Berlin, Germany, October 19, 1935.

Dear Mr. Hillips:

I am writing you to supplement my letters of August 14 and September 29, to endeavor to bring the picture up-to-date. Much has happened since my last letter which would in some respects indicate a clarification of the situation; but I cannot help but feel that fundamentally the situation is unchanged and in many respects as dangerous as ever. I shall try to be as concise as possible but developments here are so varied and the situation has so many facets and such extraordinary changes take place, that it is only through emphasizing certain details that the main outlines of the picture will appear.

The attack on the American, Velz, in Dusseldorf on October 8 which was particularly dastardly in character, precipitated, as you know, our determined action with respect to these cases. The Department's action with the German Embassy in Washington weeks ago, which should have been sufficient to wake up the Foreign Office here, had apparently had no real effect and two notes which the Embassy had sent to the F.O. remained unanswered although the most specific assurances had been given to the Embassy that immediate action would be taken. In this we can see in a very definite way what I have always known to be the case: that although Neurath and Dieckhoff really want to do the right thing and practically hold
our point of view with respect to the interference with Americans, they have not felt themselves safe in really taking a strong attitude in the right places. Certainly von Neurath had not been able to make any impression on the Chancellor; but I doubt if he had gone at it hard enough. The fact remains that the failure of the F.O. to keep its specific promises of immediate action and the failure to answer the notes were most discourteous and indicated a grave situation. In this connection I may say that I know definitely that information in one of these cases was sent to the F.O. by the proper department of the German Government at least a week before the F.O. indicated to the Embassy that it had anything although it knew how anxiously the Embassy was waiting.

At this moment came the Ambassador's speech at the American Chamber of Commerce, which was the first important statement he had made publicly since he has arrived. It was a splendid speech and extraordinarily well worded. It was not only a scholarly piece of work, but a presentation of ideas which had to have an effect. The Ambassador has a way of saying these things, which is very effective. I think there is no question but that many of the Party leaders including Hitler who was made immediately entirely familiar with the speech by Dr. Goebbels, were furious and at the same time disconcerted. They could not take open offense but the speech had the effect of pulling them up short and making them think. At the same time came the Department's instructions enabling the Embassy to go hard at the Velz case, and whether by coincidence or not, we know that at least two other Governments made emphatic representations at the same time with regard to the attacks on their nationals. At the same moment developed the strange situation at Geneva, and Hitler, Neurath, Schmitt, Goebbels and Goering were engaged in various serious conversations with regard to the entire situation. Last Friday the
Ambassador was to see von Neurath at 11:30 in accord with an arrangement made three days before; but when the Ambassador came to the Foreign Office he found that von Neurath was with the Chancellor and he was told that von Neurath would see him later in the day and as soon as possible. It is true that in the meantime and just after the Ambassador had left the Embassy for the Foreign Office, von Neurath’s office had called up that the interview had to be postponed. I do not think that this was von Neurath’s fault. However, there was no cabinet meeting as had been indicated but Neurath was with the Chancellor and it seems pretty clear in the minds of a good many here that Hitler was suffering under the general resentment he felt on account of the speech, Geneva, and the necessity for doing something against the S.A. because of the attacks on foreigners, and that he more or less deliberately wished to slight the Ambassador. It is true that they were discussing not only the American cases, but also what to do with regard to the Disarmament Conference and the League; but it is equally true that it would have been a simple matter and just ordinary courtesy for Neurath to interrupt his conferences with Hitler long enough to see the Ambassador, especially in view of the situation. Although the Ambassador waited patiently all day, it was not until 8 o’clock that he saw Neurath and in the meantime Neurath had had time to lunch with the Chilean Ambassador from London who was here. Whether a snub was intended or not, the incident shows the extraordinary ineptitude of the higher officials of the Government. I am quite sure that Neurath regretted this whole incident very much and that he was acting under pressure; but at the same time it shows that so far as the Chancellor is concerned Neurath is really powerless or may not be able to put his ideas over if he tries. As an experienced diplomat he knew that he should not put off an appointment of three days’ standing with the
Ambassador when such important matters were pending, and I personally doubt whether he emphasized the protocol and courtesy part of it sufficiently to the Chancellor.

