For pastor Palacios (personal interview, July 11, 2019), the education manual did not traditionally have any regulation towards homosexuality. Fourth, the anonymous anti-gender activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019) believed the recognition of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities would be 'problematic.' Students' uniforms for male and female students in Colombia would be gender-neutral and called 'uniform one and uniform two.' Thus, every student could choose them regarding the sexual orientation or gender identity. Finally, these anti-gender activists shared that the education manual would not prohibit any affective signs such as kissing, hugging, touching each other, and students in schools. From their perspective, these actions would represent their loss of discipline.

Following this national debate, the Ministry of Education publicly rejected the publication of '*Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación*,' which had an International Standard Book Number (ISBN) that identifies books published internationally and from a specific edition publisher (ISBN, 2020). According to pastor Palacios (personal interview, July 11, 2019), the manual was registered in Cámara Colombiana del Libro (The Colombian Book Chamber), but Juan Fernando Cristo, Minister of Interior, and Gina Parody, former Minister of Education (personal interviews, July 11 and 23, 2019; respectively) explained that it did not circulate officially among schools. Despite the anti-gender activists' claims on the inclusion of

'gender ideology' in Colombian education, the anonymous activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019) recognized that the term 'gender ideology' does not show up "so much in the education manual, rather than in other videos and materials from the government." Consequently, this national right-wing network organized a massive protest against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' in Colombian public education. 'Gender ideology' statements were transformed into protests that represented a historic setback for gender equality, preventing the Colombian society from understanding the implications of non-violent and non-discriminatory education after a long-term armed conflict.

3.1.3   Protests against the Education Manual

The fears and anxiety around a gender perspective, including 'gender ideology' ideas, facilitated the national right-wing network to construct narratives and symbols against gender and sexuality before the plebiscite. This network perceived a political opportunity with the workshops for the education manual's revision and the design of the education manual '*Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación'* proposed by the Ministry of Education. Minister Cristo (personal interview, July 11, 2019) recognized that the government indirectly offered a strategic opportunity due to their lack of understanding the relationship between the term 'gender ideology' and the potential damage to the peace agreement. The government did not anticipate the lack of knowledge around gender issues and the misinformation that this mobilization would create before the elections.

The right-wing network starts to crystallize their frames and meanings about 'gender ideology' inclusion in the Colombian society to challenge the government and the peace plebiscite. Anti-gender ideology activists used protests and mobilized their networks with public schools and parents, undergirding their trust, cooperation, and solidarity (Tarrow, 2011a). On August 10, after de la Calle's, the chief negotiator's, declarations, citing the French philosopher de Beauvoir to explain how the government and the FARC, with the help of the United Nations included gender perspective in the agreement, deputy Ángela Hernández with the most influential opponents of the peace process protested in 'Marcha por la familia' (March for the family). They mobilized against 'gender ideology' ideas as their imminent 'enemy' with specific attributes and effects on Colombian society's education and morals.

According to an anonymous anti-gender ideology activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019), these national protests started in Barranquilla and Santa Marta on the northern Colombian coast. A school associate, a powerful political clan, and a pastor indicated in a parent meeting that deputy Hernández would protest to protect children's rights due to the perceived 'gender ideology' threat in the Ministry of Education's manual. Hernández would protest with her followers in Bucaramanga, a northern-central Colombian city. Then, the right-wing network supporters invited the rest of the private schools with a religious affiliation to join them. The anonymous anti-gender activist congregated 100 schools and 30 politicians to explain the 'gender ideology' repercussions through the education manual implementation in Colombian society.

I told them: 'we are not going to have classes tomorrow; we will protest.' And I called my friends, principals of schools in an area of Bogotá, and told them we must protest in the streets, but I did not have time for explanations […] We had people in Mariquita (a small town in the Northwest closed to Bogotá), pastors in different places of Colombia, etc. (Anonymous anti-gender activist, personal interview, July 26, 2019; translation mine)

Using national contacts, the anonymous activist communicated with pastors, Confederation of the Colombian Evangelical Council (Confederación del Consejo Evangélico de Colombia, CEDECOL) coordinated by pastor Castaño; International Network of Family and Education (Red Internacional de Familia y Educación, RIFE), and one of the prominent representatives of private schools with religious affiliation, including Catholic schools grouped in the National Catholic Confederation of Education (CONACED) (E. Patiño; Anonymous activist; personal interviews, June 25 and July 26, 2019; respectively). The anonymous anti-gender activist emphasized private schools wanted to participate in the protests, but they lacked knowledge about 'gender ideology' implications for society. Thus, the anonymous anti-gender activist organized meetings to explain it.

Some private schools located in Barranquilla extended the invitation to other schools from other cities: Medellín, Cali, Santa Marta, Cartagena, and Manizales. Pastor Cañas (personal interview, July 4, 2019) explained he communicated with his believers through his megachurches in Bogotá and recruited followers from other Christian evangelical churches. In doing so, their claims against 'gender ideology' intersected with

their opposition to the peace agreement, specifically with the 'No' vote campaign. Thus, the right-wing network linked 'gender ideology' messaging to their framework against the plebiscite:

> In the agreement, the government included 'gender ideology' ideas saying they did not want the FARC to attack the LGBTI community and wanted them to have the same guarantees as all the peace process participants. We told them, 'we will protest in the streets on August 10 because 'gender ideology' statements are not related to the peace agreement. Moreover, the one that has been affected by 60 years of civil war in Colombia is the church because they have killed and kidnapped pastors, burned temples and schools, but the church is nowhere in the peace agreement. (E. Cañas, personal interview, July 4, 2019; translation mine)

Then, Christian evangelical pastors expanded their protest against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' ideas in the education manual to the gender perspective in the final peace agreement. Pastors Castaño, Cañas, and Pardo (personal interviews, June 26, July 4, and July 24, 2019; respectively) argued the government assigned certain privileges for the LGBTI community in the preliminary version of the peace agreement with the FARC while lacking attention to include what they assumed as the 'real' victims of the conflict. Pastor Jhon Milton Rodríguez from the church Misión Paz a las Naciones and the current Senator for the right-wing political party Colombia Justa Libres also emphasized the agreement should be concentrated on women's rights. "They lost their husbands,

children, and jobs," and "the guerrilla did not attack any homosexual" (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019). From Senator Rodríguez's perspective (personal interview, July 18, 2019), children should also be included explicitly as victims in the final agreement. These pastors shaped specific narratives to dispute gender and sexuality linked to the 'No' vote campaign in public opinion. For instance, pastor Castaño (personal interview, June 26, 2019) suggested that any ideas related to gender should be modified for 'respect for gender.' Moreover, Pastor Palacios (personal interview, July 11, 2019) emphasized victims of the conflict should be repaired for being 'human,' instead of taking into account their 'personal conditions' as a woman, an LGBTI individual, or a religious leader. Additionally, pastor Palacios argued that the agreement should be centered on the family as the key component to healing the Colombian society after the long-term armed conflict (L. Palacios, personal interview, July 11, 2019).

These pastors of the Christian evangelical megachurches Tabernáculo de Fe, Manantial de Vida, Misión Paz a las Naciones, and Iglesia Bautista Central wanted to resignify their participation as a political actor in the peace negotiations, the agreement, and the Colombian political arena. These megachurches understood that the political opportunity within the disputes against gender in the national debate was redefining forms of 'political homophobia' as a strategy to reinforce their political power. They distorted the representation of the LGBTI population as a threat connected to the 'gender ideology' invasion that would harm the wellbeing of society and requires their urgent intervention. However, this union of popular pastors also defended their values and morals to

materialize and protect their own right-wing political project of the party called Colombia Justa Libres.

Homophobia was strengthened as part of their politics to reduce sexuality and gender as "nothing more than a variable reflecting static religious values and traditional attitudes about sexuality, whether organized by public opinion or by political leadership" (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p. 7). The megachurches used these narratives and tried to delegitimize the Colombian LGBTI advanced rights, such as same-sex marriage and child adoption by same-sex partners. These topics would emphasize heteronormativity (Bosia & Weiss, 2013) in establishing an ideology that assumes binary construction of heterosexual difference, unions, and families as given (Runyan & Spike, 2014). As a result, their essentialization of the binary sex differences assumed women to be exclusive victims of the conflict. This essentialization diminishes women's and LGBTI organizations' fundamental role and their activism toward Colombian peace for more than two decades.

With these messages spread, Pastor Diego Rodríguez from the Christian evangelical church La Vid in Ibagué in the west of Colombia designed banners and collected offerings with his believers to participate in the protest. He invited civilians in an official statement called 'Abanderados por la Familia' (Defenders of the Family) to join the protest:

Today is a historic day for our nation, after years of silence, passivity, and indifference within many parents, to confront policies imposed in terms of morality and sexuality by the national government and the Ministry of Education. Today we have awakened and raised our voices expressing our absolute disagreement, opposition, and concern about how sexuality has been addressed by the national government and the Ministry of Education in our schools nationwide. (D. Rodríguez, personal interview, July 14, 2019; translation mine)

Senator María del Rosario Guerra (personal interview, July 18, 2019) pointed out that Colombians mobilized for protecting three untouchable aspects of life: the most intimate and most profound belief, including the spiritual and religious life, and the ideals of homeland, and the family. Consequently, pastor Jhon Milton Rodríguez and Moscoso (personal interviews, July 18 and 19, 2019; respectively) stressed that in a week, right-wing politicians, anti-gender activists, Christian evangelical pastors, private schools, and teachers mobilized more than 10,000 Colombians on August 10, 2016. For Moscoso, these synchronized national protests were 'a divine thing' because "God was the one who united us" to organize the protests across Colombia. As a result, more than 40,000 Colombians, parents, and teachers from private Christian evangelical schools mobilized against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' in the education manual (*El Espectador*, 2016a). Colombians protested to protect their children, while elites used the protest to gain 'No' voters.

This right-wing network protested in front of the Ministry of Education in Bogotá and the remaining cities' main squares. People protested with messages from the Bible

and article 42 of the Colombian Constitution:[10] 'No imposed gender education on our children and 'the discrimination issues are an invention of the Minister (of Education) to promote homosexuality' (*El Espectador*, 2016b). According to Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos, OBED) (personal interview, June 25, 2019), these mobilizations demonstrated "Colombia was thirsty for defense and protection, and these people (anti-gender activists) have moved countries." For Pastor Cañas (personal interview, July 4, 2019), "the protest had a connotation of outrage." Interestingly, the anonymous anti-gender activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019) highlighted that this network against 'gender ideology' did not expect anything. Still, when their contacts from Barranquilla, Cartagena, Pereira shared protests photos, they saw everyone protesting and cried with emotion.

Former Minister Parody explained the Ministry of Education's manual and workshops were concentrated on preventing discrimination in schools. Instead, Parody believed the opposition to the plebiscite:

> Started to weave an extraordinary and exotic story. Later, you realize this is not an isolated situation in Colombia, rather than a Latin American

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[10] Article 42 is related to the constitution of families based on the free decision of marriage between a man and a woman (Constitute Project, 2021).

movement, from the right-wing, populist. The church created the concept of 'gender ideology,' which only they know what it means. (G. Parody, July 23, 2019; translation mine)

Unsurprisingly, any of the right-wing network participants of this protest recognized their leadership to mobilize potential voters against 'gender ideology.' This right-wing network created an identity that defines 'them' and 'us' for peace, traditional values, and morals with the projection of 'enemies and allies' to protect children in building a new society. They protested as a form of contention and collective action to challenge their opponents while creating networks of trust and solidarity (Tarrow, 2011a). These national protests used right-wing networks' fears that gender would threaten the androcentric and elite perspective of economic, political, social, and educational relations (Peterson, 1992). Given this political opportunity, this right-wing network disseminated its 'gender ideology' campaign and created a collective authority and a political identity. Simultaneously, these actors promoted their superiority and elitism in a class hierarchy as part of the national culture that should always be respected, even when it justifies marginalized communities' segregation (Peterson, 1992).

Furthermore, these national protests demonstrated that their right-wing network effectively disseminated framings of 'gender ideology' statements through a robust network focused on the north of Colombia, a traditionally religious and politically conservative region dominated by classism, economic inequalities, and right-wing political parties. 'Marcha por la familia' also unveiled the power of Colombian anti-

gender leaders, who did not only adapt meanings' frames from traditional cultural symbols, rather than orienting their movement frames toward action, and fashioned them at the intersection between the population's inherited culture and its values and goals (Tarrow, 2011b). Christian evangelical leaders such as Pardo, Castaño, and Cañas; President Uribe, former attorney general Ordoñez, and Senator Guerra; and anti-gender activists in private schools with religious affiliation used their reputation and public popularity to become key leaders who stimulated and mobilized meanings against the inclusion of 'gender ideology.'

This network of key actors also invited other political and religious figures to join their ideals despite their political, economic, and religious divergences. Pastor Cañas (personal interview, July 4, 2019), using his national leadership, invited the Catholic Church to participate in this anti-gender ideology national discussion and the 'No' vote. According to Cañas, he met with the Colombian Episcopal Conference secretary to organize activities before the elections that were motivated to repair the family after the armed conflict. The Catholic Church was characterized during the peace negotiations and the plebiscite as a neutral actor in the vote campaigns. However, according to Minister Cristo and Fabián Hernández, coordinator of communication research in the non-governmental organization Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) (personal interviews, July 11 and 22, 2019; respectively), the Colombian Episcopal Conference ended up supporting the peace process through their official speakers and invited Colombians to vote freely, informedly, and consciously about the benefits of peace and violence in some regions. Nevertheless, Monsignor Pedro Mercado, former adjunct

secretary of the Colombian Episcopal Conference and former priest of the Colombian Congress (personal interview, July 26, 2019), argued the Catholic church as a hierarchical organization lacked a monolithic position and had diverse plebiscite opinions within their communities, especially around moral and ethical issues (including sexual and reproductive morality, defense of traditional marriage and Constitution of family, and the 'gender ideology' inclusion in the manual proposed by the Ministry of Education).

Simultaneously, rumors, and critics against the sexual orientation of Gina Parody, Minister of Education, started to circulate in public opinion. The protests moved beyond the streets to the National Attorney General's office (Procuraduría General de la Nación). Thus, this network mobilized their 'digital militias' (Dimenstein, 2019). According to Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019), she publicly reported that an employee of this institution started to spread messages around the distorted manual on social media. Minister Parody asserted that the Attorney General's office opened a case with these allegations, and later, it was closed. Parody, who is openly lesbian, believed the manuals' controversial debate started as a personal issue against her sexual orientation (personal interview, July 23, 2019). According to pastors Castaño, Cañas, and Pardo, most Colombians were unaware of Parody's sexual orientation and relationship with Cecilia Álvarez, former Minister of Transportation, and Commerce, Industry, and Tourism during Santos' two presidential periods.

These circumstances of the campaign against 'gender ideology' also exposed the differences between pastors on these disseminated rumors. For instance, pastor Diego Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019) explains the protests were not organized

to discredit Minister Parody and lacked political interests and homophobic and discriminatory expressions due to sexual orientations. On the contrary, pastor Rodríguez emphasized: "we did not want any intervention in the education of our children; we want (the government) to respect our constitutional right to educate our children based on our values, morals, ethics, and faith" (personal interview, July 14, 2019). In his church, their goals were to protest against the 'gender ideology' imposition in Colombia promoted by the Ministry of Education and the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa within children in public and private schools to confuse their sexual' identities.' Other rumors about the 'gender ideology' ideas, the anonymous anti-gender activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019) asserted, were concerned with the Ministry of Education employees' threats, including penalties and shutting schools if teachers and principals disobey the new non-discrimination rules in the education manual.

As a result, this intersection of frames, meanings, contentious action, and this politicized and diverse national right-wing network shaped and spread the campaign against 'gender ideology' ideas. Additionally, pastor Cañas (personal interview, July 4, 2019) argued that this campaign also included their concerns on the lack of justice and truth in the final agreement's first version. On August 16, Parody had a controlled debate in the Colombian Congress proposed by the right-wing senators, Guerra, from Centro Democrático, and Jimmy Chamorro, affiliated to Partido de la U. Both senators condemned the education manual offered by the Ministry of Education. Senator Guerra (personal interview, July 18, 2019) emphasized that they were mainly concerned about the association of the state with 'gender ideology' ideas in the country, which would harm

parents' rights for educating their children, and the state would become "the owner of the children's will and could indoctrinate them." Later, President Santos publicly announced the inexistence of 'gender ideology' ideas in the education manual 'Ambientes de Aprendizaje Libres de Discriminación,' which did not circulate officially within schools. Santos denied the publication of this manual accompanied by the Ministry of Education and the United Nations organizations involved in its construction. Parody resigned from her position at the end of August 2016. Four years later, there is no news or updates on revising the educational manual in Colombia.

3.2   The ECAS Survey

The right-wing network's agenda and trajectory against the 'gender ideology' included the biannual survey 'Survey about Sexuality Behaviors and Attitudes in boys, girls, and teenagers' ('Encuesta sobre Sexualidad en niños, niñas y adolescents, ECAS) conducted by National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE). As Sidney Tarrow (2011a) explains, social movements are involved in 'naming' grievances and connecting them to other grievances, and constructing frames of meaning that resonate with a population's cultural predispositions. Then, the movement's networks disseminate uniform messages for specific collective actions to power participants, opponents, the media, and third parties (Tarrow, 2011a). In this case, the Colombian anti-gender movement added the ECAS survey as a new perceived grievance in the campaign's frame against 'gender ideology' ideas in the country two months before the plebiscite elections. The network justified

their actions based on their goals, values, and identities, and in this case, they found their evidence secretly.

In August 2016, this network against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' in the education manual interrupted the ECAS survey's development. In the final report of this survey, DANE (See Appendix Figure B.6 DANE official Press Statement about the Cancellation of the ECAS survey 2016) explains the ECAS is a valuable instrument conducted on middle-school and high-school students to detect current problems that put children at risk. For instance, this report reveals 6.2% of girls, boys, and teenagers have had sexual relations, have tried, or have been forced to have sexual relations; and 3% of underage students revealed they had exchanged sex for something material (DANE, 2016). Nevertheless, private schools with religious affiliation and anti-gender activists also perceived this survey as a threat to Colombian society values. According to Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos, OBED), in a meeting with the association of private schools in Bogotá, one of their most prominent leaders revised the ECAS questionnaire:

> There were corrupted things for a child of 10, 11, 12 years old. These surveys came to schools and were conducted on the children with closed doors and without parental consent. (E. Patiño, personal interview, June 25, 2019; translation mine)

DANE has conducted this survey since 2006 and complied with Law 336 from 2009 and Law 679 from 2001 regarding child exploitation, child pornography, and sexual tourism with girls, boys, and teenagers (See Appendix B.2.ECAS Surveys Comportamiento y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 Conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE). The survey collected crucial statistical information on the social, individual, and familiar risk factors that may provoke child sexual exploitation and its consequences.[11] The campaign against 'gender ideology' used this survey with a specific goal: penetrate a public institution with their frames, split elites, and shape emotions to prevent the development of gender policies. The network's action focused on a section of sexuality questions in the students' survey. Patiño, Moscoso, and the anonymous anti-gender ideology activist (personal interviews, June 25, July 19, and July 26, 2019; respectively) indicated a private school teacher stole one of these questionnaires and shared it with Patiño. From their perspective, the ECAS used explicit inappropriate sexual language in Chapter D (See Appendix B.2. The ECAS Survey Comportamiento y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad 2016 Conducted by

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[11] The ECAS survey included five chapters: 1)general characteristics of the student (name, sex, age, race, roommates, attributes of the house where the student lives, etc.); 2)social context based on the companion of student's, level of communication between students and their friends, parents, relatives, etc., and resolution of conflicts; 3)favorite activities for free time, environment for decision-making, and drug consumption; 4) sexual education in school, opinion leaders about sexual education, sexual attraction, types of sexual relations (for money, sexual proposals, sexual exchange, cybersex, sexting, group sex, and sex work); and 5) use of the Internet (DANE, 2016).

the National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE). They felt that these questions could hypersexualize under-aged students in Colombian schools. They are mainly opposed to the definition of the sexual relations in the document associated with "kisses, hugs, caresses, genital contact (penis-vagina, penis-anus, penis-mouth) or penetration with any element or object" (See Appendix B.2. The ECAS Survey Comportamiento y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad 2016 Conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE*). From their perspective, these contents were inappropriate for students in sixth grade, under 12 years old:

> Nobody will tell a child that a sexual relationship is getting a 'device' inside them because it is 'paraphilia.'12 There are the right questions, but there are also 'bad' things. (Anonymous anti-gender activist, personal interview, July 26; translation mine)

According to the anonymous activist in the interview, this survey represented another government strategy episode with the United Nations, like the education manual's design for population control interventionism. For these anonymous anti-gender

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[12] "Paraphilia denotes any powerful (intense) and persistent sexual interest other than sexual interest in copulatory or precopulatory behavior (genital stimulation or preparatory fondling) with phenotypically normal, consenting adult human partners" (Cantor et al., 2009, p.527, as cited in Hinderliter, 2011, p.18).

activists, the ECAS would help 'normalizing' behaviors that are ethically incorrect. This right-wing network against 'gender ideology' explains the ECAS was secretly conducted in schools without parental consent (E. Patiño, personal interview, June 25, 2019). A pollster from DANE surveyed students. Any teacher could participate in this activity in the classroom. The ECAS survey presented a new component to mobilize their conservative frame on sexuality and identity construction in children's education.

Anti-gender activists shaped their claims to contest DANE's power using the same arguments from the Ministry of Education's dispute around the education manual. They mobilized individuals through emotions, a fundamental component to attracting followers' attention (Tarrow, 2011b). Based on the right-wing campaign's perceived risks and injustices against students' sexuality, the anonymous anti-gender activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019) indicated that they scheduled an appointment with President Santos and, later, with an official from the Minister of Interior. For the anonymous anti-gender activist and Patiño (personal interview, June 25, 2019), the government strategically paid attention to their claims due to the conjectural plebiscite context before the elections. Campaign leaders knew their new perceived dispute would create uncertainty within public opinion and incentivize the government's prompt reaction to prevent another contentious action. The network exerted pressure on the government to reconsider their commitments and allegiances (McAdams et al., 2004).

Therefore, the private schools once again contacted their allied networks from Christian evangelical churches CEDECOL (Colombian Evangelical Confederation), RIFE, Confederación Nacional Católica de Educación (CONACED) (National Catholic

Confederation of Education), Unión de Colegios Internacionales (Union of International Schools, UNCOLI) and Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos (Colombian Association of Christian Schools, OBED) to mobilize against DANE for conducting the ECAS in private and public schools. The anonymous anti-gender activist, Moscoso, Patiño (personal interviews, July 26, June 25, and July 19; respectively) highlighted that by using their political power, they also got an appointment with Mauricio Perfetti, former Director of DANE. During this meeting, this network's representatives shared their concerns on the implementation of this survey and the effects on the child psychosocial development:

> You are applying these questions to children between 11 and 17 years old. They will not understand these questions, leading them to question and ask things that the child does not understand. They (DANE) are abusing them sexually, and this is called 'institutional abuse,' and there are questions for 15 and 17 years-old that are not pertinent in the way you are doing it. So, what are we reporting? We are declaring that you, with your surveys, are institutionally abusing children. (C. Moscoso, personal interview, July 19, 2019; translation mine)

The sexuality set of questions in the survey was considered 'immoral' and unjust against minors, requiring the government revision in the middle of a polarized plebiscite campaign season. Anti-gender ideology activists like Moscoso explained that they worked with DANE in the survey revision: "we participated in a table for the construction

of a new survey including more filters and definitions of concepts that were not so explicit and aligned with children's age." Later, the anonymous activist asserted that two days before the plebiscite elections, Perfetti rescheduled a second meeting with his team constituted by 25 professionals, which included psychologists, nurses, members of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Police Department of Childhood and Adolescence, and the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF). Finally, the anonymous anti-gender activist (personal interview, July 26, 2019) stressed that they achieved their goal when Perfetti told them: "do you remember you asked to change the survey? We are going to do it. Go home and think how you would like the (design) of the new surveys, and we are going to meet again in three days to work with this team."

Based on these events, the right-wing network gained more recognition and political power within another public institution to affect policies for recognizing gender and sexuality in education. Anti-gender activists favored their systems of beliefs and interests over the wellbeing of the unequal Colombian society. These network performances and the campaign against 'gender ideology' created an effect that transformed the national right-wing coalition as strategic political actors imposing their notions of human nature and social life. This strategic network and its campaign operated as a form of social control that defines the correct patterns and perceptions on hierarchies of gender, sexuality, and social relations. The campaign against 'gender ideology' buttressed a hegemonic model that oppresses the marginalized. With these contentious

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episodes through collective claims and their interaction with politics, the government facilitated the movements' political opportunity.

According to Doug McAdams, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2004), governments tend to alter their practices and policies to respond to contentious actions. The opposition campaign politicized gender and sexuality, thus silencing victims of sexual harassment and abuse rather than contributing to a national dialogue. Unfortunately, the campaign against 'gender ideology' constructed a sustained right-wing network with solid specific claims, demonstrations, and public statements that did not require the exertion of physical violence to benefit specific privileged sectors of society. Unexpectedly, after two meetings between Perfetti and his specialized DANE expert team in education and sexuality with the right-wing network, DANE announced officially the temporal suspension of the ECAS in schools on September 21, 2016; due to the concerns of parents and principals of schools (See Appendix Figure B.6 about the ECAS cancellation in 2016) DANE would evaluate options for paraphrasing some sexuality questions of the survey as a prominent tool for public policies' decision-making process. Finally, DANE adjusted the questions from the section on 'Sexuality' in the study and posted on the official website that the ECAS was conducted to 50,083 students from secondary public and private schools in Bogotá, Cali, and Cartagena in August and September 2016. However, there is no evidence of the modified 2016 survey, updated instruments, and final results from students on DANE's website. These conditions represent a backslide in the government's role to analyze and understand the current dynamics of sexual exploitation and potential risks for Colombian school students.

Meanwhile, other right-wing sectors took advantage of the political opportunities in some Colombian regions around the Ministry of Education's manual and the ECAS to strengthen their power and promote the 'No' vote in the plebiscite.

3.3 The 'No' Vote Campaign

In the plebiscite's polarized context, the 'No' vote supporters strategically included the campaign against 'gender ideology' in their narratives and activities. The anti-gender ideology network gained national support through its protests, followers, and powerful political and religious connections with education. The right-wing network and the campaign against 'gender ideology' discretely infiltrated the education system and public institutions such as DANE to prevent gender policies for equality and peace. The most prominent representatives of the 'No' campaign, Uribe and Ordoñez, kept warning their followers about the 'gender ideology' FARC's final agreement. Some pastors from national megachurches joined the 'No' campaign and recruited voters. In Colombia, where Christian evangelical churches have around 13 million Christian evangelicals,[13] Juan Fernando Cristo, former Minister of Interior (personal interview, July 11, 2019), recognized that pastors recruited people from their pulpits with discourses against gender ideology's apparent inclusion in the final agreement.

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[13] According to the political magazine *Semana* (2016), political analysts calculated around 3 million Christian evangelicals voted 'No' in the plebiscite 2016.

In Congress, senator Guerra defended the 'No' vote. Her political party, Centro Democrático, with Uribe as a leader, criticizes the gender perspective as one of the parties' principles for implementing a comprehensive rural reform. Then, they assumed gender perspective as a limitation in the preliminary peace agreement version of September 2016. First, an article from Guerra's plebiscite archives called 'The gender perspective in the final agreement' (See Appendix Figure D.3. Article 'The Gender Perspective in the Final Peace Agreement') written by Ilva Myriam Hoyos Castañeda, the former delegate Attorney for the Defense of the Rights of Children and the Family, revealed that promoters of the 'No' vote had a persistent fear for the revindication of a new way of understanding the individual, the family, the society, 'relationships between men and men,' freedom, autonomy, and the duties of the state due to their replacement by 'new realities centered on identity and sexual orientations.' Second, the opposition uses the term 'gender ideology' as a persuasive and dangerous term that jeopardizes the peace agreement. Third, anti-gender activists were aware that 'gender ideology' statements did not appear in any peace agreement pages. For instance, Hoyos' article (2016) suggested that even the government lacked knowledge about it.

Even recognizing the inexistence of 'gender ideology' ideas in the deal, Senator Guerra indicated in a presentation at the Congress they would vote 'No' to the main persecutors of women that would be the defenders of their dignity.' This campaign deployed some strategies to reject the 'gender ideology' inclusion in the agreement. First, Guerra's presentation included academic articles, such as Hoyos Castañeda's (2016) and Miranda-Novoa's pieces (2012), to explain that gender ideology could be camouflaged

in the agreement while blurring the hierarchical gendered roles in societies' construction because 'gender ideology' ideas advocate for egalitarianism (Miranda-Novoa, 2012). From these lenses, 'gender ideology' ideas jeopardized the biological gender dichotomy and, as a result, homogenized women and men to blur their role in the family (Miranda-Novoa, 2012).

Second, Guerra explained the relationship between gender perspective and the term 'gender ideology' through a word frequency analysis of the first version of the agreement signed in September 2016. Senator Guerra associated gender perspective and 'gender ideology' statements with words such as gender, which was mentioned 114 times; gender perspective, 21 times; sexism and discrimination against women, 2, respectively. These descriptive results portrayed gender as a semantic issue that would harm the peace with the FARC due to their reported crimes perpetrated against female rebels. Third, Guerra's presentation indicated the FARC had accusations for more than 1,800 abortions and raping more than 250 women documented by the public prosecutor's office, which contradicts Santos' government message about the respect of human rights for dignity and life of women and unborn children for a future peace agreement.[14] Guerra as a supporter of the 'No' vote and the campaign against 'gender ideology,' included the

14 There is no clarity and further information about the perpetuators that diminish women's life in Guerra's presentation. By context, it can be deduced that this PowerPoint presentation is addressing the crimes perpetrated by the FARC rebels against female rebels (See Appendix Figure B.13.Reflections of Senator María del Rosario Guerra about Women's Role in the Colombian Context of the Peace Agreement).

disputed topics of abortion and gender violence in the women's rights public debate that can distort the attention effectively to the gender perspective in the agreement. These topics and the FARC crimes are sensitive issues in Colombia after a long-term conflict. These themes can stimulate polarization in any political process and depict women and children as unique victims of the conflict.

Furthermore, the ideals of family and children protection in the campaign against 'gender ideology' included in the 'No' campaign echoed in sectors that consumed fake news associated with threats to Colombian society, including the transformation of Colombia into a Castro-Chavismo regime, the FARC impunity to participate in politics at the Congress, and controversies around the recognition of gender diversity for peace. Additionally, the plebiscite opponents added another fake news called 'Law Barreras' about using Colombians' retirement pensions to support the guerrilla financially. The articulation of these components shaped the opposition's communication strategies before the elections.

