THE INFLUENCE OF KANT'S ANALYTIC OF
THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME
UPON SCHILLER'S GRACE AND
DIGNITY AND THE CALLIAS
LETTERS

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I.

Through his acquaintance with the Kantian philosophy Schiller enjoyed the greatest developmental period of his whole life. His study of Kant, who offered him an intellectual formulation of the problems with which he had been dimly struggling, led him to his own philosophy, which is in general the philosophy of the German Classical Period. At the stage which interests us at present, namely 1793 and 1794, Schiller's work is everywhere stamped with a Kantian mark. In the Callias letters and On Grace and Dignity he accepts in general the theory set forth in the first Book of the Kritik of Judgment, a theory which is that of a philosopher rather than an artist, and attempts to reconcile it with the needs of the poet by searching for the beautiful object. In his effort to call beauty an objective principle Schiller is, as he himself recognizes, eminently unsuccessful, so that finally beauty has for him the same general meaning that it has for Kant. In Of the Sublime and About the Sublime Schiller follows Kant in showing that the sublime brings freedom from nature through reason.

In the first Book of the Kritik Kant is working out step by step all the presuppositions of a judgment of the beautiful. Before him Leibniz had expounded a theory of the esthetic judgment as cognitive, and the attack in the first Moment of the Kritik is directed against such a view. As Kant clearly states at the opening of the book:

In order to distinguish whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation not by the understanding to the object for cognition, but by the Imagination (perhaps in conjunction with the understanding) to the subject, and its feeling

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of pleasure and pain. The judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of cognition.¹

The ideal of perfection is not in the object, but in the form of the judgment itself. The esthetic judgment, instead of belonging to the realm of the understanding, is itself an ideal.

Schiller acknowledges fully the influence which this doctrine of Kant’s has exerted upon him as he reproaches his friend Gottfried Körner, a follower of Wolf, because his theory of beauty as unity in the manifold depends upon a concept:

Now Kant is obviously right in saying the beautiful pleases without a concept; I can find a beautiful object beautiful long before I am in any sense in a position to acknowledge the unity in the manifold and to determine what the predominating power in it is.²

For Kant contemplation is the appropriate esthetic activity.

The judgment of taste is merely contemplative: i.e. it is a judgment which, indifferent as regards the existence of an object, compares its character with the feeling of pleasure and pain. But this contemplation itself is not directed to concepts; for the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (either theoretical or practical), and thus is not based on concepts, nor has it concepts as its purpose.³

Kant is not original in his statement that there is no interest in the existence of the object involved in esthetic enjoyment. For example, Moses Mendelsohn, to whom Lessing has set up an eternal monument in Nathan the Wise, agrees that the esthetic judgment is disinterested. Esthetic feeling is, according to Kant, connected with the vitality of the subject, with something analogous to Spinoza’s conatus perhaps. “The representation is altogether referred to the subject and to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or pain.”⁴ To borrow an expression from F. H. Bradley, esthetic pleasure is in the “What,” the series of qualities, not the “That,” the being.

The satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the existence of an object is called interest. Such satisfaction

¹ Kant, Kritik of Judgment, Bernard trans., London, 1892, p. 45.
³ Kant, op. cit., p. 53.
⁴ Ibid., p. 46.
always has reference to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or as necessarily connected with its determining ground. Now when the question is if a thing is beautiful, we do not want to know whether anything depends or can depend on the existence of the thing either for myself or for anyone else, but how we judge it by mere observation (intuition or reflection).  

If, for example, we are attracted to a painting because it would fit in well with the surroundings in our living room, we are interested in the existence of the painting, we desire, and consequently our judgment is in no sense esthetic. As Tieck shows in *Puss in Boots*, the man who calls the apple beautiful and is at the same time hungry for it is not making an esthetic judgment. Goethe offers us an excellent illustration of this very point in *Faust* in the hero’s attitude towards Gretchen, in a part written in the Storm and Stress Period, as compared with his attitude towards Helen, in a section written in the Classical Period. Faust cannot admire Gretchen without remembering that she is a woman and yearning to possess her. After going through the dangerous realm of the *Mütter* and the Classical Walpurgis Night he is able to contemplate Helen’s beauty, to regard the *Schein* without any interest in the *Sein*. Then, for the first time, he is capable of a truly esthetic viewpoint.

The complete disinterestedness of the esthetic judgment is best illustrated by contrasting it with judgments of the pleasant and the good. The pleasant, Kant shows, gratifies rather than pleases, and gratification involves inclination.

