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A BALANCE THEORY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL TEST*

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Introduction

Sociology today is experiencing a growth of interest and literature in the subarea of interorganizational relations. However, this development has been primarily theoretical and conceptual with a lesser emphasis being placed on the empirical testing of the propositions being developed. It is the purpose of this paper to broaden the empirical foundation in this area by operationalizing and testing Litwak and Meyer's balance theory of coordination between organizations and community primary groups. This test will be made utilizing data regarding Police-Community Relations units (N=187) and their relations with 20 community interest groups.

Current Status of Interorganizational Research

Currently there is a growing literature of research and conceptualization of the relation of organizational behavior and structure to various aspects of the environment. This change in focus of organizational analysis is the result of the realization by some sociologists (see, for example, Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965) that the closed system model is no longer entirely adequate for the study of complex organizations. These initial works and the subsequent writings of others, including Stinchcombe (1965), Reiss and Bordua (1964), Selznick (1957), Emery and Trist (1965), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Katz and Kahn (1966), and Terreberry (1968), indicate the utility of the open systems perspective in the study of complex organizations. Utilizing this open systems perspective, the environment surrounding the organization under study is no longer assumed to be constant, aspects of internal structure may be related to developments external to the immediate organizational boundaries, and organizations may produce a change in their environments. This developing concern for organizations and their environments falls under the current rubric of interorganizational relations.

Since the initial development of the open systems perspective, many different explanations or theories of interorganizational relations have been developed. Some works focus on specific characteristics of the environment such as the diffuseness of environmental pressure (Simpson and Gully, 1962), the causal texture of the environment (Emery and Trist, 1965), trends outside the organization (Clark, 1965), or variations in cultural norms and values (Crozier, 1964; Harbison et al., 1955; Richardson, 1956) and the effect these factors have on organizations. Others focus on specific characteristics of the organization affected by environmental pressure, such as leadership or policy (Selznick, 1966), organizational change (Terreberry, 1968), goal-setting processes (Thompson and McEwen, 1958), or managerial autonomy (Dill, 1962). A third approach distinguishes the task environment from the general environment using such concepts as organization set (Evan, 1966) and interorganizational field (Warren, 1967); and addresses interdependencies among organizations (Guetzkow, 1950; Litwak, 1961; Thompson, 1962; and Kunz, 1969) or the development of coordinating "super agencies" (Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962).

However, despite development in the subdiscipline of interorganizational relations, this has not been accompanied by a similarly high level of activity in the testing of these perspectives. The majority of the works utilize data for illustrative purposes and in the development of theories rather than for the testing of derived propositions. Turk (1970), one exception to this trend, uses an approach to interorganizational relations which focuses on community context and tests the association between the activity levels and complexity of new interorganizational networks and prior degrees of social integration with the community. In a second study, Turk (1973) tests the influence of the scale and the diversity of municipal government and of community-wide associations on the formation of hospital councils. Aiken and Hage (1968), a second exception, focus on intraorganizational structure and test the relationship between intraorganizational structure and the formation of joint programs.

Having briefly surveyed some of the major works in the area of interorganizational relations, it should be apparent that there is a discrepancy in effort between theoretical development and theory testing. It will be the purpose of this paper to further the research effort of the area by operationalizing and testing Litwak and Meyer's balance theory of coordination of bureaucratic organizations and community primary groups. In addition to simply providing further testing of propositions, this test will be of particular theoretical interest, since the theory utilizes a perspective intermediate to those of Turk and Aiken and Hage. Litwak and Meyer focus on intraorganizational characteristics of both the focal bureaucratic organization and the primary groups which make up its environment.

A Balance Theory of Interorganizational Relations

The general focus of the balance theory is an explanation of how bureaucratic organizations and external primary groups coordinate their behavior to achieve optimum social control. This approach is based on the assumption that these two forms of organization, the bureaucracy and primary group, are complementary; each providing means necessary for achieving a given goal, thus necessitating close communication between the two forms. For example, bureaucratic organizations, while unable to deal with nonuniform or relatively unique events because of rules and standardized procedures, exhibit strength in both their ability to provide professional expertise and in dealing with large numbers of people. Primary groups, in contrast, exhibit opposite strengths and weaknesses. Assuming this complementary nature of these two forms of social organization, optimum goal achievement is likely to require the utilization of both the bureaucracy and the primary group.

