Subject: A Few Thoughts on the Influence of Fear in the attitude towards war, even when the fate of the Nation is at stake.

The following are just a few random thoughts which are dictated very hurriedly. They are provoked by an article by General Carl Spaatz, former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, and now retired. In an article in the February 21, 1955 issue of Newsweek, General Spaatz says, "The spectacular change which has just occurred in Moscow leadership and the more aggressive policy it seems to have produced — should tell the United States something about the requirements of survival in today's world.

"We don't have to be too much concerned about either Soviet words or deeds right now because, whatever the new Kremlin leaders say, the fact remains that we have the lead in strategic bombing capacity — and they know it.

"The Soviet objective is a constant that hasn't changed since Lenin took over the Russian Revolution during the first World War. No matter who is in power or what he says, his aim must be to destroy capitalism and its power center, the United States. Communist tactics may change but not Communist strategy.

"Our greatest danger lies from our own character, we shrink from the horrors of mass destruction. We like the idea of a tidy agreement outlawing nuclear weapons — even though we suspect that such an agreement wouldn't be worth the paper it was written on if a nuclear war should get started. We fear that we would be at a disadvantage in a nuclear war because we couldn't strike first and could only retaliate after absorbing the initial shock. We know that Stalin was right when he said: "Our one big advantage is your fear of starting a war".

"But we must resist our inclination to be beguiled into an agreement that would deprive us of our one military advantage. We can't
hope to compete with the Soviet Empire in manpower. We must rely upon scientific and production genius.

"And we must steel ourselves to the necessity of waging all-out atomic warfare if we are attacked. There have been suggestions that our policy in case of war should be to restrict our use of atomic weapons - to make it known that we would not resort to the use of A bombs or H bombs unless the enemy used them first. The idea seems to be that a war of terror would be unethical.

The article concludes with the following paragraph: "But we must maintain our strategic airpower at second to none strength and keep it modernized as long as aggression is in the way of any part of the world we live in. To permit ourselves to become second best would be to court extinction."

General Spaatz was a great commander of the United States Air Force and is one of those relatively few generals that we have produced in our country who are statesmen as well as strategists and leaders of men in action in war. He has shown his wisdom and his reality and his moderation in all that he has said and done. He has, however, lived with the realities of air warfare and played a conspicuous part in the second World War, so that while one who abhors war as a weapon, he knows that it is still resorted to by certain nations, and as long as it is resorted to by certain nations we must maintain our power if we wish to survive.

The significant sentences in General Spaatz's article in Newsweek under reference are the quotation from Stalin: "Our one big advantage is your fear of starting a war." And also the sentence of General Spaatz: "The idea seems to be that a war of terror would be unethical".
I have only wished to make note of General Spaatz's article, which is very significant. It was the fear of the rising military power in Germany under the Nazi regime which made France and England afraid to do the things which were necessary in order to stop that development of military power in its tracks. It could have been stopped by France and England from its beginnings; it could have been stopped as late as 1937. They were the closest to the situation and the most immediately threatened and it was they who should have taken the appropriate action, at least the leadership in taking the appropriate action, to stop this military development in Germany. They did nothing. In my opinion, no responsibility falls on us until much later, when the German troops under the Nazi regime crossed the Rhine against the provisions of the existing treaties, to which we were a party, it was time for us to take action. We did not take any action, not out of fear, but because public opinion in our country was not prepared for drastic action. Our people did not feel threatened in any way; in spite of the efforts of Secretary Hull and the President in order to make the implications of what was happening in Germany clear every time they said something followed by Coughlin or the America Firsters spoke up and every forward statement which President Roosevelt or Secretary Hull made in the hope of awakening American public opinion led to a step backward. I know what this meant to them because I was so closely associated in this matter at the time. I know what heartburnings they had and what responsibility they felt.