Now that a judgment about an object, by which I describe it as pleasant, expresses an interest in it, is plain from the fact that by sensation it excites a desire for objects of that kind, consequently the satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgment about it, but the relation of its existence to my state, so far as this is affected by such an object. Hence we do not say of the pleasant, *it pleases*, but *it gratifies*. I give to it no mere assent, but inclination is aroused by it.

Sensation, as Kant uses it in this passage, applies to the objective side in contrast to feeling, which applies to the subjective side. The green of the meadows is, for example, a sensation, while pleasure is a feeling. In one important point judgments of the beautiful and

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the pleasant resemble each other: in both pleasure is immediate. Judgments of the good, on the other hand, are cognitive. They involve interest in existence, as judgments of the pleasant do, but the good differs from the pleasant through the presence of concepts. "In order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of thing the object ought to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it."®

Kant would object to the view of art as moral. The pleasant, which gratifies, the beautiful, which pleases, and the good, which arouses esteem, are sharply separated. Man shares the capacity for gratification with the lower animals; only rational animals are susceptible to beauty; and respect is known only to the purely rational being.®

Objective purposiveness can only be cognized by means of the reference of the manifold to a definite purpose, and therefore through a concept. From this alone it is plain that the Beautiful, the judging of which has at its basis a merely formal purposiveness, i.e. a purposiveness without a purpose, is quite independent of the concept of the good; because the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e. the reference of the object to a definite purpose.®

This objective purposiveness may be regarded either as utility or as perfection. The satisfaction in the useful is obviously not immediate, as is the pleasure afforded by the beautiful. The Leibnizian school, however, grasps the second alternative and regards beauty as indistinct perfection. In fact Baumgarten interprets beauty as felt perfection.® The qualitative perfection of the object is determined according to the agreement of the manifold with a concept of what the perfect thing is, while the quantitative perfection is ascertained according to whether all the requisites are present or not. The agreement of the manifold with an undetermined unity, wherein beauty consists, supplies no objective purposiveness. For example, if I look at a building and do not realize it is intended to serve a definite purpose, that of offering the inhabitants shelter, I have no concept of its perfection. The concept of purpose is essential in judgments of perfection. But on the other hand, such a concept

® Ibid., pp. 49 ff.
® Ibid., p. 54.
® Ibid., p. 77.
is incompatible with beauty, and therefore beauty and perfection are distinct.10

Goethe, on the other hand, unites the beautiful and the good. He tells us that in life, in time, the beautiful and the perfect, which are one, can last only a moment; in art alone, in space, they are eternal.

In *On Grace and Dignity* Schiller makes the same sharp distinction between the beautiful and the good, which Kant does. In this essay he is less concerned with the pleasant. Schiller’s architechtontic beauty corresponds to Kant’s free beauty, and it must be distinguished from technical perfection. Technical perfection concerns the system of purposes in an object. Beauty has to do neither with the material worth of these purposes nor with the artistic connection between them. The contemplating subject regards the appearance without consideration of its logical construction.

Although the architechtontic beauty of the human body is conditioned by the concept upon which it is based, and by the purposes which nature has in regard to man, nevertheless the esthetic judgment isolates beauty completely from these purposes, and nothing, except what belongs to the appearance immediately and peculiarly, is taken up into the judgment of beauty.

Technical perfection appeals to the understanding, is thought, whereas beauty appeals to the senses, appears. Schiller goes on to show that man, judged esthetically, is simply a thing in space. When we take his moral destiny into consideration, we are thinking of him through the mediation of a concept, we are judging him with the understanding. Schiller lays great emphasis upon this distinction between the beautiful and the moral, employing a strong figure of speech:

Granted that in regard to a beautiful human figure we could forget completely what it expressed, that we could, without changing the appearance, combine it with the rude instinct of a tiger, the judgment of the eyes would remain absolutely the same, and the senses would declare the tiger the most beautiful work of the creator.11

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10 Kant, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 ff.
II.

If, with Kant, we regard the esthetic judgment as completely disinterested, we must agree with him that it is universal. As Kant shows, satisfaction in the beautiful does not rest upon any individual peculiarities, but upon what we can justifiably presuppose in all men. Because we attribute our satisfaction to everyone, we may, for convenience' sake, speak of the beautiful as if it were characteristic of the object, and of the judgment as if logical. Like the logical judgment, the esthetic enjoys universal validity, but, unlike the logical judgment, the esthetic does not attain its validity through a concept.

