NOTES PREPARED BY GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH
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OF MODERN WARFARE" TO BE DELIVERED AT
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

At the outset I wish to express to General Harper and to the officers in the Command of the Air University and of the Air War College my appreciation of having thought of me in connection with these courses and asking me to give this address on "Diplomacy as a Weapon of Modern Warfare" at the opening of this important course. It must have been my good friend Colonel Gibson, for whose qualities as an officer and as a man I have such high regard and with whom it has been my privilege to have so many interesting conversations, who proposed my name in this connection. I feel a very deep sense of responsibility in appearing before you and am very conscious of my inadequacy adequately to present this theme, in spite of my long experience in the service of our Government at many posts.

May I also say at the outset that it is my considered opinion, out of some 34 years of service for our Government in various posts in Europe and in Latin America and in the State Department in Washington, and the relatively wide opportunity for observation which I have had of events in that period, that our country is passing through the gravest period in its history and the decisions which are taken now and in the ensuing months will determine not only our own security and future, but that they will be the determining factor as to the kind of world in which we, and we do not know how many generations to follow, will live.

I should also in these preliminary observations make clear that what I shall say today will be facts and observations and conclusions drawn from a long period in the Foreign Service of our Government which ended in August, 1947, and not on what has been written on this subject. I follow this course because I believe that whatever service I can render through the giving of such a lecture grows out of my own experience and observation, for you all have
have had ample opportunity to study and undoubtedly have read what may have been written on this subject.
THE AVAILABILITY OF DIPLOMACY AS A WEAPON OF MODERN WARFARE.

The theme which has been assigned me, "Diplomacy as a Weapon of Modern Warfare", is an extremely difficult one to elaborate because of its very nature, and particularly difficult to cover within a reasonable lecture period.

You have heard this week men more competent than I in their respective fields address you on the ground forces, the naval forces and the air forces as weapons of modern warfare. These are the accepted and powerful and effective weapons of modern warfare. Diplomacy has been considered to be and primarily is a weapon to avoid the necessity of recourse to war, rather than as a weapon in war. The armed forces it is more and more understood are an effective weapon to avoid war as well as a major weapon in waging war. I do not think that we differ very much in our own country any longer as to the fact that the existence of adequate and superior armed forces in our country is one of the strongest single preventive factors normally against war. A carefully considered and clearly defined constructive, continuous and constantly intelligently and adequately implemented internal and foreign policy in the public interest, and which takes into account in an equitable manner the just interests of other countries, is the most powerful weapon for the prevention of war for it removes the bases of war, and creates the conditions in which the germs of war cannot prosper and which tend to peace.

Diplomacy is a weapon of modern warfare but it is more a weapon to avoid war than to aid in achieving objectives and victory during war. Once armed conflict starts it is of primary importance that the major objectives of our policy remain clear to our own people and to the rest of the world, but during the conflict itself diplomacy as a weapon in the national interest is limited in its scope and effect. During conflicts as we know them
in world history before the First World War we know that diplomatic effort played an important and sometimes a preponderant role during armed conflict. Since the beginning of the First World War and particularly during the Second World War we have learned that while diplomacy remains a weapon during the actual progress of armed conflict, its effectiveness and scope are more limited.

More specifically I would say that until the beginning of the First World War diplomacy had been able to play an important part as a weapon during armed conflict and diplomatic effort was even able to destroy the effectiveness of superior armed forces in the field. One of the characteristics of the First and Second World Wars was the effective use of diplomacy as a weapon by Nazi Germany and today by Soviet Russia. I hope during the course of the observations I shall make to you to find the time to make reference to the way certain policies, situations and individuals were used by Nazi Germany to undermine the political and economic situation in Southeastern Europe, and also to make reference to the manner in which Soviet Russia has been and now is using the same tactics and procedures.

The character of warfare has changed completely in so many ways and with the development of total war, and I think we are all of the opinion that it is the only kind of war now to be envisaged, diplomacy is increasingly ineffective once armed conflict starts as it has so limited a field, both physically and psychologically, in which to operate. Nevertheless, in spite of the increasing scope of total war during the First and Second World Wars, diplomacy remained an active instrument during war itself, but I am inclined to think that now, diplomacy as an active instrument during actual conflict will have less value when two major forces such as those of our country and Soviet Russia would be opposed and the military conflict is one which
which in one form or another extends to practically every corner of the world.

In the discussion of the theme assigned me I shall therefore consider diplomacy as a weapon more particularly in the period preceding actual conflict in total warfare.
WHAT IS DIPLOMACY?

If we are to consider diplomacy as a weapon, and it is a weapon, it is essential that we have in mind just what we read into this term. During my long period of service for our Government I constantly noted that diplomacy and particularly the practice thereof has little or no professional literature. You who are accustomed to the availability of definite professional literature have undoubtedly been struck by the fact that you have had little access to books on diplomatic practice or on the methods of formulation and implementation of policy. Such books as you have on strategy and military practice and which exist for practically all professions are lacking in the field of diplomacy. We have recourse to the record of history and to the part that individuals have played in the formulation and conduct of foreign relations. We have illuminating memoirs of outstanding individuals who played preponderant parts in the formulation and implementation of policy and less important and futile books of the same type. We have no professional literature either defining diplomacy as a profession, setting forth its substance, or outlining its techniques and practices.

I am not going to try to define diplomacy for you for I feel myself inadequate to properly define this term. Negatively, I may say that it is not merely the actuation of diplomatic missions and agents beyond our borders, in accord with a rather common conception. Positively, it may be correctly stated that diplomacy involves the whole machinery of the formulation of foreign policy and the implementation thereof at home and abroad. Further, it involves the planning of major over-all near and long range foreign policy; the fitting in of near and long range policy as respects definite areas and countries into this major over-all long range foreign policy; the daily implementation
implementation of these major over-all and specialized area policies; and all this involves the existence of the adequate organization at home for the formulation of policy and for the giving of the necessary instructions and guidance for implementation, and the maintenance of appropriate establish-
ments in strategic places throughout the world and selection of adequate means and persons to implement that policy at home and abroad.

Foreign policy must have definite objectives and continued and at the same time cannot be static - more particularly as to certain areas and methods of implementation in certain areas. Foreign policy must have as its major objective the furtherance of the national interest and the protection and safety of that interest, taking into account the equitable and just rights and aspirations of other countries.

While the formulation and conduct of foreign policy is placed by the Constitution in the hands of the President, and his immediate instrument the State Department, the times in which we live make it necessary that foreign policy be formulated through the close collaboration of all the executive agencies of government particularly concerned. The Constitution did not foresee the participation of the legislative branch of our Government in the actual formulation and conduct of policy except through the ratification of declaration of war, the approval of treaties and the providing of the machinery necessary for the formulation and conduct of policy. The increased degree to which the legislative branch has entered into the formulation and conduct of policy and even in direct diplomatic practice is a development of recent years and is worthy of examination as to its advantages and disadvantages, and to this I hope to refer at another point in the re-
marks which I shall make to you.
Too great emphasis cannot be placed on the necessity for foreign policy being the result of coordinated consideration by all of the appropriate agencies of government concerned. It has been a deficiency in our Government from the earliest years that there has been a lack of such adequate coordination between the branches of government and more particularly between the executive agencies. This is not only true in our country but in the governments of most countries, and in the governments of many countries today even more than in our own. For many years of our history, when our problems were mostly internal, and our interest in developments abroad much less, and the repercussions of developments abroad upon us of a relatively minor character, this lack of coordination in foreign policy was a disadvantage, but was not so dangerous. Now that we have the position of world leadership which has been thrust on us, and it is the first time in history that a country has had this position without at least directly or indirectly seeking it, this lack of coordination would not only be dangerous, but would in fact in our day and at this moment be catastrophic. I doubt whether we can throw stones from one executive agency into the house of the other. It is inherent in democracies that agencies of government are extremely jealous of their position and so-called prerogatives. This is not a weakness of democracy. The situation in dictatorships, total or partial, is much worse for in them it is the jealousies and ambitions for power of individuals which are so dangerous. To you in the armed forces where such coordination of policy and effort as well as of administration of these vital arms of government has been so difficult to achieve, and has not yet been fully achieved, it is not so difficult to understand why this coordination between other agencies of government and of agencies of government in the matter of foreign policy has not been accomplished, even today, in an adequate measure.
One of the most useful things which I believe I can say to you as drawn out of my own experience is that I am convinced that there can be no adequate formulation of foreign policy which is really in the best interests of the country and which policy has a hope of successful achievement, unless there is this coordination between the appropriate agencies of government in the making and implementation of such policy. It may have been quite safe for the Executive and the State Department to formulate foreign policy during so many years of our history without such coordination with other agencies of government, because the world in which we lived and our place in that world did not make foreign policy so important for our safety and future. Now with the position which we hold and the problems we have to meet every day such lack of coordination is dangerous because on a major factor in foreign policy we might arrive at a decision which does not take into account some internal and external factors vital to the determination of sound and safe policy.

We know that war, when it now comes, is total warfare, and we know that wars are no longer settled on the basis of negotiated treaties which leave to certain countries, including the defeated, a good deal of their sovereignty and way of life. War is now total war and that means that one country or a group of countries united in war on one side come out as the victor, and whether that country or group leaves to any others — strong or weak — any vestige of their sovereignty or way of life depends upon the will of the victor or the victor group. The change to total warfare, therefore, and to this position of primary responsibility of the United States in the world picture, makes the formulation of foreign policy by us an entirely different and vital matter.
The Executive - that is, the President - and the State Department can no longer alone formulate foreign policy, because no matter how wise the President and the Secretary of State and their respective aides may be, they cannot in the extraordinary times in which we live and with our broad responsibilities, alone take into account all of the factors in our country and in other countries which have to be considered in the formulation of policy, nor can they adequately daily implement policy agreed upon except through the coordination of the common effort of all the agencies of government and economic and psychologic forces of our country. We are happily achieving an increasing measure of coordination but we are far from having reached the point of safety. Parenthetically, here I would like to observe that the existence of such schools as this of the Air Force, and of similar schools in other branches of the armed forces, is increasingly an important factor in the formulation of policy, for it is in these schools that men are trained to take into account every factor which has to be considered in the determination of policy, in the defining of objectives, of the means available to reach such objectives, and of the methods of using these means to the greatest effect.

Successful warfare today means the use of every single capacity which a country has to make itself effective and controlling. Armed forces which must maintain contact with the enemy and destroy it in this day of total war and in view of the character of modern warfare can only be effective if every single resource of the population is behind them. Just so in the stages preceding actual conflict, when diplomacy can be and is our principal weapon to avoid war, that diplomacy cannot really be effective unless the same elements in the country are behind it in peace which are used to achieve victory during
during actual warfare. This is just another way of saying that no matter how effective the organization for the formulation and conduct of policy may be, the implementation of it through diplomatic action cannot be effective unless there is behind that diplomatic action every vital factor in the country which would be employed in our defense or in the defeat of the enemy in war.
SECTION IV.

FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

It is difficult to state with that clarity which is desirable the major objectives of our foreign policy today because in many respects some of these objectives are just in formulation. We are in the extraordinary position of having become, without any desire or plan on our part, the controlling factor politically, militarily and economically in the world today. In the past the countries which have held this position of leadership have either sought it deliberately and shaped their policy to that end or it has come to them through a period of developments in the world picture which was rather gradual. In whatever way countries previously occupying this position reached it, deliberately or through the course of events, they had the time in which to shape their policies, define their near and long range objectives, study the methods of implementation, and to prepare individuals for specific tasks. We have not had this opportunity and before we have had time to formulate the major over-all near and long range policies to carry through our position we are faced by a world in which another country definitely wishes to grasp this world leadership. We are in the position of having to protect and defend our country and others, and even to protect a position of world leadership which we have not wanted, not because we want to retain it, but because we must retain it in the interest of others as well as ourselves.