Finally, former Judge Armando Novoa from the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE), Beatriz Quintero, director of the non-governmental organization Red Nacional de Mujeres, and Olga Sánchez, director of the organization La Casa de la Mujer (personal interviews, July 15 and 24, 2019; respectively) believed Colombians ended up voting 'No' against this set of fake news and 'gender ideology' ideas. Marisol Gómez, the editor of *El Tiempo,* emphasized the 'No' campaign stigmatized peace: "If you defended the peace agreement, you were supporting the

FARC. If you defended a judicial process for 'Santrich,' you were defending him"

(Gómez, personal interview, July 11, 2019).

Based on the plebiscite results, CEDECOL sent a letter to President Santos to renegotiate the first version of the peace agreement on November 24, 2016. The letter was on behalf of their right-wing network (See Appendix Figure C.1.CEDECOL Letter to President Santos for the renegotiation of the final peace agreement). In the renegotiation of the peace accord between the involved parties with Christian evangelical and Catholic churches' leaders, the government recognized religious victims while asking specifically for the location of 'gender ideology' ideas in the document. Minister Cristo (personal interview, July 11, 2019) argued that any of the pastors of the most popular Colombian megachurches, Cañas, Castaño, Pardo, and Rodríguez, could demonstrate the existence of the term 'gender ideology' in the agreement. Then, the parties agreed to keep the gender perspective definition among the first pages of the deal but deleted this term from the rest of the text. Thus, they removed the emphasis on gender and the LGBTI population as a victim of the armed conflict in the final peace agreement.

CONCLUSION

In two months, the right-wing network led a well-structured campaign against 'gender ideology' and identified the revision of the education manual, the ECAS survey, and the 'No' vote campaign as their political opportunities to spread specific frames, meanings, and contentious action against gender equality, the gender perspective, and the peace agreement. Anti-gender activists organized a campaign that needed to 'defeat' gender to achieve Colombian peace. As pastor Diego Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019) asserted, the campaign against 'gender ideology' became the 'battle horse' for promoting fears of the attack on traditional family values within public opinion. Anti-gender activists and the right-wing network waved 'gender ideology' messaging to confuse people with anxieties about the role of gender equality in education and peace. The term 'gender ideology' was used as an 'umbrella' concept to define behaviors, the LGBTI population, gender equality policies, lifestyle, diversity, sexual orientation, and gender identity within anti-gender activist groups.

Simultaneously, this campaign against 'gender ideology' was the 'momentum' the right-wing network used to redefine their role as political actors in the education system, peace negotiations, and Colombian politics. Their mobilizations against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' combined national protests, media news stories, and supportive 'digital militias' (Dimenstein, 2019) that distracted the public plebiscite debate two months before the elections and also demonstrated three main aspects of the

'campaign against gender ideology.' The first aspect is that the claims and grievances of the campaign against 'gender ideology' were camouflaged under their religious and conservative political representation, and their persistence to achieve the 'wellbeing.' They used their networks and leaders' reputation and status to escalate their exclusionary proposals to the government and official institutions, even when these anti-gender and anti-peace arguments stigmatized women and the LGBTI population.

The second aspect concerns how these key leaders understood that the 'gender ideology' messaging needed to identify and name timely grievances linked to public opinion's emotions and predispositions for debating. The campaign against 'gender ideology' weaved Colombian imaginaries with ideas about homosexuality, parents' rights to educate their children, and contested the government's power to intervene or control gender and sexuality in education. Furthermore, the campaign against 'gender ideology' in the 'No' vote revealed the persistent fear of a conservative power elite to revindicate new understandings of family, social norms, marriage, and autonomy. Therefore, this Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' used key actors' recognition and reputation to effectively escalate their claims to authorities.

The third aspect is that this campaign framed meanings with implicit forms of homophobia and exclusion of marginalized communities while perpetuating their beliefs within potential voters to develop and support their political project: the political party Colombia Justa Libres.

In conclusion, the build-up of the campaign against 'gender ideology' benefited a privileged male sector of society, normalized exclusionary voices, and promoted power

disparities between decision-makers and citizens to reach the elites' will. These reactionary backlash political and religious conservative movements are always looking for political opportunities that confuse public opinion with fake news and disinformation around human nature and social relations. Consequently, this campaign and its actors required contentious episodes to demonstrate their symbolic power through 'gender ideology' messaging strategies.

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Chapter 4

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 'GENDER IDEOLOGY' PREFERS SOCIAL MEDIA

The campaign against 'gender ideology' created a discrete communication strategy by taking advantage of the lack of the plebiscite campaigns regulation and uncontrolled social media platforms in the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) Resolution 1733. The right-wing network opponent to the peace agreement and the plebiscite was centered on a hybrid network of communication (Lim, 2018) that connected their cultural spaces, including schools, streets, Christian evangelical churches, and digital activism workshops' social media platforms such as WhatsApp. As Monsignor Pedro Mercado, former secretary of the Colombian Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church (personal interview, July 26, 2019), explained, the campaign against 'gender ideology' used the gender perspective as "a weapon to attack the agreements" and preferred social media to spread 'gender ideology' messaging.

This chapter analyzes how the campaign against 'gender ideology' included in the 'No' vote campaign created a 'private' digital communication strategy with fake news under international experts' guidance from Panama and Cambridge Analytica. My findings from the archival creation and the set of 24 semi-structured interviews with former ministers, senators, activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology,' directors of women's and LGBTI organizations, and journalists of the newspapers *El Espectador*

and *El Tiempo* reveal that the campaign against 'gender ideology' built restricted groups with private invitation in WhatsApp. These digital groups played a significant role in reinforcing voters' connections through emotions over Colombian political conditions' critical thoughts. The opposition's emphasis on their mistrust of Colombian mainstream media activated 'digital militias' (Dimenstein, 2019) that disputed the inclusion of gender perspective in the final agreement through fake news on WhatsApp. These digital militias had a defined audience and targeted them with primary but emotional content against peace and gender while defending the repositioning of elites' political, religious, and cultural ideals.

Opponents to the plebiscite and the campaign against 'gender ideology' built this digital strategy to spread the right-wing's panic and persuade followers for what they considered their historic battle against their internal enemies of society: communism, homosexuality, and the FARC imaginaries for attacking the family and jeopardizing identity and nationhood. Their hybrid communication network strengthened gendered social norms and static religious values and traditional thoughts around sexuality and identity with unified 'gender ideology' narratives, campaign icons, and symbols intersected in their online and offline actions. Ultimately, the elite right-wing leaders created a unified narrative against 'gender ideology' and spread messages in physical meetings and digital networks.

According to my archival creation and my interviews, 'gender ideology' narratives circulating on social media networks were based on Catholic frames of sex and gender as 'gender ideology' dogmas. Additionally, Christian evangelical pastors like

pastor Eduardo Cañas from the megachurch Iglesia Manantial de Vida (personal interview, July 4, 2019) explained that his church used social media platforms to organize activities and mobilize against the inclusion of 'gender ideology.' Cañas explained that the technique of snowball sampling to recruit other potential followers helped them communicating within churches, supporters, and anti-gender activists. As a result, social media became their platform to expand their pastoral power which permeated national politics.

However, this Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' is not an isolated case in Latin America. Marcela Sánchez, director of the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa, scholar Franklin Gil Hernández, and former Minister of Education, Gina Parody (personal interviews, July 4, July 9, and July 23, 2019; respectively) argued this digital campaign and its hybrid communication network are imported patterns from Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador, where anti-gender movements have developed similar campaigns since the 90s. Indeed, they believed this Colombian campaign rode the anti-gender movement wave, disputing gender equality policies and inclusion of minorities in political processes. This Colombian hybrid communication network reinforced their connections with pro-life and pro-family organizations working in education and politics across Latin America. Simultaneously, 'gender ideology' ideas became a blind spot for the government, the media, and women and LGBTI organizations. Consequently, this 'private' campaign reinforced digital methods and strategies for persuading specific potential adult and middle-class voters against gender, while, the government promoted the inclusion of gender perspectives in the final agreement.

4.1 Online Campaigns, Offline Rules

When the plebiscite elections were approved in July 2016 to ratify the final peace

agreement between the government and the FARC, Colombia was officially in a brief

period of electoral campaigns for two months. The National Electoral Council (Consejo

Nacional Electoral, CNE) created Resolution 1733 when the campaigns were already in

progress (See Appendix B.4. The CNE Resolution 1733*). According to the former CNE

judge Armando Novoa (personal interview, July 24, 2019), "the first rule of any electoral

process is to establish reliable rules for reliable results, but we had no rules, and there

were powerful signs that the plebiscite would be lost." The brief period for the plebiscite

campaigning was critical in surveillance of political groups' actions, media outlets, and

the popular unrestricted social media contents. The CNE issued Resolution 1733 focused

on monitoring exclusively traditional media outlets such as radio, press, and television,

regulating the 2016 plebiscite elections organization, and imposing sanctions for

promoting votes within personal, verbal, or written private communication between

voters. Although this legal decision recognized the communication challenges of

campaigning, this official statement did not include any CNE supervision of social media

or verbal or written contents through personal communication about the plebiscite

campaigns:

> The set of provisions in this title is of particular importance due to the
> nature of political campaigns of new parties and movements, increasingly
> linked to the use of mass media to disseminate their messages and

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programs. (See Appendix B.4. National Electoral Council Resolution (CNE) 1733, 2016, p. 4-5)

Based on the growth of digital power in politics and this lack of regulation and infrastructure to supervise digital plebiscite campaigns, the opposition created a digital communication strategy. Social media networks played a significant role as uncontrollable platforms for reinforcing voters' connections through emotions, despite reflections or critical thinking in political debates (George & Leidner, 2019). Similarly, the campaign against 'gender ideology' included in the 'No' campaign also saw the polarized emotional plebiscite context as a political opportunity to penetrate the national debate through an unregulated digital atmosphere. Monsignor Pedro Mercado, former secretary of the Colombian Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church (personal interview, July 26, 2019), explained that the campaign against 'gender ideology' used the gender perspective in the final agreement as "a weapon to attack the agreements."

Judge Novoa (personal interview, July 24, 2019) believed the right-wing political network created communication channels through digital social networks, beneficial for the plebiscite opposition and the failed electoral outcomes. Juan Carlos Vélez, former senator and director of the 'No' campaign in the political party Centro Democrático (personal interview, July 7, 2019), explained his campaign had scarce resources to support national activities in comparison to the 'Yes' campaign led by the government, which had access to the public budget and institutions. Senator María del Rosario Guerra

from the right-wing political party Centro Democrático (personal interview, July 18, 2019) indicated they disseminated their messages when traditional media outlets invited them to national debates. However, this campaign and Vélez were a popular target of criticisms by the media, public opinion, and the political party Centro Democrático after the elections in October 2016. Vélez publicly admitted in an interview in the newspaper *La República* that the 'No' vote campaign was the cheapest political campaign of Colombian history because it was focused on motivated people to vote with 'anger' and lies. The 'No' campaign segmented the public by economic stratification with messages on the FARC impunity and Castro-Chavismo (Ramírez Prado, 2016). "I said the people were angry, and they turned out to vote" (Vélez, personal interview, July 7, 2019), but the media criticized this campaign for the quality and truthfulness of facts. Vélez indicated the 'No' campaign disseminated facts about the peace agreement:

> Powerful advertisement pieces indicated this 'man' (former commander 'Timochenko' of the FARC), who killed children, people, and was convicted of committing these crimes, would be free. He would not go to jail, and it is maybe something complicated to understand; that is very strong, but this is a democracy. We all interpret things in some way. We have studied it. I read it (the agreement), and I almost learned it by heart. (J.C. Vélez, personal interview, July 7, 2019; translation mine)

Despite the public criticisms against his campaign, Vélez argued the 'No' campaign was the "weirdest campaign" he had ever organized. From his perspective, the problem was not the campaign's organization but rather the peace agreement's inconsistencies in justice that promoted voters' rejection.

> The peace agreement did not talk or have a clear justice standard. Every peace process should include justice for all, and there is no peace agreement in the world without justice. They (the government) must incarcerate those who committed crimes against humanity, and there is no forgiveness, that is a story invented here […] So, they (the government) thought the capacity of forgiveness of people in this country was immense when people did not have that capacity for forgiveness. (J.C. Vélez, personal interview, July 7, 2019; translation mine)

The 'No' campaign revealed frames and meanings of 'injustice' and the 'FARC impunity' shared within Christian evangelical leaders and activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology':

> I called the church and said: we are going to pray for two months because the peace agreement cannot be approved under the current conditions: it was 70% in favor of the guerrillas and 30% divided into 15% in turn of the victims and the other 15% in favor of the government's issue. (E. Cañas, personal interview, July 4, 2019; translation mine)

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Pastor Edgar Castaño from the Christian evangelical Church Iglesia Bautista Central and President of the Evangelical Confederation of Colombia (Confederación Evángelica de Colombia, CEDECOL) also was concerned about the role of justice in the peace agreement:

> Many things in the peace process were done to win the guerrilla's will, but they (the government) were surrendering the country to FARC rebels. The proof is now they (The FARC) are committing crimes; there were no resources given them stability to become peasants with an assigned land portion to grow. It did not happen, and they said (the government) did not comply with it. (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019; translation mine)

The 'No' campaign was aware that these ideas would divide interpretations within Colombians' unequal society from urban and rural areas, especially for the conflict victims. The 'No' campaign believed the government would support the FARC monthly with US $600 salary, US $520 for demobilizing, and US $2,080 for a productive project (Vélez, personal interview, July 7, 2019). Thus, the debate was around "these men who committed all these crimes will be rewarded, and that is the message that people perceived" (Vélez, personal interview, July 7, 2019). With the circulation of these ideas in the public plebiscite debate, the 'No' campaign used the power of social media to spread its messages that meant to distract from the core of the peace agreement and the

elections. Vélez explained when he visited Apartadó (Antioquia) near the Gulf of Urabá in the northern Colombian coast; a local councilor shared with Vélez a President Santos's photo with 'Timochenko' with the message: "there are no jobs and education. While the FARC would get financial benefits such as a basic income of around US$600 with the agreement" (Vélez, personal interview, July 7, 2019). Later, Vélez indicated he unintentionally posted this flyer on his Facebook profile, and his message went viral. He explained that this post got 6 million 700 thousand visits and reposts before the plebiscite elections. Although Vélez did not openly recognize the use of social media platforms or any specific communication strategy of his campaign, this example showed the strategic social media use with biased topics on the 'FARC benefits' in the agreements distorting the tangible goals pursued in the negotiations. Additionally, Senator Guerra (personal interview, July 18, 2019) indicated that the 'No' campaign sought a close relationship with citizens and took advantage of Twitter, Facebook, and 'the rest' was in the "hands of God."

After learning of the victory of 'No' in the plebiscite results, Vélez said publicly in the newspaper *La República* how the plebiscite opponents conducted this campaign. According to Novoa (personal interview, July 24, 2019), Vélez revealed amid the victory euphoria that experts from Panama advised the 'No' campaign committee and created a digital strategy to target specific publics; including elderly, women, and unemployed citizens, to disseminate the 'No' messages:

Thus, Cambridge Analytica used algorithms to segment population groups and directly construct campaign messages with lies to provoke a strong impression informing the voter's voting concept so that they could vote with fear and rage. (A. Novoa, personal interview, July 24, 2019; translation mine)

Judge Novoa has investigated the campaign's manipulation, methods, and public opinion behavior on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. He believed the 'No' campaign used "powerful tools like what happened in the Brexit referendum in Great Britain and Donald Trumps' 2016 campaign" (A. Novoa, personal interview, July 24, 2019). However, this is a topic that has not been fully explored in Colombia. These circumstances are not necessarily suggesting imminent censorship of the government on social media or freedom of speech within electoral campaigns. Still, Novoa (personal interview, July 24, 2019) highlighted that these technological resources affect democratic decision-making processes, where the central principle is freedom, equality, and capacity for discernment.

4.2 The 'Gender Ideology' Communication Strategy

Before the elections, the non-governmental organization Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) reported the potential risks of disinformation messages circulating on social media (F. Hernández, personal interview, July 22, 2019). Social networks were a revolutionary component in the Colombian plebiscite, but the government, the media, and

women's and LGBTI organizations were unaware of the challenging political and social costs. While the Colombian government spread information on the plebiscite elections for the 'Yes' vote on traditional mainstream media, the campaign against 'gender ideology' mobilized ideas combining conventional and digital methods, including protests in the streets and digital campaign activism. The campaign against 'gender ideology' did not use traditional media, and their strategies were modest and discrete. The right-wing network knew the traditional mainstream newspapers' lack of attention to the 'gender ideology' inclusion due to the media's particular economic, political, religious, and social owner's interests. Catalina Moscoso, director of the non-governmental organization Ámalos and activist of the campaign against 'gender ideology', believes that "these newspapers (*El Espectador* and *El Tiempo)* are interested in topics which benefit socially and politically their journalism labor, especially if there is an economic arrangement. Thus, we cannot trust the media outlets" (C. Moscoso, personal interview, July 19, 2019). Moscoso's sentiments toward the media are shared by Christian evangelical pastors and plebiscite opponents.

In Colombia, these newspapers are highly recognized as properties of two powerful financial groups: Santodomingo group and Sarmiento. These groups have not participated directly in national politics. Instead, they have invested actively in President Álvaro Uribe's presidential elections in 2002, his presidential reelection in 2006, and President Juan Manuel Santos's reelection in 2014 (*Semana,* 2006; *La Silla Vacía,* 2014). However, activists against 'gender ideology' ideas feared that both powerful financial corporate groups overlapped their interests, supporting the peace process and a final peace

agreement with the FARC in 2016 to improve the national economy (*Dinero*, 2016).

Likewise, Christian evangelical leaders such as pastor Edgar Castaño (personal interview,

June 26, 2019), argued the Colombian media have historically undermined their opinions

and interventions in public debates:

> The media has been used by the new world order to establish a new way of thinking. That is different from everything, that is a whole global conspiracy that encompasses the media, companies, sciences, technology, and everything that exists to impose itself […] It is like 'the beast' that appears in the apocalypse that wants to devour everything, and nobody stops it. (H. Pardo, personal interview, July 24, 2019; translation mine)

Following pastor Héctor Pardo's criticisms from the Christian evangelical church

Tabernáculo de Fe, pastor Castaño (personal interview, June 26, 2019) highlighted that

most Colombian media create opinions and are corrupted at the government's service.

Paradoxically, these Christian evangelical pastors labeled the media as a group of

influential people to divert the audience's thinking with fake news[15] (E. Castaño, personal

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[15] Fake news are understood as "news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers" (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 213). The production of fake news depends on financial and ideological motivations: outrageous and fake stories that go viral—precisely because they are outrageous—provide content producers with clicks that are convertible to advertising revenue. On the other hand, other fake news providers produce fake news to promote particular ideas or people that they favor, often by discrediting others (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017) […] While it is currently used to

interview, June 26, 2019). Moscoso and an anonymous activist of the campaign against 'gender ideology' (personal interviews, July 19 and July 26, 2019; respectively) suggested that the Colombian government financially supported the media's advertising strategies in the plebiscite campaigns. Therefore, the campaign's supporters against 'gender ideology' believed the media contents depended on private interests and their close relationship with the LGBTI community. Thus, their deep mistrust of media motivated the digital campaign's building against 'gender ideology.' This digital campaign would mainly focus on their reactionary backlash toward political and religious conservative movement ideals and prevented mainstream media, the government, peace negotiators, and non-governmental organizations from participating. Nevertheless, these elite right-wing actors still insist on the lack of a specific communication structure or strategies to persuade voters (E. Cañas; E. Castaño; L. Palacios; Anonymous leader; E. Patiño; personal interviews, July 4, June 26, July 11, July 26, and June 25, 2019; respectively).

Gina Parody, former Minister of Education (personal interview, July 23, 2019), argued that the messages against the 'gender ideology' in schools and the peace accord were disseminated more massively on Facebook and WhatsApp groups two months before the elections. This campaign was centered on what is identified as a 'hybrid

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describe false stories spreading on social media, fake news has also been invoked to discredit some news organizations' critical reporting, further muddying discourse around fake news" (Tandoc Jr., et al., 2018, p. 138).

communication network' (Lim, 2018). With the strengthening of a right-wing network

constituted by parents, private schools with religious affiliation, politicians, and anti-

gender ideology activists in Colombia's main capitals, the campaign against 'gender

ideology' created WhatsApp groups. This social media platform is one of the most

popular chat apps with high penetration rates in the Global South, and is considered the

"primary venue for political conversations and discussing and sharing news" (Barbosa &

Milán, 2020, p. 1). An analysis by Stephanie Chevalier (2019) indicated WhatsApp was

the most prevalent instant messaging app among mobile users in Colombia. Thus, "78%

of the 16- to 45-year-old respondents stated that they used the app daily" (Chevalier,

2020). WhatsApp is a 'semi-public' platform that offers an "intimate and controlled

environment for political discussion, playing a mediating role in fostering participation"

(Barbosa & Milán, 2020, p. 1).

These activists discussed their fears for the 'gender ideology' consequences in

schools and children's sexual orientation because of the peace agreement in these digital

social groups. Moreover, Christian evangelical pastors recognized that these social media

platforms helped them mobilizing people in the protests against the education manual

Ambientes de Aprendizaje Libres de Discriminación on August 10 in 2016. In Ibagué,

Pastor Diego Rodríguez from the church Iglesia Cristiana Bíblica La Vid (personal

interview, July 14, 2019) contacted around 100 pastors. Later, Rodríguez met with

Osvaldo Ortiz, a popular YouTuber and pro-life activist, protector of the family, and

promoter of ethical principles from Bogotá. Both leaders organized and unified

billboards, posted banners, and recruited pastors in Ibagué to spread their messages across Colombia in a week.

Therefore, the digital campaign against 'gender ideology' complemented the traditional emphasis from media outlets because they connected virtually at local, regional, and global levels (Lim, 2018). These hybrid networks were based on 'cultural and religious routers' such as churches and schools, where imaginaries were cultivated, connections were made, collectivities were formed, and resistance was sustained (Lim, 2018). In addition, this campaign used 'ephemeral routers' such as the use of social network apps like WhatsApp and Facebook in "certain spaces and times by necessity or creative impulses" (Lim, 2018, p.124) of their movement ideals and goals to connect followers. Thus, these networks were cheaper than a traditional campaign by the media. Digital activism on these networks did not require significant financial support or investment to circulate and permeate national political debates. These digital platforms made information more available for people to identify and unify their grievances and collective action in the corporeal or physical world.

When activists were asked about the financial support to their national initiatives to protest and escalate their proposals to the government, like in the education manual '*Ambientes Libres de Discriminación'* from the Ministry of Education and the survey Encuesta sobre Sexualidad en niños, niñas y adolescentes ('Survey about Sexuality Behaviors and Attitudes in boys, girls, and teenagers,' ECAS) conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE), they avoided answering the topic. Instead, they emphasized the

following: Planned Parenthood Federation and the Ford Foundation support feminists financially with US$125 million annually; Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren Buffet support feminism, and George Soros Center for Constitutional Rights, the Playboy Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and even, the film's director Steven Spielberg support the gay lobby financially (C. Moscoso; H. Pardo; personal interviews, July 19 and 24, 2019; respectively). They pointed out that in Colombia, "these initiatives are endorsed by "pure love and willpower of people," contrary to the 'gay lobby' within national politics (C. Moscoso, personal interview, July 19, 2019).

These campaign against 'gender ideology' ideas unveiled their rooted forms of political homophobia to "structure experiences of sexual minorities and expressions of sexuality" (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p.2). The campaign against 'gender ideology' used homophobia as a political force to mobilize potential voters of the plebiscite against the Colombian advance LGBTI rights approved after 2007. Then, this campaign shared their static religious values and traditional attitudes about sexuality (Bosia & Weiss, 2013). Activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology' discredited the protection of patrimonial rights, the right to social security for same-sex partners, marriage equality, and child adoption by same-sex partners (Bueno-Hansen, 2020) as 'potential threats' for society. Therefore, the digital campaign against 'gender ideology' instrumentalized homophobia to strengthen heteronormativity, as an ideology that assumes binary construction of heterosexual difference, union, and patriarchal families as given (Runyan & Peterson, 2014).

Using this digital strategy, Christian evangelical pastors have clearly identified their campaign's networks from Bogotá to the rest of the country. Pastor Eduardo Cañas from the megachurch Manantial de Vida (personal interview, July 4, 2019) explained each of his churches is understood as a 'cell,' and around 20 persons constitute every 'cell' in Colombia. These different 'cells' disseminated political messages to gain followers. The pastors used the technique of snowballing to transmit information over the 'gender ideology' enemy between their churches' circuit and leaders of these 'cells.' Similarly, pastor Pardo (personal interview, July 24, 2019) recognized that any church member could disseminate messages from the campaign against 'gender ideology' on their preferred social network. For instance, some of his followers and affiliated pastors chose Facebook; others, Twitter or Instagram. Then, these megachurches shared freely meanings and frames of the peace plebiscite, gender, sexuality, and the agreement under what they called "a hand that guides us that is unseen, and that is the hand of the Lord, that encourages us, inspires us" (H. Pardo, July 24, 2019).

Both pastors communicated their orders to pray for the 'No' victory in the plebiscite through their churches and social media platforms using the church power, public reputation, and pastoral power. Pastor Diego Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019) emphasized that believers' subordinated role allowed pastors to exert disciplinary control to promote unverified political ideas. Pastors with this power make believers feel responsible for their management of collective life and wellbeing. The pastor can exert power due to moral ties within followers and promote obedience as a central component to believers' conduct. Thus, their followers may obey the pastor

because it is the law, but it is also his will (Dean, 2010). Under these practices of guidance, examination, and obedience, Christian evangelical pastors motivated individuals to get into the 'gender ideology' debate before the elections and suggested what they believed is 'correct' for their morals and values in a democratic decision-making process.

4.2.1 Frames and Meanings

The claimed imposition of 'gender ideology' ideas by the campaign against 'gender ideology' to indoctrinate the society illustrates how the notions of sex and gender were transformed into 'gender ideology' dogmas for Colombian culture as a way to redefine heterosexuality as an institution. Christian evangelical leaders led the campaign against 'gender ideology,' defining gender and sex as two central topics contested through this campaign's messages in the national plebiscite debate from a Catholic perspective. Thus, the 'gender ideology' campaign incorrectly uses 'gender' instead of 'sex' to define political and social relations. I found through my archival creation that Senator Guerra's claims were supported with articles and handwriting notes that combined points of view from the Catholic Church and academic articles from Law studies, Psychology, Philosophy, and Feminism.

According to these senator Guerra's archives, sex is assumed as a natural property that defines man and woman with irrefutable biological and sexual dichotomies (Catholic.Net, 2016). Meanwhile, gender is tied to linguistics in terms of masculine, feminine, and neutral (Catholic.Net 2016). The opposition to the plebiscite used gender as a "means of power and social control" (Lassan, 1995; Wodak, 1994; van Dijk, 1988;

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as cited in Tameryan et al., 2019) against the government's proposal for the difference and particular condition in individuality (Presidencia de la República de Colombia, 2016). The government asserted that "gender is learned" when they proposed to revise the education manual of schools (See Vargas Trujillo, 2007, as cited in Figure B.3. PowerPoint Presentation of the Education Manual Revision workshop organized by the Ministry of Education of Colombia, 2016).

Anti-gender activists distorted this social construction of gender as an opportunity for men and women to 'switch' and choose different sexual orientations and gender identities anytime (E. Castaño; C. Moscoso, personal interviews, June 25 and July 19, 2019): "now, I am in a hetero-role, now I am in a bisexual role; now, the homosexual" (Catholic.Net, 2016). Senator Guerra's archives from articles and notes from the Catholic Church and academic articles, highlight that 'gender ideology' ideas assume heterosexuality equivalent to homosexual, lesbian, bisexual, and undifferentiated (Catholic.Net, 2016). This campaign's Catholic lens emphasizes the belief in heterosexuality "as the only normal mode of sexual orientation, family life, and social relations, as the currently hegemonic model worldwide" (Runyan & Petersen, 2014). The campaign against 'gender ideology' sought to impose heterosexuality ideals to essentialize the binary sex differences for a collective national identity and gendered individuals. As Adrienne Rich (1980) analyzed, heterosexuality is a cultural, political, and social phenomenon without specific borders that goes beyond the sexual preference of individuals:

Heterosexuality is presumed as a sexual preference of most women […] but also an economic and political question about the role of women to produce and reproduce the capitalist system in marital sex, maternity, and childcare. (Rich, 1980, p. 632).

The imposition of heterosexuality infiltrating the 'gender ideology' activists' claims justified patterns and norms to protect specific conservative elites' political and economic systems. These frames started to block social and legal reforms that affect women and minorities and marginalize communities like the LGBTI population (Garbagnoli, 2016). The dualistic reinforcement of stereotypes then goes beyond the social conception of relations to the sexual division of labor and equal representation of individuals in politics due to their differences (Rich, 1980). This digital campaign's messaging circulation suggested an emotional debate on interactions with other communities that lacked protection and recognition and polarized opinions within potential plebiscite voters. This digital activism stimulated a new order with repressive statements against gender and sexuality which permeated institutions and public policies.

Based on this creation of meanings of the 'gender ideology' narratives, the digital campaign also defined icons, symbols, antagonists, and protagonists of their anti-gender crusade to achieve their goals (Lim, 2018). These frames created meanings simplifying gender and sex as 'common enemies' of the right-wing network in the corporeal and digital worlds. The campaign against 'gender ideology' portrayed the elite right-wing leaders as 'icons' of a pervasive idea against peace. Gender and sex were the 'symbols'

of their dispute against 'gender ideology' that resonated within the public opinion. Then, this campaign constructed a hybrid network of communication to defeat the government with recognized 'antagonists' and 'protagonists,' that would allow potential voters to identify or reject them with their emotions, ideals, and political thoughts. In these framed meanings against sex and gender, the government was illustrated as the 'antagonist' due to the Colombian family's lack of protection. Simultaneously, the right-wing key actors, including former President Uribe, former attorney general Ordoñez, and pastors Cañas, Pardo, and Rodríguez, became the most reputable 'protagonists' to their followers in the prevention of any inclusion 'gender ideology' dynamics for peace.

By using the established hybrid communication networks, the campaign against 'gender ideology' and the identified elite of right-wing leaders disseminated unified frames and meanings against sex, gender, sexual orientations, and gender identities for peace. The right-wing network leaders started to record videos and organize their archives for campaigning activities (E. Patiño; Anonymous activist; personal interviews, June 25 and July 26, 2019; respectively). According to Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (OBED) (personal interview, June 25, 2019), the primary sources of anti-gender ideology activists were scholars, experts, families, and pro-life associations, who were also participants of their national network. 'Gender ideology' meanings blended divergent frameworks on gender, family, religion, politics, and social relations from diverse social science disciplines (Bennett & Segerber, 2012). In doing so, the campaign's frames and meanings coordinated followers' experience, guided their action, and established meanings (Lim, 2018). In this case, for

gender in the peace plebiscite elections. In sum, these frames about sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender diversity, and traditional social norms justified, dignified, and animated collective action (Tarrow, 2011). One of the key actors' strategies was building and sharing a unified 'gender ideology' narrative across their mobilizations, protests, meetings, and digital activism.