The judgment of taste, accompanied with the consciousness of separation from all interest, must claim validity for every man, without this universality depending on objects. That is, there must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality.

Kant is here concerned with the possibility of esthetic judgments, rather than with actual esthetic judgments.

He again seeks to heighten the effect of his words through contrast with the pleasant and the good. Judgments of the good are universally valid, but this validity is based on a concept, and, as Kant says, no one supposes we should all agree about the pleasant: de gustibus non disputandum! Agreement about the pleasant is empirical: some of us like blue; others prefer red; some of us like milk, while others prefer coffee.

To strive here with the design of reproving as incorrect another man's judgment which is different from our own, as if the judgments were logically opposed, would be folly. As regards the pleasant therefore the fundamental proposition is valid: everyone has his own taste (the taste of sense).\textsuperscript{12}

However, we should never think of saying, "This is beautiful for me."

We are perhaps inclined to wonder how Kant can maintain the universality of satisfaction in the beautiful despite all the quarrels of art critics. However, Kant recognizes the paradoxical situation that exists, namely, that actually there is more agreement concerning the pleasant than concerning the good, and he shows that there is only "comparative universality" in regard to the pleasant. The rules which emerge are not really universal but only general.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}Kant, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 56 ff.  
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 58.
Moreover, in the case of the beautiful, Kant neither postulates nor finds agreement, but demands it. There ought to be agreement, and Kant blames us when there is not. The universality and necessity of the judgment of taste are justified by Kant's theory of a common sense.

Since the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense, we have grounds for assuming this latter. And this common sense is assumed without relying on psychological observations, but simply as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every Logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not sceptical.¹⁴

Given this common sense, we may regard satisfaction in beauty as consciousness of the harmonious interplay of imagination and understanding.

Now if the judgment of taste followed upon the feeling of pleasure and therefore depended upon the representation through which the object was given, it could be valid only for the subject. The universal voice must be communicable, and pleasure in the object must be consequent upon the judgment of taste. But universal communicability at once suggests something logical.

Nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representation; so far as it belongs to cognition. For it is only thus that this latter can be objective, and only through this has it a universal point of reference, with which the representative power of everyone is compelled to harmonize.

We must, then, look for apriori principles which will give a rule. When we speak with the universal voice we make our judgments a rule, but a rule not determined by a concept. Here we find Kant's correction of the first Moment: there is a reference to cognition, but to cognition in general, not to any definite cognition. Since there is no definite concept involved which can limit them, the cognitive powers are in free play. In order to relate the object to cognition in general, the imagination must gather together the manifold of intuition, and the understanding must unite it. It is this state of free play of the imagination and understanding which is universally communicable.

We have no intellectual consciousness of the mutual accord

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 92 ff.
between understanding and reason, but we know that free play of our faculties only through sensation. In other words, cognition does not reveal the relation, but rather we must get at it through feeling.\textsuperscript{15} We are immediately conscious of the effect, namely pleasure, and we assume the harmony of our faculties as the cause. Pleasure is, then, obviously not prior. The object must please because it is beautiful, rather than be beautiful because it pleases. However, the feeling of pleasure is not temporarily but logically subsequent.

Pleasure in the beautiful consists in the imagination's free conformity to law: "It is conformity to law without a law."\textsuperscript{16}

At the end of the third Moment Kant sums up the explanation of beauty which he has just given: "Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose."\textsuperscript{17} In order to understand what he means here, we shall have to define some of the terms he uses. Purposiveness may be regarded as order as if for some end. The hypothetical as if is important here. The concept taken as a ground of the actuality of the object is its purpose. For example, a comfortable temperature is both the presupposition and the outcome of an air-conditioning system. The purpose need not be actually represented as consciously present. There can be purposiveness without purpose.

Since every subjective purpose implies interest in the object and every objective purpose implies a concept of the object, the esthetic judgment may under no conditions be determined by a purpose. It is the mere form of purposiveness which affords pleasure in the object. However,

to establish apriori the connection of the feeling of pleasure or pain as an effect, with any representation whatever (sensation or concept) as its cause, is absolutely impossible; for that would be a (particular) causal relation which (with objects of experience) can always only be cognized aposteriori, and through the medium of experience itself.

