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Military-Civilian Relations in Disaster Operations

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## FOREWORD

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## PREFACE

Conspicuous by their presence in disaster operations, are military organizations. In American as well as other societies they are expected to and actually do participate rather extensively in large-scale community emergencies. This report examines their operations in such situations and some of the ensuing military-civilian problems.

The first chapter discusses in somewhat abstract terms the typical structure and characteristics of military organizations. Much of this material, of course, will be quite familiar to most military men, but the presentation is primarily intended to stress to the general reader and civilian officials in particular, the bureaucratic nature of this kind of organization. The chapter following discusses very briefly the legal basis for military involvement in disasters, and then somewhat more extensively how American cultural values such as the supremacy of the civilian sphere, affects the initial involvement of armed forces in community catastrophes.

Chapter III analyzes the actual tasks undertaken by the military in support of civilian communities during periods of disasters. Problems associated with such activity are described with particular attention being given to the difficulties involved in coordinating military and civilian organizational efforts in an emergency. Because of its importance in the relationship between the two kinds of groups, Chapter IV examines in detail the whole matter of authority, including deviations from the legally sanctioned and traditionally supported pattern of military subordination to civilian control in times of disaster. For comparative purposes and to highlight the American pattern, Chapter V sets forth the disaster response of military organizations in four other societies. The report concludes with a chapter on what implications military activity in peacetime disasters have for operations in a nuclear setting.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This report considers the involvement of the military in disasters, and the nature of military-civilian relations when such involvement occurs. Our analysis will be a sociological one. That is, we will focus on social structure and social organization as they are related to military involvement in community catastrophes. Our thesis is that the way in which military units participate in the response of a community to disaster reflects, among other things, the nature of the society in which the disaster takes place, the organizational composition of the disaster-struck community, and the characteristics of military groups (i.e., features of military organizations which make their assistance valuable to civilian communities during crisis periods, such as the possession of large manpower reserves and established command systems). Finally, many of the problems with respect to military-civilian relations in disaster will also be viewed as a consequence of social organization. That is, not only the behavioral responses but such difficulties as arise between military groups and civilians in community emergencies are a result of the social structure in which they both operate.

Field studies conducted by the Disaster Research Center (DRC) are the primary source of data for this report. The Center, since its inception in 1963, has conducted 48 field studies of large scale crises, both in this country and abroad. Military organizations were involved in emergency relief operations in almost all of the disaster events among those crises. The United States Army was the military group most studied by the DRC field teams. Because of their lesser degree of participation in the disaster operations examined, somewhat less information was obtained about the National Guard and the Air Force. In this research, the data gathered on military involvement were derived from: (1) semi-structured and unstructured tape-recorded interviews with members of military organizations as well as civilians who had contact with the military; (2) recorded on-the-scene observations of military units in operation; and (3) various kinds of documents such as military after-action reports and critiques.

The disaster literature is a secondary source of data for this report. The DRC maintains a disaster data repository. Most of the published and unpublished materials on human and group responses, including military activity, to various kinds of stress situations are available in the repository. However, this kind of information only supplemented the data secured directly in the field by DRC since, with a few exceptions, previous studies seldom were based on research of actual military operations in disasters.

Excluded from consideration in what follows is the involvement of military organizations in community emergencies of a conflict nature. Thus, actions of such groups during civil disturbances and riotous disorders are not examined. While there are some similarities in organizational responses in all large scale community crises, the differences between a conflict situation such as a riot and a consensus type of emergency such as a natural

disaster, are such as to warrant omission in this report of a discussion of military activity in the former kind of situation.

An appreciation of the nature and consequences of military participation in civilian emergency activities requires an initial understanding of the nature of disasters and their impact on community social systems and processes. For this reason, in the next section we will discuss the nature of disaster. This is followed by a discussion of the structure of military organizations with particular focus on its bureaucratic nature.

### The Meaning of the Term Disaster

As Dynes has observed, the term disaster has acquired a variety of meanings.<sup>1</sup> Usually, however, the term includes at least one of four referents. For example, the term disaster is often used to refer to a physical agent such as a tornado funnel or a hurricane storm. Also, the word is sometimes used to refer to, or to include the physical impact or consequences of an agent, such as property damage and deaths. At times, the term disaster has reference to an evaluation of the impact of a physical event. For example, one community or group of persons may perceive the consequences of an earthquake as being more "disastrous" than another similar event. Finally, the term is utilized with reference to the social disruption caused by the physical event, or what is sometimes conceptualized as "stress." In the social disruption caused by an agent, the normal structural arrangements in a community may be altered as well as certain social processes.

This last formulation is most useful for our purposes. Some notion of the sociological consequences of physical events should be included in the meaning of the term disaster, as is the case with the following definition:

. . . an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society or a community undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, in a disaster, there are not only alternations of the physical environment -- as manifested in property damage -- but also changes in social behavior, both individual and group.

Among the changes that often occur at the group or organizational level following the impact of a disaster agent are the following. Community service organizations are pushed beyond their capabilities. Because of this they must supplement their capabilities with added resources, including personnel, which alters the nature of their groups. At the same time, other organizations must assume unusual activities and functions during the emergency period. In turn, the activities of these groups which may be either extra-community or supportive from within the community, create the necessity for new patterns of coordination and control among the involved organizations.

It is in this context particularly that we will look at military activity in disasters. Military units often provide the additional major capability brought to bear upon an emergency from outside the community. Their presence, however, necessitates an integration of organizational behavior considerably beyond what otherwise would be the case.

In the analysis of disaster behavior the notion of time periods or stages has been utilized. This stems from the fact that certain behavioral patterns seem to occur in particular sequences following a community disaster. For example, Powell and his colleagues conceptualize several time stages that are characterized by different functions. They tell of such stages as those of disaster warning, of threat, of impact, of inventory, of rescue, etc. Wallace, in a similar manner, conceives of a steady state, a period of warning, threat, impact, and so on.<sup>4</sup> In similar broad terms, we conceive of two primary time stages in disaster, an emergency period and a rehabilitation period. The emergency period refers to that time segment which immediately follows the impact of a disaster agent, and in those crises in which warning occurs, it also includes the time when this process occurs. The emergency period of a disaster varies considerably, but often lasts between three and four days. It is during the time that the greatest demands are imposed on the capabilities of the crisis-involved groups and organizations. The rehabilitation phase of a large scale community catastrophe frequently commences several days after the impact of a disaster agent. During this period, the sense of urgency steadily declines and many normal social functions are once again resumed. Also, actions aimed at long-term and permanent recovery are initiated.

The emergency period is the context in which we will discuss military involvement and military-civilian relations in disasters. In other words, we will focus on that time segment during disaster when groups and organizations are concerned with search and rescue functions, mass feeding and shelter operations, and emergency medical treatment for victims. This focus is taken because it is usually during the emergency period that military involvement in civilian disasters is at its height. After this period, there typically occurs a rather rapid disengagement of the military from the disaster struck community.

We now turn to a discussion of the structure of military organizations. However, this is couched neither in the usual framework of a table of organization, nor along the lines of a typical description of the personnel and resources of the armed forces of this or any other society. Instead, we discuss in abstract terms the social organizational feature of the military, especially its highly bureaucratic nature. From our perspective, this approach will help us more than any other possible view to understand better the operations of the military in civilian disasters.

### The Structure of Military Organizations

Military organizations are very complex structures. For example, as Lang has suggested: "Modern military establishments qualify as complex



organizations irrespective of size. This becomes evident when one considers the diversity of skills and specialties currently represented in the armed forces and the variety of tasks they may be called on to perform."<sup>5</sup> This is true of the military even in otherwise less technologically advanced societies. The rest of a society may still be at a peasant subsistence level of development, but modern military jet planes can be flown and serviced only by a complex of highly skilled and trained pilots, mechanics, and maintenance personnel.

Furthermore, military organizations in modern societies are essentially bureaucratic. In part, the very specialization in tasks and roles that has evolved in the military accounts for the bureaucratic character of this type of group. In turn, the specialization and bureaucratization enable military organizations to pursue their goals. This is obvious for non-disaster situations, but as we shall see, they also enable the armed forces to operate extensively and intensively in civilian emergencies.

The goals of a military organization, in the typical terminology of this kind of organization, are its "missions." It has been noted that "when missions and objectives of a military organization become increasingly complex, so that a large number of highly specialized functions are involved in mission accomplishment," the consequent requirement "for extensive and systematic coordination and control, and for a large administrative superstructure, sets the stage for the development of bureaucracy."<sup>6</sup> This bureaucracy is likely to become even more complex as goals and tasks become more diversified.

The overall missions and objectives of the military are, of course, derived from the basic goals and national policy of the society. That is, the general values of the nation dictate the general goals and tasks of its military forces. These can also vary radically from one society to another, but in general the more complex the social system, the greater the complexity of its military organization.

The complicated and massive nature of American society needs no documentation. Its armed forces are correspondingly complex. So is the bureaucracy of its military organization.

Coates and Pellegrin present a very good analysis of the bureaucratic nature of the American military organization.<sup>7</sup> They note that functional specialization provides a necessary basis for the development of bureaucratic structures in the armed forces. Regularized expectations required for the accomplishment of United States military objectives are attached to specific positions in the organization. For example, a Marine division or Air Force unit must have supplies. This requirement gives rise to a set of standardized expectations attached to specific positions, such as that of supply officer or mess sergeant. In other words, for each specialized position required by the functional division of labor, there are fixed duties.

Furthermore, to each of the positions there is attached a corresponding fixed and definite expertise. To illustrate, one must be a qualified lawyer

to be an officer in the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army. Similarly, logistical supply work requires many of the skills of a business administrator, so the granting of a commission in the Quartermaster Corps is heavily based on the possession of this kind of expertise. As such, it might be said that each segment of the military organization involves a systematic division of labor in which specialized competencies are related to specialized functions and positions. Thus, at least ideally, there are not only positions, but qualified incumbents occupying them.

Rules and regulations determine the limits of the exercise of these competencies on the part of relevant organizational members. As is sometimes joked about, these rules are written in detail in military manuals. Such regulations specify behavior and procedures appropriate for all military personnel in carrying out their specific tasks. To be certain, deviations from formal rules can and do occur, and as we shall later discuss, some such behavior can be observed in military operations in civilian disasters. But formally at least, the range of allowable behavior is clearly specified.

The regulations while detailed, are so designed as to be applicable to a wide range of specific situations. Written in general and abstract terms, they are universalistic in that they apply generally to all personnel occupying specified positions or offices. Rules do not exist for particular individuals or specific persons. The non-particular nature of these rules can be seen when an effort is made to remove an originally legitimate occupant of a position. As fictionally illustrated in the Caine mutiny story, universal rather than particular standards are generally brought to bear.

Finally, Coates and Pellegrin note that close, systematic and strict discipline is exercised to maintain conformity with the rules. A prime example of such discipline is the system of formal and informal inspections by which each member of the military organization is subject to examination by his superiors at any time with regard to the conduct of his job and his general military performance. Overt sanctions, ranging in severity from reinspection and loss of minor privileges to court martial, are utilized to enforce an effective system of regularized discipline applicable to all personnel.

In somewhat formal terms, these are some of the major features of the American military organization. They are essentially bureaucratic characteristics. Being central to the organization, they of necessity affect its operations be these in wartime or peacetime, in non-stress and stress situations.

What bureaucratic structuring does, of course, is to provide the means for coordinating and controlling a large number of persons involved in different and yet complementary tasks and activities. Through the bureaucratic machinery, which includes specialized roles, a hierarchy of authority and rules and regulations, military organizations are able to achieve most efficiently their missions and objectives. Because military organizations

have the necessary structure for coordinating and controlling large forces of men, in addition to having immediately available crucial equipment and supplies, they often prove to be of immeasurable aid to communities and societies struck by disaster.

Not only does the assignment given military organizations by societies dictate that they have complex structures and a reserve of resources to carry them out, but also that ". . . both . . . must be maintained in a state of readiness for actual combat."<sup>8</sup> Lang, in addition, notes that unlike other types of organizations, military organizations, because of their unique function, do not gear their practices solely toward recurrent contingencies; instead they are oriented towards anticipating every possible contingency. Not to do so would be to court catastrophe in wartime as a result of unpreparedness. War is the exceptional rather than the usual state of affairs. Consequently, the assumption guiding the military results in routine operating procedures based on other than everyday experiences, more on the "abnormal" than the usual. These expectations of the unexpected are standard for all military organizations. Thus, unlike many civilian groups and organizations, military units are often "ready" to respond to the unanticipated demands of a disaster situation. This ability of military organizations to adjust rapidly to the unexpected event is one of their most valuable assets in times of civilian disaster, as well as in periods of war.

#### Types of Military Organizations

Although military organizations show many common features, e.g., having bureaucratic structures, and material resources to wage war -- they nevertheless vary from society to society and even within the same social system. Military organizations may be differentiated on the basis of the specialized equipment and technologies they use to accomplish their objectives. Also, military units may be distinguished in terms of the level of government to which they are chiefly responsible.

For example, in the United States we can differentiate between those military forces which come under the jurisdiction of federal authorities and those which are responsible to the states. The former would be the armed forces of the United States and the latter would be the National Guard (obviously except when these are federalized). The federal forces, of course, are divided into the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Marine Corps is part of the Navy, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard in wartime. Also, all three services have reserve units as well as active ones. The services differ in terms of the technology that is utilized to accomplish military missions. The Air Force, e.g., is built around aircraft technology (and, more recently, missiles) and its personnel are specialists in accomplishing military objectives through the use of such equipment. The kind of overall control and command as well as the technological capability of different military units has implications for both the involvement and the nature of the activities undertaken by these organizations.

Unusual in some respects is the Army Corps of Engineers. While it does have a combat function, this organization is also heavily involved in civilian activities and is perhaps more integrated with the economic and political institutions of the society than most other branches of the armed forces. The Corps is particularly oriented to at least certain kinds of disasters, given its responsibilities in flood control.

The National Guard over the years has received increasing financial assistance from the federal government. According to one past observer ". . . the Guard has traded autonomy for financial support. Hence its present role is curious: A half-national, half-state force, financially supported largely by the nation, supervised and inspected by the regular Army, but yet commanded by the chief executives of the states."<sup>9</sup> (However, since the time of this statement, the situation has changed so that it is no longer true that only the regular Army can undertake inspection.) The adjutant general in each of the states' National Guard organization is responsible to the governor for the conduct of the Guard. However, during times of crisis (such as war or domestic unrest) the President of the United States has the authority to place the Guard under federal control. In disasters, the Guard almost always remains under state control.

In this chapter, it was indicated that we will use a sociological framework in the analysis of military involvement in community disasters. We also discussed the meaning of the term disaster. Finally, some of the general features of military social organization, particularly its bureaucratic features, were considered. In the next chapter, we examine the process through which the military becomes involved in civilian or natural disasters in this country.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter I

1. Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization, Disaster Research Center Monograph Series (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1969).
2. Robert Endleman, Personality and Social Life (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 464.
3. John W. Powell, Jeanette F. Rayner, and Jacob E. Finesinger, "Responses to Disaster in American Cultural Groups," Symposium on Stress (Washington: Army Medical Service Graduate School, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, March 16-18, 1953), pp. 178-181.
4. Anthony F. C. Wallace, Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1956), pp. 7-12.
5. Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 838.
6. Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life (University Park, Md.: Social Science Press, 1965), p. 103.
7. The next several paragraphs are drawn very heavily from ibid., pp. 105-107.
8. Lang, "Military Organizations," p. 856.
9. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 100.

## CHAPTER II

### THE INITIATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN DISASTERS

In this chapter we will discuss the process whereby the military becomes initially involved in emergency operations in support of civilian communities under stress in American society. An attempt will be made to show that military participation is related to the widespread value placed on civilian control in such situations and the pre-disaster nature of the relationship between the community involved and military units stationed nearby. However, before discussing this it will be necessary to examine the legal basis for military participation in civilian disasters.

#### Basis for Military Involvement in Civilian Disasters

There is a difference between the involvement of the National Guard, a state organization primarily, and the participation of any federal forces. The authority to involve National Guard units and their resources in emergency activities following a disaster is invested in the state governor. The Guard is usually mobilized at the request of local authorities when it appears that the problems engendered by an emergency are beyond the capabilities of the community to solve. However, it has been traditional in the United States for local government and organizations to function as the first line of defense against disasters, with state assistance being summoned only when local means are exhausted, or appear likely to be so. Thus, National Guard involvement is almost always a sign that the crisis is of major magnitude, necessitating extra-community resources.