It is fears which control us. It is the same kind of fear which we have seen in France and in England and which led to the War. The Germany Nazi regime capitalized on this fear just as the Soviet regime is capitalizing on it today. There is really no fundamental
difference between the Soviet procedures today and the Nazi procedures between 1933 and the beginning of the war. The Nazi objective developed first from domination of Europe to domination of the world. The Soviet objective is definitely domination of the world. They have not passed through the intermediary stage of the Nazis, that is the only difference. The Soviet regime today is just as implicated in its objective for world domination and the enslavement of all peoples as was the Nazi regime. We closed our eyes for too long to the objectives of the Nazi government. Some of us are still closing our eyes to the objectives of the Soviet regime. We cannot run the same danger again; in our country we are not running it. France and England, being closer to Soviet Russia, are living under the fear of atomic attack, which they think would reach them first. There is a strange psychology that by hiding from ourselves the realities of the situation everything will come out all right. In this connection I want to record here before I forget it the position taken by Pierpont Moffat, who was Chief of the Bureau of Western European Affairs during a good part of the time that I was Assistant Secretary of State, from 1937 to 1940. Pierpont Moffat was a highly educated, intelligent, cultured, fine-thinking and right-thinking person. He had all the decencies that one can expect in a human being. He was, I believe, then around 40. He was married to a daughter of Ambassador Crew, a very charming young woman. Pierpont had a good deal of knowledge of Europe. We were good friends. He had read the letters which I wrote weekly, or practically every week, from Berlin and Vienna from 1933 to 1937, inclusive. He was aware of all that had happened in Central Europe and he was certainly aware of the dangers of the Nazi regime and he knew what its objectives were. He would often come to my office in the afternoon, around half past six or seven, before
returning home. I can recall him standing in front of my desk and looking at me in a reproachable way. He would usually say, "George, I wonder whether you know what you're doing. You are helping us to get into this war which is coming on". He was terribly concerned because I was insisting that the Department we face these problems in Europe in a realistic way and have no illusions with regard to them. My answer used to be: "Pierpont, you yourself speak of the war as being inevitable. If you are a realist, as you must be here, you ought to recognize that by the same token if there is a war we couldn't keep out of it. You know what history has taught us. You know what the world is today. You consider this war inevitable in Europe and yet seem to think that by hiding our heads in the sand and ignoring the facts that come to us every day, we will somehow or other be able to keep out of the war." His observation frequently, when I made this remark, was: "But what a horrible thing it is. How can we think of it?"

He was overwhelmed by the horrors of war, he just would not face the realities. He somehow felt as though the rest of the world were engulfed in the holocaust of war, that we would be able to keep out of it. The day we declared war, Pierpont came into my office and looked at me and said, "Now, George, you're satisfied". I said to him, "Pierpont, you are a very just man; you have never said a more unjust thing and I'm sure you realize it." Tears came into his eyes and he begged me to forgive him for having made such an unjust statement and said, "You have been right all the time and, of course, I knew that you were right. I just couldn't face it."

The fall of Malenkov as the head of the Soviet regime machinery in the last months (early 1955) and his replacement by Khrushchev has led naturally to great speculation. The position which Marshal Zhukov,
the head of the Soviet Armies, has not only retained but strengthened in the new Khrushchev machinery, has led to a good deal of hope.

Even hope of a real character is placed in the circumstance that President Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukov have real respect for each other. While this is a very useful and a very important factor, it does not have the basic policy signification that is being read into it. Marshal Zhukov, as a military man, probably has the same lack of desire to actually use war as an instrument of policy as most great military men have had. All great military leaders of modern times have wanted to build up the military force of their country knowing that it was the only sure protection of the country's sovereignty. They wished, however, to build up this military power to prevent war rather than to provoke it. The only difference in modern times we have is the Hitler regime and the Soviet regime. The basic fact to bear in mind is what the objectives of these two regimes are and were. In the Nazi regime everything became subjected and subordinated to the principal objective of the regime, which was world domination and control. Nothing would swerve the Nazi leaders from this objective. They hoped to gain it without actually engaging in a major war. The objective of the Soviet regime has been and is, as definite and as implicable and as unchangeable as was that of the Nazi regime, it is complete world domination. It should be even more clear to public opinion everywhere that this is their objective, than it was to public opinion in its time that the objective of the Nazi regime was world domination; but we do not learn.

When the Nazi regime came into power in 1933, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, holding down the Germany Army to 100,000 had been carefully supervised and carried through. It was quite natural that the military leaders of Germany, who were in no way tainted or
affected by Nazi propaganda, should be writhing under these provisions of the Versailles Treaty and wished to build up a military power more in accord with what they believed to be the importance and strength and necessities of their country. While in the beginning of the Nazi regime the important military leaders did not collaborate with regime, they did view it with a certain tolerance because they saw that this regime was going to get rid in a large measure, in one way or another, and without resort to war, of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. They saw, under this regime, the possibility of building up a military force comparable to the needs of Germany. They were, not, I believe, thinking of it as an instrument of offense or of revenge for what had happened through the defeat in the last World War. They were military men and they were thinking in the terms that military men must think, as must civilians of the defense of their country and the maintenance of its prestige.

