The political policy of the United States is primarily determined, as is the policy of all nations, by geographical facts. The new world, comprising North, Central, and South America, is an island, much smaller than the island of the old world, comprised of Asia, Africa, and Europe, and above all it possesses, in comparison to it, an almost ridiculously small population. If the old world should one day come completely under the sway of the Three Power Pact, it would be an easy matter to dispose of America. One only has to remember the three bridge-heads connecting a German-dominated block composed of Europe, Africa, and the Near East with the Americas. All of these three bridge-heads are already today wholly or in part in the hands of States which are dependent in a large measure on Germany, such as France, Spain, or Norway, or which because of their military weakness could easily be occupied by Germany, such as Portugal, or which at least offer favorable fields for German propaganda, such as Ireland or Brazil.

The most reliable bridge for the two Anglo-Saxon countries is the one leading from Newfoundland over Greenland, the Faroe Islands, the Shetland Islands, to Ireland, England and Norway. In the event of a German victory over England, Germany would permanently occupy the British and Irish ports and also earlier or later it could be counted on to annex the northern islands which, according to the German geo-political standpoint, belong to Scandinavia.

The middle bridge leads from the Bermudas by way of the Azores to Lisbon. In the event of a German march through Spain, Bermuda and the Azores would be seriously endangered.

The third and shortest, and the most unfavorable bridge for the Anglo-Saxon Powers, is that one which leads from Brazil to the French, Spanish and Portuguese possessions and to Dakar.

The political policy of the United States is determined for it by its geographical situation; the experience of history confirms this.
The freedom of the relatively small and thinly populated American continent is only assured if the United States is able to ensure its safety in a balance between Asiatic and European blocks, the continent of Africa being included in the latter.

Equilibrium is a physical conception borrowed from mechanics. Its fulcrum is the political freedom of the various peoples. Wherever the people are free, they tend towards balances of power. Therefore, the effort of the United States, for reasons of its own political policy, to place itself in a balance of power, is of equal importance to the fight for freedom of the democratic peoples, European as well as Asiatic, especially the Chinese.

There exists not only a connection between such a balance of power and the independence of the United States, but also between said balance of power and the domestic as well as the personal and cultural freedom of the Americas.

Democratic forms of government have incomparable advantages, but they do not possess the great secrecy and advantages of attack in their foreign policy as in the case of the dictatorships. Democratic governments can only be assured of their continued existence, if the balance of the world is likewise republican. For this reason, the first democratic movement for freedom in the history of the world, that of the city-states of Greece, failed against the military monarchy of Macedonia and later against the military government of Rome. For the same reason the second wave of republicanism, which was evidenced by the city-states of the Middle Ages, was destroyed by the Princes, with the single exception of the Swiss Confederation.

Today the third world historical epoch of democracy, which has existed since the 18th century, is exposed to the danger of disappearing before the dictatorships, perhaps - as in the case of the two earlier epochs - for many centuries.

President Wilson was well aware why he placed the democratizing of the world among the first of his peace conditions, even in the vanquished States. He was deceived, however, in the vitality of the German democratic movement. Republics cannot be created where the people have been reared for generations under a monarchical and militaristic form of government such as prevailed in Germany; the people must be developed for democracy by generations of experience.

A victory of the signatories of the Three Power Pact, even if they renounced the immediate subjugation of the United States, would nevertheless force upon it for an indefinite period a rigid dictatorial form of government.
government accompanied by compulsory military duty with long periods of service and other encroachments on the part of the State to maintain its power. In this case, the Americans would be forced for reasons of self-protection to surrender the personal and cultural freedom guaranteed them by their Constitution.

The enormous contribution to history on the part of the two Anglo-Saxon peoples hitherto has been two otherwise irreconcilable antithesis, freedom and power. Today these two peoples are confronted by the choice, to give up either freedom or power, yes even more: they face the greatest danger of losing both.

The fate of the American continent has always been intimately connected with the neighboring world. That has been evident since its discovery. It is the reason why Spain, after the conquest of Granada, sought new fields for territorial expansion. But the entire colonization of the American continent — whether by the Spanish, French, or British — whether by Catholics or Protestants — was decided on the battlefields of Europe and on the seas.

The impetus and the possibility for the revolutionary movement in the American colonies came as a result of the Seven Years War, commonly known in the United States as the French and Indian war, when England sought to compel the colonies to bear a part of the cost of the war. The success of the Revolution was due principally to the occupation of England with France and Spain.