The participation of federal forces in civilian disaster operations in American society involves the whole question of national assistance in such kinds of emergencies. In this regard, stated federal policy is quite explicit about the primacy of local and then state response.

Federal disaster assistance is supplemental to, and not in substitution for, relief afforded by the States and their political subdivisions. Primary responsibility for disaster relief rests with State and local agencies. Federal assistance is provided only when State and local resources are clearly insufficient to cope with the effects of the disaster.<sup>1</sup>

Under the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, (Public Law 81-875) the President, at the request of the governor of the affected state, can declare an emergency situation a "major disaster." This declaration authorizes the participation of federal agencies, including the military when needed, in emergency relief operations in the disaster.<sup>2</sup> Following the declaration by the President, the Office of Emergency Planning has the responsibility for coordinating the disaster relief activities of involved federal agencies.

In general, the Department of the Army is responsible for the control of the domestic emergency operations of the Defense Department and for coordinating the participation of Air Force and Navy units.

However, the involvement of federal forces is not totally dependent upon presidential action. The Department of Defense, along with several other federal agencies, has statutory authority to lend state and local authorities rapid assistance following disaster " . . . prior to or in the absence of a 'major disaster' declaration by the President."<sup>3</sup> For example, "The Department of Defense can provide military assistance to prevent starvation, extreme suffering, or loss of life when local resources are clearly inadequate to cope with the situation."<sup>4</sup> This means that the commanders of military installations in or near a disaster-struck community have the authority to commit the resources at their command in assisting local and state officials. In essence, then, military units located near civilian communities are able to respond almost as local organizations when their aid is requested by civilian authorities, and they do not have to wait until they receive specific authorization from higher federal authorities if the situation is deemed so serious as to warrant immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great destruction of property.

Legally, the scope of the activity possible to the military is very broad and encompasses many services. The assistance may take the form of personnel or the use of supplies, equipment or facilities. It can be given to individuals, groups or communities in general. Aid in rescue and evacuation, the provision of food and shelter, and the giving of medical help are the kinds of possible services that tend to be specified in rules and regulations. A specialized military organization such as the Corps of Engineers is empowered to repair and reconstruct flood control works, restore federally constructed hurricane or shore protective works, engage in debris clearance, or provide sanitation services among other things. A group like the United States Coast Guard may assist in search, rescue and evacuation of disaster victims, the transport of supplies, the providing of emergency communication and the emergency marking of waterways.

There seems to be little that is directly prohibited to military organizations operating in disaster situations. Most restrictions appear to be in the financial area (e.g., the distribution of money). However, what military organizations actually do in most disasters as compared with what they potentially could do in a legal sense, will be discussed in the next chapter.

#### The Inauguration of Military Aid

The studies of DRC and the findings of earlier researchers indicate quite clearly that the armed forces and National Guard are quite frequently called upon to lend assistance to disaster-struck communities. In fact, it is an extremely rare community crisis that does not evoke military

participation. Much of the assistance rendered is given during the emergency period when it appears to be most needed.

The manner in which non-civilian aid is initiated is crucial owing to the widely held belief in American society that the military should be utilized sparingly, if at all, when a particular problem can be met with civilian resources. The matter of military participation in civilian crises is further complicated by the value placed in our society on the local community government serving as the primary problem solving agency. Thus, since the armed forces are part either of the federal governmental structure or the state establishment, care has to be taken that they do not appear to become involved in local community problems without being invited to do so.

It is not surprising, therefore, that military commanders -- both those in the federal forces and the National Guard -- are often reluctant to commit their resources without a firm and explicit request from local authorities. In some respects the military units become "guests" of disaster struck communities that they are assisting. For example, this idea is suggested in the following quotation taken from a report detailing Army assistance in Alaska following the March 1964 earthquake:

One other thing that every soldier received before being employed with the civil authorities was a thorough briefing. The members of the brigade were impressed with the idea that they were acting as auxiliary civil defense or policemen, not as Army, and that they were in the disaster areas only as guests of the civilian authorities.<sup>5</sup>

A major problem for military units, then, is one of determining when they should become involved in civilian emergency operations.

On the other hand, while there is a reluctance to move without an explicit invitation from the local community to do so, there is an implicit pressure to do so. This stems from the fact that at a time of disaster, the military is often the one organization in the vicinity with large amounts of available resources in the way of personnel and equipment. Base and unit commanders know this, and they assume a stricken community knows it also. How this affects the actions of the military before they are explicitly called upon for aid will be discussed later.

A further difficulty for military organizations is determining how to lend civilian communities the most effective assistance. The solution to this problem entails at least three things. First of all, military personnel must have some assessment regarding the impact a disaster agent has on the functioning of the civilian community, i.e., its magnitude. Second, the military authorities must determine what the available, emergency relevant resources of the community are, so that they will only contribute resources from their reserves which are needed and avoid unnecessary duplication. Third, liaison must be established with civilian authorities through which



military aid can be channeled and coordinated. These matters are usually attended to during the initial period of military involvement in natural disasters.

In the next several sections, we will present some case studies dealing with how the military, including the National Guard, initiated emergency operations in several community disasters in the United States. In these disasters, the manner in which military involvement was initiated and evolved can by and large be understood with reference to: (1) certain values of American society, (2) the pre-disaster military-community relations, and (3) the nature of military structure.

#### Warner Robins Tornado<sup>6</sup>

In April, 1953, a tornado struck the town of Warner Robins, Georgia, and nearby Robins Air Force Base, killing 16 persons. Most of the casualties occurred in the town rather than on the base. Insofar as military-civilian relations are concerned, there was considerable integration between the air base and the town.

Warner Robins, with a population of about 16,000, was a "dormitory community" physically adjacent to the base. Most of the residents were either Air Force personnel or civilian employees at the installation. Thus, the civilian community was entirely dependent upon the base for its existence. In fact, before the establishment of the base, only a small, rural, crossroad hamlet existed on the site of the town. People lived in Warner Robins because they worked for the Air Force or because they were engaged in providing services for those who were employed there. Much of the land on which the town was built was owned by the federal government, and most of the dwellings which were destroyed were similarly owned. Consequently a very close relationship existed between the military installation and the town even before the tornado struck. Given this close relationship between the two it was inevitable that the Air Force base would become heavily involved in any disaster activity in the civilian community.

Shortly after the disaster, it became apparent to authorities at the base that the town would require considerable assistance. The initial assistance that was given by the base resulted from a telephone call from the mayor of the town who asked for 100 air policemen to be used in traffic control and for security. An officer was also immediately sent to the mayor's office to offer assistance from the base and to determine what was required by the community. A civilian employee of the base who was well known in the town was appointed as the liaison agent between the base and the town and also as head of the Air Force rescue and clean-up operations. In this disaster, then, the prior relationship between Warner Robins and the Robins Air Force Base obviously influenced the process in which the military became involved.

## Waco, Texas Tornado<sup>7</sup>

On May 11, 1953, a tornado struck Waco, Texas, leaving 114 dead and about 500 injured. Shortly following this catastrophe, personnel from a nearby Air Force base became involved in emergency work in the town. However, unlike the situation at Warner Robins, "The Air Force personnel did not wait for an official request from local officials for assistance but moved in because the need was apparent."<sup>8</sup> The commander of the base went to Waco to assess the magnitude of the disaster. And after doing so he gave the order to send in men and equipment from the base to support civilian authorities.

Although in this disaster the military became involved without an official request from local authorities, military officials nevertheless indicated quite clearly that they were aware of the traditional view regarding military-civilian relations in this country. For example, when the Air Force moved into Waco there were indications that some local authorities wanted it to direct disaster relief activities completely; however, Air Force authorities resisted this arrangement because they believed the direction of such activities to be a civilian responsibility. Apparently this pressure for the Air Force to take charge of emergency measures grew out of the fact that there was little effective organization in Waco. We will discuss in greater detail in another chapter how this and similar social organizational characteristics affect military-civilian relations in disaster.

## Alaska Earthquake Disaster

One hundred and sixteen persons lost their lives in the March 27, 1964, earthquake in southcentral Alaska, and property damage was over \$300 million. The affected communities included Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, Kodiak and Whittier, with Anchorage being the largest of these.

The Alaska earthquake resulted in one of the most extensive involvements of the military in a civilian disaster in the history of the United States. The military operation which was labeled "Operation Helping Hand," involved principally the Army and Air Force of the Alaskan Command, and the Alaska National Guard. Headquarters for the Alaskan Command is located just outside of Anchorage at Elmendorf Air Force Base. This large air base is also the headquarters for the Alaskan Air Command. Headquarters for the United States Army, Alaska (USARAL) is at Fort Richardson, adjacent to Elmendorf Air Force Base. At the time of the disaster, some 25,000 military personnel resided in the Anchorage area. We will only describe the involvement of the military in the Anchorage area and not its participation in disaster operations in the other communities.

The military was similarly integrated into the community of Anchorage as it was in Warner Robins. The military in Anchorage, for example, played an important role in the economic life of the city and was interwoven with civilian organizations and groups in other ways. The wives of military personnel

stationed in the Anchorage area taught in the Anchorage schools, and their children attended school in the city. The military and civilian organizations cooperated with one another in numerous ways; for example, Anchorage area fire departments had mutual aid agreements with military fire units. Also, upon retirement from active military life, former military personnel sometimes assumed positions in Anchorage organizations. Thus, there existed a spirit of cooperation and interdependence between the military and civilian communities of Anchorage prior to the 1964 catastrophe. It was not surprising then that the military provided considerable assistance to the civilian community in its hour of need.

The earthquake occurred around 5:30 p.m., and about 6:30 p.m. the first contact was made between the military and civilian officials. At this time, the Army Provost Marshall from Ft. Richardson -- who had been sent into the city to see if military assistance would be needed -- made initial contact with civilian authorities at the downtown Public Safety Building, which became the emergency operation center for the city. Throughout the emergency period, the provost marshal acted as the Army liaison officer between USARAL, the city police department and the Anchorage Civil Defense with the primary function of coordinating requests for assistance between civil defense and USARAL. At 8:00 p.m., the police requested Army troops to assist in securing Anchorage against possible looting and to control the movement of people in the affected areas. Because of the magnitude of the earthquake, officers at the base had anticipated the need for assisting the civilian community; thus they were well mobilized when the official request was received. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the first contingent of troops departed from Fort Richardson for Anchorage. From this initial point of involvement, the assistance from the military in the disaster-struck community of Anchorage expanded considerably.

When the disaster struck, the Alaska Army National Guard had just completed its annual two weeks of field training at Fort Richardson. Shortly after the earthquake, the Alaska state adjutant general left Fort Richardson for Anchorage to assess the situation in the city. Arriving in Anchorage sometime after 6:00 p.m. he was told by police officials that the Guard's assistance was badly needed, so he sent an order back to the base to send 150 men. These troops arrived in Anchorage at about the same time as the first Army troops and were given essentially the same duties, i.e., security and control.

#### Belmond, Iowa Tornado

Belmond, Iowa, is a small town with a population of approximately 2,500. On October 14, 1966, at 2:55 p.m., a tornado struck the town leaving 6 dead and between 150-200 injured.

After receiving notification from civilian authorities, the Adjutant General of Iowa alerted four units of the Guard to standby in case they would be needed for emergency duty. After a survey of the disaster area by National

Guard officers, and consultation with civilian authorities, it was decided that the four alerted Guard units would be needed in the town. The units that were sent into Belmond were those from nearby towns. These units consisted of about 185 men. Since Belmond did not have a Guard unit of its own, some of the residents of the town were members of these other four units when the disaster struck. The troops that arrived were soon involved in such tasks as traffic control and security. Throughout the emergency period the Guard worked principally with the Iowa State Highway Patrol.

#### Topeka, Kansas Tornado

At 7:15 p.m. on June 8, 1966, a tornado began its move across the heart of Topeka, Kansas. It left 17 dead, approximately 550 injured, and millions of dollars in property damage.

Shortly after the disaster, a nearby Air Force base contacted city police officials to advise them that the resources of the nearby base, if requested, would be put at the disposal of civilian authorities. The Disaster Control Command Post at the base had been earlier activated, and the city was told to channel its request for Air Force aid to that point. The initial requests for military assistance came at 7:30 when the police asked for 50 air policemen to augment their own personnel on security duty. Fifteen minutes later a second request was received for 100 troops and available Air Force ambulances. This was only the beginning of the massive assistance eventually provided by the base for the city of Topeka. Throughout the entire emergency period, the Air Force base responded to civilian requests for troops and material which it channeled through the local police department and civil defense.

#### Oak Lawn Tornado

On Friday, April 21, 1967, an estimated 18 tornadoes struck portions of northern Illinois and were responsible for one of the worst storm disasters ever to occur in this area. One of the communities affected was Oak Lawn, a suburb of Chicago. There a tornado left 32 dead, nearly 500 injured, destroyed 129 homes, and caused an estimated \$20 million total loss.

The Illinois National Guard supplied the bulk of the military assistance in this disaster. The Cook County sheriff requested National Guard assistance in Oak Lawn in the evening of the disaster and the first contingent of Guardsmen arrived in the disaster area for sentry duty about 11:15 a.m. Saturday. The Guard units called out were from the Chicago area. The National Guard gave aid to local authorities in Oak Lawn for about four days.

#### American Values and Initiating Military Involvement

The above cases illustrate that the initiation of military involvement in civilian disasters reflects the value system of American society. The

belief is widely held in our society that local problems, including those created by disaster, ought to be solved through civilian governmental structure and organization, and that non-civilian means should be turned to only if it appears that civilian resources will be inadequate. As a result of this traditional belief, as our case material shows, military authorities in both the Guard and federal forces generally do not commit their resources in assisting local communities until they have been requested to do so by civilian leaders. To become involved without such authorization could later lead to charges of attempts at military control. This belief in the primacy of civilian institutional means, even in the event of natural disaster, has been well stated in the following manner: "Military support for civil government -- not military control in emergencies -- is a manifestation of our democratic process and is a tradition deeply rooted in national life."<sup>9</sup> Even in Waco, the one situation where military officials did not wait for civilian authorization, base officials refused to assume control of the entire emergency operation although some civilians had hoped that they would do so.

Frequently, the federal force and the Guard anticipate that they will be called upon to provide aid to a local community. In this time period between the onset of the disaster and when civilian authorization asks for assistance, the military will be mobilizing troops and equipment. For example, in one disaster studied by DRC, troops at a base were on the alert for action for more than two hours prior to their being requested by the police in a nearby community.

Sometimes the military will offer assistance to civilian authorities before it has been requested. For example, the commander of a base may send representatives to the mayor or chief of police to advise them that military assistance is available. In other cases, the offer of assistance by the military and the request for assistance from civilian leaders may be made at approximately the same time but through different channels so that each is not aware of the efforts of the other. For example, in one disaster studied by DRC, the top command Army sent an officer into a stricken community to offer military aid while at the same time the Mayor of the city was negotiating at a lower level for military assistance.

In general, military aid is offered and requested in about the following order:

1. Offer of assistance made by the military prior to receiving a request for such aid by the civilian community.
2. Request for military assistance made by the community prior to receiving an offer from the military.
3. Offer of assistance made by the military, and a request for aid made by the community at approximately the same time.

4. Actual military involvement prior to the receipt of a civilian request for such aid.

As previously indicated, the last situation seldom occurs.

#### Military Involvement as a Reflection of Local Social Organization and as a Form of Symbiosis

The thesis presented throughout this report is that the analysis of pre-disaster social organization helps to explain military involvement and military-civilian relations in disaster. Because it seems to have considerable impact on military-civilian relations during disaster, we have discussed one aspect of the American value system, i.e., the widely held belief that it is best to rely upon civilian institutions, especially local ones. Still to be discussed is another important aspect of social organization, referred to as symbiosis, and its effect on military involvement in civil disaster.

The involvement of the military in some civilian disasters can be interpreted as a consequence of the pre-disaster symbiotic relationship which existed between a civilian community and a nearby base. When a military installation develops near a civilian community, or vice versa, a considerable amount of interdependence often emerges between them. Each performs important functions for the other. Coates and Pellegrin discuss such symbiotic arrangements

. . . the base represents a community which exists alongside a larger community to which it has a kind of symbiotic relationship. The term symbiotic relationship is one borrowed from ecology, where it refers to the relationship between two species of animals in which both are dependent of the other for the performance of some mutually beneficial function.<sup>10</sup>

They indicate and DRC observations support them that a number of major functions are performed by the two types of communities for each other. They include the following.

Major functions performed by the host community for the base.