As brought out elsewhere in these notes, the important leaders of the military in Germany kept themselves aloof and apart from the Nazi regime, but at the same time collaborated to the degree that was necessary in order to build up the military force of the country, the military, the SS, and the SA; it was their hope that with the building up of a real army that the SA and the SS would be eliminated by them. They may not have been altogether realistic in this but, at least, that is what their definite thought was and it was carried through in practice. I have elsewhere in these notes referred to the careful way in which men were recruited into the ranks of the increasing army in Germany. No Nazi sympathizers and no member of the Nazi party were taken into the ranks. I have elsewhere in these notes brought out how the Nazi elements gradually infiltrated into the army, and in a memorandum
I have dictated on the conversation I had, I believe in 1937, with General von Fritsch, it was then that he said that he could no longer depend "on the colonel sitting outside of his door".

When the Nazis first came in it was believed that the Lutheran and the Catholic churches in Germany would be one of the principal bulwarks against the domination of the Nazi party of every aspect of German life. For reasons set forth elsewhere in these notes, the resistance of the Lutheran party, except in rare instances, gradually died out. Elsewhere in these notes I have mentioned the agreement which was reached with the Vatican, which led to the loss of influence and prestige of the Catholic church in Germany so far as resistance was concerned, and that this agreement between the Nazi regime and the Vatican led to the loss of any power to resist the Nazi government in Germany. The army remained as a bulwark. The hopes of reasonable Germans were centered in the army, which as has been pointed out previously, was subject to this infiltration, which was becoming more widespread constantly.

When Hitler took the decision in 1937 (?) to cross the Rhine, contrary to the provisions of the obligations of Germany, the military did everything they could to dissuade Hitler from this movement. They were absolutely sure that the Germany Army would meet resistance, when it crossed the Rhine, from the British and the French troops. They knew that this would provoke a war between England and France, at least on one side, and Germany on the other. The military knew that in spite of the growing power of the army, that they were not prepared for such a war and would lose it. Besides that, they saw no reason for such a war. It had no purpose whatever. There is no doubt that the high leadership of the Germany Army did everything in its power to dissuade Hitler and Goering and the rest from this adventure. Hitler was unmoving; he ordered that the movement across the Rhine take place. He said to the
military that he was sure that the British and the French troops would not react, he was sure that there would be no resistance. The military were equally convinced that the French and German troops would resist and that Germany and France could not permit this movement across the Rhine. A compromise was finally reached. Hitler was to a degree affected by the arguments of the military; he agreed that if, on crossing the Rhine, the German troops met with resistance that they were to withdraw. The military had to accept this risk. The movement was undertaken. History records what happened.

I am not in a position to say whether it is correct that the French were insisting that the troops of the British and French should resist and that it was the British government which took the position that there must be no resistance. What happened so far as the British and French governments are concerned is still, so far as I know, locked away in the minds of individuals, some of whom have passed away. I wonder what official documents there may be, in the way of exchanges of information, which would explain this situation. Whether England has the greater responsibility to bear or whether the responsibility falls equally on the French and the British governments, I am not able to say and I doubt whether there is a categorical and clear answer available. Whatever may have happened, the British and the French troops offered no resistance.

The effect was calamitous. Nazi prestige increased all over Europe. What was found more important was that the prestige of Hitler in Germany increased tremendously. What was even more important than this was the fact that a good many of the higher army generals began to doubt their own judgment. Hitler was undoubtedly acting only on intuition but, to a good many people in Germany, he became more than ever
a god and to a good many of the high military he became one whose judgment was unerring. From the moment of the crossing of the Rhine, which met with no resistance, the power of the Germany Army to control events in Germany was ended. Whatever resistance there was on the part of a number of the generals had to be carried on quietly and under cover. There were a number of these generals who did not lose their heads. They had no confidence in the Hitler legend of infallibility. They had no more use for Nazi policy, internally or externally, than they had before. But their real power to stem events in Germany was gone, and from the moment of the crossing of the Rhine there was nothing any more in Germany to prevent Hitler's word being supreme and controlling in every respect in internal and external policy.

The record of history shows how these generals were subordinated and gradually eliminated. General von Fritch was always a thorn in the flesh of Hitler. There seems to be no doubt at all that von Fritch was killed by a shot in the back in the action in Poland and that he was eliminated at Hitler's orders. As the war went on, one after the other of the generals in whom Hitler had no personal confidence, so far as allegiance to him was concerned, were eliminated. The story of the way in which von Rommel was obliged to commit suicide is a matter of history. The fact that von Rommel had contributed so much to the glory of German arms during the war and was endeavoring to serve his country did not prevent his elimination. The story of the efforts of the German generals who retained their sense of proportion and who realized the dangers of defeat in the war which had been undertaken, and who were patriotic, and how they endeavored to get rid of Hitler, is set forth with numerous detail and with accuracy in Wheeler-Bennett's book entitled "Nemesis of Power".
What I'm getting at is that we cannot place too much dependance in the military being out of accord with certain fundamental objectives of policy of the government of their country. They may be completely out of accord with the policy of the government which they are obliged to serve, but this does not mean that they can influence that policy or change it. We should learn this from the careful study of developments in Germany and from what happened to the German Army. Some of these generals, like General von Fritsch, General von Hammerstein, General von Rommel, General Guderian, General von Beck, when the war actually came were fighting for their country and to maintain its integrity and future and not fighting for Hitler or for anything that he represented. This is a fundamental fact that we must bear in mind.