Through our action — and I am sure that it was through our action rather than that which may have been taken by several other Governments, Hitler was forced to make a decision on the question of the attacks on foreigners. The American press in this respect was very helpful. They emphasized during those days the probability that our Government would have to take some action with regard to informing Americans that they might not be free from molestation in Germany, and I know from my contacts in the Government how tremendously disturbed they were that such a declaration might be made. I had told them about it many times but they felt that our patience had no end and when they realized the imminence of action they were more upset than I have known them to be about anything since the 5th of March. They realized the economic effects which any such action on our part would have. Hitler himself was very greatly perturbed and as they decided at the same time to go out of the Disarmament Conference and the League, they knew that something would have to be done to appease us, for above all they want our friendship and support.

And then came action such as I always felt they could take if they really wanted to. The men who attacked Velz were found, brought to Berlin, tried immediately and sentenced to six months each, although they belong to the S.A. The S.A. storm trooper who had attacked Mulvihill here, we were informed had been arrested on August 24 and put in a concentration camp. Goering got out a statement to the press about the treatment of foreigners and orders were transmitted of a categorical nature all over Germany. Dr. Goebbels for the first time permitted notices of the attacks on foreigners to appear
appear in the German press as well as news as to the punishment of S.A. men. All these things we have been trying for for months. The action, however, was not taken without tremendous difficulties, for Goering and Goebbels did not wish to give in and it was the influence of Hitler and Schmitt which carried the day. Hitler later personally informed the Ambassador that he himself would see that if there were any further attacks, the men would be punished. All this sounds very satisfactory and is; but we cannot forget that they should have done this long ago and knew they should. Even at this last moment Goering and Goebbels were dead against doing anything against S.A. men and Goering, in his orders, always speaks of these S.A. men who attack foreigners as Communists masquerading in the brown uniform. Neither can we forget that the mendacious habits of the officials have not changed. In a note which the Foreign Office sent to the Embassy on October 14, it is stated that the storm leader, Karl Rusch, who attacked Mulvihill on October 16 "was arrested on August 24 and placed in a concentration camp". This does not jibe with the information which the head of the State Secret Political Police gave me on August 18 to the effect that the attacker of Mulvihill had been arrested and turned over to the judicial authorities. After the Secret Police had given me this information I tried in vain to get from the Prussian Ministry of Justice and from the Secret Police, information as to the name of the man who had been arrested and when he was brought to trial. I am absolutely convinced that he had not been arrested on August 18 as I was informed by the Secret Police, and also that he was not arrested on August 24 as stated in the Foreign Office; but that some man, whether he is the culprit or not, was arrested early last week in order to enable the Government to make some decent answer to us with respect to the formal inquiries regarding the action in this case. This seems like a very serious thing to say, but we must look these things in the face and can only judge by facts.
So far as the attacks on foreigners are concerned, I believe that the action taken by the Government will be very helpful. Whether we can definitely look forward to adequate action in the future I am not yet sure; but there is at least a more adequate recognition of the importance of this matter in the highest places now.

With respect to the stability of the Government, there is constant talk of cabinet changes, and that Neurath, Schmitt and Krosigk are scheduled to go. I do not think that we must give too much credence to these reports; but there is basis for them. None of them are members of the Party and Schmitt has recently identified himself more closely with the Party and has become a member of the S.S. Goering has, I think, not altogether given up his hopes of becoming Foreign Minister, but for the time being would not wish the place as his post as Minister President of Prussia makes him much more powerful until the picture is changed. Neurath's position is weak as it has been from the outset; but I believe that the developments at Geneva will have a tendency to keep him in his position for some time longer. The position of Krosigk of the Treasury, is uncertain. He has really not done very much himself and there is a possibility of his going some time. Schmitt is the most useful member of the cabinet from a constructive point of view, but he is subject to constant attack by Darre, the Minister of Agriculture, who is a radical and an irresponsible man. Schmitt is really a fine figure and a man of fine principles and who, in a quiet way, has done a great deal to bring a quieter situation in industry.

