The following observations on the status of United States-Argentine relations are the result of my experience and observation during the period that I was Assistant Secretary of State from 1937-40; as Ambassador to Cuba, Mexico, and now since May 22, 1946, in charge of our mission in Buenos Aires. During all that time, I have had a keen interest in our American problems.

For more than one hundred years we have collaborated in inter-American meetings and have encouraged the building up of close collaboration among the American republics and since the inauguration of the so-called "Good Neighbor Policy" we have intensified that collaboration and had been able to remove through that the doubts and fears which existed among so many of the other American states with respect to our policy and intentions. The declarations agreed to and adhered to by all of the American states at the México City Conference were the culmination of inter-American meetings and gave promise of definite consolidation of this collaboration and there was great faith and even enthusiasm among all of the Latin American states.

During the last year, doubts have again arisen among
the other American states as to our real interest in inter-American collaboration and many new factors in the world picture have made them feel that this collaboration is more important than ever. At this particular moment, the inter-American structure is, in some respects, at its weakest for years as the meetings contemplated after México City such as Bogotá and Rio de Janeiro have not taken place; and there has been no meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American states for a number of years.

ARE WE STILL INTERESTED IN INTER-COLLABORATION COLLABORATION?

If we are still interested in inter-American collaboration, it is necessary for us to take some definite action as a government to show that our interest subsists and is more firm than ever. Words and declarations are not sufficient. If we do not take positive action, the disintegrating elements which are working from within some of these American states and the disintegrating efforts which are being made from without will do damage to this inter-American collaboration which no one can tell when and if it can be repaired and this, in a world when that collaboration is more necessary to each and every one of the American republics than ever before.

In my actuation as a Chief of Mission in the American republics, I have worked on the assumption that it is a basic policy of our Government to promote by all feasible and sound means the closest political, economic, social, and defense collaboration among all of the American republics. I have taken it for granted that we consider this collaboration as essential for us as it is for every one of these other countries in the world in which we live and
live and increasingly so.

Since the San Francisco meeting of the United Nations and the action taken there, I have worked on the assumption that this collaboration among the American states can be one of the strongest bulwarks of any United Nations organization for security and peace. This, I believe, is a fundamental conviction of the people of our own country as it is of the other American countries.

NECESSITY FOR ARGENTINA BEING INCLUDED IN INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

No thoughtful person can for a moment contemplate any collaboration among the American states which is effective whether it be in the political, economic, social, or defense fields unless the Argentine is included. It is presently one of the strongest states in every respect in this hemisphere next to the United States and Canada, and in the opinion of most people and most American states, the strongest. In some respects it is the most virile of the states South of the Rio Grande and has the most immediate real prospects of rapid development in its industrial and agricultural economy and, therefore, in further strengthening its position and prestige among the American states and particularly among the Spanish and Portuguese peoples of the hemisphere. It is useless to labor this point because I do not think there is a single student of American affairs whether it be in our own country or in any American country who is not convinced of this.

RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT BY OTHERS

Canada has opened diplomatic missions in a good many of the American countries and is making a strong bid for
the friendship and for the trade of these countries; and while we are tied with close bonds to Canada, there is adequate evidence that Canada is hoping to a certain degree to exploit the present situation in the United States–Argentine relations although there is every reason to believe that fundamentally Canada will welcome a composition of the situation recognizing that it is in the end in her greatest interest.

Great Britain is deeply concerned over the situation in United States–Argentine relations because she considers that if the situation is not normalized in a relatively short time, resentments and disappointment and injury of national pride will create a situation in the Argentine which will result in the Argentine taking a super-nationalistic attitude in the political and economic field— for which attitude there is already fertile ground in the country— and that the result of this will be not only resentment against the United States but eventually against Great Britain. While it has been the tendency in the past for British Governments to view difficult relations between the United States and the Argentine as an advantage to Great Britain and to British interests in the Argentine and to British trade, there is reason to believe that the present British Government is deeply concerned over this situation and fears that there will be a reaction against United States interests in the Argentine and consequently in the other American republics from which United States interests may suffer first but from which British interests will inevitably suffer very soon thereafter. There is reason to believe that Britain fears that if the situation is not composed between the United States and the Argentine in the near future there
future there will be violent action against American interests in the Argentine and that such action against British interests will inevitably follow in due course.

