History shows that there is no strong impulse amongst the Poles to form a nation. To witness the repeated partitions of Poland, Poland's resurrection is attributable solely to German victories on the Eastern front, the results of which were not nullified but rather confirmed by the Versailles Treaty. The Russians have not waived their claims on Poland. This was evidenced in 1920 by the Russian-Polish war which, however, ended in the defeat of Russia. The Poles do not wish to return to Russia, not only because they remember the harsh treatment they suffered under the Czars but also because they strongly dislike the Bolshevist system.

In the re-establishment of Poland large areas that had been under German rule were incorporated in the new country, less out of ethnographic reasons than for economic considerations. (The Corridor meant access to the Ocean; Upper Silesia afforded an industrial basis.) Germany has never ceased to call for the return of these areas. From the economic point of view her claims are very strong, because Upper Silesia, no more than the Corridor, forms an economic unit.

History would point to a new partition of Poland between Germany and Russia. The essentially Polish areas falling to Russia. In this connection it may be pointed out that, as shown in the table appended, only 0.4 per cent of Russians are living in Poland, but that great national affinities exist between the Polish and the Russian Slavs.

In the event of war the strategic position of Poland is extremely unfavourable. Not only is the common frontier with Germany inordinately long but in a number of places it would appear impossible to defend. Moreover, the industrial potentialities of Poland in the event of war are greatly reduced owing to the fact that the iron and steel industries are largely dependent on Sweden for their supplies of ores. Poland might easily find it impossible to continue to draw these supplies, not only because Danzig would be closed but also because of the superiority of the German Navy in the Baltic. Consequently, the task of supplying Poland with arms, etc. would rest largely on the shoulders of Russia.

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THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM.
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Ten per cent of the population of Poland are Ukrainians. At present they are rather pressed by the Poles because they agitate for a separation from Poland of the Ukrainian territories. The
greater part of the Ukrainians form an autonomous federalistic state within the frame of the U.S.S.R. This autonomy responds to hopes which the Ukrainians have entertained for centuries. The remaining Ukrainians would rather join the Ukrainian Soviet Republic than remain within Poland. However, there is a political movement for an independent Ukraine, such as was established in 1918 for a brief period with the help of the Germans. Agitation to that end finds strong support in Germany, in the hope that if the Polish Ukrainians went to the Ukraine, as the Sudeten Germans did to Germany, Poland would be weakened. Besides, an independent Ukraine subordinate to Germany would be very useful to Germany, considering it is Russia’s granary, and is very rich in mineral resources: Russia to-day derives from that area 80 per cent of her coal supplies and 70 per cent of her iron supplies. (In 1936, Ukraine produced 66,000,000 tons of coal; 8,956 million tons of iron; 7,985 million tons of steel.)

In the event of a new partition of Poland between Germany and Russia it seems likely that Germany would waive her claims to a share of Polish Ukraine provided she could obtain the German and Polish areas she has lost to Poland.

There is no economic need for Germany to-day to control the Ukraine since she can practically dispose of the Hungarian and Romanian wheat output. The iron and steel industries of Ukraine are situated in the Donets Basin which for the time being is inaccessible to Germany.

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APPENDIX

POPULATION OF POLAND

| Total: 34,779,000 |

Distribution according to languages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenians</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POPULATION OF THE UKRAINE

| Total: 31,901,400 |

Distribution according to languages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunry.</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 26, 1939.
1. **Wavelengths.**

For several months, the first news bulletin in German has been given at 8 o'clock p.m. Central European time exclusively on the short wavelength.

This is not suitable, considering that only the more expensive German radio sets can receive on short wavelengths.

The British Broadcasting Corporation is aware of this fact, since it gives out the identical news bulletin on the medium and long wavelengths at 10 p.m. This duplication is hardly rational.

2. **Press Review.**

A detailed account of English newspaper comment is of particular importance for the German listeners. The German public takes a great interest in British public opinion, but hardly reads English papers and receives, through the Nazi foreign correspondents, a quite distorted picture of the attitude of the British Press.

3. **Avoid superfluous News.**

I have noticed repeatedly that official German news has been included in the British bulletin given out in German; for instance, facts or speeches of leading Nazis that have already been fully reported in the German Press.

Care should be taken, in my opinion, only to give such facts or speeches in so far as they have not appeared in the German Press.

4. **Deal only with topical Subjects.**

When little news is available, the bulletin is often padded with uninteresting statements.

This policy is harmful, because the German listeners may lose interest in these bulletins. It would be preferable, failing suitable information, to shorten the bulletin.

Perhaps the spare minutes might be filled up with gramophone records, of performances by well-known German artists who have been compelled to leave their country, but whose names are not forgotten there.

5. **Choice of Subjects.**

The average German is extraordinarily ignorant of what is going on in the German economic system.
He sees in the papers accounts of the continuous boom, inadequate labour supply, record occupation in German industry; he is told that German industry is prospering much better than the British, French, or even American. Outward appearances go to confirm the views spread by Nazi propaganda. The average German has not enough knowledge to realize the delusions of the German economic system. Hence, largely, the popular confidence in the official economic policy.