I may make a few general observations on the objectives of foreign policy. From your reading of history you will have noted that the objectives of the foreign policy of a country change with the degree of its political and economic development, in relation with that of its neighbors, and with those countries with which for economic reasons and in some cases for political reasons, it must maintain certain intercourse and status. You will have observed
observed that the foreign policy of no country, great or small, can be static.

You will, however, have observed that always a major objective of foreign policy is to maintain the prestige of the country in the rest of the world so as to create the conditions under which the country's sovereignty and way of life may be safeguarded and its channels of trade essential to its internal life remain open. You will have observed that considerations of defense become important as objectives in foreign policy when certain conditions prevail in the area in which the country lies, or when the country becomes sufficiently important to become a subject of envy by another.

For many years of our history the major objective of our foreign policy was the maintenance of peaceful relationships with all other states through the establishment of a favorable atmosphere for our country, our institutions and our goods; to keep open sources of supply under favorable conditions for materials which are needed in our internal economy; to promote our prestige and friendly feeling and respect for us by making known the basic principles underlying our government and the aspirations of our people; in making known our basic institutions; and to bring to us a flow of the best in the way of new blood and ideas which we believed would aid in our own development. In the wars which we fought in the interval after the War of Independence and before the First World War we had no reason to believe that our sovereignty or independence was threatened. We could devote ourselves so far as our relationships with other states were concerned to the development of peaceful, friendly relations. We had no aspirations to acquire sovereignty over other peoples.

An historical examination of the fundamental objectives of our foreign policy in the past will not help us very much in the study of what must be the objectives of our foreign policy today. On the other hand a study of the
the objectives of foreign policy of certain other countries and particularly that of Russia over the years is helpful. I say Russia instead of Soviet Russia because in so many respects, as you know, the policy of Soviet Russia today finds many of its origins in the policy of previous governments in that country.

In the summary remarks which I shall find it possible to make with respect to the major objectives of our foreign policy today I take into account first the new position which we hold in the world and the responsibilities which go with it and which we cannot avoid without inviting certain disaster for us. This position has brought, with great suddenness, upon us the important need for broad further policies such as up to a few years ago did not enter into our thinking. We enter into this position at a time when we have these tremendous responsibilities and burdens and immediately present dangers and practically none of the advantages which go along with the position of a great power. We had become slowly but inadequately accustomed to the responsibilities of a great world power and in fact one of the preponderant world powers in the period between the First and Second World Wars, but we did not and we could not adequately foresee the position into which we would be so rapidly forced by developments in the world picture. Now we have been forced into the position of the greatest world power and confronted immediately by the second greatest world power which has aggressive designs on everyone and naturally and particularly on us, for we primarily stand in their way in the gaining of their major objectives. For this position we are in some respects unprepared so far as experience in the conduct of foreign relationships is concerned. As I have already inadequately indicated, European countries such as Spain, France and England, which formerly occupied
somewhat similar positions, were better prepared through long historic background for coping with the new situations which came with greater power and responsibility. Our position of world leadership comes at a time when we have not had the opportunity to learn how to exercise it and with no experience of our own in the past to guide us, and at a moment when we are threatened, and the world is threatened, by another world power which has aggressive designs and the principal objective of which is to weaken us by destroying our strength, and the strength and political and economic stability of all those countries which would be our natural ally. It is not too much to say that not only has no country ever before been so quickly pushed into a position of world power without preparation for it, but also that no country which reached this position before was ever immediately confronted with the necessity for active implementation of its defense and the burden upon it of strengthening urgently the defenses, politically, economically and socially, of those similarly menaced and in a weaker or practically defenseless position.

It is no wonder, therefore, that we may have floundered somewhat, that we have made mistakes such as those which confront us in Germany and in Berlin today. It is no wonder that a foreign policy which is adequate to protect our interests and to carry through the constructive things which are necessary in practically every part of the world as a part of our defense, is proceeding slowly and painfully. In my opinion, taking all things into account, we have done not too badly and the most vital factor in the whole situation today is that the people of our country recognize the situation in which we are and are willing to support government in the policy which the policy-forming agencies may determine is necessary. This latter factor does not make the burden of policy making any easier but it does furnish the
background in which effective policy can be formulated and conducted. This has not formerly been true, for it was this lack of adequate public opinion and support, for example, which made it impossible for us to do in the years preceding the Second World War the things, both with respect to armament and support of other governments, which our Government knew was essential for us.

In the formulation of the major objectives of our foreign policy today we know and take into account that not only we but every other country is definitely threatened by Soviet Russia which has shown openly its hand. We know that Soviet Russia has a definite objective in its foreign policy which is that of Soviet domination of the world. We know that Soviet Russia is utterly ruthless and unswerving in its efforts to achieve this objective. We know that negotiation, conciliation and bargaining on any safe basis, which have been instruments in the past in dealing with other countries, are impossible in our dealings with Soviet Russia. We know that Soviet Russia, either through ignorance or overconfidence, is practically fearless in endeavoring to gain its objective. We know that up to now it desires postponement of war in order to better prepare itself for its conduct of the war which it itself undoubtedly considers inevitable. We know that its policy is shaped towards creating continuous and constantly increasing unrest so that no condition may be present outside of its own territory which leads to the strengthening of the position of others.

One thing is therefore certain and that is that at least the objectives and methods of the country aiming to destroy us and others are clear. This makes the over-all objective of our foreign policy, and in a large measure of our internal policy, a single one, and that is to take all those measures necessary to strengthen our internal position; our internal economy; our internal social and political position; to establish our military striking power.
power on a basis superior to that of Soviet Russia; and by all means in our power, political, economic, financial and military, to aid those countries which are resisting the aggressor and whom it is considered possible to maintain in a position where they can increasingly offer resistance to the aggressor, keeping in mind that we may be faced at any moment by direct attack or by the necessity of assuming the offensive ourselves.

Coupled with these measures we must make all possible efforts to maintain peace by bringing about understanding and making it clear to the active aggressor as well as to others that while our objective is not domination over the aggressor or other countries but to maintain a position in which all can live in peace and with decency and without fear, we are prepared to strike and to strike any time to destroy the aggressor if we find this necessary for our safety and that of others.

We recognize this situation. We are slowly and gradually formulating our policy and implementing it, keeping in mind this situation. We are making it clear to the world that the primary objective of our foreign policy is the maintenance of our security and peace and that of others; that we have no designs on the sovereignty or territory of others; that we have no political or social philosophy that we wish to force on others but that we are determined to maintain our own democratic institutions and to aid others in maintaining their democratic institutions as the best way of life any of us have yet found; that we are prepared to talk with all countries including Soviet Russia on a conciliatory and peaceful basis; that if necessary we are prepared to defend ourselves and others with all the means in our power. In my opinion we have reached the point when we must make it more definitely clear to Soviet Russia and to the rest of the world that we are prepared to undertake the initiative if this becomes necessary to destroy the military power of Soviet Russia before it can
it can destroy us and the rest of the world. The Soviet Government and those who are controlling the peoples inhabiting the area controlled by Soviet Russia do not understand any other language except that of force. The more clearly it is understood that we will use the force at our command when we see fit the greater possibility there is that we may not have to use that force.
The capacity of a country to carry through a strong, effective foreign policy is dependent primarily on the internal conditions prevailing in the country. A country in which political and social peace and justice prevail, in which industry and agriculture have a certain balance and are highly developed, and in which the people are thrifty, is able to play a role in the world picture frequently far beyond that which its population, size and wealth would indicate. (Belgium, Holland, Sweden). A country cannot play a preponderant role in foreign relations or make its own policy effective unless such policy has behind it the full resources of the country.

In the time in which we live and in the position in which we are and with the immediate imperative responsibilities for action which we have we cannot implement the soundest foreign policy which may be evolved by those responsible in our Government unless we develop and maintain economic, social, political and financial conditions and programs in our own country which give us not only the physical power we need, but also the prestige, the capacity to help, to bargain, to establish confidence, and even where it is necessary to create wholesome fear. We have the economic power which we need to implement the policy which is necessary for our defense and responsibilities and even for an offensive policy. No country ever had or will reach for years to come the economic power possessed by the United States.

We have still relatively sound social peace. In this respect, however, we have not escaped the general world social unrest growing out of two great wars in such close succession. We have not altogether escaped the insidious effects of the social unrest promoted by Soviet Russia as part of its policy of weakening to destroy. We have social problems in our own country and these have developed at somewhat an alarming rate in recent years, but there is among
is among us a sense of equity and social justice and a generosity which will make it possible to weather the storms through which we are passing. We have to maintain this social peace and equity or our economic power will be weakened.

We have an unequalled position of prestige and confidence in the world today. This position with respect to equity and confidence is somewhat impaired in certain areas. We have failed to take adequately into account the fact that this continent is our house and that our relations with the other American republics are just as important for us as our relations with more distant countries. We have given great thought to maintaining social, economic and political stability in Europe and in the Far East and have failed to take the necessary measures to aid our neighbors in this hemisphere in an adequate measure. We have forged a Defense Pact among the American states and then have not taken into account that such a defense pact is useless unless the states participating in it have a certain economic and political stability. We have done things for distant countries which we have refused to do for our nearest neighbors who could be vulnerable spots in our defense system and actively helpful in case of war, as was demonstrated in the last world conflict. Without keeping this in mind and maintaining balanced policy we weaken our prestige and the confidence which others have in us.

We must practice equity in our relations with all countries with which we wish to maintain friendly and helpful relations and keep as allies.

We must have continuity of policy, for without continuity there is no basis of confidence in our policy, our strength and in our determination to carry through which strengthens our position and influence and aids in the
maintenance of proper conditions in other countries.

We must have adequate military strength in the three branches of the armed forces. This military strength we must maintain in the times in which we are at the highest level of efficiency and effectiveness and let it be known to the world what we have and it must be clear that we are prepared to use it if necessary for our defense and that of others. On this point there can be no uncertainty. One of the dangers and unhappy factors in the European situation today is that the people of Europe who have no sympathy with Communism or its works and its methods and who hate it fundamentally as much as we do, are uncertain as to whether we will use our power to stop the encroachments of Soviet Russia or whether we will permit Soviet Russia to grow so strong that she will not only engulf these countries, but also destroy us. Until this fear is removed to a greater degree than it has been up to now through the implementation of the policy of stopping Russia which we have already evolved, and until we have made it clear to the rest of the world that we are prepared to use all our strength to stop Soviet Russia, this pall of fear will remain over Europe and in a measure counteract the constructive things which we are doing.

We can only be strong outside of our borders as we are at home. The factors I have mentioned are basic. One of the most important developments to indicate the degree of maturity which we have reached in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy is the circumstance that the two major political parties, instead of making foreign policy a matter of political difference, are now collaborating closely in a single policy.

In summary the weapons at our command are:

1. Social peace at home and increasing social justice.

2. The maintenance of our economy at its present high level of efficiency and its continued strengthening and broadening.
3. An understanding of our people of the things which threaten us and readiness to defend our position.