Soviet Russia is showing a deep interest in the Argentine and is endeavoring to exploit the present state of relations between the United States and the Argentine to the utmost - not only in accentuating the present situation but in endeavoring to solidify it and to create division among all of the American republics with the end of destroying the more-than-one-hundred years of collaboration between the American states. This attitude of the Soviet Government is so obvious that it is not necessary to go into detail to support it beyond mentioning the almost daily broadcasts and other expressions from Moscow, officially sponsored, aimed at destroying the inter-American system through creating division among them and developing resentment against and suspicion of the United States.

THE POTENTIALLY STRONG POSITION OF THE ARGENTINE AS A SUPPLIER AND AS A CONSUMER CANNOT BE IGNORED

The Argentine is one of the principal producers of cereals and certain agricultural products in which the other American republics and Europe and even countries of the Orient are interested. It is one of the principal consumers in the world today of all kinds of fabricated goods. This position of the Argentine as an exporter and importer, while temporarily accentuated by world scarcities in many products, is, however, a fundamental one; and there is no need for further proof than the fact that during the last six months that I have been here there have been trade missions from India, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Spain, England, Brazil, Chile.
Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, et cetera, with one coming from Italy. These countries are interested in the Argentine not only as a supplier of foodstuffs but as a market for their own products, more particularly manufactured goods for which the Argentine has been one of our principal markets. (According to the Argentine Government, 19 such missions have been here since January 1, 1946.)

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Southern Bloc

Previous Argentine Governments have been interested more or less lukewarmly or actively in a southern bloc composed of the Argentine, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. There has always been a certain body of opinion in the Argentine in favor of such a southern bloc. The present Argentine Government has declared that it has no interest in the formation of such a southern bloc which it considers politically and economically infeasible and that it is interested instead in inter-American collaboration and with the United States. The present Argentine Government has taken opportunity to state that it is interested in close friendship and collaboration with the United States as it considers this more important in its interest than a southern bloc with weak associates. This is the first time in decades that we have such an attitude by a Government of the Argentine.

B. Latin American Cooperation

In the Argentine and in practically each one of the other American countries, there has been a minor opinion in favor of Latin American collaboration in contrast with inter-American collaboration feeling that through such Latin American collaboration certain pressures could be brought upon
brought upon the United States and certain advantages received from the United States which could otherwise not be secured. The Argentine Government has taken the attitude that it is interested in inter-American collaboration rather than in Latin American collaboration because it believes that Latin American collaboration would be an association of relatively weak states and that such an association would be politically and economically infeasible.

C. Latin Collaboration

There has been in some of the other American republics for years and in the Latin countries of Europe, particularly Spain, France, and Italy, a sentiment for cooperation among the Latin states in contrast with inter-American collaboration. Although this idea has never been as strong as the impulse in certain countries towards Latin American collaboration, the idea is being propagated in France in certain quarters and has increasing adherents in certain circles in the other American republics besides Argentina. The present Argentine Government has expressed that it has no interest in such Latin collaboration.

REALITIES OF THE SITUATION

We have to recognize that for the first time there is a government in the Argentine which is definitely seeking close collaboration with the United States instead of assuming an antagonistic or uncooperative attitude. We must recognize that for the first time there is a government in the Argentine which is not interested in a political southern bloc nor in Latin American collaboration nor Latin collaboration as in contrast with inter-American Collaboration.
collaboration. If this present government in the Argentine is further rebuffed in the friendly and friendship-seeking attitude which it has assumed, anyone who knows the Argentine people, who do not differ from any other Latin people in that respect, will realize that a reaction will take place in due course and that old attitudes of lack of cooperation and antagonism will be not only consolidated but strengthened on the part of all the people of the Argentine, irrespective of internal political division on other matters. It must be recognized that if we do not compose the situation with the Argentine in the near future, we will by our attitude be driving her towards the formation of a southern bloc, towards Latin American and Latin cooperation, and the inter-American system which is so fundamental for us in our political, economic, and defense interest will be wrecked for decades and who knows for how long.

OUR PRESENT POLICY

As I understand it, our relations with the Argentine are supposed by us to be on an entirely normal basis except that we have stated on various occasions and again on April 8, 1946, through a statement of the Secretary of State, that we cannot participate in a defense meeting or supply arms or military material to the Argentine until she has met her inter-American commitments. We maintain diplomatic representation with each other. We maintain normal trade relations with each other. We maintain normal relations to all intents and purposes on the surface in every respect except that we have formally indicated that we will not sit down in a defense meeting or supply arms and military material until the Argentine has met her inter-
her inter-American commitments.

