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LOS ANGELES 1992: FIRST URBAN
UNREST OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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CHARACTERISTICS, STRUCTURAL ANTECEDENTS,
AND DYNAMICS OF THE LOS ANGELES UNREST:
A COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION

The Los Angeles unrest is widely considered to be the most serious episode of race-related crowd violence in the U. S. in this century. In the aftermath of the disturbance, the city continues to face major challenges related to community recovery and reconciliation.

In many respects, the unrest was almost a textbook case, the prototypical big-city riot, resembling episodes of collective violence that occurred in Washington, D. C., Detroit, Newark, and scores of other U. S. cities during the 1960s. Like many of these earlier racial disturbances, including the 1965 Watts riot, the 1992 unrest was triggered by an event that highlighted conflicts between a minority community and the law enforcement/justice system (see National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders 1968 for a discussion of common features of these earlier riots). The unrest also closely resembles the 1980 Miami riot, which followed the acquittal of police officers in the killing of Arthur McDuffie, a black man. That case also involved a change of venue—to Tampa. The jury,
which was all white and all male, discounted the
testimony of eyewitnesses, including police officers,
who testified that McDuffie had been beaten to death by
police following a high-speed chase. (For accounts of
the origins and dynamics of this collective violence
episode, see Ladner et al. 1981 and Porter and Dunn,
1984.)

As was the case with the riots of the 1960s,
including Watts, and like Miami in 1980, the 1992 Los
Angeles unrest was initiated within the minority
community by local residents, and the looting and
burning of business establishments were the major forms
of property crime. And like these earlier episodes,
most of the people killed in the unrest were black.

These similarities notwithstanding, it is the
premise of this chapter that in other important
respects the Los Angeles episode constituted a new form
of race-related collective violence. Just as
significant shifts occurred earlier in this century
between the race riots that broke out around the time
of the First World War, those of the Second World War,
and those of the 1960s, the U. S. may well be in the
midst of a transition to a more complex form of unrest,
of which the 1992 riot is a precursor. The origins and
dynamics of this new form of unrest derive from large-
scale changes that have occurred in the U. S. since the
1960s: major demographic shifts, increased immigration, increased population diversity, and the declining investment in the cities. These ideas will be expanded on in the sections that follow. I will first discuss the distinctive features of the Los Angeles unrest, and then outline factors at the societal and community levels that influenced the dynamics of the unrest. The chapter will close with a discussion of the implications of this case for collective behavior research and for the future of Los Angeles and other urban centers.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE 1992 DISTURBANCE

Following the release of the verdict in the police brutality trial in mid-afternoon on April 29 (a Wednesday), crowd actions began taking place almost immediately. The unrest started in the relatively stable, comparatively well-off Hyde Park neighborhood. The area around the intersection of Florence and Normandie, which became notorious for the Reginald Denny beating, was a similar neighborhood (Los Angeles Times July 5, 1992). Among the first acts of the rebellion were attacks on persons—mainly white and Hispanic motorists who were perceived as outsiders from the perspective of the African-American community. Looting began by about 6:00 pm., and the burning of buildings started less than two hours later. Outside
the South Central area, police headquarters at Parker Center in downtown Los Angeles was another focal point for crowd activity (mainly peaceful protests) on the night following the verdict.

Caught by surprise and unable to muster a sufficient number of officers to the initial flashpoints, the police were not successful in bringing the first crowds that formed under control. Police officers sent to South Central fell back to a field command post to reorganize, but found that they lacked the communications equipment and other resources necessary to manage all the incidents that by then were occurring. This inability to act decisively in the early hours was a factor in the growth of the disturbance, which by the second day (Thursday) covered a larger geographic area. The situation was exacerbated by continuous media coverage that focused on areas where looting and other crowd actions were taking place and conveyed the impression that law enforcement agencies were not actively present in the riot area.

The unrest was most intense on Wednesday night and Thursday, April 29 and 30. It was during this period that most of the deaths and injuries occurred and most of the fires were set. Activity tapered off on Friday and over the weekend (May 1-3), and the community
gradually began returning to normal during the next week. State and local officials declared the unrest over on May 4.

Two features are important to note in considering both the dynamics and the conditions underlying the Los Angeles unrest: the selective damage done to Korean-owned businesses; and the widespread participation in the riot by non-black minority group members.

Targeting of Korean Businesses

Previous studies indicate that in civil disturbances property crimes such as the looting and burning of buildings are selective rather than random, reflecting emergent norms that define particular types of property as deserving of community retaliation or expropriation. The properties most often attacked are typically businesses, as opposed to schools, churches, other community institutions, and homes. The businesses that are most often targeted are those that are operated by persons the community considers outsiders (Dynes and Quarantelli 1968; Quarantelli and Dynes 1970). In the urban riots of the 1960s, the victimized businesses tended to be owned by whites; in the Watts riot, for example, Jewish store owners were singled out. However, the norms that develop during a situation of unrest can define a range of groups as deserving of attack. For example, Porter and Dunn
(1984: 144) noting that a number of black businesses were among those looted by blacks in the 1980 Miami riot, explain this pattern by arguing that "[t]o the very degree that black merchants achieve commercial success...they are perceived as having become just as bad as the white merchants."