My analysis of the most frequent themes mentioned by former ministers, senators, religious leaders, activists against 'gender ideology,' journalists, and women's and LGBTI organizations suggests an alignment of narratives to contest the inclusion of 'gender ideology' within the supporters from the 'No' vote and the campaign against 'gender ideology.' Key elite actors composed a group that recognized their support publicly to the 'No' vote and the campaign against 'gender ideology'. This group was composed of: right-wing senators María del Rosario Guerra from the political party Centro Democrático and pastor Jhon Milton Rodríguez from Colombia Justa Libres, the Christian evangelical pastors[16] Eduardo Cañas, Edgar Castaño, Diego Fernando Rodríguez, and Monsignor Pedro Mercado, former secretary of the Colombian Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church.

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[16] Pastors Eduardo Cañas, Héctor Pardo, and senator Jhon Milton Rodríguez are publicly recognized for their leadership in megachurches. These three pastors participated in the renegotiation of the first version of the final peace agreement between the government and the FARC in November 2016, after the rejection of Colombians in the plebiscite.

Another group composed of religious and active promoters of the campaign against 'gender ideology' were: pastor Héctor Pardo and activists against 'gender ideology' as Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos, OBED), Catalina Moscoso, director of the non-governmental organization Ámalos, an anonymous activist, and Lila Palacios, President of the International Network for Family and Education (Red Internacional por la Familia y la Educación, RIFE). Interestingly, former Minister of Education Gina Parody was part of this group due to her use of the language, words, frames, and meanings associated with 'gender ideology' ideas to explain her experience and rejection regarding this campaign. Her repetitive use of key topics and narratives to oppose the campaign against 'gender ideology' evidenced the reinforcement, dissemination, and positioning of these ideas across public opinion before the elections.

These unified themes and narratives used in the campaign against 'gender ideology' perceived that the gender perspective lens proposed revising the education manual '*Ambientes de Aprendizaje Libres de Discriminación'* and the final peace agreement as a target to contest the relocation of gender in the Colombian political agenda. Likewise, Guerra and her political party also had a specific framing and meaning for 'gender ideology' ideas and 'gender perspective' in the plebiscite, which also coincided with the statements of activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology.' According to her notes, 'gender ideology' would eliminate femininity and insist on women's contribution to society (See Appendix Figure D.1.Comparative Table of

Meanings between Gender Perspective and 'Gender Ideology' from Senator María del Rosario Guerra's Archives).

Therefore, Guerra's article posited ideas disseminated by the right-wing network publicly. 'Gender ideology' ideas are framed as a detrimental 'component' that jeopardizes the traditional constitution of societies and gendered binary roles of women and men, promotes an individualistic perspective of human rights, minimizes the women's role in reproduction, and approves unions between homosexuals (Miranda-Novoa, 2012) (See article 'Diferencia entre la Perspectiva de Género y la Ideología de Género,' Miranda-Novoa 2012, pages 345 and 348).[17] Right-wing leaders of the campaign against 'gender ideology' portrayed gender perspective as an ideology that betrays maternity and reproductive rights and prioritizes the raising of children as the most significant role of women (Toldy & Garraiao, 2020). This distortion of the gender perspective in the revision of the education manual and the final agreement reflect a narrative for the backlash against women's participation in public discussions and political debates that directly impacted them (Toldy & Garraiao, 2020).

The campaign against 'gender ideology' contested these initiatives to legitimize unequal gender roles consolidated in Colombian politics and conservative sectors. Therefore, these frames and meanings of 'gender ideology' ideas helped the right-wing key actors to justify their interests for the perpetuation of a right-wing elite male power

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17 Article is available on the website:
http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/dika/v21n2/v21n2a02.pdf

while diminishing the recognition and inclusion of women and minorities in peacebuilding decisions. As a result, these activists considered any individual who defends gender equality in social relations or gender perspective as a 'gender ideologist,' but these 'ideologists' are not considered feminist (Catholic.Net, 2016). Consequently, these frames and meanings within the right-wing network of the campaign against 'gender ideology' provoked online and offline interconnectivity. This hybrid communication network with concrete 'gender ideology' narratives for contentious politics connected elite leaders with their followers, who were also potential plebiscite voters across the country. Ministers, journalists, and non-governmental organizations argued these frames and meanings lacked validity and intentionally circulated their campaign's social media networks before elections. However, this 'gender ideology' messaging was a blind spot for the government, women and LGBTI rights activists, and the media that complemented a set of fake emotional news around the plebiscite opposition which they considered threatening to Colombian society.

4.2.2 A 'Private' Campaign with Fake News

Politicians who led the 'Yes' vote campaign supported the inclusion of the gender perspective in the peace agreement and believed the opposition used people's emotions and the digital platforms' immediacy. The former Minister of Education Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) argued the right-wing network "constructed a conjectural but an important movement. It was decisive." The consolidation of this right-wing campaign depended on networks that spread fake news online that are described as, "wholly false

or containing deliberately misleading elements incorporated within its content or context"
(Bounegru et al., 2017, p. 8, as cited in Bakir & McStay, 2018, p. 154-155). The fake
news before the plebiscite elections encompassed four topics: first, 'Law Roy Barreras'
(Ley Roy Barreras) referencing senator Roy Barreras from the right-wing political party
Partido de la U and supporter of the peace plebiscite; second, the Castro-Chavismo
regime's imposition; third, the FARC impunity; and fourth, the 'gender ideology'
inclusion in the final agreement. The 'Law Barreras' fake news emphasized that
Colombians' retirement pension was a government transaction to support the FARC
financially after the peace negotiations. Senator Roy Barreras from the right-wing
political party Partido de la U argued this information was spread to around 4,000
Colombians before the plebiscite elections. When Barreras and the government noticed
this set of contents, he tried to confront these chains of digital messages with Clara López,
former Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, through social media, official press
releases, and news stories on traditional mass media. However, Barreras (personal
interview, July 12, 2019) indicated that "it was insufficient to control Colombians'
emotional reactions."

Minister Cristo and senator Barreras (personal interview, July 11 and 12, 2019;
respectively) also indicated another set of fake news about how the FARC would take
Colombia's political power. 'Timochenko' would become the new President supported
by small coves with millions of dollars, which could deviate the 2018 presidential
elections. However, "the FARC only had 50,000 votes from 17 million voters in the 2018
elections for Congress" (Barreras, personal interview, July 12, 2019). Barreras identified

former President Uribe as the most prominent representative of the 'No' campaign and a 'great communicator' who connected Colombians' primary instincts with anger and fear. Furthermore, editor Marisol Gómez from *El Tiempo* (personal interview, July 11, 2019) highlighted that before the elections in public opinion were massive chains of messages on WhatsApp repeating the buzzword 'Castro-Chavismo regime:' "we (Colombia) are going to become Venezuela (Vamos a ser como Venezuela)." Finally, the 'No' vote claims also included contents warning voters about the 'homosexualization' of Colombia through the 'gender ideology' imposition in the peace agreement.

Through analyzing these circumstances around fake news from the perspective of Claire Wardle (2017, as cited in Bakir & McStay, 2018), this set of fake news represents what the opposition considered the tripartite threats to Colombian society: the FARC violence impunity, the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime, and communism, and finally, 'gender ideology' ideas with 'homosexualization' of society. This fake news stimulated false connections between media contents and misleading contexts. This information mixed genuine facts with incorrect contextual information and misled information to harm the peace agreement and the government negotiator. This fake news was one of the main components that disrupted the national plebiscite debate from the final agreement's concrete proposals. In the past, Colombian political debates informed potential voters and were led by opinion leaders, elites, and traditional mainstream media (F. Hernández, personal interview, July 22, 2019). Nowadays, digital movement building and social activism are taking advantage of the immediacy- 24 hours of information with full access, and low costs.

Moreover, media outlets' negative reputation tied to their political, economic, or religious ownership conditions decreases their public reputation. Fake news emerged as a strategy of the opposition to remind emotional and controversial debates within a long-term armed conflict with anonymity and less inhibited online people (Bakir & McStay, 2018). Following a globalized tendency, creators of the plebiscite fake news anticipated Colombians would easily engage with these contents. Thus, these contents would increase "misinformation, understood as the inadvertent online sharing of false information, and disinformation with the deliberate creation and sharing of information known to be false" (Bakir & McStay, 2018, p.159). By using fake news, people tended to have a 'confirmation bias' (R. Barreras, personal interview, July 12, 2019), "an unconscious propensity to search for, favor, recall, and interpret information in a way that confirms their previous beliefs and hypotheses while giving disproportionately less attention to alternative possibilities" (Alsaad et al., 2018, p. 42).

The fake news narratives portraying political and social transformations of society suggested Colombians would be losing their national identity for peace through: the FARC as 'terrorists,' but winners of the plebiscite elections, the shadow of Venezuela with the Castro-Chavismo coinciding with their massive 2.4 million of Venezuelans displacement (ACAPS, 2020), and the conservative unity of the family defeated by the propagation of homosexuality that would require the religious and right-wing political intervention in public institutions and policies. Fake news crystallized a list of collective imaginaries, fears, and ranges to dispute their votes against the government (J.F. Cristo, personal interview, July 2011, 2019). While fake news circulated on public opinion, the

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government 'trusted' private surveys published in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* with their final victory in the elections. For Barreras (personal interview, July 12, 2019), one of the surveys' inconsistencies was the lack of a measure of the 'shameful vote.' At that time, people would not even share their final vote decision. In fact, Jhon Torres, editor of *El Tiempo,* commented on this phenomenon by saying (personal interview, July 3, 2019): "there were people who, despite their understanding of the peace benefits, also thought over the costs that Colombia would assume for peace."

According to pastor Diego Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019), the Christian evangelical church was one of the 'No' vote actors that played a prominent role in legitimating fake news distorted contents. Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019) alleged that the church disseminated confusing chains of digital messages that mixed truths with lies on the WhatsApp and Facebook profiles of recognized pastors. Indeed, pastor Cañas remembered he and his wife, prophet Fulvia Arboleda de Cañas, participated in a 'committee' with the pastor and senator Jhon Milton Rodríguez of the right-wing political party Colombia Justa Libres. They were in charge of organizing and ordering pastors to disseminate information across Latin American countries through a WhatsApp chat group. As a result, fake news circulation in these hybrid communication networks raised concerns within pastors of different Christian evangelical churches across the country. Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019) highlighted that pastors were concerned about the truths and quality of the information regarding gender and sexuality before the plebiscite elections. The restricted WhatsApp groups that required private invitation were spreading massive fake news and strengthening a 'private' and

'intimate' disinformation campaign also divided opinions and perspectives within

national Christian evangelical churches (E. Castaño; D. Rodríguez, personal interviews,

June 26 and July 14, 2019; respectively). Digital networks helped to assemble the right-

wing leaders with followers for combating gender ideology but polarized the churches'

positions in the campaign against 'gender ideology' ideas. For instance, pastor Rodríguez

explained he left this campaign after the massive protests in August 2016 that he helped

to organize:

> The 'gender ideology' message was turning into a 'different campaign'
> with discriminatory statements that could harm the LGBT population, the
> non-governmental organizations that protect Colombian minorities, and
> the 'Yes' vote supporters. Thus, I preferred to organize workshops with
> my followers about the peace agreement's meanings and implications
> based on the bible. (D. Rodríguez, personal interview, July 14, 2019;
> translation mine)

Indeed, pastor Castaño (personal interview, June 26, 2019) also described how

WhatsApp and Facebook groups with 'gender ideology' messaging split pastors'

relationships due to their different perspectives of their vote in the plebiscite and the

existence of 'gender ideology' in the peace agreement.

> The church was resentful and estranged from its unity[…] We are not
> going to argue about those things about politics, the government. Let's
> focus on what is ours, the love of God, and human respect. (E. Castaño,
> personal interview, June 26, 2019; translation mine)

Additionally, pastor Castaño explained that they were also victims of technology.
He accused the LGBTI community of rejecting the campaign against 'gender ideology'
and hacking the Evangelical Confederation of Colombia (Confederación Evángelica de
Colombia, CEDECOL) website with explicit sexual images. However, there is no
evidence of this cyberattack (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019).

These circumstances suggest that 'gender ideology' messaging through fake news
were powerful and had a basic and unified structure to mobilize emotions and opinions.
According to Fabian Hernández, coordinator of the media research in the non-
governmental organization Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) (personal interview,
July 22, 2019), the author of digital chains spread by WhatsApp tends to be unknown.
The sender is a legitimate source of information, such as a family member or close friend
of the receptor (G. Parody, personal interview, July 23, 2019). These WhatsApp chains
of information followed a script to attract targeted audiences: elderly, retired people, and
relatives from the middle-class, with low academic background and scarce skills or
abilities to identify fake news and its dissemination. The chain messages tend to follow
this structure:

Hello (family member), (name of a friend), who works in (any organization of importance and reliability, for example, the prosecutor's office) tells me that (any plausible data in a tone of concern) a candidate is meeting with the systems manager to balance elections. My source's friend is reliable because he/she works directly in (name of the institution) -with a tone to reinforce the plausibility of the fact-; aunt/uncle (or relative) it seems to be very serious. So, tell everyone there at home (an actual physical place where you are daily) and tell everyone what is so. (F. Hernández, personal interview, July 22, 2019; translation mine)

The non-governmental organization MOE detected that this set of fake news circulating in the digital campaign against 'gender ideology' had a consolidated strategic logic of communication: a targeted specific adult group of potential voters, the sender was a reliable source, relative, or friend considered an opinion leader for the recipient, and the message seemed to be endorsed by official institutions and authorities that offered facts and reliable information. Simultaneously, these contents identified by the MOE tended to spread a fearful and frightened imminent tone in the contents. The fake news had an implicit 'rumor'-like tone that engaged the recipient quickly with basic language that was endorsed by their senders' confidence and trust. It is important to consider that recipients of the information are active actors looking to frame and create new meanings of any content against 'gender ideology' ideas and peace based on their experiences with armed conflict, personal background, religious, cultural, and intellectual knowledge.

This chain of digital messages against gender, suggested and proposed specific national political context framings. However, there is still no empirical evidence of their consequences on the audience and their voting behavior. This digital campaign against

'gender ideology' targeted an adult group to disseminate fake news to, who already might be skeptical and indifferent to peace negotiations after ten failed historical processes. Also, recipients of fake news could experience different types of connection with peace, the FARC trajectory in Colombian politics, the role of gender, and social media. Consequently, fake news of the opposition to the plebiscite confronted an active group of adult voters to rely on their sources' trust to interpret critical political elections aspects. The resistance created fake news to target an audience unexperienced about the scope, effects, and verification of social media platforms contents. At the same time, the campaign for the 'No' vote and against 'gender ideology' ideas transformed these unexperienced social media audiences into unintentional transmitters of disinformation. This WhatsApp chain of messages against the inclusion of 'gender ideology' and the final agreement generated a digital and brief conversation without arguments or a 'real' basis.

The intersection of these circumstances and the creation of a specific style and communication strategy in opposition to the plebiscite evidenced that 'gender ideology' messaging was a blind spot for the government, the women and LGBTI organizations, and journalists that did not unpack these campaign meanings and frames timely before the elections. They did not decode, elucidate, or investigate in depth the structure and functional logic of the campaigns' instruments for: contentious actions, the internal debates and goals of the right-wing network to contest the peace agreement, the specific construction of offline and online strategies, and their methods for persuading and dividing potential voters into segments from different national contexts through digital media platforms such as religion, political parties, and education. After a long-term

conflict, the key actors of the plebiscite debate thought Colombians would vote for peace. Still, they did not decipher how this 'gender ideology' messaging jeopardized the development of a fair plebiscite election, expanding the stigmatization of minorities and homophobia in national politics. This Colombian case also suggested how WhatsApp groups connected the country's urban and rural areas against gender and peace, which are areas that lacked governmental assistance to inform, solve, and attend communities' social problems.

4.2.3 An Imported Communication Pattern

According to former ministers, directors of non-governmental organizations, and scholars, the campaign's communication strategies against gender ideology are an imported pattern of similar transnational actions from right-wing networks and religious leaders during Latin American democratic processes (M. Sánchez; Gil Hernández; Parody, personal interviews, July 4, 9, and 23; respectively). This campaign is considered a 'repetitive formula' that rides the anti-gender movements' wave resisting norms and policies to promote gender diversity, equality, and inclusion (M. Sánchez, personal interview, July 4, 2019). The Colombian campaign connected through WhatsApp with international anti-gender movements and campaigns. For instance, Moscoso, director of the non-governmental organization Ámalos and activist in the campaign against 'gender ideology,' has been participating in the WhatsApp groups 'Gender Ideology No More' (No más ideología de género) and 'America for the family' (América por la Familia). The latest group was created by a mother concerned about the risks and effects of gender

ideology in society. Moscoso (personal interview, July 19, 2019) explained that the group 'Gender Ideology No More' has 34 participants and 'America for the family,' 106 participants, including reputable activists, popular politicians, opinion leaders, friends, and pro-life and pro-family followers. All participants are people engaged in education and combating what they consider the 'gender ideology' expansion (C. Moscoso, personal interview, July 19, 2019).

The dynamics of these WhatsApp groups also reveal the consolidation of a transnational elite network of power. Edgar Patiño, former President of the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (OBED) and activist Moscoso (personal interviews, June 25 and July 19, 2019; respectively), explained these digital conversations against 'gender ideology' are restricted to invited and verified followers, professionals, and participants of meetings and pro-life and pro-family congresses and meetings organized by anti-gender movements and campaigns from Argentina, Perú, Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay, Panama, Costa Rica, and Colombia. These Latin American digital networks are then composed of clusters of right-wing leaders that tend to come from upper-middle classes and elites, with high levels of education, some form of authority, and political power in their regional contexts. For instance, Patiño (personal interview, June 25, 2019) highlighted that Fabricio Alvarado, a popular former presidential candidate of Costa Rica, and the lawyer Beatriz Mejía from Perú are some of the social media group participants. Moreover, these activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in Colombia recognized that these digital chains of messages keep participants updated on activities,

articles, massive manifestations, protests, meetings, among others (E. Patiño; C. Moscoso, personal interviews, June 25 and July 19, 2019; respectively).

While this Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' connected with similar Latin American anti-gender activists, WhatsApp groups disseminated networks of fear, "a terrain upon which fake news proliferate" (Oliveira Kalil, 2018, p. 22). For Moscoso, these digital groups were implemented as "counter-platforms for critical cases." Colombian anti-gender activists participate in online discussions about Argentina's abortion rights with the green tide movement. Then, Moscoso (personal interview, July 19, 2019) explained that they organized counter answers with the blue tide of Christian evangelical groups called 'Let's save both lives' ('Salvemos las Dos Vidas'). Therefore, WhatsApp groups were key platforms to dispute what cases that the campaign against 'gender ideology' identified with urgent consideration to nourish their public agenda: abortion rights, feminist discourse, women's and LGBTI rights movements, comprehensive sex education, and the deconstruction of the family shaping a transnational Latin American agenda (Oliveira Kalil, 2018; E. Patiño; C. Moscoso, personal interviews, June 25 and July 19, 2019; respectively). The Colombian campaign also connected to the Spanish network against 'gender ideology' expansion called CitizenGo.[18]

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[18] CitizenGo is a community of active citizens who work together, using online petitions and action alerts as a resource, to defend and promote life, family, and liberty. We work to ensure that those in power respect human dignity and individuals' rights. CitizenGo influences institutions, governments and organizations in 50 different countries (CitizenGo, 2020)

These transnational and digital networks of communication filtered their participants regarding their commitments, engagement, and affiliation with anti-gender movements and campaigns against 'gender ideology.' In Colombia, interested participants must be associated with a church or have a stable and closed relationship with their religious leaders. Using this hierarchy of power to centralize communication, these right-wing key actors create a virtual society with specific roles and rituals on what to communicate and who can spread any discourse (Mills, 2003). Then, these narratives transmitted power and knowledge of certain elite actors with status and recognition that determined who can talk and who must listen (Mills, 2003). These right-wing digital campaigns established a vertical communication structure and altered gender knowledge in 'dogmas.' Specific international authorities and experts in positions of power were in charge to speak. The articulation of these transnational digital networks and online strategies construct a hierarchical communication of political and religious authority in the Colombian campaign.

Using this centralized power and knowledge of right-wing leaders in digital networks and WhatsApp groups for disseminating fake news, this campaign persuaded and attracted the interest beyond right-wing religious believers, churches, and activists. These transnational campaigns also attracted parents, teachers, scholars, and schools, who ended up being potential voters in democratic processes and shared a social group identity, a membership, and an ideology as a digital social movement (Bennett & Segerber, 2012). Consequently, the 'gender ideology' transnationalization helped the Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' to create connectedness, trusted

relationships, and knowledge mediation (Barbosa & Milán, 2020). In sum, the right-wing network weaponized gender to prevent a final peace agreement with 'digital militias' on WhatsApp, who spread misleading content across the country (Dimenstein, 2019). For instance, Parody highlighted that in her role as Minister of Education, she publicly reported an attorney general office employee for spreading messages against 'gender ideology' around the education manual in social media (Parody, personal interview, July 23, 2019). These digital militias can even work at the government's core and among official institutions and are focused on attacking anyone seen as an 'enemy' of their sociopolitical and economic ideals (Dimenstein, 2019).

These messages circulating on WhatsApp networks blurred any alternative political imaginaries of gender equality and strengthened digital activism the organization of the campaign's actions against 'gender ideology. Connectivity in digital platforms facilitates the transnational communication of right-wing networks. People connect through common lifestyles, the immediacy of their responses, and their connectedness with 'private' or 'personalized' groups based on feelings of belonging, unity, emotions, passions, and feelings against particular shared grievances (Barbosa & Milán, 2020). Hence, right-wing networks make their followers believe that they could immediately achieve their campaigns' goals through their active digital participation (Martínez, 2018).

CONCLUSION

In a globalized world, social networks have altered the power, meaning, and value of traditional media. According to editor Marisol Gómez from *El Tiempo* (personal interview, July 11, 2019), "we are in a real crisis, and the agreement's opponents were super effective on social networks." However, social media in Colombia is only part of the story behind the 'No' vote victory in the plebiscite, the success of its new digital actions modified anti-gender movement building, and right-wing networking across Latin America. Gender was strategically framed in a 'private' digital campaign as a weapon of contentious action at the political core of anxieties surrounding family and sexual difference. The campaign against gender ideology also questioned potential voters about gender as a structural component that could define Colombian society due to the final agreement changing traditional gender norms (F. Gil Hernández, personal interview, July 9, 2019).

The plebiscite opposition underscored gender as an 'intimate' and an 'emotional' topic in the offline and online worlds. The frames, meanings, performances, icons, and symbols of this campaign against 'gender ideology' evidenced how the campaign against 'gender ideology' took advantage of the lack of prompt responses from the government about the prominence of gender and the gender perspective for the construction of a peaceful society. Despite the non-governmental organizations' efforts like the MOE warning voters about the circulation of fake news and disinformation, the mainstream

media was disconnected from gender issues online. Hence, the media outlets should also reflect on their role in covering the plebiscite campaigns and reputation as the government's allies.

This digital campaign against 'gender ideology' activated 'digital militias' (Dimenstein, 2019) composed of right-wing key actors, such as former presidents, political parties, private schools, and activists against the final agreement in restricted WhatsApp groups. This 'virtual militancy' (Dimenstein, 2019) permeated the public debate through social media platforms to prevent an agreement with the FARC and implement the gender perspective. The circulation of fake news and disinformation was a communication strategy in which 'gender ideology' ideas complemented and overlapped with the tripartite threats to Colombian society defined by the opposition.

The 'private' digital campaign against 'gender ideology' was dedicated to confronting whoever was against their political and religious ideals and goals. The hybrid communication network against 'gender ideology' became a public adversary of recognition and the inclusion of women and the LGBTI community in the final agreement. This campaign also used digital media platforms to spread moral panic of communism, homosexuality, and the FARC in national politics. With basic and concise messages on WhatsApp, the private campaign against 'gender ideology' promoted homophobia and unequal participation and recognition of women and minorities in the peace agreement and elections. This Colombian case suggests the urgent need to debate the protection of privacy, data rights, and fact-checking during political campaigns and digital activism. Otherwise, right-wing networks and transnational movements will

identify these political opportunities in local and national contexts to exert their

contentious repertoires, assuming a biased and harmful leadership to protect elites'

interests and prevent gender policies.

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Chapter 5

MEDIA BLIND SPOTS: HOW NEWSPAPERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE WOMEN AND LGBTI ORGANIZATIONS OVERLOOKED THE DIGITAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST 'GENDER IDEOLOGY' AND ENABLED ITS MESSAGES

The two most popular Colombian newspapers *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo,* openly supported the 'Yes' vote in the plebiscite in the news stories published between August 24 and October 2, 2016. The content analysis of 301 randomly selected news stories, my archival creation, and my set of interviews demonstrated how both newspapers tended to use an optimistic tone about the historical election for peace. This chapter examines how the campaign against 'gender ideology' was a blind spot in both mainstream media sources that complemented fake news around the tripartite threats to Colombian society: the imposition of the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime and communism, the FARC impunity to participate in Colombian politics, and the inclusion of 'gender ideology' in education and politics. Two months before the elections, the campaign against 'gender ideology' took advantage of political opportunities in the media coverage, the lack of infrastructure and regulation of social media campaigns in the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE), and the lack of concrete explanations on the peace agreement before the elections.

The communication style and the technical information production in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* ended up overlooking the scope, goals, objectives, and effects

of this 'gender ideology' messaging for gender policies and peacebuilding. According to former Minister of Education Gina Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019), *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* lacked investigation. They missed digging on 'gender ideology' narratives circulating in public opinion, protests, and fake news disinformation on uncontrolled social media platforms before the elections. Instead of covering victims, survivors, and minorities who experienced the armed conflict, both newspapers framed the plebiscite in a confrontational coverage, emphasizing political disputes between elite right-wing politicians such as former President Álvaro Uribe and former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez against the government and the final agreement with the FARC. Moreover, the confrontational coverage transformed the political elites into the most frequent news stories source. These elites were active supporters of the campaign against 'gender ideology.' They used their reputation, status, and positionality to strengthen a repetitive negative tone about the gender perspective in the media contents against the final agreement. The scarce media attention about 'gender ideology' messaging in 2.3% of the 301 randomly selected plebiscite news stories in both newspapers suggested the lack of media preparation to cover gender issues. Their news stories ended up repeating the same negative language of the opposition and redefining their political identity in Colombian politics.

The Agenda-setting and frames of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo's* plebiscite information indicated that the right-wing network used the confrontational coverage as a 'sounding boards' of homophobia for contesting the government's gender equality policies in the final agreement. The campaign's right-wing leaders against 'gender

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ideology' consolidated their transnational communication network, encouraging emotional reactions over factual and critical political debates. This disconnection between traditional media with 'private' digital campaigns and its right-wing networks proposes future analyses of the traditional mass media redefinition for surveillance and the need for verification of political struggles that may overlap with their owners' private interests, public interests, and journalism mission.

Furthermore, the audience waited for a prompt and articulated statement regarding this disinformation campaign against 'gender ideology.' However, the government and women's and LGBTI rights activists also missed the impact of this hybrid communication network and online campaigns connecting sociopolitical and cultural effects to fears about the FARC's imaginaries, 'Castro-Chavismo,' homophobia, and gender diversity. Minister of Education, Gina Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) explained that the government ended up using "the same language of the enemy" and lacked public counterstrategies to explain the significance of this historic vote for the inclusion of women and minorities after 52 years of armed conflict. Thus, political actors and institutions are now being called to revise regulation policies of digital contents for political campaigning, the construction of public communication strategies, the definition of their audiences and access to rural and urban areas, and the use of technical language to prevent the instrumentalization of gender, women's and LGBTI rights as contested categories within religious and political elites for discrimination.

5.1 The Newspapers' Agenda and Media Regulation

In the globalization era, newspapers are still considered the main gatekeepers to the public debate and the primary agenda-setters of political deliberation (Blach-Ørsten, 2013; Skogerbø & Krumsvik, 2015; Vonbun et al., 2016, as cited in Sjøvaag & Pedersen, 2019, p. 216), while social media only makes echo of traditional media's agenda (Djerf & Shehata, 2017; as cited in Su & Borah, 2019, p. 236-237). According to Maxwell McCombs (2014), "the media agenda helps public opinion organize their agendas and decide which issues are most important." In the production of news stories, the media assigns affective and cognitive attributes to shape the most prominent themes through the implicit sources of information and journalists' positive or negative tones implicit in public issues' news stories. The framing of news articles defines social issues and influences public opinion towards a particular perspective or solution. Consequently, "setting the agenda of attributes for an issue is the epitome of political power. Controlling the perspective of the political debate on any issue is the ultimate influence on public opinion" (McCombs, 2014, p. 51). The final agreement's ratification depending on the plebiscite victory was at the core of the mainstream newspapers' coverage.

This historic election had a narrow window for campaigning and the government 'improvised' control mechanisms in the national debate. Former judge Armando Novoa from the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) [19] explains,

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[19] Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is an autonomous and independent part of the Electoral Organization and the National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil). The CNE is constituted by nine judges elected by the Colombian Congress for a period of four years (Consejo Nacional Electoral, 2021). The CNE

"Colombia is a country that holds many elections but has no rules." A month before the elections, CNE issued Resolution 1733 to organize and supervise political propaganda dissemination through the mainstream media for a general national audience (See Appendix B.4. The CNE Resolution 1733). The CNE Resolution was adopted before the preliminary version of the agreement was signed by the involved parties (A. Novoa, personal interview, July 24, 2019). Thus, the media needed to be prepared to cover the 'Yes' and the 'No' vote, in which the government would work with public institutions and financial structures to promote peace. Resolution 1733 was focused on surveillance and control of the campaign's dynamics, including traditional media outlets such as radio, television, and press to disseminate the plebiscite campaigns' contents. The document indicates the maximum number of radio spots and advertisements of the printed media's plebiscite campaigns. Written and printed publications of wide circulation were allowed up to twelve news stories as large as one page per issue, and for other levels of circulation, it was up to eight news stories. The media outlets and advertisement agencies would

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issued the resolution 1733 on August 2016 (See Appendix B.4. The CNE Resolution 1733), in which establish the rules of surveillance, control, and inspection of the electoral organization ensuring guarantees in electoral processes for the rights of minorities and the opposition, regulation of the media use, political parties and movements in terms of national number of committees, participation of government officials in the 'Yes' and 'No' campaigns, use of political logos, requirements for conducting national surveys, participation of governmental employees in campaigns, the use of billboards, and the balanced access of campaigns to the traditional media sources to guarantee pluralism and impartiality before the elections (See Appendix B.4. The CNE Resolution 1733).

report to the CNE the number of spots, billboards, and advertisements published the first

two days of the week.