However, Litwak and Meyer also assume an antithetical nature of these two forms, since when too isolated they are likely to interfere with each other; if too close they are likely to disrupt each other. Recognizing this, their balance theory states that optimum goal achievement "is most likely to occur when coordinating mechanisms develop between bureaucratic organizations and external primary groups that balance their relationship at a midpoint of social distance where they are not too intimate and not too isolated from

each other" (1966: 38). Social distance, in this instance, is a function of both the differences in values and goals between the focal organization and the primary group and the ability of the primary group to implement their values and goals.

Acknowledging the variability in social distance between these groups, the balance theory also provides a criterion for deciding which coordinating mechanisms will provide optimum goal achievement by utilizing

1. mechanisms that permit communication and reduction of social distance in the case of great social distance, and
2. mechanisms that increase social distance in cases where social distance is too intimate (1966: 38-39).

From a review of the literature, Litwak and Meyer developed eight reasonably distinct types of coordinating mechanisms by which a formal organization might seek to influence external primary groups to identify with values and norms of the organization.[1] Based on their analysis, "the balance theory of coordination suggests that where great social distance exists, mechanisms such as the detached expert, opinion leader, delegated function, and settlement house are more effective than mass media, common messenger, formal authority, and voluntary association approaches" (1966: 46). From these assumptions is derived the first hypothesis that

1. Optimum social control is most likely to occur when coordinating mechanisms develop between bureaucratic organizations and external primary groups that balance their relationships at a midpoint of social distance where they are not too intimate and not too isolated from each other.

The final determinant within the balance theory is the bureaucratic structure (administrative style) of the focal organization. Using a Weberian approach, Litwak and Meyer distinguish between four models of bureaucratic structure (rationalistic model, human relations model, professional model, and non-merit model) and discuss the different organizational dimensions of these models.[2] Each of the eight coordinating mechanisms is linked with a particular model on the basis of the particular structural attributes it demands in order to operate.[3] Based on these combinations of bureaucratic structure and coordinating mechanisms, the second hypothesis is

2. When administrative style and mechanisms of coordination are structurally consistent, each will operate most effectively in achieving the given goal.

Method

The relations between Police-Community Relations Units (PCR units) and 20 community interest groups are utilized to test the hypotheses of the balance theory. Although Litwak and Meyer are primarily interested in explaining

relations between bureaucratic organizations and primary groups, it is felt that the theory is also applicable to the relations that exist between PCR units and community interest groups as specific bureaucracies and primary groups. This assumption is supported by the fact that the maintenance of a high level of positive police-community relations is dependent on actions by community interest groups as well as by the police themselves. Similarly, while police departments typically maintain close positive associations with certain community interest groups, there are other community groups which cite factors such as consideration of police as symbols of white injustice, use of arrest powers for harassment purposes, higher arrest rates in the ghetto, and juvenile curfew enforcement used as a means to break up street corner gatherings (Gabor and Low, 1973) as a basis for their less than positive relations with the police. In addition, PCR units have the potential for exhibiting a variety of bureaucratic structure and depend on nonviolent, noncoercive, communicative strategies of influence similar to those called for in the theory.

There are some differences between the types of organizations considered here and those discussed by Litwak and Meyer. For example, although PCR units share many of the characteristics of bureaucratic organizations, they are also a sub-unit of the larger police organization and tend to be small except in the larger cities. These factors should not be overemphasized since PCR units are distinct from the police department with few officers ever utilizing their arrest powers and the staff of units may include as many as 50 officers and 50 civilian members. Community interest groups may also differ from primary groups in that they may tend to be more organized than primary groups. Overall, it is felt that these differences should not have a significant effect on the test of the balance theory.

Questionnaires were initially sent to 228 U.S. cities with populations greater than 75,000 which had their own police department. A follow-up questionnaire was sent to those police departments which had not responded to the first mailing. Usable questionnaires were received from 187 departments, or 82 percent of those being studied. The return rate should actually be indicated as being somewhat higher since there is some indication that many of those police departments not responding do not have PCR units. The overall cooperation of the PCR officers both in responding and in answering the entire questionnaire increased the confidence that the data is an accurate representation of all PCR units.