Following the unrest the Disaster Research Center obtained records from the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety and the City Clerk’s office that contain information on both buildings and building tenants that sustained damage in the unrest. The records indicate that, consistent with the patterns of property crime observed in earlier U. S. riots, businesses were overwhelmingly targeted in the 1992 unrest; an exceedingly small number of residential dwellings were damaged. In preliminary analyses, an effort was made to code the 1,530 business establishments included in the records according to business type (using SIC codes), owner ethnicity, and the extent of the damage to the business. From the records, it was possible to determine business type for 1,079 of the cases and to determine owner ethnicity for the majority of the businesses. Unfortunately, it was impossible to distinguish white and black owners, since an owner’s race was not included the record, and owners’ names don’t provide a basis for
differentiation. Businesses that were owned by
corporations could also not be categorized according to
owner ethnicity. Despite these limitations the data
are still useful for suggesting patterns of riot
victimization.

**TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE**

Tables 1 and 2 summarize damage patterns in the
1992 unrest. The data indicate that the Los Angeles
disturbance was similar to other U. S. riots in terms
of the types of businesses that were looted, burned,
and otherwise damaged. Retail stores were most
frequently attacked; clothing stores, eating and
drinking establishments, markets, and discount stores
were the most frequent retail targets. The service
establishments that were damaged in the disturbance
include personal service businesses (e.g., beauty
salons, barber shops) and services grouped as "health,
educational, and social," which mainly included medical
offices of various types (see Table 1).

The data also suggest that, consistent with
earlier patterns, businesses whose owners were easily
identified as non-community residents were singled out
for attack. In this case, it was Korean merchants who
suffered disproportionately. As Table 1 indicates,
approximately one-third of the businesses that had riot
damage were Korean-owned, with apparel stores, markets,
and eating and drinking establishments hardest-hit. Just under 9% of the damaged businesses had owners who were Chinese or members of other Asian nationalities. Some of these owners could have been mistakenly identified as Korean, or the attacks on these businesses could have reflected general anti-Asian sentiment.

Table 2 presents data on business type and owner ethnicity for establishments that were totally destroyed. Korean representation is even higher in this category, constituting 46% of the 403 businesses in the "100% loss" group; and again, a number of businesses owned by members other Asian groups were also destroyed. According to the 1990 Census, there are just over 73,000 Koreans in the city of Los Angeles, and Koreans constitute only two percent of the city's population of approximately 3,485,000. Relative to their numbers in the population, Korean losses far exceeded those of the city's other ethnic groups.

Part of the reason for these high losses is the fact that Koreans were more likely than whites or other non-black minority group members to be doing business in South Central and adjacent downtown areas. Ong and Hee suggest in a recent paper that as many as one-third of all Korean-owned stores in the city are located in South Central Los Angeles, noting that "Koreans are the
latest immigrant group to operate in South Central, replacing the Jews who left in large numbers after the Watts Riots" (1992: 8). Using data from the California State Insurance Commissioner's office (which contains information only on businesses that had insurance), they also found Koreans to be highly overrepresented among victimized businesses, with Latino businesses the second-hardest-hit. Observing that "[t]he economic niche created by Koreans exposed them disproportionately to the violence" (1992: 10), they also argue that Koreans in South Central may have suffered such drastic losses in part because, unlike many Korean merchants in other parts of the city, they were forced to abandon their stores during the riots, since "most owners felt it was unsafe to stay and protect their property...[g]iven the anti-white and anti-Asian nature of the attacks on persons by the rioters" (1992: 10).

Attacks on Korean businesses (particularly liquor stores and convenience stores) began in South Central Los Angeles very soon after unrest broke out, most likely in the late afternoon on Wednesday. When crowd activity began to spread beyond the South Central area where the initial outbreaks occurred, one prominent pattern was movement northward along Vermont Avenue, in the direction of commercial centers in Koreatown, which
is just north of the Santa Monica Freeway and west of the central business district.

Many of the businesses in that area are Korean-owned and cater to a Korean clientele; however, the residential population is predominantly Hispanic. The Pico-Union district adjacent to Koreatown is home to the largest community of Central American immigrants in the United States, and it was Pico-Union residents who became involved in looting in and near Koreatown on the second and third days of the unrest. It is likely that damage would have been even more widespread in Koreatown if armed groups composed primarily of Korean men had not formed to defend property in that area (for a detailed description of how this emergent group activity was organized, see Yu 1992).