4. A recognition by our people of the vital necessity of maintaining the governments and economies of other countries.

5. The maintenance of preponderant military strength in every branch.

6. The possession of military weapons superior to those of any other country. We must maintain that superiority.

7. Increasing coordination in the formulation of policy and increasing effectiveness in implementing it.

8. Bi-partisan conduct of foreign relations.
TECHNIQUES OF DIPLOMACY.

I will make only a few observations on the techniques of diplomacy. This is too broad, too important and too complicated a phase of the theme assigned me to cover in this lecture. My observations which follow are necessarily very brief and general. I wish to precede these too inadequate observations I shall make by one thought. You, as military men, know that no matter how carefully planned an operation may be it depends upon the skill and techniques and resourcefulness of the chief operating officer in command on the spot, and all his associates and subordinates as to how effectively the operation can be carried through. The same applies in the implementation of foreign policy, where techniques and individual resourcefulness may even be more important, and certainly more far-reaching in their fundamental effects, than in military practice.

The practice of foreign relationships has its techniques which are just as important in that field as strategy in the planning of the use of armed forces. Human elements must be used to implement policy at home and abroad, just as they must be used to manipulate military weapons. Both in military and diplomatic warfare the human elements are important and failure of the human element can be as disastrous in foreign policy and diplomatic practice as it may be in the manipulation of armed forces. Diplomacy is an art, it is not a science. Fixed rules and techniques cannot apply, for the application of fixed rules and techniques can bring more often disaster than success. Policy is essential as an objective and as a directive. It is a complete vacuum unless applied with infinite variety of techniques depending upon the particular conditions and the particular problem which has to be met. The same conditions or the same problem in one country may have to be met with an entirely different set of approaches and techniques in another country.
There is perhaps no single activity in which human beings play the major part, in which the equity and capacity, understanding, flexibility, tact and resourcefulness of the human element play so important a part. This is why Chiefs of Mission, Foreign Service Officers, and those chosen to implement policy abroad must be selected not only on the basis of capacity to pass certain examinations or because they have a certain prestige or political position at home, or because they have performed some useful service at home for which a reward is indicated, but they must be men with that combination of qualities which make it possible for them to understand and to meet conditions which they have to meet in the country in which they serve and to be able to bring to bear on every problem the equity and understanding and the force of our policy as well as of our power. The idea that Chiefs of Mission should be chosen from the Career Foreign Service is in principle an excellent one but in practice one which cannot be adhered to inflexibly. The idea that diplomats do not count in our time is erroneous and dangerous, for in some respects the personality and capacity of Chiefs of Mission is more important today than it has been for many years. One man can often change hostile attitudes in another country in a short time. There are qualities such as those of personality, flexibility, tact, resourcefulness, language, etc. which are as important as understanding of the problems to be dealt with.

The Chiefs of Mission and the responsible heads of our Foreign Service establishments must be given the consideration which their position has inherent in it, for otherwise they cannot carry through their work abroad nor carry the weight at home which they should have. Chiefs of Mission and responsible Foreign Service Officers must maintain contact with the highest policy officers and executive officers of the respective agencies at home.
at home, as otherwise they are not in a position to adequately carry through their responsibilities abroad or to bring to their own government the information and advice and counsel which should be so important and which cannot be expected to trickle through third and second levels to the top. A self-respecting, effective Foreign Service Officer abroad must be conscious of the fact that he has adequate access to those responsible at home, for without that consciousness his usefulness is impaired, his self-respect is destroyed and his prestige diminished.

In most countries today direct contact between Chiefs of Mission and heads of states abroad or the highest responsible officer is essential and the language qualifications in certain cases are indispensable. The direct contact between Chiefs of Mission and responsible Foreign Service Officers and the adequately high responsible officers of other governments in these days is indispensable, and without intermediaries. Where it is known that such direct contact would be hampered if there is a language obstacle, no Chief of Mission or Foreign Service Officer should be assigned to such post, for he will suffer from an almost insuperable obstacle. No responsible head of state or high foreign official will talk in the way it is necessary to talk these days with our people if there is present an interpreter of his own or ours. The dangers to both parties are too great to permit the presence of interpreters on such occasions except when it cannot be avoided and then the contact is less effective than it would otherwise be.

I do not wish to overemphasize the importance of the individual in the contact between our country and others, but experience from the very beginnings of our foreign relationships has demonstrated the importance of this. The mission of Benjamin Franklin to France was to win France, as the hereditary enemy of England, to our side, and he did it by his tact, understanding and resourcefulness.
resourcefulness and the use of every means within his power to gain the aid of a then strong country for a struggling and weak one, and he overcame what seemed to be insuperable obstacles. Times have changed but human beings are very much the same and the techniques which Franklin employed in Paris are those which serve most effectively today.
THE PRESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE.

The use of the press and of public opinion forming organs and means at home and abroad, as instruments in the implementation of policy, is a theme which is too broad for me to cover in these remarks which I have the opportunity to make today. I only wish to say that without the adequate and full use of this public opinion forming means the implementation of policy is ineffective. Outside of military power and economic power there is no instrument which is so useful in the implementation of policy as properly informed public opinion. It is not only that such properly informed public opinion is necessary as the basis for government to carry through specific policies at home, but also to make them effective abroad. We are still new in the use of these public opinion organs. The press is like a musical instrument on which all tones can be employed as the circumstances and objectives require. We are still very new to this instrument and are just learning to use it.

We are hampered in the use of these public opinion forming organs by the same restraints and the same inhibitions which in some respects have hampered us in achieving objectives through the use of other instrumentalities. I still remain of the opinion that the correct, truthful and adequate use of the press and opinion giving and opinion forming means are still the most effective methods of using this weapon, rather than the insidious methods employed by Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia today, and by those who follow their lead and their directions.
EQUITY AND UNDERSTANDING AS INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY.

Equity and understanding are basic practices in the effective implementation of policy. Human nature, as we know, is the same no matter what the color of the skin or the shape of the face may be. There is no safer and surer road to gain confidence than to establish the conviction that one is proceeding on the basis of equity, fairness and understanding. Because we are Anglo-Saxons we take certain things for granted in intercourse which cannot be taken for granted. There are other mental processes than our own, although basic sentiments, feelings and prejudices may be the same.

To negotiate a treaty or an agreement through the use of force has no permanent value. It creates distrust in others, and fear and resentment in the other party to the treaty. If a treaty or agreement is to last it must be equitable.

Similarly understanding is the second sure approach to the other man. No matter what differences of all kinds there may be between two individuals, if it is possible to establish the feeling that you are honestly and adequately endeavoring to understand the other man's position and the problems with which he has to deal, and to appreciate his basic springs of action, the principal obstacle to finding a common ground has been overcome.

The practice of the diplomatic art in so many respects does not differ from the ordinary day to day relationships between individuals in a small community. Equity and understanding are the keys which will open closed hearts and will often overcome centuries old prejudices if the approaches are made in the right way.

The experience of many a resourceful and understanding diplomat and statesman would bring out many concrete examples of how completely opposing points of view and seemingly irreconcilable ones have been cleared up through individuals
individuals on both sides getting together and examining the position in this spirit of equity and understanding. While equity and understanding must be bases in the practice of foreign relations, even such a broad spirit which controls in government will not be effective completely unless the instruments which maintain actual contact with other governments establish the conviction that they are working on a basis of such complete equity and understanding.

These notes do not permit any illustrating of the foregoing with details. It is hoped, however, in these notes to make a comparison of Nazi and Russian pressure methods in various fields, including the diplomatic, and which entirely exclude these basic considerations of equity and understanding. It may also be possible in these notes to make certain useful comparisons of German and Russian infiltration methods as a means of undermining the positions of governments or the particular policy of governments.
MACHINERY FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Foreign policy, no matter how wisely conceived and sound and safe in its objectives, is a pure vacuum unless there is continuity and adequate implementation thereof and this involves the existence of full and adequate formulation and machinery for implementation.

The machinery for the conduct of foreign relations and its implementation implies the following:

1. The President who under the Constitution is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations, and this implies the supreme control of the formulation of policy.

2. The Secretary of State as the officer directly responsible to the President to aid in the formulation and conduct and implementation of this Constitutional responsibility.

3. The Department of State which is the instrument of the President and of the Secretary of State for the formulation of policy and implementation at home and abroad.

4. The arrangements for coordination of the appropriate executive agencies of the government which must participate in the formulation of policy, particularly such as Treasury, National Defense and Commerce.

5. The Foreign Service which is the instrument of the President, of the Secretary of State and of the Department of State, and in fact for all agencies of government, for the gathering of information abroad; to act as the eyes and ears of our Government abroad; to act as the sole spokesman abroad for our Government; to bring to the Department of State matured observations and suggestions and recommendations on policy in particular areas for the consideration of those at the seat of government responsible for the formulation of major policy; to carry through the innumerable administrative functions set forth in our statutes for the protection of our citizens and our interests and their furtherance in various areas abroad; to bring to the heads of governments, high officials of governments and to peoples abroad the objectives of our policy and to serve as the instrument of the day to day implementation of such policy.

The degree to which the Executive - that is the President - enters into the formulation and implementation of policy has depended and will depend in a very large measure on the personality, capacity and inclinations of the President.
The participation of the President in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy is too broad a subject to discuss in adequate detail within the limit of these notes. I wish only to observe that if there are those who criticize the degree to which the President, particularly in the last decades, has intervened in the formulation and conduct of policy I would observe that such persons do frequently not take into account the fact that in the positions which we have held in the world during the last decades a considerable measure of direct intervention by the Executive in the formulation and conduct of policy has become necessary if it is to be adequately coordinated and effective. The makers of the Constitution definitely foresaw the scope of this responsibility of the Executive and all that has happened in the intervening years has accentuated the wisdom of those who placed the primary responsibility for formulation and conduct of policy in the Chief Executive. Anyone who has had intimate contact with the conduct of foreign policy in important periods of history realizes that there has to be a central authority to take decisions and enforce them.

The position of Secretary of State has been in our history and must, in my opinion, remain the central one in the actual machinery for the formulation and conduct of policy. This position has been almost continuously held in our country by men of the highest qualifications for this task. Developments in recent years have tended somewhat to subordinate the position of Secretary of State through the more direct intervention of the Executive and of the Senate and House committees in the formulation and conduct of policy. In the form in which this situation has developed it has not been helpful in reinforcing the implementation of policy and has been somewhat disintegrating so far as the conduct thereof is concerned. I would only observe that the predominant position of the Secretary of State in the field of foreign policy
policy and implementation does not exclude this important participation by
the President and by the legislative branch or the proper helpful participa-
tion of other agencies of government in formulation and implementation of
policy.

The Department of State has been and must remain the sole instrument of
our Government, in the machinery of government, for the formulation and con-
duct of policy. This is fundamental and cannot be too greatly stressed and
disregarding this fundamental fact would have increasingly serious conse-
quences in the effectiveness of foreign policy. I have elsewhere in these
remarks referred to the necessity of all appropriate agencies of government
entering into a coordinated formulation of policy. This includes the armed
forces. This coordination we have not adequately reached. There has been
a tendency on the part of particular agencies of government to force their
own points of view with respect to policy and to enter too greatly and con-
cretely in the implementation of policy. (Concrete examples can easily be
adduced but we need only recall the unhappy intervention of a recent Secretary
of Treasury in critical matters of foreign policy at critical moments.)

While the appropriate agencies of government must enter into the formulation
of policy and in an adequate measure once policy has been decided upon through
such coordinated effort, the Department of State must remain with its machinery
the instrument and the sole instrument for carrying it through. This is a
categoric statement but the experience of all countries including our own
has proved that the conduct of foreign policy must remain in one agency.

If the Department of State today is not in every respect adequate
through its machinery for the task which it has to carry through, I would
only observe that the appropriate steps have to be undertaken and without
delay to give that organization and machinery its full effectiveness.

