Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 383, of Sept. 20, 1916,
from the Legation at Vienna, Austria.

(Translation)

(London Against Rome)

Hegel's contention that all prominent personages and events appear twice in history is, it is true, untenable as a generalization, but appears to confrim itself at the present moment by an individual case. As a result of England's hesitating tactics, the war of 1926 has become almost as inevitable as that of 1914. Perhaps Mussolini would have been spared the catastrophe of the world war, if Berlin had had knowledge of the British-French secret agreement or if the London government had informed the competent Berlin quarters in time, at least in the July days of 1914, that England would enter the war on the side of France. As it was, however, responsible people in the German Reich were convinced up to the last moment of Great Britain's neutrality and when the British Ambassador informed the Chancellor of England's participation in the war at a moment when the Central Powers could not turn back the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg broke into tears. England has followed exactly the same policy - of keeping her plans in the dark - this time as well, as can be seen from an interview between Mussolini and a representative of the London "Morning Post." Italy, according to Mussolini, had informed the British government through the medium of the Italian Ambassador in London on January 28th that Italy "requested England to make possible a clear agreement regarding a harmonious development of British and Italian interests in Abyssinia; the British Minister for Foreign Affairs gave an evasive reply." Italy's endeavor to learn the British attitude towards Italian aspirations in Abyssinia was unsuccessful a second time at the Saint Germain Conference. The whole world noticed at that time that the official statement regarding the agreement of the three powers mentioned was made only of European problems. Mussolini commented in this interview on this restriction: He himself, as he said, had isolated the word European in the communiqué: "I did so because the African questions had not been discussed."

A third attempt to learn the attitude of England, which was made by Italy again through the medium of the London Embassy - on May 1st - had just as little effect as the first and second ones.

England's political attitude of "waiting and seeing" how matters develop, a policy determined by tradition and consideration for internal-political conditions, and by a slowly developing sympathy or antipathy of the men in the street, failed in 1914 as it is failing in 1926, and thus...
were which, in view of the whole position of the British
World Empire and of the internal economic needs of Eng-
land, were desired by nobody less than by England, become facts. The reason that Italy wanted to learn British
opinion and England's advice (Schlimmang) with regard
to the action in Abyssinia, lay in Italy's geo-political
situation, characterized by the long coasts of the
Appennine peninsula, and in the tradition of Italian for-
ign policy. On the occasion of the conclusion of the
treaty of the Triple Alliance in 1882, and particularly
on the occasion of its first renewal in 1897, Italy was
conscious that no disagreement with England should arise
out of this treaty of Alliance. The reason given by
Italy in 1915 for abandoning the Alliance was that Italy's
participation in the war could never take place on the
side of a group of powers opposed to Great Britain's
sea power and naval forces.

If the British statesmen who were in responsible
position during the first months of the development of
the conflict in Abyssinia, Prime Minister Ramsay Mac-
Donald and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir
John名片, had told the Italian government the unvar-
ished truth regarding England's attitude towards the
Italian aspirations and their achievement, Mussolinii
would have put on the brakes and the armed conflict, which
today has almost become a dead certainty and which for many
reasons no power can desire less than England, would not
have taken place. Of course it is not quite certain that
Italy would have given in or changed its policy under
these conditions; for England's over-weening position and
weighty importance, as well as the almost judicious po-

sition which she has occupied in relation to events on
the continent during long periods of history, are no
longer so overwhelming and decisive as before. It consti-
tuates a real world historical turning-point that Italy
dares at present to undertake an overseas venture "with-
out Geneva and against Geneva" as well as without and
against London.