The questionnaire was developed utilizing Litwak and Meyer's discussion of conceptual and research problems associated with their theory, and on field studies of police departments previously conducted by The Disaster Research Center (Kreps, 1971; and for other work done at the Center see Quarantelli and Dynes, 1970 and Dynes and Quarantelli, 1973). For the purposes of this study, items were developed to measure bureaucratic structure, mechanisms of coordination, social distance, goal achievement, and a measure of consistency between mechanisms of coordination and social distance as they relate to PCR units and their relations with 20 community interest groups. An expanded discussion of these measures is presented in the Appendix. Having only two overall measures of PCR unit goal achievement, it was also necessary

for some parts of the analysis to utilize overall scores for both the types of coordinating mechanisms used and for the social distance of community interest groups. The ranges of the scores for both coordinating mechanisms and social distance were divided into three groups of approximately equal size, representing categories on the two scales rather than discrete homogeneous categories.

Findings

The data testing Litwak and Meyer's first hypothesis that

> Optimum goal achievement is most likely to occur when coordinating mechanisms develop between bureaucratic organizations and external primary groups that balance their relationship at a midpoint of social distance where they are not too intimate and not too isolated from each other

are presented in Tables 1 and 2, utilizing separate tables for success in meeting general PCR goals and success in meeting their own particular PCR unit goals. Looking at both tables it can be seen that the hypothesis is not supported. The lack of support is first evidenced by the insignificant F-ratios comparing the variance explained by the coordinating mechanism and social distance factors with the error variance for both types of goal achievement. Further examination of the marginal means shows that the greatest success in achieving PCR unit goals is found among units utilizing human relations coordinating mechanisms or dealing with supportive community group environments, although the differences between scores are small. Cell means further clarify this interpretation and indicate that units which utilize more human relations coordinating mechanisms are equally successful in dealing with community interest group environments throughout the range of social distance. However, as units tend toward the utilization of more rationalistic coordinating mechanisms they maintain or slightly increase the level of goal achievement in dealing with supportive community group environments, but show a definite decrease in goal achievement when dealing with more conflicting community group environments.

A more in-depth analysis was conducted comparing goal achievement for units utilizing coordinating mechanisms more or less consistent with the social distance of each specific community interest group rather than the composite scores utilized in Tables 1 and 2. The consistency score utilized for this analysis is the percentage of conflicting and supportive groups contacted by the unit utilizing consistent mechanisms. These data are presented in Tables 3 and 4 using both measures of goal achievement. As can be seen in the tables, units utilizing greater percentages of coordinating mechanisms consistent with the social distance of specific community interest groups contacted are less successful in achieving both types of goals. This is further support for the previous finding that the most successful units are characterized by the inconsistent combination of human relations coordinating mechanisms with supportive community interest group environments. Litwak and

Meyer's theory, therefore, explains the greater success of units utilizing more rationalistic coordinating mechanisms which deal with supportive groups, but fails to explain the equal levels of goal attainment of units utilizing more human relations mechanisms regardless of the social distance of the community groups contacted.

Turning to the second hypothesis that

> When administrative style and mechanisms of coordination are structurally consistent, each will operate most efficiently in achieving a given goal,

an initial test was conducted to determine if PCR units tend to use coordinating mechanisms which are consistent with their administrative style. The data in Table 5 show that there is no strong tendency towards consistency. In fact, the percent of coordinating mechanisms in the cells on the consistent diagonal is slightly smaller than the horizontal marginal would lead one to expect. However, Litwak and Meyer's second hypothesis refers to greater success of consistent combinations of administrative style and coordinating mechanisms rather than organizations tending toward internal consistency.

The data testing the levels of goal achievement for consistent organizations are presented in Tables 6 and 7 utilizing both measures of goal achievement. In both tables administrative style explains a significant amount of variance and the interaction factors, while not significant, are both consistently large. The coordinating mechanisms factors continue to be extremely small with the marginals showing only a very small difference in the goal achievement scores. The cell means again show no clear pattern, but higher goal achievement scores tend to be achieved by PCR units with a rationalistic administrative style, utilizing more human relations coordinating mechanisms, or a combination of both factors. The interaction of the two factors is evidenced by the extremely low goal achievement by units with human relations administrative style and utilizing rationalistic coordinating mechanisms and the extremely high goal achievement by units with rationalistic structure and utilizing human relations mechanisms. Therefore, while the success of units on the consistent diagonal does tend toward the "average," the highest scores are found among units with rationalistic structures and which utilize higher levels of human relations coordinating mechanisms. The second hypothesis of the balance theory is also not supported.