Kant maintains further that charm and emotion are clearly separate from beauty; he calls taste barbaric which permits charm and emotion to play any role in satisfaction. In making clear what he understands by emotion, he gives a Hobbsian definition: beauty is

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 64 ff. \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 96. \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 90.
pure form, and no empirical satisfaction may be mingled with its determining ground. Tone and color, for example, are matter; only if we regard color as the form of a number of vibrations may we consider it beautiful.

It may be too extreme a distinction which Kant makes here concerning form and matter. However, it is not a purely philosophical distinction which he is drawing; he has the support of one of the world's greatest artists, Michael Angelo, who would agree with him that color and tone are alien to beauty. Beauty lies in delineation, in figures in play, in masses in relation to one another, in balance through line. Tones and colors serve simply to fix the composition more definitely. An ornament, if it does not consist in beautiful form, becomes mere finery.\textsuperscript{18}

Insofar as he maintains that the beautiful is not pleasing through a concept, Schiller allies himself with the Kantian School. However, he asserts further that a concept of beauty is possible, although our feeling of pleasure in the beautiful does not depend on it. In fact he attempts to show that beauty is an objective principle. The difference in the methods of treating the esthetic judgment is perhaps due to the fact that for Kant the object conforms to the representation of the subject, while for Schiller each object occupies a definite position in space and time. While Kant is not interested in the contents, but only in the subject, Schiller seeks something in the object itself which causes harmony between the subject's faculties. He says:

My principle of beauty is to be sure up to this point merely subjective, because I have so far been arguing only from the point of view of reason itself and have not yet ventured on to the object. But it is no more subjective than anything else which is deduced apriori from reason. That something must be found in the objects themselves which renders the application of this principle to them possible is self-evident, just as is my obligation to give an account of it. But that this something (namely the self-determination in things) is perceived, and indeed with approval, by reason, can according to the very nature of the situation be demonstrated only with reference to the essence of reason and consequently only subjectively. I hope, however, to prove convincingly that beauty is an objective property.

The "something" in the object which brings about the harmony

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 72 ff.
in the subject is freedom, a word with many different meanings for Schiller. At times Schiller seems to consider that freedom consists in the absence of force and at times in the dominion of reason. However, he is clear in his statement that determination by reason means heteronomy for a phenomenon, whereas the essence of beauty is autonomy. Beauty is freedom in the appearance. Something in the object must force us to regard it as if it were self-determined. There is no determination either as a result of physical force or in accordance with a purpose. Of Kant Schiller says:

There has certainly been no greater word spoken by mortal man than that Kantian expression, which forms at once the contents of his whole philosophy: determine thyself according to thineself.\(^\text{10}\)

Unity in the manifold is what brings about the state of harmony in the subject. The sensible object must be in accordance with the rules of the understanding and yet must seem to have developed naturally, following no rules but those of its own nature. The subject's understanding must be led by a rule without recognizing it, just as Wilhelm Meister is led by the Turm Society, without being aware of it.

The object must then possess and show a form such that it admits of a rule: for the understanding can perform its function only according to rules. It is not necessary, however, that the understanding perceive the rule (for perception of the rule would destroy all appearance of freedom).

This passage is reminiscent of Kant's purposiveness without purpose.

Schiller recognizes, however, that in the realm of appearances self-determination is impossible; \(^\text{20}\) free form means therefore ultimately that the understanding is given no cause to seek an explanation outside of the object.\(^\text{21}\) It would seem that in a certain sense the judgment of beauty already loses its claim to universality, for whether an external cause is sought depends on the subject.

Form is for Schiller a rule which is at the same time given and followed by the object. This is what is called Heautonomy, and it should be an objective principle. Nature, to be beautiful, must

\(^{19}\) Schiller, Briefe, pp. 254 ff. (translations by the author).

\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp. 267 f. (translations by the author).

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 258.
appear like art, and art like nature. Schiller acknowledges his indebtedness to Kant for this thought, saying:

Kant draws up a sentence in his *Kritik of Judgment*, which is of universal fruitfulness, and which, as I think, can find its explanation only in my theory. Nature, he says, is beautiful, when it looks like art; art is beautiful when it looks like nature.22

To be beautiful, the handle of a vase, for example, must appear to have grown voluntarily; its use must be forgotten. In a beautiful composition the limitation of the parts for the sake of the whole must appear to be voluntary.23

Here we see most clearly that the esthetic judgment is no longer an imperative, as it is for Kant, or rather it would not be, had Schiller really succeeded in establishing the objectivity of his principle, for according to his definition of it, this principle is to be found in Germany only in Classical art. The art of the period out of which Schiller was able to develop only with the help of Kant, the art of the Storm and Stress Period, would be completely banished from the realm of beauty.