1. Support of certain basic services. It is common for bases to contract for their electric power, gas, water, and other utilities from commercial companies. A military base almost always has a police and fire department of its own, and also emergency medical facilities. At the same time, some close ties as well as personal relationships typically exist between civilian organizations of this kind and their military counterparts.
2. Provision of economic services. Although military bases frequently include post exchanges, ship stores and commissaries in this country, at least clothing, food and household goods are purchased in the civilian community. Part of this stems from the fact that the majority of service families live off base.

3. Providing of educational facilities. A very important service offered by civilian communities to military base personnel is education. While some bases do operate schools for children of servicemen, usually these children attend schools in nearby communities. In the instance of a very large military installation, this requires a significant increase in the number of teachers and school facilities, a fact recognized in federal aid to education to localities so affected.

4. The supplying of recreation. Possibly the most important service rendered to nearby military bases, certainly as far as unmarried servicemen is concerned, is recreation.

Major functions provided for the host community by the military base.

1. Indirect economic support. Military personnel usually spend most of their incomes in the nearby civilian community, thus furnishing a major source of revenue to local businesses. Aside from this, there are the additional financial contributions made to the community as a result of the employment of local civilians by the military base.

2. The emergency use of military facilities. (However, this is a reciprocal function for cities sometimes help bases with their emergencies, e.g., New York City assistance in the Brooklyn naval shipyard fire.)

Thus, when nearby military bases initiate assistance or become involved in the disaster activities of their civilian neighbors, this can be understood as a continuation of their symbiotic relationship with the civilian community. Certainly this was a major factor in several of the cases described above.

Pre-disaster social organization, although not necessarily related to the notion of symbiosis, also accounts for many of the patterns of National Guard involvement in civilian disasters. For example, it is typical, whenever possible, to utilize local units, i.e., "home" Guard units. This was done in the Chicago suburb of Oak Lawn, where Chicago area troops were used in disaster relief activities, and also to some degree in Anchorage.

Guard units from towns like Seward were used for a period of time in Anchorage along with the local unit since the former group could not be transported because of poor flying conditions to their home areas. However, as soon as it was feasible such troops were flown to their own communities to engage in emergency work there. Of course, the utilization of "home" troops in part is done to keep down mobilization and transportation costs. Yet much of it is undoubtedly done because it is believed that troops working in communities with which they are familiar will perform better.

For example, following the emergency period in one disaster studied by DRC, three Guard officers who resided in the stricken town were designated to continue with important relief activities when the other Guardsmen had been dismissed from duty. In an interview one of the Guardsmen noted:

Then as things progressed . . . the Guard began pulling out, Tuesday night with two units and Wednesday morning the final unit. And at a meeting where the Guard officials, patrol officials, city officials, and so on attended, they decided that they would leave three of us here. I live here and two of the officers of another unit, both first lieutenants, live here and they decided that this coordination of volunteer work with the incoming requests was a big task and they decided that people familiar with the town . . . would be suitable. So the recommendation was made to the adjutant general's office that the three of us be left on state duty and that this would be our task. And as of this recording here a week later, we're still on state duty and will be at least through Sunday, and our job at city hall is to take the incoming requests and dispatch volunteer help, both machines and individuals.

Another consequence of pre-disaster social organization is the tendency for the military and Guard to utilize pre-existing channels of contact and communication with civilian communities when they participate in natural disaster operations. In Anchorage the provost marshal was sent from Fort Richardson to establish liaison with the city police. During normal times it was customary for the military police and the civilian police to cooperate with one another through this office. In another disaster, too, much of the liaison between an Air Force base and the city involved the military and civilian police. An important link between the base and the local police was an air police investigator who worked daily with the city police prior to the disaster and who was in town when the tornado struck. Following the tornado, he went immediately to the city police station. In his own words: "So I went to the police station and when I got there I called back into the base, they said 'stay there.' I know the city police a little more than any of them, so I just stayed there." At the police station he spent most of his time relaying requests from the police to the air base command post. Finally, mention has already been made of the role played by a civilian employee of the Warner Robins Air Force Base following the 1953 tornado, who was appointed by the military to head the Air Force rescue and cleanup activities. This man was well known and respected in the community and therefore was able to represent the Air Force effectively in its dealings with the civilian community.

In this chapter, we have discussed how the military and National Guard become involved in civilian disasters in the United States. The case material presented illustrates the manner in which this involvement unfolds. Much of the military response reflects the notion of civilian supremacy in this country; that is, in general, military men are hesitant to become involved prior to receiving civilian clearance in order to avoid charges of undue non-civilian involvement and control. At times, the pressure to respond leads to action by the military which will increase the probability of a civilian request for aid. It was also noted that symbiotic relationships develop between military bases and civilian communities, and this interdependency affects military assistance in times of community crisis. Finally,



we have suggested that pre-disaster social organization has some bearing on the channels utilized between the military and civilian community during disasters. The pattern seems to be that the military and Guard will use previously existing channels of communication and coordination when they exist.

In the next chapter we will discuss the kinds of tasks that the military and Guard perform for the civilian community during natural disasters.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter II

1. Federal Disaster Assistance Handbook for Local Government Officials (Washington: Office of Emergency Planning, n.d.).
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Ibid., p. 1.
4. Ibid., p. 1. For specific instructions on military operations in disasters see Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, "Employment of Military Resources in Natural Disaster Emergencies Within the United States, Its Territories and Possessions," November 18, 1965.
5. Truman R. Strobridge, Operation HELPING HAND: The United States Army and the Alaskan Earthquake, 27 March to 7 May 1964 (monograph prepared by the Historian, U.S. Army, Alaska, n.d.), p. 114.
6. All specific details of this disaster are taken from Lewis M. Killian and Jeannette F. Rayner, "Military Assistance in the Warner Robins Tornado Disaster," Studies of Military Assistance in Civilian Disasters, Disaster Research Report No. 2 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, August 20, 1953).
7. Except where indicated, all specific details of this disaster are taken from Jeannette F. Rayner, "The Role of the Military in the Waco Tornado Disaster," Studies of Military Assistance in Civilian Disasters.
8. Billy G. Crane, "Intergovernmental Relations in Disaster Relief in Texas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1960), p. 105.
9. William Durkee, "Civil Defense-The Military Support Role," Army Information Digest, XIX (November 1964), 21.
10. Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life (University Park, Md.: Social Science Press, 1965), p. 391.

## CHAPTER III

### MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NATURAL DISASTERS: THEIR SCOPE AND PROBLEMS

In this chapter, the focus is upon: (1) the actual activities carried out by military organizations in support of civilian communities during periods of disaster, and (2) the kinds of problems which beset military and civilian groups and organizations as they work to restore normal community functioning following major emergencies. This is preceded by a discussion of the range of community tasks likely to be generated by large-scale community emergencies.

#### Tasks Created by Disasters

Disasters create certain tasks and problems for communities. These, of course, will vary from one kind of large-scale crisis to another. In most major catastrophes, however, all the following disaster-generated activities may have to be carried out:

- (1) Warning
- (2) Rescue
- (3) Caring for casualties
- (4) Protecting against continuing threat
- (5) Restoration of minimum community services
- (6) Caring for survivors
- (7) Maintaining community order
- (8) Maintaining community morale
- (9) Information, control and coordination

Regarding these activities and processes the following can be noted. Within a community, there are some activities which can be initiated prior to the impact of a disaster agent. In certain disasters, notably floods and hurricanes, periods of forewarning are possible. Such time periods allow preparation to be made for impact.

After impact, other predictable activities are produced. The victims of the disaster must be located and rescued. Those who have been killed must be found and the injured cared for. If the threat is sustained, certain protective measures may have to be initiated or continued. In order to function as a unified social entity, disrupted community services must be restored to some minimum operating level. Also, the survivors in the impact area must be cared for in different ways. If loss of housing, possessions and food supply has been a by-product of the disaster, some arrangements must be made for a quick, even though temporary, supply of these amenities.

Engaging in such activities accentuates other important community processes. In order to accomplish necessary tasks, there is often a pre-occupation with problems of order and security within the area. In addition, there is attention given to the morale and motivation of those individuals and organizations which have become involved in emergency operations. The increase in the scope of community activity, as well as the fact that the tasks are relatively unfamiliar to the acting groups, necessitates the collection and transmission of considerable information. This also evokes concern with controlling activities and coordinating the behavior of all individuals and organizations participating in the disaster-generated crisis.

With their substantial manpower and material reserves, military organizations possess the capability to carry out effectively many of the emergency activities in support of disaster-struck communities. This is borne out by the fact that in many civilian disasters in which they participate, military units are among those organizations which become most involved in multiple emergency activities and processes. In fact, practically no other type of organization tends to assume as many tasks.

It was suggested in the preceding chapter that one pattern of social organization -- i.e., the symbiotic relationship between a military base and host community -- may effect the involvement of military organizations in disaster-engendered activities and processes in a community. There are also other social organizational variables which may effect the scope of military activities in a civilian locality during a large-scale emergency. A key variable is the extent to which emergency-relevant structures exist in a community prior to a disaster. For example, the existence in a community of groups and organizations which could be effectively utilized at times of crises for such activities as warning and rescue may mean that military organizations would not have to be called upon for such tasks. Also, the actual impact of a destructive agent on the structure and pre-existing resources of a community is another variable. For example, a disaster may be of such magnitude that pre-existing social arrangements for dealing with warning, evacuation, and other emergency activities are insufficient for coping with the demands of the emergency. Consequently, military support may be required. Most communities feel they cannot afford to maintain expensive resources which can be used only in the event of disaster. Thus, even if some arrangements have been made for dealing with disaster-engendered tasks -- and too frequently such arrangements are little more than nominal -- considerable extracommunity assistance may be needed. The military is well suited for lending such assistance for as said earlier, unlike civilian organizations, military structures and resources are geared to meeting the non-routine and unexpected.

Finally, the scope of military involvement in a civilian disaster may not only reflect the extent to which emergency-relevant resources exist in a community, but also the degree to which the presence of such resources are known to civilian authorities. A major problem for organizations in disasters is obtaining knowledge of what resources are still available and what can be obtained. Thus, civilian leaders may call for the utilization

of military resources to solve some disaster-created problem because they may be unaware of the existence of such resources in the civilian community. Such inadequate dissemination of information may stem from pre-disaster interorganizational arrangements, or from patterns created by the disaster itself. Whatever the reason, such situations are likely to extend the scope of military involvement in certain disaster activities for the military is generally known to have both personnel and resources. This is a matter of common knowledge and is almost taken for granted.

In the next section, we discuss military involvement in emergency activities and processes in a number of specific disaster situations. The analysis is organized in terms of the disaster tasks enumerated above. This is followed by a discussion of some of the problems which influence the effectiveness of military participation in emergency activities in civilian communities.

### Military Involvement in Disaster Activities and Processes

#### Warning and Preparing for Impact

The opportunity for disaster warning and the implementation of pre-impact protective measures in a community depends on the nature of the threatening agent. Hurricanes and floods, since their onslaught is usually slow, can be anticipated by a community. They thus offer the greatest opportunity for the issuance of public warning and the implementation of pre-impact protective measures.

The military is frequently called upon to take part in disaster warning. This is apart from the activity of alerting members of their organization. For example, prior to the impact of Hurricane Audrey in Louisiana and Texas in 1957, the military played a crucial role in this process. In one instance:

The Coast Guard base at Sabine Pass, Texas -- being in the middle of the threatened area -- devoted its full efforts to disaster activity. At the time of Hurricane Audrey's appearance only fifteen officers and men were stationed at this base. . . . The officer-in-charge assigned two vehicles with two men in each to the task of arousing the citizens and giving word-of-mouth warnings. They performed this task throughout most of the night preceding the arrival of the hurricane. The men were given typed copies of the latest weather advisories which they left for distribution at key points. In addition to warning individuals, they informed the owners of all business concerns of the impending danger.<sup>1</sup>

Evacuation can be one of the most effective protective measures for communities to take when there is the threat of disaster. The military may

also be called upon by civilian officials to assist in this pre-impact activity. For example, in addition to being involved in warning prior to the impact of Hurricane Audrey, the Coast Guard also assisted in the evacuation of some threatened families in Texas.<sup>2</sup> More recently, during Hurricane Beulah, the military was very heavily involved in assisting in the evacuations of thousands of both Mexicans and Americans.

Similar to hurricanes, floods are also usually slowly developing events, and communities often have time to make preparations which may minimize their destructive impact. Army, National Guard, Navy and Air Force units have been frequently called upon to assist local communities in flood control work -- for example, in the reinforcement of levees and dikes. Assistance of this nature usually involves the contribution of equipment as well as personnel. The Army's Corps of Engineers has traditionally had the role of helping local communities in developing flood control programs and is inevitably involved in these particular kinds of emergencies.

### Rescue

One of the most important tasks generated by any disaster is the need to rescue victims. It has been well established that in most disasters the initial rescue effort is carried out by individuals who happen to be in the impacted area. Because of the lack of involvement of organized community groups during the initial phase of this work, the beginning rescue effort is apt to be unsystematic and uncoordinated. Eventually, community organizations such as civil defense, the police and fire departments become involved and some semblance of coordination may gradually evolve. In some cases, the role of organizing and conducting the rescue effort is assumed by the military, while in other instances the military may play only a supportive role.

For example, following the Waco tornado, an organized rescue operation developed only after this emergency activity was assumed by the Air Force. The military had the personnel and preexisting organization to sustain a systematic search for disaster victims. "The military provided teams of men under the direction of officers. These teams provided an organized and consistently progressive rescue operation."<sup>3</sup> In this disaster, civilian participation in the rescue task sometimes proved to be a problem for the military. "In addition to being in the way, the inability of the civilian rescuers to remain at the task long enough to be useful seems to be one of the main reasons for their being a hindrance."<sup>4</sup>

The military also played an important role in rescue operations following the Warner Robins tornado. Most of the personnel and equipment used in the rescue effort were furnished by nearby Robins Air Force Base.<sup>5</sup> However, in contrast to the Waco rescue operations, it seems that in this instance the civilian participation was better articulated with the military effort. The nature of the coordinated or joint effort is dependent on other than just the response of the military organization.

In contrast to the Waco and Warner Robins disasters, military units played more of a supportive role in rescue activities in Anchorage following the 1964 earthquake. In fact, fairly systematic search-and-rescue work had been undertaken by civilian groups and organizations by the time the Army had sent personnel from the nearby base for this purpose. Similarly, the military played a supporting rather than leading role in rescue efforts following the Topeka tornado. An Air Force base provided the city police department with personnel to assist in a house-to-house search for disaster victims. The base also provided civilian officials with important equipment for rescue operations. The military seems to play a secondary role in rescue efforts when civilian operations along the line are relatively quickly and effectively initiated.

### Caring for Casualties

In many disasters, the military may become heavily involved in caring for civilian casualties. Such involvement may include the utilization of military hospital facilities by civilians or the assistance of military medical personnel in the disaster area. Often aid will take the form of donations by the military of needed medical supplies.

For example, various units of the armed forces were heavily involved in the care of disaster victims following a tornado in a Texas city. A first-aid station was set up in the National Guard Armory for the treatment of minor lacerations and wounds resulting from the tornado and for injuries incurred by rescuers in the process of digging people out of the wreckage of homes and stores. The base hospital prepared to care for 150 patients, although it eventually admitted only about 80. Ambulances from the base arrived at the disaster site approximately forty minutes after impact. Another Air Force base provided such medical supplies as oxygen and blood. Personnel from this base also donated blood at the other base hospital.<sup>6</sup>

In most disasters studied by the Disaster Research Center, the military assistance provided in the caring of casualties often took one of two forms. Frequently, medical supplies were provided from military stores for civilian hospitals and groups. Somewhat less often, emergency medical equipment was loaned to organizations handling victims in the local community.

### Protecting Against Continuing Threat and Restoring Minimum Community Services

Following a community disaster, a major task is to identify and control potential sources of secondary impact. For example, disaster-damaged structures such as commercial buildings and residences have to be located and public use of them must be prevented as long as they remain unsafe. Broken telephone poles and lines have to be removed to prevent further injuries, and dangerous debris must be cleared. Similarly, another task which is immediately created by disaster is the need to restore disrupted community services

such as supplies of electricity, gas and water. These two tasks, then, must be carried out if the community is to regain some degree of normalcy.

Military organizations frequently assist in these two tasks. They often take actions to protect the population against secondary or continuing dangers. Likewise, military units often assist civilian agencies in the restoration of public utilities.

Following a tornado in a southern town, for instance, an Air Force base provided both men and equipment for debris clearance and general recovery work. In one city badly hit by an earthquake, soldiers from a nearby military installation surveyed the streets with mine detectors in search of the city's underground water lines. Developing flood situations frequently result in the sending of soldiers to man and to continue to raise levees. The National Guard tends to operate in the same way also; thus, in one tornado situation contingents of Illinois Guard troops were sent with heavy equipment to clear streets and roadways. In general, in these as well as other examples that could be cited, the military acted in support of the civilian groups undertaking the tasks and did not assume the major role in the emergency activity.