During
During the last two decades efforts have been made to bring about the coordinated formulation of foreign policy to which I have made reference at several points in these papers. I participated in the beginnings of these efforts and realize the difficulties which have been and are being experienced in bringing about that coordination. The major difficulty has been not that the responsible officers of government fail to recognize the necessity for this coordination but that the occupations of the heads of the major government agencies make it difficult for them to directly participate in major foreign policy formulation. The principal defect so far has been that representation of agencies has been delegated to subordinates too far down the line. The adequate machinery for bringing together the points of view of the different agencies has not yet been established. The problem is not an insuperable one. The most feasible machinery which has so far been suggested but which has not yet been carried into effect is that the heads of certain government agencies sit as a council on foreign relations presided over by the Secretary of State and that this council have in each executive agency under the immediate supervision of the head thereof and who is a member of the council, a small group at the head of which is the alternate of the head of the department. With weekly meetings of the smaller group in each executive agency and with weekly meetings of the alternates of the heads of the executive agencies it would only be necessary for the council itself to meet every few weeks or at the call of the Secretary of State, or even at the suggestion of the head of one of the other executive agencies in the council when he believes a special problem requires consideration without delay.

Through a long and painful experience we succeeded in our government in establishing an effective Foreign Service. I believe we have arrived at the point
the point where we have the best equipped Foreign Service of any government. The maintenance of the most effective career Foreign Service as an instrument of the Department of State and of the other agencies of our Government abroad is of the most primary importance. A whole book could be devoted to the importance of this Foreign Service in the formulation and implementation of policy, but to you as professional members of a major branch of our Government service I need not expand on this.

At this point it may be noted that the too current impression that Chiefs of Mission and Foreign Service Officers are purely instruments for carrying through the policy determined at the seat of government is an erroneous one, although as a matter of fact it is only too true that governments are not sufficiently taking into account the advice and counsel of officers abroad. Any Chief of Mission or any Foreign Service Officer who has reached a certain category of service and experience must, if he is worth his salt, be in a position to give important observations and recommendations to his government with regard to policy respecting a specific country or area or a specific matter. Just as coordination is needed in the formulation of policy at home, so policy makers at home must take into account the observations, counsel and recommendations of men of proved experience and competence in the field. A Chief of Mission or a Foreign Service Officer who carries through an instruction or a directive in policy which, in his considered opinion, is contrary to the objectives of our major policy, and who does not before acting inform his government of his considered opinion, is not carrying through his real function. While the final directive of the home government must prevail, the officer in the field who does not make his convictions insistently known is a pure time server. (In this connection the difference between the points of view as to the attitude of England in the case of outbreak of war, just
just before the First World War, is a striking example and the observations of former Chancellor Bruning, of Germany, on this matter are pertinent. The failure of the German Government to adequately take into account these differences in views precipitated the actions which resulted in the actual outbreak of the First World War.

A word with reference to the increasing intervention of the legislative branch of government in the formulation and even conduct of policy may be desirable.

The original intent of the Constitution was that the intervention of the legislative branch in the formulation of policy should be limited to the enactment of laws which might be necessary as a basis for policy or for implementing it through appropriations for machinery and applied measures of policy. The Constitution also wisely foresaw the declaration of war and the approval of treaties by Congress. It definitely provides for the provision of funds by the Congress for the machinery for the formulation and implementation of policy at the seat of government and in the foreign field.

In the last few years, and it may be said in the last decade, a very unexpected development has taken place in the formulation of policy. The Senate and House committees having to do with foreign affairs has assumed a much greater role. I can recall the time when these committees did not play any important and certainly not a preponderant role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Today the House Committee, while it is secondary still in its role to the Senate Committee, is an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy and is increasingly entering into the implementation of policy.
policy. The Senate Committee, and more particularly its Chairman, has assumed a position in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy which has reached the degree of almost being controlling.

I can recall the time in which, when the Chairman of the Senate Committee or of the House Committee wished to confer with the Secretary of State or vice versa, the Chairman called on the Secretary on his own initiative or the Secretary requested the Chairman to call to see him. Today when the Chairman of the Senate or House Committee wish to see the Secretary of State they ask him to call at the committee rooms. I mention this merely to indicate the change which has taken place. Instead of being advisory bodies these committees have become, if not controlling, at least very extraordinarily important bodies in the formulation of policy.

As this development is of very great importance it may be worth while to enter into a few more observations. It is possible that the Congress, through its committees, may have asserted what may be too great a place in the formulation and conduct of policy and has been able to establish this position because the Congress controls the appropriations for the support of policy and without which appropriations the State Department and the Executive are helpless in implementation. It need not be observed that no matter how wise or sound a policy may be, unless it is supported by adequate appropriations it is a policy made in a vacuum. The use of appropriations as a club or big stick in asserting the views of Congress in the matter of foreign policy could prove to be most unhappy. Congressional committees and the floor of Congress are not the best places nor the best atmosphere in which to forge sound foreign policy. Sectional and individual influences and prejudices and decisions of the moment may play too important a part in a critical
a critical decision. The Congress has to legislate on a broad variety of subjects. The formulation of foreign policy requires accurate and definite knowledge of background. The machinery of Congress and even of the committees on Foreign Relations is not fitted for the formulation of foreign policy, as to be adequate it would involve setting up in each committee a small Department of State. (The degree to which an individual Congressman can use his position is not always understood by those not having intimate knowledge of the procedures of Congress. I can recall an instance in which a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made it clear that he would hold up any appropriations for the Department of State and any appointments of Chiefs of Mission until a certain person, who happened to be utterly incompetent, was appointed a Chief of Mission, and this person was appointed a Chief of Mission after the particular member of Congress had shown clearly that he was able to hold up appropriations and other appointments.) (A striking example of the dangers of too great direct participation in policy by Congressional committees is the precipitate action of the House Committee on Foreign Relations about a year ago in passing a resolution to the effect that Spain should immediately be admitted to the United Nations and the Marshall Plan. This was done on pure sentiment, inadequate information and hasty reaction, even though the Committee for the most part is made up of excellent men. Another striking example is the activity during the last few months of a Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Interstate Commerce, which through its intervention in foreign oil policy has set back a solution of the Mexican oil policy for at least six months or more by precipitate and ill-considered action, when as a matter of fact such a solution of the Mexican oil policy is of primary interest in our national defense and that of the continent.) It is too early to determine through practice and experience to what degree this intervention by the Committees on Foreign Affairs will be helpful or otherwise.
otherwise. From my observation and experience I would say that it has to be viewed still with a certain degree of concern, for no one executive branch of government and the Congress can use their powers to enforce a view of their own. I have endeavored to emphasize in these notes the importance of coordinated formulation of policy and that does not involve high pressure methods of any particular agency. (It is interesting to note in connection with this increasing participation of the Congressional committees that the present Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has preferred to remain in that position rather than to become Secretary of State and has not been too greatly tempted even by the possibility of the nomination of his party as a candidate for the Presidency.)
INCREASING ROLE PLAYED BY THE WAR COLLEGES.

An important development in the formulation of policy and implementation has been the establishment of the war colleges, such as this which I have the privilege to appear before today, to study not only warfare (contact of armed forces) but the conditions under which the military establishments can be most effective in the period preceding conflict through coordination with the other resources and forces of the Nation which must be behind the armed forces.

It would not be proper for me to enter into any discussion of the role played by the war colleges and the work done therein. It is sufficient for me to say that when I was in a position to do so, in the measure possible to me, I fostered the policy of selected officers of the Department of State participating in these courses, both giving and receiving through that participation. I should like to add that attendance of officers of the Foreign Service specially selected for their capacity and prospect of broader usefulness in these courses in the war colleges is particularly important and it is similarly important that the training facilities of the State Department are adequately developed and carefully selected military officers of adequate previous experience should be brought to such State Department training courses.
DESTRUCTIVE APPROACH IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE.

A destructive approach in diplomacy has been far more current and favored, as history shows, than the constructive approach which the United States has almost invariably used. The foreign policy of a country may be constructive in the sense that its objective is the primary interest of the country concerned but the history of relationship between states shows that as a rule the constructive aspect of policy has been limited in scope. Foreign policy was usually shaped with the idea of gaining particular advantages, whether in the form of prestige, territory, trade or temporary convenience. Even when in the 18th and 19th centuries the foreign policy of two or more states were shaped to a particular end it was usually defensive or offensive in character and egotistic in the sense that it was made without any concern as to equities or the sovereign rights of other states and peoples. It was for this reason that intrigues, arranged marriages, secret bargains and treaties and the mendacious attitude of diplomats characterized the relations between states. What we are concerned with today, however, is policy and diplomatic practice in the world in which we live.

The most outstanding examples in modern times of the destructive approach are that of Nazi Germany, and of Soviet Russia today.

When the Nazi German Government decided as its first political objective, after adequately consolidating the position of the government within Germany, to get control of Southeastern Europe, this was its first major decision in foreign policy. At the same time that they made this decision to get control of all of Southeastern Europe, by means other than force if possible and by force if necessary, they made at the same time the decision to endeavor to disarm the rest of the world as to their real intentions so that they could carry on their task without too much interference. Once this policy was formed
formed they started to implement it in a forceful, definite and effective manner.

They began a diplomatic and economic effort to undermine individuals and governments and economies in the countries which they wished to absorb. They selected as Chiefs of Mission in these Southeastern European countries men who were supposed by the rest of the world to be anti-Nazi, for the most part men who had a name which was respected and known in other countries, both as far as their own actuation was concerned and that of their families. Practically no out and out Nazis or even members of the party were chosen for these posts. These men, however, had the most specific instructions as to the objectives of their mission and these were to destroy by intrigue, promises, stirring up of internal difficulties, creating friction between neighboring countries, suborning of individuals, accentuating national aspirations for territory or economic advantage, in fact every possible subversive instrument.

(It might be useful, if time permits, to illustrate the foregoing by a resume of a conversation which the writer had with General Seering and with General Milch in March or April 1932 when Seering was thinking of making himself Foreign Minister and bringing about certain changes in the German diplomatic and consular representation.)

At the same time that these apparently responsible and respected men were sent as Chiefs of Mission to create confidence in the rest of the world and in the countries to which they were accredited, under-cover emissaries were sent from Germany to work in these countries. This was begun just as soon as the Nazi Government came into power. No time was lost. I know a good many of these men who were sent as under-cover agents, usually on short
missions, to Southeastern Europe. These men did not hesitate to speak to me in the most cynical manner of the easy success which they claimed to have had, usually through the making of the most opposite promises to various individuals and groups in those countries, which for reasons of personal advantage and the hope of coming power which they could not otherwise hope to achieve, fell for these promises. This aspect must not be underestimated, for it was the work of these temporary under-cover agents in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia which did incalculable harm and they sowed the seeds which sprouted so rapidly. They knew the terrain in which they were working. They knew the thwarted ambitions of generals, prelates, government officials, industrialists, writers and artists and every type which could in any way influence a sector of public opinion, large or small. Quietly and insidiously they made it known to these people that whatever they would do would not be forgotten when the change in government and Nazi control came. Almost invariably, however, they endeavored to make it clear that national sovereignty would remain and their argumentation lay in the direction of principal advantage for the individuals concerned and the advantages which would come to their country through collaboration by it in the Nazi orbit.

