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Vienna, November 23, 1934.

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Personal
C. Phillips

Dear Mr. Phillips:

I last wrote you on November 16, just as Chancellor Schuschnigg was leaving for Rome, and as he has just come back I have not yet had an opportunity to see him or the Foreign Minister, so can give you no first-hand information with regard to the results of their conversations. I expect to see the Chancellor this evening, but it will be too late to get anything in this pouch.

My impression, however, is that he will have little to say, although I believe the conversations which took place were of primary importance. After the conversations between Dollfuss and Mussolini the inference was drawn, after a time, that Mussolini had specifically promised Dollfuss that in case of German aggression against Austria Italy would take definite action, but this did not appear from the official communiqués and neither Mussolini or Dollfuss said anything about it until some time afterwards, but the Italian action on July 25 in mobilizing on the Austrian frontier was sufficient indication that the promise of active aid had actually been given Dollfuss.

I am sure that the Embassy at Rome has already telegraphed you the official communiqué issued at the close of the conversations, so I will not touch on the published statements. The press comment here we have covered in a despatch, No. 219, of November 22, 1934, which goes forward by this pouch. The published comment and the official communiqué are sufficient, I think, to confirm that Mussolini stands by his original commitments and that he stands as solidly behind Austria today as he did when he issued, on his own initiative, the orders for mobilization on July 25. This is important for it would seem to show that the efforts which Germany has made through Goemboes have been without effect.

In well informed circles here the impression is that Schuschnigg comes back from Rome with as definite assurances of Italian support against German aggression as those which Dollfuss previously had from Mussolini. It is too early to say whether this is so, and it will be almost impossible to

The Honorable
William Phillips,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

get any official confirmation, but I may tell you for what it is worth that it is my impression that this is the major result of the Chancellor's Rome visit. I had indications before he left that the principal subject of conversation would be the action to be taken in case of German aggression. Austria is, I believe, at present in a position to take care of any internal National Socialist uprising, and I think the Government feels very strongly that it is able to do so. In the first place, the National Socialist Party organization within Austria is thoroughly disrupted and disheartened, and the Army and the private forces at the disposal of the Government are, I believe, amply sufficient to take care of internal uprisings and are loyal to the Government. This undoubtedly Schuschnigg was able to say to Mussolini from the Austrian side, but he would have to make it clear, which he probably did, that the forces at the disposal of the Government were not sufficient to combat successfully any organized attack on Austria from the outside. This situation Mussolini is thoroughly familiar with through the reports he has from Italian official representatives here and from other sources at his disposal.

What the Chancellor wished to know from Mussolini undoubtedly was how far he could count on the same measure of Italian support. On his previous unofficial visit to Mussolini at Florence this question had been gone into and he undoubtedly had assurances, but not of the definite character which Dollfuss had had, for it was understood at Florence that a later official visit was to be made by Schuschnigg when these matters would be gone into more thoroughly.

Well informed quarters here are of the opinion that Mussolini had a great deal more difficulty in arriving at a decision than before. July 25 and the two days immediately following, they believe, were not particularly happy ones for him, for he had given the order to mobilize and definitely committed Italy and brought the country really to the brink of war. The actual realization that Italy might have to fight a war with all its consequences and implications when his people really did not want one, it is believed, gave Mussolini a good deal to think about and this has been one of the reasons he was willing to listen to Goemboes as intermediary for Germany. I doubt whether it is possible for any of us yet to learn exactly what propositions Germany was making to Italy with regard to Austria, but that she did make certain propositions through Goemboes seems fairly clear. Probably the best guess is that for a more friendly attitude on the

part of Italy towards the Third Reich and for moral support on the Saar and disarmament questions Germany was prepared to say to Italy that she would keep her hands off Austria for a time. The idea probably appealed to Mussolini, for he would undoubtedly be glad to find a solution which would keep him from being placed in the same position he was on July 25, that is, from giving a mobilization order which would actually lead to armed intervention and probably to war on more than one front. However much the idea may have appealed, I understand that Mussolini's fundamental condition was that Germany should make a written, formal, and unequivocal declaration publicly to keep hands off Austria definitely. In order to do that Germany would be committed in such a way that any aggression against Austria would place her before the world as breaking a solemn public promise and thus bring consequences upon her from other quarters as well as from Italy. As to Hungary, even such Germanophiles as Goemboes and Kanya realize that Germany has in no sense given up her aspirations with respect to Austria; that there were small hopes that such a declaration would be forthcoming, and as it was not, the mediatory action of Goemboes was without effect.