One of the principal characteristics of this revolution has been that every one who is out of a job is trying constantly to get out some one who is in. This is true from the bottom of German life to the very top. These rumors of cabinet changes, therefore, have a foundation because they are characteristic of the revolution; but I personally doubt
doubt whether Neurath and Schmitt will be put out in the near future, for after Geneva it is doubtful whether the Party wishes to give this additional shock to the outside world. Goering has been remarkably quiet recently and there are all sorts of rumors about him which I believe are for the most part without foundation. That he is extremely anti-Goebbels and that Goebbels is anti-Goering, is certain; but outwardly they work together. While Goebbels is probably the most unpopular man among his colleagues, he has the ear of the Chancellor and they know they cannot do without him. The new elections which of course are no elections at all, are to be handled by Goebbels who is to put them over. Whenever anything has to be put over with the masses — this is necessary constantly — Goebbels is the man to do it. Schacht's position in the Reichsbank is stronger than ever but as an influence generally, he does not count. He wants to keep his place in the Reichsbank and admits that on many matters on which he should advise the Chancellor he no longer even makes any attempt to do so. Keppler, who is the Chancellor's economic adviser, is after all a small man and although he is better than those who formerly had the Chancellor's ear, I have little confidence in him. The other day he sat next to the Ambassador at the Chamber of Commerce luncheon and as the Ambassador knew he was going to see Hitler in a day or two, he wanted to lay some of the background through Keppler for his call. Practically the Ambassador's first remarks to Keppler were met by a cynical expression and Keppler turned away his face and said: "That I must contend". It is unfortunate that these people who have the Chancellor's ear either do not tell him the truth because they are afraid to, or because they want to hold their jobs or because they are really not able to properly advise him.

The other day I arranged for a small luncheon at the house so that the Ambassador could talk quietly and at length with Dr. Schmitt and with
his principal lieutenant in economic matters, Dr. Posse. There were only four of us and I am sure that the contact between the Ambassador and Schmitt was very helpful for after all Schmitt is the one man, even more than Neurath, who can be depended upon today to give the Chancellor good advice, and Schmitt has the advantage that the Chancellor listens to him. During this luncheon Schmitt and Posse were both quite emphatic that if we levied countervailing duties under Section 303 of the Tariff Act on German imports on account of the use of blocked marks and scrip by exporters, they would be forced by public opinion in Germany to retaliate with anti-dumping measures against our goods on account of the depreciated value of the dollar on foreign exchanges. I telegraphed this information to the Department and wrote a despatch in which I gave certain observations which I think we should carefully consider before taking any action. I personally am strongly of the opinion that we should not take any anti-dumping measures against German goods for the present, for I think we would be affected much more than they. My despatch will reach the Department at the same time as this letter, and may interest you. In any event, I hope that you will find it possible to stop any action by our Government for the present.

There is a good deal of difference of opinion here as to the economic situation. Unemployment is certainly not relatively as great as with us although the earnings of many of the employed are not sufficient to sustain them. A good deal of the new employment has been forced, both in industry and agriculture and cannot last. I reckon the number of unemployed here now at 5 million, but the Government figures are around 4. Dr. Schmitt told the Ambassador and me the other day that he feels that there has been a 10% improvement in business in Germany generally and bases this on the demand for iron and steel, coal, power and light, etc. One of my German friends who sits
on the board of a score or more of large industrial concerns, feels that the economic situation is on the face of it not so serious, but that the dangerous fundamental features remain. In any event I think we may safely say that on the face of things the economic situation here appears better than at home.

With respect to the financial situation the budget is, considering everything, in comparatively good shape. It is possible here to do something which we cannot very well do at home, but budget figures can be secured for the Reich, states, cities and communes and the total budget for all Government establishments and organizations is now around 15 billion of marks a year, of which about 6½ billions is for the Reich and the rest for the states, cities and communes. A part of the 6½ billions for the Reich goes to the states and cities also. The budget itself is in practical balance but this figure of 15 billions does not include the extraordinary items for creating new work, etc., for which it is estimated about 3 billions will be used as from the first of July of this year until the end of spring in 1934. The curious fact is that the budgetary situation here is not at all as bad as it might be. I talked over the budget situation recently with both Dr. Schmitt, the Minister of Commerce, and with Mr. Jeidels who is the principal director of the "Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft", now the most solvent bank in Germany, and both seem to be quite optimistic with regard to the budget although they are not Party men and are giving an objective rather than a prejudiced viewpoint.

One of the interesting and unexpected developments is that the export balance just published for September shows a larger balance than for previous months, when the general expectation was that it would be lower due to the prejudice and boycott against German goods abroad. I do not believe that the export balance would be deliberately juggled, and if they keep up having this surplus

Dr. Schacht
Dr. Schacht can not raise any further objections to interest payments on the foreign debt. They will certainly have to continue to pay under the present arrangements if the favorable balance keeps anywhere near the average for this year so far.

