Berlin, Germany, December 30, 1932.

Dear Mrs. Shipley:

You have by this time received my letter of December 17 with regard to the Einstein case. Your letter of December 10 has just reached me as well as one from McKenna. I learn from McKenna's letter which he asked me to keep confidential but which I am sure he would not mind my mentioning to you as I shall otherwise keep the information he gave me for myself alone, that my personal telegrams to you and to Mr. Klots were routed to various people in the Department and really reached them before you. I am so deeply chagrined about this that I do not know what to say or how to apologize for my putting you to this annoyance. I thought by marking the telegrams "Personal for Mrs. Shipley" etc., they would simply be decoded and turned over to you and Mr. Klots without in any way being routed in the Department. The mistake, of course, is entirely due to my lack of knowledge of Departmental procedure in this respect. I coded the telegrams in order to save money which I regret to say is a very important consideration with us now. With our personal income cut about 71% from what it was two years ago and with my official income cut about 30%, one has to think about these things but if I had had the least notion that these telegrams would go anywhere except to the code room, I would have sent them in plain language. I really cannot tell you how sorry I am that I made this stupid mistake and can only hope that you will fully forgive me as you must have, as shown by your generous and thorough action on the telegram.

I am glad that they realize in the Department how thoroughly stupid and unnecessary their telegram was, even though it was necessary for the Secretary to
to make it so emphatically apparent. If it had not been for this telegram there would, of course, have been some publicity about the Einstein incident but the bad part of it would have been almost surely avoided. The telegram required us to ask certain specific questions with regard to Einstein’s connection with certain organizations which was really totally unnecessary. It required us to question him “carefully” about these and other things and in that respect I can assure you we used large discretion, and any question of this kind was obviously unnecessary. It required us to telegram to the Department no matter what our decision was, before we could take action and this was certainly all wrong because this caused the major trouble. When we could not give the visa to Einstein immediately after his application that fatal Monday morning, he and Mrs. Einstein who before were already very nervous about not getting the visa, were practically sure when they left that they would not get it and that afternoon Mrs. Einstein gave out the interviews to the press here which really started the trouble. The Department’s telegram was undoubtedly designed to prevent a visa being refused to the Einsteins without prior communication with the Department, but even in that respect it was badly worded for in that case it should have said that in case the Consul found it necessary to refuse a visa he should telegraph the Department before doing so. This would have left the Consul a free hand. In addition the Department’s telegram required us to circularize it all over Europe when as a matter of fact there was not one chance in a thousand that Einstein would apply anywhere but in Berlin. The telegram indicated the panicky state of mind of certain people in the Department, and lack of confidence in the officers in the field which their visa practice certainly has not deserved. The whole thing was unutterably stupid and I cannot see how such a telegram was ever sent out. I was not going to raise that question and only raised it very indirectly and discreetly in my despatch to the Department reporting the Einstein incident, but I am glad that the Secretary had full information on the subject in the end and expressed himself
himself with regard to the telegram, because it may do some good in certain quarters.

Of course I can understand how such a telegram should be sent out by Hodgdon because while I like him in certain ways and I think he is ambitious and anxious to make good, he is, I think, totally inept and has not had the field experience of proper importance to have acquired a certain skill in strategy and technique which a man at the head of such a Division should have. In addition to this he is so supremely satisfied with himself and has been a good deal spoiled. I can understand too, how Kelley with whose views on many things I cannot agree at all and who I have never felt is big enough to be chief of a Division, could be a party to such a telegram, but how it got by Mr. Carr is beyond me for he is so skillful about things of this kind and has such a wealth of background and experience that the dynamite and possibilities in the telegram and its utter ineptitude should have been apparent to him if he really saw it before it went out. In any event whoever in the Department had anything to do with the authorizing and framing of the telegram, certainly let down Mr. Carr.

It was really this telegram and its formal provisions which caused the trouble. Of course we could use a certain discretion in carrying out parts of the telegram and I can assure you that in spite of it the questioning of Einstein, what little was done, was done by Geist in a most discreet and proper and inoffensive manner. The real difficulty was that the formal prescriptions of the telegram made it impossible for us to grant a visa to Einstein immediately after Geist's conversation with him. We had to telegraph and although the Department's reply was very prompt, we could not get it before the next morning. It was that afternoon in the interval between Einstein's call on Geist and the next morning when we got the telegram authorizing us to proceed as we proposed, that all the trouble took place.