These notes are being dictated in March 1955. During the last few years there has been speculation in high places in governments and among thoughtful people in England and our country in particular, as to what the real position of the army in Soviet Russia is. We have been placing our hopes in the Russian Army, that is, in the leaders of the Army. We have been hoping that while they play along with the Communist Party and Communist regime which controls Russia, that they are really not in accord with these aims of world domination and that they can be depended upon to maintain a restraining influence. There is, I believe, no doubt from the record that they have maintained a restraining influence. They are, nevertheless, just as much interested in maintaining the strength of Russia and attaining superiority in every field as we in England and the United States are in maintaining superiority over Soviet Russia. They may not want to attack but they do not want to be attacked, and if they are attacked they wish to be sure to be able to establish supremacy.
There has been since, in the last month, since the fall of Malenkov and the obvious greater emergency of Marshal Zhukov, a restrained feeling of greater confidence that the Army is gaining increased power in Soviet Russia. I'm one of those who believe that it is a good thing that Marshal Zhukov has regained this position. I'm one of those who believe that it is, in the measure that we can count upon it, a reassuring element. I'm not one of those who believe, however, that Marshal Zhukov is in a position to determine Soviet policy or to change the objectives of the Soviet regime for world domination. If war should break out as the result of the irresponsible action of the Communist regime in Russia we would see, I am confident, the same thing happen as we saw happen in Nazi Germany when the really responsible Germans of the German Army who were not affected by the Nazi propaganda and doctrine, as well as those who had been affected by it, joined together in making this tremendous military effort for Germany. They were fighting for the integrity of their country.

It is true that those who are in control in the Communist regime in Russia have shown a greater measure of reserve in some respects than the Nazi regime did. They are not prepared for war and they feel that they are not prepared for war, and until they do feel that they are ready they will not take the aggressive steps which will provoke a war. Hitler and the Nazi regime endeavored to gain their objectives gradually without resorting to actual war. When things went too slowly and when they found that to go ahead actual measures of war and force were necessary, they did not hesitate to use them. In the end it provoked the general conflict which they perhaps wished to avoid. But there is also reason to believe that when the final real conflict broke out, Hitler and his associates were convinced that the United States would not enter the war. Everything that had been told to Hitler by Ribbentrop and others
had led him to this opinion. He saw only the might of the German Army, he saw the long record of conquest of the recent years behind him. When the final moment came he did not hesitate because he felt that even if the United States entered the war, they would be able to prevail. Why should we have any reason to believe that the situation with respect to Soviet Russia is different? The parallels are so clear and so close. All the historic effect and record are there. They are there even more definitely than they were in the years just preceding the outbreak of the second World War, and what we must have no illusions about whatever and, fortunately we seem to have one less illusion about that than we did before the second World War, is that the objectives of the Soviet government have not changed and will not and, I believe myself, cannot change. They have set on a path which I do not see how they can change without losing out themselves in their own country and that they are not going to do.

There is one big difference between the two situations. Public opinion is more aware of the definiteness of Soviet objectives and the unalterable character thereof than it was of the unalterable objectives of the Nazi regime. To some, the maneuvering of the Soviet regime in the United Nations and in its relations with us and with England and France and other countries, may seem to be clever. I think to the great majority of the people, however, in the rest of the non-communist world there are no illusions with respect to that. In this respect we have a great advantage over the previous situation.