(If we have anything to learn from Nazi practices and in a lesser measure from Soviet practices today it is that for diplomatic action to be effective it is absolutely necessary to know with the most complete assurance the country in which the diplomatic agents are working, and this involves not only the political and economic, but the social, religious and professional life of the country, undin fact an accurate knowledge of the outstanding individuals in particular countries - their idiosyncrasies, prejudices, strengths and weaknesses, and ambitions.)
I cannot go into the giving of specific examples of how this destructive diplomatic approach worked in practice but there is no more outstanding example than the one which is fairly well known and that is the actuation of von Papen as Minister to Austria and later Ambassador to Turkey. Von Papen was bitterly opposed to the Nazi regime in Germany in the earlier years. Some of the strongest public addresses made against the National Socialist Party and against Hitler and setting forth the dangers of a Nazi government in Germany were made by von Papen. This did not prevent von Papen from plotting with von Schroeder, the banker, von Schleicher, the general, and some of the leading industrialists in Germany in October and November 1932, and to help to bring about the unholy bargain which brought the Nazi party into power in January 1933, and von Papen got his reward as Chancellor for a brief period. He was marked for liquidation in the June 30, 1934 massacre and was saved by General von Fritsch and the Reichswehr. In spite of this, almost
almost immediately following this June 30 massacre which he escaped by a hair and in which two of his three devoted secretaries were killed, he accepted the post of Minister to Austria to succeed von Rief, who had helped to engineer the assassination of Dollfuss. I had known von Papen for years. It was in the little island of Curaçao, during the First World War, that the records of the State Department, and I feel sure those of the War and Navy Departments, will show that I discovered through a strange combination of circumstances the code which von Papen and his associates in Washington were using to communicate with German agents in the United States and in Latin America. It was a strange coincidence that I should be our Minister to Austria when von Papen arrived in Vienna as German Minister. When I called on him in Vienna some weeks after his arrival in order to make the indispensable courtesy call and to return the one which he had made on me, he calmly informed me that it was his business to undermine the Austrian Government and to bring about a Nazi régime and anschluss with Germany. In the most cynical and direct manner he said that one of his principal methods of approach would be through the Catholic Church, Cardinal Innitzer and other important Catholics, and observed that he was the ideal instrument to do this job for his country because he and his wife were both known to be devout Catholics. The records of the State Department must contain the despatch which I wrote covering this extraordinary interview which for cynicism was one of the most dreadful of which I have personal experience. I witnessed von Papen at work, faithfully and confidently carrying through the instructions which he had received and it is only too sad a commentary on human nature that history registers the important part his work played in German successes.

It is sufficient to say that following this "successful" tour of duty in Austria von Papen was sent to Turkey as Ambassador to carry through the
same job and where, as we know, he met complete failure, because he was
dealing with a different people whose ways he did not understand and which
during preceding years had learned how to deal with a diplomatic representative
from Germany of his type.

The work of von Papen was paralleled in other Southeastern European
countries by men of his type but often with less capacity for intrigue. The
efforts of these men were adequately seconded by under-cover men to do the
jobs which the Chief of Mission could not do.

At the same time that the direct subversive effort was being carried
through in Southeastern European countries the Nazi Government sent men like
Dr. Luther to the United States in order that they, by their previous record
known in our country, could cover up the real objectives of the Nazi Govern-
ment. Men like Luther and Dieckhoff committed great crimes against their own
country and the rest of the world. Both of them knew fully the dangers of
the Nazi Government to Germany and to the world but they were, out of pure
opportunism, willing to take these posts and they became, so far as circum-
stances permitted, relatively effective diplomatic instruments and they did
a great deal of harm to disorient the opinion of important people in Wash-
ington and in the rest of our country.

Ribbentrop, a relatively mediocre man, but who spoke English like an
Englishman, and who had a certain superficial charm of manner, was sent to
London and there, with a large house and unlimited money at his disposal,
became the instrument of the Nazi Government to establish contact with all
those groups in England who feared war, which had Fascist tendencies or
which for some reason or other were discontented, and he did not fail to use
even those whose mental equilibrium was disturbed. Ribbentrop was shrewd
and cunning and even in a country so definitely threatened by growing Nazi
power
power and even in a country which in a large measure was informed of the objectives of Nazi Germany against England, secured a considerable influence over the then King, largely by the attentions which Ribbentrop showed to Mrs. Simpson in the German Embassy, when she was being in a large measure ignored in England and in diplomatic houses in London. I mention this latter phase of Ribbentrop's activity in London merely because it shows that this Nazi diplomacy did not fail to use every single instrument of intrigue that had been used during the centuries.

It is not necessary to multiply examples, but what was done by German diplomats in Europe, in the Far East and in Latin America, as well as in the United States, was tremendous. If ever diplomacy was used as a destructive instrument in a critical time it was successfully used by Nazi Germany during the period under reference.

It is lamentable but necessary to show here also the degree to which the diplomatic agents of several European countries most threatened became really in a measure agents to forward Nazi ambition and lust for power. When I was stationed in Vienna as Minister from 1934 to 1937 a Secretary of the British Legation was removed after considerable difficulty by the British Minister, because in his conversation he was showing definite sympathy for the Nazi regime in Germany and for Nazi ambitions to dominate Austria. To the consternation of his Chief in Vienna, he was sent from Vienna as First Secretary in Prague, where the German activities to destroy Czech sovereignty and resistance were getting to their height, and in Prague this British Secretary did not hesitate to openly express his sympathies with the German ambition to dominate Southeastern Europe. This was in the period that Chamberlain was directing the foreign policy of England and endeavoring to direct the force of Nazi Germany against Russia by giving it free rein in Southeastern
Southeastern Europe. The most distressing and the most unhappy conversation I have ever had in my life was with Neville Henderson in Berlin in May 1936, when he calmly informed me in the British Embassy in Berlin that Austria was Nazi and that his colleague in Vienna did not understand the situation and that Germany had a perfect right to dominate Austria and that she should be permitted to dominate Southeastern Europe "to Turkey" as this would bring her into inevitable conflict with Soviet Russia and Nazi power would spend itself against Soviet Russia. He berated me and our Government for not having understanding of the legitimate German aspirations in Southeastern Europe. A week later in London one of the most important persons in England at the time said to me in his home in London exactly what the instrument of their group in London was saying in Berlin. In this connection I may say that when, in the conversation under reference, I asked Neville Henderson why the Germans would stop at Turkey, his only answer was "They have told me that they will not disturb Turkey". Such naiveté and duplicity could not have surpassed by a Nazi German diplomat and anyone who knew Germany and the aspirations of the Nazi Government had to know that Germany was just as much after domination of the Dardanelles and the sea route to the east as it was interested and set upon German domination over the rest of Southeastern Europe, and that these other countries were the road to the Dardanelles.

This is a section of my observations to you on the use of diplomacy as a destructive instrument that I should like to enlarge upon but I doubt whether it is necessary, for you are I am sure all familiar with the sordid chapters of this long and unhappy story.

The Soviet Government is using the same destructive approach as the Nazi German Government used, but it has not had at its command the same choice of instruments.
instruments. The Russians who knew Europe and who had a name and a family history which could have been used as cover for intrigue and subversive activities would not permit themselves to be used. If there were some who for opportunism would have permitted themselves to be used, the record shows that the Soviet Government, for reasons of its own, did not use them. Whether it is for this reason or because their approach has not been as clever and has been more open I do not know, but in any event the subversive diplomatic effort has not been so successful as was that of Nazi Germany. The diplomatic effort of Soviet Russia as such has been for the most part a failure.

On the other hand, the Soviet destructive approach has on the whole been more effective than the Nazi German destructive effort in other countries. Perhaps this is due to the disturbed economic and political situation which followed the war. The Nazi diplomats were able to stir up strife, nationalism, lust for personal power, but they were not able to sell Fascism. They were able to buy individuals and they were able in many cases to sell the idea that it would be advantageous for a country to be in the Nazi orbit. Soviet Russia may not have been able to sell Communism as such to many countries. It has been able to force it, or at least Communist governments, on certain neighbors where she has used all the pressure of her military power and the degree of compulsion which the western powers have shown for one reason or another to date. It has not been necessary for her to sell Communism, for the disturbed economic and political conditions in practically every country of the world have created a fertile field, if not for Communism as such, for movements which do not differ substantially from it. I saw enough of Nazism to know that it was in its time the most pernicious disease which the world had up to that moment known and it was a dangerous
mental disease. Communism and the various forms of near-Communism with which we have to deal in every country in the world today, including our own, are just as much a disease as was Nazi doctrine and there is every reason to believe that it is a far more dangerous disease than the Nazi doctrine ever was. The Nazis made it clear by what they said and what they did that they would enslave and dominate the peoples of Europe and eventually of the world. The Communist doctrine preached by Moscow is the emancipation of the masses from despotic governments within and imperialistic influences from without. In the world in which we live and in which there is still so much poverty and distress and deep social unrest this idea takes root and spreads in the most unexpected places and does not need much fertilising from abroad. The Nazis had to send their agents to various countries. There is no doubt that Moscow sends out her agents as well, but what makes the situation infinitely more dangerous is that she does not need these agents in most countries, for they seem to spring up almost overnight in the most unexpected sectors, from the highest to the lowest, in almost every country, and we cannot except our own.

So far as the direct diplomatic effort is concerned it has been in a very large measure a failure, largely due to the quality and ineptitude of the men whom it has sent as Chiefs of Mission. The Soviet Government has opened diplomatic relations with every country it can do so with, because this gives diplomatic immunity to so many activities. The procedure has been through these Chiefs of Mission and their staffs to establish contact with certain individuals in the countries of residence and to endeavor to foment internal discord by every possible means. The pattern being followed in many ways is identical with the Nazi German pattern. The effort, in spite of the ineptitude of the Chiefs of Mission themselves, has been successful because as I have already indicated there are willing agents in practically every country.
Outstanding examples in this hemisphere of such diplomatic effort are the attempted activities in Mexico and in Buenos Aires. In both cases the effort up to now has been a failure.

The Soviet Government, in reestablishing diplomatic relations with Mexico, after a long lapse, in 1944, when Oumansky was appointed as the first Soviet Ambassador after this long lapse. (Soviet relations with Mexico were broken off by Mexico in 1914 when Mexico took the initiative in recalling her Minister in Moscow) made the mistake of considering Mexico as Communist because it was undoubtedly a Left country. The last Soviet Minister in Mexico conducted himself as though he were giving orders to a subject country, and I have heard the last Mexican Minister to Moscow up to the breaking of relations say that his position in Moscow was intolerable, as he was called to the Foreign Office and given instructions as though he were the representative of a subject country.

The Soviet Government was exceedingly desirous of reopening diplomatic relations with Mexico because it was a part of its program to disrupt inter-American relationships. The Soviet Government was convinced that because there had been bad feeling on the part of Mexico towards the United States for many years and because United States troops had at one time or another been on Mexican soil, and for many other reasons, that Mexico was the most fertile focus from which to begin to work in the Western Hemisphere, and for this reason they sent what they considered to be their most effective diplomatic instrument.

When Oumansky arrived his coming was welcomed by men like Cardenas, Lombardo Toledano, and a fairly considerable group of Mexican intellectuals who were on the extreme left. The activities, however, of Oumansky from the outset were so inept that they created deep resentment in the Mexican Government.
ment and in the very circles which had most ardently welcomed him. He made
the mistake of purchasing for the Soviet Government one of the most preten-
tious houses in the country and of entertaining on a broad and lavish scale
and doing so in a formal manner. His elaborately engraved invitations to
the big functions at the Embassy always contained the note that the dress
was "fracs" and usually "with decorations". This went down hard in a country
where at least up to the present President government officials have appeared
at public functions in street clothes or at the most in a dinner coat.

Oumansky took it for granted, as had his last predecessor years before,
that Mexico was Communist and that it would be against the United States
and that it would help to sabotage inter-American collaboration. The Soviet
Government and Oumansky made the same mistake which they had made years before.