Schiller realizes his failure to unite objectivity and universality and acknowledges it in a letter to his friend Körner in the following words:

I am now convinced, that all dissensions that arise between us and others like us, who are otherwise more or less agreed in feeling and principle, are the consequence of our basing beauty on an empirical concept which really does not exist. We should necessarily have to find all our representations of it in conflict with experience, because experience really does not present the idea of the beautiful, or, what is more, because that, which is usually regarded as beautiful, is definitely not the beautiful. The beautiful is no concept of experience but rather an imperative. It is certainly objective, but merely a necessary problem for sensible and reasonable nature; in real experience, however, it generally remains unsolved, and an object, be it ever so beautiful, either is made perfect by anticipating reason or merely pleasant by anticipating senses. It is completely subjective, whether we feel the beautiful as beautiful, but it should be so objectively.24

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22 Ibid., pp. 274 ff. (translations by the author).
23 Ibid., pp. 380 f.
24 Ibid., IV, 44 f. (translations by the author).
In this letter Schiller admits his inability to maintain an objective principle. In the empirical realm we can find only relative, not absolute, beauty. In his conclusion Schiller is really a Kantian, although he has attempted to free himself from Kant.

III.

Bosanquet emphasizes that although Kant never for a moment suggests that the judgment of taste may be objective, he seems discontented with the principle which bans objectivity from the realm of beauty. According to Bosanquet it is only for the sake of his thesis that Kant calls a judgment of taste impure if it is associated with objective ideas. In any case, Kant does admit that there is a type of beauty which involves a concept, and this beauty he calls dependent. The pure judgment of taste, however, concerns only free beauty. Free beauty is for Kant not necessarily limited to nature. A rug or a strip of wallpaper might represent free beauty. As an example of free beauty Kant gives a flower, for none but the botanist has a definite concept of what a flower should be. Bosanquet objects to Kant at this point and wishes to distinguish between the concept of utility and an appreciation of organic unity. He believes that only a botanist can really feel the beauty of flowers, for the freedom of their beauty consists in the fact that their purpose is one with their own existence.²⁵

Human beauty, on the other hand, is one example of dependent beauty, for the concept of moral purpose is involved.²⁶ Bosanquet’s comment on this example, which Kant gives of adherent beauty, is especially apt.

That beauty which is the largest and deepest revelation of spiritual power is not the most dependent but the freest beauty, because it implies no purpose whatever excepting that which constitutes its own inmost nature, the expression of reason in sensuous form. It is plain that Kant felt this and practically recognized the true rank of such beauty, but was baffled in attempting to include it in his formal datum, the judgment of taste.²⁷

In *On Grace and Dignity* Schiller makes the same distinction between free and dependent beauty, although the terminology is

²⁶ Kant, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
different. Grace corresponds in general to adherent beauty, and architechttonic beauty to free beauty, although Schiller is still attempting to define an objective principle instead of concerning himself simply with the subjective conditions of a judgment of beauty, as Kant does. In interpreting grace as an expression of moral feeling, Schiller is in accord with Kant. Man's destiny as a moral being shines through the graceful act. Architechttonic beauty, on the other hand, is a product of the forces of nature, without the influence of mind. In order to be judged as architechttonically beautiful, man must be taken simply as appearance, with no regard to his moral nature.  

IV.

Kant's influence upon Schiller is even clearer in the case of the sublime. In fact it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the differences lie chiefly in terminology. However, we must remember that Schiller is approaching the problem as a poet, rather than a philosopher, and what he really wishes to accomplish is a reconciliation between Kant and Lessing.

Kant opens the second book of the *Kritik* with a comparison of the sublime and the beautiful. Both, he says, presuppose a reflective judgment. They are dependent neither upon sensation nor upon concept, although the satisfaction is referred to indefinite concepts. Since, upon a given intuition, the imagination promotes the faculty of concepts of understanding or reason, the judgment of the beautiful or the sublime is both singular and universally valid.