But in one respect the situation is not changed. The same fears and the same hesitations are there. We are religious, moral, law-abiding, humane peoples. I do not speak of the great mass of the ignorant and unvocal Russian population. But so far as the Communist Party and its
members are concerned, and the Communist regime, there is nothing humane nor moral or law-abiding to be found. The record that they are writing every day is so clear, not only within Russia itself, but in the satellite countries, should leave no doubts with regard to this. Here we are at a tremendous disadvantage. We will not undertake a war in order to eliminate Soviet power at the time when we think that we are prepared to win it and to eliminate this danger which is hanging over all of us, but we must recognize that Soviet Russia, whenever she is ready or whenever they think they are ready or whenever they think it is convenient and opportune, will not hesitate by surprise to endeavor to annihilate the rest of the non-communist world. Here we are at a great disadvantage and this is one of the great dilemmas which faces the western world. It is a very real dilemma and not too much emphasis is placed upon it. This element of fear is so serious that more should be done to eliminate this fear. I saw what this element of fear meant in practice in France and in England in the early years of the Nazi regime. If it had not been for these fears the power of the Nazis could have been stopped in their tracks. It was not done.

As these are random notes and are to be connected later and related in a coordinated picture, I wish here to note the following.

Well before the actual election of President Eisenhower, there were a good many who believed that it was almost certain that Foster Dulles would be named by him as Secretary of State. I was one of those who profoundly hoped not only for the victory of Eisenhower at the polls but also that he would choose Foster Dulles for this, the next most important post in our government. I had known Foster Dulles well for a number of years. I had great admiration and respect for him as a lawyer. I had great admiration and respect for him as a man who could place aside
personal interests when his government needed him. During a part of President Truman's administration he had given his services willingly and freely at personal sacrifice because he thought he could be of use and others thought he could be of use. I knew that he would make a great Secretary of State and I felt that, in spite of the fact that we have such a long list of distinguished Secretaries of State since the foundation of the republic, I had every confidence that he would make and prove to be the greatest Secretary of State we have had up to this time. In this I, and I'm sure no thoughtful persons in the United States, have been mistaken. There was only one reserve that I had in my mind. I knew what his broad experience for the post was, few men have become Secretary of State with the broad and full and adequate background that Dulles had for this post. I knew his courage, his understanding, his wisdom, his patience. The one thing that concerned me, and that I'm sure concerned some of his friends, was the fact that we knew that he was a religious man. We knew that he was in no sense a fanatic, that is, a religious fanatic, just as he was not a fanatic on any subject. We knew, however, that he had behind him as fine a family tradition as anyone in our country could have. This was a tradition of maintenance of principle, of correct personal life, not only of religious thought but of religious practice. I wondered whether when a critical moment might arise, when everything was at stake for our country and for the world, that because of these principles and religious beliefs he might hesitate to take the drastic action which the circumstances demanded. While these doubts at times would creep into my mind and I considered them a serious thing, I had the absolute confidence that when the moment came for any decision which involved our country that Dulles would not hesitate to take an attitude which the safety of and preservation of our future
demanded, and so it has proved. In this respect, however, he is very different from many well-meaning and thoughtful persons in our country who are so shocked by the thought of war and all that it involves and so shrink from it that they would rather take the chance of possible annihilation than take the decisions which the circumstances demand. These fears and indecisions are there, not only among good people in our country, but they are there in every law-abiding country.

It was not my intention when starting to dictate this particular set of notes to cover the question of preventive war, but as these are random notes I wish here to record another series of circumstances with which I happened to become intimately connected and which may be of interest.

After I had retired from the Foreign Service in the second half of 1937 and became connected with Mexlight at the end of 1937 and established my residence as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of the Company in Mexico City, I was obliged to travel frequently to New York and Toronto and Washington on business of the Company, and made at times prolonged stays, running into weeks. I spent a good deal of time in Washington. I saw a good many of my old friends who occupied positions of importance in the government. I kept up my connection with many of my military friends with whom I had close and happy associations over so many years of my service for our government in various parts of the world and in Washington.

I had particularly close connection towards the end of my service with the high command of the Air Force. General Arnold and his wife came to Mexico City towards the end of my stay in Mexico as Ambassador on a visit of courtesy to the Mexican Government. As my wife and I were going to Washington for a brief stay just about the time that General and Mrs. Arnold and their companions were returning, he suggested
that we return with them and make the trip with him on his plane. We were very happy to do so. During the trip north General Arnold asked me whether I did not think it would be a good thing for a squadron of planes of our Air Force to make a visit to Mexico City. The Mexicans had been collaborative with us during the war. The collaboration between the Mexican Air Force and ours had been very close and friendly. It had remained that way. General Arnold thought that it would be a nice gesture on the part of the Air Force and of our government to send one of the largest planes that we had, that is, one of our largest bombers and intermediate planes of various kinds, to Mexico City for a sort of show of what the United States Air Force had. I said that I was sure that the Mexican Government would be pleased and that certainly the Mexican population would be pleased. There was no reason why it should not be done and I was sure the Mexican government would be very happy to collaborate in such a visit if it was decided by our people to go ahead with this idea of General Arnold. He told me he was going ahead with it.