The CNE judges criticized this Resolution due to the rapid development of the

plebiscite elections coverage. There were tensions between CNE and the media outlets.

The non-governmental organization Foundation for Press Freedom (Fundación para la

Libertad de Prensa, FLIP, 2016) released a press statement indicating that the evaluation

of impartiality and integrity of media contents could not measure with a numerical or

quantitative evaluation, like the number of space or times of coverage of each campaign.

The media opposed constructing the weekly report ordered by CNE with a description of

broadcasts or publications' times and spaces that covered any of the campaigns. Although

the CNE required a technical team of experts to update these plebiscite traditional media

contents, judge Novoa (personal interview, July 24, 2019) explained that this institution

lacked human resources to weekly fulfill this task.

> An electoral campaign without rules and authority of regulation, what happens? It is as if you go to a boxing ring and allow them to punch each other and take out rods and stab each other, bite each other's ears; the winner would be the most powerful, most potent, and most astute. (A. Novoa, personal interview, July 24, 2019; translation mine)

Despite the non-governmental organization Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP, 2016) massive use of the internet in Colombia, one of the South American countries with the highest mobile internet rates with 65% of the population (Chevalier, 2021), the CNE resolution omitted to regulate social media platforms. The plebiscite opponents and anti-gender activists took advantage of this political opportunity, and fake news was already circulating on WhatsApp. With this resolution focused on traditional mass media, journalists feared the government's control to censor specific contents on the plebiscite. The media considered this resolution would violate the freedom of speech and jeopardize the democratic process. These media rules for the plebiscite campaigns were portrayed as detrimental to journalism freedom. Meanwhile, these digital plebiscite campaigns against gender and the FARC's final agreement became a blind spot for *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* in the plebiscite coverage before the elections. Both newspapers set a supportive agenda for the final agreement and disregarded the digital conversation scope between the right-wing elite networks, the campaign against 'gender ideology,' and public opinion.

5.1.1 Newspapers Supported the Plebiscite

National journalism faced major challenges in covering the first historic peace elections in Colombia due to the lack of clarity to fulfill the requirements of Resolution 1733, the government's investment in achieving their victory in the plebiscite, and the limited period. *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo's* agenda publicly favored the 'Yes' vote campaign with positive statements. These affective attributes indicate the journalist's tone

or sentiment in the plebiscite news stories (Shah et al., 2003)[20]. The quantitative analysis of sentiment scores through the software Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) indicate the average of the sentiment score is related to proportions that range from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to 0% of all words, either positive or negative in an article about a given topic, and 1 corresponding to 100% of the words was either positive or negative of that opinion topic. This analysis created a single news article sentiment score based on four main aspects using the difference between these positive and negative sentiment percentages. First, these findings are sensitive to the size of news stories collected in each newspaper about the elections. Second, these findings indicate the use of relatively more positive or negative words per document regarding the informative context. Hence, these analyses do not necessarily evaluate the media source's positive or negative intention in the selected articles. Third, while the reported average of the sentiment scores for these news stories summarizes the contents with more positive sentiment, some of the underlying sources tended to have more negative words per document. Fourth, the association of sentiment values using words related to a more specific theme does not

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[20] The measure of sentiment score in terms of a news article's more positive or negative sentiment required a specialized dictionary. I chose the specialized dictionary ISOL (TIMM) in Spanish. The Spanish-language sentiment dictionary has more than 2,509 positive words such as competent (competent), liberado (liberated), magnífico (magnificent), optimista (optimist), etc.; and 5,626 negative words defined in its sentiment score dictionary such as borroso (blurred), condena (condemn), denigrar (denigrate), egoísmo (selfishness), interferir (interfere), etc.

necessarily mean that the latter was the main object of (positive or negative) discussion in that particular publication or article.

El Espectador had a score of 1.41, and *El Tiempo had a* 1.24 in positive language in the plebiscite news articles before elections. *El Espectador* discussed the plebiscite more positively than did *El Tiempo.* Additionally, the random sample of plebiscite news stories published in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* tended to use an average sentiment score of 1.32 in two broad classes of words: positive sentiments to highlight the significance of the 'Yes' vote in the elections for the construction of a peaceful society and negative sentiments to neutralize the negative campaigning against the plebiscite. When Juan Carlos Vélez, director of the 'No' vote campaign in the right-wing political party Centro Democrático (personal interview, July 7, 2019) was asked about the positive tone of the plebiscite coverage, he explained the newspaper editorials evidenced their support for the agreement's ratification. Similarly, Alfredo Molano Jimeno, the editor of the section 'Politics' in *El Espectador,* argued the newspaper's editorial position encouraged and supported journalists to cover the 'Yes' campaign positively.

The media has a long tradition of taking a political and ideological position when it comes to national political processes coverage. The director defines it through editorials in general terms: it is not that they tell journalists outright which position to take. For example, Molano stated,

I always clearly supported that I believed in the peace agreement. One feels helped to write with a specific tone and a particular focus, and this is a product of the newspaper director's decision through the editorial." (A. Molano, personal interview, July 9, 2019; translation mine).

Likewise, Marisol Gómez, former editor of *El Tiempo* (personal interview, July 11, 2019), argues that newspapers sometimes need to take positions, especially when it is for a peace agreement after 50 years of an armed conflict. Hence, the plebiscite news stories' production reveals specific techniques for constructing information and unveils journalistic objectivity limits after being professionally and personally exposed to the persistent Colombian violence and editorial ideals. In limiting objectivity, both newspapers used specific words in the selected news stories such as: FARC, Gobierno (government), Santos (President Juan Manuel Santos or relatives), Presidente (President), Acuerdo (agreement), plebiscito (plebiscite), política (politics), Colombiano (Colombian), Uribe (referencing former President Álvaro Uribe), Guerra (war), and conflicto (conflict). Figure 5.1. illustrates the use of these words below:

Figure 5.1. The Most Frequent Words in the Entire Corpus in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*

Meanwhile, víctimas (victims) of the armed conflict, guerrilla (guerrilla group), and justicia (justice) were mentioned with a low frequency, and género (gender), LGBTI, and mujeres (women) were the scarcest used words in the 301 plebiscite news stories. The news stories' contents anticipated that the plebiscite coverage key players were elite politicians such as Santos and Uribe. The positive words with implicit sentiments in the news stories demonstrate the newspapers spread their supportive position among news stories. Their journalists covered the plebiscite while defending their perspectives in the

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elections. Juan Fernando Cristo, former Minister of Interior and one of the peace negotiations participants, recognizes that the government identified *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* as "friends of the peace agreement" and were prone to support the 'Yes' vote without excluding the 'No' campaign coverage.

5.2   Media Overlooked 'Gender Ideology' Ideas

Despite *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo's* public support for the peace plebiscite in their news stories, these media outlets overlooked disinformation and fake news associated with the campaign against 'gender ideology' on social platforms, such as WhatsApp. References to gender ideology were only found in eight news stories (or 3% of this sample). Thus, this campaign included in the 'No' vote public statements was not a central focus of media coverage. *El Espectador* published seven (3.2%) from 217 news articles to dispute the opposition's tripartite enemy of the Colombian society included in the final agreement: the emergence of the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime and communism among the discussions of being homosexual in the Colombian peace process and plebiscite, the development of 'gender ideology' ideas to distort the gender perspective prominence in the final agreement, and the FARC impunity to support the 'gender ideology' inclusion in what the opponents to the plebiscite called the final 'Santos-Timochenko agreement.

In addition, other sections of *El Espectador's* news stories associated with 'gender ideology' ideas explained the closed relationship between right-wing politicians, such as former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez, with pastors from Christian evangelical

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churches, and emphasized the impact of the recognition of the LGBTI community in the Colombian Caribbean as victims of the armed conflict, and the effects of the sentence in favor of Sergio Urrego[21] in framing gender equality in the final agreement and peacebuilding. Meanwhile, *El Tiempo* published only one opinion column (1.2%) within the set of 84 news stories written by former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez, a key public player of the No vote campaign, about his legal, political, and moral reasons for the 'No' vote in the plebiscite.

While these figures were small relative to my analyzed news stories' main themes, these observed instances suggested that a noticeable degree of attention was afforded to 'gender ideology' statements as a secondary topic within the two most prominent printed media sources with different engagement levels and informative scope. These news stories also demonstrated how both newspapers underestimated the campaign against 'gender ideology's effects in the final agreement and the plebiscite outcome. Therefore, this blind spot showed the disconnection between mainstream newspapers with the public opinion debates in 'real life' and digital campaigns and their specific style of plebiscite coverage.

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[21] Sergio Urrego was a student who committed suicide because of the bullying based on his homosexuality in his Catholic school in Bogotá in 2014. The Colombian Constitutional Court ordered in a final sentence to the Ministry of Education the revision of the education manual for gender equality, gender diversity, gender identity, and prevention of discrimination in all Colombian public schools (Colombia Diversa, 2021).

5.3 The Confrontational Coverage

El Espectador and *El Tiempo*'s coverage emphasizes political disputes between the government. Campaigning for the 'Yes' and the 'No' vote split their editorial interests for peace. Both newspapers publicly supported the plebiscite but ended up shaping the plebiscite news stories by focusing on confrontational coverage. These political clashes were often included in the same or different news articles in both newspapers. Minister Cristo explained that facing the confrontational climate toward the peace agreement was not the most convenient, but it became inevitable. Both newspapers became sounding boards for the confrontations between right-wing elites' leaders instead of proposing a broader social debate. The plebiscite coverage favored the opposition and activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology,' while their style of producing information blurred their supportive intentions in the election's outcome.

As Figure 5.2 illustrates, *El Espectador* published 104 (48%) stories of its 217 news articles about the political coalitions between former Colombian presidents such as Andrés Pastrana and Álvaro Uribe. They are members of different political parties (Pastrana from the Conservative political party and Uribe from the right-wing Centro Democrático) to support and promote the 'No' vote in the elections. *El Tiempo* covered former presidents' political coalitions against the plebiscite elections' victory and final agreement in a low frequency in seven (8.3%) news stories. These confrontations were attractive to the media due to the participation of elite politicians and opinion leaders of Colombian politics, Christian evangelical pastors of megachurches, private schools with religious affiliation, and anti-gender activists. These influential actors were recognized as

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movement entrepreneurs that oriented the 'No' campaign's frames toward action based on "the intersection between a target population's inherited culture and its values and goals" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 145).

Figure 5.2. The Most Frequent Plebiscite Themes Covered in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*

For instance, the news story "Début de Ordoñez y Uribe en contra del Acuerdo de Paz" (Ordoñez and Uribe's debut against the peace agreement; translation mine) in *El Tiempo* on September 26, 2016; explains the political repercussions of the mobilization promoted by Ordoñez and Uribe against the peace agreement in Cartagena, in the north of Colombia:

> Uribe and Ordoñez not only consolidated themselves as the most radical opponents of the agreement (The 'No' in the plebiscite), but they fed the necessity of an expectation for a political deal to continue rejecting ex-combatants from entering civil life. The mobilization that Uribe and Ordoñez led in Cartagena yesterday was against the act of signing the peace agreement of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC in front of representatives of victims, social and political sectors, armed forces, and the international community. It is also a new step on the path to rejecting the agreement. (*El Tiempo*, 2016b; translation mine)

Another news story called "No tengo tiempo para aceptar ningún debate": Santos sobre invitación de Uribe" ("I do not have time to accept any debate": Santos about Uribe's invitation; translation mine) published in *El Espectador* on September 20, 2016, covered how President Santos rejected a public debate proposed by Uribe to discuss the 'Yes' and 'No' vote in the plebiscite to endorse the final agreement:

"[…] When would I accept a debate? I do not have time; I have been waiting to discuss this peace process with my opponents for four years," argued the mandatary. (President Santos) he was always receptive to dialogue with the opponents of the peace process to explain each point, but this never happened. (*El Espectador*, 2016a; translation mine)

Meanwhile, *El Tiempo* framed the plebiscite information through Colombians' positive voting intentions, which suggest an imminent interest of the newspaper in the 'Yes' victory amongst readers. This newspaper published 34 (40.5%) news stories based on a survey conducted by Datexco and IPSOS in Colombia's capital cities in September 2016. This newspaper privileged the peace agreement's effects in Colombia in 14 (16.7%) news articles, and it was the only media source that published news stories of the debate over the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)[22] in 7 (12%) of the pieces. *El Espectador* also covered the significance of the plebiscite as a historic vote in 33 (15.2%) news articles, the effects of the peace agreement in the construction of a peaceful Colombian society in 24 (11%) news stories, and the organization of the plebiscite elections, which covered the media rules for the coverage of the electoral campaigns, security for people to vote across security, reports of events of corruption in specific

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[22] Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) (The Colombia's Special Jurisdiction for Peace) was created in the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. This institution investigates, prosecutes, and punishes responsible of human rights violations committed during the armed conflict. Moreover, JEP protects the rights of victims for justice, truth, and reparation (International Court of Justice, 2019)

campaigns before the elections, absenteeism, proselytism, and the influence of tropical storm conditions within people to vote. This newspaper spread 15 (7%) news stories covering the FARC intentions to seek forgiveness within the armed conflict victims in the peace negotiations.

Consequently, both media organizations emphasized the significance of Colombians participating in a historic plebiscite decision to revert the violent conflict into the construction of a peaceful society. These topics of the media agenda also portrayed the FARC as one of the historic 'enemies' of Colombia seeking redemption through the emergent JEP, which also was the target of political confrontation by right-wing elites. Another news story called "No hay suficiente información" (There is not enough information; translation mine) was published in this newspaper on September 16, 2016. *El Tiempo* interviewed José Gregorio Hernández, former President of the Colombian Constitutional Court. Uribe proposed that Hernández discusses with President Santos and speakers of the 'No' vote campaign. Hernández argued his criticisms against the final peace agreement are strictly judicial and related to the creation of a model of 'special justice' to substitute the conventional justice system:

> The goal of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is to rule on the responsibility of perpetrators of the worst crimes against humanity and, consequently, if that court concludes that some of them have not been sanctioned by the rules of domestic law and justice has not been done, or there is impunity; obviously, you are going to learn about their behavior […] (*El Tiempo*, 2016c; translation mine)

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This confrontational scope and style of information production differed from *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo's* editorial supportive interests for peace. Their coverage ended up favoring political elites to contest power and gender, which attracted potential voters' attention. Even the openly support of both newspapers could be counterproductive for the ultimate plebiscite outcome. Minister Cristo indicated peace negotiators and the government were aware of the adverse effects of Colombians' apparently favorability in the Datexco and IPSOS surveys on voting intentions published in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*. They feared Colombians would skip going to the polls in the plebiscite elections due to the positive voting intention for the 'Yes' vote in the preliminary surveys' results.

5.3.1 Disinformation through Fake News

Despite the overall supportive coverage and agenda of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* in the plebiscite campaigns, their concentration on political disputes and voting intentions diverted their attention from fake news on social media for potential voters (Torres; Molano; Gómez; Cristo; Barreras; Parody, personal interviews, July 3, 9, 11, 12, and 23, 2019; respectively). Both newspapers ended up reinforcing the circulation of disinformation on the national debate rather than demystify it. Using the confrontational coverage in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*, the 'No' campaign's right-wing leaders shared their affinity and cultural similarities, diffused, and attracted public opinion attention to their messages. They contested sensitive national public opinion issues with emotions and critical meanings to justify their actions. The right-wing network took advantage of the main media blind spot in the lack of substantial journalism investigation about 'gender

ideology' ideas, the prominence of the gender perspective inclusion in the final agreement, and the lack of analyses on the expansion of the digital campaign against 'gender ideology' to add disinformation before the elections. The opposition expanded their agenda with fake news focused on their rejection of the final agreement and what they considered the tripartite threats of the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime in the country, the FARC impunity to participate in Colombian politics, and the 'gender ideology' invasion to impose homosexuality in classrooms.

The content analysis in the plebiscite news stories showed both newspapers presented different coverage levels with positive or negative tones about this set of fake news in the plebiscite coverage.

Figure 5.3. Correlation between Fake News' Score Levels and Positive or Negative Coverage in the Entire Corpus of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*

This correlation of the sentiment score with the matching individual attention score across my sample in *El Espectador* tended to have a positive tone in the news stories associated with the inclusion of gender diversity, and paradoxically, 'Castro-Chavismo' and the reported FARC impunity. When interviewed by these newspapers, ministers and politicians who participated in the peace process and the plebiscite campaign often mentioned keywords associated with this fake news to refute them in the agreement. My randomly selected plebiscite news stories indicated that the media did not investigate beyond the political contexts. Overall, the plebiscite news stories that included this set of

fake news reinforced the political disputes of right-wing elites and the 'No' vote campaign, their voices, and messages against peace and gender.

5.3.2 'Castro-Chavismo' and The FARC Impunity

Despite the different right-wing political and economic trajectories of Colombia, the fake news around 'Castro-Chavismo' shaped the public opinion with this term constructed with Castro's last names, associated with Fidel Castro, former Cuban revolutionary leader, and Hugo Chávez, former President of Venezuela (Rodríguez, 2017). Thus, the right-wing networks and the opposition to the plebiscite took advantage of the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis in Latin America and portrayed it as an 'imminent threat' for Colombia and its neighbors:

> 'Castro-Chavismo' is a rhetorical invention of right-wing political sectors, which has been spread through the mass media and social media, emphasizing the 'fateful future' for the left-wing political parties' votes. This term has been used primarily by former President and current Senator Álvaro Uribe to warn the population about Colombia's transformation into communism. (Serrano, 2017)

El Espectador tended to positively frame the news stories associated with the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime and the FARC impunity. When newspapers interviewed ministers and politicians who participated in the peace process, they often clarified and

refuted this fake news positively. For instance, a news story called "Así busca desmentir el Gobierno mitos sobre entrega del país al Castrochavismo" (This is how the government seeks to deny myths handing over the country to 'Castro-Chavismo,' translation mine) published in *El Espectador* on September 6, 2016, indicated how Minister Cristo explained the agreement terms amongst law students at Universidad del Externado in the Colombian capital, Bogotá. Minister Cristo explained the lack of coherence of 'myths' disseminated in the 'No' campaign about the participation of the FARC in the Congress following the peace agreement between both parties:

> Five in the senate and five in the house of representatives is an absolutely reasonable number. I do not think five senators and five representatives would lead this country to 'Castro-Chavismo.' On this subject, he stressed that it is not true that it (Colombia) is going towards 'Venezolanización,' as some members of Centro Democrático argue to scare people. (*El Espectado*r, 2016b; translation mine)

Marisol Gómez, the former editor of *El Tiempo* (personal interview, July 11, 2019), explained the opponents' and anti-gender activists' main concerns about signing a peace agreement supporting the FARC impunity to politically participate in Congress and transform Colombia into the 'Castro-Chavista' regime. In this sense, editor Molano of *El Espectador* (personal interview, July 9, 2019) also explained that fake news circulating on the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime imposition and communism stimulated

potential voters to mirror the Colombian political situation with Venezuela's current political and economic crises. Anti-gender activists feared these situations could be replicated after the peace agreement. Regarding the FARC political participation, pastor Edgar Castaño, President of the Evangelical Council's Colombian Confederation (Confederación Consejo Evangélico de Colombia, CEDECOL, personal interview, June 26, 2019), explained that he talked to President Santos about the ten assigned seats to the guerrilla in Congress as part of the final agreement. From his perspective, these actions dishonored the Colombian democracy because the FARC members such as Seuxis Pausias Hernández Solarte, aka 'Jesús Santrich'[23] are "women's killers and rapists," who would be legislating in the Congress with authority or right to do it (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019).

Based on this narrative and emotional symbolic 'threats,' the 'No' campaign also sought the support of Colombians who live in Venezuela and Venezuelans naturalized as Colombian citizens to actively share their experiences and vote in the plebiscite. According to Vélez (personal interview, July 7, 2019), "they considered the FARC like President Maduro and advocates of the Bolivarian Revolution." Moreover, Colombians

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[23] Seuxis Pausias Hernández Solarte aka 'Jesús Santrich' was a member of the central general commander of the FARC and negotiators in the 11th peace process. In August 2019, he appeared in a video with Iván Márquez and other dissidents of the extinct FARC guerrilla, announcing the birth of the 'Second Marquetalia' and his return to the armed struggle. He is currently a fugitive from justice and some hypotheses indicate 'Santrich' is a refugee in Venezuela under the protection of Nicolás Maduro government. In June 2020, the Attorney General announced the dismissal and disqualification of 'Santrich' from holding public positions (*La Silla Vacía*, 2020).

had imaginaries against the FARC nationalism and their communist perspective of politics, impacting their guerrilla's animosity (Corredor, 2020). When the newspapers tried to confront and contextualize these topics in the plebiscite news stories, the fake news was already disseminated on the 'private' right-wing groups of WhatsApp from the campaign against 'gender ideology.'

The Colombian government's response tried to reject disinformation. Still, they indirectly used the exact words associated with negative sentiments on 'Castro-Chavismo,' President Maduro, and Rodrigo Londoño, aka 'Timochenko,' one of the FARC commanders, etc., in the news stories in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo.* For instance, President Santos explained in the news story, "No tengo tiempo para aceptar ningún debate": Santos sobre invitación de Uribe" ("I do not have time to accept any debate": Santos about Uribe's invitation), published in *El Espectador* on September 20, 2016, that "we are not handing over our political system or private property, nor we are handing over to Castro-Chavismo." He added that the opposition to the plebiscite "must read the agreements to see that what they say is not true" (*El Espectador* 2016a; translation mine). Moreover, this fake news underlined the political differences to understand peace between the 'Yes' and 'No' vote campaigns. For instance, in an opinion column titled "El No, el Sí y la constituyente" (No, Yes, and the Constituent Assembly), published in *El Espectador* on September 8, 2016, former Colombian President César Gaviria indicated:

The country does need peace, and this process is well conducted and judicious. We need to end the permanent clashes that have existed due to the historical conflicts for the lands. We are a different society where the highest violence rate is in rural areas and not in cities. This country must recover those zones and bring society up to date to respond to all commitments. The arguments from those (supporters) of the 'No' are insufficient […] It is stupid to talk about 'Castro-Chavismo.' It has no base. They cannot be compared to President Santos with Maduro. And, only ex-president Uribe can come up with Havana's agreements that would give the Presidency of the Republic to Timochenko. (*El Espectador*, 2016c; translation mine)

Editors also discussed their role and accountability in the production of information covering these issues. Editor Gómez (personal interview, July 11, 2019) argued that journalism must learn from these inconsistencies to verify fake news and revise suggestive titles. This technical information production could confuse readers and consolidate the random use of 'popular' phrases and 'buzzwords' like 'Castro-Chavismo' that the audience enjoyed reading because 'Colombia is transforming into Venezuela.' As a result, Gómez in the interview emphasized that these narratives became truths, and journalists' efforts to explain their biased and noncoherent meanings were insufficient to convince readers. Meanwhile, *El Tiempo* disproportionately used negative words regarding the FARC impunity in the peace agreement. Editor Molano (personal interview, July 9, 2019) asserted that the parties involved in the peace negotiations and journalists were conscious that the FARC had a specific reputation that promotes negative public opinion for the elections (A. Molano Jiménez; M. Gómez, personal interviews, July 9 and 11, 2019; respectively).

Despite the efforts of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* news stories to explain the other side of the peace agreement's actors with explicit journalists' positive and negative tones, editor Gómez and judge Novoa (personal interviews, July 11 and 24, 2019) emphasized that the 'No' campaign insisted on portraying the FARC in news stories as a leader of war with extreme levels of humiliation such as child recruitment, kidnappings, many people extorted and disappeared, committed mistreatments across the country, and trafficking cocaine. Consequently, fake news around the FARC impunity for imposing 'Castro-Chavismo' included the governmental endorsement for recognizing gender diversity and inclusion of the 'gender ideology' threat.

5.3.3   Gender Diversity as a Threat

Overall, the campaign's coverage against 'gender ideology' in both media outlets tended to be negative and associated with the 'No' vote. *El Espectador* used a disproportionately larger share of negative words related to 'gender ideology' statements. *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*'s news stories openly refuted this disinformation on the pervasive effects of gender diversity and gender inclusion in the peace agreement using negative words. Plebiscite news stories that mentioned "El anticristo está en Colombia (The Antichrist is in Colombia) and there is no peace, it is a tramp (No es paz, es una trampa)" (*El Tiempo,* 2016; translation mine) were some of the popular phrases of Christian evangelical pastor Miguel Arrázola referencing President Santos and the opposition to the plebiscite. These news stories showed the confrontation between the campaigns and, simultaneously, how the 'No' vote supporters took advantage of this

media coverage to circulate emotions, meanings, and frames against gender, women's, and LGBTI rights.

Nevertheless, both newspapers lacked fact-checking, reviewing, investigating, and overlooked these social issues in the media agenda. For instance, *El Espectador* published on September 28, 2016; a news story called "La sentencia a favor de Sergio Urrego es una estocada de muerte al pluralism" (The sentence in favor of Sergio Urrego is a death thrust to pluralism; translation mine) based on academic reactions during XI Encuentro sobre la Jurisdicción Institucional:

> The former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez 'spoke his mind' against the sentence T-478 2015, which forced the school Gimnasio Castillo Campestre to ask for forgiveness due to the suicide of the homosexual student Sergio Urrego and called all schools to revise and adjust the education manual for respecting diversity […] The mediator of the debate was an international guest: Professor Joan Solaner Mullor, from Universidad Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. In fact, this professor recognized that the sentence discusses education, diversity, and defend sexual orientation. 'This is a debate that requires reflection, and each case is different,' said Professor Solaner Mullor.' (*El Espectador*, 2016e; translation mine)

In addition to the lack of investigation in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* on 'gender ideology' narratives against gender diversity in public education, the content analysis also suggested that these news stories related to the 'gender ideology' ideas in the peace

agreement were mainly discussed in other formats rather than news stories. For instance, Minister Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) highlighted that 'gender ideology' ideas and the discrete evolution of the 'gender ideology' campaign were discussed in opinion columns rather than interviews, reports, or traditional newspapers' articles. This disconnection between public opinion and the elites' debate in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*'s coverage stimulated the trivialization of gender issues as rumors from anti-gender activists and religious leaders. These circumstances reflect a tension between the media outlet's knowledge of gender policies, women's, and the LGBTI population's role in constructing peace with the Colombian mainstream journalism as impartial instruments of surveillance and investigation on democratic processes events.

5.4   Media Blindspot: 'Gender Ideology' Messaging

The main blind spot, 'Gender ideology' messaging against the plebiscite, in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* complemented the set of fake news disinformation around 'Castro-Chavismo,' the FARC impunity, and the controversies for accepting gender diversity before the elections. The low coverage of reactions, thoughts, and mobilizations offline and online against the term 'gender ideology' in both newspapers suggested the editorial's positions about the understanding and positionality of gender issues in the media agenda. According to the content analysis findings and Wilson Castañeda, director of the non-governmental organization Caribe Afirmativo (personal interview, July 10, 2019), *El Espectador* cited experts and scholars in the plebiscite news stories questioning the LGBTI movement and their role in the peace agreement, even after the elections.

Overall, this newspaper intended to clarify the misconception of gender as a 'dangerous ideology' in the plebiscite, while *El Tiempo* preserved neutrality and discretion about this topic. These observed instances of gender ideology discourse indicated that the two most prominent media sources varied in their attention and discourse levels.

The coverage of 'gender ideology' messaging in both newspapers' plebiscite news stories tended to have a negative tone due to the inclusion and citations of activists from the campaign against 'gender ideology' and promoters of the 'No' vote. Quotations of the plebiscite opponents indirectly popularized the simplification of 'gender' as a moral issue and peace as 'an impunity agreement with the FARC.' *El Espectador* published "Estoy seguro que va a ganar el 'No': Alejandro Ordoñez" (I am sure the 'No' will win: Alejandro Ordoñez; translation mine) on October 2, 2016; the former attorney general indicated he voted with joy and certainty while depicting the tripartite enemy and the emotional charge of the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime and communism, the FARC impunity, and the campaign against 'gender ideology' before the elections:

> There will be an avalanche of 'No' votes, a silent vote of people who, thank God, perceived what it was about [...] I come to fulfill the civic duty after having gone to mass, after having said 'Yes' to God and "No" to the Santos-Timochenko agreement. After saying 'Yes' to justice and 'No' to impunity for the Santos-Timochenko agreement. After saying 'Yes' to the family and 'No' to gender ideology in the 'Santos-Timochenko agreement.' (*El Espectador*, 2016d; translation mine)

Besides the opponent voices, *El Espectador* also provided a counter-perspective of the recognition of gender and the LGBTI population in the peace agreement and the plebiscite. Previously, Colombian peace negotiations misrecognized gender relevance into historical and cultural boundaries. Until 1991, the government recognized explicit guarantees for women's rights in the modified Constitution of Colombia of 1886. Since then, women have organized active and influential networks and groups around their gender identities and their unique experiences in the armed conflict in the previous peace negotiations (Rojas, 2009). These news stories provided that one of the discursive strategies of the right-wing network of the campaign against 'gender ideology' and the plebiscite was to condemn the inclusion of gender perspective through word search analysis. For instance, Juan Sebastián Jiménez Herrera published in *El Espectador* the news article "Castrochavismo, Gais, y Paz" (Castro-Chavismo, Gays, and Peace; translation mine) on August 28, 2016, which explained this condemnation of the inclusion of gender perspective strategy:

> Some people claim that the agreements seek to impose a 'gay dictatorship' […] The deputy from Santander Ángela Hernández, one of the most incredible supporters of this thesis, indicated she was very concerned that "they (the government) plan to include gender ideology in the Constitution through the plebiscite." As evidence of this, Hernández reported "the word 'gender,' which is not in our Constitution, it is 114 times in the final agreement; it would eventually be a special agreement." (Jiménez Herrera, 2016; translation mine)

In the meantime, *El Tiempo* published an opinion column called "Por qué el voto negativo" (Why is the negative vote; translation mine) where the former attorney general Ordoñez on October 2, 2016, is quoted as saying:

> As a grandfather and father of a family, I will definitely vote 'No' because, based on the agreement, it intends to elevate 'gender ideology' to the constitutional norm level. They (the parties of the agreement) invoke peace to steal children of their innocence and destroy the family. (*El Espectador*, October 2, 2016; translation mine)

Despite the dissemination of 'gender ideology' ideas in the plebiscite news stories in both newspapers, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* missed digging for the goals and operations of 'gender ideology' messaging and networking within the massive chains of online discussions and national protests. These newspapers assumed their readers would be on the same track with their editorial position to distinguish these right-wing network political dynamics to gain more conservative political power. The coverage of the campaign against 'gender ideology' created polarization and a confrontation of elite forces. For example, on one side, there were former Attorney General Ordoñez in two of the seven news stories published in *El Espectador,* former President Uribe, deputy Ángela Hernández, Christian evangelical pastors such as Eduardo Cañas and Jorge Gómez, Director of Christian Evangelical churches in Latin America and on the other side, the

voices of LGBTI rights activists such as Wilson Castañeda from the non-governmental

organization Caribe Afirmativo, lawyers Ramiro Bejarano and Mónica Roa, and scholar

Joan Solanes Mullor.