This failure on the part of Germany to commit herself on the Austrian question in a way satisfactory to Mussolini, when she had had ample time to do so and when the Hungarian intervention had undoubtedly been undertaken on German initiative, undoubtedly influenced the Rome conversations and while it is too early, as I have already indicated, to have definite information whether Mussolini actually gave Schuschnigg categorical assurances of Italian military aid, it is clear that Mussolini was under no illusions with respect to German aims. I think this impression, too, is justified by the fact that immediately before the conversations the Italian press emphasized that the entire attitude of Germany has to be interpreted in the light of the Saar question. They emphasized that the whole situation could be cleared up if Germany would give a definite declaration on Austrian independence and integrity which so far she had been careful not to do.

I can therefore not assert from first-hand knowledge that Schuschnigg has come back with this formal and definite assurance of Italian aid in case of German aggression against Austria, but I believe that the future developments will show that he has received this assurance. On the other hand I think it is also a safe inference that Mussolini has not given any such

assurance with much lightness of heart for he realizes more definitely all of the implications and consequences of the action which he may have to take on this promise. It is worth remarking in this connection, however, that if he did give the assurances, he had in mind not only Italy and Austria, but also Hungary. For Hungary, although she fears Germany, does not want Germany on her frontier.

The cultural relations between Italy and Austria were also undoubtedly discussed at the Rome meeting, but I doubt whether too much in the way of serious action may be expected from them. The idea is that a sort of cultural institution is to be set up by Italy in Vienna and similarly by Austria in Rome. The project does not create much enthusiasm in Austria. One might say almost the contrary. People here do feel kindly towards Italy for they realize what Italy has saved them from, but it cannot be forgotten here that Italy is, after all, the hereditary enemy of Austria and that the present role she is playing is a new one. Then, too, Austria is a country of German culture and not Latin, and in spite of what has happened in Germany, and in spite of the sentiment against Anschluss, the Austrian people feel themselves a German people and now the leader of German culture. As a really cultured people, they believe in sympathetic cultural relations with other countries, but they do not look kindly on any dilution of Austrian culture with Italian. One hears it freely expressed here that such an Italian cultural center in Vienna would become a mere propaganda center for Italian political influence and this is resented. I believe therefore that while there will be a good deal of talk about strengthening of cultural ties and some action along this line, it will find very little expression in concrete form. The Chancellor in his reply to Mussolini at the dinner which the latter gave for him, found it advisable to say that "without ever once even attempting to exercise any influence whatever upon the internal affairs of Austria, Italy had given the world, in an exemplary manner, the proof of her wish to serve with all the weight of her position as a great power, and with the incalculable value of her classical tradition, the cause of European peace".

More significant in the conversations, as shown by the official communiqué, is the emphasis placed on Austria's resuming at the earliest date, "her true historic function as holding the equilibrium between the forces that converge in the basin of the Danube." A great deal can be read into this statement, but perhaps its full significance lies in the desire of Italy to emphasize the position of Austria as an independent state retaining its integrity in every way.

The practical working out of the Rome Protocols was undoubtedly discussed and here Austria made it clear that she does not desire her position to be strengthened at the expense of Hungary, but wishes to work in full harmony with her. One of the interesting developments of the last months has been the increasing friendliness between Vienna and Budapest, and I see nothing for the present which would disturb future developments in this connection. The tendency is in every way to emphasize the community of interests between the two countries and the similarity of their problems.

While I would not wish to be so rash as to draw too far reaching conclusions from these conversations, when so little is yet available in the way of first-hand information, I believe that it is safe to assume and that we will find that the conversations mark a further defeat in the foreign policy of Germany. Germany has made another attempt, and a really vigorous one, before these conversations took place to break through the ring that isolates her, through the intermediary of Hungary. It seems that once more she has failed and merely strengthened Italy in the position she had previously taken and in Hungary there will be distinct disillusionment and disappointment, for there the hope was nourished that Germany might come across with some satisfactory assurances and guarantees with respect to Austria which would make it possible for both Austria and Hungary to have more direct and friendly relations with Germany.

The whole question, of course, hinged on the real German intentions. As I indicated in my last letter, those who know the mind of Hitler realize that it is unalterable on the question of Austria. The conversation which I had with Papen and which is covered in the enclosure to my letter of November 16, clearly shows that Papen is working for Anschluss in spite of all of his declarations and protestations. Germany is not prepared to give up her aspirations respecting Austria and this must have been the decisive factor during the Rome conversations.