The full implications, however, of this situation are not realized in the United States for it is not realized by our people that unless the relations are normalized our whole relationship with the Argentine is in danger; that old political resentments in the Argentine will be resurrected and strengthened; that the Argentine will be driven into closer relations with powers which are not friendly with us; that the inter-American system will disintegrate; that our considerable interests in the Argentine will be subject to unfriendly and discriminatory treatment; that our trade will suffer and Argentine needs will be filled from other markets.

We have to recognize that Great Britain is going to follow not only a conciliatory but a most friendly policy with respect to the Argentine not only as a measure of defense of her existing interests in the country but in order that she may assure herself of the foodstuffs which she must have from here and assure herself of a continuance of an even greater outlet for British goods in the Argentine. We can expect no support from Great Britain in any action towards the Argentine except that of a conciliatory and friendly character.

Soviet Russia is making every effort to strengthen her position not only in the Argentine but in the other American countries and the strongest bulwark that there is against such penetration of Communism and Soviet influence in the Argentine and in the other American republics is the strengthening of the American system with the collaboration involved in every field and this involves the normalization of relations with the Argentine.
From a military and defense point of view the position of this hemisphere and our own country is tremendously weakened by the maintenance of this present status in our relationships with the Argentine, and we are running the definite risk of consolidating an exposed flank in a world in which security is yet to be established. The emphasis placed by our public opinion during the last war on the unhappy attitude of the Argentine Government is one of the evidences of the understanding of the people of the United States of the importance of the Argentine in any system of inter-American collaboration and for our defense; and the irresponsible criticism of our military and naval authorities for taking cognizance of this situation by the accusation that they are planning to arm the Argentine, which in turn will attack her neighbors, is about as dangerous and an extraordinary procedure as one can imagine. Some of this opposition to the defense pact, and some of the criticism of our military and naval and aviation authorities, comes from within the Department of State and such criticism does not take into account in any respect the realities of the situation which we have to face in the world today. Any criticism of the defense pact of this kind and particularly with respect to Argentine participation therein does not take into account the fact that the purpose of the defense pact is not only the collaboration of the American countries in the defense of this hemisphere and in securing uniform organization, training, and equipment, but that the inevitable arrangements under such a defense pact will forever exclude the possibility of any one American state using its arms or military or economic power against another American state except as
except as a common measure of the American states against an American state which may become an aggressor. All this talk, therefore, with respect to supplying arms and military material to the Argentine is based on the assumption that the Argentine will become a military menace to the political and economic integrity of other American states. The best way to avoid any such possibility developing so far as the Argentine or any other American country is concerned is through the defense pact. This fundamental factor is completely left out of account by critics of the defense pact and of the Argentine.

Our present policy with respect to the Argentine, if we have a policy, is in effect causing serious concern among the other American republics, and we cannot expect any sympathy or support except lip service from a few of the other American countries in any policy of being tough with the Argentine, and we can expect no support for any policy towards the Argentine which involves keeping her out of the inter-American system. A primary interest of all of the Latin American states is that this situation between the Argentine and the United States be normalized and from Mexico down we will get no support for any other policy. Too great weight must, in some instances, not be placed on the statement of Chiefs of Mission of other countries in Washington for very often they are playing a personal game and are not altogether representative of the attitudes of their Government. The best proof of this is that we have never had anything except lip service from most of the American countries with respect to our present policy concerning the Argentine, if, as I say, they have any understanding of what our policy may be and there is, among all of them
of them the greatest confusion in this respect.

FUNDAMENTAL FACTS WE HAVE TO CONSIDER

A. We have to keep in mind first of all that the inter-American system will not work without the Argentine's cooperating.

B. The present Argentine Government is disposed to cooperate in that system and with us as no Argentine Government in decades has been prepared to do.

C. The present Argentine Government is a constitutional government and was brought into power by an election which is recognized in all of the other Latin American countries as an honest and correct and free election. It is similarly recognized in the European countries.