Discussion

Having shown no support for Litwak and Meyer's balance theory, one must consider what factors are responsible for the findings. It is always easiest, especially with an initial operationalization of a theory such as this, to explain the findings as a result of methodological problems. In this instance, most problems involved the measurement and the use of bureaucratic structure. Although PCR units were questioned regarding several aspects of the attributes of the models of bureaucratic structure, attempts to construct a scale of administrative style were made difficult by a lack of scalability

of these attributes. It was also found that few units represented Litwak and Meyer's human relations and rationalistic models since most utilized mixed structures. However, rather than attributing the problems associated with administrative style to poor operationalization, it will be suggested that they are due to the inadequacy of the Weberian bureaucratic approach utilized by the balance theory.

Looking first at Tables 6 and 7 it can be seen that the highest goal achievement scores are attained by units with the "inconsistent" combination of rationalistic structure and human relations coordinating mechanisms. Although this characterization is inconsistent with the balance theory, it can be shown to be typical of what one would expect for PCR units. In another paper (Blanshan and Smith, 1974) this apparently discrepant association of rationalistic structure with human relations coordinating mechanisms is explained in terms of PCR unit development. Initially, PCR units tended to develop as a closely aligned subunit of the police department responsible for police public relations activities. However, with changes within the community, such as those which took place during the racial disturbances in the mid-1960's, PCR units increasingly found themselves functioning as intermediaries between the police and the community. As a consequence of this change in function, most PCR units are now more informally organized and involve personal relations with other staff, general policies rather than detailed rules, colleague authority, and broad definition of goals. This type of structure allows the staff to handle various types of tasks with greater ease and flexibility, be it instructing a new class of police cadets or meeting with community groups over conflicts.

Despite these trends toward the decline in rationality of program activities, this was not the case with structure. Structurally, units are more rationally oriented since they are part of the larger, more rationalistic police department. Much has been written (see, for example, Simon, 1964) about the constraints placed upon subunits by the larger organization. In addition to the militaristic authority structure model of the police department, as activities expanded staff size also increased, budgets grew, full-time rather than part-time commanding officers were utilized, units spread to more than one location, and much of the rationalistic structure was maintained while activities became increasingly more human relations-oriented.

The result is an inconsistency in the bureaucratic model based along dimensions similar to the distinction made by Frederick (1952) between the organizational elements and the behavioral elements of bureaucracy. These findings support the questioning of the bureaucratic model since typical and successful PCR units are characterized by an "inconsistent" combination of rationalistic structure and human relations-oriented program. Their structure is rationalistic, as is that of their parent police department, but their mode of operation is defined by both the police and the public as human relations-oriented. A similar finding among police departments is also reported by Wenger (1973). It states that, although the authority structure of the police department is based on a military model, under normal operations the assumed hierarchical model of decision-making and action is more apparent than real with officers trained to act autonomously, independently, and without close supervision.

Although the preceeding discussion does not serve as a sufficient explanation of PCR unit structure and program, it should serve to emphasize the fact that there are some very basic influences at work simply in the development of PCR units similar to those discussed by Stinchcombe (1965) which affect the structure and program. Because of these strong influences, one would have to focus on a fairly sophisticated unit before one would expect to find the extensive differentiation expected by the balance theory.

Another factor related to the use of the bureaucratic model is whether bureaucracies of any type are capable of being so adaptive that they are able to estimate the social distance between themselves and their group environment and alter communication mechanisms with the group accordingly. It is in the very nature of bureaucracies, as Litwak and Meyer themselves point out in their characterization of bureaucratic organizations, to standardize responses and to be less adaptable and flexible to unique situations. Bureaucratization has also been seen as a means whereby outside pressures are neutralized or buffered from the standpoint of the governing regime (Bordua and Reiss, 1966) or the core technology (Thompson, 1967). There is also evidence (see, for example, Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Hage and Aiken, 1970) that the rate of program change is greatest in organizations high in complexity and low in centralization and formalization, rather than being found equally among all forms of complex organization.