#### Caring for Survivors

A major community disaster may leave large segments of the population without food, shelter, adequate clothing and other essentials. Formal community welfare organizations such as the Red Cross and The Salvation Army, as well as certain agencies of the local government, may be able to meet the needs of many of the survivors of a disaster; however, in many instances the support of other organizations such as military units may be required. In fact, in community emergencies of major magnitude, the armed forces almost inevitably play a large role in caring for survivors.

Following the Good Friday earthquake in Anchorage, for instance, the military provided considerable assistance in the care of victims and survivors. A wide range of specific tasks were carried out by the Army in alleviating some of the unpleasant circumstances of the disaster. The earthquake damaged water pipes and sewer lines in the city and thus water pollution became a problem. The Army supplied the city with 500-gallon water trailers and "For the first few days, these water trailers provided the only safe source of drinking water for the entire population of Anchorage. Their prompt deployment to points readily accessible to the victims of the catastrophe played a major role in the prevention of widespread disease."<sup>7</sup> Also, portable mess halls were set up in the city to provide food for disaster victims and relief workers. Finally, hundreds of displaced residents of the community were given temporary housing at Fort Richardson near Anchorage.

Even greater assistance for victims has been provided by the military in historically important catastrophes in American society. Classic examples are the Galveston hurricane and the San Francisco fire. It is notable that in



both instances, there were really two kinds of disaster agents -- in the case of Galveston there was a flooding as well as a hurricane, and in San Francisco an earthquake, of course, as well as the fire.

### Maintaining Community Order

The military is perhaps most conspicuous in civilian disasters in the United States in its security operations. In a widespread emergency, local police organizations almost always believe they will have a problem in maintaining order. The exposed property that is the aftermath of a disaster is thought of as raising considerably the possibility of extensive looting. This belief is almost pure myth, but however incorrect, its widespread acceptance leads to requests by civilian groups to military organizations for assistance in preventing large-scale looting. (This myth has unfortunately been reinforced by the perception of looting in recent urban civil disturbances. However, such situations represent community emergencies of a radically different nature than those involved in natural disasters.)<sup>8</sup>

More of a real problem is the fact that a disaster site becomes the focus of a considerable convergence of persons from near and far.<sup>9</sup> These individuals are motivated in many different ways, and many have quite legitimate reasons for flocking to the stricken community. However, their presence often creates monumental traffic problems and frequently hinders the effective operations of emergency groups and organizations.

Military units are frequently called upon by local officials to aid in the maintenance of order because of the manpower they have available and because the military uniform is generally recognized as a symbol of authority. In most disasters in which military participation occurs, the initial request by civilian officials tends to be for troops to serve as guards in the most devastated areas, and to help in traffic control. In fact, if the military undertakes only one task in support of a disaster-struck civilian community, it will be in this connection, that of the maintenance of order.

Relatively large numbers of troops may be assigned to assist the civilian police in securing damaged areas. For example, in Topeka, Kansas after the tornado, 389 Air Force base personnel were used for guard duty on the first day, and 750 on the following day. In another disaster studied by DRC, at least 74 different sentry posts were established in a cordon around the impacted area. As shall be noted later, when security operations are carried out on such a mass scale, there sometimes are problems of coordinating and facilitating civilian entry beyond the road blocks and guard posts.

### Maintaining Community Morale

Subsequent to a disaster, local officials and organizations strive to create a feeling of solidarity and unity within the community. This is aimed at rallying the victim group to meet the heightened demands of the disaster situation. The idea is promoted that the disaster-struck community is still a viable entity, capable of not only restoring itself but even of developing more progressive programs and policies. Community morale is fostered by a

variety of techniques, including the reporting in mass communication outlets of heroic deeds by private citizens and local officials, and by "pep" talks from such officials as the mayor and chief of police.

Extracommunity officials and organizations may also become involved in the building of community morale following disaster. For example, the appearance of the governor may boost community morale as he pledges to provide as much state aid as possible for the disaster-struck community. Further, the appearance of national and regional personnel from the Red Cross and The Salvation Army may boost the spirits of local residents and give them the feeling that with such outside assistance the community may soon be restored to normalcy.

The involvement of the military in a community disaster may also have morale-boosting consequences. The presence of military troops seems to symbolize efficiency and authority to many local residents and officials. Thus, even if the military organization operating in the disaster area made no conscious attempt to enhance community morale, its presence would probably have this latent consequence anyway.

However, in most instances a conscious effort is made by the military establishment to boost community morale following disaster. This may be done through public declarations of plans for continued support to the civilian community by high ranking military leaders such as a base commander or general, and the actual appearance of these officers in disaster areas. For example, following the Alaska earthquake, military leaders stated over the Anchorage radio the intent of their organization to stand by the disaster-struck community. Also, the commanding general of Fort Richardson, a nearby base, made personal appearances in Anchorage to demonstrate the Army's support of that city's recovery effort. In a tornado disaster, likewise, an Air Force base commander made similar morale-boosting appearances in a stricken city following the tornado.

#### Information, Control and Coordination

The collection and dissemination of information concerning the impact of a disaster on a community, and information about what needs to be done and is being done by emergency-activated groups and organizations is essential for the recovery of the community. Likewise, the coordination and control of emergency measures taken by involved community and extracommunity groups and organizations is necessary if a rapid recovery is to be made. The involvement of the military in these processes is often crucial.

The military may become involved in the collection and dissemination of emergency information by performing a reconnaissance of the disaster area, and thus determining the needs of the affected population. For example, reconnaissance by the Air Force and Army was one of the principle sources of information regarding the impact of the Alaska earthquake on communities throughout the state, including Anchorage. Aircraft from the Alaskan Command flew photo missions over Anchorage and other communities, and ground reconnaissance

was carried out by the Army. Information thus obtained was relayed to civilian as well as military sources and was the basis for much of the extensive emergency and recovery work in the state. The same was true after Hurricane Beulah had hit Texas.

Also in many disasters the military will provide emergency communication equipment, as well as operators, to facilitate the dissemination of critical information between emergency groups and organizations. Given the fact that in most disasters normal means of communication are disrupted in a community, such substitute means of communication become extremely important for inter-organizational coordination and control. In one disaster studied by DRC, the Army provided civilian authorities with field telephones and radios, along with communications personnel to operate them. This temporarily gave the stricken city a substitute communications system until its civilian system could be repaired and restored.

Perhaps the most difficult process to establish in a disaster situation is effective coordination between the numerous groups and organizations that come to participate in some phase of the emergency response. Yet, in many respects, this is the most important process. Without effective control and coordination between emergency agencies and organizations, they tend to function as discrete units. This results in duplication of effort, waste of critical resources, and the failure of important tasks being assumed by some responsible group or organization. Although in the next section we discuss more specifically the problem of coordination as it relates to military participation in civilian disasters, there are a few brief observations that we should make at this point.

First, military installations maintain coordinating centers in order to control and coordinate the functions of their internal units during times of crisis, including natural disasters. Such centers are activated when the military becomes involved on a large scale in civilian emergencies. For example, after one tornado struck a midwestern city, a disaster control command post at a nearby Air Force base was quickly activated. In Anchorage, Alaska, following the earthquake, the operations center at Fort Richardson became the focal point for coordinating the Army's own emergency efforts in the community. Though internal coordination and control of this nature are important for all disaster-activated units, more is needed if an adequate response is to be made to problems created by a disaster. That is, coordination between groups and organizations involved in emergency activities and functions is required.

The military usually attempts to coordinate its activities with those being carried out by civilian agencies, by establishing liaison with a limited number of community organizations such as the police and local civil defense. There is usually no effort made to establish links with all groups operating in the emergency. Liaison is established with police authorities because troops are often used for security duties. When civil defense organizations exist in communities an attempt is made to establish contact with them because they are assumed by the military to be the legitimate coordinating agency for

local government and organizations. In any case, establishing coordination between military and civilian organizations is frequently difficult and our discussion in the next section will consider this problem.

#### Some Problems of Military Involvement in Disaster Activities

Coordination between military units and civilian organizations, and the channeling of civilian requests for military assistance are undoubtedly two of the major problems in military-civilian relations during natural disaster. These problems, along with the problem of authority which will be discussed in the next chapter, have to be resolved, however, if effective military assistance is to be accomplished. There are a number of factors that are responsible for such problems. Among the main ones are: (1) the failure of civilian officials to understand and appreciate military structure and operations, and similarly (2) the less frequent failure of military authorities to comprehend and to accept the manner in which civilian organizations are structured and how they operate, and (3) the absence in many cases of any viable civilian means for coordinating and integrating the activities of the numerous groups and organizations -- both civilian and military -- that assume emergency tasks.

Generally speaking, the respective social organizational backgrounds of civilian and military authorities seems to inhibit their understanding of and appreciation for the problems and required procedures of authorities in organizations unlike their own. Members of any organization bring their own special perspectives into a situation. For example, civilians often tend to perceive in an exaggerated fashion the "red tape" of military bureaucracies. In a parallel fashion, military authorities frequently overestimate -- sometimes to a surprising degree -- the absence of efficient bureaucratic procedures, channels, etc., in civilian organizations. Thus, it is not surprising that problems of coordination and the channeling of requests emerge when civilian and military organizations become involved in the same emergency operation.

As was mentioned earlier, the military generally prefers to work through or to coordinate with a minimum of community organizations. In many instances, coordination is accomplished through liaison with the local police department or civil defense organization. By coordinating through such a responsible civilian agency, the legitimacy of requests for military assistance can be determined and unnecessary duplication of assistance and activity can be avoided. The previously mentioned Topeka disaster is an example of where this type of coordination was attempted. One military authority who was involved in the emergency operation noted in an interview:

. . . as long as the requests were filtered through the civil defense people, we here at Forbes would honor it. We established field kitchens in the county garages. We delivered rations, cots, blankets, any number of things. These requests had to come through civil defense, or if they did not, then I in turn would call civil defense and say, O.K., what about this?

So and so says that he needs something at "X" school. What about it? So we would not take requests from other than the constituted authorities.

However, in many cases the civilian agencies which might serve as the focal point for coordination are not either well organized or -- in some localities a group such as civil defense -- might not even exist. For example, in one major disaster studied by DRC, there was no functioning civil defense organization in the stricken community, although one existed on paper. During the emergency period the civil defense group was reactivated, but it took several days before it was operating with substantial efficiency as a formal organization. The lack of a clear-cut agency with which to establish liaison considerably hindered the attempts of the military to coordinate with civilian organizations in the community. For example, a high Army officer who served for a time as the official military liaison with the reforming civil defense group noted that volunteers acting in the name of civil defense were:

. . . coming in to us all the time rather than having one person bring in the request to us. We had no way of knowing if they had channeled them or not, but some of the requests that were received had not been checked through the CD chief.

He also noted that:

There were also requests coming from one section of CD to us and then we would get duplicate requests from another CD section for the same items, and we found ourselves duplicating.

In a few days, this difficulty was to a large extent resolved. However, for the most crucial part of the emergency period, the weakness of the civil defense organization did not facilitate the overall coordination of the community response and made the work of the military more difficult.

It is usually expected -- given the values of our society -- that some local civilian group or organization will assume the responsibility for coordinating community emergency and relief efforts following a large-scale disaster. However, seldom is it clear just exactly what group of officials or organization ought to assume this responsibility, and how this responsibility ought to be carried out. In those American communities which have a civil defense organization, it is sometimes stated in law that this organization will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of local government in time of disaster. However, even in such cases realistic plans for bringing about coordination between local agencies in time of calamity are too often not worked out ahead of time.

The difficulty that local civilian agencies have in integrating their emergency efforts in time of major emergencies is well illustrated in the problems which usually accompany attempts at establishing a pass system to control entry into disaster areas. This, of course, is of particular concern to military units since they almost always assist in sentry and guard duty whenever

they get involved in civilian disaster operations in this country. If disaster areas are cordoned off by police and military personnel following a natural catastrophe, some means for identifying those persons who should be allowed ingress into them -- such as those involved in emergency work, those who live in the areas, etc. -- have to be established. Usually this is done through the issuance of special passes to such persons. Frequently, this effort will not be coordinated and a number of agencies will utilize different criteria for determining who should receive passes. For example, considerable confusion occurred in Anchorage after the earthquake because several organizations issued their own passes without regard for what other agencies were doing along this line. The police department, the state and the local civil defense organizations, as well as the city building department issued their own passes. This made the job of the Army and Guard, who were assigned the major responsibility for cordoning off much of the disaster area, much more difficult. Some difficulty of this nature was also experienced by the military in Topeka after the tornado.

Sometimes, problems develop between the military and civilian organizations participating in an emergency operation because civilian officials do not understand the channels to use in seeking military aid, nor the need to follow formal procedures. To many civilian officials, military organization probably epitomizes the negative aspect of bureaucracy, i.e., "red tape." On occasions, also, the formalized procedures that have to be used in seeking military assistance appear overwhelming to the civilian. Furthermore, civilian officials at times feel that the requirement that they follow authorized channels in seeking military assistance in time of disaster is an unreasonable one, when life and death is in the balance.

In more general terms, Rosow notes that conflict may occur between organizations and groups involved in emergency activities if they are characterized by different values. He says:

Tensions may exist between values of bureaucratic authority on the one hand, and on the other, either (1) humanitarian values focused on immediate human suffering and need, or (2) anti-authoritarian, anti-bureaucratic, anti-organizational attitudes. The humanitarians may want to plunge directly in and help without any delay or distraction from organizational considerations and the integration of operations.<sup>10</sup>


Local community officials often find it particularly upsetting and frustrating when they find they have to move through a state hierarchy first, and then through a federal organization before they can acquire military disaster assistance. This problem is well illustrated in the Hurricane Carla disaster.

In a few flooded cities there was a noted tendency to make telephone requests for aid direct to 4th Army -- contrary to the Army requirement that the State and OEP must first certify that all civilian resources were exhausted. 4th Army reported itself plagued by calls from fire chiefs,

police, civil defense directors, mayors, and others. Great delay resulted as requests were referred to the Denton OEP-OCD regions, which sent them back to the State, which went back to the head of local government to see if the request from his fire or police chief represented his own wishes and if so, whether the State could fill needs with nearby equipment before calling on the Army. When military units arrived, local officials showed an especial tendency to place additional requests on them directly, rather than first exhausting State and OEP resources.<sup>11</sup>

Even though the military establishment is a complex bureaucracy, with very formal procedures and clear-cut norms, it can at times minimize official requirements and "red tape," contrary to what many civilian officials may believe, to meet the exigencies of an emergency. We will illustrate this by using an example where several adaptations in procedure were made by the United States Army operating very extensively in a major catastrophe.

According to official requirements, requests for Army assistance in this particular community were supposed to follow definite channels. These channels were as follows: (1) if some resource was needed in the stricken community, e. g., manpower, equipment, supplies, etc., the local civil defense organization was officially expected to contact the state civil defense organization; (2) state civil defense was then supposed to determine if the local request could be met by state resources. If that was not the case, state civil defense could relay the request to Army liaison officials in the stricken community; (3) the Army was expected to relay the local civil defense request for its assistance to its higher military command which had access to Army, Air Force and Navy units; and then (4) the higher command would order a specific unit, usually the Army, to meet the request initially made by the local civil defense. The diagram below indicates the official channels through which requests for military assistance were to follow.




However, after a few weak attempts to follow this complex chain, the effort was abandoned. It was considered all around as too time consuming. An adjustment was made so that the local civil defense could act in behalf of the

state civil defense and directly request assistance from the Army local liaison. The change in procedure was done informally because it violated the concept of the full employment of civil (i.e., state) resources first.

The Army also made an internal adjustment in its procedures in order to facilitate more rapid assistance to the local community. When Army authorities were asked to give specific kinds of aids, they immediately and directly alerted the military unit that would in all probability be ordered by higher military command to meet the request, instead of first notifying higher military command as they were officially supposed to do. This had the effect of "shortening the reaction time" of the unit. As one of the Army liaison persons noted in referring to one such instance:

We called down to the base and alerted our men out there that they were going to be asked for a demolition team. And the reason for this tipping off is that they needed advance warning in the Army to get this stuff. . . . Usually the majority of the stuff was on the road before higher military command was even called.

The diagram below indicates in a rough fashion the actual pattern that was followed in processing civilian requests through the military chain of command.