D. It is a constitutional government and is following constitutional procedures even though following these more definitely than previous Argentine Governments have done is making the functioning of the Government more difficult. The Argentine Constitution is as liberal as that of any of the other American republics and the Argentine Government is following constitutional procedures as definitely as any of the other American republics.

E. Any efforts by us to intervene in the internal situation in the Argentine would not only not be in accord with our definitely established policy of non-intervention but would be bitterly resented in every one of the other American republics. Whether we like to recognize it or not, there is a strong feeling in these other American republics that our actuation in some respects during the last election in the Argentine was intervention or as close to intervention as such action can become. Every one of the other

American republics
American republics fears that there may be a repetition of such an attitude on our part and for this reason their attitude so far as the Argentine is concerned is one of solidarity.

F. We have to recognize that the Argentine Government is as solidly established as most and more solidly than most of the Governments of the other American republics and it is the Government which we must reckon having to deal with for the foreseeable future. No one can foretell the course of events too long in any one country these days, and there may be an over-turn of the present Government in the Argentine, but this is not anything which we can reckon with as a factor in our relationships with the country.

G. It must be taken into account that if there should be any over-turn or change of or change in the present Government, it would be in the direction of an unconstitutional de facto and arbitrary government which would be definitely unfriendly to the United States. The struggle within the present Government is for the reasonable and more restrained elements to maintain control; and if there is any change, responsible Argentines, whether they are in the government or bitterly opposed to it, realize that anything which would follow this government would be, so far as the Argentine and the Americas are concerned, infinitely worse.

H. We have to recognize that there is this confusion not only in the minds of our people at home but also in the minds of the Argentines and of the peoples of the other American republics with respect to our policy towards the Argentine.
 Argentine. We have considered that our relations with the Argentine are normal and friendly in every respect except that we have declared that we will not enter into a defense meeting with the Argentine or deliver any arms or military material until she has adequately met her inter-American commitments. This much can be understood by our own people and by the peoples of the other American republics but there is a growing feeling in the Argentine and in the other American republics that there is no real interest on the part of the United States in completely normalizing its relations with the Argentine. This is the most dangerous factor on the horizon today so far as inter-American relationships are concerned, and unless this position is clarified, the inter-American system is in grave danger, and our position in this hemisphere and in the world will be seriously weakened.

I. The newspapers in the United States and some of the correspondents from the American correspondents in the Argentine have not helped to create a better atmosphere or a more understanding knowledge of the situation. So far as the American press is concerned, press comment and editorials increasingly are in the direction that the Argentine is a Fascist totalitarian state, unfriendly to the United States and with sinister designs on its neighbors. Some of our papers and some of our editorial writers speak of the Argentine as though we were in a sort of war with her and that she is an enemy country and this at a time when we are making peace with our bitter enemies during the last war who inflicted such great damage on us in lives and property and who at the same time we are now aiding with loans and supplies and foodstuffs. The attitude which has been built
been built up in the public mind with respect to the United States so far as the Argentine is concerned is increasingly making more difficult the composition of the situation between the two countries, on a sound basis, and which is indispensable. Another unfortunate turn which the news in the United States has taken with respect to the Argentine, and even editorial comment, is that there has been a tendency to make it appear that there is a difference between Assistant Secretary Braden and the Ambassador in Buenos Aires with reference to Argentine policy, and more lately this difference has been made to appear in some papers as one between the Department and the Ambassador in Buenos Aires. It is an altogether new circumstance in the history of our foreign relations that such a situation should be built up through which it would appear that policy was being made by a subordinate official in the Department of State or by an Ambassador in the field, when foreign policy in our country is a matter for the determination of the President and of the Secretary of State; and according to our present practice which we have built up in recent years, foreign policy is a coordinated matter through consultation between the Department and officials concerned in that policy, with final decisions remaining in the President and the Secretary of State. We have to recognize that this publicity has done a great deal of harm and has created great confusion and has reached the point where it is becoming dangerous so far as our fundamental interests are concerned.
ACTION OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS MEETING ITS INTER-AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

With the end of the war the meeting by the Argentine of her inter-American commitments fell into four principal categories.

A. The ratification of the Acts of México City and San Francisco.
B. Adequate relative action in the field of enemy property.
C. Adequate relative action in the field of enemy aliens.
D. Adequate relative action in the field of Axis schools, institutions, and propaganda.