At the present time, these data are merely suggestive. Without being able to classify all the business owners in the areas of the city that experienced collective violence (including those whose businesses were not damaged) in terms of their race and ethnicity, it is not possible to say how much more likely Koreans were to be attacked than were other business owners, and the underlying causes for the pattern of violence are still not entirely clear. Koreans may have suffered such heavy losses not only because of their ethnicity and their presence in and
proximity to South Central Los Angeles, but also because they tended disproportionately to own the kinds of businesses that typically become targets in episodes of civil unrest: liquor stores, markets, and apparel stores. Members of the Korean community have also argued that when the unrest broke out, the City failed to move decisively to protect Korean merchants, sacrificing areas like Koreatown in order to protect the more affluent Anglo parts of the city. A number of lawsuits seeking damages from the City have been filed, mostly by Korean business owners (Los Angeles Times Oct. 27, 1992). An emergent group, the Korean-American Victims Association, is spearheading this effort.

Despite gaps in the data, the riot damage data make a strong prima facie case for the selectivity hypothesis. Perhaps more importantly, community residents and leaders in both the African-American and the Korean communities acknowledged after the unrest that many of the attacks on businesses contained an element of hostility against Asians.

Non-Black Minority Participation

Most of the early violence in the 1992 rebellion was initiated by blacks in predominantly black neighborhoods. However, the unrest was by no means confined to predominantly black areas of the city or to African-American participants. Unlike the 1965 Watts
riot, the 1992 unrest extended well beyond South Central Los Angeles, to areas north and west of that part of the city. With respect to participation in the unrest, media coverage clearly showed that those looting and protesting were a racially mixed group, and fourteen of the 51 persons killed in the unrest were Latinos—the second largest group of fatalities after blacks.

Arrest records are almost certain to be a biased indicator of who participated in the rebellion, but in the absence of survey data they may shed some light on the question of participation. In their analysis of data on approximately 5,600 adults arrested in the Los Angeles judicial district during the unrest (April 30 through May 5), Petersilia and Abrahamse (1993) found that in contrast with the Watts riot, in which the majority of arrestees were black, over half of those arrested in 1992 were Latinos. Young Latino males accounted for fully 30% of those arrested, and this group was overrepresented relative to their numbers in the general population. Their analysis also indicates that Latino arrests outnumbered African-American arrests throughout the duration of the riot, including April 30, the first full day.

Analyzing population composition and change over time and comparing arrest statistics between the Watts
riot and the 1992 unrest, Petersilia and Abrahamse conclude that Latino participation was higher and black participation lower in 1992 than their numbers in the population would predict. Characterizing the unrest as a "minority riot," not a "black riot," these authors argue that "the riot was much more than a protest by blacks against an injustice to a fellow black. Such an interpretation would vastly oversimplify and misrepresent the unrest" (1993: 21).

Petersilia and Abrahamse suggest that the arrest statistics may reflect a tendency on the part of police to selectively arrest Hispanics, while avoiding confrontations with black lawbreakers during the disorders, but I know of no research that addresses this question. The arrest patterns could also reflect selective deployment of police resources, or law enforcement agencies may have used the unrest as an occasion for rounding up Latinos suspected of being in the country illegally. During the uprising, police turned over a number of undocumented arrestees to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and nearly 500 persons, most of whom were from Mexico, were subsequently deported. But even if police were selective in rounding up Latinos, it is still clear that the participants in the unrest were a diverse group.
General Observations

These data suggest that the 1992 Los Angeles rebellion differed in important ways from earlier episodes of civil unrest in the U. S. Whereas in the past such outbreaks could be analyzed in terms of relations between members of the dominant white society and members of specific racial or ethnic minorities, the Los Angeles unrest involved clashes among a range of groups, including blacks and whites; blacks and Asians; Latinos and blacks; and Latinos and Asians. In a broader sense, the unrest constituted a collective attack by minority group members both on Anglos and on minority business proprietors. The section that follows attempts to put the Los Angeles disturbance into a broader historical context and to identify the sources of the patterns of collective violence that emerged.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE UNREST

The trial verdict was the precipitating factor for the outbreak of civil unrest, and the inability of the Police Department to respond adequately in the early hours had a major influence on its subsequent dynamics. However, many aspects of the disturbance can only be understood in the context of changes that Los Angeles has undergone in population composition and intergroup relations in recent years. These changes helped determine the direction the unrest would take once the
triggering event occurred. Among the most important contributing conditions were demographic trends in inner-city Los Angeles, particularly those related to immigration; inter-ethnic hostility; and recent U. S. urban policy.

Demographic Trends and Immigration

As other chapters in this volume show, one of the main reasons why the participants in the 1992 unrest were not predominantly black is that South Central Los Angeles is no longer predominantly black and hasn’t been for some time. As was the case with patterns of participation in earlier U. S. urban riots, African-American and Latino participants in the 1992 unrest reflected the demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods in which the unrest occurred, except that they were younger and predominantly male.

Media accounts tended to depict the unrest as an African-American uprising against the white justice system, or secondarily as a black-Korean clash. However, the disturbance was much more complex. Some journalistic analyses suggest that a significant number of black-Latino clashes also occurred during the 1992 unrest. For example, Miles (1992) argues that during the riot many blacks engaged in intentional hostile actions against Hispanics, especially recent immigrants. According to his analysis, these attacks
occurred because blacks resent Latino immigrants who compete with and undercut them in the labor force and who are moving into their neighborhoods in increasing numbers. Latino participation in the rebellion is accounted for, according to Miles (1992: 59), by the fact that Latinos who originally came to the U. S. in the hope of taking part in the American dream never had a chance to do so and ended up looting when the opportunity presented itself, to "steal what they once thought they could earn."