In these circumstances it would be very important to enlighten the German public as to the fundamental differences between the German and, say, the British or American systems. Thus it might be pointed out that the notion of money in Germany is hardly comparable with the notion of money in other countries; or that the apparent stability of price indices in Germany is largely due to a constant lowering in the quality of the articles of which prices are recorded.

The German public must be made to feel how different the standard of living of the German working classes and middle classes is from that of the corresponding classes in England, France, Holland, Sweden, etc. Essays by non-British enquirers on the mode of living of the English workman or employee might be usefully reported.

It would be important to give interesting accounts of England's commanding position in the wool trade, the cotton trade, the wheat trade, etc., and showing the international significance of the Pound Sterling in the unhampered role of a world currency.

The German public would be greatly interested to hear striking facts regarding the English Air-Force, Navy, and Army. The German listener is not impressed when he is told from time to time that 200,000 fresh recruits have voluntarily joined the Territorial Army, because he is quite unable to grasp the significance of this said voluntary recruiting. He hears the figures and thinks them small.

The British Broadcasting Corporation is giving every week a review entitled 'America Speaks'. The German public would be greatly interested to hear a review of this kind, particularly with reference to British conditions.

6. Extracts from Speeches of Leading Foreign Statesmen.

Speeches on foreign affairs, whether by foreign or by British statesmen, would be listened to eagerly in Germany in view of the scanty and inaccurate notices they receive in the German Press. It would be useful to point out, by means of characteristic examples, how such speeches are distorted or curtailed in the German Press.
7. **Literary Broadcasts.**

It would be helpful from time to time to mention literary work by German writers outside Germany. For instance, when a new book by Thomas Mann or Stefan Zweig appears it might be reviewed and suitable extracts given. The average German has no idea that exiled German writers continue to work and are producing valuable books.

Purely political books by eminent German writers would also deserve mention, such as Rauschnigg's, or Beschwitz's recent work on 'You and the Masses' which is a remarkable study on the manner in which the attitude of the masses has been worked upon in the course of history.

Important publications in English, French, and American literature should be brought to the notice of the German public whose interest in foreign literature is all the keener to-day because of the scarcity and poor quality of German production. (Hence the rapid increase since 1933 in the circulation of books translated from other languages.) At the same time, the decline in the export of German literature might be pointed out.

July 26, 1939.
I. RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN PROBLEMS.

Two factors dominate Russia's attitude: firstly, a deep distrust of the western European democracies and, secondly, fear of a German hegemony.

As regards the first point, Stalin has not forgotten that England and France omitted to consult him in September 1938 on the Czechoslovakian question although Russia had an alliance with Czechoslovakia on the one hand and with France on the other. Neither France nor England appeared to have attempted to obtain that Russia should participate in the Munich conference. The same men who at that time treated Russia as a 'quantité négligeable' are still in office in France and in England; and Russia - or rather Stalin - fears that in another crisis these same men would again go to Munich without Russia being consulted. Hence Russia's anxiety to provide in the minutest way for every contingency so as to be spared unpleasant surprises. Negotiations would be facilitated if new men were acting in the place of Chamberlain and Daladier or at least at their side. There are some who even hold that Russia is purposely dragging out the negotiations so as to exercise a pressure on public opinion in England and France and thereby a change in the Cabinets of these two countries.

As regards the second factor - fear of German hegemony in Europe - this is largely based on an extensive knowledge of Germany's military power. It must not be forgotten that very close relations existed between the Russian and German military authorities at the time when Germany was secretly re-arming under the Weimar Republic; presumably many personal relations have not yet been severed. On the other hand, Russia knows well that Germany's strategic power has been greatly enhanced by the construction of the Western line of defences.

However, it is realized that supposing Germany overcame the Western Powers, a crusade against the Bolshevist régime in Russia would be likely to follow. This danger is all the more to be feared because the leaders of Germany, on racial grounds, describe the incorporation of the Baltic States in Germany as a natural development. The spokesman in this contention is a close friend of Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, who is himself a Baltic German. Nothing but the fear of German hegemony can cause Russia to abandon her attitude of neutrality which at first sight would be her most natural position.

Even if Germany did not attack Russia, her hegemony would practically exclude Russia from Europe. The Kremlin will not be resigned to accept such an elimination; on the contrary, it aims...
at reinstating Russia as a power in European affairs. Hence Russia's entry into the League of Nations and her military treaty with France.

II. SITUATION AND PROSPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW.

The negotiations are hampered by Stalin's lack of confidence in Chamberlain and Daladier. Moreover, a psychological mistake was made in sending out a comparatively secondary personality (Mr. Strang), because, since the Munich occurrences, the Russians have become very sensitive to marks of consideration. Moreover, the aims of the two parties to the negotiations were in opposition: for the English and French were primarily concerned to arrive at a general agreement in the hope of checking Germany's ardour, whereas the Russians are anxious to see an agreement worked out in its smallest details so as to leave no loophole for Chamberlain and Daladier. This explains why the negotiations have been so protracted.

If the information given out to-day by the United Press "that an Anglo-French military mission is on the point of leaving for Moscow" should receive confirmation, a valuable indication would be afforded that the negotiations had been carried a great step further.

July 26, 1939