Mexico is Left, but not Communist. Mexico was not going to take any orders
from Soviet Russia any more than it would from the United States. Mexico
knew that Soviet Russia had nothing to give Mexico and that it had something
it might expect and had been getting from the United States. Mexico realized
that whether she liked it or not her future was tied up with the United
States and she did not want any foreign Ambassador messing up her relations
with the United States. She felt that she was perfectly able to take care
of that herself. Even Cárdenas, who extremely dislikes the United States,
had to turn away from Oumansky when Oumansky lost his life in a plane ac-
cident and the Soviet Government tried to make it appear that this accident
was sabotage by the Mexican Army or by United States officials in Mexico.

Through the attitude which the Soviet Government took over the loss of
Oumansky's plane it did itself irreparable damage in Mexico and after the
death of Oumansky the Soviet Government decided to abandon Mexico as the
focus of activity in Latin America and to transfer it to Buenos Aires, where
it believed
it believed that there was the second best chance.

The Soviet Government started in the Argentine with a trade mission which promised all sorts of things and which began under-cover political activity. Under the guise of endeavoring to promote trade relations between the Argentine and Soviet Russia the trade mission began to engage in the fostering of all sorts of political difficulties and to stir up feeling against the United States and to foster the difficulties which existed between the Argentine and some of her neighbors. The offers of the Soviet Government of military material, automobiles, tractors, trucks and many other things which the Argentine was hungry for in a world in which these goods were at a premium, could not be fulfilled and the Argentine Government knew that they could not be fulfilled. The offers of the Soviet to buy certain surplus Argentine products and even a few purchases of such products at exaggerated prices did not mislead the Argentine Government, for it knew that under no circumstances could the Soviet be a continuing customer of the Argentine and that these purchases were only made to fish in troubled waters and to create false hopes and to accentuate difficulties with the United States. The actuation of the trade mission was as inept as it could possibly be. When the Soviet Government realized that the Argentine Government was on the point of telling the trade mission to go home, the Soviet Government made insistent approaches for the opening of diplomatic relations. President Peron agreed to the opening of diplomatic relations and this was commonly believed to be an indication of a pressure measure on the United States. As a matter of fact, there is no doubt that the Argentine agreed to the opening of diplomatic relations on the ground that it would be more able to control the activities of a diplomatic mission than of a trade mission, as a diplomatic mission was supposed to maintain a certain decorum. Further,
I am personally convinced that President Peron was of the opinion that if we were carrying on diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia it would be more helpful to us in the American picture if the Argentine reopened relationships.

The Soviet Ambassador who arrived was a nondescript person, utterly tactless and lacking in understanding, but extremely active. The first thing he did was to endeavor to get control of the Slav elements in the Argentine. It would be worth while to expand on this activity of the Soviet in the Argentine, because it shows that if Soviet diplomacy has been inept in practice, Soviet policy has been shrewd and clearly conceived. The Soviet Government knew that there were over 300,000 Slavs, mainly Czechs, Yugoslavs, Romanians and Poles, in the Argentine and that these had come from the lower levels in these countries and in the years have become little integrated into the Argentine economy and practically not at all into the Argentine political and social situation. These Slav groups in the Argentine were closely organized, as they are in our country, in the various forms of social, benefit, sick and death insurance organizations. They maintain practically their whole life in self-contained groups in the country. As there is no indigenous Communism in the Argentine to speak of and as the government was more openly and definitely anti-Communist than any of the other Latin American governments and as it was a strong government, the Soviet Ambassador had instructions to get control of the Slav population through these organizations. The Soviet Ambassador practically immediately after his arrival let it be known to these organizations in under-cover ways and to the leaders of the Slav groups that he was their natural protector and guide. When the Slav groups in the country, which had no interest in Communism or in Soviet Russia,
Russia, in fact the contrary, showed lack of inclination to accept any directive from the Soviet Embassy, the latter let it be known in its quiet way that they had better come around or their relatives in the home country would suffer. Again no variation from the Nazi technique but in this case it failed completely because the Argentine Government happens to be a strong one and the economic situation internally is relatively good. There is, however, no doubt that the Soviet maneuvers in the Argentine would have been as effective there as the Nazi technique had been in the countries of South-eastern Europe had it not been for the presence of a strong government in the country.

When a government chooses to use diplomats as a destructive instrument in times like these it has a fertile field. When a government such as the Soviet Government determines on a policy of undermining the strength of another country and settles on so definite an objective as the undermining of inter-American collaboration as a means of weakening the United States in inevitable conflict, it shows not only clearness in objective but also the possession of that necessary information concerning conditions which is necessary so that such a destructive policy may be effective. The Soviet Government knew the ineptness and ineffectiveness of our policy in many respects towards the Latin American countries, it knew that while we had learned during the war to recognize the importance of stable political and economic conditions in these countries, that with the end of the war we were forgetting this and failed to do some of the most elementary things which were necessary to maintain confidence in us and to deal in a spirit of complete equity with these countries. They knew how to exploit the old feelings of lack of confidence and fear of us which had so largely disappeared during the war. They knew how to exploit our old indifference which began
to make itself felt. They knew how to exploit the fact that our manufactured goods were going into these countries at high prices established in our own internal markets and that the goods which these countries produced were being sold at relatively lower cost than production costs and the world situation in other goods justified. They knew how to work on the leaders of discontent in every one of these countries. They knew how to reach certain writers and intellectuals and certain papers. They knew how to use every aspect of this fertile field to their advantage. They have had considerable success and success to a dangerous degree. Again I wish to say that this was not due to aptness nor tact or skill of their diplomatic representatives in the field. It was due more to the effective formulation of policy in Moscow than to its execution in the field. It was due more to effectiveness of the Soviet press and radio and to the intellectuals and discontented leaders in these countries. A portion of their success was due to our own failure to know how, through the use of our instruments at home, our economic power, our public opinion forming means, and through the carrying through of certain equitable economic measures to counteract these forces. Today the Defense Pact is an empty shell when it could already be a living entity. In the last war we had the full collaboration in the measure possible to it of every one of the Latin American governments with the exception of the Argentines, in the political field, and it in the economic field gave more aid to Great Britain to enable her to feed her population than all the rest of Latin America together. This factor is too often forgotten when that country is reproached for its attitudes during the war. Should hostilities open with Soviet Russia there is no one who can tell today to what degree the countries of Latin America would be with us or to what degree they would serve as Soviet bases against us should the war develop into one lasting months in-
stead of weeks. The tragedy of all this is that what it would have cost us in money to counteract all of this external and indigenous Communist and near-Communist activity against the United States and sabotaging of inter-American collaboration and defense, would have cost us less than we are spending under the Marshall Plan in a year in some of the smaller European countries. There is no sadder story in the history of our policy and diplomatic effort than the failure of our country to carry through a constructive and understanding policy with reference to the other American republics. We do not lend money because we speak of long records of non-payment at the same time that we are making tremendous gifts for which we expect no material return to these more distant countries. This observation is not made in the sense that I am trying to say that we should not do what we are doing in Europe and in the Far East. It is only that I wish to point out that the house which burns next door is as much if not a greater threat to our house in the long run than the one which may be ablaze further away.

The foregoing points have been emphasized, for the failure of the United States during the last two years to carry through the constructive policy which we had begun to implement and had implemented over a long period of years in Latin America, has created a situation which is now a grave danger for us. The foregoing observations also point out the necessity for continuous and constructive policy, adequately implemented day by day, in a particular area of such primary importance to us from the military and economic point of view.
THE USE OF DIPLOMACY AS A CONSTRUCTIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE WEAPON

The United States has, since the beginning of its history, almost invariably used diplomacy as a constructive weapon. This is the practice of all responsible governments. Even responsible governments, however, at times find it advisable in order to bring about constructive and peaceful developments, to use their power, political and economic, through certain concrete measures, to undermine and to destroy certain individuals or governments in other countries. It may be said with justice for us that where we have done this in a few cases in the Western Hemisphere it has been for the purpose of destroying certain individuals or governments in order to make possible more equitable, stable economic and political conditions in the interest of the people of the particular country. The advantage to us was indirect. Because of the still unstable conditions, economic and political, in some of the Latin American countries, it may be advisable and necessary for us from time to time to undermine the position of certain individuals and even governments which may have imposed themselves by force on the people.

If we used our political and economic influence to destroy a man like Lombardo Toledano, who is without prestige in his own country of Mexico, but who has acquired a certain influence over extreme radical leaders in some of the other American countries and who is an almost self-confessed and certain instrument of Soviet Russia, we are certainly doing what our interest and that of our neighbors requires. If we did not give the dictatorship of Vargas, in Brazil, the support which his regime sought we made it possible for Brazil to strengthen her democratic processes. The use of this instrument, however, always has been and is still dangerous no matter how sound or praiseworthy the objective. The manner in which we handled the situation in Panama...
in Panama to make possible the building of the Canal was such that it will never be forgotten in Colombia and created conditions in Panama with which we still have to deal today. We committed an act which will be held against us in every other American state for years to come and will continue to be exploited by our enemies. On the other hand, the manner in which we used force and pressure and even the physical presence of armed forces in Nicaragua and Haiti was such that even in the countries concerned no deep resentments remain.

Our diplomatic approach until we came into the position of world power which we unwillingly hold today has been almost invariably constructive. As examples of constructive policy with worldwide repercussions I would like to mention only two -- the trade agreement policy inaugurated by Secretary Hull and the Marshall Plan.

The trade agreement policy of Secretary Hull is perhaps the first outstanding example in the world of a foreign policy with worldwide repercussions and intended to be reciprocal for all countries entering the agreement. It was formulated as a means of countering the economic nationalism which was becoming almost worldwide and which was raising barriers of trade and developing unsound economic positions in many countries, which positions were bound eventually to cause political differences which would easily lead to war. It was the first broad attack against fundamental economic factors which were becoming prevalent and which brought in them the germs of war. To establish this reciprocal trade policy was not an easy task for our Government. History will show that even President Roosevelt, with his broad understanding, never gave it his complete support. The policy met determined opposition for purely political reasons of the opposite political party and of at least a part of the entrenched industrial and agricultural interests in our
in our own country which were egotistic and unwilling to take into account the major interest of the whole country. It was only the great prestige of Secretary Hull and the feeling in our own country and many other countries in enlightened circles that this policy had a hope of destroying economic nationalization that gave it force, and of course in our own country the overwhelming majority in the Congress which Secretary Hull then could count upon. It was only as it became increasingly obvious in our own country and abroad what the dangers of this economic nationalization were, and as we increasingly realized at home the importance of collaboration between the two major political parties in foreign policy, that the reciprocal trade agreement policy was able to have any effect outside our borders and in the formulation of an imposing series of trade agreements. The trade agreement policy was never a full success because it had this difficult start and handicap in our own country, and there is much reason to believe that if it had had adequate support at home from the very outset it would have served as an even more effective diplomatic instrument and would have made it possible to create in a greater degree economic conditions in various parts of the world that would have counterbalanced political frictions which were so successfully exploited by Nazi Germany. In this connection it is interesting to note that Nazi Germany did everything it could to prevent a customs union between the weaker countries of Southeastern Europe and to sabotage our making trade agreements with these countries — both of which procedures would have done so much to decrease economic nationalization in Southeastern Europe and to strengthen the economic position, and therefore the political position, of the respective countries vis-a-vis Nazi Germany.

It would be useful to concretely implement the above statements by giving a brief account of the degree to which a truncated Austria was able to establish
tabliah gradually a firm economic position because of sound internal measures and considered support from abroad. It would also be helpful to illustrate the foregoing statements by outlining some of the constructive measures which were attempted by the Southeastern European countries and which were thwarted by Germany even before the Nazis came into power.