The propaganda activities are becoming very subtle and much more intelligent and I feel that this is something we have to reckon with. I do not think that they will hesitate at anything. A young man named Bossard who was attacked in Berlin as you know, and whose case was reported to the Foreign Office and the other authorities and who was undoubtedly the subject of an unprovoked attack as he reported to us in an affidavit, when he arrived in the United States issued a statement to the reporters that everything was well in Germany and that if foreigners got into trouble here it was their own fault. I happen to know from Dr. Funk who is the right-hand of Dr. Goebbels, that after the attack on Bossard they got in touch with him and showed him all kinds of courtesies and practically bought him. I have no evidence, but I feel practically certain that they paid him to give this statement to the newspapers on his arrival home.

In the case of Drloff which you are familiar with and which could have been so serious in its consequences, when he arrived in New York he refused to talk, and judging from the remarks made to me by Minister President Goering I feel pretty sure that he was paid a large sum to keep quiet for his real story would have created a sensation at home.

A very clever system has been worked up to get in touch with practically all foreigners of any importance coming to Berlin. Before they know it they find themselves wined and dined and given the opportunity of seeing people whom they are naturally curious to see but whom they had no thought of endeavoring to reach or being able to reach. They are filled up with all sorts of propaganda which they eagerly swallow as the price of their satisfied vanity.
vanity. How Mr. Crane, our former Minister to China could make the statements which he did when he got to Paris, I cannot understand. He certainly got the right picture from the Ambassador and must have known better. I am now running down a report that I. V. Lee is in charge of the Nazi propaganda in the United States and his son is here in Berlin and we already have some reason to believe that he is in the Nazi pay. We have got to be increasingly careful of what certain people say when they get home.

There is undoubtedly increasing dissatisfaction in the S.A. as well as among the population generally; but I do not think that we must as yet give any particular significance to this or at least not exaggerate it, as there is a tendency to among some of the people here. Naturally the government has not been able to do anything of real account for the S.A. and will not unless they go to war, when they will have a real job which I think most of them are only too eager for. There are 660,000 of the S.A. who are well drilled and in many ways as well trained as the Reichswehr, and they are a tough lot. Of these 660,000, few are over 30 years of age. The S.A. of course in reality has many more members, some estimating the real number authorized to wear brown shirts by their S.A. card, as 1,800,000. However, we do know that only the 660,000 are really what you might say well trained and completely equipped except for guns. The remainder have uniforms but not full equipment and many of them are older and do not do constant duty. A good many men in the S.A. feel that the recent action of the Party has been more in the direction of taking them out of good jobs which they temporarily had, rather than in putting them in. They feel that a good deal that they wanted and demanded has been undone through the men at the top who are taking good care of themselves. They are not wrong in this but in receding from their original action they do not realize that the men at the top did this to save the movement. These S.A. men feel themselves so
strong and so beyond and above the law, that they
do not understand why there should be any limits
to their power even though the leaders are beginning
more and more to understand it.

There is, from what I can gather, growing
dissatisfaction among the people in general. One
hears sarcastic comment and expression of opinion
much more than one did a month ago. On the other
hand the people are docile and as long as the S.A.
is there and remains under control, the Government
is firmly entrenched in the saddle. I think
you will be interested to know that the other day
at lunch Dr. Schmitt, the Minister of Commerce,
told the Ambassador and me that he was working very
hard on the Jewish question. He is only one of
many who realize how dangerous this anti-Semitic
movement has been to Germany's economic and financial
and general cultural structure. He intimated that
the problem was causing him daily preoccupation.
That he realizes the seriousness of the situation
and is endeavoring to find a constructive solution
or at least the beginnings of one, is known to some
of the fanatic Party leaders and this is why a
radical and an irresponsible like Barre is able to
get support for his propaganda against Schmitt. It
is interesting, however, that Dr. Schmitt is really
working on this problem, for as long as he has the
confidence of the Chancellor he may be able to finally
make some impression, particularly if he is able to
hold on until some reorganization in the Government
is forced which can serve as an excuse for receding
to some extent on the Jewish question. I thought
you would be interested in this. Dr. Schmitt holds
very sensible views in every way on the Jewish
question.