In a 1984 article on South Central Los Angeles, Melvin Oliver and James Johnson pointed out that the Latino population of that area had been growing rapidly, while the black population was declining, resulting in heightened levels of inter-ethnic conflict. They hypothesized that "the influx of Spanish speaking households into south central Los Angeles has created the conditions ripe for considerable conflict between blacks and browns" (1984: 75). Their examination of survey data from the early 1980s revealed that Latinos held prejudiced attitudes towards blacks, and that blacks, although not expressing high levels of hostility generally, did resent Hispanics--many of whom were recent immigrants--for taking jobs away from them. Oliver and Johnson identified this situation as one that could develop
into overt intergroup conflict, adding that (1984: 86)
...researchers should be sensitive and concerned
with the potential for social conflict that exists
between the have-nots who are increasingly forced
to live together in our nation's ghettos...The
impact of the "new immigration" is that the new
groups, for the most part, are ethnically and
culturally different from the traditional
inhabitants of these areas and therefore, each are
perfect targets for the others displaced
hostility.

In a parallel case, Ladner, et al., (1981) have
argued that large-scale Cuban immigration formed part
of the context for the 1980 Miami riots. The pre-riot
pattern they describe is similar to what has occurred
in Los Angeles: white flight from the city, combined
with a large influx of refugees and other migrants that
competed with blacks for increasingly scarce jobs and
housing, resulting in intergroup hostility and
conflict. The Cubans in Miami, like Asian immigrants
in Los Angeles, were also perceived as having greater
access to business and credit opportunities, placing
black businesses at a competitive disadvantage (Porter
and Dunn, 1984).

Sharply increased rates of Asian immigration combined
with the tendency for Asians (particularly Koreans) to
operate businesses in inner-city neighborhoods clearly affected the character of the 1992 Los Angeles unrest. Los Angeles has been the destination of choice for recent waves of Korean immigrants who have established themselves primarily as small-business owners (Light and Bonacich 1988). Koreans make up a thriving immigrant enclave that has invested heavily in the small retail business sector: liquor stores, grocery stores, gas stations, and similar enterprises (Portes and Manning 1986; Light and Bonacich 1988). And in Los Angeles, as in many other U. S. cities, the presence of large numbers of Korean entrepreneurs in inner-city neighborhoods has sparked African-American hostility. Cheng and Espiritu (1989), focusing specifically on the situation in Los Angeles, argue that while both Hispanics and blacks might have reason to resent the presence of Korean-owned businesses in their neighborhoods, black Los Angeles residents are more likely than Hispanics to do so. African-Americans see recent immigrant business owners (in this case, Koreans) as having an unfair advantage over them; in contrast, Latinos, who tend to be immigrants themselves, are more likely to view competition from other immigrants as fair.

Hostility between Korean merchants and black community residents constitutes an important element in
the social context that shaped the 1992 uprising. Particularly significant was the case of Soon Ja Du, a 51-year old Korean liquor store owner in Los Angeles, who killed a black 15-year-old customer, Latasha Harlins, shooting her in the back of the head with a .38 caliber revolver following an argument in which Du accused the girl of attempting to shoplift. In November of 1991, Du was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and given probation by a Los Angeles judge—a verdict and sentence that enraged many members of the black community and heightened hostility against Koreans (Neuman 1992; Coleman 1993).

Since the unrest, it appears that, if anything, the antagonism between blacks and Koreans has deepened. Many Koreans not only consider themselves uniquely victimized by the unrest, but also strongly resent recovery-related policies that make it difficult for liquor stores in South Central to get back into business. The Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment, a social movement organization that had been active for a number of years before the unrest, is leading the effort to reduce the number of liquor stores in inner-city black neighborhoods. In the aftermath of the riots, Korean merchants have come to interpret this activity as directed specifically against them, and the community
has banded together to fight the new regulations (see Yu 1992 and *New York Times* 1992 for more details on this controversy). The Black-Korean Coalition, set up to improve relations between the two groups, disbanded in December, 1992, partly as a result of these conflicts.

As Los Angeles has become increasingly diverse, with Anglos now in the numerical minority, the stage has been set for increased competition and conflict among ethnic groups occupying different niches in the local economy, housing market, and labor force. Often, as is the case with blacks and immigrant Latinos, these relationships involve competition for increasingly scarce resources such as jobs and housing. Or, as is the case with blacks and Korean merchants, hostility develops out of perceived relationships of exploitation. Deep cultural misunderstandings further complicate the relationships among these groups.