Our trade agreements program was constructive and the German program and approach was destructive, and when the Nazi Government came into power it made the most active efforts to counteract this policy throughout Europe and in the world. In view of the widely spread German trade developed beginning 1900, the German diplomats and business men and German firms in Europe, in the Far East, in Africa and in Latin America were able in a considerable measure to sabotage the trade agreement policy. As this sabotaging, destructive policy of Nazi Germany had behind it the full support of the Nazi leaders and Nazi pressures and methods, and as our constructive policy did not yet have undivided support at home, for this and for other reasons the destructive German policy was more successful than our own.

Since the end of the war our country has made a determined effort to carry through the broad principles of the trade agreements policy, of reciprocal trade, of free access to natural resources, of equitable treatment of capital and private initiative, and the United Nations has lent such weak support as it could give through the more than year-long negotiations in Geneva. The Geneva understandings could have had a constructive effect in bettering economic conditions in many of the countries which are so weak and in such economic, political and social turmoil today, but now it has been the turn of Soviet Russia to sabotage the Geneva agreements by attacking the United States as imperialistic, as seeking world domination to keep back the economies of undeveloped countries and create distrust and fear of us. The degree to which she has been successful in the disordered world in which
in which we live is shown by the unhappy discussions which took place at the Havana meeting last year which so largely destroyed the constructive results growing out of the Geneva meeting. There is no concealing the fact that the failure of the Havana meeting was a Soviet success. (The major reason for relative failure of the Havana meeting was the lack of outstanding United States representation and leadership.)

Another example of constructive approach, and perhaps, the most extraordinary example of such approach in world history, and certainly unique, has been the formulation of the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan is really only an extension of the 3-1/2 billion dollars which we lent, or rather gave, to Great Britain in order to bolster up her economy and her political position in Europe in order that she might be able to maintain her position in the world picture against the encroachment of Soviet Russia. It was the first time in the history of the world that one country had given to another country, practically as an outright gift, so unheard of a sum of money, one of the purposes of which was to put the economy of that country into a position to compete with our own products in foreign markets.

The rapidly developing deterioration in the European situation resulting from the ever increasing Soviet aggression, infiltration and pressures, made necessary the boldest, costliest and most important policy and diplomatic instrument ever forged and implemented by any government. It was not the idea of an individual and bears the name of the Secretary of State only because of his position. I recall very well that in discussing this plan with me Secretary Marshall modestly said that he did not think he could permit the use of his name in connection with the plan because it was not his conception, and I told him that in this respect he was in the hands of precedent.
precedent and could not do anything and should not do anything about it. That it was possible for the United States to formulate and to execute so major and outstanding a policy which involved such great sacrifice in time of peace is a good yardstick to indicate the degree to which we have matured in policy making.

I will not enter into any discussion of the Marshall Plan, which is a constructive effort to prevent war through the maintenance of the economic and political position of countries threatened by an aggressor, and is the most serious and important step ever taken in diplomatic history, except to state that the implementation of the Plan suffers from two serious handicaps.

The first of these is the inability of some of the countries needing and receiving aid to appreciate the necessity for them, on their own part, to carry through certain measures. Taking into account all of the unhappy factors with which the governments of some of these countries have to deal, it is still distressing that so constructive and generous a plan has not met with an equally constructive and understanding response in the countries asking and receiving aid.

The other unhappy factor is that in our own country the machinery for carrying through this tremendous plan was not adequately prepared and considered during the period that the Congress was discussing the appropriation of the extraordinary sums necessary to implement the Plan. The consequence is that much planning had to be done by the ECA hurriedly and its machinery set up precipitately. Because of the inexperience of so many of those connected with the policy forming and spending operations of so tremendous an undertaking there is a lack of understanding of the necessity for coordination of ECA policy and practice with the established agencies of our Government, and particularly with the State Department. The Marshall Plan is a diplomatic
diplomatic instrument to avert war. It is therefore unfortunate that in too
great a degree the head of the ECA and some of his principal associates con-
sider that they must keep in mind more individuals in Congress and later ap-
propriations rather than the main over-all objectives of the Plan. Sound
policy is subordinated to what is considered money-getting policy. This lack
of coordination may result in our country and the receiving countries get-
ting out of the Marshall Plan only a part of the benefit which the money and
policy could bring about. (Whatever major deficiencies the Marshall Plan may
have do not lie in conception but in execution. There are important adminis-
trative officials in the ECA who are acting not only on prejudice which in
many respects is purely personal, but who are really, through the strong
machinery of the ECA, endeavoring to carry through personal quarrels and dif-
ferences with countries which are of vital importance to us and to their
neighbors.)

As a concrete example of the lack of effective administration of the
ECA is its policy with respect to Latin America and particularly certain
countries of Latin America, such as Argentina. While the countries of Latin
America are able to understand and can be made to understand that the prin-
cipal aid of the Marshall Plan must be directed to Europe, no one can find
the adequate reason which will convince these Latin American countries that
they have not been grossly neglected and even completely ignored in the ap-
lication of the Marshall Plan. When we consider that these countries are
our near neighbors and that the stability of their economies is as important
to us in war and in peace as that of the more distant countries into which
we are pouring, often without discretion and understanding, our dollars and
our aid, it is obvious what a grave error we are making.
Some of our civilian and military authorities learned during the war how important the security of the continent is to us in war and in peace and what it meant to us in our military effort to achieve the victory to have the continent united and ready, so far as the resources of each country permitted, to defend their sovereignty against what they considered the common enemy. We believed this so strongly that some of us in the military and civil establishments gave ourselves fully to the effort of making possible the Defense Fact and we secured the collaboration of every one of the American countries to that end at the Rio Conference, in spite of the fact that we ineptly in that conference failed to take into account the views of some of these countries in raising their economic problems. Now, on top of the inadequacy of the implementation by the State Department and other agencies of our Government of sound economic policies well within our power and altogether in our interest, to aid these Latin American countries in an extremely difficult period of their development, the ECA adds insult to injury by openly and deliberately telling these countries, or most of them, that it has no need for them and has no interest in them, even to the degree of deliberately making worse the condition in the Argentine, which is potentially the strongest of the Latin American countries in a military, economic, financial and political sense, if not socially the most stable also.

Another grave error in the implementation of the Marshall Plan is the lack of coordination which exists between the ECA and the other agencies of our Government. The responsibility for this rests almost entirely on the ECA, as it is practically acting on its own and is disregarding even the most major objections to certain acts by experienced agencies of the Government, such as the Department of State.
While the trade agreement policy and the Marshall Plan are the two outstanding constructive policies which our Government has put into effect in order to meet the desperate world situation, the main responsibility of the solution of which falls on us, these major instruments of policy are only indicative of the effort which we shall have to make in the military, economic, social and political field to make our policy effective in time of peace, or better said, the present cold war, and to put behind that the military effort when what seems to be inevitable war comes. The machinery for the development of these over-all policies is still terribly weak and inadequate. The Policy Board set up in the Department of State a few years ago is a worthy but inadequate effort. While there are good people associated with this Policy Board it is on the whole inadequate to the task and requires more effective and outstanding personnel. In its present form it could serve better as the secretariat of a real Policy Board on which would sit no less than the officers of the Cabinet, or alternates designated by them who are in the closest touch with the work of the respective Departments which they would represent on the Policy Board. Until this is done there can be no guaranteed and effective foreign policy of the bold and constructive type which is needed to meet the desperate problems before us and on which our future security and very existence depend. (A good beginning has been made through the National Security Council and this organ can be made effective through closer study of the best means of its utilization.)
Some of you may know that I was rather closely associated with the developments in Europe beginning with the end of the First World War. I went to Belgium as Consul at Antwerp in early 1919, and under the instructions which I had, and to a certain degree out of my own initiative, I followed closely events in Central, Southeastern and Western Europe until 1928. As Consul General in Berlin with supervisory responsibility over all of our Consular establishments in Germany from 1930 to May 1934 I was particularly close to developing events in Germany and in Central and Western Europe. From May 1934 to the spring of 1937 as Minister to Vienna I remained in close contact with events in Germany and had even closer contact than before with developments in Southeastern and Western Europe. In the spring of 1937 I was asked to return to the Department of State as an Assistant Secretary by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull who, as they said, felt that I had been closer to developing events in Germany and in Central Europe than any other American in that period and wished me to return, as they felt that eventual war had become inevitable and that I could perform more effective service in the Department than in the field through making available such intimate knowledge as I might have of individuals and developments and at the same time organizing the Department of State more effectively so as to be better able to bear the brunt of the increasing responsibilities falling on it.

I make this personal reference because out of that observation of events in Europe following the First World War and immediately preceding the Second World War I can see practically no change in the pattern which developed in those years and which ended in war, from the pattern which is developing now. I wish
I wish to make only a few brief and inadequate observations in this respect.

The Nazi leaders of Germany started with the idea of the domination of Southeastern Europe and if anyone had said to Hitler at that time that he nourished the idea of eventual world domination he would have thought him as unbalanced as we knew Hitler himself to have been. As the Nazi leaders met less and less resistance within Germany, in Southeastern Europe whose domination they were determined upon, and less resistance from England and France, their objective gradually developed to that of world domination. This gradually increasing scope of Nazi ambition was one of the most interesting features of that period and for some of us the most distressing to observe, for we knew that it could have been stopped in its tracks at any time until 1937 and perhaps even a little later. The same development has been taking place in the scope of the objectives of the Soviet Government. It started with the objective of ideological domination of the surrounding countries and then the rest of the world, and now the political domination, though perhaps in a slightly different form from the direct military control the Nazis envisaged.

The same ignorance of the rest of the world characterizes the Soviet leaders which I and others saw characterized the Nazi leaders in Germany. Most of the Nazi leaders had not lived outside of Germany and were almost totally ignorant of the rest of the world but at the same time felt that they knew more than anyone in any other country knew of his country. The Soviet leadership is similarly ignorant of conditions in other parts of the world and in some respects even more isolated and equally arrogant and unwilling to accept any conception of other countries than their own, whether it is given to them by their own people on returning to Russia or by others.
This ignorance and isolation were two of the most dangerous features of the Nazi regime just as they are of the present Soviet regime. (In this connection it may be interesting to cite the conversation which, at the request of Goering, I had with General Ernst in 1933, when I made him understand that no matter what the internal strength of the S. A. and S. S. were, they were powerless beyond the German borders).

The Nazi leaders believed in the complete effectiveness of force and the Soviet leadership accepts no rule except that of force. The only exception to this was that force must not be used unless the insidious instruments of undermining sovereignty and internal strength in other countries failed.

The Nazi leaders hoped to achieve their aims of world domination without actual warfare by using infiltration in the internal life, political, and economic and social, of other countries, and by exploiting every source of internal discontent and dissatisfaction in the respective countries and by accentuating all outstanding difficulties between neighboring countries. The Soviet leadership is endeavoring to use identical methods short of war but is equally prepared to use war if necessary to achieve the objective. In this infiltration and penetration the Soviet has improved and perfected the methods employed by the Nazis.

The Nazi leadership desperately endeavored to use every means at its disposal to prevent action against it abroad, through the force of public opinion, or through the action of individual governments, or by coordinated action of the governments of threatened countries, so as to gain time to complete the adequate armament effort within the area they controlled. The Soviet regime today is carrying through the same policy of gaining time by disturbing and confusing public opinion and governments, and by stirring up internal
internal movement in various countries, while preparing itself for war.

The Nazi Government used every instrument they could find in other countries to aid them in their objective. They found a Goring in Czechoslovakia; similar instruments in Austria and the other Southeastern European countries; a Laval et al. in France, a Bost von Tommigen in Holland, a Mosley and even more important instruments in England, a Wannen-Gren in Sweden, not to speak of similar instruments in the United States. They had a canny instinct to find these individuals in practically every country who had the same idea of personal domination and power which they had and knew how to approach, finance and secure collaboration through promise of power.