Mrs.
Mrs. Einstein trembled because she felt sure the visa wouldn't be granted although Geist had done everything in his power to make it clear that the delay meant nothing at all, and so that afternoon she gave the newspapers a mouthful and didn't hesitate to deviate from the truth. The newspaper men simply bombarded Geist that afternoon and evening and he was in touch with me at Breslau over the phone and I told him that we could not give any information to the press for if we did they would easily be able to see through it all and realize that we had to telegraph the Department. I felt that under no circumstances could we admit to the newspaper men that we had a telegram which made it necessary for us to communicate with the Department before granting the visa. The newspaper men here are intelligent and know a good deal concerning our visa practice and no matter what we would have said they would have seen that we had to telegraph and then the fat would have been in the fire. The criticism would have been turned on the Department for not leaving us free in our legal function to determine whether a visa should be granted or not. Geist and I felt that we had to be good soldiers and bear the brunt of it, and so we had to tell the newspaper men that we were not in a position to discuss a visa case with anyone except the applicant. Of course this made them a bit sore because Einstein is first page news, and so the reports that went in from here were entirely one-sided. If the Department's telegram had not bound us hand and foot and made it impossible for us to even say anything to the newspaper men for background purposes, the chances are that the news sent from here by a good many of the correspondents at least, would have been ironical at least and have put the Einsteins in their true light.

Well, there is no use in going into all this any further because I think the situation is pretty well understood in the Department and the publicity outside has changed in tenor so much that I think Einstein and Lippmann and the rest of them will probably suffer more than any of us
in the end. I am glad, however, that the matter came to the Secretary's attention because he would see at once the stupidity of such a telegram and its utter ineptitude.

I am sorry to say that I am convinced that had it not been for you and Mr. Klots my long telegram asking the Secretary to make a statement would not have come to his attention but that it would have been treated as a routine matter and the newspapers would have been allowed to nail me to the cross and keep me hanging there. It is too bad that this is so and it costs me an effort to believe it is so, but I am convinced that had it not been for the intervention of yourself and Mr. Klots with the Secretary, there would have been no statement to the press by the Department and the matter would have been treated there with indifference and silence in spite of the fact that the career of one of its most faithful officers might have gone by the board and in a measure at least, the whole reputation of our visa practice at consular establishments abroad, been very adversely affected. I know you did this for me and I shall be eternally grateful but I think in a way you did a thing that was even bigger than what you did for me because it established at least a precedent that a man in the field cannot be crucified for something for which the Department is really responsible, or at least that it is not going to be done with impunity.

I am so happy that the Secretary made this generous statement and particularly so that it was done without delay. It was splendid of him to take the time to do it. I think that if the statement had been long delayed or if there had been continued silence on the part of the Department, there would have been a Messersmith incident to follow the Einstein incident. In the Department I have always been very careful not to say much concerning my friends. I have wanted to make my way and to establish credit for my opportunities merely on the basis of what personal worth I may have or for what value my opinions may be appraised at. I have gone probably too far in this respect because I have continuously urged my friends in and out of politics...
not to say anything to the Department concerning me. But I am proud to say that I have friends and worth while ones in practically every city of the country and when this newspaper publicity in the Einstein incident appeared in its intensely personal criticism of me, I got indignant telegrams from all kinds of places and people, wanting to know if I would permit them to go ahead and do things. The statement of the Secretary, so generous and so complete and so early in the affair, of course settled the matter, but I am sure that some people in the Department would have been made very uncomfortable by what would have happened without any steps on my part, had something of this sort not been done.

I know you must be sick of the whole Einstein incident too and I will not say another word about it except that I want you to know that Geist and I will never find words to express our appreciation to you and Mr. Klots for what you did. We both have the conviction that had it not been for you, the results for us would have been serious and lasting and that it is entirely due to your having brought the matter to the Secretary's attention that he was, in these busy times, able to give it thought and the generous action which he would be sure to take if he knew anything about it. I have written just a brief word to the Secretary, thanking him, but it was very inadequate as I did not feel that I could take his time with more than a line or two. I hope you will, at a convenient opportunity, tell him how grateful I really am.