One final modification in official procedures made by the Army was that it permitted one of its enlisted men to operate essentially as a volunteer under civilian officials in order to give him greater flexibility in meeting the needs of the civilian community. This enlisted man, among other tasks, had assumed responsibility for tracing down missing persons for city officials. He performed so well in this capacity that local officials asked his Army superiors if he could be assigned to work with them as a volunteer throughout the emergency period. Permission was granted by Army authorities and the enlisted man performed a valuable service for the stricken community.

The just-cited examples illustrate to what extent a military organization can and does alter its operating procedures in order to be more effective in a civilian emergency. This can be done without any loss of efficiency. In fact, in the particular case cited, the changed patterns clearly made for better all-around functioning of both civilian and military groups involved in the disaster. Bureaucratic expectations were clearly violated but the civilian authorities were not at all hesitant in informally approving a deviation from what they considered an unwieldy and unrealistic official pattern.



In addition to the coordination problem and the authority problem to be discussed in the following chapter, there are other difficulties that do sometimes arise in civilian-military relations in a community disaster. We will only briefly list these.

1. Sometimes community officials do not know what resources are available at the local level and do not realize these have to be requested from the military. Thus, valuable time and effort may be lost because civilians request and receive military assistance which could have been acquired more easily from local sources. This problem is particularly prone to occur in communities with poor disaster planning.

2. The issuance of vague requests for assistance by civilian officials may hinder a rapid response by the military. For example, time may be lost when military officers have to check back and ask what particular kind of truck or other specific piece of equipment is required. It is relevant to note that some local officials in the area affected by Hurricane Carla felt "An especial need for . . . a military equipment coordinator 'to sort out requests,' and advise on what type of military equipment was available and whether it would meet needs."<sup>12</sup>

3. Another problem that sometimes occurs stems from the fact that civilian organizations, in contrast to military ones, often do not have the depth in manpower. They frequently lack enough persons to rotate coordinators and key personnel in time of disaster. For example, during emergency periods public officials such as mayors, police chiefs, and civil defense directors often work for days without any or very little rest. Obviously, there comes a point when their effectiveness significantly decreases due to their lack of sleep and hectic activity. On the other hand, key military liaison personnel work on a shift basis, thus their effectiveness is not usually decreased due to a lack of rest. Equally as important is that civilian officials sometimes seem to resent having to deal with a number of rotating military coordinators, feeling that valuable time is being lost as the new or changed coordinators have to be updated on what has been occurring. There seems little question that the advantage of having alert and rested military officers in this kind of situation is partly counterbalanced by their lack of knowledge of what has been going on and which is quite familiar to their civilian counterpart.

In summary, we have noted in this chapter that the military frequently becomes involved in several types of disaster-generated activities in support of civilian communities. Local officials may call on the military for assistance in warning, rescue, and other disaster-created tasks. We also noted that a number of problems may emerge which effect military-civilian relations in large-scale disaster. Among the most important problems mentioned was the difficulty in coordinating military and civilian efforts during the emergency. In the next chapter, we will discuss the problem of authority in military-civilian relations during large-scale disasters.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter III

1. Billy G. Crane, "Intergovernmental Relations in Disaster Relief in Texas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1960), p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 78.
3. Jeannette F. Rayner, "The Role of the Military in the Waco Tornado Disaster," Studies of Military Assistance in Civilian Disasters, Disaster Research Report No. 2 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, August 20, 1953), p. 16.
4. Ibid.
5. Lewis M. Killian and Jeannette F. Rayner, "Military Assistance in the Warner Robins Tornado Disaster," Studies of Military Assistance in Civilian Disasters, p. 23.
6. Rayner, "The Role of the Military in the Waco Tornado Disaster," pp. 16-17.
7. Truman R. Strobridge, Operation HELPING HAND: The United States Army and the Alaskan Earthquake, 27 March to 7 May 1964 (monograph prepared by the Historian, U.S. Army, Alaska, n.d.), p. 41.
8. For a discussion of the myth see E. L. Quarantelli, "Images of Withdrawal Behavior in Disasters: Some Basic Misconceptions," Social Problems, VIII, No. 1 (Summer 1960), 68-79. An analysis of the basic differences between natural disasters and civil disturbances insofar as looting is concerned is presented in Russell R. Dynes and E. L. Quarantelli, "What Looting in Civil Disturbances Really Means," Trans-action, V (May 1968), 9-14.
9. Types of convergence behavior are discussed in Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1957).
10. Irving Rosow, "Authority in Natural Disasters" (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1968). (Mimeographed.)
11. Mattie E. Treadwell, Hurricane Carla (Denton, Tex.: Office of Civil Defense, Region 5, December, 1961), p. 73.
12. Ibid.

## CHAPTER IV

### AUTHORITY AND MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS IN DISASTER

Authority is a key dimension of human behavior and social organization. For example, the various groups that comprise a community can function in an integrated fashion because certain authority patterns and relationships are recognized and accepted as legitimate. Such relationships between the group components of a community -- i.e., its agencies, organizations and associations -- make it possible for their individual activities to be coordinated and controlled so that larger community goals and objectives will be realized.

Authority is important during normal, relatively stable periods. If that is so, it is even more crucial under conditions of community stress and disaster. Under such conditions, there is the tendency for structural arrangements to break down or become fragmented. Obviously, such fragmentation makes coordination difficult to achieve at a time when it is needed most. Some of the disruption of authority during large-scale community disaster is usually a function of the breakdown of normal means of communication which typically accompanies extensive emergencies. It is difficult to maintain control over sub-units in an organization, and to affect control over and coordination between different groups in a community when communication cannot be established or maintained.

Also, disasters generate new tasks and activities and in such cases it may be questionable as to who has the authority -- legal or otherwise -- to carry them out. Usually, unless a community has had considerable disaster experience, there is always some room for emergent authority patterns to develop. That is, if there is a void or absence of authority in a new kind of community stress situation, some form of control pattern will be developed.

In this chapter, we discuss authority relations between the military and civilian spheres during disaster. As we shall see, sometimes such relations are relatively problem free, and at other times they are characterized by considerable difficulty. First, we will discuss the meaning of the concept of authority as it is generally used by sociologists, and then look at its functioning in several disaster situations.

#### Sociological Meaning of Authority

The major analysis of authority was done by the German sociologist, Max Weber. He provides this definition: "Authority means the probability that a specific command will be obeyed."<sup>1</sup> He further notes:

Such obedience may feed on diverse motives. It may be determined by . . . the compliant actor's inarticulate habituation to routine behavior; or by mere affect, that is, purely personal devotion of the governed. A structure of power, however,

if it were to rest on such foundations alone, would be relatively unstable. As a rule both rulers and rules uphold the internalized power structure as "legitimate" by right, and usually the shattering of this belief in legitimacy has far-reaching ramifications.<sup>2</sup>

Following this idea, it is possible to visualize three forms of legitimate authority: legal authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority. Legal authority is based on enactment by an official body. The authority invested in state and city governments, and other bureaucratic organizations represent this form. On the other hand, "Traditional authority rests on the belief in the sacredness of the social order and its prerogatives as existing of yore. . . . The man in command is the 'lord' ruling over obedient 'subjects.' People obey the lord personally since his dignity is hallowed by tradition."<sup>3</sup> In a sense, this is authority that stems from the fact that this is a pattern of social relationships that has been followed in the past. On the other hand, "Charismatic authority rests on the affectual and personal devotion of the follower to the lord and his gifts of grace (charisma). They comprise especially . . . abilities, revelations of heroism, power of the mind and of speech."<sup>4</sup> This is authority, in other words, that rests on the personal qualities of the actor.

We will be generally discussing legal authority in disaster situations in this report since it is the basis for power in governments as well as in organizations such as the military in modern societies. However, it should be recognized that some elements of traditional and charismatic authority may be involved in certain aspects of a community response to a major emergency. These would tend to affect civilian-military relationships in a disaster only indirectly.

It was pointed out in a previous chapter that the military has a legal basis in this country for becoming involved in disasters in civilian communities. It has also been noted that civilian officials have the overall and final authority in emergencies in their communities. The legality of ultimate authority residing in local or state officials, even in disaster situations, is reflected not only in municipal and state laws, but in federal law as well. One exception to this could be the declaration of martial law or as it is now known, martial rule.<sup>5</sup> However, there is no known case of a disaster where such a declaration was ever made, although incorrect reports of such declarations frequently circulate in many major community disasters.

In the main, it can be said that the authority arrangements that emerge between military and civilian officials in large-scale community emergencies follow from what could be expected given existing law. Yet, in many instances there are deviations. These deviations from expected and institutionalized patterns which sometimes develop between the military and a disaster-struck civilian community are a function of the nature of the pre-disaster and post-disaster community structure as well as the organizational form of military groups.

### Predominance of Civilian Authority

In most disasters in the United States, civilian officials maintain overall authority in the community, and all organizations participating in emergency operations, including military units, work under that authority. In part, this is related to the hesitation of most military commanders to becoming involved in civilian emergencies without the invitation of constituted civilian authorities, a point discussed in an earlier chapter. In part, the pattern that emerges simply follows from mutual understanding of the legal aspects of the situation. Thus, the federal forces and the National Guard have been observed to be quite willing to work under the direction of and in support of civilian authorities as these officials assume their legitimate authority during a crisis.

For example, following the Alaska earthquake, the military perceived itself as being subordinate to local government and local agencies insofar as emergency operations were concerned. As a very high ranking officer in the National Guard remarked in an interview: "There was never a question as to who was to be in charge. Very definitely the city police were in charge." In a midwestern area hit by a tornado, the Air Force base in the area recognized the overall authority in the disaster operation as being vested in local officials. As their report of this activity stated:

Combat Support Group personnel were organized into three shifts (200 men per shift) and were assigned directly to the police department. At the police department were qualified Air Police personnel (Officers and NCO's) who were literally assigned to the Chief of Police Staff. They received their assignments from the police department and subsequently, assigned and posted their guards.<sup>6</sup>

In those disasters studied by DRC, where military units participated in support of emergency operations, they almost always worked under the direction of some kind of police authority, city, county or state.

### Deviations

Thus far, we have discussed those situations in which military-civilian authority relations have conformed to the expected and anticipated. There are, however, exceptions to this pattern which we now want to examine.

By and large, the deviations from the legally sanctioned, and traditionally supported pattern of military subordination to civilian authority in periods of disaster, result from the absence of effective civilian-community organization to exert such authority. This aspect of social organization in a community may be a consequence of the disaster itself, or it may be a pre-disaster condition. Whatever the case may be, the result is that the community does not have an effective organization to cope with disaster demands, and thus the military becomes very intensely involved, often reluctantly so, with

respect to authority and control in the emergency. What occurs in these situations, as will be illustrated below, is that the military, so to speak, moves into an authority vacuum.

It can be said as a general rule that in a community-wide disaster, when official executive authority is not exercised -- either as a result of abdication, physical incapacitation, or absence of the legitimate incumbent of the positions having executive authority -- considerable pressure is generated for other officials to assume authority. When this void occurs in the civilian sphere, the pressure goes over to the military "to do something." This is hardly surprising. When official authority is not exercised, the organization (or segments thereof) having the greatest generally recognized capability to deal with the perceived demands is most likely to be given temporary executive authority during the emergency.

There always are some inconsistencies between ideal values and behavior in a society, and disaster situations are no exception. Civilians see the military as having substantial capability. Thus, in the absence of effective organization and the implementation of civilian authority and control during natural disaster, local communities are sometimes willing to submit to the direction and leadership of the military. In certain instances, then, the military may assume the leadership over some or all phases of a disaster operation without having the formal authority to do so.

In such cases, there occurs what can be called the separation of leadership from formal authority. Regarding the two Rosow notes:

"Leadership" is the ability to plan, organize, and direct the activities of others in order to achieve certain goals. Authority is the acknowledged right, power, or obligation to exercise that leadership and to have directives obeyed.<sup>7</sup>

From a community viewpoint, the exercise of such leadership can be highly functional in helping to meet major and immediate problems.

In an earlier chapter, mention was made of the fact that following the tornado in Waco some persons wanted the military to assume control of emergency measures in that community. This was also the case during the 1957 Lampasos, Texas flood as is bluntly set forth in this excerpt from a study of that disaster.

. . . approximately seventy men and officers from Fort Hood arrived in Lampasos within an hour after the disaster hit. Although the commanding officer carefully explained to the author in a subsequent interview that his military charges did whatever the local authorities wanted done and did not make decisions on their own, interviews with the non-military rescue workers indicate that the Army assumed control of the rescue activities upon arrival. These individuals viewed the Army's assumption of command with approval, in view of the state of disorder prevailing during the first hours of the disaster.

It will be remembered that the mayor, trapped atop a building, could not coordinate the rescue efforts. Furthermore, if the local civil defense director performed any of the duties expected of the holder of that title, the fact remained unearthed in all the files and interviews relating to the Lampasos flood. Finally, there had been no attempt to coordinate the rescue work of the local fire and police departments, the National Guardsmen, and the large number of private citizens who volunteered their efforts. Under these circumstances, it was only natural for the stricken city to look to the Army for leadership at this vital point of the calamity. As so often is the case in such situations, the Army fulfilled this need for direction without resort to the niceties of protocol.<sup>8</sup>

The absence of an effective community organization and authority structure through which military units can work and give support poses a serious problem for them. For example, following one midwestern disaster studied by DRC, a National Guard officer said in an interview that because local governmental officials did not exert their authority, "It made it real difficult to make a decision of exactly what was right and what was wrong. We had to kind of push them into making this proclamation, and one thing and another." Similarly in a tornado aftermath: "The base commander explained the greatest problem confronting his forces . . . was that 'we were there with military personnel and material in the midst of a civilian disaster and could take little action without authorization, yet could for a time find no one to give authorization.'"9

As we suggested previously, for the military to assume outright authority over civilian disaster operations entails certain potential hazards, such as possible violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, in those situations where the military has actually assumed leadership, civilians still maintain nominal or token authority. That is, actions are taken and announcements are made so that it appears civil officials are making the key decisions and are really controlling emergency measures. The possibilities for difficulties arising from such an arrangement are, of course, quite obvious.

Another adjustment by military units when it appears that local authority is lacking during a disaster is for them to outline needed authority arrangements. In at least one case a military commander actually presented an organizational chart to a mayor suggesting how the emergency response should be organized. In most cases, when suggestions of this kind are made, they are usually presented in more indirect ways.

The possibility also exists for the development of an informal sharing of military-civilian authority in emergency operations. Such an arrangement of sorts emerged between an Air Force base and a nearby community in Georgia following a tornado disaster. The base liaison agent to the civilian community, although a civilian employee of the military installation, was defined as representing military authority because he was seen as an agent of the base. The report on this situation follows.

While this man . . . was officially only a liaison agent between the base and the town, and director of Air Force rescue and clean-up operations, he became, in effect, deputy mayor. . . . He and the mayor together procured a direct telephone line to base headquarters. The two men worked as a team, sharing authority equally and acting as one director of operations rather than as two. Whichever one was in the office when decisions had to be made and orders issued took the responsibility for action.<sup>11</sup>

In summarizing what has been said in this chapter thus far, it has first of all been observed that of the various patterns that might occur, the most frequent is for civilian officials to exercise their legal authority over emergency measures, and for the military to function in a supportive or subordinate role. However, it was noted that deviations from this expected and traditional pattern sometimes occur, which seem to be the result of local, civilian officials not carrying out their legal authority. Such circumstances may lead to the military assuming overall authority on an unofficial basis, with civilian officials still nominally in control. Another possible but rarer deviation which can develop following a civilian disaster is for military and community officials to share authority informally. Finally, there is the possibility that martial law (or in the more correct technical terminology, martial rule)<sup>12</sup> will be declared officially subordinating as necessity dictates civilians to military authorities. Given the value system of American society, this appears more of a theoretical than actual possibility insofar as natural disasters are concerned.

The chart below indicates the form that military-civilian authority relations can take in major community disasters. The arrows point from the possible dominant source of exercised authority in disaster to that of the lesser authority.

#### Possible Relationships of Military and Civilian Authority

<u>Military Authority</u>		<u>Civilian Authority</u>
1. Subordinate	←	Official
2. Martial Rule	→	Subordinate
3. Unofficial	→	Nominal
4. Shared	↔	Shared

In the final section of this chapter, we present in some detail case material on military-civilian relations during the 1967 flood disaster in Fairbanks, Alaska. We conclude the chapter with this material because it illustrates some of the forms that military-civilian authority relations can assume during disaster, and also because it points out some of the problems which frequently develop in this area. In addition, given the extensive nature of this particular disaster, some implications for a nuclear situation are suggested.