To state that higher levels of goal achievement will be reached if there is a balance between the social distance of groups encountered and the types of coordinating mechanisms used and if the administrative style and coordinating mechanisms are consistent, is to present two static and testable hypotheses. However, to state that complex organizations will strive to achieve balance and consistency, involves dynamic and purposive aspects of organizations which should be born out empirically rather than being simply assumed as they are here. The findings do not support these assumptions.

The balance theory also considers goal setting as a static element rather than a necessary and recurring problem facing any organization (Thompson and McEwan, 1958). Goal setting, in most instances, involves not only the determination by the organization of what it should be doing, but also "what the society (or elements within it) want done or can be persuaded to support" (Thompson and McEwan, 1958: 23). This model, because of its static conceptualization of organization goals, neglects the possibility that organizations, particularly those faced with failure, may engage in a renegotiation of organizational goals and the institution of structural changes which are reflected in their organizational structure (see, for example, Sills, 1957). Internally, PCR unit goals are influenced both by the larger police department and the larger governmental framework under which they work. Externally, units are faced with a wide variety of pressures not equally derived from all community organizations. For example, units may at times find it more satisfactory to deal with the more supportive community groups, since the achievement of some goals is thus made easier despite the possibility of problems cited by Litwak and Meyer as related to dealing too closely with supportive groups. In other circumstances, the goals may be shifted to dealing with the organizations which make the greatest demands on the unit regardless of their social distance.

Units may also have multiple goals applicable to different aspects of their task environment.

In addition to the dynamic character of goals, one must also deal with the problem of few goals being stated in specific terms. Initially, most PCR unit goal structures are ambiguous and borrowed from other units rather than developed through experimentation to meet their unique needs. These vague generalities may, in the beginning, be functional since they are both meaningless and highly flexible. However, later reappraisal of goals is made difficult since their "product" is not tangible and difficult to measure objectively (Thompson and McEwan, 1958). The result is that while two organizations may evaluate their success in achieving organizational goals equally, one is never sure what this score represents due to the different negotiation processes each set of goals has gone through.

After having looked at the balance theory from the standpoint of the current piece of research, one can also gain some insight into the question of interorganizational relations and goal attainment from other alternative interpretations suggested by the current literature. Rather than focusing on the narrow range of factors such as administrative style, social distance, and coordinating mechanisms, the literature suggests that there may be other structural characteristics associated with interorganizational relations which may be operating. For example, it has been shown that organizations which are involved in programs which deal with their environment tend to have a higher predominance of segmentation into units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), professionalism, more active internal communications, slightly more decentralized decision-making structures, and little association with formalization (Aiken and Hage, 1968). These findings, along with those of this study, may indicate that there is a certain model of organization or structure of administrative style which is "best able" to participate in interorganizational relations. It may also be that these same organizations exhibit greater success (efficiency) in their dealing with their envirnoment. Although this is similar to the development of an ideal type bureaucracy by Weber, it should be emphasized that efficient interorganizational relations appear to require elements somewhat different from those elements suggested by Weber to be associated primarily with efficient internal operations.

Likewise, organizational structure is also seen as a function of environmental characteristics other than social distance. Simpson and Gulley (1962), focusing on the diffuseness of environmental pressure, found that voluntary associations with diffuse pressures were more likely to have decentralized structures, high internal communication, and high membership involvement. Those organizations having more restricted pressures from the environment had the opposite characteristics. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) report similar findings among organizations in dynamic industries, which tend to be organized with wider spans of supervisory control, less attention to formal procedures, and more decisions reached at the middle levels of authority. This is in contrast to organizations in stable industries which tend to be more mechanistic.

Summary and Conclusion

It was the purpose of this paper to test Litwak and Meyer's balance theory utilizing data regarding relations between PCR units and 20 community interest groups. Neither the hypothesis that organizational goals will be maximized when the coordinating mechanisms are balanced by the social distance of interest groups contacted nor the hypothesis that organizational goals will tend to be maximized when administrative style and coordinating mechanisms are consistent was supported. In contrast, the greatest success was achieved by "theoretically inconsistent" organizations with a rationalistic administrative style, utilizing human relations coordinating mechanisms, and dealing with supportive community interest groups. To explain the lack of support for the balance theory, it was first suggested that this may be due to problems associated with the initial attempt at operationalization. However, rather than focusing on methodological problems, alternative explanations were explored.