Ratification of the Acts of México City

One of the first steps of the Argentine Congress when it met in June 1946 after the present administration came in was to ratify the Acts of México City. The record of the Argentine with respect to the ratification of inter-American resolutions and agreements over a long period of years has been relatively poor. It was, therefore, significant that the Argentine Congress ratified by strong majorities the Acts of México City and San Francisco, which for the first time oriented the policy of the Argentine Government definitely into a system of inter-American collaboration. It has been stated that as the de facto government which preceded the present constitutional government had adhered to the Acts of México City that this ratification by the Congress was not necessary and as a measure of compliance of no significance. To make such assertions is to disregard the facts and is characteristic of so much of the unfavorable comment which it is the practice to make in so many countries concerning the
concerning the present Argentine Government. Under Argentine constitutional practice the Acts of México City had to be ratified by the Argentine Congress and this was recognized by the Foreign Minister during the de facto government when the Argentine adhered to these Acts by a statement he made to the press in Buenos Aires to the effect that when a constitutional government was established in the Argentine, ratification by the Congress would be necessary to complete Argentine adherence. The fact that the ratification of these Acts by the Congress required considerable persuasion by the executive branch of the Government seemed to pass completely unnoticed in the United States, although its significance in the other American countries was fully understood and appropriate value placed thereon. The ratification of the Acts of México City by the Argentine Congress gives a definite orientation to the Argentine in the inter-American system.

Action with respect to Axis Schools, Institutions, and Propaganda

The Embassy in Buenos Aires has already informed the Department of State that in the field of Axis schools and institutions and propaganda the Argentine Government has taken as effective action as any one of the American republics and in many respects as definite action as our own government and the Embassy has informed the Department that in this respect, and in its opinion, the Argentine may be considered as having complied with its commitments. As there is no doubt of this and as the facts have been reported to the Department, it is not necessary to enter into supporting statements here. The British Embassy in

Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires, which has collaborated with this Embassy in these matters, has given as its definite opinion that the Argentine Government has complied in this respect.

Although this Embassy has made its statement to the foregoing effect to the Department some months ago, there has been no expression of comment or approval by the Department of State.

**Enemy property**

The problem of the Argentine Government with respect to enemy property is more difficult than that of some of the other American republics, first because the volume and value of this property is considerable and because Argentine citizens had legitimately associated themselves before the war, as in other countries, with some of these German firms. The second difficulty has lain in the fact that the Court decisions in the Argentine have made more difficult the program of the government towards liquidation.

Up until six months ago, although appropriate decrees and regulations with respect to enemy property had been issued, the de facto government had done very little towards actual liquidation of the established enemy interests in these properties. When the present Government came into power in June 1946, it began active steps towards the liquidation of the property but was hampered by the inefficiency of the Government organizations handling the matter and by certain lack of interest on the part of the officials. The Argentine Government has in recent months activated the liquidation of enemy interest in such properties and is actively working on a list of 68 firms which represent the principal ones in which enemy interest has been established.
been established. It is believed by the Embassy in Buenos Aires that there is no doubt that the Argentine Government will carry through faithfully the liquidation of all established enemy interest; and with the carrying through of the program respecting these 68 firms and some additional ones under investigation the Argentine Government will have complied with its inter-American commitments in this respect as effectively if not more effectively than most of the other American Governments.

**Enemy Aliens**

The British and United States Embassies have been working closely together in the matter of enemy aliens and have presented altogether a list of some 600-700 names to the Argentine Foreign Office which they believe should be investigated. It has been taken for granted by some at home that because these names were submitted to the Argentine government, it meant that we were asking for the repatriation and deportation of all these individuals.

As a matter of fact, a considerable mistake was made by both the United States and British Embassies in submitting such long lists because the lists contained the names of individuals concerning whom in many cases little or no information was available.

The Argentine government had, before the present government came in, repatriated the members of the crew of the *graf spee* who could be located - over 800 some. It had deported on the *Highland Monarch* some 28 German agents and aliens against whom adequate information had been established. It has deported a number of others against whom information could be established.
The Argentine Government has been investigating the names which the British and the United States Embassies submitted. In most cases, as already indicated, the information which the British and United States Embassies could submit was unsupported by evidence and the Argentine government has not been able to find supporting evidence. The Government has, therefore, prepared a list of 52 persons which includes those against whom enemy activities have been definitely established, and this list includes those from our lists concerning whom we had been able to supply real information. These 52 are presently being rounded up and an Argentine vessel is held in readiness to carry them to Germany. After the deportation of these 52, or as many of them as can be located and apprehended, the Argentine government intends to continue its investigation of further names on our lists, but it is the considered opinion of this Embassy and of the British Embassy that there are very few additional names in that list with respect to which information is available which would be adequate for action by the Argentine Government.