I think it may be interesting in this connection to tell you about some information which reached me from a reliable source here. In my letters and despatches I have mentioned a Herr Huebner, who is one of the so-called nationally minded Austrians who has been talking with the Chancellor with the idea of getting back of the Government. Huebner is a brother-in-law of Goering and has maintained close contact with

him. According to my informant Huebner has just come back from Germany a few days ago and told his Nazi associates here that he was much disappointed and depressed. He said he had just been in Germany and that the prospects for German aid to the Austrian Nazis were poor because Germany, even after the Saar question is settled, and no matter how it is settled, does not want war now. He says that Germany is not ready for war and will not be for some time, and that therefore she cannot afford to help the Austrian Nazis in any adventure in the near future under any circumstances. This statement of his is particularly interesting as he undoubtedly got this from his brother-in-law, General Goering, and I have reliable information from other sources that this is the attitude of Goering.

I have had the opportunity of seeing one of my German friends within the last few days who is one of the best informed men in Germany because of his wide contacts in all circles. He confirmed the tremendous progress in rearmament and the almost feverish activity there is on this program. He says, however, it is a mistake to assume that the Reichswehr is playing any active part in the German Government today. He says that it is maintaining its traditional attitude, just as under the Socialist regime in Germany the Army prided itself on its aloofness from participation in the Government. He confirmed what I have already indicated in some of my letters, that if the Reichswehr were ~~taking~~ ^{an} active part in the Government a great many figures in Germany would already have disappeared from the scene. He says on the other hand that the Reichswehr is entirely in sympathy with the rearmament program and welcomes, stimulates, and directs this program. He says, however, that the Reichswehr has no illusions whatever with respect to its preparedness for a war. It places no confidence whatever in the Polish agreement on which Nazi circles count, and has no illusions whatever with respect to aid from Hungary and Yugoslavia. He says that the Reichswehr is of the opinion that war now by Germany would mean war against Europe and therefore merely another humiliation. He pointed out that what the Reichswehr wants is to wipe out the humiliation of the last war and not to repeat it, and that it does not want war until Germany is ready. He says that the Reichswehr is using what influence it has to restrain the Nazi leaders from further irritation abroad in order not to precipitate trouble while the rearmament program is being carried through and particularly in the manufacture of certain types of guns of which Germany still has practically none. He says that the Nazi leaders are so confident that the position of the Reichswehr in this respect is difficult.

As General Goering maintains the closest and friendliest contact with the Reichswehr, and by well informed persons is believed to be one who can be counted on to cooperate with the Reichswehr in any crisis, it is interesting that Huebner should make these statements recited in a previous paragraph to his Nazi friends here, reflecting, as they undoubtedly do, what his brother-in-law Goering told him.

That the Nazi leaders feel themselves prepared for war and that the Army feels the direct opposite is one of the stabilizing influences for the present, but the reports which the French have recently made public in connection with the estimates and which are based on good information, are not reassuring and one can understand why at least a good part of the Nazi leaders not so familiar with the technical phases of warfare should feel so confident with the men and means already at their command.

The failure of the mediatory role which Goemboes played between Germany and Italy on German suggestion, is bound to cause, as I have already mentioned, considerable disillusionment in Hungary. Goemboes is really fundamentally pro-German and one must not forget that already in 1920 he was closely associated with Hitler. Goemboes, too, is the man who gave the murderer of Walter Rathenau asylum in his villa in Hungary. He has learned a lot since then and is a good deal more objective and reasonable than he was then, but his ancestors came from Germany and his background is German. Kanya's attitude you know so well that I need not touch on it, but he is getting very much out of the picture in Hungary. Eckhardt can undoubtedly be Foreign Minister whenever he so chooses, and may find it necessary to take this post before very long, but he, too, feels more friendly towards Germany than to any other country. Eckhardt, however, is well informed with regard to the situation in Germany and has no illusions about the permanence of the Nazi regime. All these men cling to the idea that there is more of the old Germany in the present day Germany than there really is, and it is really to the old Germany that they are attached. The German Minister in Budapest, von Mackensen, plays really quite an important role in this connection. He is the son of the Field Marshall and is married to von Neurath's daughter. Goemboes and the Regent are both very fond of him and seek him out as a bridge partner and as a dinner guest. He is personally a very pleasant and representative individual and a good deal of his popularity is due to his background and personality. The Hungarians like to think that he is the kind of German they

they can put their confidence in, forgetting that he is no longer representative of any of the influences in power in Germany. Nor have the Hungarians fully realized the utter isolation of the German Foreign Office and its lack of influence on National Socialist policy. The Hungarians who know the attitude of Hitler with respect to Austria have hoped that those in his entourage might influence him and this hope has been nourished through the personality and work of von Mackensen. Now that Germany has refused to come out with any unequivocal declaration regarding Austria, when she had the opportunity to do it at an important moment, it will not only cause disillusionment in Hungary, but will, I believe, considerably influence her attitude, not yet definitely, but it has introduced new unfavorable factors which will work against Germany.