This style of information production diverted the balanced construction of precise

and valid contexts of facts for the national debate on gender in national politics. *El

Espectador* and *El Tiempo* relied on a different frequency of voices repeating emotional

and sensitive arguments that were already reinforced on an online campaign. Hence, both

newspapers were more of 'sounding boards' rather than an investigative and analytical

space to confront "gender ideology' messaging and influential right-wing actors

preventing the inclusion of women's and minorities' recognition. This recurrent use of

political elites as the most preferred source of information consolidated the

confrontational coverage, strengthening 'gender ideology' messaging as a blind spot in

the media agenda.

5.5 Political Elites as Sources of Information

In the framing of the newspapers' agenda, the type of information sources is

cognitive attributes selected by journalists or editors (Shah et al., 2003). Unsurprisingly,

the confrontational coverage tended to use elite politicians that participated in the

disputes. Thus, they became the most frequent sources of information. The most cited

source was the former Attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez with 23 news stories

published in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo.* The second most frequent source was

President Santos in 15 news stories and former President Álvaro Uribe in 13 news stories

in *El Espectador*. *El Tiempo* cited President Santos in five news stories, the former attorney general Ordoñez in four news articles, and Óscar Iván Zuluaga, former director of the right-wing political party *Centro Democrático* and former presidential candidate, in four news articles.

According to the content analysis findings, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* quoted 221 sources of the plebiscite elections. *El Espectador* used 160 and *El Tiempo,* 76 official sources linked to the government. The official sources of information had limited interests involved in the outcome of the plebiscite. They revealed partisan splits in the endorsement of these sources of information (i.e., significant divisions between former President Pastrana, a supporter of the 'No' vote, and the Conservative political party members' endorsement to the 'Yes' vote in the plebiscite). However, it is interesting that only *El Espectador* cited about seven victims of the armed conflict as sources of information within my sample. Moreover, there is no evidence of secondary sources, such as books or articles used in this set of plebiscite news stories across these two newspapers. Editor Molano and Minister Cristo (personal interviews, July 9 and 11, 2019; respectively) shared that Ordoñez was a popular source of information due to his radical positions and his visible participation and leadership in the campaign against 'gender ideology' across the country:

> The 'No' campaign created its own speakers and leaders; Ordoñez was there. He took away the legitimacy of the 'No' discourse for journalists

because he is a removed, controversial character with low popular support. In some ways, he can be mentioned a lot because this was a way to show who was with them, representing the most recalcitrant side of the Colombian right-wing, like Uribe. Thus, showing those two leaders, in some way, was characterizing the profile of the campaign. Meanwhile, Santos, obviously with the used President of a Republic's coverage, always talks about the benefits of peace since he was the natural leader of this project. (A. Molano Jimeno, personal interview, July 9, 2019; translation mine)

Although these elite politicians, such as Uribe and Ordoñez, and Christian evangelical pastors from megachurches, in their campaigns against the plebiscite, have enough recognition and status to share their narratives with full access to media sources, pastors believe this plebiscite media coverage harmed their public reputation and recognition as reputable politicians due to their participation in the 'No' vote and the campaign against 'gender ideology.' The visibility of these dominant voices from the opposition with their Catholic and political reputations could turn against their own image favorability (H. Pardo, personal interview, July 24, 2019). Pastors believed the traditional media coverage discredited the church, Catholic, and Christian evangelical believers in these political campaigns (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019). From their perspectives, the media used a 'mortal campaign' with reports of nepotist interests, conservative ideas, church affiliations, and 'Falsos Positivos'[24] (H. Pardo, personal

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[24] 'Falsos Positivos' is a practice carried out by military actors as extrajudicial killings of innocent civilians to be presented as guerrilla casualties in the middle of an alleged

interview, July 24, 2019). Instead, they preferred to disseminate their messages through

a digital campaign, especially on WhatsApp restricted groups to their followers and local

and international networks against 'gender ideology.'

The 'No' campaign took advantage of these opinion leaders' popularity to

permeate the national plebiscite debate with a unified narrative against peace with the set

of sensitive fake news:

> The 'No' campaign leaders used the term 'gender ideology' as a 'battle
> horse' […] 'Gender ideology' ideas were the component that connected
> them emotionally with the electorate, and this is how they increased their
> significant number of 'No' votes. The 'No' and the 'Yes' promoters
> understood differently the electoral process and how they campaigned. So,
> you saw Ordoñez and Uribe spreading flyers […] while President Santos
> did not do that, and when we talked about it (the plebiscite), we did not
> connect with the electorate. (J.F. Cristo, personal interview, July 11, 2019;
> translation mine)

The confrontational coverage, the lack of fact-checking, and contextualizing the

newspapers' plebiscite issues endorsed the powerful campaign against 'gender ideology.'

Where the confrontational coverage of the plebiscite in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* did

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fight against the terrorism (Londoño, 2011; Semana, 2008, as cited in Olarte-Sierra &
Castro Bermúdez, 2018).

not follow the campaign's development against 'gender ideology' on social media, Twitter was used as a source. Tweets were sources of the confrontational coverage, but both newspapers missed the campaign against 'gender ideology's presence online. These mainstream newspapers also cited the same right-wing politicians and guerrilla tweets as digital sources of information with low frequency.

El Espectador and *El Tiempo* ended up naming the guerillas FARC and ELN's optimistic announcements to construct peace while adding controversial statements of former Presidents Uribe, Pastrana, and former Director Zuluaga around the 'No' campaign and the apparent inconsistencies of the plebiscite elections. Twitter was a source of information in ten (3.3%) news stories of the plebiscite news stories sample. For instance, *El Espectador* used a tweet from the maximum commander of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño, aka 'Timoleón Jiménez,' who confirmed the organization of the last FARC Conference to end the guerilla discussions due to the signature of the peace agreement with the Colombian government in a news story from September 2, 2016. *El Espectador* also used another tweet from the FARC on October 2 about their optimistic plebiscite perspective and the hashtag #SíALapazEnColombia (#YesforPeace) with the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, *El Espectador* cited supporters of the 'No' campaign. A news story published on September 6 cited a tweet from the former President Uribe around removing the attorney general Ordoñez from his position. Meanwhile, *El Tiempo* quoted a tweet from the former President Pastrana replying to the chief negotiator for peace Humberto De la Calle's proposal for a 'calm debate' about the plebiscite in a news story published on September 15, 2016.

This style of coverage demonstrated how the elections for peace concluded, concentrating on an unbalanced dispute of political power between Colombian presidents:

> The most prominent opponent of this peace agreement was Álvaro Uribe. I do not think there is a better opponent than Uribe in Colombia. He knows how to make opposition because he does not care about creating fake ideas to oppose what he does not like. Every day, he works every hour, every second, to make opposition, and it is suitable for a politician. The questionable part is the unethical way because he created lies. (M. Gómez, personal interview, July 11, 2019; translation mine)

While *El Tiempo* shaped the plebiscite information from the perspective of leaders of the 'No' vote, *El Espectador* engaged with other sources with a low frequency, including former presidents, ministers, participants of the peace negotiations, and experts who scarcely participated in these political disputes but supported the 'Yes' vote actively. For instance, Minister Cristo and former President Gaviria were debating, neutralizing, and defeating the 'myths' and fake news in the plebiscite news articles. In the news story, "César Gaviria la emprendió contra el procurador Alejandro Ordoñez" (César Gaviria challenged the attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez; translation mine), published on September 7, 2016, the former Attorney general suggested the 'Yes' vote campaign was cheating:

And the former President went further by warning that the Attorney General, who 'clearly' is violating the ruling of the Constitutional Court, prevents the control bodies from participating in the political debate around the peace plebiscite. "The presidential rule was necessary for the view of the intimidating language that the Attorney General has been using to prevent officials from exercising their rights under the Constitutional Court ruling" (*El Espectador*, 2016d; translation mine).

The selection of information sources in both newspapers questions journalism ethics in framing the plebiscite contents. Editor Gómez (personal interview, July 11, 2019) argued that journalism missed the concrete discussion before the plebiscite elections: "the journalist is not there to decorate; the journalist's mission is to teach people to discern." These confrontational coverage production components reveal that the most prominent 'sin' of journalism was the concentration on 'who says this and what says that' without profound and convincing explanations (M. Gómez, personal interview, July 11, 2019). Despite the positive coverage of the plebiscite news stories in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo,* the campaign against 'gender ideology' was a media blind spot due to the disconnection of the offline and online media platforms, the lack of contextualization of fake news, and the media preference for right-wing elites' voices in plebiscite contents that diverted their editorial positions.

On the other hand, despite my content analysis results, Jhon Torres, editor of *El Tiempo* (personal interview, July 3, 2019), insisted this newspaper used diverse information sources but not limited to Uribe and Ordoñez in plebiscite stories. Torres emphasizes that *El Tiempo* included government representatives, social organizations,

victims' organizations, political analysts, experts in armed conflicts, and the FARC. This analysis demonstrates that women's and LGBTI's rights organizations, religious leaders, and anti-gender activists of the campaign against 'gender ideology' were consulted with a very low frequency in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo.* Castañeda, as Director of the non-governmental organization Caribe Afirmativo, was quoted in one of the 217 plebiscite news stories published in *El Espectador* two months before the elections. Director Olga Sánchez (personal interview, July 15, 2019) indicates that non-governmental organizations, such as La Casa de la Mujer, were not considered relevant sources for the media, despite their efforts to include women and minorities at the peace table the last 20 years.

Similarly to the non-governmental organizations' leaders religious leaders, Pastor Cañas, one of the most prominent promoters of the 'No' vote campaign, was quoted in one of the 217 plebiscite news stories in *El Espectador*. Pastors Castaño and Pardo (personal interviews, June 26 and July 24, 2019; respectively) shared that both newspapers "ignored them completely during the plebiscite campaigns." Overall, they believed these outlets have a specific treatment with religious leaders: "I was pursued personally by the media. They called me, and felt I was against them, they pressured me, that I was not a person with criteria, and we were against peace" (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019). However, Castaño in the interview argued that the Christian evangelicals were not against peace, and instead, they were against the process, which was flawed. In sum, they were convinced that both newspapers supported the 'Yes' vote

and preferred to interview experts, scholars, sociologists, or anthropologists to detract from the significance of the 'gender ideology' claims.

Regarding the FARC leaders as part of the peace negotiation and information sources, they were quoted in five (1.6%) of the 301 plebiscite news stories published by both news media online: Timoleón Jiménez was quoted in two (0.9%) news stories in *El Espectador,* and one in *El Tiempo.* Two (0.9%) news articles of *El Espectador* mentioned the secretariat higher command's member Iván Márquez. As one of the crucial parties of the peace negotiation with the Colombian government, the FARC was consulted as a group in one (1.2%) of the 217 news stories in *El Espectador.* It means the guerrilla was considered a source of information with a very low frequency than the Colombian political opposition's previous results.

This content analysis finding suggested the traditional media prevented the coverage of the FARC's reactions or campaigning for peace due to their trajectory in the Colombian armed conflict, previous unsuccessful peace processes, and war effects within the society. Editor Torres explained, "the FARC was not necessarily our main source of information because we tried to cover from the middle (of the plebiscite) with impartial people, who could share the good and the bad things" (J. Torres, personal interview, July 3, 2019). The government recognized that if the FARC promoted an active campaign in the mainstream media before the elections, it could be detrimental for the plebiscite results (J.F. Cristo, personal interview, July 2011, 2019). The government never wanted to be aligned with the FARC. They only appeared together at the very end, so it risked

credibility on a large part of the peace process, taking oxygen away from the FARC. The

eventual appearance that was made by the government showed them as:

> When Romaña (one of the FARC commanders), 'the bloodthirsty' came
> to the table and that was reported to the media outlets, the government's
> lobby with 'Santrich' said that he is unbearable and detestable. (This) had
> a very negative effect on the table. Nobody was willing to concede
> anything to the FARC, and the 'No' (campaign) exploited it very well. (A.
> Molano Jimeno, personal interview, July 9, 2019; translation mine)

Overall, the FARC as a source of information in the analyzed news stories

demonstrated the newspaper's style to illustrate peace proposals assigning roles of

'enemy,' 'participant,' or 'ally' in the plebiscite context. Therefore, the FARC could not

exert any proselytizing activity because they did not lay down their arms during the

negotiations (A. Molano, personal interview, July 9, 2019). The FARC did not promote

any campaign, and they were not public figures of the plebiscite until they signed the first

version of the agreement with the government in September and the final revised version

in November 2016. On the other hand, media outlets could also be forewarned to cover

the guerrillas. Editor Gómez (personal interview, July 11, 2019) pointed out the FARC

committed terrorist attacks across Colombian history, and these events had a relevant cost

in the media coverage. Moreover, Gómez (personal interview, July 11, 2019) indicated

that at the beginning of the peace negotiations, the FARC did not know how to participate

in politics. When the rebels participated in the media interviews or were quoted during the peace negotiations, the FARC disseminated an 'archaic and anachronist discourse.' Later, when the campaigns spread their vote messages to public opinion, the FARC remained silent (M. Gómez, personal interview, July 11, 2019).

Beyond the FARC's support of the inclusion of a gender perspective in the final agreement to address human rights violations, there was no empirical evidence about the FARC's female or male leaders' opinions or statements about this topic and the dissemination of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in this research. This guerrilla group is a hierarchical organization that defined who talked to and selected the media sources, which also involved a definition of the rebels' role in the media coverage. For instance, Castañeda, director of Caribe Afirmativo, explained the female insurgents participated in the gender discussions of the agreement. Still, their commanders probably did not allow them to speak to the media or participate in conversations on rural reform and political participation (W. Castañeda, personal interview, July 10, 2019). Finally, both newspapers cited the FARC in news stories restricted to judicial processes and their support to plebiscite campaigns.

5.6   The Government, Women's and LGBTI Organizations Lacked Counterstrategies

El Espectador and *El Tiempo's* plebiscite information production's communication style and conditions also demonstrated the campaign against 'gender ideology' was also a blind spot for the government and women's and LGBTI

organizations. They could not decipher the powerful socio-cultural and political

components of the campaign against 'gender ideology' and its hybrid communication

networks from education, politics, and religion in the online and offline worlds promptly.

Former Ministers Parody and Cristo agreed with Senator Barreras (personal interview,

July 12, 2019) that the Colombian government lacked a timely reaction to confronting

the digital media campaign against 'gender ideology' before the plebiscite elections:

> Perhaps, we underestimated the hostility of Colombians for the damage
> committed by that FARC for such a long time when they were armed. The
> government believed that people would accept anything related to the
> peace agreement and the FARC" (J.F. Cristo, personal interview, July 11,
> 2019; translation mine).

The campaign against 'gender ideology' leaders benefited from the government's

lack of understanding about the Colombian audience characteristics to create an effective

public communication strategy offline and online with basic points and dimensions of the

final agreement. Using this political opportunity structure from the national context, the

campaign against 'gender ideology' reinforced homophobia and gender stereotyping in

statements against gender and peace in their digital groups and networks. According to

the interviewees, former President Juan Manuel Santos and the public institutions omitted

three fundamental aspects. First, the plebiscite opposition publicly criticized the peace

negotiations and argued that the agreement used jargon and technical language that complicated the middle-class citizen's understanding. For instance, the news story called "No hay suficiente información" (There is not enough information; translation mine) published in *El Tiempo* on September 16, 2016, was an interview with José Gregorio Hernández, former President of the Colombian Constitutional Court:

> They (Colombians) will vote for a complex 297-page agreement, which is very complicated for an ordinary citizen. Very long, and with a language that is not easy for a housewife, an office worker, or a worker. (*El Tiempo*, 2016c; translation mine)

These debate's gaps in the concrete use of the peace agreement's meanings affected the voters understanding of the final agreement with the FARC and the economic, political, social, and cultural benefits for Colombians and international relations. Second, directors Marcela Sánchez from the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa and Olga Sánchez from the non-governmental organization Casa de la Mujer (personal interviews, July 4 and 15, 2019; respectively) argued that the agreement's technical language reflected a lack of a pedagogical strategy of the government. The plebiscite elections lacked a basic guide for voters to explain meanings, benefits, and procedures to achieve peace after a long-term conflict. Third, the supporters, as well as the opponents to the plebiscite, pointed out that the government missed the

structure and extension of this digital campaign and transnational network, the power of anti-gender propaganda, and the fake viral news circulating on social media platforms (E. Patiño; E. Castaño; M. Sánchez; W. Castañeda; J.F. Cristo; B. Quintero; O. Sánchez; C. Moscoso; G. Parody; P. Mercado; E. Cañas; Anonymous leader, personal interviews, June 25 and 26, July 4, 10, 11, 15, 19, 23, and 26, 2019; respectively). Editor Gómez (personal interview, July 11, 2019) argued the Colombian government believed they would achieve the victory by explaining the agreement's points with theoretical concepts through mainstream media contents, while the digital campaign was already in progress using concrete and basic language for a general middle-class audience. The campaign against 'gender ideology' and the 'No' promoters made the most of their 'momentum' to unify their narratives, frames, meanings, allies, and audiences for both virtual and corporeal atmospheres.

This lack of comprehension and definition of communication strategies impeded an assertive and coherent discussion of peace messages within potential middle-class voters without an academic background for understanding politics but who were interested in voting. "It was a very unfair competition in terms of the legitimacy of the communication" (G. Parody, personal interview, July 23, 2019), and the opposition combined it with President Santos' unpopular approval rates before the plebiscite elections. Furthermore, the government refuted the 'gender ideology' inclusion in the final agreement during the controversial debates of the education manual '*Ambientes de Aprendizaje Libres de Discriminación'* while using and legitimating "the same language of the enemy." Parody refers to the public use of words such as 'gender ideology,'

'indoctrination of children,' 'homosexualization,' 'distortion of family values,' among others. Thus, the government and peace negotiators appropriated the fearful narrative strategy of 'gender ideology' as a threat-making echo in the political context.

As a result, the public opinion debate regarding peace and gender equality was diverted by the campaign against 'gender ideology.' The peace dialogues were transformed into a "signifying agent actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for movement supporters" (Lim, 2018, p. 111), in this case against gender equality and peace. The campaign against 'gender ideology' infiltrated the public agenda using contentious meanings and elite right-wing leaders' power. Finally, these gaps in the peace plebiscite communication process legitimized symbolic practices online of homophobia for preventing peace. In hindsight, Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019) still questions how she could have better responded to this digital movement-building and campaigning in her former role as Minister of Education:

> This debate was very toxic. You can always repeat the message, and you can always explain better and demonstrate the truth. But, if the truth is within quotation marks and it is an opinion that dissents others, you decide what you want to defend [...] I think we did not convince the media to seek the truth and confront thoughts. (G. Parody, personal interview, July 23, 2019; translation mine)

While the campaign against 'gender ideology' was a blind spot within the media, the government, and the women's and LGBTI rights activists; this national network benefited from political opportunities to bolster a very private and intense circle, where Minister Parody indicated "the people listened to what they wanted to hear" (personal interview, July 23, 2019). Meanwhile, the audience, the potential plebiscite voter, waited for a coherent statement from the government's chief negotiators. Unfortunately, the agreement's unified peace clarifying statement did not circulate on mainstream newspapers or social media to confront the massive fake news and rumors on WhatsApp. Later, on October 2, while the government believed the traditional support of the most popular national newspapers would be enough to win the elections, "people voted against the FARC, rather than against the peace agreement" (J.F. Cristo, personal interview, July 11, 2019).

Likewise, women's and LGBTI organizations recognize they did not respond to the 'gender ideology' distorted effect. Olga Sánchez, director of La Casa de la Mujer (personal interview, July 15, 2019), asserted: "we should create a counter-protest, but we did not pay too much attention to these gender ideology mobilizations." According to Marcela Sánchez, director of the non-governmental organization Colombia Diversa, 'gender ideology' ideas were a noise that distracted the government, while public opinion talked about 'something else,' such as the disseminated fake news about the 'gender ideology' inclusion in the revision of the education manual of the Ministry of Education, the FARC impunity, and the imposition of the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime. Similarly, director Sánchez from La Casa de La Mujer (personal interview, July 15, 2019) still

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questioned the prominence of 'gender ideology' ideas in the country: "I do not know if we should make such a repercussion about it." In this sense, Beatriz Quintero, director of the non-governmental organization Red Nacional de Mujeres (personal interview, July 15, 2019), explained women's organizations repudiated the campaign against 'gender ideology.' Still, its influence and repercussions for their representation and recognition in the plebiscite context went unnoticed.

Despite their analysis around the implications and effects of 'gender ideology' in the outcome, women's and LGBTI rights activists understood how their strategies were insufficient to defeat fake news and the right-wing networking against the recognition of minorities in the agreement. Before the elections, women's and LGBTI organizations designed and implemented diverse pedagogical activities to explain and support the peace agreement's benefits across the country. According to Sánchez (personal interview, July 15, 2019), La Casa de la Mujer developed a dialogue of experiences with victims and survivors of the conflict, workshops, and printed materials, including flyers, printed handbooks, and an application designed for cellphones about the implications and meanings of war for women and the significance of voting consciously. Similarly, Quintero (personal interview, July 15, 2019) indicated Red Nacional de Mujeres designed and distributed a printed handbook explaining the gender perspective in Colombian peace in regions that directly experienced the conflict.

These women's and LGBTI rights activists' efforts were limited to expose the campaign's goals and communication strategies against the 'gender ideology' network and messages. These organizations also evaluated their roles in the peace negotiations

and plebiscite elections. Castañeda, director of Caribe Afirmativo (personal interview, July 10, 2019), suggested that their concentration on lawsuits and litigations against the Colombian political elite weakened their communication with potential voters. Since the plebiscite, Castañeda emphasized women's and LGBTI rights activists understood the relevance of identifying the diverse backgrounds and experiences of middle-class citizens who are likely to vote based on emotions. Overall, these reflections suggested the need to redefine an effective communication strategy to approach various sectors for dialogue around diversity. Women's and LGBTI rights activists need to use concrete and basic language about gender, sex, sexuality, same-sex marriage, marriage equality, child adoption by same-sex partners, gender identities, and sexual orientations for their audiences. Despite some women's and LGBT activists questioning the influential character of 'gender ideology' ideas, Castañeda in the interview recognized the organizations' challenge is to keep expanding their allies' networks to indigenous women's groups, women's organizations, and peasants' movements, among others.

CONCLUSION

The gender ideology messaging of moral panic and fear of social decay became a blind spot for *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* in their attempt to support a peace agenda. The 'No' campaign's political power obstructed the understanding of inequalities before the elections. The plebiscite information style and technical production consolidated a contentious coverage that attracted mainly news media outlets' attention. Therefore, the Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' was a less attractive media agenda component to engage readers in this discussion. First, these specific coverage conditions demonstrated tensions and challenges between journal principles and the media outlets as economic enterprises. Editor Gómez (personal interview, July 11, 2019) explained the role of peace in the newspapers' agenda:

> Everything, when it is associated with violence, will always be more attractive and morbid. You know, peace is not sexy, yet it is another vital point. Very interested specialists read topics related to peace, but it is not what readers read the most. If you navigate on a webpage and you start scanning within the titles, you go to something that stood out to you, seduced you, that woke you up. Peace topics in the Agenda-setting of mass media lack 'sex-appeal and are not attractive enough for readers, and online newspapers need 'clicks.' Peace topics are not profitable for this industry. (M. Gómez, personal interview, July 11, 2019; translation mine)

The media chose to frame a story in a certain way to attract readers and consolidate their reputation with relevant production of information. Colombian media sources are prepared to cover an armed conflict for more than 50 years but are technically inexperienced to verify gender ideology facts or rumors associated with gender in a contentious period of heteronormativity promoting sexism, homophobia, and the gender binary as social rules.

Second, both newspapers relied on powerful right-wing politicians who opposed gender issues in the peace agreement and did not confront their biased narratives before the elections. Both newspapers thought their support for the 'Yes' vote would increase the levels of trust for peace within their readers, but this was not the case. Instead, former Presidents like Uribe and Pastrana, right-wing Senators, and Christian evangelical pastors as key advocates of the 'No' campaign required journalist coverage, and these newspapers offered a solid space focused on their political disputes. These leaders instigated the plebiscite campaigns' confrontational coverage every day with extreme political or cultural positions, lacking forceful and convincing counterarguments and investigation. Editors Gómez and Molano Jimeno (personal interviews, July 11 and 9, 2019) shared that these opinion leaders are recognized publicly with dominant status and are attractive to public opinion. They are located in the top headlines and breaking news stories of media consumption online. Hence, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* ended up unwittingly serving as a platform to spread the campaign against 'gender ideology':

Probably, this is one of the most classic problems over the last years since Uribe ended his presidential period […] It is problematic that ex-President Uribe, despite many journalists believing that it is better to take distance and prevent quoting him, finds ways to be mentioned. I believe Ordoñez is also a leader like that, who is so controversial that we end up falling into 'the trap' and cover him in news stories. (A. Molano Jimeno, personal interview, July 9, 2019; translation mine)

El Espectador and *El Tiempo*'s emphasis on repeating negative phrases or categories of meaning about the campaign against 'gender ideology' in the elections reflected the media outlets' lack of preparation to face digital 'gender ideology' messaging before the polls. These diverse factors also question the media's capacity to cover democratic processes. The mainstream outlets are openly supportive of the government's campaign and, and ironically are endangering the level of truth and confidence within readers.

Third, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*'s editorial interests could overlap the public interest and journalistic mission. Molano Jimeno in the interview indicated *El Espectador* was prevented from replicating 'lies' from the opposition; for instance, 'gender ideology' statements before elections: "likely, we did not cover it (gender ideology ideas) widely because the term 'gender ideology' was not included (in the agreement). We did not disseminate that discourse." Nevertheless, the content analysis results also suggested that *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*'s financial ownership could be influential in framing the editorial's interests, the media agenda, and the attributes of contents.

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In Colombia, media outlets are corporate financial enterprises with financial, political, religious, social, or cultural interests in their coverage. They struggle with social media competition. One of the main problems with Colombian traditional media outlets is how *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* could monopolize the plebiscite and campaign against 'gender ideology' framing. The financial capital and ownership of both media outlets can affect the construction of understandings and meanings of gender and political contexts through information. The close relationships between *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* owners with Colombian presidents, influential politicians, and electoral campaigns since the 90s' (*Semana,* 2006; *La Silla Vacía,* 2014) (See Chapter 1. Introduction and Background*)* represent an ethical risk for editors and journalists. Censorship and political and financial favors can modify journalism commitments for investigation, integrity, and impartiality in news story production. Simultaneously, the media owners can find traditional media outlets an effective mechanism to impose their personal interests and particular cultural or conservative perspectives of identity, religion, gender, politics, peace, economic status, and social interactions. Thus, the challenge is for these newspapers' consumers, especially in developing countries, to decode the media's symbolic power.

The dissemination of disinformation surrounding the campaign against 'gender ideology' on WhatsApp questioned how the role of newspapers is declining in promoting dialogue and critical political thoughts in society. According to Fabian Hernández, coordinator of the media research in the non-governmental organization Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) (personal interview, July 22, 2019), the alternative and

intended use of WhatsApp in the campaign against 'gender ideology,' among one of the most popular social media messaging platforms in Colombia and Latin America, contributed to the redefinition of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo's* role online for covering gender issues in the first version of the agreement and the construction of peace. Minister Cristo (personal interview, July 11, 2019) asserted that "nowadays, the alternative media with networks have a major effect." Senator Roy Barreras from the right-wing political party Partido de la U (personal interview, July 12, 2019) believed this is a societal change in how people get information: "traditional media outlets have lost their power to debate or promote public opinion. The opinion is formed on social networks, without filters and editors, and of course, much more emotionally," and these new digital communication platforms are manipulating society's emotions, which Senator Barreras argues is one of the leading crises of modern democracy.

Furthermore, the secrecy implemented in peace negotiations was a 'trap' that harmed the peace agreement. The lack of a coherent communication strategy between public institutions, actors, experts, negotiators, non-governmental organizations, and journalists centered on communities' needs and regional contexts with practical explanations of disputed terms by the opposition, such as gender identity, sexual orientation, sex, gender perspective, among others; diverted the core of any peace process: people and marginalized communities like women and the LGBTI population. The government and the peace plebiscite's key social actors should be accountable as mediators of assertive communication channels. For instance, director Olga Sánchez, from the non-governmental organization La Casa de la Mujer (personal interview, July

15, 2019), emphasized that the government's representatives could visit communities and explained the advantages, procedures, and benefits of the gender perspective in constructing a peaceful society.

This analysis from *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* showed how the technical production of confrontational coverage based on the political elite shaped the electoral processes' media agenda and added substantial or critical ideas to the public opinion. These results offer a partial explanation for future research to identify how gender, peace, and transnational campaigns against 'gender ideology' are unworthy of traditional media journalism production standards. Whereas peace and gender are structural categories of political power and social relations, there is a lack of media engagement and political understanding of gender issues consequences. Even though this chapter does not intend to suggest the media coverage and style of production of information would have changed the plebiscite outcome, these circumstances require an urgent evaluation of priorities in the traditional newspapers' agenda and framing contents for future coverage of plebiscite outcomes.

Future research needs to uncover how the synchronization of the transnational campaigns' dynamics against 'gender ideology' mobilizes political structures and right-wing networks, performances, and movement leaders from free digital platforms to street mobilizations, thereby redefining popular traditional media's mission. If research does not look into the newspapers' communication style and characteristics of information production during political processes, objectivity and neutrality will become utopian ideals due to Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter. In sum, this situation requires societies

to pay closer attention to new debates circulating on private spheres and networks to construct peace.

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Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Two months before the peace plebiscite elections in 2016, elite right-wing leaders, Christian evangelical pastors, and anti-gender activists weaponized gender to confront the government and prevent a final peace agreement with the FARC. My findings from the content analysis of 301 randomly selected plebiscite news stories online, and a set of 24 semi-structures interviews with former Ministers, senators, Christian evangelical leaders, anti-gender activists, women's and LGBTI organizations, and journalists unveiled that a right-wing network against 'gender ideology' and the peace plebiscite articulated three main events as a political opportunity structure to dispute the inclusion of gender perspective for peace: the Ministry of Education revision of the education manual for inclusion of gender equality in schools, the development of the 'Survey about Sexuality Behaviors and Attitudes in boys, girls, and teenagers' ('Encuesta sobre Sexualidad en niños, niñas y adolescentes,' ECAS) conducted by National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE), and the 'No' vote campaign. These influential actors reactivated a national network to portray gender as a 'dangerous ideology' to Colombian society within public opinion. Consequently, 'gender ideology' narratives complemented panic around the 'No' vote campaign against the final agreement and the inclusion of gender perspective in Colombian society.