## The 1967 Fairbanks Flood

In mid-August 1967, a disastrous flood hit the Tanana Valley in central Alaska. Record rainfall caused the Chena River which flows through Fairbanks and the Tanana River located to the south of the city to overflow their banks and create havoc for the population living in the area.

The largest community effected by the flood was Fairbanks, Alaska with a population of 30,000 residents. In this, Alaska's second largest city, it was estimated that the flood damage exceeded \$150 million. Extensive evacuation had to be carried out. Over 15,000 of the city's residents were forced to leave their homes. Around 13,000 were evacuated to emergency shelters in the Fairbanks area and several thousand were evacuated by air to Anchorage.

Also hard hit by the flood was the village of Nenana located some 50 miles southwest of Fairbanks. Here, the entire population of 300 residents had to be evacuated from the community.

Seven deaths were attributed to the disaster in the Tanana Valley. In addition to the civilian losses, military installations in the area suffered millions of dollars in property damage.

Responding to requests from civilian officials the military provided considerable assistance to the disaster-struck region. This included both logistical and direct field support. The primary military assistance came from Fort Wainwright, which is located adjacent to Fairbanks; Eielson Air Force Base, located about 23 miles from Fairbanks; and from units of the Alaska National Guard, including the local Fairbanks unit.

### Army

Fort Wainwright was struck hard by the flood, so initially most of the post's emergency efforts were directed toward its own internal problems. The post's emergency operation center became the focal point for the Army's emergency response. During the first few days of the flood in Fairbanks, local officials appeared to be responsible for the community's disaster operation, so Fort Wainwright personnel dealt through them. Later, though, state officials assumed the responsibility for the disaster operation and at this time the Army worked through such agencies as the Alaska Disaster Office (ADO), which is state civil defense in Alaska. Regardless of the civilian authority which seemed to be in control of the disaster activities in Fairbanks, the Army served purely in a supportive, non-directive fashion.

The response of nearby Fort Wainwright to the request for assistance from Fairbanks fits the symbiotic, "good neighbor" pattern which we discussed in an earlier chapter. As interdependent as the Fort Wainwright and Fairbanks communities are, it appears highly unlikely that the former could have ignored the latter's call for aid.

The Army made Bassett Hospital on Fort Wainwright available to Fairbanks when it became necessary to evacuate the local civilian hospital during the flood. Army personnel assisted in the evacuation of civilian patients to the post hospital. In this and other activities, Fort Wainwright used over 150 vehicles in support of the civilian population.

The Army also participated in the extensive air rescue activities. Helicopters and pilots from Fort Wainwright were involved in the rescue work throughout the emergency period of the disaster. The Fort Wainwright pilots worked under the operational control of the Air Force at Eielson Air Force Base.

Finally, the Army sent in men from Fort Greely located about 105 miles from Fairbanks. These men, involved in search and rescue work, utilized ten special 35-foot boats.

#### Air Force

For a few days prior to the emergency in Fairbanks, helicopter pilots from Eielson Air Force base had been involved in search and rescue activities in areas outside the city. On Tuesday morning, August 15, they began to respond to the emergency situation as it progressed in Fairbanks. Initially, Eielson responded with its own crews and aircraft. Later, helicopters and pilots from Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage were sent to Fairbanks to augment the resources of Eielson. Also, helicopter pilots from Fort Wainwright were placed under the control of Air Force personnel from Eielson. In addition to the rescue of endangered residents of Fairbanks, the helicopter operation had as a secondary mission the distribution of critical supplies throughout the disaster area.

The control of military helicopter aircraft involved in search and rescue was affected at the command post on Eielson Air Force Base. Information and requests were directed by radio to the base and Air Force personnel determined priorities and dispatched assistance. The matter of determining priorities frequently proved to be a difficult problem. For example, sometimes untrained civilian observers with insufficient or inaccurate information would channel requests for assistance to the Air Force. In the first instance, Air Force personnel would not know what type of priority to assign a request, and in the second instance, valuable time would be lost if a mission was assigned high priority and it was later discovered that those involved were in no immediate danger.

In addition to the military aircraft involved in search and rescue activities, there were also many civilian helicopters involved. However, these did not work under the control of the Air Force. They did, however, add to the air traffic.

In this disaster then, both the Army and Air Force provided considerable support to the civilian population. For the most part, the Army and Air Force

provided this aid while working through the command structure of the military. For a short time at the beginning of the disaster, civil authorities were permitted to give directives to military helicopter crews. However, this situation was soon modified and an Air Force colonel assumed control over all military helicopters. From this point on civilian requests for military helicopter assistance, instead of being given directly to operational helicopter crews, had to be first channeled through military authorities who were responsible for determining priorities and establishing coordination in the air operation. Thus, the military had an operation in support of civilian authorities in which the former made the key decisions.

### National Guard

Several Alaska National Guard units became involved in assisting flood-plagued Fairbanks. An Army National Guard task force was sent to Fairbanks from Anchorage on Tuesday, August 15. The local Fairbanks Army National Guard unit -- which had been dispatched to Nenana to help local residents fight a flood situation which had developed there prior to the Fairbanks situation -- was also recalled to Fairbanks on Tuesday. Both of these Guard units were part of a transportation outfit and therefore they possessed badly needed vehicles capable of operating in high flood waters. A National Guard Eskimo scout unit was also sent to Fairbanks from the community of Bethel. Air support was provided by the Alaska Air National Guard operating out of Anchorage. Thus, a fairly sizable National Guard effort emerged in this disaster.

The National Guard played a major role in surface rescue and transportation. During the emergency period, thousands of residents of Fairbanks were transported from flooded areas to emergency shelters. The Guard also assisted by transporting and distributing emergency relief supplies throughout Fairbanks as these arrived from outside communities and states. Finally, the Army Guard aided in providing police security for the community.

The Alaska Air National Guard also played an important role in the disaster. For example, the Air Guard transported thousands of Fairbanks evacuees to Anchorage. Also, the Air Guard flew tons of needed supplies to the city.

In this disaster, the National Guard -- both Army and Air -- worked in the main under the authority and general direction of the Alaska Disaster Office. For example, the air evacuation missions flown by the Air National Guard were largely assigned and determined by the ADO. This was the expected authority relationship between the ADO and the Guard in an emergency which had been declared a disaster, as this one had, by the Governor.

However, at times during the disaster, National Guard and civilian officials experienced authority problems when dealing with one another. Part of the difficulty apparently resulted from the fact that many of the operations undertaken by individuals and organizations during the flood were new and untried -- at least on the scale they had to be performed -- and so there was considerable confusion as to who had the legitimate authority to carry them out. Furthermore, effective authority relations is in part dependent upon good

communications and that was lacking during the flood in Fairbanks. Because of a general breakdown in communications within and between organizations and groups during the disaster, there was considerable difficulty in establishing consensus on such things as emergency priorities; also orders and directives were frequently countermanded by both civilian and National Guard officials in Fairbanks. Finally, available evidence suggests that some of the authority conflict stemmed from the difference in values held by the National Guard and some civilian organizations.

Throughout the disaster the Fairbanks International Airport was one of the key centers of emergency activity. From this point, thousands of Fairbanks residents were evacuated to Anchorage, and the airport became a logistics center as several hundred thousand pounds of emergency supplies flown from outside the city were unloaded there. Also, during one period the airport was used as a heliport for helicopters involved in search and rescue missions. Persons who were at the airport during the first few days describe the scene as chaotic with no one having a clear idea as to who was in charge. When the Guard contingent arrived from Anchorage on Tuesday, some of its personnel were assigned to the airport whereupon they attempted to exert some authority in order to bring about a degree of order to the situation. The airport operation proved to be one of the most troublesome in terms of military-civilian relations in this disaster.

On Wednesday, the ADO which had become aware of the lack of organization in the airport emergency operation, assigned the authority for directing the effort at the airport to a volunteer civilian group. Specifically, this group was authorized to organize an operation for the reception and distribution of emergency cargo sent to Fairbanks, and to organize for the pick-up of flood victims from evacuation centers in Fairbanks and their transportation to the airport so that they could be airlifted to Anchorage. To assist the volunteer group in this effort, the ADO assigned to it several men and vehicles from the Fairbanks Guard unit.

Apparently, it was not well understood or accepted by many National Guard officials that the ADO appointed group was in charge of the vital airport emergency operation. On several occasions, National Guard officers challenged the authority of this group by making decisions that members of the civilian group had been authorized to make. Also, National Guard officers sometimes countermanded the orders that had been given by the ADO group to the Guardsmen who had been assigned to work under it.

As we previously noted, group members bring the perspectives and values of their respective groups to situations, and disaster experiences are no exception. Persons who are in military groups usually prefer that organization's approach to problems. The same can be said of persons who are most familiar with civilian groups and organizations, i.e., they tend to prefer civilian groups and their modes of operating to military ones. Some of the authority conflict between Guard and civilian officials concerning the airport operation had its basis in such differences in group values.

For example, there was some feeling in the Guard that a civilian group could not effectively direct such an important operation. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the ADO group to exert authority over the airport emergency operation was questioned. Thus, in one respect, a military organization bias hindered the acceptance of civilian authority.

In contrast, the volunteer group was characterized by a preference for civilian values and organization, and exhibited a corresponding pro-civilian bias. For example, the complaint was made in this group that as the scope of the disaster grew the National Guard involved a larger number of its officers. This supposedly had the effect of making it unnecessarily more complex for civilian authorities to channel requests and decisions through the Guard's military structure. Similarly, the complaint was made that the Guard created problems for civilian authorities by too frequently rotating the officers in charge of key activities. For example, in an interview one civilian official said:

I just don't have the time to search out the commanding officer. I want that commanding officer on duty 24 hours a day -- the same that I was for three days straight. And I want him right on my coat tails so that when an order has to be issued it can go, because there's nothing more frustrating than to go over and tell who was in charge four hours ago what you need and find out that the chain of command has been changed and now you have to go see another one.

Some of the authority problems which developed between civilians and the Guard during the Fairbanks flood grew out of the fact that many of the emergency activities that were carried out had either never been done before or had never been done on such a large scale in this particular community. Thus, authority norms had not been worked out prior to the flood which would have outlined the responsibilities of different groups and organizations. No one had envisioned the groups that would participate in such a disaster situation nor the emergency tasks that would have to be performed.

Numerous groups and organizations became involved in various emergency activities. At certain points it could be said that who was in charge was an open question. Sometimes an official's authority would be challenged and sometimes it would not be with regard to the same action. Also, persons at one level of an organization might recognize the authority of certain outside officials and at another level they might not. This inconsistency within the same organization is illustrated in the quotation below taken from an interview with a National Guard officer. He refers to the response of some lower level men to civilian officials whom he defines as having dubious authority:

...the driver would take off with an emergency evacuation to the University of Alaska, one of the shelter areas, and someone at the University of Alaska with a white hat on and a red band or something would say you've got to go over here and do this, that, and the other thing. Well, the poor kid that's driving the truck he doesn't know. So he goes ahead. So we actually lost a lot of our trucks for operational use for about two or three days.

Problems such as these, then, resulted in part from the fact that many of the groups and organizations involved in emergency activities, including the National Guard, had never worked together before. There had been little or no predisaster planning to establish and clarify authority relationships between emergency activated groups.

Some of the authority problems which evolved in the Fairbanks disaster underscore the crucial relationship between control and communication. That is, the fact that effective control and coordination cannot be realized unless communications are operative. Telephone communication was disrupted during the flood and sufficient emergency radio equipment was unavailable to many groups and organizations performing important disaster tasks. Clearly, some of the authority problems experienced between the National Guard and the ADO groups at the airport were due to misunderstanding brought on by the sheer difficulty of communicating during the disaster.

The lack of provisions for communication also created problems for internal control and the exercise of authority. For example, National Guard officers often lost effective control of their truck crews involved in evacuation once they departed on a mission because many of the vehicles were without radios. Sometimes a truck would leave on a mission and not return for an extended period of time after that mission had been completed. During this time, the Guardsmen would act on their own or on orders given to them by persons whose formal authority was at best marginal. Because of this situation an overall system of mission priorities was difficult to establish. These internal authority problems experienced by the Guard and other groups also spilled over into their external relationships. This was true because it made it difficult for them to coordinate and complement their authority structures with other units.

With this case material on the 1967 Fairbanks flood disaster we conclude this chapter on military-civilian authority relations during disaster. Our data indicate that social organizational variables strongly influence the pattern that such relations take in disaster situations. Furthermore, we have suggested that problems in this area can be some of the most difficult to solve for groups and organizations involved in emergency work.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter IV

1. Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," in Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader, ed. by Amitai Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Because of its common usage the more familiar term martial law is generally used in this report. However, the more correct terminology is martial rule, which is the measure of military control justified by the common law concept of necessity. Martial law is the body of regulations issued by the military authorities in furtherance of a measure of martial rule. See U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Pamphlet 27-11 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 27.
6. Because it would identify the location of the disaster the specific reference of the larger report from which this excerpt is taken cannot be given. It was obtained by a DRC field team from personnel at a military base.
7. Irving Rosow, "Authority in Natural Disasters" (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1968). (Mimeographed.)
8. Billy G. Crane, "Intergovernmental Relations in Disaster Relief in Texas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1960), pp. 154-155.
9. Ibid., pp. 114 and 120.
10. For a discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act and other statutes relating to military intervention in civil affairs, see U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, Military Assistance, pp. 11-19. The mentioned act, in part, prohibits the concerted use, under orders, of units or individuals of the Army or of the Air Force to execute the laws.
11. Crane, "Intergovernmental Relations," pp. 119-120.
12. Lewis M. Killian and Jeannette F. Rayner, "Military Assistance in the Warner Robins Tornado Disaster," Studies of Military Assistance in Civilian Disasters, Disaster Research Report No. 2 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, August 20, 1953), p. 23.

## CHAPTER V

### MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS DURING DISASTER IN SOME OTHER SOCIETIES

When the pattern of military-civilian relations during major disasters in the United States is compared with those in some other societies; important differences can be seen. Such relations, like other social patterns, are a function of a society's past experience and the development of its social structure. Since societies differ in terms of historical background and the evolution of their social structures, we would similarly expect some variation with regard to military-civilian relations during catastrophes.

In this chapter, we discuss military-civilian relations during large scale disasters in four foreign societies: Italy, Japan, Chile and El Salvador. Our observations on each of these societies are based chiefly upon data collected by Disaster Research Center field teams following only a single disaster. Therefore, the findings should be construed as tentative until they are subject to further verification through more disaster studies in each of these countries. However, at the time these studies were being conducted, every attempt was made by the field researchers to determine whether the response pattern was general or only particular to that disaster situation. Similarities and differences in the military involvement in disasters in these different societies are pointed up, as well as a drawing of comparisons with American military organization operations in civilian emergencies.

#### Italy

On October 9, 1963, a vast landslide into the lake behind the Vaiont Dam in northeastern Italy produced a great wave of water which plummeted over the Dam and engulfed the valley below. Between 2,500 and 3,500 persons in the town of Longarone and several nearby villages were killed by the gigantic mass of water.

The Italian military provided the major organizational response to this disaster. The Army assumed control over the disaster scene throughout the entire emergency period. It supervised and coordinated the efforts of such emergency activated groups as the police, fire and volunteer groups. Also, military personnel comprised the bulk of the manpower involved in rescue and relief work.

The military was the first to reach the impact area of the disaster from the outside. Joined by firemen from nearby towns the military troops which numbered in the several hundreds began a search for survivors. However, there were few survivors in this disaster due to the suddenness of its onslaught which left little time for escape. Also, few injured persons were to be found because the tremendous force of the water killed most of the persons in the impact zone. As a result, the rescue operation consisted mainly of the recovery of bodies.



Following the disaster, some measures were taken to prevent the outbreak of an epidemic as a result of the large number of bodies. An extensive chlorine decontamination of the devastated area was undertaken; and again soldiers provided the bulk of the manpower for this operation. Army units also disposed of animal carcasses so that they would not become a threat to public health.

The nature of Italian society, in part, accounts for the leadership demonstrated by the military in this disaster. The military is expected to play an important role during major catastrophes. For example, one of the assigned duties of the carabinieri (military police with civilian responsibilities) is to provide assistance in civil emergencies. Also, under Italian law, the regular army is supposed to become involved and to exert considerable leadership during periods of disaster when the resources of a region are overwhelmed, as they were in this case.