I will not touch upon the Ambassador's conversa-
tion with Hitler as he has, I am sure, already told
you about it. The Chancellor's assurances were so
satisfying and so unexpected that I think they are
on the whole too good to be true. We must keep in
mind, I believe, that when Hitler says anything he for the moment convinces himself that it is true. He is basically sincere; but he is at the same time a fanatic. It has been very correctly said that the Germans have for a century, except during the period of Bismarck, been illusionists so far as their foreign policy is concerned. They say something which they don't mean or which for the time being they want to believe or which they want the rest of the world to believe and feel that the world must believe. This is what angers Hitler and some of the leading National Socialists. They say the most extraordinarily insincere things and then want the whole world to believe them. In the speech which he made after the announcement of the withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Conference, Hitler said that the Reichswehr with its 100,000 men was the only armed force of Germany. He could not be sincere when he makes that statement for he knows that in the S.A. they have 660,000 men as effective as the Reichswehr and that they could easily find rifles in a few days for most of them. Any one who has seen a big S.A. gathering realizes that it is a real army and there is no gainsaying this. They now have already several thousand S.A. mounted men and there are among them machine gun battalions and subdivisions almost entirely corresponding to those of an army. When Mr. Hitler says that if people criticize the German children for marching, they forget that it is only the expression of the interest of the youth of Germany in the regeneration of the country. He ignores the fact that these children are being taught things every day in school which to our senses are most shocking and that family discipline has disappeared because children stay on the streets until 10 and 11 in the evening participating in these parades; and that if a parent would object it would be very bad for the parent. I was at the house of young von Swinner some weeks ago for dinner (his father was the founder of the Deutsche Bank and friend of the Kaiser), and his 8, 12 and 16 year old children did not come back from a parade.
parade until after 10 in the evening - and von Gfoihner is afraid to say a word: Steere, our Agricultural Attaché here, had to take his children out of a German school because they were being taught to throw hand-grenades and were getting the most extraordinary ideas. I get this same information from many of my friends and this is true all over the country.

I therefore do not place too great confidence in Mr. Hitler's protestations. I think for the moment he genuinely desires peace but it is a peace of his own kind and with an armed force constantly becoming more effective in reserve, in order to impose their will when it may become essential. I learn this morning that the aeroplane factory at Johannisthal has been reopened. The item appeared in the first of the noon papers of today but was suppressed in the noon papers which appear a little later. The Finance Minister has issued a decree today to the effect that those owners of houses who build an air attack protection chamber in their houses can deduct the whole of the cost from their income tax. The Government had already issued a decree several months ago to the effect that a house-owner who built such an air attack protection chamber could have a good part of the cost advanced by the Government. As the presence of such a chamber in houses will in present-day Germany be an advertisement for it, you can readily appreciate that practically every house owner, as soon as he can get it for nothing, is going to build such a chamber and all this helps to keep alive the war fears and war sentiment. I cannot get away from the conviction that these are just clever steps to make the people believe that they are being menaced by attack from all sides. If such a Germany is peaceful and really desires peace, it is beyond my comprehension! If responsible leaders who take such measures after withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Conference with high-sounding declarations that they want peace, are sincere, it is a mentality and combination of circumstances
circumstances which I am completely unable to understand.

After the Ambassador had seen Hitler the other day, I saw one of my friends who is one of the principal lieutenants of Minister President Goering. He is the real Acting Minister for Air. His ideas are very radically opposed to those which the Chancellor had expressed and I think represent more the views of Goering and the mass of the S.A. Mr. Hitler may be prepared to say that if the French march in, he will do nothing; but this is not the way his followers feel about it and it is always a question as to how far the population could be restrained and follow the policy of non-resistance, especially when the state of mind prevails which we must reckon with here today.