Using their public reputation and status, these right-wing leaders framed a range of meanings that cover: gender policies, the role of women's and LGBTI organizations in the national peace negotiations, the parents' rights to protect and educate children under their beliefs, and the recognition of the church as a political institution for peace. Moreover, anti-gender activist groups contacted their allies in regional media outlets to spread messages with fearful content about modifications to social norms through the education manual, primarily in the traditional Catholic and conservative cities of Barranquilla and Santa Marta in the North of Colombia. 'Gender ideology' messaging took form into a national campaign that mobilizes private schools, Christian evangelical believers, anti-gender activists, parents, and teachers in 14 main cities against the Ministry of Education and what they called the inclusion of 'gender ideology' for child indoctrination.

In this Colombian anti-gender campaign, the term 'gender ideology' was an 'umbrella' concept to define behaviors, the LGBTI population, gender equality policies, diversity, sexual orientation, and gender identity as potential threats. Anti-gender activist groups inflamed discussions on LGBTI rights, abortion, and comprehensive sex education in schools within their communities to defend their political and cultural order. Based on these ideas, these circulating narratives produced disparities of power between elites, women, and minorities for political recognition in education and politics. This network drew upon forms of political homophobia to reduce sexuality and social norms as static religious and gendered values (Bosia & Weiss, 2013). Their anti-gender meanings and frames of action endorsed "an authoritative notion of collective national

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identity" (Bosia & Weiss, 2013, p. 3). Thus, this campaign against 'gender ideology' interrupted the political debate for peace, politicizing the 'gender ideology' term. This narrative helped anti-gender activists questioning the role of gender identity, sexual orientation, and alarmist assertions regarding the threat to traditional family values.

My findings also demonstrate how the campaign against 'gender ideology' leaders identified the lack of regulation of social media campaigns before the plebiscite as a political opportunity to expand their campaign to social media platforms. In Colombia, the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) issued Resolution 1733 to supervise the distribution of the plebiscite campaigns' information on traditional media exclusively. As a result, they connected their claims to tripartite threats to Colombian society that they identified: The FARC impunity for participating in national politics, the imposition of 'Castro-Chavismo' and communism, and the debates around gender diversity.

These three issues activated anti-gender activists' fears of internal enemies to the state and were fundamental components for their political communication strategy. In my interviews, Christian evangelical pastors and Senator María del Rosario Guerra from the political party Centro Democrático recognized a disconnection with traditional mainstream media outlets during the plebiscite campaigns. Pastors Edgar Castaño and Héctor Pardo (personal interviews, June 26 and July 24, 2019) emphasized that traditional media owners have relationships with political parties and influential financial corporate groups that promote a different agenda from their values and principles. Moreover, they pointed out that the media did not take them seriously as a source of information in

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political processes. They revealed their mistrust and lack of confidence in the media coverage. In response, pastors Castaño and Pardo (personal interviews, June 26 and July 24, 2019) used the lacked social media regulation of the government and the CNE to center their communication strategy of the campaign against 'gender ideology' in a 'hybrid communication network' (Lim, 2018) with offline and online actions. Former judge Armando Novoa from the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE, personal interview, July 24, 2019) argued the 'No' vote leaders created a 'private' digital strategy under international experts' guidance from Panama and Cambridge Analytica. Using uncontrolled social media platforms such as WhatsApp, the most popular digital network in Colombia (Chevalier, 2020), anti-gender activists linked what they considered their internal enemies to the state in restricted 'semi-public' WhatsApp groups for filtered followers and supporters by religious beliefs or political thoughts.

According to Fabián Hernández, coordinator of the media research in the non-governmental organization Misión Observación Electoral (MOE) and judge Novoa (personal interview, July 24, 2019), the opposition to the plebiscite disseminated fake news linked to the right-wing network's historical national security agenda, their emotions around the traditional social norms, their FARC imaginaries within public opinion, and their capitalist interests. The archives from Senator Guerra's office exposed that the campaign against 'gender ideology' feared that the plebiscite agreement would impose Marxism and feminism, which would destroy the family (Catholic.Net, 2016). In addition, fake news around 'Castro-Chavismo' regimen and communism was a strategy to mirror the current Colombian political and economic situation in Venezuela. For

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context, currently, there are 2.4 million Venezuelans displaced to Colombia (ACAPS, 2020), there is a depreciation of Bolívar, the Venezuelan national coin at 60%. Additionally, there is a rise in consumer prices at 80% and interannual inflation at 4,210% (Armas & Pons, 2020). Therefore, fake news and disinformation challenged potential voters to mirror their country to Cuba's political regime and economic conditions.

Then, this hybrid communication network connected followers against the inclusion of gender for peace with cultural spaces such as Christian evangelical churches, meetings, workshops, and street mobilizations with this restricted social media information. Hernández (personal interview, July 22, 2019) explained that fake news's basic structure could engage potential voters to circulate disinformation within their social groups, family, friends, and relatives. Furthermore, this political debate based on unverified information rather than facts exposed 'digital militias' forming (Dimenstein, 2019) in the core of the digital campaign against 'gender ideology' and also in official institutions such as the office of the Attorney General, as former Minister Gina Parody asserted in my interview. These 'digital militias' were centered on the attack of their opponents with disinformation.

While the campaign against 'gender ideology' strengthened this digital communication strategy, traditional newspapers such as *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* overlooked the goals, mechanisms, and logic of this anti-gender campaign. My findings from the content analysis demonstrated that the campaign against 'gender ideology' was a blind spot in both newspapers. *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* supported the 'Yes' vote in the plebiscite news stories. Still, their confrontational coverage ended up providing a

'sounding boards' for the opposition to the inclusion of gender equality and gender perspective in the final agreement. My content analysis demonstrated that both newspapers covered 'gender ideology' ideas and the evolution of this national campaign with low frequency in 2.3% of 301 plebiscite-related news stories published by both newspaper organizations. According to former Minister Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019), both newspapers missed investigating and confronting the 'gender ideology' messaging effects of hybrid communication networking on 'real life' and digital platforms. As a result, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* omitted the victims, survivors, and minorities affected by the armed conflict at the peace agreement's core. This communication style and type of coverage concentrated on right-wing political elites using and repeating 'gender ideology' narratives, consolidated a negative tone of the gender perspective in the plebiscite news stories.

These circumstances also unveiled the lack of knowledge and preparation of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* to face the hybrid communication strategies and networks of the campaigns against 'gender ideology' and the 'No' vote. While 'gender ideology' messaging circulated on streets, fake news, and WhatsApp groups, the government, women's and LGBTI organizations, and journalists lacked effective and structured counter-responses to demystify 'gender ideology' narratives and disinformation. Digital activism on social media is becoming an impenetrable platform. The mainstream media outlets are disconnected from following up and interpreting the scope and effects of public conversations circulating on digital media platforms.

According to the interviewed ministers, women's and LGBTI organizations, and journalists, the Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' was an imported pattern from a transnational movement with multiple networks against gender, feminist studies, women, and LGBTI rights functioning since the 90s across Latin America, especially in Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, among others (M. Sánchez; F. Gil Hernández; E. Castañeda; J.F. Cristo; B. Quintero; G. Parody, personal interviews, July 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 23, 2019; respectively). The opposition to the plebiscite and anti-gender activists also benefited from the blind spot of 'gender ideology' messaging in newspapers. For Minister Parody (personal interview, July 23, 2019), even the Colombian media did not clearly understand or state the core of the debate in the campaign against 'gender ideology.' Marisol Gómez, the editor of *El Tiempo,* also questions the media's accountability for the plebiscite debate's polarization. Also, the right-wing network exploited the absence of a public communication strategy of the government and even the women and LGBTI rights organizations to explain the peace agreement and the prominence of the gender perspective in the final deal. Instead of using technical language and jargon about the plebiscite, the campaign against 'gender ideology' used a basic narrative in fake news, easy to understand and repeat without a background and knowledge.

Similarly, like other Latin American campaigns within the framework of anti-gender movements, this national campaign penetrated national interests for gender equality and diversity in the Ministry of Education and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE

). It derailed public initiatives to include gender equality in education and politics two months before the plebiscite. Nowadays, Christian evangelical pastors of national megachurches and anti-gender activists in alliance with traditional right-wing political parties have reshaped their identities and leadership as dominant political actors to escalate their claims across the government and official institutions. Christian evangelical leaders created the political party Colombia Justa Libres, promoted a pro-life party legislator in Congress, and passed a bill to create parenting workshops in Colombian private and public schools. Right-wing networks organized these workshops to strengthen parents' right to decide on their child's education while maintaining the family connection with the education system. Consequently, this Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' evidenced a well-structured and organized anti-gender network that constantly seeks political opportunities for their particular benefit, jeopardizing human rights protection and constructing a peaceful society to reinforce their political recognition.

6.1 Campaigns against 'Gender Ideology' Chase Political Opportunities

Since the plebiscite elections, elite right-wing movement entrepreneurs, Christian evangelical networks, and the campaign against 'gender ideology' have worked in their hybrid networks of communication and contentious performances in politics. This research highlights how these activists strengthened their mobilization capabilities in the streets and through social media campaigns. The movement entrepreneurs and their networks organized activities and participated in transnational networking and messaging

(E. Cañas, personal interview, July 4, 2019). Overall, this campaign was and continues to be looking for reasons or specific political opportunities to confront the government or social groups that think or act differently as they do. For instance, abortion is one of their central political opportunities to debate women's rights and roles in politics. They often used abortion to return to 'gender ideology' ideas. In February 2020, while the Colombian Constitutional Court was considering the legalization of abortion[25], the media reported the case of a 22-year-old woman from Popayan (a traditionally Catholic city in the southwestern of Colombia), who chose to end her pregnancy due to mental problems. Her ex-boyfriend opposed her decision and protested in the hospital, campaigned on social networks, and publicly denounced her case to authorities (BBC, 2020). Later, right-wing political parties, anti-gender activist groups, pro-life organizations joined his grievances. These groups organized protests against the non-governmental organization Profamilia that conducted the medical procedure and the Constitutional Court in Bogotá (See Appendix Figure E.1. about RIFE Official statement against abortion 2021).

According to the RIFE press statement, this case mobilized people to preserve mothers' and children's lives and asked Congress to debate the legalization of abortion

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[25] In 2006, the Colombian Constitutional Court allowed a woman to have an abortion in three circumstances: "when her life is at stake, when a fetus has serious health problems and when her pregnancy resulted from rape" (Turkewitz, 2020). In February 2020, Judge Alejandro Linares from the Constitutional Court favored legalizing abortion in the first four months of pregnancy, arguing that obligating a woman to have a child forces her to give control of her body to others, including the State. However, in March, a top court declined to legalize abortion (Turkewitz, 2020).

instead of the Constitutional Court. As in the plebiscite elections, these right-wing networks also protested against the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Health. Additionally, they also collected signatures through Unidos por la Vida's platform connected to the pro-life organization CitizenGo from Spain. Their goal was to collect 800 signatures and send them to the Ministry of Health for intervening in this legislative process (Actuall, 2019). Later, in December 2020, when public opinion debated the legalization of abortion in the middle of Latin American protests, senator Rodríguez appeared in the media, arguing abortion should not exist in any case. Then, he proposed a project to the Congress in which the state would protect and ensure psychological and medical attention to women who do not have an abortion. From his lens, the pro-life option is the mother will have the possibility of raising the boy or girl or allow them to be adopted (Semana, 2020).

With the plebiscite elections, the Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' as part of a transnational anti-gender movement has consolidated and expanded its networking with pro-life and Catholic organizations, especially in Venezuela, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala in Latin America, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa (See Appendix Figure E.1. about RIFE Official statement against abortion 2021). In their contentious politics, they use digital skills to communicate with followers through social media platforms, blogs, posts, and videos. Using Facebook and Twitter, messaging is typically against abortion, gender equality, gender-neutral bathrooms, gender-neutral school uniforms, and the destruction of the traditional nuclear family. In the International Network Family and Education (Red Internacional por la Familia y la

Educación, RIFE) profile, even Facebook has labeled some of its contents as 'partially false' or 'false information.' However, these right-wing networks keep these published contents online (See RIFE profile on Facebook). Campaign's leaders use their digital skills for hashtivism[26] with keywords such as #Colombiadicenoalaborto or #provida in their Twitter and Facebook profiles to promote the preservation of life and link their interests with other transnational Christian evangelicals, Catholic, or non-governmental pro-life organizations.

Activists and leaders of this campaign, in alliance with the Colombian Association of Christian Schools (Asociación Colombiana de Colegios Cristianos, OBED), organize congresses and academic events against 'gender ideology' challenges with the intervention of international experts, as can be seen on RIFE Facebook's profile (See Appendix Figure E.2.RIFE profile on Facebook). Furthermore, the protests against the academic coexistence manuals proposed by the Ministry of Education on August 10, 2016, became an iconic day for activists to celebrate the 'International Day of Freedom to Educate' (Día Internacional de la Libertad para Educar). Lila Palacios, President of the International Network of Family and Education (Red Internacional Familia y Educación, RIFE), explained in a video posted on Facebook that this day celebrates parents' rights to choose their childrens' education based on their morals, principles, and values.

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[26] Hashtivism "is a collective effort to intervene in public discourse by curating a massive amount of Twitter statements by using certain hashtags, a word or an unspaced phrase prefixed with the hash character (#), to cluster social media conversations around a certain issue or topic" (Lim, 2018, p. 114).

6.2   Consolidating Right-Wing Political Power

According to Juan Fernando Cristo, former Minister of Interior (personal interview, July 11, 2019), since the religious freedom proclamation in the Colombian Constitution in 1991, the relationship between politics and religion has been persistent. Pastor Edgar Castaño from Iglesia Bautista and President of the Colombian Evangelical Council (Consejo Evangélico de Colombia, CEDECOL) defined pastors' roles should be positioned on faith rather than politics. Still, their role is prominent because pastors are "the voice of conscience, the voice of truth, the voice of morality" (E. Castaño, personal interview, June 26, 2019). Interestingly, these pastors from national megachurches have a public relationship and support to right-wing elite politicians, including former President Álvaro Uribe and former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez. These elite politicians visit these megachurches and even campaigned there before national elections. Pastor Cañas recognized his close relationship with both politicians and explained that they request his prayers for Colombia's future under challenging situations, as happened in the plebiscite.

In 2016, these Christian evangelical leaders exerting their pastoral power, publicly revealed their support for the 'No' vote and the campaign against 'gender ideology.' Pastor Cañas (personal interview, July 4, 2019) argued that he raised his voice to his congregation for the 'No' vote in the plebiscite because "he is a leader of the nation and 'God opened his eyes." Pastor Diego Rodríguez from Iglesia La Vid in Ibagué, a city in western Colombia, indicated that megachurches such as Iglesia Manantial de Vida, Tabernáculo de Fe, and Misión Paz a las Naciones with more than 60,000 followers led

the plebiscite decision-making processes within their followers and other national Christian evangelical churches. The megachurches' representative pastors, Eduardo Cañas, Héctor Pardo, and Jhon Milton Rodríguez traveled to the Havana peace negotiations representing the Christian evangelical churches and participated in the peace agreement's renegotiation. They persuaded followers to stand against the gender perspective while unifying their political interests in Colombian politics.

Despite pastor Castaño's conception that "the church should not be partisan, but political," a year after the plebiscite elections, the Christian evangelical churches created the political party Colombia Justa Libres[27] (Cañas, personal interview, July 4, 2019). According to Cañas, this political party "brings together 70% of Colombia's Christian evangelical church." Pastor Jhon Milton Rodríguez won a seat in the Colombian Senate in the period 2018-2022. Cañas and Pardo (personal interviews, July 4 and 24, 2019) explained their political party reflects their concerns about the imposition of a communist regime throughout the peace agreement with the FARC. They created this political party in part to prevent the 'Castro-Chavismo' regime promoted by Senator Gustavo Petro, who is a former rebel of the M-19 guerrilla and a member of the center-left-wing political party Colombia Humana:

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[27] As a traditionalist conservative political party, Colombia Justa Libres emerged and adopted right-wing political features as a civic movement of men and women who fight for the establishment of Christian moral and ethical principles, family, justice, and truth in every aspect of the Colombian society (Colombia Justa Libres, 2021).

At that time, it was an emergency. Otherwise, Colombia would be like Cuba or Venezuela. We were afraid of what was happening in Venezuela, and that the situation would repeat in Colombia. (H. Pardo, personal interview, July 24, 2019; translation mine)

Pastors Rodríguez, Cañas, and Pardo recognized this political party is an instrument to validate their social recognition as a powerful institution with strategic alliances: "we are terrific friends of Centro Democrático, we are in the same coalition with MIRA political party, which is also a Christian party, and with a part of the Conservative political party" (E. Cañas, personal interview, July 4, 2019). From their lens, Castaño (personal interview, June 26, 2019) believed Colombia Justa Libres had transformed their former national reputation from an 'ignorant' or radical source of information, dedicated exclusively to praying with a bible to aspiring to achieve significant political participation as a political movement to reform social values. For pastor Diego Rodríguez (personal interview, July 14, 2019), this party just mirrors the Colombian traditional right-wing parties.

Since the plebiscite elections, the political party Colombia Justa Libres participates actively in Colombian politics with three senators: Edgar Enrique Palacio, Eduardo Pacheco, and pastor Jhon Milton Rodríguez, and Carlos Acosta in the House of Representatives. Pastor and now, Senator Rodríguez is a member of the Senate's fourth commission focused on budget laws, financial control system, industry property regulation, quality and price control, and administrative contracting. As a Senator,

Rodríguez has often worked in alliance with the Conservative political party and Centro Democrático against the legalization of abortion and promoting what he called parents' autonomy to educate their children. Besides, he also restarted discussions from the campaign against 'gender ideology' when national projects or public opinion discuss abortion, women's rights, and the LGBTI population recognition in politics. For instance, in March 2019, pastor Rodríguez and some right-wing politicians claimed the government promoted a 'homosexual dictatorship' in the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, PND)[28]. He tweeted that the article called 'Diversity with equity' (Diversidad con Equidad) proposes the investment policy to ensure the protection of minorities' rights in the PND was worse than the academic coexistence manuals of former Minister Gina Parody and the 'gender ideology' documents of the Havana peace negotiations (Caracol Radio, 2019). Like in the plebiscite elections, he claimed this PND section should not emphasize recognizing the LGBTI population exclusively as victims of discrimination because these ideas may violate the autonomy and educational oversight of parents' and children's identities (Jerez, 2019).

In July 2020, Rodríguez proposed a bill to create a legal pro-life commission to defend life and prevent any threats against human life from conception to adulthood. This

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[28] According to the National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, DNP), the National Plan of Development (Plan Nacional de Planeación, PND) "is the formal and legal instrument that define the objectives and goals of the government and the subsequent evaluation of its management" (Departmento Nacional de Planeación, 2021).

pro-life commission would generate spaces to legislate, conduct political control and share scientific knowledge about life origins, and promote areas of debate with institutions, citizens, and the media (Senado de la República, 2020). Furthermore, in the same month, current Colombian President, Iván Duque, approved Rodríguez's parenting workshops' project as a mandatory requirement in Colombian schools. This bill circulated in the Senate since 2018, and now, "it allows overcoming the undue action of the State against the family, recognizing the educational autonomy of parents to educate their children according to their principles and values" (Congreso Visible Universidad de Los Andes, 2021). Parents and schools will actively define the educational and academic values and principles of children to strengthen the family as the fundamental core of society. Consequently, they will inform, prevent, and recognize any topics that threaten children's and parent's physical and mental health (Congreso Visible Universidad de Los Andes, 2021).

These different actions and their approved bill evidences the intervention and power of the right-wing movement entrepreneurs from the campaign against 'gender ideology' to permeate national politics and the education system. For instance, parents' educational autonomy was linked to the Ministry of Education's proposal to revise the education manual in schools for including gender equality. This substantial evolution of the right-wing network against gender policies in Colombian politics during the last five years requires future research on this Christian evangelical political party's legal and educational implications. Future studies also need to examine this bill's framings for minorities and marginalized communities' recognition. Colombia Justa Libres and

senator Rodríguez seem to be very interested in consolidating and preserving the right-wing power. In February 2021, this right-wing party recognized Rodríguez as one of the precandidates for the Colombian presidential elections in 2022 (Blue Radio, 2020).

6.3   Future Research: Digital Strategies and Audiences

This research examined how the versatile campaign against 'gender ideology' adapted its messaging and networking tactics for contentious politics. Anti-gender activists recognized the most popular and preferred social media platforms to connect with national and transnational supporters. The Colombian campaign against 'gender ideology' communication strategies and networks mirrors Latin American transnational campaigns such as #DoNotMessWithMyChildren ('Con mis hijos no te metas') with similar topics and hybrid networks of communication in the offline and online worlds, including street protests, active digital campaigning, the proliferation of restricted groups of discussion on WhatsApp, and organization of international meetings. This transnational campaign against 'gender ideology' has created an influential community with divergent ideas such as right and left-wing politicians, Christian evangelical and Catholic believers, teachers, parents, and professionals, but identified with unified narratives, values, and principles against gender equality.

Beyond the popular digital platforms Facebook or Twitter, further research should examine these digital platforms as a significant space for linking national and international movements to raise grievances against gender equality and minority groups' progressive inclusion. In Latin America, there is a lack of practical techniques, methods,

and empirical data to gain access and research ethically about the styles of communication, contents, actors, and organization of events involved in international WhatsApp groups against the inclusion of 'gender ideology.' Consequently, this analysis of the campaign against 'gender ideology' proposes further examination on three main issues related to Colombia's digital atmosphere. First, an urgent investigation of international consulting firms' role in Latin American electoral processes to design socioeconomic stratified massive disinformation campaigns. For instance, former judge Armando Novoa from the CNE (personal interview, July 24, 2019) points out that Juan Carlos Vélez, director of the 'No' campaign in the right-wing political party Centro Democrático, suggested that Panamanian experts advised its campaign. Second, an exploration of artificial intelligence in transnational campaigns using big data to maximize results, engage more voters, and persuade them with updated political issues, grievances, or claims. Marisol Gómez, the former editor of *El Tiempo* (personal interview, July 11, 2019), underscored rumors about the existence of robots and think tanks dedicated to retweet information from the 'No' campaign included 'gender ideology' messaging. Third, an examination of the current government regulation of digital media and surveillance of political activism online during democratic processes, such as voting, protesting, petitioning, etc. As this section explained previously, the plebiscite campaigns exposed the technical gap in the National Electoral Council Resolution 1733 (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) to coordinate and supervise digital platforms campaigns, which facilitated fake news' diffusion of disinformation.

During these five years, the Latin American wave of campaigns against 'gender ideology' has been challenging the media, the government, women's and LGBTI organizations, experts, and scholars to reflect on gender as a required analytical category for understanding the inequality of social structures and gender hierarchies (Tickner, 2001). As a defining structural category, gender is socially constructed and shapes subjective identities through which we explore and interpret social interactions, gendered order of power, and gendered expectations of actors and institutions in global politics (Runyan & Peterson, 2014). Despite audiences' active role in constructing their meanings and interpretations of their social, political, and cultural realities, mainstream newspapers are major actors of political processes that must revise and improve their labor. First, the media needs to redefine their knowledge of national gender issues in reproducing hierarchical orders and meanings from dominant right-wing national political powers. These newspapers could provide analytical frameworks for recognizing and preventing the promotion of 'dogmas,' such as the imposition of heterosexuality and radical ideologies as part of the collective national identity.

Second, the plebiscite experience showed newspapers the necessity to decenter elite political actors' voices from coverage of political issues and democratic processes. The unbalanced plebiscite coverage favored the representation of a 'politicized' and an upper-middle-class peace in urban areas while missing the experiences from oppressed victims, survivors, vulnerable communities, and non-governmental organizations that contributed to ending the armed conflict in rural areas for more than 20 years. In this sense, journalists must reflect on their accountability in the polarization of public opinion

through their unbalanced communication styles and technical attributes, such as the topic's scope, information tone, and sources for framing the 'gender ideology' information.

Third, newspapers' agenda-setting must engage with the audience and public opinion debates on influential social movements against gender, women's rights, and the recognition of the LGBTI population, despite newspapers' tensions with owners' interests. This case proposes journalists construct a bridge between offline and online public opinion to understand the repercussions in the rapid growth and organized structure of anti-gender campaigns confronting public policies. The campaign against 'gender ideology' reinforced narratives against peace through social media, which has reformulated mass media's prominent role for democracy. Nowadays, social media platforms are spaces that expose emergent or bolstered networks of social movements against authorities, rules, and legitimate actions in a given political opportunity (Selander & Jarvenpaa, 2016).

Finally, future interdisciplinary research focused on the audiences or potential participants in these campaigns could improve the analysis of 'gender ideology' fake news consumption and dissemination of disinformation strategies on mass media and social media. Based on the 'gender ideology' framework, these analyses would provide factual information about the reception of messages and interpretation of sexual orientation, gender identities, abortion, same-sex marriage, LGBTI rights, and comprehensive sex education. The challenge is analyzing intersections between 'gender ideology' with the working class and lower-class population, religious groups, and

ethnicity. These forthcoming findings would uncover the media blind spot associated with 'gender ideology' ideas to provide empirical data and substantial ideas for constructing pedagogic counter-responses to defend women's and LGBTI rights in more democratic societies.

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Appendix A

ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS

Table A.1.Sample of 1,132 Plebiscite News Stories

Media	Publication Format	Number of News Stories
Newspaper *El Espectador*	Daily	426
Newspaper *El Tiempo*		162
Political Website *La Silla Vacía*	Daily	201
Political Magazine *Semana*	Weekly	344
Total		1,132

Table A.2.Cluster Themes of 301 Plebiscite News Stories

Number of media that covered the theme	*El Espectador*	*El Tiempo*	Total of News Stories Covered
FARC Conference.	1	0	1
Dismissal of Alejandro Ordoñez, attorney general.	5	1	6
Organization of the peace plebiscite elections	15	0	15
Plebiscite elections as a Historic vote for peace.	33	0	33
FARC seek forgiveness for armed conflict.	15	0	15
Political parties support to peace plebiscite.	9	0	9
Political parties confrontations to support the peace plebiscite.	6	6	12
Political coalitions against the peace agreement and the plebiscite	104	7	111
Economy.	5	11	16
Effects of the peace agreement and peace plebiscite.	24	14	38
Freedom of speech	0	2	2
FARC in politics	0	1	1
Transitional Justice	0	6	6
Rural reform	0	2	2
Voting intention	0	34	34
TOTAL	217	84	301

Table A.3.Stop Words in Spanish

A través	Fue	Político	Meses	Nacional	Parece
Acá	Decía	Dicen	Hicimos	Noticia	Difícil
Dar	Digamos	Fuente	Cómo	Pasando	Persona
Caso	Puede	Nadie	Hecho	Dicho	Podía
Voy	Siempre	Sociales	Mismo	Precisamente	Alguien
Ver	Espectador	Hablar	Menos	Viene	Fuerte
Mil	Tiempo	Dijo	Haciendo	Quiero	Precisamente
Tal	Día	Dije	Mira	Puedo	Quedó
También	Vez	Hacer	Cada	Nunca	Peor
Dio	Bien	Mismo	Allá	Diciendo	Viene
Iba	Hace	Manera	Todas	Ustedes	Empieza
Claro	Creo	Bueno	Muchas	Toda	Digo
Bien	Hizo	Pasan	Cosas	Cuál	Hecho
Decir	Hablar	Miran	Sola	Pasó	Toda
Hacer	Mucha	Años	Sino	Tipo	Unas
Sino	Quiero	Punto	Tampoco	Quiere	Gran
Tal	Puedo	Primero	Social	Primera	Cuenta
Ahí	Nunca	Obviamente	Medio	Llama	Igual
Paso	Diciendo	Fuentes	Situación	Temas	Pasado
Quien	Cuál	Realmente	Mejor	Allí	Demás
Quién	Parte	Final	Religiosa	Pasado	Decían
Dice	Ustedes	Veces	Alguna	Gran	Favor
Cosa	Digo	Lado	Idea	Demás	Aparece

A.1 ISOL Specialized Dictionary

This dictionary is composed of 2.590 positive opinionated words such as: adequate (adecuado), fortunate (afortunado), ethical (ético), honorable (honorable), clean (límpio), motivated (motivado), new (nuevo), optimistic (optimista), privileged (privilegiado), etc. On the other hand, the dictionary includes 5.626 negative words such as: abismal, abatido, desobedecer, insoportablemente, mentira, pisotear, repression, robo, etc. (See ISOL dictionary 2019 on https://sinai.ujaen.es/investigacion/recursos/isol).

I added a list of 72 words associated with the plebiscite by categories in the ISOL Specialized dictionary by category. These words were the result of the preliminary conversations with experts and an anti-gender activist in Bogotá, October 2018.