It was shown that in addition to the factors considered by Litwak and Meyer there are certain structural and historical factors which may help explain why PCR units link rationalistic structure and human relations coordinating mechanisms in a way inconsistent with the predictions of the balance theory. The assumptions of the bureaucratic model were also questioned, both in terms of the assumed internal consistency of structural and behavioral elements and the ability of bureaucracies to be responsive and adaptable to the factors proposed by Litwak and Meyer. It was also suggested that the findings may be due to the restricted and static focus of the balance theory, which tends to ignore such factors as goal renegotiation, differential evaluation of relations with various groups regardless of their social distance, the impact of basic structural requirements necessary to carry on interorganizational relations and the impact of environmental pressures in general. Finally, it was suggested that there may be a discrepancy between the structural elements associated with the efficiency of the internal operations of bureaucracies (i.e., Weber's ideal type bureaucracy) and those elements associated with successful interorganizational relations. The strict adherence to models of intraorganizational structure may blind us and inhibit development of theories of interorganizational relations.

Despite the questions and criticisms which have arisen from this study, the theory may be applicable to organizations other than PCR units in which the inconsistencies, such as those found within this study, do not exist. The questions and issues raised in this paper can only be answered through comparative research of different types of organizations with differing environments. It is hoped that this paper will serve as an initial effort.

Footnotes

1. The mechanisms include 1) the detached expert, 2) the opinion leader, 3) the settlement house, 4) the voluntary association, 5) the common messenger, 6) the mass media, 7) formal authority, and 8) delegated function. The utility

and limitations of these mechanisms for narrowing or increasing social distance is determined by approaching the mechanisms as communications from the bureaucratic organization to the primary group and evaluating them in terms of the communication principles of initiative, intensity, focused expertise, and maximum coverage.

2. The rationalistic model is characterized by impersonal social relations, detailed rules, strict hierarchy of authority, job specialization, narrow delimitation of occupational duties and privileges, and evaluation on the basis of merit. The human relations model exhibits horizontal patterns of authority, minimal specialization, mixtures of decisions on policy and on administration, little a priori limitation of duty and privileges to a given office, personal rather than impersonal relations, a minimum of general rules, and evaluation on the basis of merit. The professional model incorporates elements of both the rationalistic and human relations models. The non-merit model utilizes bases other than merit for evaluation of personnel and performance which are irrelevant to the achievement of organizational goals.

3. The following combinations of bureaucratic structure and coordinating mechanisms are structurally consistent: human relations structure with opinion leader, settlement house, detached expert, and delegated function mechanisms of coordination; rationalistic structure with common messenger, mass media, formal authority, and voluntary association mechanisms of coordination; professional structure with both human relations and rationalistic coordinating mechanisms; non-merit structure and any mechanism.

Appendix

The following is a detailed description of the measures of bureaucratic structure, mechanisms of coordination, social distance, goal achievement, and consistency.

Bureaucratic Structure (Administrative Style) To tap the bureaucratic structure of the PCR units, items were developed which measured the distinguishing attributes of the four models of bureaucratic structure as discussed by Litwak and Meyer. These attributes included the types of social relations, the standardization of rules and procedures, the hierarchy of authority, job specialization, and the delimitation of occupational duties and privileges. The items utilized for the bureaucratic structure score include 1) whether positions are under civil service, 2) number of locations, 3) type of authority structure, 4) number of ranks, 5) use of a policy manual, 6) use of training sessions, 7) use of staff meetings, and 8) type of goal definition.

Assuming an additive model a scale was constructed from these items by scoring them using the following process: rationalistic response = 3, professional response = 2, human relations response = 1. An item analysis was performed on the total scale utilizing Kuder Richardson's equation 3 for scale reliability. The Kuder Richardson test reliability for the total scale was 0.1424, which is well below the suggested minimum reliability of 0.3. In

order to increase the scale reliability, items with the lowest test reliability were removed and item analysis was performed on the remaining eight items. This second analysis yielded a scale reliability of 0.3136 with only two of the eight items having reliabilities greater than the .3 minimum level. Another attempt was made to improve the test reliability of the scale by again removing items with low reliability, but improvement was insignificant. Scores using this scale ranged from 1.3 to 2.3, indicating a definite skew toward the human relations end of the distribution.