What I have tried to bring out is not that I wish to say that Hitler is entirely insincere, but that one must take his statements at what they are really worth and one must bear in mind that a mentality has been created here which even Mr. Hitler could not under certain provocation control if he should wish to do so. We cannot be too sanguine with respect to the assurances regarding the desire for peace or that S.A. men who have attacked foreigners or do attack them will be punished. We have had action because it was necessary to get the country out of a hole. We had particularly satisfactory action in some of our cases, at least action which seemed satisfactory on the surface, because of the Disarmament crisis the Government is childishly eager for our good-will. Germany fears France. She has no fear of Poland and Czechoslovakia. She disregards Belgium. She is not sure of England but feels that she really need have no fear because England will finally decide to follow the course which seems in her best interests. Germany, however, really fears the United States. The Germans have not forgotten that they definitely counted us out of a certain war and that we came into it and defeated them. I do not think they hold any particular rancor.
rancor in this respect, and they have forgotten only too regrettably too much about the war; but they have not forgotten the part that we played. They are not very wise in international politics but they know that they made a big mistake about us once and now they want our good feeling and if possible, our active help in the Disarmament question. But that they were for months willing to let our nationals be attacked by their extra-legal army without taking any action against the offenders, shows how inconsistent they can be in their policy. I am convinced that the strong attitude which the Department took with respect to these cases has raised our prestige here and probably increased our usefulness as a mediating factor in the European situation. I am delighted that the Department has taken this attitude and I think that if we have further cases we must act most energetically because our dignity does not permit anything else, and I am confident that the stronger the action we take, the more effective the results we will have. Force and strong language are the only things that these people understand and we cannot conceal this fundamental fact from ourselves.

I think we must remain distinctly realists so far as the German situation is concerned. There are 65,000,000 people here who cannot be ignored; but because they are 65,000,000 in the middle of Europe, it is very important for us to know just what is being made out of them. I should like to go into the aspects of the youth movement but I have already made this letter so long that I fear it will try your patience; however I hope to do this at another time.

I should like to add, however, before I stop, that so many of the Americans who come here, and other foreigners as well, seem not to realize how the intellectual life of Germany has been made poor by the anti-Semitic movement and by the elimination of so many worth while people in intellectual and scientific circles by the political persecution.
persecution of all non-National Socialists. It is not only the Jewish professors, physicists, chemists, technicians, engineers and philosophers who have been eliminated from German life; but I think that there are as many Aryans in these fields who can no longer work here as there are Jews. There were for example before the 5th of March, perhaps 14 or 15 outstanding physicists in the world, of whom at least half were in Germany. Only two of these are left. How can a country which has depended so much for its industrial and general progress upon the creative work of its scientists, hope to keep its place? The United States with its natural resources does not need from within itself such scientific creation nearly so much as Germany because we can use the creative genius from other countries. Germany, however, without such natural resources has been forced to creative work in science and has been able to get the best out of certain processes, such as the creation of nitrate from air, before they became available to the rest of the world. She has set herself back in this direction for years, and the effects of the departure of so many worth while people will not be felt at once but will be felt in the next generation or two. Some of the damage may yet be corrected, but that is something which we can't tell about yet.

May I again say what I think I told you at the beginning of this revolution. I think I said to you that there are so many pathological cases involved that it would be impossible to tell from day to day what will happen any more than the keeper of a madhouse is able to tell what his inmates will do in the next hour or during the next day. This situation still prevails to a large extent. I do not recede from what I have already told you, that the moderate elements have been gradually getting more in control and that the higher leaders have grown steadily more moderate. But the question as to whether the really moderate elements will be able to remain in control is not yet settled, and until we have something more than speeches and promises which are belied daily by
acts completely to the contrary, we shall have to feel very unsafe and very insecure and shall have to judge Germany by her deeds rather than by the declarations of her leaders. I think for the present moment, therefore, we must guard against any undue optimism which may be aroused by the apparently satisfying declarations of the Chancellor and by certain acts which took place recently. I am telling all my friends to whom I can talk in a frank way — and these I am glad to say are many — that Germany has been making too many decisions in the heat of passion and in a spirit of resentment and as a result of a feeling of offended dignity, and that these decisions have invariably harmed her. I am telling them that the need for patience and for deliberation and the utmost caution on their part is greater than ever. I think one makes some impression; but when I realize the factors which my friends have to deal with, I am not overly optimistic.

For the present I think we must continue to deal very cautiously with the situation here, and while willing to help in what ways we can without involving ourselves, we must accept with reserve the statements coming to us even from the highest authorities of the German Government.

I have dictated this letter rather hurriedly but I hope that the information may be of some use to you in giving at least a part of the picture here.

Believe me,

Cordially and sincerely yours,

The Honorable
William Phillips,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.