General Arnold was a man of great decision. He performed an unusual task during the war in directing the Air Force. I often think that the services which he rendered and the extraordinary capacities which he had have been little recognized by our people. He was a man who did not like red tape and the tremendous responsibilities which the Air Force had during the war in every part of the world meant that its commander in chief could not be one who was addicted to red tape. He was a man of decisions.

A few days after our arrival in New York several of the higher officers of the Air Force immediately around General Arnold came to see me and said that they had instructions from him to arrange for such a
visit if it was agreeable to the Mexican Government. I assured them that I was confident that it would be agreeable that those steps could be taken very quickly. They could act on the basis that the visit would be agreeable, I was sure, in the meantime. They said they had a further request from General Arnold; they were asked to talk with me as to whether I did not think it would be a good thing to leave a few of these planes with the Mexican Air Force. The idea was that the Mexican Air Force was to use them for the time being and that in due course these planes would become surplus and could remain with the Mexican authorities without any compensation. I told them that I thought it was a good idea to leave a few of these planes with the Mexican Air Force but that appropriate arrangements should be made then with the Mexican authorities for compensation. This compensation would not have to represent the value of the planes. This was a sort of an operation that our government was making in connection with planes and other war materials all the time and, therefore, was quite in order. I did not think, however, that the matter should be left in the air and that the planes should merely be left there. I felt that eventual difficulties might arise with respect to payment and that we should not burden the Mexican government with the payment for planes when it had need for its money for so many productive purposes. A few days later I was informed that these thoughts had been brought to the attention of General Arnold but that he was confident there would be no difficulty eventually about the matter and that the Mexican government would not be asked to pay for these planes, which could in due course be declared surplus and sold for a few dollars each, and that the arrangements were to go ahead to leave the planes there, that is, some of the planes.

Mrs. Ruth Hughes, who was at that time the Assistant Chief of the Mexican Division in the Department of State and who has long been
associated with Mexican affairs in the Department and who knows Mexico very thoroughly, appreciated that such a haphazard arrangement for the delivery of these planes to the Mexican Government would lead to difficulties. There was nothing, however, that we could do about it. The show took place and was a great success and a number of planes were left with the Mexican authorities. It was years before the question of the settlement of payment was finally adjusted and it caused unnecessary misunderstanding between the authorities of the two countries. I may refer at another place in these notes to the visit of this air mission and of these planes. I have made mention of it in this connection because the head of the mission who came to Mexico with these planes was Colonel Kenneth Gibson. Colonel Gibson was an air officer with a distinguished record during the war and with an unusually broad knowledge of his field. He was intensely interested in the problems of air strategy and air command, and he had a very real appreciation of political factors. We became very good friends.

After I returned to Mexico in a private capacity, after my retirement, it was I believe in 1949 that Colonel Gibson was in touch with me and said he wished to come to Mexico to see me with several other officers from the air base at Montgomery, Alabama, that is, from Maxwell Field. He came accompanied by one or two officers and they stayed with us in our home. They talked with me for several days with regard to the major problems in Europe and as they affected us and, of course, with particular reference to Soviet Russia. At the end of the second day they proposed to me that I come to Maxwell Field to the Air Force School there in order to deliver a lecture on diplomacy as a weapon of modern warfare. I was informed that the school at Maxwell Field was, in fact, the higher school for the training and indoctrination
of air force officers. Only officers of proved capacity and with cer-
tain experience were asked to take these courses at the School. Every
eyear they had a three months intensive course. I was told that General
Marshall was to speak on the subject of the Army as a weapon in modern
warfare. General Arnold was to speak on the Air Force as a weapon in
modern warfare, and I do not recall for the moment who was the Admiral
who gave the lecture on the Navy as a weapon in modern warfare. I
rather shrank from the task of delivering a lecture of this kind at the
School on diplomacy as a weapon of modern warfare, but realizing the
seriousness of the School and that these lectures were completely off
the record without any publicity of any kind whatsoever, I consented.
Colonel Gibson and several other officers returned just before the time
I was to give this lecture, which I prepared with great care. We went
north to Maxwell Field from Mexico City in an Army plane and the follow­
ing day I delivered the lecture. There were some 200 officers present,
all of higher ranks. I had been told that the lecture was to be for
one hour, which was to be followed by a question period of an hour. I
had prepared my talk to fall within the period but in order that I would
be able to use the time to the best advantage, I read my prepared speech.
I will not go into a discussion of what I said as I will append to this
memorandum a copy of the lecture which I gave. I never had a more atten­
tive audience than the one I had there. I knew that I could talk with
complete frankness; there were present a few Canadian officers who had
been selected by the Canadian government to attend the School, and a
few British air officers. The presence of the Canadian and British
officers did not deter me from speaking with the most complete frankness.
In connection with the theme which I had to discuss, that is, diplomacy
as a weapon of modern warfare, I, with the approval of General Anderson
who was in command of the School at the time, and of Colonel Gibson who
was in direct charge of the School under General Anderson, expressed my views on the extreme gravity of the situation and said that the battle which we had on was one of time. I said, concerning the objectives of the Soviet government, that there was no question whatever and that they were world domination, and that in my opinion nothing would change these objectives. I expressed the opinion that in view of the fact that we had not only air superiority but also superiority in atomic weapons, that we should use this at the time we knew we could use it with complete success. I said that if we used our superiority in strength in time that we would be able to restrict the limits of the war to Soviet territory and the rest of the world would not suffer. The longer we waited, the more serious the consequences and the broader the area of the war would be. We were still in a position to keep our country and Western Europe safe from attack from the air. I was basing this statement on the information I had with regard to our military and air strength from the proper people in our own country.