Table A.4.'Castro-Chavismo' Words

Spanish	English
Nicólas Maduro	Nicolas Maduro
Cuba	Cuba
Venezuela	Venezuela
Fidel Castro	Fidel Castro
Hugo Chávez	Hugo Chavez
Mito	Myth
Ideología	Ideology
Comunismo	Comunism
Socialismo	Socialism
Pobreza	Poverty
Frontera	Frontier

Table A.5.FARC Impunity Words

Spanish	English
FARC	FARC
Guerrillero	Rebel
Amnistía	Amnesty
Partido político de las FARC	FARC Political party
Curul	Seat
Víctimas	Victims
Injusticia	Injustice
Justicia	Justice
Reparación	Reparation
Penas	Penalties
Prisión	Prison
Sentencia	Sentence
Terrorista	Terrorist
Violencia	Violence
Juicio	Trial
Uribismo	Uribismo
Memoria	Memory

Table A.6.Gender Diversity Words

Spanish	English
Subcómite de género	Subcommittee of gender
Género	Gender
Sexualidad	Sexuality
Sexo	Sex
Homosexualidad	Homosexuality
Familia	Family
Hijos	Sons/Daughters
Niños	Children
Padres	Parents
Diversidad	Diversity
Biológico	Biological
Naturaleza	Nature
Familia	Family
Diversidad	Diversity
Equidad/Igualdad de género	Gender equity
Gay	Gay
Lesbiana	Lesbian
Proceso de paz	Peace process
Acuerdo de paz	Peace agreement
Histórico	Historic
Distorsión	Distortion
Homogenización	Homogenization
Cartilla	Educative manual
Gina Parody	Gina Parody
Cardenal	Cardinal
Representante	Represent
Ministerio de Educación	Ministry of Education

Table A.7.'Gender Ideology' Words

Spanish	English
Diversidad	Diversity
Contenido	Content
Imágenes	Images
Obstáculo	Obstacle
Familia tradicional	Traditional Family
Original design	Diseño original
Homosexualidad	Homosexuality
Gay	Gay
Anticristo	Antichrist
Colonización homosexual	Homosexual colonization
Equidad/Igualdad de género	Gender equality
Bullying	Bullying
Sergio Urrego	Sergio Urrego
Gina Parody	Gina Parody
UNICEF	UNICEF
Colombia Diversa	Colombia Diversa
Cartilla	Educative manual
Discriminación	Discrimination
Libertad	Freedom
Diversidad sexual	Sexual diversity
Profesores	Teachers
Escuelas	Basic Schools
Colegios	Secondary and high schools
Dios	God
Iglesia Católica	Catholic Church
Iglesia Cristiana	Christian church
Alianza	Alliance
Centro Democrático	Centro Democrático
Papa Francisco	Pope Francis
Vaticano	The Vatican
Valores	Values
Moral	Morality
Papá	Father
Mamá	Mother
Libertinaje	Debauchery
Uribismo	Uribismo
Álvaro Uribe	Álvaro Uribe
Alejandro Ordoñez	Alejandro Ordoñez

Lila Palacios de Martínez	Lila Palacios de Martínez
Miguel Arrazola	Miguel Arrazola
Claudia López	Claudia López
Ángela Hernández	Ángela Hernández
Mara Viveros	Mara Viveros
Educación sexual	Sexual education
Comunidad LBGT	LGBT community
Privilegios	Privileges
Reconocimiento	Recognition
Identidad sexual	Sexual identity
Derechos sexuales y reproductivos	Sexual and reproductive rights
Violencia de género	Gender violence
Acuerdo de paz	Peace agreement
Riesgos	Risks
Peligros	Dangers
Conservador	Conservative
Promiscuidad	Promiscuity
Plebiscito	Plebiscite
Minoría	Minority
Participación	Participation

A.1.1   ISOL Dictionary: Examples of Positive and Negative Words

Table A.8.ISOL Dictionary Examples of Positive Words

abiertamente	animar	coherente	disfruta
absorbente	apelar	comedido	disponible
abunda	apoyada	comodamente	dispuesto
abundancia	apreciar	compacto	diversion
abundantes	aprobacion	compatible	divina
accesible	armonia	competentemente	dorado
aceptable	asegurar	complementar	dulce
aclamacion	asombrosa	comprensible	duradero
acogedor	atento	conciliar	educado
acreditada	atractivas	conectadas	eficiente
actualizadas	atraer	confiable	efusivo
adecuada	auge	conocidos	elocuente
adelantamiento	autentico	consagrada	eminencia
adelantar	autoestima	consecuentemente	emocionada
adorar	avances	consideradas	encantador
adular	avido	contenta	energeticas
afable	barato	continuidad	enriquecimiento
afecto	belleza	conveniente	entrañable
afinidad	bendecir	cooperativa	entusiasta
afirmar	beneficio	coraje	equilibrados
afortunada	bien	correcta	ergonomicas
agil	bienestar	cortejar	espacioso
agradable	bienvenidas	creativo	esplendida
aguda	bondad	crecimiento	espontanea
ahorra	bravo	creible	estimulante
ajustable	bueno	cumplido	eterno
alabada	caballeroso	curar	exacta
alcanzable	calida	decencia	excelente
alcista	calma	dedicado	exito
alegre	calor	defensor	experta

Table A.9.ISOL Dictionary Examples of Negative Words

abortar	azotar	cinica	desaire
abrasivo	azote	coactiva	descaro
abrumador	balbucear	cobarde	descortes
abrupto	bestial	coja	descuartizado
absurdo	blasfemia	colapso	desesperacion
abuso	bloqueo	colgar	desgracia
accidente	bobo	complicacion	deshonesto
acecho	bofetada	complices	despido
acosar	boicotear	comun	despilfarro
acritud	bomba	condenar	desplazar
acusar	borracho	contagioso	despojar
adiccion	borrar	contaminacion	desterrar
adulterar	bribon	contradiccion	destruir
agotar	burra	corrupto	desvalido
agraviada	cabron	costoso	desviacion
agresor	caer	crimen	detesta
anarquia	calabozo	crisis	deuda
angustia	calambre	critica	diablo
aniquilar	callosa	cronica	dictador
anomalia	calumnia	culpa	dificil
anormal	calva	daño	difusa
anticuada	cancer	debacle	dilema
antipatia	canibal	debil	discorde
antisocial	cansado	debilitar	disgusto
anular	caos	defecto	droga
apesta	caro	degeneracion	duramente
aplastar	castigar	degradar	egocentrico
aprension	castrar	delirante	egoismo
arañazos	cataclismo	demoler	eludir
ardor	caustica	demonio	embate
arpia	cegador	demora	empobrecido
arrebatos	celos	denigrar	engaño
asco	censurar	denso	ensuciar
asesinos	cerda	deplorable	envidia
asustar	chantaje	depravado	error
aturdir	chifladas	depresion	escaso
autogolpe	chismes	derrame	esclava

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
Figure A.1.Cluster Analysis in the 24-Structured Interviews with Similar 'Gender Ideology' Narratives

Figure A.2.Most Frequent 100 Words associated with 'Gender Ideology'

Figure A.3.Most Frequent 100 Words Associated with Agenda-Setting

Figure A.4.Comparison Diagram of ideas between Senator Right-wing Political Party and an Anonymous Activist of the Campaign against 'Gender Ideology' in Semi-Structured Interviews

Figure A.5.Comparison Diagram of Meanings for Gender' and 'Gender Ideology'
between Key Plebiscite Actors about in Semi-Structured Interviews

Figure A.6.Comparison Diagram about the Role of the Campaign against 'Gender
Ideology' between a Christian Evangelical Pastor and a Catholic Church
Representative in Semi-Structured Interviews

Appendix B

**MATERIALS ABOUT THE EDUCATION MANUAL AND THE COLOMBIAN
PEACE PLEBISCITE 2016**

Figure B.1.PowerPoint Presentation Slide of the Colombian Ministry of Education about the Characteristics of the Education Manual Revision 2016

Figure B.2.PowerPoint Presentation Slide of the Colombian Ministry of Education with Definition of the Education Manual

Figure B.3.PowerProint Presentation Slide of the Colombian Ministry of Education with
    Definition of 'Sex'

Figure B.4.PowerPoint Presentation Slide of the Colombian Ministry of Education with Definition of 'Gender'

B.1   Questionnaire for the Revision of the Education Manual in Schools Designed by the Colombian Ministry of Education 2016

Sistema Nacional de Convivencia Escolar y Formación para el Ejercicio de los Derechos Humanos, Sexuales y Reproductivos y a Prevención y Mitigación de la Violencia Escolar

PREGUNTAS ORIENTADORAS

PARA LA REVISIÓN Y AJUSTE DE LOS MANUALES DE CONVIVENCIA ESCOLAR

INSTRUCCIONES PARA EL DILIGENCIAMIENTO

Respetado(a) Rector (a)

La ficha que encuentra a continuación tiene como finalidad ayudarle a identificar los aspectos básicos que debe incluir en la revisión y actualización de los manuales de convivencia.

Para su diligenciamiento usted debe:

1. Convocar a su comité escolar de convivencia de manera extraordinaria
2. Tener siempre a la mano una copia del Manual de Convivencia Vigente.
3. Responder cada uno de los interrogantes teniendo en cuenta lo registrado actualmente en su manual de convivencia en compañía de los integrantes del comité.
4. Como líder del EE debe consolidar la información y traerla consigo al taller que se realizará en fecha 26 de mayo de 2016 en el auditorio de la Alcaldía Municipal de 2:00 pm a 5:00 pm, también deben traer el Manual de Convivencia, Actas de conformación del comité de convivencia escolar.

Algunas Definiciones Orientadoras - MEN (2013). Guía 49

Enfoque de derechos humanos: Incorporar este enfoque en la escuela significa explicitar en las prácticas educativas y principios pedagógicos que los Derechos Humanos y la dignidad humana, son el eje rector de las relaciones sociales entre la comunidad educativa. Se trata de potenciar prácticas y formas de vivir desde los referentes éticos de los Derechos Humanos, desde los cuales se desplazan y cuestionan significados y formas de actuar contrarias a la dignidad de las personas y al respeto por sus DDHH.

Enfoque diferencial: Se relaciona con identificar en la realidad y hacer visibles las formas de discriminación que se presentan en la escuela contra grupos considerados diferentes por una mayoría (ONU, 2013). Así mismo, se toma en cuenta este análisis para ofrecer atención y protección de los derechos de estas personas o grupos. Las ventajas de aplicar este enfoque como herramienta se relacionan con la respuesta a las necesidades particulares de las personas, reconocer vulnerabilidades específicas y permitir realizar acciones positivas que disminuyen las condiciones de discriminación y buscan transformar condiciones sociales, culturales y estructurales (ONU, 2013).

Enfoque de género: Es un enfoque de trabajo que analiza la situación de mujeres y hombres en la escuela, haciendo énfasis en el contenido y calidad de las relaciones HEGOA & ACSUR, 2008). Las relaciones de género han sido consideradas como sinónimo de desigualdad, jerarquía y poder desde las cuales se justifica la opresión que explota y disminuye capacidades; limitando su participación e impidiendo el ejercicio de sus derechos de manera justa.

Convivencia y paz: convivir pacífica y constructivamente con personas que frecuentemente tienen intereses que riñen con los propios.

Participación y responsabilidad democrática: Construir colectivamente acuerdos y consensos sobre normas y decisiones que rigen a todas las personas y que deben favorecer el bien común.

Pluralidad, identidad y valoración de las diferencias: construir sociedad a partir de la diferencia, es decir, del hecho de que a pesar de compartir la misma naturaleza humana, las personas son diferentes de muchas maneras.

Convivencia escolar: Se puede entender como la acción de vivir en compañía de otras persona en el contexto escolar y de manera pacífica y armónica. Se refiere al conjunto de relaciones que ocurren entre las personas que hacen parte de la comunidad educativa, el cual debe enfocarse en el logro de los objetivos educativos y su desarrollo integral.

FICHA PARA DILIGENCIAMIENTO

DATOS DE LA INSTITUCIÓN EDUCATIVA:

Nombre IE	
Código DANE	
Fecha de diligenciamiento	
Municipio	

A. ENFOQUE DE DERECHOS

	PREGUNTA	SI	NO	Comentarios
1	¿En el Manual de Convivencia se reconoce el derecho al debido proceso (preexistencia de la norma, presunción de inocencia, defensa y apelación)?			Es un conjunto de requisitos (pasos) necesarios para interponer cualquier tipo de medida pedagógica a los estudiantes, (A,B,C tiene jurisprudencia donde menciona lo que debe tener el debido proceso 7 pasos, 5 aspectos).
2	¿En el Manual de Convivencia se reconoce el derecho que tienen los miembros de la comunidad educativa, especialmente los estudiantes a participar en su construcción y actualización?			Es importante que se abran espacios en el colegio para la participación activa de la comunidad educativa. "Resalta los espacios de Participación estudiantil y su rol en las instancias de participación escolar (Consejo Directivo,

			Consejo Académico, Comisión de Evaluación y Promoción, Comité de Convivencia, Consejo Estudiantil, Personero Estudiantil, Asamblea y Consejo de Padres de Familia). Se promoverá la organización estudiantil que no necesariamente esté enmarcada en los anteriores espacios, privilegiando las que los niños, niñas, adolescentes o jóvenes consideren para su participación real y efectiva. Es necesario además tener en cuenta los ciclos de vida para lograr que los y las estudiantes de transición y primaria en especial, tengan sus propios espacios. Trabajar en la participación estudiantil es importante para la apropiación de procesos y conocimientos democráticos y, sobre todo, es un derecho fundamental." Estructuración del Manual de Convivencia Escolar-Nariño
3	¿El Manual de Convivencia es coherente con la Constitución, respeta y promueve el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la autodeterminación y la igualdad?		Los miembros de la comunidad educativa deben tener claridad que hay normas superiores los derechos que no se pueden afectar por las disposiciones contenidas en los manuales.
4	¿El Manual de Convivencia enuncia derechos y deberes de las y los miembros de la comunidad educativa en un marco de derechos humanos?		Todo debe enmarcarse en los derechos humanos. Reconocimiento de derechos fundamentales.
5	¿El Manual de Convivencia es coherente con la normatividad relativa a la inclusión de personas con discapacidad y la garantía frente los apoyos requeridos?		El manual debe pensar en las personas con discapacidad y no segregarlos de ninguna forma.

B. CONSTRUCCIÓN Y ACTUALIZACIÓN DEL MANUAL DE CONVIVENCIA

	PREGUNTA	SI	NO	Comentario
6	¿Se contó con la participación activa de la comunidad educativa en la construcción y actualización del manual de convivencia?			El manual de convivencia debe ser revisado por los representantes de la comunidad educativa, en el marco de Comité de Convivencia Escolar, se debe cumplir el principio de participación de la ley 1620 de 2013.
7	¿Dentro del Manual de Convivencia se hace referencia a las estrategias de socialización del contenido del mismo?			El manual de convivencia debe ser un documento activo que resulte vital para la convivencia, su desconocimiento o inoperancia genera relaciones negativas.
8	¿Para actualizar el manual realizó un proceso de diagnóstico participativo o lectura de contexto, que permita identificar las principales situaciones que alteran la convivencia escolar en su institución educativa?			Es obligatorio hacer diagnostico anuales de convivencia, para que en el manual se vean reflejados abordajes a las problemáticas.
9	¿Realizó participativamente los procesos de elaboración de alternativas de solución a las situaciones que afectan la convivencia en su EE?			La Comunidad Educativa en la actualización y revisión del manual debe incluir posibles soluciones a los problemas que los afectan cotidianamente, el manual de convivencia debe ser un documento que debe presentar protocolos para dar posibles soluciones, es necesario pensar en términos de convivencia.
10	¿Existe un reglamento del Comité de Convivencia Escolar como parte anexa del manual de convivencia?			Es un requisito exigido por la ley 1620 de 2013 y su decreto reglamentario 1965 de 2013.

C. DIVERSIDAD - PLURALIDAD

	PREGUNTA	SI	NO	Comentarios

11	¿Su manual de Convivencia establece tratos diferenciales o roles distintos entre niños y niñas? (roles y estereotipos de género)		Los manuales de Convivencia no deben contener distinciones ni diferencia en obligaciones o labores a partir de conceptos de raza, identidad de género, religión, orientación sexual, discapacidad.
12	¿Hay expresiones que descalifican o condenan la orientación sexual, identidad de género, etnia, credo, discapacidad?		Se encuentran acápites o posturas manifiestas que vayan en contra de la diferencia como por ejemplo condenar las orientaciones sexuales no hegemónicas, o algún tipo de persecución por no compartir alguna creencia religiosa, se usan expresiones negativas como pecado, en contra de la moral, falta a las buenas costumbres al referirse a aspectos como orientación sexual, identidad de género, etnia, credo, condición de discapacidad.
13	¿En el manual de convivencia considera como falta disciplinaria las identidades de género y orientaciones sexuales no hegemónicas (LGBTI)?		Estas disposiciones van en contra de la Constitución. Es contrario al derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad y al derecho a la igualdad. T- 478 de 2015 Sergio Urrego T-565 de 2013 T-562 de 2013
14	¿Contienen normas específicas y procedimentales para proteger de actos discriminatorios a personas con discapacidad; afrocolombianas, indígenas e integrantes de alguna etnia; que exploran, expresan o se reconocen con una orientación sexual o identidad de género no normativa; mujeres y minorías religiosas?		Respetar y reconocer la diversidad humana. Ley contra la discriminación 1572 de 2015, se considera delito. T-478 de 2015 Ley 1620 y el decreto 1695 de 2013: prevención y promoción.
15	¿Restringe las demostraciones de afecto entre parejas heterosexuales o entre parejas del mismo sexo?		T-478 de 2015 Sergio Urrego.
16	¿Hace uso de un lenguaje incluyente, no sexista, reconoce las prácticas de convivencia interculturales?		Es importante que desde el lenguaje utilizado en el manual sea incluyente
17	¿Permite que estudiantes usen el uniforme que les hace sentirse a gusto con su identidad de género?		Protección al derecho libre desarrollo de la personalidad.

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| 18 | ¿Establece restricciones para que estudiantes o docentes luzcan como deseen? Ejemplo: prohíbe el uso de maquillaje; cabello largo, tatuajes, piercing, accesorios para el cabello, etc. | | T-565 de 2013
T-562 de 2013
Sentencia T-994 de 2000
"En todo caso, aspectos como el estado de embarazo de una estudiante, el color de su cabello, su condición sexual, o la decisión de escoger una opción de vida determinada, como puede ser vivir independiente, casarse, etc., si no son circunstancias que entorpezcan la actividad académica, ni alteran el cumplimiento de sus deberes, y además pertenecen estrictamente a su fuero íntimo sin perturbar las relaciones académicas, no pueden ser consideradas motivos válidos que ameriten la expulsión de estudiantes de un centro docente, ni la imposición de sanciones que impliquen restricción de sus derechos. Por ende, tal como fue expresado en la sentencia T-543/95, en los cambios que conciernen a la vida privada, ninguna institución, ni pública ni particular, puede erigirse en autoridad para desestimar o desconocer las decisiones autónomas de un individuo respecto de la unión amorosa, sentimental, matrimonial o de convivencia familiar que desee establecer."
T-124 de 1998 (Deber de fomentar la tolerancia ante formas distintas de ver la vida por jóvenes estudiantes de colegio, aplicada a su vestuario, maquillaje y corte de pelo). |

D. MEDIDAS PEDAGÓGICAS

	PREGUNTA	SI	NO	Comentario
19	¿Su manual de Convivencia tiene pautas explícitas de análisis y resolución de conflictos?			Si los manuales de convivencia nombran solo las sanciones y no tienen desarrollados en el cuerpo del mismo el debido proceso que se tiene que realizar para imponerla, se encuentra fuera del marco constitucional.
20	¿Las medidas pedagógicas se abordan desde una perspectiva punitiva o de castigo?			Las sanciones se enfocan en restringir derechos al estudiante para que responda por el hecho, y no existe construido un pensamiento pedagógico en la misma ni un abordaje de convivencia o reparación del daño. Se emula el tipo de falta leve, grave y gravísima.
21	¿Hay sanciones y/o medidas pedagógicas que implican la suspensión, exclusión o expulsión del EE?			Las suspensiones de clases o las desescolarizaciones van en contravía del derecho a la educación.
22	¿Su manual de convivencia homologó las faltas disciplinarias (leves, graves, gravísimas) con las situaciones de Convivencia (tipo I, II, III)?			Se realizó en el manual un emparejamiento de las faltas con las situaciones de convivencia quiere decir esto que las situaciones se nombran para otorgar sanciones. Estas son diferentes deben ir separadas las situaciones de convivencia son pensadas para darles un abordaje de prevención, promoción, atención y seguimiento.
23	¿Las medidas pedagógicas tienen contenido pedagógico argumentado?			Los procesos en la escuela deben pensarse desde lo pedagógico. No desde lo punitivo o desde el castigo.

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24	¿Reconoce que las situaciones o casos de discriminación y hostigamiento escolar pueden ser generados también por parte del cuerpo docente, directivo, administrativo u otro diferente del estudiantado?? ¿Se hace explícita la ruta a seguir para atender estas situaciones?			El hostigamiento escolar no solo se reduce a relaciones entre estudiantes, los docentes pueden ser acosados y acosar.
25	¿Garantiza medidas pedagógicas y/o disciplinares sean proporcionales con el acto o situación presentados?			Es importante que la comunidad educativa reflexione acerca de las medidas pedagógicas priorizando el derecho a la educación.

E. RESOLUCIÓN DE CONFLICTOS y PROMOCIÓN DE LA CONVIVENCIA

	PREGUNTA	SI	NO	Comentario
26	¿Se hace referencia a la ruta de atención integral en el manual de convivencia?			Esto no se debe limitar a copiar la ley 1620 de 2013 y su decreto reglamentario, es importante un proceso de retroalimentación y adaptación a la situación de la Institución educativa.
27	¿Existen desarrollos de los componentes de prevención, promoción, atención y seguimiento para situaciones de convivencia?			La institución educativa debe abordar los problemas de convivencia con estos cuatro componentes, queriendo decir que no se debe reducir el trabajo del caso a atención, sino que se debe pensar en los otros tres componentes para abordarlo.
28	¿Su manual cuenta con unos acuerdos para mejorar la convivencia entre los integrantes de la comunidad educativa?			Es necesario construir acuerdos y que la convivencia no se centre solo en derechos y obligaciones, debe contener los tratos mínimos para garantizar un ambiente escolar positivo.
29	¿El manual de convivencia aborda las situaciones que afectan la misma a partir de la reconciliación, la restauración, la reparación de los daños causados y el restablecimiento de un clima de relaciones constructivas en el EE?			Incluir esto es lo que permite que el manual de convivencia tenga un punto de partida diferente al punitivo logre transcender para la resolución de conflictos, el pensar en reconciliación y reparación del daño causado entendiendo que lo vital es

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				restablecer relaciones que aporten positivamente a la convivencia es vital. Ejemplo práctico dos niñas pelean al descanso las sanciono a las dos y que no se gradúen o le apuesto desarrollar trabajo conjunto con ellas.
30	¿El manual de convivencia tiene un protocolo que involucre los componentes de promoción, prevención, atención y seguimiento para el consumo de sustancias psicoactivas?			Las Instituciones Educativas deben tener un protocolo de sustancias psicoactivas, que involucre a toda la comunidad.
31	¿Tiene protocolos para las situaciones de embarazo adolescente donde se le garantice el derecho a la educación a la niña o adolescente en condiciones de no discriminación?			Es un aspecto necesario para proteger a las niñas o adolescentes en esta situación y que exista claridad. "La protección que el Estatuto Superior depara a la maternidad es de tal intensidad que ni siquiera aquellos centro educativos cuyo proyecto de educación se encuentre fundado en una determinada visión ética o religiosa del mundo - protegida por la libertad de conciencia (C.P., artículo 18) - pueden utilizar tal visión para estigmatizar, apartar o discriminar a una estudiante en estado de embarazo de los beneficios derivados del derecho a la educación. En otras palabras, ante la tensión que puede existir entre la autonomía de los centros de educación y el derecho de la futura madre a no ser discriminada por razón de su embarazo, prima, sin duda, este último". T-551 de 2002.
32	¿Contempla acciones de prevención y atención frente a cualquier tipo de discriminación u hostigamiento escolar por condición de género, étnico-racial, discapacidad, orientación sexual e identidad de género no normativa?			La institución educativa tiene claridad de cómo actuar en un caso de hostigamiento por diferencia, hay campañas a partir del manual de convivencia que se hagan en la comunidad educativa para evitar estas situaciones.

| 33 | ¿El manual de convivencia contempla el seguimiento a las situaciones que afectan la convivencia? | | | Esto permite recoger lecciones aprendidas acerca de las estrategias de afrontamiento implementadas. Igualmente aporta a establecer una base para las lecturas de contexto y diagnostico y balance de la implementación de la ruta de atención en prevención, promoción y atención. |
| 34 | ¿Identifica estrategias para vincular las formas de organización propias de las comunidades étnicas y las formas que tienen estas para la resolución de conflictos? | | | El artículo 7 de la Carta Política reconoce y protege la existencia de la diversidad étnica y cultural de la Nación Colombiana.
Las culturas de estos pueblos, de las etnias, constituyen valores de la nacionalidad colombiana y como correlato concuerda con el artículo siguiente que establece como principio esencial la obligación para los particulares y para el estado de proteger las riquezas naturales y culturales de la Nación.
Derecho constitucional fundamental a la educación y compromiso en cabeza de las entidades estatales así como de los particulares encargados de prestar el servicio público de educación de aplicar medidas afirmativas y enfoques diferenciales con el fin de garantizar la efectiva protección de las minorías étnicas. Sentencia T-1105/08. |

Figure B.5.Education Manual '*Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación'*

The book is available on the website: http://www.semcucuta.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CARTILLA-MEN-AMBIENTES-ESCOLARES-LIBRES-DE-DISCRIMINACION.pdf

B.2 ECAS Surveys *Comportamiento y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad* **2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 Conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE)**

The ECAS Surveys results are available on the following websites:

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ecas/formularios/ECAS -2006.pdf

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ecas/formularios/ECAS -2008.pdf

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ecas/formularios/ECAS -2010.pdf

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ecas/formularios/ECAS -2012.pdf

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ecas/formularios/ECAS -2014.pdf

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ecas/formularios/ECAS -2016.pdf

El DANE suspende temporalmente la Encuesta de Comportamientos y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad en niños, niñas y adolescentes –ECAS- en los colegios

Comunicado de prensa

Bogotá, 21 de septiembre de 2016

La Encuesta de Comportamientos y Actitudes sobre Sexualidad en Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes Escolarizados - ECAS, se realiza desde el 2006 y responde a un mandato legal de lucha contra la explotación, pornografía y el turismo sexual con niñas, niños y adolescentes.

El DANE, por mandato, tiene la responsabilidad de adelantar esta investigación estadística cada dos años con el fin de conocer los factores de riesgo social, individual y familiar que propician la explotación sexual de niñas, niños y adolescentes, así como las consecuencias del abuso.

Dadas las inquietudes que algunos padres de familia y rectores de instituciones educativas han manifestado, y que este es un fenómeno que no es de menor preocupación –el 6,2 % del total de niños, niñas y adolescentes que han tenido relaciones sexuales, han sido forzados o intentaron forzarlos a tener relaciones sexuales y el 3,0 % manifestó haber recibido algo a cambio de tener relaciones sexuales, según los datos de la encuesta realizada en 2014-, el DANE informa que ha decidido suspender temporalmente la aplicación de la encuesta, con el objetivo de evaluar alternativas de parafraseo de algunas preguntas del capítulo D sobre sexualidad.

El DANE ratifica que tener información permite conocer la problemática, y solo a partir del conocimiento de los riesgos a los que están expuestos nuestros niños, niñas y adolescentes, Colombia puede tomar decisiones de política pública para enfrentar este preocupante fenómeno que afronta nuestro país.

Cód.: DIE-020-PD-01-r6_v2 Fecha: 18/12/2014

Figure B.6.DANE Official Press Statement about ECAS Survey Cancellation in 2016

The DANE official Press statement available on the website:

https://www.dane.gov.co/files/noticias/comunicado_prensa_suspension_ECAS.pdf

B.3 Official Statement from Humberto de la Calle, Chief Negotiator from the Government in the Colombian Peace Process, about the Inclusion of Gender Perspective in the Final Peace Agreement 2016

The official Press statement from Humberto de la Calle, chief negotiator of the Colombian peace process 2016 and Presidencia de la República de Colombia is available on the website: http://es.presidencia.gov.co/noticia/160724-Palabras-del-Jefe-de-la-Delegacion-del-Gobierno-Humberto-de-la-Calle

B.4 The National Electoral Council (CNE) Resolution 1733 in the Peace Plebiscite Elections 2016

The document is available on the website:

https://wsr.registraduria.gov.co/IMG/pdf/res_1733_2016.pdf

Appendix C

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

Señor Presidente de Colombia
Doctor
Juan Manuel Santos Caderón
Casa de Nariño
Bogotá D.E
L.C

Los abajo firmantes, representantes de la mayor parte de la Sociedad Evangélica Colombiana, damos a conocer a usted de manera respetuosa y a la opinión pública nuestra posición sobre el NUEVO ACUERDO FINAL PARA LA TERMINACIÓN DEL CONFLICTO Y LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE UNA PAZ ESTABLE Y DURADERA, acordado en La Habana (Cuba). A saber:

La Iglesia Evangélica de Colombia por convicción y vocación, cree y apoya los propósitos para lograr consolidar la Paz Nacional, donde el cese de los conflictos y la reconciliación de los colombianos sean una visible realidad.

No obstante lo anterior, sobre el NUEVO ACUERDO FINAL tenemos las siguientes manifestaciones y consideraciones, puesto que es necesario establecer ante la opinión pública nuestra posición, a saber:

A) Rechazamos que se insista en los términos del Nuevo Acuerdo en consideraciones tales como el término Enfoque de Género tal como aparecía en el acuerdo anterior, y que no se hubiera producido las modificaciones que con respeto solicitamos.
Recordemos que habíamos expresado que el llamado enfoque del "Nuevo Acuerdo" se hiciera específico en la prevalencia de los derechos de la mujer, entendiendo que la mujer en sí misma, es una víctima exclusiva del conflicto nacional. (Ver pág. 47, 53, 79, 80,117, 119, 126, 131,134.136, 137, 191).

B) No compartimos que en la introducción del documento se haya establecido nuevamente que al "Nuevo Acuerdo", se le adhieren de

manera automática "una serie de acuerdos que constituirán un todo indisoluble", dando a entender que el documento 82 acordado en La Habana (Cuba) fue nuevamente revivido y adherido en su texto original

NO es aceptable que en los temas de *enfoque diferencial y de género* se pretenda constituir un comité de acompañamiento internacional integrado Solo por organismos pertenecientes a la Organización de Naciones Unidas, llámese ONU Mujeres, Representante del Secretario General de ONU para violencia sexual, Federación Democrática Internacional de Mujeres y Suecia.

C) Lamentamos que la **FAMILIA** no fuera reconocida en texto del **nuevo acuerdo**, como *víctima principal del conflicto* y que su única referencia fue haber sido citada bajo el texto constitucional del Artículo 42 de la Carta Fundamental.

D) Si bien reconocemos que en cuanto al Tribunal Especial de Justicia se excluye la participación de magistrados internacionales, como inicialmente se pretendía, no es de recibo que esta Jurisdicción tenga un carácter supraconstitucional y con funciones superiores a nuestras Cortes de Justicia y, más aún, con un aparato de investigación propio con funciones extralimitadas, lo cual desde nuestra óptica pone en peligro la institucionalidad y la estabilidad de la República.

E) Reconocemos la inclusión en la implementación del "**Nuevo Acuerdo**" a organismos propios de nuestra naturaleza evangélica-cristiana, tales como: Consejo Nacional de Reconciliación y Convivencia, Organismos de monitoreo y verificación, Comisión de estudios de derechos a las víctimas que han sido establecidas en el documento.

F)   Más se echa de menos la atención necesaria respecto a   la necesidad Urgente y prioritaria, de un pronunciamiento expreso en estos "Nuevos Acuerdos" de la entrega de los miles de Menores reclutados por las FARC, la regulación de la entrega Efectiva de las Armas y de los Bienes para Reparar a sus Víctimas, la creación de Entes Especiales de protección para líderes y víctimas Cristianas

Evangélicas, como así mismo tenemos serios reparos frente al desequilibrio de las garantías y concesiones entre víctimas y victimarios, toda vez que se peticionó que estas fueran equitativas en la búsqueda de una Reparación Integral, más nada se dijo en el "Nuevo Acuerdo" de las zonas de Reserva para Víctimas, ni de las Curules Peticionadas en respeto a la Equidad, ni de la Jurisdicción Especial para Víctimas Cristianas Evangélicas, debidamente peticionadas.

G)Todo lo anterior, sin contar con el hecho Irrefutable de que no Es Aceptable la Elegibilidad Política de quienes han cometido Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y Crímenes de Guerra, contra nuestro Grupo y en general contra la Población Colombiana.