Blacks, Latinos, and Asians are currently among those suffering most as a result of large-scale changes in the U. S. economy and the broader capitalist world system. Yet they are forced to compete for jobs, housing, resources, and political power, and that competition engenders hostility. In Los Angeles in 1992, Korean business owners became a "middleman minority" (Bonacich 1973) in a very literal sense:
perceived as outsiders and exploiters by African-American inner-city residents, they bore the brunt of attacks by African-Americans and Latinos when the violence erupted.

Urban Policy and the Riots

Like residents of other large cities in the U.S., Los Angeles residents experienced a worsening economic situation in the two decades leading up to the unrest. In South Central Los Angeles, which had never really recovered from the Watts riots, levels of poverty and joblessness were high. In the late 80s, per capita income in South Central was less than half that of Los Angeles county as a whole, and poverty and unemployment rates were more than double. More than one-fourth of the households in South Central were on public assistance, as compared with about 10% for the county as a whole. For those few who were fortunate enough to find work, the average hourly wage only amounted to 58% of the countywide wage (Ong 1992).

Throughout the 1980s, Los Angeles portrayed itself as the new financial and cultural capital of the Pacific Rim, and foreign capital poured into the city for costly development projects and high-profile real estate purchases in the downtown area (Davis 1992). City government aggressively pursued development downtown and in the predominantly Anglo westside, while
just south of the booming downtown business district, South Central Los Angeles lost jobs and economic activity on a massive scale. By any standard, the area constitutes a pocket of underdevelopment. The economic policies of the Reagan-Bush era hastened the flight of jobs from many inner city areas, including Los Angeles; between 1982 and 1989, 131 plants were closed in Los Angeles, and 124,000 workers lost their jobs. These plant closings disproportionately affected African-American and Latino communities (Johnson, et al. 1992; Oliver, Johnson, and Farrell, 1993). By the end of the 80s, economic activity was depressed in the retail, manufacturing, and service sectors in South Central. The small number of manufacturing jobs that remained were in low-wage industries like garment manufacturing, and these jobs were more likely to be held by Latinos than by blacks. Oliver, Johnson, and Farrell (1993: 122) observe that "[w]hereas joblessness is the central problem for black males in South Central Los Angeles, concentration in low-paying, bad jobs in competitive sector industries is the main problem for the Latino residents of the area." Large retail stores and supermarket chains avoid South Central (Ong 1992)--which is one reason the opportunities were so good for Korean liquor and convenience stores owners.

Although touted on the grounds that it would
provide more jobs, the development frenzy of the 1980s didn’t deliver on that promise in Los Angeles and many other U. S. cities. Tax advantages accrued to developers, not cities or community residents, and whatever new revenues were generated were typically diverted to pay for services that the Federal government was no longer supporting. Moreover, new construction in cities like Los Angeles may actually have increased urban blight, as tenants in older buildings near the city core deserted them in favor of newer, more prestigious addresses (Washington Post, May 10, 1992).

At the same time the economic situation worsened, the ability of cities to provide public welfare and safety services to residents declined. Drugs, crime, gang violence and other social problems were rampant in South Central Los Angeles and other inner city areas, but Federal programs to address these problems had been systematically cut as a part of the strategy to dismantle the social programs of the 1960s (Johnson, et al. 1992). In the decade leading up to the riots, Urban Development Action Grants, revenue sharing, and assistance to local law enforcement agencies were either eliminated or severely cut.

Police departments in cities like Los Angeles also became increasingly estranged from the communities they
were supposed to be protecting, and critical resources were weakened. For example, at the time of the unrest in 1992, the Los Angeles Police Department had a force of about 7,800 officers—down from 8,400 two years before (Los Angeles Times, Oct. 22, 1992). The ratio of police officers to residents was about 2 to 1,000. Los Angeles was capable of deploying only 15 officers per square mile, compared with 89 per square mile for New York (Miles 1992). Of a police force of nearly 8,000, in early 1992 the city reportedly had only about 300 officers on the street at any given time to respond to radio calls; by the fall of 1992, that number had dropped to 279 (Los Angeles Times, Oct. 22, 1992). A large proportion of the police force held desk jobs and non-patrol duties, many of which could have been handled by civilians.

The analysis conducted for the Webster report (Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners 1992) following the unrest revealed a police department that was overinvested in elite units like the SWAT team and a gang-suppression unit called CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums). These units became the main avenue for promotion in the force, to the detriment of ordinary patrol activities and other crime-fighting efforts. The Commission noted that setting up these highly specialized units took more and
more officers out of daily contact with the community, and it recommended that officers from these units be redeployed into community patrol duties. This pattern of chronic understaffing in the face of escalating community problems, along with lack of training and deeply ingrained racist attitudes that high management tolerated, may explain why police officers in Los Angeles were notoriously quick to resort to excessive force with minority suspects (for discussions of cases of police brutality involving the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff’s Departments, see Amnesty International 1992).