In the meantime we had been obliged to undertake these tremendous expenditures abroad, including the Marshall Plan and all kinds of aid, and that it was only a question of time as to how long we would be able to bear these economic strains in our own country. No country was rich enough and strong enough to be able to maintain a schedule of expenditures as great as that which we were then making and there was no doubt that it would increase with the years for some time to come. The whole world was living in fear of Soviet Russia. At that time nothing was moving forward in Europe, no one was ready to make any new commitments. The economy was stagnant, no one would make any serious long term investment as long as he felt this definite threat from Soviet Russia. The fears which were being instilled in the people of Europe were bound to bear serious and disastrous fruit. So far as our country
was concerned, we were just beginning on a scale of expenditures which would expand from year to year.

I expressed the opinion that the thought of preventive war and the word "preventive war" was something that people did not wish to talk about but which responsible people had to think of. The trouble was that we were afraid to talk about it and afraid to take any action. The same fears which had caused the second World War to develop were now developing in our country and might make the third war inevitable. It looked as though they were making the third World War inevitable. There was only one reasonable and safe thing to do, and that was to take the preventive measure while we could. The margin of power between ourselves and Soviet Russia was diminishing year by year. Scientific development in nuclear arms would go forward; how long we could keep our superiority in nuclear weapons and how long we could keep our superiority in the power to deliver atomic force from the air was problematical. At the best, I said, this margin of safety was definitely decreasing year by year.

I realized that people would not talk about this because they had the fear of being considered outlaws by public opinion. I said that our deep religious convictions and our moral code and all the established practices of our country were against undertaking what was spoken of as preventive war. As a matter of fact, there had been many preventive wars fought, only they had not been called by that name. It was unfortunate that we were speaking of this by this term which was so obnoxious to everyone. I said that in this matter the responsibility was primarily ours because it was we, among the free peoples, who had the superiority in the atomic warfare and in air capacity. If we did not act, it was our responsibility this time primarily and not, as it had been before the second World War, for a long time the primary responsibility of France
and Britain. The principle question, however, was that we should do what our security and safety demanded and what the security and safety of the world demanded. Unless something of this kind were done, there would be no peace in the world and any future that any of us could look into, and there was no doubt that at a given time, when the Soviet felt that its power was superior to ours that it would use it, and the question would then be who would survive.

As I've already said, I will append to these notes a copy of the address which I delivered.

When I finished the reading of my prepared speech, there was as complete silence as I have ever felt in a room. Everybody sat silent in his seat. One could feel an atmosphere of tenseness. I did not know how to interpret it. I did not know whether the silence meant complete disapproval of what I had said or what it meant. I only know that I had one of the strangest feelings that I have ever experienced after making an address or being in a room with so many people.

After what seemed to be ten minutes but which could not have been more than 2 or 3 minutes, but it was certainly that, General Anderson rose. He made a very brief statement. He said that they had just heard a masterly exposition of the theme which had been assigned to me. It was not customary to make any comment on the speeches made by the men who were invited to address the School. He could not in this case fail to say that he was in complete agreement with everything that I had said. He felt sure that the silence and the atmosphere in the room was a tremendous expression of agreement of those present with what I had said. He then said that there would be the usual period of questions and answers.