Finalmente, como Ciudadanos y entidades pertenecientes a la Sociedad Evangélica de Colombia, nuestra afirmación y nuestro compromiso es seguir trabajando en la consecución de una Verdadera Paz, promoviendo la labor Espiritual y Social, aquella que bajo el signo evidente de la Justicia podamos establecer en los urgentes tiempos de Colombia y donde la defensa de la Familia y de los Principios y Valores Cristianos sean establecidos en toda el territorio Nacional.

Dado en Bogotá (Colombia) a los 24 días del mes de noviembre de 2016

Por CEDECOL
Consejo Evangélico de Colombia

Edgar Castaño Díaz
Presidente

Figure C.1.CEDECOL Letter to President Santos for the Renegotiation of the Final Agreement Shared by Lila Palacios de Martínez, President RIFE

Hoy es un día histórico para nuestra nación. Hoy 10 de agosto de 2016 después de años de silencio, pasividad e indiferencia por parte de muchos padres de familia frente a las políticas impuestas en términos de moralidad y sexualidad por parte del gobierno nacional y del ministerio de educación nacional. Hoy hemos despertado y levantado nuestra voz expresando nuestra absoluta inconformidad, oposición y preocupación por la manera como se viene manejando el tema de sexualidad por parte del gobierno nacional y el ministerio de educación nacional en nuestros colegios a nivel nacional.

Es importante iniciar haciendo mención de lo que no nos lleva a realizar ésta manifestación pacífica. Lo que no es ésta manifestación a nivel nacional.

1. No es una campaña programada de desprestigio en contra del ministerio de educación o personalmente contra la ministra Gina Parody como se ha querido presentar en los medios de comunicación.
2. No es el resultado de ninguna inclinación o afiliación política, no ha sido motivada, alentada, ni organizada atendiendo a los intereses oportunistas de algún sector político en particular.
3. No es una manifestación homofóbica como también se ha querido presentar ante la opinión pública. No es así. La comunidad LGBTI tiene garantizados sus derechos. Nuestro plantón no es contra la comunidad homosexual en sí misma por lo que son, o por quitarles los derechos que tiene como ciudadanos de un estado social de derecho, laico y democrático.
4. No es una invitación a la discriminación por razón de su identidad sexual o por cualquier otro motivo. Estamos totalmente de acuerdo en que debemos buscar todas las formas posibles porque la discriminación por cualquier causa sea erradica de nuestras aulas de clase.
5. No es una incitación al odio y a querer imponer los derechos de unas mayorías sobre las minorías.

Entonces ¿Por qué sí nos estamos manifestando en éste día? ¿Qué sí es ésta manifestación?

1. Si es una voz que quiere *expresarse* sobre como los padres sentimos que se nos está vulnerando el derecho que tenemos como padres de educar y criar a nuestros hijos de acuerdo a nuestras convicciones en términos de la sexualidad, la moral, los principios, los valores y la familia.
2. Si es una voz de *alerta* sobre cómo a través del ministerio de educación nacional y de manera astuta amparados en unas sentencias de la corte constitucional respecto a la no discriminación y acompañados en éste

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ejercicio por varias organizaciones y en especial Colombia diversa, se esté ejerciendo algún tipo de presión hacia las colegios públicos y privados para imponer de manera soterrada la ideología de género en los niños y con esto generar confusión en cuanto a su identidad sexual.

3. Si es una voz que se *levanta* para decir que no aceptaremos que se nos imponga a nuestros hijos una ideología de género, ni por Colombia diversa, ni por el ministerio de educación nacional, ni por ninguna otra organización que atente contra nuestras convicciones.

4. Si es una voz que *exige* que de la misma manera como nos disponemos a respetar los derechos fundamentales de todos los demás que no piensan como nosotros en términos de la construcción de familia. También nuestros derechos fundamentales sean respetados.

5. Si es una voz que busca que los derechos de unos pocos, no se conviertan en una imposición para todos.

6. Si es una voz que *reclama* respeto por la autonomía educativa y por el derecho de los padres a escoger la educación para sus hijos conforme a sus convicciones, su fe y sus creencias.

7. Si es una voz que nos *recuerda* que sí hay padres que aman a sus hijos, que se interesan no solamente por proveer económicamente, sino también de guardar sus mentes y sus corazones.

8. Si es una voz que *demanda* del Presidente de la República, de los magistrados de las altas cortes, de los representantes del senado y cámara, de los ministros de los diferentes gabinetes, de los gobernadores, alcaldes, diputados y concejales que se conviertan en defensores, guardianes y garantes de nuestra constitución, garantizando así los derechos Fundamentales de las familias colombianas.

Todo lo anterior amparados en la LEY 1361 de 2009 por medio de la cual se crea la Ley de Protección Integral a la Familia, que en su Artículo 1º dice: "*Objeto*. La presente ley tiene por objeto fortalecer y garantizar el desarrollo integral de la familia, como núcleo fundamental de la sociedad; así mismo, establecer las disposiciones necesarias para la elaboración de una Política Pública para la familia. Y en su artículo 4º. En cuanto a *derechos* dice: "El Estado y la Sociedad deben garantizar a la familia el ejercicio pleno de los siguientes derechos. Numeral 14. "Respeto y libertad en la formación de los hijos de acuerdo a sus principios y valores"

Por último, que el amor, la sensatez y en especial Dios continúe guiando a nuestra amada Nación. Dios bendiga a nuestros niños. Dios bendiga a nuestras familias. Dios bendiga a Colombia.

ABANDERADOS POR LA FAMILIA!

Figure C.2.Official Statement from a Christian Evangelical Church to Protests in 'Marcha por la Familia' 2016

Figure C.3.PowerPoint Presentation Slide from Senator María del Rosario Guerra about the 'No' vote in the Peace Plebiscite at the Congress

Figure C.4. PowerPoint Presentation Slide from Senator María del Rosario Guerra about Gender Perspective in the Peace Process

Figure C.5. PowerPoint Presentation Slide from Senator María del Rosario Guerra about Gender Perspective in the Final Peace Agreement

Appendix D

ARTICLES, REFLECTIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

CUADRO COMPARATIVO ENTRE ENFOQUE DE GÉNERO E IDEOLOGÍA DE GÉNERO

[handwritten at top: Busca la igualdad sin rechazar la diferencia]

ENFOQUE DE GÉNERO [PERSPECTIVA]	IDEOLOGÍA DE GÉNERO
Propone una organización social fundada en la distinción de los sexos, pero en un nivel de igualdad.	Igualdad absoluta entre varón y mujer hasta el extremo de eliminar cualquier aspecto que los identifique como tales.
Defiende, como unidad básica de la sociedad, la primacía de la pareja varón –mujer, sin jerarquías.	Visión individualista de los derechos humanos, exaltando la búsqueda de la independencia personal (o autonomía) en todos los aspectos de la vida.
Hace énfasis en el reconocimiento de los derechos de las mujeres resaltando los aspectos propios de la feminidad, como la capacidad de engendrar y de criar los hijos.	Descalifica, desaprueba o rechaza por insignificantes todos los roles femeninos definidos socialmente y minimiza las cualidades o contribuciones relacionadas con el sexo, incluida la posibilidad de engendrar (...)
Insiste en la contribución de las mujeres a la sociedad y trata de buscar la igualdad sin rechazar la diferencia.	Se equipara social y jurídicamente la mujer al varón.

[handwritten annotations below the table, left column:] No podemos elminar la feminidad, y no se puede plantear como construcción social. Género – lo cultural, sexo – lo biológico

[handwritten annotations, right column:] Matrimonio y herencia hombre – mujer (Heterosexual) se necesitan al construir a otro mundo

Figure D.1.Comparative Table of Meanings between Gender Perspective and 'Gender Ideology' from Senator María del Rosario Guerra's Archives

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D.1   Definitions of 'Gender Ideology' Ideas from the Catholic Website Catholic.Net Found in the Senator María del Rosario Guerra's Archives

Document available on the website:

https://es.catholic.net/op/articulos/41418/cat/447/que-es-la-ideologia-de-genero.html

IMPORTANTE MUJERES

- La inequidad salarial de las mujeres frente a los hombres es de 21%. 71%.
- En el mercado laboral hay mayor participación de los hombres (76%) que de las mujeres (54%).
- La informalidad laboral de las mujeres es 4.5% mayor que la de los hombres.
- Las mujeres trabajan 10.8 horas más a la semana que los hombres.
- Los hombres trabajan 4 semanas al mes, mientras las mujeres trabajan 5.
- Cuando la jefatura del hogar es femenina, las cifras de pobreza aumentan (31%).

The effect of women's economic power in Latin America and the Caribbean (Banco Mundial - Agosto 2012) y *Gender Equality in Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship* (OCDE 2012) han demostrado que la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres trae beneficios sociales y económicos al aumentar la productividad y la competitividad del país.

Según estos estudios, mayor participación de las mujeres en la fuerza de trabajo —o una reducción de la disparidad entre la participación de mujeres y hombres en la fuerza laboral— produce un crecimiento económico mayor y más rápido.

MUJERES FARC

- Conferencia Guerrillera 20 Septiembre de 2016, Victoria Sandino dijo que **no tenía el número exacto pero que eran el 30 o 40% de las FARC.**

- Ejercito Nacional en 2011 dijo que eran 2,700

FISCALIA:

Informe "violencia sexual, crimen asociado al reclutamiento ilícito" dio cuenta de que 214 mujeres (92 y 18 hombres (8 %) fueron víctimas de violencia sexual en las filas de las Farc.

250 mujeres violadas
1800 abortos forzados

Figure D.2.Reflections of Senator María del Rosario Guerra about Women's Role in the Colombian Context of the Peace Agreement

EL "*ENFOQUE DE GÉNERO*" EN EL ACUERDO FINAL

Ilva Myriam Hoyos Castañeda

Introducción

El "*enfoque* de *género*" en el Acuerdo Final, fue transversal en todo el documento y tiene 2 usos diferenciados que tendrán implicaciones de índole diversa en el ámbito de las políticas públicas, en la educación, en la salud, así como en la reparación integral a las víctimas y en todas aquellas que promuevan una paz estable y duradera:

1. Criterio de análisis que permite evidenciar las diversas clases de discriminación que han sufrido las mujeres y, por ende, buscar las medidas a través de las cuales puede conseguirse la igualdad de derechos y oportunidades entre los hombres y las mujeres

2. "*Enfoque de diversidad, identidad y orientación sexual*" a través de un lenguaje sutil, "encriptado" que defiende la libertad, la inclusión, la no discriminación a partir del reconocimiento de la tesis que deben superarse los estereotipos de carácter sexual para promover, ejecutar, desarrollar políticas públicas a partir de las identidades y orientaciones sexuales y de género.

Historia subcomisión de género

- Se instaló el 7 de septiembre de 2014 la **Subcomisión de Género**, conformada por mujeres y hombres de las delegaciones del Gobierno Nacional y de las FARC-EP, quienes con el apoyo de diez (10) expertas colombianas en violencia sexual y diez (10) ex guerrilleras de otras partes (Sudáfrica, Irlanda del Norte, Guatemala, El Salvador, Indonesia, Uruguay)

- 14 de julio leyeron comunicado conjunto

Alcance que le dieron el Gobierno Nacional y las FARC-EP antes de la suscripción del Acuerdo Final al enfoque de género

Declaraciones de 14 de julio de 2016, el Jefe de la Delegación colombiana, Humberto de la Calle Lombana dijo:

"la Delegación procuró que las discusiones fueran más allá de la conce... género tradicional"

El ""género no hace alusión solamente a la mujer"

El "impacto diferenciado de situaciones concretas sobre hombres y mujeres y [de] personas LGTBI"

"El enfoque de género es una conquista y tiene una perspectiva más amplia cuya validez irradia valores que trascienden el empeño de la Mesa"

Es claro, por tanto, que para el Jefe de la Delegación del Gobierno Nacional en las negociaciones de La Habana "el enfoque de género" tiene un alcance más amplio que la simple reivindicación de los derechos de las mujeres y de la superación de la discriminación que durante años han vivido en el marco del conflicto armado

Con el término "género" se reivindica una nueva manera de entender la persona, la familia, la sociedad, las relaciones entre hombres y hombres, la libertad, la autonomía, los derechos fundamentales e incluso los deberes del Estado para sustituirla por nuevas realidades centradas en la identidad y en la orientación sexuales, ¿esto no es lo propio de la "ideología de género"? (ILVA)

Qué se incluyó en ese Acuerdo respecto al enfoque de género (2da acepción):

Pág 9 - *Reforma Rural Integral*: se pactó que los planes y programas que formarán parte de la Reforma Rural Integral *"deben tener un enfoque territorial, diferencial y de género que implica reconocer y tener en cuenta las necesidades, características y particularidades económicas, culturales y sociales de los territorios y las comunidades rurales —niñas, niños, mujeres y hombres, incluyendo personas con orientación sexual e identidad de género diversa— y garantizar la sostenibilidad socio-ambiental"*

Pág 35 - *Participación Política:* Acuerdo establece que deberá ofrecerse protección especializada a las personas elegidas popularmente, a las que se declaren en oposición política, a *"líderes y lideresas de partidos y movimientos políticos, con enfoque diferencial, de género y con presencia nacional y regional. Para efectos de su participación en política, la evaluación tendrá en consideración los rasgos específicos que enfrentan las mujeres y las personas con orientación sexual diversa"*

Pág 71- "*Fin del Conflicto*: Las partes pactaron que las medidas que se adopten para garantizar al ciudadano el acceso a una justicia independiente, oportuna, efectiva y transparente también "*deben contribuir a garantizar una administración de justicia efectiva en casos de violencia de género, libre de estereotipos basados en género o [en] la condición sexual y* [que se adoptarán] *sanciones proporcionales a la gravedad del hecho*"

Implicaciones previstas en el Acuerdo sobre lo que el texto llama "*un adecuado enfoque diferencial y de género*"

- Las partes que negociaron y suscribieron el Acuerdo Final de La Habana comparten que el "*enfoque de género*" debe ir más allá de la justa y legítima reivindicación de los derechos de las mujeres y su más novedosa y radical interpretación lo llevaría a emparentarse con las tesis de la llamada "*ideología de género*" → Ideología en su sentido más radical como un conjunto de ideas o sistema de pensamiento que adopta una parte de la realidad.

- En el Acuerdo Final no aparece la expresión "*ideología de género*", entre otras razones, porque el Gobierno Nacional ha reconocido no saber qué es, pero no es necesario que esta expresión aparezca en el texto, basta que al "*género*" se le dé un cambio de significado para decir lo que expresamente no se puede decir, pero sí se quiere decir.

- El "*enfoque de la diversidad, identidad y orientación sexuales*" y la agenda social que pretende

Dos de las organizaciones que intervinieron en la Mesa de Conversaciones en representación de la población LGTBI fueron Caribe Afirmativo y Colombia Diversa. Dentro de sus propuestas:

Caribe Afirmativo: Revisar en clave de "*género*" la manera como se están construyendo los acuerdos de paz para eliminar de ellos "*cualquier práctica patriarcal y excluyente y garantizar un enfoque de género y diversidad sexual en todo el proceso de negociación*"

Colombia Diversa: La implementación como elemento específico de la educación "*de un programa de reconocimiento de la diversidad sexual y de género, así como la eliminación de la educación sexista, homofóbica y toda aquella que perpetúa los estereotipos y prejuicios*"

Figure D.3.Article 'The Gender Perspective in the Final Peace Agreement' Written by Ilva HoyosCastañeda from Senator María del Rosario Guerra's archives

Figure D.4.PowerPoint Presentation Slide Against 'Gender Ideology' and
        Comprehensive Sex Education from Red Internacional Familia y
        Educación (RIFE)

Figure D.5.PowerPoint Presentation Slide from Red Internacional Familia y Educación (RIFE) about the Role of Sexual and Reproductive Rights in the Education Manual *'Ambientes Escolares Libres de Discriminación'*

Figure D.6.PowerPoint Presentation Slide from Red Internacional Familia y Educación (RIFE) about the Inclusion of 'Gender Ideology' Ideas and the Revision of the Education Manual

Appendix E

ADDITIONAL TOPICS, SUPPORTERS, AND DISINFORMATION

"Convocamos al gran Plantón por la Vida el 19 de febrero, ante la Corte Constitucional y las sedes de Profamilia en el país"

Comunicado de organizaciones pro-vida a la opinión pública

El doloroso caso de JuanSe, el niño abortado por la organización PROFAMILIA después de sus 7 meses de gestación, deja en evidencia lo lejos que ha llegado la práctica del aborto en Colombia. Se trataba de un niño en avanzado estado de desarrollo, sin malformaciones incompatibles con la vida, concebido en una relación consentida y de cuya madre la Unidad de Salud de la Universidad del Cauca dijo que no se encontraba en riesgo de afectación a su salud por razón del embarazo.

El asesinato de JuanSe ha generado amplio rechazo social y expone los abusos que se vienen cometiendo desde la Sentencia C-355 de 2006 de la Corte Constitucional. La misma Corte ha buscado ampliar la práctica del aborto a través de sentencias de tutela, en las que ha dado un margen mayor a la interpretación de las tres causales originales: malformación del feto incompatible con la vida, violación o riesgo para la vida de la madre. De esta última hoy se abusa para justificar el aborto en cualquier circunstancia y por eso la misma PROFAMILIA en su rueda de prensa por el caso de JuanSe, ha dicho que la afectación de la salud mental constituye el 90% de los casos de aborto realizados por esa organización (22.146 solo el año pasado).

Este caso, reveló al país el drama de los niños abortados en avanzado estado de gestación, incluso cuando ya es viable su vida extrauterina, como lo era JuanSe. Todo esto ocurre mientras en la Corte Constitucional se discute una nueva ponencia abortista del magistrado Alejandro Linares que pretende liberalizar aún más la práctica del aborto, y mientras el Ministerio de Salud evalúa la reglamentación de dichos procedimientos.

Es por eso que las organizaciones provida pedimos que este momento sea propicio para que el debate se aborde en el escenario más idóneo: **el Congreso de la República**. Este debe ser el espacio de construcción del diálogo democrático, antes que las sentencias de la Corte o las resoluciones del Gobierno.

Pedimos también que se investigue a PROFAMILIA por el caso en mención y por otros casos en los que se pudo haber abusado de la despenalización para cometer abortos ilegales (sin causales). Que responda por el destino de los cuerpos de los bebés abortados, en estricto sentido el de JuanSe. Confiamos en que la justicia aclarará las actuaciones de esa organización en lo que respecta a su función abortista y a su actuación en el caso concreto de Juan Sebastián.

Hemos recibido en solidaridad el apoyo de muchas organizaciones internacionales, quienes se han sumado a este comunicado.

De esta forma, invitamos a todos aquellos que se unen a esta causa, que el 19 de febrero, desde sus países, nos acompañen organizado un pequeño plantón en las embajadas o consulados colombianos y hagan entrega oficial del comunicado de la sociedad civil, rechazando el aborto.

Internacionales:

Chile

Colectivo de Organizaciones Por las dos vidas:
1. Siempre por la Vida
2. Movimiento de Mujeres Reivindica
3. Testimonios por la Vida
4. Proyecto Esperanza Chile
6. Frente por la defensa de la Vida - Valparaíso
7. Fundación Mirada Más Humana
8. Comunidad y Justicia
9. Fundación Ángel de Luz
10. Maternitas
11. Red por la Vida Bíobio
12. Plataforma Chile es Vida
13. Amigos del Maule por la Vida
14. Juntos por la Vida
15. Fundación Coordinadora por la Vida
16. Proyector Alégrate Mujer
17. Médicos por la Vida
18. Niños por la Vida
19. Proyecto Nasciturus
20. Salvar el 1/ Save de 1 Chile

Paraguay

21. Generación Provida
22. Foro de Diálogo Civil
23. FEDAVIFA
24. SMMM
25. CAV
26. 40 Días por la Vida
27. Pastoral de la Vida
28. Con Mirada de Mujer
29. Frente Joven
30. Sí a la Vida, a las Dos Vidas
31. Con Mis Hijos No Te Metas
32. Frente Nacional Provida y Profamilia
33. Padres en Acción Paraguay

Perú

34. Proyecto Esperanza Perú
35. Opción V
36. Viñedos de Raquel
37. Red Jóvenes Provida
38. Salvemos las 2 Vidas Perù
39. Movimiento Pro Mujer
40. Frente Joven
41. Corazón de Madre
42. Vida Viva
43. Coordinadora Nacional Unidos por la Vida y la Familia
44. Fraternidad de Agrupaciones Santo Tomás de Aquino - FASTA

Venezuela

45. Proyecto Esperanza Venezuela

México

46 Red ProYucatán
47. Donando Sangre, Compartiendo Vida A.C
48. Paternidad, A.C.
49. Casa Hogar para el Desamparado, A.C.
50. Infancia Feliz, A.C.
51. Instituto Dar
52. Asociación Nacional Pro Superación Personal, A.C.
53. Instituto José Pablo Rovalo
54. AZCUE, A.C.
55. AMANC Yucatán, IAP
56. Aprendamos Juntos, A.C.
57. Club ARCA, A.C.
58. COMEXBIO
59. TUUKLEH-Piénsalo
60. Patronato Hogares Juveniles SANA, A.C.
61. Asociación de Médicos Católicos
62. Asociación de Mujeres Yucatecas Contra el Cáncer, A.C.
63. Asociación Hogar de Angeles, IAP
64. Asociación Vida Humana Integral, IAP
65. Ayuda a la Mujer Embarazada, A.C.
66. CAIYRAD
67. Estoy Bien, A.C
68. Género F, A.C.
69. Hogares MANA, A.C.
70. Salvemos una Vida, A.C.
71. Unión Nacional de Padres de Familia Yucatán
72. Más Humano, AC
73. Amor Seguro, AC
74. MaterDei Centro Cultural Católico
75. Fundación Valentina Arrigunaga Peón
76. CEFIM Yucatán
77. Proyección Valor, AC
78. Instituto Proyecto Humano Integral

79. Fundación del Empresariado Yucateco (FEYAC)
80. Primero Familia
81. Red Para la Familia de Yucatán
82. Casa de Descanso de los Abuelos
83. 40 Días por la Vida Yucatán
84. Centro Educativo y Comunitario Pbro. *Fernando Castro Andrade, IAP
85. CEDIDOWN, IAP
86. AMSIF
87. Mano Amiga Conkal
88. Fundación PAUDI
89. Psicoparatodos
- Acción Jalisco México

Ecuador
90. Frente Joven Ecuador
91. Proyecto Esperanza, Guayaquil
92. Fraternidad de Agrupaciones Santo Tomás de Aquino - FASTA

El Salvador
93. Fundación Sí a la Vida
94. Fundación Forja
95. Vida y Familia Vida y Familia
96. EVA - Educando la Voluntad y Afectividad
97. Fundación RESVAMUSAL
98. PIMUDES
99. Somos Más
100. Heartbeat El Salvador
101. Vito Católico SV
102. Fundación Eva
103. Asociación Manos Amigas
104. Salvemos a la Familia
105. Comunidad Cristiana de Asambleas de Dios San Salvador/ Santa Ana/ San Miguel/
La Libertad y Sangüilingo
106. Conferencia Evangélica de Asambleas De Dios
107. Movimiento de Transformación Nacional - Levantémonos El Salvador
108. Grupo Pastoral Nueva Jerusalén

Bolivia
109. Plataforma Ciudadana por la Vida y la Familia
110. Discípulos de Cristo, del Movimiento Jesús, José y María
111. Proyecto Esperanza Bolivia
- Salvemos las 2 vidas Bolivia

Uruguay
112. Asociación Cristiana Uruguaya De Profesionales De La Salud (ACUPS)
113. Ministerio Nehemías - Educadores Cristianos
114. Congreso Iberoamericano Por La Vida Y La Familia
115. ESALCU
116. Colegio y Liceo Bet-El
117. Hacemos un Trato

118. Comisión Evangélica Multidisciplinaria del Uruguay
119. Todos por los Niños
120. A Mis Hijos No Los Tocan
121. Unión Deportiva Cristiana
122. Ministerio Internacional La Casa Del Rey De Gloria - Mercedes-Soriano
123. Casa de Dios. Red Apostólica Internacional - Montevideo
124. Las Deboras
125. Madrinas por la Vida
126. Red de Familias Uruguay
127. CEPRODIH
128. Gruta de Belén
129. Proyecto Esperanza Uruguay
130. Servicio Comunitario Siembra
131. Movimiento Adelante
132. Movimiento Por La Vida
133. Mesa Coordinadora Por La Vida - Salto
134. PROMI - Protección Materno Infantil

Guatemala
135. Asociación La Familia Importa
136. Asociación Sí a la Vida
137. Ministerios Maranatha
138. Presbiterio Cristiano de Guatemala
139. Instituto Internacional Juntos por la Vida
140. Fundación Apoya
141. 40 Días por la Vida Guatemala
142. Asociación pro vida humana de Quetzaltenango, Guatemala
143. El país de los jóvenes
144. Guate X La Familia
145. Asociación de Familias Numerosas
146. Intercesión por La Vida
147. Una Mente Abierta a la Vida (UMAVID)
148. Familias con Sentido
149. Héroes por la Vida y la Familia
150. Arte Hoy y Siempre
151. Proyecto Esperanza
152. Ministerio de Sanación San Pedro
153. Live for Life
154. Asociación PADREZ
155. ASOVID
156. Asícromosomos
157. Síndrome X Frágil
158. Pastoral Familiar de la Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala
159. Centro de Atención a la Mujer Sangre de Cristo
160. Sección Señoras Regnum Christi
161. Enlace A.C.
162. Pastoral Arquidiocesana de la Vida
163. Movimiento un Camino Mejor
164. Apóstoles de la Virgen de Guadalupe, del Movimiento Jesús, José y María
165. Discípulos del Santísimo Sacramento, del Movimiento Jesús, José y María

166. Fundación María Madre de Misericordia, del Movimiento Jesús, José y María
167. Familias con Sentido
168. Asociación Equidad y Desarrollo Sostenible Andar
169. Instituto de Análisis de Riesgo y Prospectiva Estratégica
170. Mission Hope
171. Mano Amiga
172. Encuentro Matrimonial

Panamá
173. Alianza Panameña por la Vida y la Familia

Brasil
174. Movimento da Cidadania pela Vida
175. Brasil sem Aborto
176. Movimento de Defesa da Vida da Arquidiocese do Rio de Janeiro
177. Asociação Nacional Provida do Brasil
178. Rede Nacional em Defesa da vida e da família
179. Geração PróVida Brasil
180. Associação Nacional Pró-vida e Pró-família
181. Instituto Espirita Vida
182. Comissão Arquidiocesana de promoção e defesa da vida.
183. Missão Vida in Concert
184. CERVI-Centro de Reestruturação para a Vida
185. G.O.D. (Global Organizacion Defense)
186. Movimento Legislação e Vida
187. Movimento Nacional da Cidadania pela Vida - Brasil sem Aborto

Costa Rica
188. Médicos por la Vida de Costa Rica
189. Opciones heroicas
190. Asociación Crece
191. Despierta Costa Rica
192. Alianza por la vida
193. Médicos por la vida
194. Grupo Maria Virgen y Madre, Movimiento Jesús José y María.
195. Fraternidad de Agrupaciones Santo Tomás de Aquino - FASTA

España
196. Fraternidad de Agrupaciones Santo Tomás de Aquino - FASTA
197. Foro de la Familia
198. Citizen Go

República Democrática del Congo
199. Fraternidad de Agrupaciones Santo Tomás de Aquino – FASTA

Figure E.1.Official Press Statement mentioning the supporters of the Red Internacional Familia y Educación (RIFE) against Abortion Published on Facebook on February 2021

Figure E.2. Facebook Profile of Red Internacional Familia y Educación (RIFE) with Detected Disinformation Content in 2021

Appendix F

IRB/HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

Title of Study: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives on the Colombian Peace Plebiscite Elections 2016

Principal Investigator(s): Ángela María Bohórquez Oviedo

Important aspects of the study you should know about first:

- **Purpose:** The purpose of the study is to explore the knowledge and experiences of politicians, religious leaders, activists, scholars, and journalists that played a key public role in the national debates of the campaigns for the Yes and No vote in the peace plebiscite elections in the most widely read national newspapers.

- **Procedures:** If you choose to participate, I will be interviewing based on a set of broad questions about the national debates of the Yes and No campaigns before the elections of the peace plebiscite in the most widely read national newspapers.

- **Duration:** This will take about 30 minutes to one hour in one session.

- **Risks:** The participation in this study will not expose you to any physical, psychological, social, financial or legal risks given that you are a public figure whose opinions and ideas are well-established in the public sphere.

- **Benefits:** The main benefit from this research to you is the opportunity to share their expertise and knowledge about the peace plebiscite results. The findings of the interview will nourish the future analysis of peace mechanisms of democratic participation in political processes in Colombia and Latin America, which has not been a central object of study in political science and political communication.

- **Costs and Compensation:** If you decide to participate there will be no additional cost to you and you will not be compensated.

- **Participation:** Taking part or not in this research study is your decision. You can decide to participate and then change your mind at any point.

Contact Information: If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues related to this research study you may contact the Principal Investigator, Ángela María Bohórquez Oviedo at 484-9088419 or angelabo@udel.edu or you may contact the co-chairs of her dissertation committee: Dr. Kara Ellerby at 302-8310730 or kellerby@udel.edu and Dr. Pascha Bueno-Hansen at 302-2201915 or pbh@udel.edu

Page 1 of 1

I/C Exempt Form Rev. 01/2019

Figure F.1.Consent to Participate in a Exempt Research Study

DATE: June 10, 2019

TO: Ángela María Bohórquez Oviedo
FROM: University of Delaware IRB

STUDY TITLE: [1331679-1] Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives on the Colombian Peace Plebiscite Elections 2016
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project

ACTION: DETERMINATION OF EXEMPT STATUS
EFFECTIVE DATE: June 10, 2019

REVIEW CATEGORY: Exemption category # *(2)*

Thank you for your New Project submission to the University of Delaware Institutional Review Board (UD IRB). According to the pertinent regulations, the UD IRB has determined this project is EXEMPT from most federal policy requirements for the protection of human subjects. The privacy of subjects and the confidentiality of participants must be safeguarded as prescribed in the reviewed protocol form.

This exempt determination is valid for the research study as described by the documents in this submission. Proposed revisions to previously approved procedures and documents that may affect this exempt determination must be reviewed and approved by this office prior to initiation. The UD amendment form must be used to request the review of changes that may substantially change the study design or data collected.

Unanticipated problems and serious adverse events involving risk to participants must be reported to this office in a timely fashion according with the UD requirements for reportable events.

A copy of this correspondence will be kept on file by our office. If you have any questions, please contact the UD IRB Office at (302) 831-2137 or via email at hsrb-research@udel.edu. Please include the study title and reference number in all correspondence with this office.

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

www.udel.edu

Figure F.2.IRB Determination of Exempt Status of the Research