The situation in which the Los Angeles Police Department found itself at the time of the unrest was indeed ironic. LAPD officers were originally responsible for the beating that became the occasion for the unrest. The LAPD’s use of excessive force and its callousness toward the minority community caused many community residents to sympathize with Rodney King, focused community attention on the trial, and fueled the rage against the verdict. The police department’s relationship with the South Central community was evidently so poor it was unable to gauge the magnitude of the resentment and riot potential that existed. And when the unrest began to escalate, the LAPD was too short-handed and disorganized to contain
it. One is reminded of Carter's (1988) discussion of the relationship between police force size and riot severity, which suggests the cities in which the most serious rioting occurs are those in which the police force is large enough to generate a significant number of hostile encounters with community residents, but not large enough to exert control when a collective violence episode begins to escalate. This was certainly the case in Los Angeles.

DISCUSSION

Grievances and the Los Angeles Unrest

The 1992 disturbances could lead to renewed discussions among collective behavior scholars concerning the role of grievances and discontent in collective violence. Such questions have been thoroughly addressed in previous research, the general thrust of which has been to downplay the importance of shared attitudinal predispositions like deprivation and frustration and to emphasize instead differential motivation and differential participation in collective behavior episodes (see McPhail 1971; Gurney and Tierney 1982; Rule 1988). Action-in-common need not stem from common underlying sentiments or goals; nor are attitudes automatically expressed behaviorally. In Los Angeles, many of the people who rioted were upset and outraged about the verdict, but clearly so were many of
the people who didn’t. Not everyone who burned a building during the period of unrest did so to protest the verdict; for example, fire department investigations attributed some arson cases to opportunism—that is, property owners using the uprising as a cover to unload unprofitable pieces of real estate. Reasons for looting likely included not only anger over the verdict and resentment of Korean shopowners and business owners in general, but also the desire for consumer items, basic food and clothing needs, and fear that the supply of goods would run out or that stores wouldn’t reopen.

The acts of physical violence that were committed during the unrest undoubtedly stemmed from complex motivational sources as well. For example, some accounts suggest that the Reginald Denny beating was attributable in part the manner in which the police who first responded at the intersection of Florence and Normandie treated local residents. In other words, it may have been both the King verdict and subsequent actions by the police that triggered crowd violence against Denny and others who were attacked at that location. Other acts of violence that were considered part of the riot may actually have been unrelated to it. For example, in one homicide attributed to the unrest, two people got into a fight in a grocery store,
and one person strangled the other. A stabbing death that was included in the toll occurred in a community where no other violence had been reported, and no one actually saw the killing. Several of the deaths included in the overall toll were heart attacks in which pre-existing medical conditions were judged to have been exacerbated by the verdict and the unrest (see Los Angeles Times, May 6; Koehler, et al. 1993).

Like all statistics, riot statistics are social constructions.

Not everyone who takes part in crowd violence or collective lawbreaking does so because of anger against injustice. In their study of prison riots, for example, Useem and Kimball (1991) find that while such riots originate in objective conditions like the abuse of inmates, and while grievances arising from these conditions do play a role in the genesis of riots, a great deal goes on in actual riot situations that is by no means grievance-related or protest-oriented. Inmates may use a riot as an opportunity to steal food and other goods, set fires, or exact vengeance against "snitches." Useem and Kimball argue that a prison riot can be political in origin but lack explicit political content; it may be a political event for some participants, but not for others. The same argument can be made about episodes of urban unrest like the
Unrest as Protest

It would thus be an oversimplification to argue that the riot was purely expression of pent-up African-American grievances; both the data and previous research argue against such a perspective. At the same time, there is no question that black outrage did play a major role the genesis of the unrest. That outrage was generated not only the Rodney King verdict, but perhaps more importantly by the history of negative experiences that so many South Central residents—especially black males—had with law enforcement officers. The frequency of hostile encounters between police officers and blacks doubtless led many residents to empathize with Rodney King and made the trial and the verdict especially salient to a broad segment of the African-American community. The beating of Rodney King and the acquittal of the police officers would not have had such a large impact had they not resonated with what many African Americans in Los Angeles already knew from their own life experiences about law enforcement and the justice system.

There is a body of collective behavior theory and research that characterizes crowd violence as a form of protest or collective retaliation against an unjust social order. Historical and comparative studies
suggest that events like the Rodney King verdict, which underscore a dominant group’s lack of fairness, can trigger spontaneous and violent responses by members of subordinate groups (Hobsbawm 1959; Rude 1964; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1975; 1978; Piven and Cloward 1977). These short-lived disturbances, which may be intensely violent, are typically engaged in by relatively unorganized groups that have few alternative avenues for expressing discontent or pressing for change. As Piven and Cloward (1992: 311) argue, the riot is an enduring form of collective behavior that appears and reappears throughout history:

...preindustrial food riots, grain seizures, land invasions, and machine smashing have rough parallels in the modern period with urban riots, mob looting, squatting, sit-downs, sit-ins, rent strikes, and industrial sabotage...Even as changing modes of social organization bring into being new forms of protest, certain persisting features of social organization facilitate continuities in other protest forms.