A second reason for the heavy military involvement in the Vaiont Dam disaster had political overtones. Some competing political groups in the country were trying to determine if blame could be affixed to someone for the catastrophe -- e.g., by seeing if there had been some oversight regarding the safety of the Vaiont Dam system. This resulted in the unwillingness of many civilian authorities to become involved in the important decision making during the post-disaster period out of a fear of drawing undue attention to themselves which could later bring them criticism. As a result, the military found it necessary to move into this authority vacuum. However, given the structure of Italian society -- i.e., its centralization and the disaster relief role assigned to the Army -- the military still would have played a prominent leadership role during the disaster even without the political controversy.

### Japan

On June 16, 1964, at 1:02 p.m., Japan was struck by an earthquake measured at 7.7 on the Richter scale. The city of Niigata, the capital of Niigata Prefecture, was the most heavily affected area. In this community of nearly 300,000 residents, the earthquake totally or partly destroyed 8,637 houses and disrupted all the public utilities and normal means of communication. Eleven persons were killed and 20 were injured in the disaster. Over fifty per cent of the land area in the city was flooded as the earthquake caused a weakening of the embankments of the two major rivers which run through Niigata. Flooding also resulted from an earthquake-generated tsunami.

A highly centralized response was made to the disaster; i.e., national governmental units of their regional and local representatives played the key roles. The organized response in general followed a master disaster plan which specified that national agencies and ministries were responsible for directing emergency measures. Given the centralization of Japanese society, in contrast to a society such as the United States, such a pattern is not too surprising.

As required by the Japanese master disaster plan, a disaster control center was established in Tokyo on the day of the earthquake. Also, a disaster

headquarters was set up in the city of Niigata. From these two points, civilian governmental authorities controlled and coordinated the activities of agencies and organizations involved in emergency measures.

Large-scale assistance was rendered by the Japanese military (Japan Self Defense Forces) in this disaster. Several thousand men from the Self Defense Forces and considerable equipment was utilized to alleviate the suffering of the affected civilian population. Ground Self Defense Forces personnel, for example, worked at building dykes, repairing roads and railways, restoring damaged pipe lines and assisted in purifying and distributing water. The Maritime Self Defense Forces transported sandbags, assisted in clearing the Niigata harbor of debris and carried out reconnaissance work. The Japanese Air Self Defense Forces transported needed supplies.

The military, then, played an important role in the response to the Niigata disaster. Yet, they were always under the authority of civilian officials. The Self Defense Forces were seen as working in support of civilian agencies and subordinate to them; i.e., they were not seen as responsible for particular activities such as sandbagging, but were perceived as, and accepted the role of, an organization that worked to bolster the resources of civilian organizations responsible for such activities.

Indicative of the military's subordinate authority in disaster situations in Japan is the fact that it was never assigned the security function during the disaster, this remained the function of the civilian police. In contrast, as we have noted elsewhere, the military will often be used for security duty in the United States. To some civilians as well as to some military men in the United States, the appearance of troops in a security role during a natural disaster suggests that final authority rests with the military. In Japan, civilian officials are very concerned about preventing any implication that the military is in charge; and military personnel are not generally used for security duty during disaster.

The post-war attitude towards the military in Japan is related to the clear subordination of the Self Defense Forces to civilian officials during disaster. The specter of Japanese militarism which led the nation into a costly war looms large in the minds of many of its citizens; the result has been that the role of the military has been significantly reduced in that society. The post-war preference for civilian institutions in Japan and the distrust of powerful offensive military organizations seem to be symbolized in the present name given military units, i.e., Self Defense Forces. Because of the post-World War II structure of Japanese society then: (1) the master disaster plan clearly specifies the supremacy of civilian authority and (2) Japanese military officials themselves exercise considerable restraint when operating in a disaster situation so that it does not appear that they are going beyond their narrow limits of responsibility in a civilian emergency.

We have noted that in the United States, too, the military when operating in a civilian disaster is expected to be subordinate to civilian authority. Yet, we have seen that this expected and traditional pattern does not always

prevail in the United States. However, the available evidence on Japan suggests that the anticipated subordination of the military to civilian authority would be realized more often in that society than in the United States.

First of all, legally there are no exceptions to the prescription in Japan that military authority is subordinate to civilian authority. For example, there is no provision for martial law in the Japanese legal structure. Therefore, the attendant confusion which often follows military involvement in disaster operations in this country is absent in Japan. In this country, the mere presence of the military is at times misconstrued to mean that a state of martial law has been declared.

Second, it would seem that the very centralization of disaster operations in Japan would mitigate against the military having to extend its authority into spheres that are expected to be assumed by civilian agencies. We pointed out in an earlier chapter that in some disasters in the United States the military assumes unexpected authority and responsibility because the impacted communities are "organizationally poor" -- i.e., they do not have sufficient local institutions such as fire and police organizations and effectively organized local governments to cope with disaster. In such instances in the United States, military authorities feel considerable pressure to "take matters into their own hands." It would seem that this type of pressure would not be felt by the Japanese military since civilian national organizations and agencies assume much of the burden at the local level during disasters in Japan. In other words, in Japan in contrast to the United States, there is less of an authority vacuum into which the military could step.

### Chile

An earthquake that registered at 7.5 on the Richter scale struck Chile on Sunday, March 28, 1965. Widespread damage and destruction occurred throughout the central portion of the country. In this area, numerous towns and villages felt the impact of the disaster as 18,000 people were left homeless and between \$50 and \$100 million in damage was done.

As is common in Chile, the major response to this disaster was at the national level. The Chilean military exerted authority over local and regional civilian officials and organizations in a manner unheard of in the United States.

Following a major disaster in Chile, national governmental officials decide whether local civilian authorities should remain in charge of emergency operations or whether jefes de plaza (disaster area supervisors) should be appointed to assume the responsibility for such operations. A jefe de plaza will be appointed to an area if the government feels that an emergency situation is too large for local authorities to handle. Persons that are designated jefes de plaza are military officers who have previously served in this capacity. Thus in Chile the national government determines not only the degree of its own participation in disaster operations, but the extent to which local authority will prevail as well. In the United States on the other hand, local officials

determine the extent of national involvement, and they can either ask for or reject federal assistance. Further, the military jefe de plaza arrangement in Chile gives military-civilian relations during disasters in that country a character quite different from such relations in societies like the United States and Japan.

Shortly after the earthquake, an emergency committee was formed in Santiago to direct the country's disaster activities. The minister of the interior was appointed to head the emergency committees which also included the ministers of the economy and defense. The emergency committee was responsible for assigning disaster relief roles to the various national agencies.

Also on the day of the disaster, the commander of the armed forces appointed officers to serve as jefes de plaza in the effected towns and areas. Most of the jefes arrived in their assigned areas the next day. Local authorities had assumed control over emergency efforts until the jefes arrived in accordance with Chilean law. When the jefes de plaza arrived, however, they assumed complete command of disaster activities and had authority over all local governmental officials and public and private agencies involved in emergency work in their areas. For example, one jefe that was interviewed stated: "All the public services were under my jurisdiction, including the governor who just the day before had been my superior." Similarly, one Chilean civil defense official observed:

We in all emergencies present ourselves to these men in uniform because here in any catastrophe the heads are the military, the chiefs of the areas which are called jefes de plaza. All institutions, be it carabineros (national police), Red Cross, civil defense, and so on, all these institutions which are organized, inevitably have to present themselves to the jefes de plaza. There is only one chief, and that chief coordinates the work of all the institutions; even though some of us might not have liked it. We cannot express our dislike.

The jefes de plaza served as the liaison between the disaster areas and the national government in Santiago. They determined what kinds of requests for emergency assistance would be forwarded to the capital and they also decided how all the incoming aid would be distributed. This is typically done by the jefes de plaza during disasters in Chile and it results in minimizing the possibility of needless duplication.

The Army was the most active agency engaged in direct emergency activities. It, of course, worked under the authority of the jefes de plaza. Both manpower and supplies were provided by the Army. It was involved in setting up tents which served as emergency housing for the earthquake victims. The Army was the major supplier of tents and also supplied most of the vehicles for emergency transportation. Finally, the Army was heavily involved in clearing roads, patrolling the disaster areas, construction work and distributing supplies.

In Chilean disasters, then, there evolves the centralization of authority that does not develop in comparable situations in the United States. In the disaster being discussed, governmental officials ran the support operation from the capital while field authority rested with the military jefes de plaza. Such an arrangement violates two American values: (1) the preference for local over federal authority, and (2) the preference for civilian over military authority. Thus, the structure of American society would seem to preclude the emergence of the Chilean form of disaster organization in the United States.

Instead of the centralization of disaster operations as is seen in Chile, there is great concern with the "democratization" or decentralization of such activities in the United States. Thus in this country, there tends to be some rather vague expectation that a local civilian organization such as civil defense will provide the leadership and will affect the needed coordination in field operations, rather than a military man or organization. We have already discussed some of the problems which this arrangement creates in American disaster responses. For example, it often means that coordination between disaster activated organizations may occur relatively late during a disaster, if at all, because local authorities may not agree on who should have the responsibility for bringing it about. Or, the organization or group who does have this responsibility may not have the ability to carry it out.

We have implied that the emergency centralization in Chile may make for greater speed and efficiency in disaster relief operations. However, this form of disaster organization also has its problem. For example, local people may come to expect and rely upon assistance from the military and other outside sources to such an extent that they make little attempt to use what skills and resources there are available in their communities prior to receiving such outside assistance. For example, in an interview one jefe de plaza when talking about the local people in his area following the earthquake noted:

When I came everyone was here waiting. There was complete disorganization. Everyone needed someone to help them organize their activities and no one could think of what to do on their own at first. They had done some work with some of the wounded people and had gotten them out of the houses and this sort of thing, but they had not begun any organized activity. Everyone was waiting for someone to give some kind of help from the outside. They were all somewhat confused and were counting on outside assistance to help them get reorganized and reestablished.

Some of the prominent patterns which exist in the Chilean response to natural disaster are also found in El Salvador. For example, in El Salvador the military has considerable authority during disaster and there is, in general, considerable centralization in the responses to disaster in that society. However, as we shall see, there are some differences when compared with the Chilean response.

### El Salvador

On May 3, 1965, an earthquake measured at 7.5 on the Mercalli scale occurred in El Salvador. The affected area included San Salvador, the capital, and several surrounding towns and villages. An estimated 150 persons were killed and approximately 500 were injured. About 35,000 persons were left homeless by the disaster.

Similar to Chile, much of the organizational response to this disaster came from the national level, both in terms of the exertion of authority over groups and organizations involved in emergency activities and the carrying out of important disaster tasks. The response of the government was in general based upon a national emergency plan called the Vulcano Plan which had been written several months before the earthquake. This plan had outlined emergency procedures to be followed subsequent to a major earthquake. Also under the plan an emergency structure was established and various branches of the Salvadorian government as well as non-governmental organizations were assigned disaster roles.

According to the Vulcano Plan, a national emergency committee composed of the subsecretaries of the ministries of interior, defense and public health was in charge of coordinating the nation's disaster effort. Several minutes after the earthquake struck, the national emergency committee met at its headquarters in San Salvador and launched the government's disaster operation.

National police and national guardsmen were sent into the disaster area shortly after the earthquake. Residents were evacuated to safety points and the injured were transported to hospitals and clinics. The chief of staff of the Armed Forces was designated jefe de plaza and assumed legal control over groups and organizations in the disaster area.

Several refugee camps were established where thousands of earthquake victims were given shelter, food, and typhoid vaccine. Supervision of the camps was handled by personnel of the Salvadorian Armed Forces under the authority of the jefe de plaza.

Private organizations involved in disaster relief work included the Salvadorian Red Cross and Caritas (Catholic Relief Service). These two organizations assisted with the distribution of food and clothing to disaster victims. The Red Cross and Caritas generally coordinated their work with the national emergency committee.

Although the Salvadorian response to the earthquake was in many ways similar to the pattern followed in Chile -- for example, the appointment of a jefe de plaza and the existence of an emergency committee on the national level with broad coordinative powers -- it was nevertheless somewhat different. The major difference was that the national government and the military wielded more actual power in Chile than their counterparts in El Salvador. Still, however, the patterns in these two countries, as far as centralization and the involvement of the military is concerned, are more similar to each other than either is to the United States pattern.

The activities of the mayor of San Salvador during the disaster illustrate the point that power and control were not as centralized in the national government and the military in El Salvador as they were in the Chilean disaster. Under the Vulcano Plan, the mayor of the city was formally designated the somewhat limited responsibility of the identification and burial of the dead. However, his informal activity during the disaster went far beyond this. He organized and directed several groups of city employees, including the police, in such work as damage assessment, food distribution, transporting of refugees, and public security. Through his own initiative he also worked with other organizations such as Caritas. The work of the mayor of San Salvador was not coordinated by the emergency committee or the military jefe de plaza. The kind of autonomy exhibited by the mayor of San Salvador in this disaster probably could not have occurred in Chile. Nonetheless, as in Chile, the military and national government in El Salvador played the key roles in the response to the earthquake.

Except in the case of Japan, our data show that societal centralization is positively correlated with the expectation that the military will supply much of the leadership in disaster operations, rather than just working in support of other agencies. Also, the evidence indicated that in those societies in which the military exerts considerable authority during disaster, the alleviation of disaster engendered problems will in general be the responsibility of nationally based agencies and organizations. Table 1 below shows these relationships.

TABLE 1

National Societal Structures and Military Disaster Responses

<u>Country</u>	<u>Societal Structure</u>	<u>Focal Response</u> <u>Level</u>	<u>Expected Role of</u> <u>Military</u>
Italy	Centralized	National	Leadership
Japan	Centralized	National	Assistance
Chile	Centralized	National	Leadership
El Salvador	Centralized	National	Leadership
United States	Decentralized	Local	Assistance

In summary, military involvement during natural disasters in the societies we have discussed, and military-civilian relations during such periods reflect the structure of these societies. That is to say, a society's adaptation to disaster problems grows out of its pre-disaster structural arrangements and values.

## CHAPTER VI

### IMPLICATIONS FOR A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE

A basic thesis of this report is that the manner in which military organizations participate in a community emergency is a function of the nature of the society in which the crisis occurs, the organizational composition of the stricken community, and the structure of the military itself. Along some lines, these three aspects would be identical in all kinds of major emergencies. However, along other lines differences can be expected in a peacetime in contrast with a wartime situation. Because of the focus of this chapter we will primarily discuss differences.

#### Wartime Differences

A society that comes under a wartime attack from an external source almost always reacts with a heightened sense of solidarity. To this extent, the reaction is similar to the consensus-like situation that prevails immediately after a natural disaster. One important consequence of such consensus is that generally held views about the functions and responsibilities of different institutions and organizations in the society are not likely to be challenged.

In America as in most other highly developed countries, the national military forces are seen and are expected to be the major instrument of the society to defend itself against external enemies. This will not change in the event of a nuclear attack. There would be a very high degree of emphasis on the military mission. This would be merely a manifestation of the priorities American society could be expected to assign to its various institutional complexes in the event of a nuclear attack.

If such is the case, it could be reasonably anticipated the civilians in a nuclear setting would have relatively low expectations about the assistance they think the military should render them insofar as non-military emergency tasks were concerned. This of course can not at present be directly documented. However, indirectly there is some evidence. If local communities rely heavily on nearby military resources for assistance during peacetime it is, in part, because of the realization that the personnel, equipment, material, etc., are not crucially involved in other, higher priority activity. In one sense, civilians perceive that the military can be "spared" for other uses in such situations. Given the much higher priority mission of the military in wartime, there would be a different anticipation regarding military help in a nuclear situation. (It is also necessary to distinguish what civilians would probably actually anticipate as over against what they might desire from the military if they thought the possibilities were available.)

As indicated previously, the civilian organizational resources available for an emergency will depend on a variety of factors. Among other things, some communities have a wide range and a large number of organizations; others are



organizationally "poor." Speaking very generally, it could be anticipated that a nuclear attack would be most likely to be directed against the more populated and thus the more organizationally "rich" areas of the country. In this sense, communities in such areas would have relatively less need of aid from the military, as is true even during peacetime disasters. This statement of course makes a number of assumptions such as that the nuclear attack is not so overwhelming as to leave few viable groups and agencies, or that the attack is so selective as to impact key emergency organizations somehow more than the surrounding community.

It is true that there are certain federal policies and there has been some national planning with regard to military support of a stricken civilian population. More specifically, there are general regulations and guidelines as to the support the military organization is to give civil defense. However, two aspects about all the directives stand out. First it is made quite clear that:

Military assistance will complement and not be a substitute for civil participation in civil defense operations. Military plans and plans developed by civil authority must recognize that civil resources will be the first resources used to support civil requirements with military resources being used only when essential to supplement the civil resources.<sup>1</sup>

Second, it is equally clearly indicated that as far as priority of emergency operations is concerned:

Measures to insure continuity of operations, troop survival and rehabilitation of essential military bases will take precedence over military support of civil defense.<sup>2</sup>

For the general guidelines and policies to be implemented will require the development of more specific and detailed plans than presently exist. This will necessitate the solving of structural, logistic and administrative problems in planning and a clarification of areas of responsibility and authority -- all matters under current consideration. On the other side, it is the DRC field observation that civilian authorities and organizations at the community level seem almost totally ignorant and unaware of intended or planned military support to civil communities after a nuclear attack. All of this together does not augur for much military initiative towards assisting civilians in a nuclear setting.