We have been hearing here that Sumner Welles is to be the new Under-Secretary. But others seem to think that this impression has got abroad largely through him and that there has been nothing from the powers that will be so far, that would indicate that he will be the man. I do not know him except as a name, but what I know of him is good. I think that so far as the new Secretary is concerned, we will be sure to have a first class man. Times are such as to make this indispensable, so I think we are safe so far as the Secretary is concerned. As to the Under-Secretary, I have no worth while information at all
except the gossip concerning Welles. It is a tremen-
dously important position and I hope it will go to
a good man. Some one has told me that Leland
Harrison is interested in having this appointment
but I have not had any letter from him for some
time so have no information as to what his own views
or ambitions are. I would not be surprised if he
would prefer to go to the field rather than to have
a post in Washington. But there are other reasons
why I believe he would be willing to consider the
post of Under-Secretary. In many ways I think Leland
would make a good man for I believe his views have
broadened a great deal, he has become a great deal
more human and understanding, and I think has more
grasp of administrative problems of the Service
than most of the men whose experience has been
largely or wholly in the diplomatic branch. In any
event I hope he will come back into the Service
either to a post in Washington or in the field.
So far as the Assistant Secretaries are concerned,
I suppose and hope that there is no question about
Mr. Carr. In fact some of my Democratic friends
have been in touch with me and I have made it clear
that I think it is essential in the public interest
that he stay there. As to Francis White, if he
wants to stay, I hope he can because it will be
difficult to replace him and I personally like him
very much. I understand, however, there are a
few people gunning for him as they hold him
responsible for some things that happened in South
America, but if he does go I feel sure it will be
to a major post in Latin America. That both Mr.
Bundy and Mr. Rogers have to go, is a great mis-
fortune and I am hoping that their places will be
filled with really first class men.

We simply must have someone in the Department
who has a grasp of administrative problems as well
as an interest in the purely political aspects of
the work. We have not had any one in the Department
below the Secretaries for some time except Mr.
Cotton, who had a grasp of administrative matters
and he had to leave us just at a time when he was
going to do some of these important things. It is
easy enough to get men from the outside who have
administrative ability, but they do not have the
knowledge of Service detail and it takes a good

long
long time for a man to know what can and cannot be done in so complicated a machine as the Department and our Foreign Service. The result is that by the time these men are ready to do anything, they must go again and nothing happens. Mr. Carr has tremendous knowledge of Departmental and Service detail and practice which is essential, but he is not a very good judge of men who can carry out these ideas and is not willing to take the initiative in getting certain things done. So again here we have no progress.

I think it would be advisable to have some one in the Department from the Foreign Service, who really has not only the political and Service background, but also certain administrative ability and knowledge of administrative practice which should be applied in the field. Heretofore when we have taken a Foreign Service officer from the field as an Assistant Secretary, he has usually had only experience in the diplomatic branch and I do not know a single diplomatic officer who has given any real study to administrative practice as too the problems of reorganization. This is quite understandable from the way they have been trained, but it is one of the misfortunes from which we have suffered. We should have as an Assistant Secretary a Foreign Service officer who not only has the usual background of a Foreign Service officer, but who has in addition knowledge of administrative details and of Service problems in the field and above all, the courage and the knowledge of strategy and technique to carry out certain important things which have been pending only too long.

Now here you can have a laugh all to yourself and say to yourself what an argument I have been building up for myself to be brought into the Department. As a matter of fact the idea of going to the Department as an Assistant Secretary does not appeal to me at all. I distinctly prefer the field and so does my wife and in many respects I do not like to work in Washington. I have always tried to avoid service in the Department when the question came up indirectly. Besides that, with our private income practically gone I should find it difficult to live in Washington as I feel that I should as an Assistant Secretary. Besides that too, I should have to give up my Service status which I should dislike to do. There are any number of reasons why I prefer service
service in the field, but recently some of my friends at home have been sounding me out as to whether I would be willing to go to the Department. I have told them all that I am distinctly not a candidate for any position in the Department and that I prefer the field for personal reasons. I have told them that I would not wish to go to the Department unless it were specifically understood that the President and the new Secretary wished to have certain things done and would want to see them carried out. Under those circumstances I would be willing to go to the Department for at least several years in order to see that certain administrative measures are taken with respect to the Foreign Service and its establishments, and with respect to the coordination of the activities of the various Departments of our Government abroad. I think Mr. Carr's views and mine on this subject are largely in accord. The only difference is that if I were there working with him, the steps necessary would be taken, while frankly if they are not taken, I don't know whether they will ever be taken until they are forced on us from the outside and then we shall be in the soup.

