Supplementary Observations to Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Respect to the Secret Memorandum on the Argentine Situation dated November 3, 1944.

The Department of State believes it desirable to stress that under the proposed plan for a meeting, as set forth in the secret memorandum under reference, the Farrell régime would merely be given an opportunity to state why its case should be heard at the end of the meeting. The proposed Argentine item of the agenda suggested in the secret memorandum does not contemplate that the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics will go into the merits, the pros and cons, of Argentine compliance with its international commitments. It contemplates merely that the Argentine representative would be given an opportunity to state why it desires to have a full hearing on its case, and what it believes could be accomplished by such a hearing.

The Department of State believes that the proposed plan has the additional advantage that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would be able to exchange views personally, around a conference table, before arriving at a decision which is of such tremendous importance to the Americas. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and they alone, and not their delegates at the Pan American Union, should exchange views and seek to arrive at a consensus of opinion on the Argentine request.
It is already clear that if the governing board of the Pan American Union were to take the final decision on the Argentine proposal, it would be exercising a political judgment of a most delicate character. If the varying shades of opinion on the Argentine request are to be effectively reconciled in the common interests, the task must be performed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs themselves. The plan suggested in the secret memorandum would afford precisely this opportunity.

A further thought is that a thorough analysis of the Argentine proposal is necessary to appreciate all of its implications. We believe that Venezuela and Colombia have acted precipitously and without considering, for example, such basic questions as to whether it is intended to arrive at a decision with regard to recognition. Would this be decided by majority vote? How would the evidence be presented? Is there not the greatest danger of falling into a trap when acceptance is given to a proposal qualified by broad, undefined reservation on "internal order". All such questions should be discussed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs themselves, it would appear, before they decide whether to hear the Argentine case.