The major general situation in Europe from the reports which you get from all sources will, I believe, at this writing seem to you more promising. There are, however, so many changing factors that one cannot be sure at any time of tomorrow and it is still a little too early to be too optimistic. Just at the moment when England is prepared to cooperate more completely with France the internal situation in France becomes more difficult and just at the moment when Italy is more reasonably inclined with respect to Yugoslavia and prospects open for closer understanding between Italy and France, Yugoslavia is insistent on action being taken by the League with regard to the murder of Alexander. Hungary, too, is not failing to make it clear to Italy that she is as insistent as ever on her revisionist claims. Yugoslavia, where trouble might be expected, remains quiet, but the French Government in the meantime has unexpected difficulties.

One of the most unfavorable factors is the really unpleasant situation in France. The old financial scandals are not cleared up and new ones are being constantly uncovered. Domergue in a statement which he recently made from his retirement has in clear and drastic terms expressed his disillusionment with practically all those figuring in the Government and he knows of what he is talking and expresses pretty well the sentiment of most Frenchmen, and although these financial scandals and parliamentary troubles have been pushed into the background again in view of the external situation, they are bound to break through in time. The French people are almost as disgusted with their leaders as it is increasingly evident that the German people are becoming with National Socialism. This creates a very poor background for the major problems which have to be met.

Hitler seized the opportunity to talk with the leader of the French Veterans and to tell them of his peace-loving sentiments and his desire to talk directly with France and reach an understanding. As the French people do not want war, and particularly these veterans, it is quite clear that Goy was quite impressed with what Hitler told him and does not realize the real situation. While the French Government is doing what it can to counteract the effects of the Hitler declarations which it believes, and I think is correct in believing, mean nothing, Hitler's action has undoubtedly increased the difficulties of the French Government. This difficulty at the top in France is by no means minimized through what I understand is Laval's dislike of Francois Poincet. It is true that Francois Poincet by his family connections is closely allied with the Comite des Forges, but on the other hand I had sufficient contact with Francois Poincet in Berlin to realize that his estimate of the German situation then was in accord with that of less prejudiced observers. As Laval has always been inclined towards direct understanding with Germany, Hitler knew what he was doing when he made this new appeal to the French Veterans at this time. The disillusionment in France is so great that, as one well informed person put it to me, "the French people are almost as much inclined to believe Hitler as their own rotten politicians". The fact, however, that this interview between Hitler and Goy has not been permitted publicity in Germany is undoubtedly helping the position of the Government in France.

At the same time that the French Government is faced by this internal situation, the insistence of Yugoslavia in bringing the murder of Alexander before the League has embarrassed her and I am informed that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Jestic, in a conversation with the French made it clear that France must realize from what happened in the case of Poland that a similar situation might result in French desertion of Yugoslavia. France was in the position of having to appease Yugoslavia and find a formula in this matter of the investigation of Alexander's murder and at the same time not interfering with the conversations which must be held with Italy and this at a time when Hungary has been impressing on Italy that she does not want to be deserted on her revisionist policy.

Now that England has so plainly made her decision, the favorable effects of this are already seen. England may waver and it may take her a long time to make up her mind, but when she

has coordinated her policy and reached a decision, the results begin to be seen. A direct result of this definite orientation of British policy is seen in the statement which King George gave out to the effect that the murders of Dollfuss and Alexander indicated the necessity for general agreement on the right of asylum, particularly for so-called political refugees, and that this was a matter which the League should immediately take up. This was undoubtedly an inspired statement made by the King to help France out of this difficult situation. Jestic, in order to strengthen his own position, felt that he must be insistent, and was much more insistent than the circumstances made necessary, but he was in a position to make a lot of trouble and that is why the problems in these little countries become so important when the ambitions and political aims of a single individual may become so impossible. According to the last news the French and Italian pressure, supported by practically all European opinion, has made this British initiative bear fruit and the question of the Marseille murders will not come before the League until January. By that time enough water will have passed under the bridge so that the investigation may take an entirely different form than that it would have taken now and it may be diverted into the more harmless channel of the consideration of a general agreement on the right of asylum.