The way in which the allotments for rent are being made to the men in the Foreign Service, can to any unprejudiced person only appear as the result of either incompetence or indifference and this thing is causing great injury to the morale of the Service. I am talking now not of the amounts which are available for allotment, but of the inequitable way in which the money is allotted. Our maintenance of dual establishments, that is of Consulates and Chanceries in every capital, is something which cannot continue because it is the one vulnerable point which the Department has. A program should be undertaken for the consolidation of our establishments in capitals as it is not only efficiency, but economy which requires this action. A proper policy of continuous transfers between the two branches of the Service should be undertaken and carried through logically and with discrimination, for while we have eliminated practically all of the snobs at the top, the Department by its present procedure is deliberately training up scores of them in the Unclassified Service. There are all these problems connected with our relationships
with other Departments abroad, every single one of which could be solved if we had some one in the Department with the knowledge of conditions in the field and with the proper tact and strategy to deal with the other Departments. These are only a few of the things which require attention and which a good many people closely associated with the new administration are thinking of. I have written with regard to so many of these things to the Department and I think every single recommendation I have made has been buried. You know that I am one of Mr. Carr's real admirers and supporters and a real friend, and I have written to him with regard to so many of these things giving him intimate detail which I cannot put even in confidential despatches, and he does not even acknowledge my letters. I think he feels that I am pressing him all the time but if I am bringing these matters to his attention, I am only doing so as a friend who knows that these things require attention and wants to see them done by the right people. In my opinion a friend is only a friend if he is frank and if he is not frank he is not faithful. But I really think that Mr. Carr thinks that I am trying to stir him into things all the time and he doesn't realize how important some of them are.

I learned some time ago that some of my friends have criticized me for being too energetic and for trying to run things. I was somewhat chagrined because I felt that my friends at least would realize that if I was energetic it was because I wanted to get certain things done which I felt were important in the public service and certainly not to have my way or because I was looking for something for myself. If I had been looking for something for myself my tactics would have been very different and I would have been able to get things without being so energetic. My one object is to try to see certain things done for the Foreign Service before I go into a more comfortable post somewhere and vegetate.

I have opened my heart to you and would like to write more, but cannot take more of your time now. I wanted to tell you about this Assistant Secretaryship so that you have the right slant on it if you should hear some talk. I am not interested in such a post and shall not solicit it in any way. I would not
wish to come to the Department in that capacity unless it were with the distinct idea that the President and the Secretary wanted to have certain things done which they thought I could do in the course of a couple of years as an Assistant Secretary. Because I think these things can be done and are absolutely essential in the public interest, I would be willing to go to Washington for several years. Some of these things fall peculiarly within the province of Mr. Carr but I believe that he and I could work together harmoniously and carry these things through and his policy of holding back might make a good balance wheel for what some seem to think my too great energy. I wouldn't, however, contemplate going to the Department if I did not feel that Mr. Carr and I could work together in these things in complete harmony. I feel sure that we could. Nor would I wish to go to the Department if it were not with the idea that certain things were to be done as otherwise I should simply be eating my heart out when I might at least be of some use in the field. Some of these questions with regard to the Service have been given a good deal of thought by leading Democrats and probably this is the reason why I have been sounded out as to my own views. I have made myself very clear to them and they know that I am entirely satisfied personally where I am. If there should be any developments of any interest, I should be very glad to let you know.

I hope you will tell McKenna that I got his letter and appreciate it very much and shall be writing him shortly. I am sending you herewith a copy of a memorandum on the consolidation of our establishments abroad which I have sent the Department with a covering dispatch. I know you will be a bit shocked at some of my recommendations but it is a thing to which we will have to come and we ought to make a start very quickly.

Again with a thousand thanks and the hope that you have forgiven me for my ineptitude in the way I sent my telegrams,

Cordially and faithfully yours,