It does not seem amiss to note that there may be situations where, far from the military giving emergency assistance to a nearby civilian community, the converse may be true. That is, it is not inconceivable that the brunt of even a widespread nuclear attack might be borne by military installations. If that were the case, instead of excessive requests for military aid to civilians, the problem could be how nearby civil communities might assist stricken local bases.

Finally, the very structure of the military strongly encourages it, in a nuclear situation, to attend to the organization's primary mission. This mission, of course, is defending and protecting the society against wartime enemies. During peacetime, military organizations cannot only afford to participate in civilian emergencies; there are actually positive incentives to do so for humanitarian as well as public relations considerations. (The latter fact was sometimes explicitly although carefully acknowledged to DRC field teams by military commanders when talking of their unit operations in civilian disasters.) In a wartime situation the permissive condition will be missing, the rewarding conditions of less importance. The priority of the overriding military mission will supersede all other aspects.

It is possible, of course, that the legal basis for possible involvement of U.S. armed forces in civilian communities could be changed under the stress of a nuclear situation. The extreme case of this would be the imposition of martial rule. However, since the whole federal posture and national wartime planning is fairly negative to taking such a drastic step, even in the event of a nuclear catastrophe, it is most likely that the legal basis for U.S. military participation in the civilian sphere will remain the same as it is in peacetime.

The use of the National Guard in contrast to federal forces is somewhat of a more problematical matter. Since the Guard tends to be defined as a local community group in many sections of the country, it might be expected that considerable pressure would be exerted on the governor for use of such troops to aid nuclear-stricken communities. Adding to this possibility is the fact that the Guard, particularly to the extent it is not actually federally mobilized, is viewed as having other than solely a military mission of defending and protecting the society against wartime enemies. Especially among organizational officials who have primarily seen and worked with the Guard during natural disasters and civil disturbances, there is a tendency to think of it as a resource available to handle internal and local problems more than external and manmade threats to the society as a whole.

There do exist some plans for the use of state military forces in a nuclear situation. However, these seem to be even less well known at the local community level than are the very poorly understood specific functions of the National Guard in many instances of natural disasters. As we shall note later, a more explicit clarification of the National Guard role in wartime with regard to their relation to the civilian sphere seems essential in long-run emergency planning.

In overall terms, then, it is to be anticipated that military organizations will not participate as extensively in civilian emergencies during a nuclear catastrophe, as they typically do during peacetime disasters. However, it is to be expected that there will be some degree of involvement. Total non-involvement is unimaginable. Prior symbiotic ties of military bases, for example, with nearby local communities will not automatically and fully dissolve. Some civilian officials and agencies will undoubtedly feel that the military should assist their community if it is hit. This will probably be particularly true in those communities where there has been prior military-civilian cooperation in natural peacetime disasters.

In addition, the scope of the nuclear catastrophe particularly with respect to fallout will be an important factor affecting military involvement. One of the most commonplace observations that can be made in a peacetime disaster is that when an emergency function is unfulfilled, an existing organization or new group steps in to handle the problem. The same could be expected in a nuclear setting. Thus, for example, to the extent there is a widespread fallout problem and civilian personnel are insufficient and/or incapable of dealing with it, there will be both internal and external pressure on military groups to enter upon the scene. Fallout would also be naturally identified by most civilians as being a "military problem." In part, this would be because it is one of the extremely few aftermaths of a disaster agent that does not have a peacetime counterpart. (Strictly speaking, this is not totally correct for fallout from peacetime testing and accidents has occurred, but as a practical matter very few civilians have any experience whatsoever with such a threat.)

We now turn to a discussion of the tasks that military organizations might tend to undertake for civilian communities in a nuclear catastrophe. What problems are likely to be intensified under that kind of extreme stress situation will also be noted. In addition, we will examine the nature of the coordination possible between the military and the civilian spheres of authority in a wartime nuclear setting. In conclusion, a few suggestions regarding areas for prior planning to avoid potential difficulties and problems will be indicated.

#### Possible Military Assistance to Civilians in a Nuclear Catastrophe

In Chapter III of this report, it was pointed out that in natural disasters the military participates, in varying degrees, in at least nine kinds of emergency activities: (1) warning; (2) rescue; (3) caring for casualties; (4) protecting against continuing threat; (5) restoring of minimum community services; (6) caring for survivors; (7) maintaining community order; (8) maintaining community morale; and (9) information, control and coordination. To the extent that military organizations would participate in the activities of civilian communities in a nuclear catastrophe, the same tasks would probably be undertaken. There would be only one almost certain exception. This is warning, which in a developing or actual wartime situation is a prime responsibility of civil defense, at least so far as local communities are concerned. At the national level, the federal civil defense warning system is linked to the overall military warning system, but this has little direct relevance for a local base and surrounding civilian communities.

Assisting in pre-impact population movements to the degree that this is part of precautionary activities associated with warning seems also generally precluded for three major reasons. First, even in peacetime, military organizations normally participate on a relatively limited scale in such an undertaking. It is not a traditional emergency pattern of the military. Second, military directives and plans for wartime operations in support of civilian activities almost totally ignore the possibility. The basic Defense Department directive on military support of civil defense lists dozens of specific tasks

military units might undertake in assisting non-military groups, but no mention at all is made of help in the physical movement of civilian populations.<sup>3</sup> Finally, it is current national policy to have people take to shelters rather than to attempt to leave an area in the event of hostilities.

### Rescue

Rescue activities along with the control function are the two tasks that military organizations would most likely undertake with civilians in a nuclear setting. The reason for the probable involvement in rescue efforts is that this is a very necessary task that is not the major responsibility of any organization in American communities. Far more than other organizations, military groups have the personnel, the equipment and the formal organizational structures that lend themselves quite well to systematic search-and-rescue efforts. It is easier for the military to fill this gap in the emergency requirements of a community than it would be for any other organization or agency. Also, since this activity is one directly associated with the saving of life -- a fundamental value in American society -- there would be pressure from within the military and from civilian sources to act in support of this value in time of great emergency.

On the other hand, there are the potentials for some major difficulties between civilians and the military if the latter attempted to assist in the rescue of the former after a nuclear attack. If the military is going to hold to its primary mission, it may not be able to use as much personnel and as many resources for rescue purposes as civilians might consider necessary for what they would consider an extremely important emergency task. Given the large number of lives that could be at stake, some civilians might on this point question the priority of the military mission. Then, too, military officers might have a better understanding than civilians of attempting rescue in the context of radiation and fallout dangers, and thus the necessity of proceeding cautiously. The lack of experience of both parties in working together in such a kind of very unusual and dangerous context would further add to the possibility of stress and strain in civilian-military relations.

### Caring for Casualties

There is little evidence from peacetime disasters to suggest that military hospitals might become subject to widespread demand for civilian use in a nuclear catastrophe. In general, such resources are seldom visualized by local community officials as something they could call upon in a major emergency. Civilians almost totally ignore, even in major natural disasters, the hospital facilities of nearby military bases and the huge complexes of the Veterans Administration. The reason seems to be that the military is simply not thought of in medical or health terms. To suppose that this perception would be drastically altered in a wartime setting is to assume changes in continuity of human and social behavior that seldom occur. Even the providing of medical supplies -- typically the major military medical assistance rendered in peacetime disasters -- is more often done at the initiation of the military organization than as the result of requests by civilian authorities.

It could be supposed that the probable changes in quantity and quality of victims in a nuclear catastrophe as compared with natural disasters might make a major difference in the seeking of medical care. This of course is possible. However, it is to be suspected that any such change would occur primarily as the result of the initiative of the military. A far more likely imposition of demand for medical care of civilians by the military is likely to stem from the military organization taking over the general care of survivors of a nuclear attack. If the feeding, sheltering and clothing of victims is assumed, it almost follows that medical care would also have to be provided. This general possibility is further examined in a later discussion.

#### Protecting Against Continuing Threat and Restoring Minimum Community Services

In natural disasters, the military typically plays a secondary and supportive role to civilian efforts directed against continuing threats and civilian attempts to restore utility services. There is little reason to suppose that this would materially change in the event of a nuclear catastrophe.

However, as already indicated, this must be qualified insofar as radiation or fallout dangers are concerned. As previously noted, civilians tend to have had little experience with such kinds of dangers. In addition, civilians undoubtedly see such threats to themselves as being associated with weapons, and the latter evoke the image of the armed forces. For these and other reasons alluded to earlier, it should be expected that civilian officials and communities would turn to military groups for advice and assistance in dealing with the fallout and radiation threat, particularly in the absence of any other viable group that might have competence regarding such kinds of dangers. The additional problem of the number of military personnel that would be required to handle all aspects of radiation and fallout dangers is noted below.

#### Caring for Survivors

In peacetime disasters, the American military often provides a "back-up" organization to assist in feeding, clothing and sheltering victims, refugees and evacuees. As was noted earlier, military organizations particularly seem to get involved in this kind of activity when the disaster is multi-faceted, i.e., when several disaster agents have appeared simultaneously or close together. A nuclear catastrophe would be such a setting. However, in peacetime disasters, much of the initiative in providing this particular kind of aid comes from the military organization; it is not typically undertaken as a result of demands from civilian authorities. In general, the same kind of a situation might be expected in a nuclear setting with the role of the military depending on how well other organizations in the community could deal with the problem of caring for survivors. If community agencies and groups cannot deal adequately with the problem, it could become a major task that the military organization might have to undertake with relation to civilians.

In many ways the crucial factor in this respect will be the ability of the traditional emergency welfare organizations in American society, particularly the Red Cross, the Salvation Army and different church groups, to function in a nuclear setting. Analyses of the possible functioning of some of these kinds of groups and agencies are discussed in other reports in this series. As a general statement, it can be said that there are probably some very definite limits on the extent to which such organizations could bear the total emergency relief demands likely to be generated in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. Some of the immediate burden at least, unless emergency plans are devised that will involve other organizations, would seem almost inevitably to fall upon the military.

#### Maintaining Community Order

As indicated earlier and contrary to deeply and widely believed myths, natural disasters are not characterized by great amounts of looting, any mob activity, or widespread crowd disorders. There are many reasons for this state of affairs, but at a fundamental level it is because human and social behavior does not quickly or radically change from everyday patterns, even under conditions of extreme stress. Isolated cases of deviation can be found, as they can also be noted in the most normal of times, but the overall behavioral pattern is clear. A similar absence of major anti-social or disruptive deviant behavior in the aftermath of a nuclear attack can be expected. (Such objective evidence as does exist for the emergency behavioral pattern in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is consistent with this statement.)

However, just as the military is called upon and is expected to assist in maintaining security after a peacetime emergency, similar requests may be anticipated in the wake of a nuclear catastrophe. Just as in peacetime, such requests will be very difficult to ignore. At the very least, a manifest albeit possibly nominal response will have to be made by the military to such civilian pleas (usually by the mayor or the police) for aid in maintaining security. As we note later, if nothing else such actions will contribute to the maintenance of community morale.

Control and supervision of traffic movements rather than maintenance of security would be a far more likely task for military forces after a nuclear catastrophe. It is true that for a variety of reasons far less convergence on the impact area can be expected in a wartime as compared with a peacetime emergency. If this is the case, there would be far less of a traffic problem. On the other hand, there are some special aspects of a nuclear bombing that might require more in the way of roadblocks, guards and similar control measures. Passage in and out of a radioactive zone will, for example, have to be restricted in different ways and might entail the use of great numbers of men.

The necessity for the military in such situations obviously depends on a variety of factors. In some possible wartime situations, civilian police forces with the help of auxiliaries might be able to handle the problem. On the other hand, in the aftermath of a very heavy and widespread nuclear attack

upon the country, most of the military personnel available might be occupied solely with the control task if they were so assigned. Clearly the magnitude of the task will affect civilian need for military assistance in this regard, but there would seem to be limits even to the capabilities of the armed forces in this respect.

### Maintaining Community Morale

An easily overlooked emergency task is that of the maintenance of community morale. This will be even more crucial in a nuclear catastrophe than it is in a natural disaster. In many ways, however, it is one of the most easily met demands, for it essentially involves, insofar as the military organization is concerned, "a show of uniform," an indication of the presence of the armed forces on the impact site in the civilian community. The visible carrying out of assigned tasks in connection with other emergency activities already discussed would help the military to contribute to the maintenance of community morale.

### Coordination of Military and Civilian Authority

In the absence of martial rule, authority in a nuclear catastrophe will be the same as in peacetime. That is, there will be two authority systems in the society -- with the military one formally subordinate to a civilian hierarchy of the President, Congress and other civil officials such as the Secretary of State. As we indicated earlier in Chapters III and IV, however, there are almost always problems of coordination between civil and military authorities even in natural disasters. Part of this, as also previously discussed, stems from the traditionally given American cultural value that civilian supremacy of the kind indicated over the military is to be manifest at all times; some of the difficulties result from the mutual lack of understanding by civilians of the military bureaucratic structure, and the latter's lack of appreciation of civilian procedures and manners of operations. Other factors were also examined earlier and will not be discussed again at this point.

It seems rather obvious that the problems of coordination between military and civilian authorities will be considerably aggravated in a nuclear catastrophe. Almost all the sources of irritation, misunderstanding and conflict present in a natural disaster will exist in even more magnified form in a wartime setting. As the case material shows in the previous chapter, some of these difficulties are avoided in other societal patterns of military-civilian relationships; they however involve a national social structure inconceivable in present-day or any foreseeable American society.

Only one aspect of military operations in natural disasters offers much hope for better coordination with civilian authorities in a nuclear catastrophe. There is a strong tendency for the military organization to seek to coordinate its activity with civilian groups by establishing liaison with the police (and less frequently with civil defense) who are seen as acting representatives of the local community. Official federal civil defense policy, and to some extent

actual operational policy at the local community level, makes civil defense in a nuclear catastrophe the coordinator of the civil government in its emergency responses. This being the case, if civil defense did its assigned job in the civilian sphere, the military organization could be quite effective in a nuclear catastrophe in relating to the local community by establishing major liaison with the civil defense organization. This, of course, presupposes a viable and locally accepted civil defense structure, a situation far from being the case in many present-day American communities.

Particularly crucial in affecting the response of the military will be its prior contact with other groups or organizations. In this respect, experiences during natural disasters could influence considerably what organizations the military might try to establish liaison with in a nuclear situation. Thus it might be said that the greater the experience military authorities have in working with civil defense officials in natural disasters, the more likely military commanders will turn to them at times of other community emergencies.

#### Some Planning Priorities

In the light of our examination of actual military-civilian relations in peacetime disasters, and our projection and extrapolation of these into a nuclear setting, certain priority matters for prior emergency planning suggest themselves.

1. The prime military mission of the armed forces as well as the need of the civilian community to be prepared to solve its own problems in a nuclear catastrophe must be continually made explicit.
2. The role of the National Guard in nuclear situations must be made far clearer than it is at present to community officials.
3. The military organization must prepare and expect to be called upon for assistance to civilians in rescue and security measures in the aftermath of a nuclear attack.
4. Civilians will expect the military to assist with unique and special problems such as nuclear fallout and radiation unless more clearly relevant and distinctive organizations for this emergency task are developed.
5. The possibility exists that the military in the event of a nuclear catastrophe might be expected to assume part of the responsibility in caring for survivors.
6. Coordination between civilian and military authorities in a nuclear catastrophe will be even more difficult than in natural disasters unless civil defense can better establish itself as the coordinator of the civil government in its emergency responses.



7. The probability of the military establishing liaison with civil defense as representative of civilian authority will be increased to the extent there has been experience in other community emergencies such as natural disasters.

In the event of a nuclear attack, the military forces of the United States will play the major role in the defense of the country. However, the military organization of necessity will also have to participate to a degree in the civilian response to such a catastrophe. This report, on the basis of studies of peacetime disasters, has suggested the probable lines of a wartime response and the possible and probable military-civilian difficulties which may arise.

FOOTNOTES: Chapter VI

1. This is quoted from paragraph 220.4 from Department of Defense Directive 3025.10, March 29, 1965.
2. Ibid.
3. U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Pamphlet 27-11 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 2-3.