It would have been extremely unfortunate therefore to have this investigation by the League now. If undertaken it would have been a further blow to the League if it were not done in a thoroughgoing way, and political murders over here are not something that can be gone into thoroughly. Yugoslavia was willing to make Hungary the goat, and there is no question but that Hungary tolerated at least one group of Croatian agitators. On the other hand there was one here in Austria whose friendly contact with certain individuals in the Government would perhaps seem more sinister than they really are if brought to the light of day. That Italy tolerated three camps where these Croatians foregathered is just as well established as it is in Hungary, and there are those who say that there was much more definite evidences of direct Italian support in the way of money. France and Belgium would be brought into it, and Yugoslavia could hardly hope to have her own part in such political murders covered up. It is really a case of the pot calling the kettle black, and it will be much better to draw a veil over the whole affair and try to get some agreement on the right of asylum. If it is correct, as it seems from the information available to me, that this further danger point has been passed, it is another

of the encouraging signs which we have seen recently. And it does show that Geneva has a real value for Europe.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the increased cooperation between England and France will strengthen the hand of France when it comes to talking with Mussolini with respect to the revisionist claims of Hungary. The Hungarian revisionist claims have received fairly wide support among the members of the House of Commons and it is some of these supporters of Hungarian revisionist claims who are asking the most embarrassing questions in the British Parliament now with respect to its Continental policy. The British Government, however, seems to have made up its mind and this will help both France and Italy in dealing with this particular aspect of the problem. Hungary realizes this and the natural tendency would be to turn her more to Germany, but her recent disillusion with regard to Germany, which I have mentioned in this letter, will be a factor in this connection. It means that Hungary remains on the fence, but she will keep her eyes turned both ways and we know that she is under no illusions with regard to developments in Germany.

Jugoslavia has been very anxious to get her skirts as clean as possible in connection with the question of political refugees and has been urging on the Germans to take away the Nazi refugees at Warasdin. The papers say that some 1900 refugees are to be taken by sea on German ships to Bremen and from there to Bavaria. According to a Vienna newspaper of November 22, Hitler is said to have stated that "every refugee at Warasdin shall be enabled to celebrate Christmas in Germany". While I have no official confirmation that these refugees will be repatriated in German ships, I am told in well informed circles here that this action has been arranged for by Berlin.

It seems rather extraordinary action when one considers that most of them are Austrians. If Germany actually does take these refugees from Jugoslavia, it is a fairly clear indication of her responsibility for July 25.

That the situation in Germany seems to be growing steadily worse is indicated by all the information which we get here. There is living in Austria a female member of the Thyssen family whose opinion in financial and business matters is highly considered by those running the family interests in Germany and she is therefore frequently consulted by them. A member of the staff of the Legation has friendly touch with her and her husband.

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Day before yesterday he had a conversation with the principal representative in Austria of the Thyssen family interests, and I am appending hereto a copy of the memorandum covering this conversation. I think you will be interested in this for it confirms for the most part what I have said in recent letters and is in accord with the information which we get from other sources. When one considers that it is Herr Thyssen who subsidized Hitler and did so much to bring him into power and who in the months preceeding his taking over the Government introduced Hitler to audiences of industrialists in the Ruhr as "the Savior of Germany", it is interesting to get the reaction of the family as shown in this memorandum.

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I also saw one of my old friends from Berlin here the other day who is perhaps one of the best informed Germans there is because of his wide contacts in all circles. I am sending you herewith a copy of a rather gossipy memorandum which you may be interested in reading. What is more important than anything which appears in this memorandum is the statement which he made that the raw material situation would not necessarily lead to a crisis before next fall. He said that so far as fats were concerned, it would be felt definitely before that and that this was serious. The fat content in soap had already been reduced by 40%. The program of replace materials could not work out because these materials were difficult to produce in adequate quantities and much too expensive. The raw material stocks in Germany, paid for or not paid for, would be used and would last pretty well into the spring, together with what they would be able to import in the meantime. The summer months would make the situation easier again and in his opinion, unless the whole ring encircling Germany broke down, the raw material situation of itself will precipitate a crisis then. He thinks, however, that other factors which may even become more important, may bring about the crisis before then.