Several analyses of the 1960s urban riots characterized those episodes primarily as a form of protest against racial inequality and injustice (Fogelson 1971; Feagin and Hahn 1973). To some degree, the 1992 unrest can be interpreted in that same light.
Many Los Angeles residents have in fact made that interpretation: a survey conducted after the 1992 unrest, using a sample of Los Angeles County residents, asked (as had several earlier riot studies) whether respondents considered the riots mainly protest, mainly a chance for participants to loot and commit crimes, or both. Not unexpectedly, different ethnic groups interpreted the riots differently; 67% of black respondents considered the riots mainly protest, as compared with about 43% of the Asians, 39% of the Hispanics, and 37% of the Anglos (Bobo, et al., 1992).

The "Assembling Process" and the Riots

While the unrest cannot be understood without taking into account black outrage against police brutality and other forms of injustice, the unrest was a complex event whose dynamics were also influenced by other factors. Work by Clark McPhail and his collaborators provides a useful perspective for understanding the crowd actions that constituted the unrest (see McPhail 1971; 1991; McPhail and Miller 1973; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983). Like many collective behavior scholars, McPhail argues that it is incorrect to assume that organized actions like crowd violence and looting stem from common psychological predispositions like frustration, anger, or feelings of deprivation. Rather, he claims, riots, like other...
types of collective gatherings, take place when participants have received various kinds of "assembling instructions" that indicate a gathering is occurring or about to occur. Persons who consider the gathering relevant, are able to participate, and don't have competing obligations that would rule out participation are most likely to join these collective behavior episodes.

Participation in riots and other "nonperiodic assemblages" can also be explained by taking into account ecological factors such as the spatial distribution of ongoing patterns of behavior, typical daily routines, and the propensity for particular groups to gather at particular locations. In other words, to understand patterns of riot involvement, one must first understand social behavior under routine conditions. Crowds will have a tendency to form in locations where people typically gather. Individuals who spend a lot of time on street corners with friends will likely congregate on street corners during times of crisis. People who have a history of hostile encounters with police will be more interested than others in the results of a verdict like the one in the Rodney King case and more likely to consider gatherings related to such issues as relevant. Densely populated, bustling areas like the Pico-Union district, or
intersections like the one at Florence and Normandie, will be more conducive to crowd formation than more sparsely populated, less trafficked areas, simply because any unusual action that is initiated in such settings is more likely to "draw a crowd."

Seen from this perspective, the extensive media coverage of the King beating itself and of the trial, combined with black residents' experiences with the LAPD over time, other cases of police brutality, and incidents like the Latasha Harlins shooting, produced a social climate in which large numbers of black Los Angeles residents were involved with the King case and interested in the verdict. On the day the unrest broke out, the assembling instructions that led to the formation on unruly crowds included the news of the verdict, news reports that clashes with police had occurred or that looting had begun at a particular location, and direct visual evidence of looting and other crowd activity. The verdict was announced at approximately 3:30 pm on a weekday, a time when many community residents were at work or on the streets, which made for rapid transmission of the news and also facilitated crowd formation. The message was reinforced by the constant media coverage of the crowd actions that subsequently developed.

The timing and manner in which the verdict was
released and the media coverage that followed created conditions that were ideal for the formation of crowds. The fact that the police were unable to respond rapidly enough to contain the crowds that initially formed contributed to the spread of the unrest in part because it lowered the costs of participating in crowd activities. These important points were recognized by city authorities, who following the second police brutality trial in 1993 first withheld the verdict, which came on a Friday afternoon, from the general public; then released it at approximately 7:00 am the next day; and made sure there was a visible law enforcement presence on the streets when the verdict was announced.

Intergroup Competition and the Unrest

The work of Susan Olzak provides another useful framework for understanding the structural sources of the 1992 unrest. Olzak’s analyses point to the important role played by immigration and labor markets in the genesis of collective violence. She argues that violence increases in periods characterized by both high rates of immigration and declining economic conditions (Olzak 1983; 1986; 1987). Her work also suggests that the existence of ethnic enclaves like those established by Koreans in Los Angeles may be associated with higher levels of intergroup conflict.
(see Olzak 1986). However, Olzak's work to date, like other recent scholarship on riots (e.g., Carter, 1990; 1992) analyzes collective violence as a situation involving two groups—typically whites and some other minority group, usually blacks—that are in conflict with one another. The Los Angeles case involved multiple interracial and interethnic antagonisms that are not easily reducible to a single model. Conflicts between African-Americans and Latinos in South Central can be analyzed from a split labor market perspective (Bonacich 1972), for example, but this is not the case for conflicts existing between African-Americans and Anglos or African-Americans and Koreans.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing analysis suggests that the Los Angeles unrest was considerably more complex than earlier episodes of racially-motivated collective violence in the U. S., and that future episodes of unrest in urban communities may well follow this new pattern. Recognizing that the form collective violence takes varies over time, earlier writers made a distinction between the "communal" riots of the first half of the twentieth century and the "commodity" riots that came later (Janowitz 1969). The 1992 unrest constitutes a new type of collective violence, involving multiple groups (rather than only two) as
well as elements of both communal and commodity forms. Given the increasingly diverse range of potentially solidaristic ethnic, enclave, and class groupings in our cities, the Los Angeles unrest may well be a precursor to future episodes of collective violence.