There were very few questions. The few questions there were I
answered as honestly and as frankly as I had spoken during my prepared speech. A British Air Force officer rose and made a brief three-minute speech instead of asking a question. He said that his country could never agree to a preventive war because it would mean that England would be wiped out in the very beginning and she could not provoke such a situation. The British people were too conscious of what they had suffered during the previous war. It was quite obvious that his remark was not well received by the others present. He sat down in a dead silence but it was a different kind of silence that had followed my prepared speech. I asked Colonel Gibson why the questions were so few. He said it was because the men present were stunned by the completeness, the soundness, and the thoroughness of the way I had covered the subject and that I had been the first one who appeared before them who had had the courage to say what had to be said and what these men themselves believed.

The following year I was asked to address the School again and I made another prepared speech following up the one I had made the year before, and a copy of the text is appended to this memorandum. I had the pleasure, during the short period that I was at Maxwell for the second address, to find there Lord Philip Swinton, who was at that time a member of the British Cabinet, and an old and valued friend of mine. He had been asked by the School to deliver a prepared address to the officers.

It was only a short time afterwards that I read, to my astonishment, in the newspapers that General Anderson had been relieved of his command at Maxwell Field and of this high Air Force Strategy School. General Anderson was considered as one of the most outstanding officers of the Air Force. He was a man of brilliant mind but of great soundness.
He was a man of great courage and did not hesitate to express his convictions even though he knew they might not be in accord with his superiors, but he expressed these convictions always to his superiors and did not air them in public. It seems that he had been asked by the Chamber of Commerce in Montgomery to give an address to its members and as a matter of courtesy he had done so. He was given to understand that only members of the Chamber would be present and that there would be no publicity whatever to what he said. General Anderson had been stationed at the School for some time and had naturally formed friendly relations with some of the merchants and leading people in Montgomery. He was too serious a man to take up anyone's time with idle talk and so he gave them a serious talk, knowing that it would not appear in the press. Either a correspondent had surreptitiously introduced himself into the meeting or one of the persons present spoke to the press and an article appeared in the Montgomery newspaper stating that the General had advocated preventive war.

No matter what the personal opinions of President Truman may have been or of the Secretary of State or of the Secretary of Defense or of the high officers of the Pentagon, they did not feel that any official sanction could be given to the idea of preventive war or that anyone was even thinking of it. General Anderson was retired and went to live on his farm in Florida. He was another sacrifice to the fears of his superiors. That most of his superiors were in accord with his thinking there is little doubt in my opinion. It was unpopular and dangerous to talk of the idea of preventive war so he was made the sacrifice.

Every time that anyone raises the idea of preventive war there is hue and cry. The highest officers of our government from time to
time in the last few years have felt it necessary to say that they are not in favor of a preventive war. I will not labor this question any further at this time in these notes, as I have merely wished to dictate these random thoughts and facts and I will coordinate them in a considered and carefully prepared section of these notes. I wish to make note further, however, at this time, of the statement which Churchill made in the House of Commons early in March 1955. He made it clear that in the position of the Conservative government and majority in England, the superiority which the United States has and in which Britain shares in atomic weapons is the best security that we have against surprise attack at this time. He made it clear that the British government was going ahead with the production of the hydrogen bomb. It was a courageous and timely statement by this great statesman who has never lacked in courage and seldom in wisdom. As was to be expected, Aneurin Bevan, whose influence in the British Labor Party has been constantly decreasing during the last year, endeavored to bring about a vote of lack of confidence in the government on the basis of this statement of Churchill. A changed situation in Britain, from that which existed in the years of 1933 to 1937, is obvious from the fact that Attlee, as leader of the British Labor Party, did not support Bevan and Bevan's action has created a new split in the British Labor Party, the majority of which is going along with Mr. Attlee and Mr. Churchill. This is a great step forward towards facing the realities.

It is interesting to note that after these two addresses which I was invited to make in the School at Maxwell Field, I was not invited the third year. I've always felt that the authorities of the School not to ask felt that it was more prudent/ever me for they knew that I would speak with the same frankness that I had before and that even though they
might be in agreement with what I was going to say and might wish it said, they did not wish any repetition of the circumstances which led to the retirement of General Anderson.

With reference to the recent changes in the high command in Soviet Russia in the last weeks, it is natural that there should be this speculation as to what it means and hopes placed in the better position of Marshall Zhukov and the Army. What must be born in mind is that no matter what changes there may be in men and faces and positions in the higher command in the Soviet regime, policy remains the same. Faces may change and for the time being certain practices and approaches may change, both in Russia internally and in her external relations, but the objectives of the Soviet government remain the same - world domination - no essential change has taken place. We can speculate all we may wish but as to the fundamental danger for us and the world and as to the fundamental objectives of the Soviet regime, there can be no speculation and the basic fact remains the same. Objectives have not changed and are not likely to change.