In view of the indications which the Austrian newspapers have had to go lightly on Germany, it is interesting that the VIENNA TAGBLATT of November 23 carried half a column article in a prominent position stating that an electric atmosphere is again noticeable in Germany, that there is a decided falling off of enthusiasm, that the Hitler salute is seen much less, and that there is open criticism of the regime. The article points out that in shops and factories the workers, faced by rising prices, are becoming daily more discontented and that in some establishments the workers pride themselves that there is not a single National Socialist among them. According to the article the prestige of Goebbels, Darre, Ley, and Himmler is decreasing and that Hitler is basing all his hopes on a

favorable outcome of the Saar question and that there will be no change of policy before January.

In another article in the TAGBLATT of the same day, it is reported that serious difficulties are developing between Schacht and Schmitt, who is coming back into the picture. Schacht remains firm against devaluation, while Schmitt is to be brought back as Minister of Commerce to bring about a partial devaluation of the mark in order to relieve the internal situation and to aid exports. The article pointed out that the industrial interests are in favor of partial devaluation.

It is interesting that in various Austrian newspapers there has been repeatedly mentioned that Schmitt is to go to Washington as Ambassador and that Luther will be definitely retired. I think it is much more likely that this is under consideration than his going back to the Ministry of Commerce. Schmitt cannot go back to the Ministry of Commerce under this regime unless it completely changes its policy, and I do not believe yet that such a change is possible. Schmitt has had enough experience in the job, as I know from direct and fairly intimate contact with him, to realize that he could do no more in it now than before unless Nazi policy is completely changed. He might, however, be willing to go to Washington. He does not speak English well, but he understands a good bit and would learn to speak it rapidly. I have mentioned him so frequently in my letters that you know I hold him in high regard. He would make a splendid Minister of Commerce if there is a new Government in Germany, but I do not think he would be able to do more in Washington under this regime than Luther. Perhaps I should not put it in that way, and say that eventually he would not be able to accomplish more, for we would realize that Nazi policy remains the same and that no more faith could be put into German performances than before, but personally Schmitt would be able to make much more progress than Luther. He is tall, well-built, and makes a very good appearance, and has a pleasant manner. In personality and approach he would, from the German point of view, make just as desirable a representative as Luther is the other way. Besides that Schmitt is a man who carries conviction and in spite of my high opinion of him and of his sane views, I have learned to realize how pliable an instrument the best German can be. Luther fundamentally holds the same views as Schmitt, but we have seen what a defender of even the most radical Nazi doctrines he has been willing to be in spite of these inner convictions.

I am sure there has been brought to your attention the strict order in Germany against Party and other gatherings

without the specific approval of the Minister of Propaganda. This is more significant than it would appear on the surface. Heretofore these meetings have been encouraged as the principal means of keeping alive the enthusiasm and the illusionment of the people. Now the facts are breaking through and disillusionment is growing and will continue to grow, and public meetings must be forbidden or controlled in order that this disillusionment will not find such outward expression in mass form. All these things are signposts towards a developing situation which is beginning to become more aggravated and towards which it was obvious from the outset that it would turn eventually.

Internally the situation in Austria remains quiet and I see no reason to expect untoward developments here for the next five weeks. In the meantime the general situation seems to be shaping itself fairly satisfactorily with the decision of England to play a major role in practically every factor which has to be considered in this complicated continental problem. The position of Chancellor Schuschnigg will be strengthened as the result of the Rome trip.

I can appreciate what a heavy burden you all have been carrying in connection with the conversations in London on the Naval Treaty. I sat next to the wife of the Japanese Minister here last last evening for several hours. She and her husband have both lived in the United States for a number of years and feel very friendly, and she is an extraordinarily intelligent woman. I happened to be seated between her and the wife of the British Minister and somebody laughingly remarked about my position between them, but I could tell from her reaction that London weighed very heavily on her mind. She is an extremely intelligent woman and this Japanese sensitiveness is really something extraordinary. The most intelligent and broad-minded, and at the same time the most friendly, Japanese I have ever known is now the principal secretary to the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokio, and has been for some years, but I think he was the most sensitive man I ever knew and certainly more so than the most hypersensitive Latin I have known. Aside from what they are really after and what we know they have in mind, this striving for equality coming out of their inferiority complex thrusts itself forward at all times even among the best of them.

Believe me, with all good wishes,

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

1. Copy of memorandum re Thyssen
2. Copy of memorandum of Nov.21

George S. Messersmith.