Mechanisms of Coordination Based on both Litwak and Meyer's description of their eight coordinating mechanisms and knowledge of current PCR unit activities, eight activities frequently used by PCR units which closely parallelled Litwak and Meyer's mechanisms were developed. These mechanisms included:

1) giving speeches to the group,
2) being an informal leader for the group,
3) being a regular member of the group,
4) providing meeting space for the group,
5) participating in associations sponsored by the group,
6) contact with the group through a third party,
7) issuing special materials to the group, and
8) facing the group in a law enforcement capacity.

Units were asked to indicate whether these activities were utilized in their relations with a list of twenty community interest groups. The list of community interest groups included: "militant" blacks, traditional blacks, local labor unions, "left wing" student groups, local anti-poverty groups, inner-city neighborhood councils, local service clubs, inner-city youth recreation groups, drug abuse task groups, church-related volunteer groups, parent-teacher associations, NAACP, Junior Chamber of Commerce, Black Panthers or Black Nationalists, welfare rights organizations, the Salvation Army, the city community relations office, the American Medical Association, SDS groups, and the local American Legion or VFW. A composite score of those coordinating mechanisms used was developed by determining the percentage of coordinating mechanisms which were consistent with the human relations model. These scores ranged from 23% to 100% use of human relations coordinating mechanisms.

Social Distance Following the suggestions of Litwak and Meyer, social distance was measured using two five-point Likert items. The first item asked the unit to evaluate the conflict between the values and goals of the PCR unit and individual community interest groups. Conflicting values and goals were scored -2 and -1, mixed values and goals were scored zero, and supportive values and goals were scored +1 and +2. In the second item units were asked to evaluate the ability of the interest groups to implement their values and goals. The scale ranged from the lowest ability, which was scored 1, through the highest ability, which was scored 5. By multiplying these two scores together a composite score, ranging from -10 to +10, was obtained that reflected both the direction and intensity of the social distance. These scores were summed to obtain an overall estimate of the social distance between the PCR unit and its environment as a whole. These scores were very

positively skewed with a median of +3.2, indicating a low level of social distance between PCR units and their community interest group environment.

Goal Achievement This dimension was measured using two seven-point Likert items which asked PCR units to evaluate their success in achieving the goals of their own particular unit and their success in achieving general PCR goals as compared to other units. Most units positively evaluated their level of goal achievement.

Consistency Score A consistency score was developed by combining the information regarding the social distance and the types of coordinating mechanisms used for each specific community interest group rather than utilizing the overall measures discussed previously. Consistency was defined as utilizing a majority of rationalistic mechanisms with supportive groups or a majority of human relations mechanisms with conflicting interest groups. Groups with goals at the midpoint between supportive and conflicting were not considered. The consistency score is the percentage of conflicting and supportive community interest groups contacted by the unit utilizing consistent coordinating mechanisms. The range of consistency scores was divided into three approximately equal groups for the analysis. These groups were low = 0% to 10%, medium = 11% to 22%, and high = 23% to 100%.

TABLE 1

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IN MEETING OWN PARTICULAR GOALS FOR COMBINATIONS OF COORDINATING MECHANISMS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Coordinating Mechanisms	Social Distance Conflicting	Intermediate	Supportive	Total
Human Relations				
$\bar{X}$=	5.69	5.73	5.65	5.69
N=	16	15	17	48
Intermediate				
$\bar{X}$=	5.50	5.61	5.60	5.57
N=	18	23	15	56
Rationalistic				
$\bar{X}$=	5.25	5.13	5.92	5.50
N=	18	8	12	28
Total				
$\bar{X}$=	5.52	5.57	5.70	5.60
N=	42	46	44	132

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F-RATIO	PROBABILITY
Coordinating Mechanism	0.7394	2	0.3697	0.2894	$p > .05$
Social Distance	0.8253	2	0.4127	0.3230	$p > .05$
Interaction	3.0770	4	0.7693	0.6022	$p > .05$
Error	157.1250	123	1.2774		