The important territorial expansion of the United States at the opening of the 19th century was the result of clever exploitation of the Napoleonic Wars.

The freeing of Central and South America from Spain which was so important to the United States succeeded because of the occupation of Spain by Napoleon. The Monroe Doctrine, which was designed to ensure the freedom of these countries from the motherland in 1823, stands in intimate connection with the liberal British policy pursued by Canning and its antagonism against the intervention of the Restoration powers, under Metternich.

If the United States was able to weather its most terrible crisis, that of the Civil War, this was only because Great Britain, which worked for a victory of the Confederacy, was occupied by other questions of a domestic and foreign nature. How fortunate for present day Great Britain that the Confederacy did not succeed: Napoleon the Third, who took advantage of the Civil War to intervene in Mexico was likewise occupied by European problems much nearer home, especially the rapid rise of Prussia under Bismarck. This hindered him in the pursuit of his Mexican policy.
The Prussian victory over Denmark and Austria in 1866 already were defeats for France.

The emergence of the United States likewise at the turn of the last century as a world power can only be understood when this event is examined in the light of the international situation. If the United States was able to occupy Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines and to assume monopoly rights over future canal routes through Central America, including the Panama route, this was only possible because all of the Powers, which might have intervened for Spain, or which could have opposed the United States, were completely absorbed with their own affairs. Japan had been occupied with sharp antagonism with Russia since 1895, which led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Great Britain, moreover, which decisively forfeited much of its Central American influence as a result of its failure to intervene, was bound not only by African problems such as the Boer War, but even more by conflict with the Russo-French Alliance. The antagonism against Russia resulted from irritation over frontier questions arising all along the frontier zone from the China Sea to the Mediterranean. The antagonism against France had its roots in conflict of interests springing from the French plans for a Central African Empire extending from Morocco to Egypt (Suez, Fashoda) and Djibuti, as well as French Indo-China. But also against Germany, the enemy of the Dual Alliance, which would have been glad to have participated in the inheritance of the Spanish Colonial Empire, England found itself at loggerheads in 1900 with regard to the German protectorate over Turkey and the German plans for colonization in Africa from German East Africa to German Southwest Africa. Exactly as in the case of the French plans for an empire in northern Africa from the Atlantic to Djibuti (Fashoda), these aspirations collided with the British plans for the consolidation of all of its holdings from the Cape to Cairo. There were also differences between Germany and England with regard to the size of the German fleet.

When Wilson intervened in the World War, he did so because a German victory already then would have meant German hegemony over Europe, Africa and the Near East. Only the victory of the Entente and the Anglo-Saxons in the World War, and the earlier conclusion of the World War, brought about by the American intervention therein, forced Japan under the cloak of war with Germany and opposition to Bolshevik Russia, to give up the project of conquering China and Siberia. The World War came to an end far too
quickly for Japan which was obliged at the Conference of Washington in 1921 to vacate the Asiatic positions occupied by it.

The situation today is comparable to that during the World War, except that the American situation is much more serious because now Japan, the ally of Germany, covets the mastery of Asia.

Much more probable than a more or less long existence side by side of two opposing continental blocks is the immediate conquering of America. The man at the helm in Germany today has arisen from small beginnings to be the mightiest ruler in Europe. This man, who always works with historical catchwords, desires to be the first one in history to have not only Europe but the entire world at his feet.

But political policy would force Germany on this road, at first probably through undermining in South America. It is true that there exists today new technical possibilities, as never before in the history of the world, to bring about the hegemony of a small minority, such as the Germans, over an enormous majority of enslaved peoples. At the present, however, the feeling of nationality among the oppressed nationalities is much harder to suppress than formerly. These would always hope for deliverance from the United States. Germany would be forced, therefore, to follow a policy similar to that pursued in ancient Rome by Caesar and the Emperor Claudius. After the subjugation and enslavement of the continental-European Celts, they likewise conquered England, because it was from there that the conquered continental Celts received moral support. Today, after a German victory, the European nations robbed of their freedom would look to the United States in the hope that their kin there would intervene for them much in the same manner as did the Irish in the United States in 1921, when they secured valuable help for the motherland.

And we must not forget that in the time of the Roman Empire, the island of Britain was far more inaccessible to Rome from the standpoint of travel than is the United States to Germany today?

(Translated by M.W.A.)