The Los Angeles unrest had its origins in the ongoing experiences, daily activities, and collective definitions of minority community residents. These experiences included not only hostile encounters with law enforcement agencies but also increasingly uneasy and competitive relations with members of other ethnic groups. And these daily contacts and interactions had their roots in turn in broad structural changes--immigration, the internationalization of major urban centers, the globalization of the economy, and deindustrialization--that differentially impacted the various ethnic groups in Los Angeles.

Los Angeles in the Wake of the Unrest

In the two years since the Los Angeles unrest, some hopeful changes have taken place, but the picture remains bleak. On the positive side, the police department has a new chief, Willie Williams, who wants to improve police-community relations by instituting community-based policing practices. The newly-elected mayor appears to have a much better working relationship with the new chief than his predecessor,
Mayor Bradley, had with Chief Gates.

On the negative side, economic conditions, already poor for blacks and Latinos, have generally worsened, and the downturn has now affected the middle classes. The economic climate in Los Angeles is not one that is conducive to the kinds of recovery projects the community needs, and the Clinton Administration pays just as little attention to inner city problems as did its Republican predecessors. "Rebuild LA," a post-riot reconstruction effort that was based on the notion that recovery can be privatized, has brought few tangible results. The effort to rebuild ultimately mirrored the intergroup antagonisms that characterize Los Angeles politics generally, government support was virtually nonexistent, and business enterprises that were not inclined to locate in areas like South Central Los Angeles prior to the unrest were generally even less willing to do so afterwards.

In May of 1993, the New York Times reported the results of a study it had conducted, based in part on data from the city's Department of Building and Safety. At that time, fewer than half the riot-damaged properties had been repaired or rebuilt, and compared with other hard-hit areas of the city, recovery was progressing most slowly in South Central Los Angeles. Among the reasons cited for the slow pace of recovery were:
lack of money, problems collecting insurance and getting loans, heavy winter rains, bureaucratic delays with permits, compliance with modern seismic and disability codes, opposition to liquor stores, a depressed local economy and, for many owners, sheer fear and weariness (New York Times, May 10: 1).

In January of 1994, the city confronted yet another crisis. The Northridge earthquake caused widespread damage and disruption throughout the greater Los Angeles area and impacted neighborhoods, residents, and businesses that were still in the process of trying to recover from the riots. Besides creating additional financial burdens for a city that was already facing considerable economic difficulty, the earthquake may well exacerbate intergroup tensions. Within a few days of the earthquake, for example, complaints were raised that the needs of earthquake victims in South Central were being ignored, while the attention of the media and public officials was focused mainly on victims in the San Fernando Valley. Anti-immigrant interests moved swiftly to try to limit undocumented residents' access to certain disaster assistance programs. Controversies developed around the provision of HUD "Section 8" rent vouchers to disaster victims, since thousands of low-income families had already been on
the long waiting list for subsidized housing prior to the earthquake. Post-earthquake recovery is likely to further erode what little interest there is in the needs of riot victims and black inner city residents, rechannel the energies of city officials, and place a further drain on public finances.

Implications for Other U. S. Cities

A short commentary that appeared in the Los Angeles Times a few days after the disturbances argued that what it termed the nation's first "multiethnic riots" ought to be seen in the context of large-scale economic and social changes in which labor and capital were internationalized (May 10, 1992: M4):

It was the simultaneous arrival of new money and new people that created, in the enthusiasm of the late 1980s, the vision of Los Angeles as capital of the Pacific Rim. That vision, we are learning, has a dark side.

Over ten years ago, Ladner et al (1981) made a similar point about the Miami unrest of 1980, an event that parallels the Los Angeles disturbances in numerous ways--except that it was Cuban immigrants who were the main competitors against blacks in Miami, and Koreans were not present in that city in large numbers (for a detailed analysis of that episode of unrest, see Porter and Dunn 1984).
Anyone familiar with U. S. urban centers today knows that the background conditions that gave rise to the 1992 unrest are in no way unique to Los Angeles. The restructuring of the U. S. economy, the globalization of labor and capital, and the policies of the Reagan-Bush years have affected communities across the country. And although it is probably very near the end of the continuum in terms of racial and ethnic diversity, Los Angeles is not the only city with a multi-racial, multi-ethnic population. The patterns of civil unrest observed in Los Angeles are almost certain to be repeated elsewhere. U. S. cities are becoming increasingly diverse, and members of minority groups are beginning to outnumber members of the white "majority." Overall, the future does not look promising. As cities nationwide have become less white and less important politically, there has been a corresponding national decline in public investment—including the types of investment that prevent and contain collective violence (Blakeley and Ames 1992).

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Useem, Bert and Peter Kimball. 1991. States of Siege:


Table 1: Businesses With Losses Related to the 1992 Unrest, by Business Type and Owner Ethnicity

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