There is no present reason to believe that the Argentine government is not acting in good faith so far as the program of enemy aliens is concerned, and that it has not and will not carry through a program which will be relatively as effective as that carried through in any of the other American republics and in some cases more effective.

It must be noted in this connection that the program of the Argentine Government has been very greatly hampered by the fact that the courts up until recently failed to recognize any distinction in protecting aliens under the law who had not performed acts against the state and those...
who had performed acts against the state or the United Nations. As soon as the Argentine Government was able to apprehend and arrest some of these aliens when it started on its program of active performance they were released by the Courts on writs of habeas corpus. It is only recently that the Courts have taken a different attitude.

We cannot lay down a blueprint for Argentina performance. It has been the constant recommendation of this Embassy, which I believe is based on sound grounds, that our Government cannot lay down a blueprint to the Argentine government as to what it must do in the matter of Axis schools and institutions, enemy property and enemy aliens. We have not laid down such a blueprint for any of the other American republics. It would be an intervention on our part in the internal affairs of another country and a violation of its sovereignty if we should do so. All that we can properly expect is that the other American Governments, including the Argentine, take cognizance of the information which the British Government and we have supplied them, and that these governments, including the Argentine, on their own initiative make the appropriate investigations to establish the facts with respect to these three matters and then take in all good faith appropriate action. The final action taken by the respective countries with respect to these three matters must depend upon their constitutions and laws and the question of good faith cannot be raised unless there is flagrant and obvious lack thereof.

We have not laid down a blueprint with respect to these matters for the other American republics, but the tendency is definitely to do so with respect to the Argentine. We have not questioned the good faith of any
of the other American republics, but the tendency is definitely to question the good faith of the Argentine government. Although others of the other American republics have been slow in taking adequate action with respect to enemy property and aliens and schools and institutions, we have not permitted this to, in any way, affect our relationships with them. We have collaborated with them in the military field and have furnished them with military equipment, and we have been willing to enter into a defense pact with them. With respect to the Argentine, however, we have permitted ourselves to get into a difficult and, in some respects, untenable position. On April 9, 1946, the secretary of state made a statement to the effect that we could not sit down in a defense treaty with the Argentine or deliver military material to her until she had met her inter-American commitments and stated that what we needed was deeds and not words. This statement of the Secretary of state was entirely correct and necessary, but since the statement has been made the application thereof has by no means been clear. Progress in many of the other American republics with respect to enemy property and aliens has been slow and in a number of them there is no definite indication that in the end enemy property will not revert to the original owners after some lapse of time. With respect to enemy aliens, some of these Governments have been as inactive as the de facto government of the Argentine was and as inadequate in performance as the present Government of the Argentine has been in some respects up to this time.

The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that there is a definite tendency to endeavor to apply criteria to
the Argentine with respect to performance which we are not applying to the others of the American republics and if we do this, there is grave danger that we will never be able to normalize our relations with the Argentine with the consequent disadvantages which have been set forth in this memorandum and with no advantage.

We will have no support from the British Government nor will we have any support from any of the other American countries in applying criteria to Argentine performance which we do not apply to others of the American republics. Public opinion in the United States, when adequately informed instead of inadequately as at present, would not support the applying of criteria to the Argentine which we do not apply to others.

We are making treaties of peace with our enemies during the war and properly so. We are making them loans, and we are furnishing them materials and food. We are permitting them to retain military equipment and military establishments fixed by these treaties. In the matter of the Argentine, there would be a tendency on the part of some to treat her as an enemy country and to apply criteria which we are no longer applying to the former enemy states.

It is true that the conduct of the Government of the Argentine was uncollaborative during the greater part of the war as it was in the first World War. It is true that it made its declaration of war at the very end and under circumstances which did not do particular credit to it, but it did respond to pressures exerted by us and by others of the American republics. The Argentine has been admitted as a member of the United Nations, and I cannot conceive of any situation under which she would be deprived.
be deprived of that seat. It is therefore incongruous that while a member of the United Nations which will retain its seat, we should continue to take this attitude that the Argentine is not a fit member of the American community of states and a country with which we can maintain the same relations that we maintain with all of the other American states.