TABLE 2

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IN MEETING GENERAL PCR GOALS FOR COMBINATIONS OF COORDINATING MECHANISMS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Coordinating Mechanisms	Social Distance Conflicting	Intermediate	Supportive	Total
Human Relations				
$\bar{X}$=	5.44	5.67	5.65	5.58
N=	16	15	17	48
Intermediate				
$\bar{X}$=	5.06	5.35	5.53	5.30
N=	18	23	15	56
Rationalistic				
$\bar{X}$=	5.25	5.13	5.67	5.39
N=	8	8	12	28
Total				
$\bar{X}$=	5.24	5.41	5.61	5.42
N=	42	46	44	132

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREE OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F-RATIO	PROBABILITY
Coordinating Mechanisms	1.9316	2	0.9658	0.6670	$p > .05$
Social Distance	2.9130	2	1.4565	1.0060	$p > .05$
Interaction	1.1810	4	0.2952	0.2039	$p > .05$
Error	178.0908	123	1.4479		

TABLE 3

GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IN MEETING OWN PARTICULAR GOALS BY PERCENTAGE OF CONFLICTING AND SUPPORTIVE GROUPS CONTACTED UTILIZING CONSISTENT MECHANISMS

	Consistency		
	Low (0%-10%)	Medium (11%-22%)	High (23%-100%)
Goal Achievement			
$\bar{X}$=	5.905	5.442	5.415
N=	42	43	41

TABLE 4

GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IN MEETING GENERAL PCR GOALS BY PERCENTAGE OF CONFLICTING AND SUPPORTIVE GROUPS CONTACTED UTILIZING CONSISTENT MECHANISMS

	Consistency		
	Low (0%-10%)	Medium (11%-22%)	High (23%-100%)
Goal Achievement			
$\bar{X}$=	5.714	5.326	5.293
N=	42	43	41

TABLE 5

TYPE OF COORDINATING MECHANISMS USED BY TYPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE

Administrative Style	Coordinating Mechanisms			
	Human Relations	Mixed	Rationalistic	Total
Human Relations				
N=	8	23	23	54
Percent=	15%	43%	43%	100%
Mixed				
N=	15	15	20	50
Percent=	30%	30%	40%	100%
Rationalistic				
N=	11	21	15	47
Percent=	23%	45%	32%	100%
Total				
N=	34	59	58	151
Percent=	23%	39%	38%	100%

TABLE 6

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IN MEETING OWN PARTICULAR GOALS FOR COMBINATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS

Coordinating Mechanisms	Administrative Style: Human Relations	Mixed	Rationalistic	Total
Human Relations				
$\bar{X}$=	5.45	5.35	6.20	5.61
N=	22	20	15	57
Intermediate				
$\bar{X}$=	5.26	5.73	5.81	5.58
N=	23	15	21	59
Rationalistic				
$\bar{X}$=	4.67	5.86	5.50	5.50
N=	6	14	10	30
Total				
$\bar{X}$=	5.27	5.61	5.87	5.58
N=	51	49	46	146

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO	PROBABILITY
Coordinating Mechanisms	0.7652	2	0.3826	0.3224	$p > .05$
Administrative Style	9.1753	2	4.5877	3.8663	$p < .05$
Interaction	7.6801	4	1.9200	1.6181	$p > .05$
Error	162.5625	137	1.1866		

TABLE 7

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IN MEETING GENERAL FCR GOALS FOR COMBINATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS

Coordinating Mechanisms	Administrative Style: Human Relations	Mixed	Rationalistic	Total
Human Relations				
$\bar{X}$=	5.32	5.15	6.27	5.51
N=	22	20	15	57
Intermediate				
$\bar{X}$=	5.13	5.33	5.57	5.34
N=	23	15	10	59
Rationalistic				
$\bar{X}$=	4.67	5.57	5.60	5.40
N=	6	14	10	30
Total				
$\bar{X}$=	5.16	5.33	5.80	5.42
N=	51	49	46	146

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO	PROBABILITY
Coordinating Mechanisms	1.4345	2	0.7173	0.5384	$p > .05$
Administrative Style	11.3408	2	5.6704	4.2565	$p < .05$
Interaction	6.8194	4	1.7048	1.2797	$p > .05$
Error	182.5078	137	1.3322		

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