The Soviet regime is doing the same today and with greater result than the Nazi regime ever had, for while the number of instruments of importance and position which the Nazis were able to secure in other countries were relatively few, the Soviet has had more success in getting a larger number of persons with following in practically every country in the world.

The arrogance and the complete disregard of the rights of everyone within their own and other countries which characterized the Nazis, characterizes the Soviet regime today.

The cynical disregard of truth and fact and the complete cynicism which characterized all of the acts of the Nazi leaders find their counterpart in the Soviet regime today.

The dependence of the Nazi leadership on the power to mislead public opinion through constant distortion of facts characterizes the Soviet regime today.

The use of threats by the Nazi Government to intimidate the weak and the strong has been refined upon and is used in an even more effective way by the Soviet Government today.

The Nazis
The Nazis endeavored to cover up their own improper activities by imputing these same activities to others. The Soviet regime has become a past master in refining this technique and in using it.

The use of discourtesy in dealing with foreign representatives and governments which characterized the Nazi regime is used even more crudely but just as effectively by the Soviet Government today.

Violent language in public speeches by high-ranking government officials, by writers and by the press is used even more effectively in some respects by the Soviet Government than by the Nazi Government.

One of the grave differences between the Nazi and Soviet practices and pattern is that the Soviet Government is prepared by its action to take greater risks in provoking war before it really wants it than Nazi Germany was prepared to do and did it. This is being effectively countered by the plain speaking of our Government and others and the speeches of Bevin and Spaak in Paris during the last few weeks have been an effective illustration of how this technique must be countered in order to prevent public opinion from becoming confused.

I will not expand further on the similarity in pattern between the years preceding the Second World War and that pattern which is developing during the cold war in which we now are.

The only
The only difference in the pattern which, out of my close contact with developing events before the Second World War, I can see, and that of today is that in the period preceding the Second World War the French and British governments in particular, and other governments, including our own, refused to face the facts and permitted the developing power of Germany within their power to have stopped the menace in its tracks. The least responsibility is on the French Government, for it was willing steadily to take the steps which were necessary, including the use of entirely justified force as a matter of self-preservation. The primary responsibility is first on Britain because on a number of occasions she prevented the French from taking the action which would have stopped the Nazi menace in its tracks and refused to collaborate with the French in such action. Our responsibility was secondary until probably 1937 because it was France and England which were primarily menaced and which should have taken the decisive action necessary and when they were strong enough to do it. Later our responsibility was as great as that of the French and British and others. I lived so close to these developments and know that the greatest fear which the Nazi leaders had was that they would be stopped before they were ready to use force, and it was this indecision and lack of definite action on the part of France and England, and later ourselves, that undermined the situation in the threatened countries of Europe and gave increased arrogance and force to the Nazi Government at home and in every part of the world.

This time the primary responsibility rests on us from the outset because of the kind of world in which we live and because of our being the only country militarily, socially and financially strong enough to take the action necessary. This time we are facing the problem resolutely and more understandably.
understandingly than the French and British Governments did when it was
their primary responsibility when faced with a similar Nazi menace.

There is, I believe, this time no doubt in the American Government or
among the American people as to the danger which confronts us and our
responsibility, not only to ourselves but to others.

The only other variation in the pattern which I see is that in the
period preceding the Second World War it was impossible for our Government
to make our people understand what the developing events in Germany and in
Europe meant for us. I will not expand on this very vital factor as you are
so familiar with the difficulties which we faced then in our country. There
were men in our military, naval and air establishments and in the White House
and in the State Department and a few in the Congress who did understand
what the developing events meant for us in their full import. Among the
great mass of our people there was almost complete lack of understanding
and indifference. This time our people understand the menace of Soviet
Russia and the forces which it has aroused in practically every country of
the world, and in many respects our people are ahead of our Government.
While there is adequate understanding in high places in our civil and mili-
tary establishments of the consequences which developments may have and
inevitably will have unless there is proper action and adequate action by
our country and in good time, in many respects our people are more prepared
to take the immediate and appropriate action which they consider necessary
than is government. The danger this time is not that the people may not
follow the Government, but that Government may not be taking adequate advan-
tage of the situation to assume the responsibility to carry through the
task when it can be carried through with reasonable hope, if not full hope
of success.
ON THE INEVITABILITY OF ANOTHER WAR AND THE DANGER
OF SENTIMENT AND ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE DELAYING ACTION
UNTIL PREVENTIVE WAR BECOMES A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT.

I shall now touch on delicate ground and I will start by quoting a man
whom I consider to have been the greatest Secretary of State our country
has had, in spite of the fact that no one post in our Government since its
inception has been filled by a larger number of really competent men for
that great responsibility. In an address which Secretary Hull delivered
to the graduating class of Brown University, at Providence, on June 15, 1936,
he said among other things: "The supreme care of the statesman should be
the well-being of the people. War exacts too high a price to be conducive
to human welfare — a price which normal human intelligence cannot possibly
accept as justified by any achievement that can be secured through a deliberate
resort to arms. That is why enlightened and responsible statesmen of our day
seek, in every way possible, to outlaw war as a means of national policy and
to substitute for it the constructive processes of friendly conciliation
and arbitration and fair adjudication of international disputes. War is
sometimes described as the last resort of a statesman. I should rather say
that recourse to war as a means of attaining the aims of national policy
is an unmistakable symbol of bankrupt statesmanship."

I wish to emphasize the statement which this wise statesman made at a
time when I know that he had no illusions concerning the Nazi Government
and its determination to secure world domination by force, "War exacts too
high a price to be conducive to human welfare — a price which normal human
intelligence cannot possibly accept as justified by any achievement that can
be secured through a deliberate resort to arms." Although Secretary Hull
had no illusions whatever with regard to the Nazi determination to use force
to achieve
to achieve its end, including domination of our country; although he knew that Nazi Germany was building up a military machine which had not had a parallel in world history; although he knew that the military power of France was deteriorating, that England was failing to take the necessary steps to protect herself against the danger, and that similar weak neighbors of Germany were afraid to take any action to prepare to protect themselves against the danger menacing them for fear of provoking immediate military or economic action; although he knew that if Nazi Germany could not gain its ends by infiltration and intimidation and subversion it would use this force when it considered it strong enough to use without any risk of defeat; he, at this critical period in our own country when it was most important to formulate public opinion to bring about adequate recognition of and preparation against the danger, if not to already aid others in stopping it in its tracks, made this statement which is the epitome of the feeling of the United States people, and in fact of all decent peoples, with regard to war as an instrument of policy. He made this statement at a time when he knew that it was necessary to bring about an immediate stoppage of the Nazi menace by the use of combined force in Europe and by giving to that combined effort in Europe all the military, economic and financial force which our country could have brought to their aid. I am not criticizing my great friend and master for having made this statement. Perhaps almost anyone in his position at the time would have made it. What I wish to bring out is that the lesson of the last war showed us that there is only one way in which such a force as that generated by Nazi Germany and now by Soviet Russia can be met and that is by the use of greater and overwhelming force to stop it in its tracks before it can involve our country and the whole world in an even more devastating conflict than that from which we have hardly emerged.

It is
It is my considered opinion that war between Soviet Russia and the United States is now practically inevitable. I do not believe that recourse to war as a means of attaining the aims of national policy is an unmistakable symbol of bankrupt statesmanship, as Mr. Hull has said in his Brown University speech. I think it is true that recourse to war as the means of attaining the aims of purely national policy is a symbol of bankrupt statesmanship, but the United States today is in the unique position of not making national policy, but really policy for all the world that remains decent and liberty-loving outside of Soviet Russia. For that reason resort to a preventive war by the United States would not be an instrument of national policy but the carrying through of an international responsibility brought to it by the position which against its will it occupies in the world today and unfortunately dependent upon us, and on the resoluteness with which we act depends not only our own liberty and safety, but that of really the whole world. It is time that we developed a new attitude with respect to war as an instrument of international policy or global world policy. It is the first time in the history of the world that a single nation has been met with this responsibility. At the end of the Second World War we decided to establish a new principle of international law — that is — the establishment of the responsibility of the aggressor. We did this through the formal indictment of Germany in the Berlin war criminal trials and in the indictment against the German Nazi Government. Soviet Russia today is just as much an aggressor in the cold war which is being carried on in Germany and in practically every part of the world by Soviet Russia, as Nazi Germany was by starting the unprovoked Second World War to establish world domination. The question is whether out of sentiment we shall stand by until the aggressor is able by overwhelming force to destroy us, or whether we shall recognize him as the aggressor and world menace he has shown himself to be and stop him in his tracks.
tracks before humanity is scourged as it has not been scourged before. When
what we call civilization and all that we have learned to cherish through
the ages is threatened it is criminal not to stop all this when it can be
done without much human suffering and destruction.

It is my considered opinion that the Soviet Government can only be
stopped by force, just as the Nazi Government could only have been stopped
by force. I am not adequately informed concerning the relative state of
military preparation by ourselves and of Soviet Russia, but if it is true
that we still have the advantage with respect to the atomic bomb and air war-
fare, and certainly we have an overwhelming advantage still on the sea, then
our only safety lies in using the overwhelming weapons which we have while
we have the opportunity to do so with full effect. Any moral objections
towards the use of the atomic bomb over Soviet Russia, where from my limited
knowledge I must still believe that it could end all possibility of a real
conflict in a relatively short period, should have no bearing any more than
the moral objection which we all have towards war as an instrument of national
policy can have validity. This is a matter in which a certain sentiment can
play no part, for we have learned that sentiment against war does not prevent
wars nor do moral principles prevent wars. I am of the opinion that nothing
can stop the Soviet Government except the destruction of Soviet Power and the
destruction of the present Soviet regime. At this moment to a non-military
observer it would appear that this objective can be gained by the use of the
atomic bomb over Soviet territory alone and perhaps even over a limited area
of Soviet territory. This I consider, even from a sentimental point of view,
far preferable to permitting Soviet military power to mature when it can be
used mercilessly as it will be used against every other country. It is
better that a few people perhaps in even limited areas of Soviet Russia
suffer
suffer than that the whole world should be subject to devastation by Soviet attack. To me the argument that Soviet ground forces can rapidly overrun Europe has little validity, because while it is probable that in the present state of Europe such Soviet forces could sweep like a fan rapidly over a good part of the continent, there is adequate reason to believe that such Soviet forces could not live beyond Soviet territory any time if Soviet power and supply are destroyed at home.

The dangers in delay which I see are not only that Soviet Russia may be able to strengthen adequately her military position and get the arms we have, or even superior ones, but that the psychologic position in our own country and in those opposed to Soviet Russia will deteriorate and in the end no purely military superiority in weapons can counterbalance the loss in morale and psychologic forces. If ever a preventive war was justified it is at this time. No one would ever reproach the United States as an aggressor, for we would not be looking for territory or for power or for economic advantage. We would be the aggressor only in the sense that as the instrument of international policy we would prevent the destruction of the world and continue the possibility of countries developing their internal lives in the way they see fit. Just as the Nazi Government was an aggressor practically from January 1933 a preventive use of force against it would have been justified from the outset, so the Soviet Government is the aggressor every day. To wait until Soviet Russia is prepared to consolidate a de facto into a de jure position in so many parts of the world is only to invite disaster over the whole world and to make it inevitable.

I do not hesitate to say that if I were determining the high policy of our Government today it would be shaped to use every instrument, military, economic and psychological, that we have at our command and that friendly countries
countries have at their command, to destroy Soviet power at its seat. As a man of peace and who has some knowledge of what war means I realize that this is a serious statement, but it is because I have this knowledge out of experience that I have this conviction.