It is essential that the Argentine meet her obligations with respect to enemy property and aliens, but this performance cannot be on the basis of a blueprint laid down by us nor on the basis of criteria other than those applied to the other American republics. This would put us in an intolerable position with respect to world opinion and before our own people, for in our international relations we proceed on a basis of justice and equity and equality of treatment.

We must not permit the question of Argentine compliance to become a subject of discussion among the American states or permit ourselves to get into the position of exigencies on our part being considered as violating the sovereignty of another state. This is a position into which there is danger that we may move, and we are already partly in it. It is therefore necessary to clarify this whole situation in order that the position may be clarified both so far as our Government and the Argentine Government are concerned and a composition of the situation arrived at as soon as possible.

Decisions cannot be delayed.

Suspicion is growing in some of the other American states as well as in the Argentine as well as in the minds of some people at home that we are endeavoring by an

intransigent attitude
intransigent attitude toward the Argentine to foment a change of government in that country. This is a position into which we cannot permit ourselves to be put for we would be doing exactly what we have imputed to the Argentine governments of doing and what some impute, without any adequate basis whatever, to the present Argentine Government.

The Swedish and Czechoslovak Governments are already offering arms to the Argentine. The Belgians, French, and others are getting ready to do so and have already made preliminary steps. The Swedish and British Governments are not happy over the "gentleman's Agreement" which they have with us not to ship arms to the Argentine. The Swedish Government has made it clear that it wishes to abrogate this "gentleman's Agreement". There are indications that the British Government is growing restive under this "gentleman's Agreement" and is ready to approach us with respect to its termination. The Swedish and British Governments, as well as most of these European Governments, consider the sale of arms as a business and as an industrial outlet on which they place great value so far as their economies are concerned. If the defense pact is not entered into within a relatively short time so that the purchase and deliveries of arms can be regulated by common accord among the American states, we will find that a considerable portion of the revenues of these states will go towards the purchase of arms and all plans for standardization, uniformity of training and equipment so important to us from the defense point of view will be definitely eliminated.

The Armed Forces of the Argentine, as I believe of all of the American countries, are in favor of this standardization, uniformity of training and equipment,
but in the Argentine in particular, which has not been able to get arms during the period of the war, there is a situation in every branch of the Armed Forces, which is destructive, of morale and which those responsible in Government must take account of. The officers of the Armed Forces as well as the Government of the Argentine recognize the superiority of United States equipment but the Argentine Armed Forces are suffering from this lack of morale because they have practically no equipment of a modern character. There is no established indication that the Argentine Government or Armed Forces intend to set up an unbalanced military establishment and there is no indication that they intend to use any military establishment except in a concerted plan for the defense of their country and of this hemisphere. How long it will be possible for the Argentine Government to refrain from making purchases of arms from other countries which it would prefer to buy from us is very problematic, and it is obvious that this situation cannot last much longer.

Most important of all is the psychological situation which exists in the Argentine Government and among the Argentine people. For the first time in decades, there is a definite tendency and desire here as well as an established policy for friendly and collaborative relations with the United States. If we do not meet this with a responsive attitude we will consolidate, and this is inevitable, the old situation of hostility, jealousy, and recriminations which existed and which was such an unhappy element in the inter-American picture. In the major interest of our country and of this hemisphere, this problem must be faced in all of its realistic aspects and it has been the

attempt in
attempt in this memorandum to present some of these, although a complete statement would require a document many times the length of this.

The first step is a clarification of our position and of our real policy. We are drifting into a situation both in the press and so far as action of government is concerned which will definitely alienate the two countries and force the Argentine into all of the positions which in the past we have hoped by our policy to avert. Without a composition of the situation we will definitely destroy inter-American collaboration and will open the way for all sorts of foreign influences in this hemisphere. We will destroy the stability of our interests in the Argentine and gradually close this important world market to our goods. We will destroy any hope of a defense pact which would be effective and weaken our own security and that of every country in this hemisphere and through that destroy what can be one of the principal bulwarks to any world organization for peace and security.

George S. Messersmith

Buenos Aires, Argentina,
December 19, 1946.