There are, however, very considerable differences between the beautiful and the sublime. In the first place, whereas the beautiful is satisfaction in a definite form, the sublime is satisfaction in an indefinite form. Therefore no work of art may awaken the feeling of the sublime, but only the rough and untamed in nature. The impression of boundlessness, together with the thought of totality, is the occasion of the feeling of the sublime, so that the sublime may be regarded as the presentation of an indefinite concept, not of understanding, as in the case of the beautiful, but of reason. Reason is, according to Kant, the faculty which has to do with the unconditioned and renders us dissatisfied with the highest syntheses of the understanding. Moreover, the pleasure afforded

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by the sublime is a negative pleasure, which lies in an overwhelming followed by a reassertion of the subject’s own being. The imagination is overcome, but in this very overcoming of the imagination lies the key to reassertion through another faculty, namely reason. The object which awakens the feeling of the sublime in us seems to do violence to the imagination and so to violate purpose in regard to the judgment. Kant says emphatically that this object is not sublime itself, but merely arouses in the subject the feeling of the sublime, which concerns only ideas of reason. The sublime is in and for the mind alone, and the feeling of purposiveness is completely independent of the object which summons it into the mind.\(^{29}\)

The sublime is even more subjective than the beautiful, so that there will be a certain relativity about its arousal.

Schiller agrees with Kant in his statement that the feeling of the sublime may be aroused only by the formless, boundless object.\(^{30}\) He calls the sublime state of mind a mixed feeling, a combination of awe and delight. These different relationships which exist between subject and object are explicable on the basis of Schiller’s dualism. He presupposes two natures in each man, and two natures which admit of no polar relationship such as exists between the two drives which Goethe sees in every living creature. Through the sublime we discover that we are not simply sensible nature: there is also a self-sufficient principle in us. The limits of imagination are not the limits of comprehension, but rather we possess another faculty, reason. In contemplating beauty, as we have said, the understanding and imagination are in perfect harmony.

In the case of the sublime reason and the senses are not in harmony, and in the very opposition between them lies the charm with which it takes hold upon our spirit. The physical and the moral man are here most sharply distinguished from one another; for in the presence of such objects, where the first feels only his limitations, the other experiences his power and is in fact infinitely exalted by that which suppresses the other.\(^{31}\)

A further difference between the sublime and the beautiful which Kant emphasizes is the division of the sublime into two types, whereas we know only one type of the beautiful. The sublime presupposes a movement of the mind. If this movement is referred

\(^{29}\) Kant, _op. cit._, pp. 101 ff.

\(^{30}\) Schiller, _Werke_, XIII, 294.

\(^{31}\) _Ibid._, pp. 268 ff. (translations by the author).
through the imagination to the faculty of cognition, we have the mathematically sublime, while if it is referred through the imagination to desire, we have the dynamically sublime.\textsuperscript{32} Or, thinking back to the \textit{Kritik of Pure Reason}, we may say that the mathematically sublime concerns a synthesis of homogeneous units and the dynamically sublime a synthesis of heterogeneous units.\textsuperscript{33}

In discussing the mathematically sublime, Kant shows that the relatively great presupposes a standard of comparison, and in the procuring of this standard an esthetic element is involved. The standard is universal, but also subjective, so that it is not available for a logical judgment; there must be an intuitive apprehension of the fundamental measure upon which all mathematical estimates by means of numbers depend. In such estimates two elements are involved, apprehension and comprehension. Apprehension is simply an addition of units; there is no intrinsic limitation to such a process. Comprehension, on the other hand, is intuition in the Cartesian sense; such a movement of the mind is clearly limited. Apprehension may go on, where comprehension meets a limit. We may take a small unit as standard for estimating the height of a man, a man for measuring a tree, a tree for measuring a mountain, and so forth, repeating the process again and again, and we shall have logical, but not esthetic, comprehension. The apprehended magnitude must be comprehended as a whole. For example, the observer must stand far enough from a pyramid so that he can grasp the whole and yet near enough so that he does not lose the details. Beyond a certain point, however, magnitude cannot be gathered into a unity. The mathematical estimate of magnitude, although unlimited, can never excite the feeling of the sublime.

It is the inability of the faculty employed in judging sensible things to give us totality which excites in us the consciousness of a supersensible faculty, and we call not the object itself, but the arousing of this feeling by a certain object, sublime. "The sublime is that, the mere ability to think which, shows a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of sense." Imagination, when stretched to its limits, can give us only a series; we want totality, and the thwarting of the imagination in its endeavor to attain to the absolutely great seriatim stimulates us to hunt for the supersensible faculty, reason, which requires for every magnitude compre-

\textsuperscript{32} Kant, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 106.

hension in one intuition, presentation of all members of a progressive series.

The infinite can be thought by reason alone. It can have a meaning for us, but there can be no sensible representation of it, for that would presuppose a unit relatable to the infinite by number, as is shown by Locke's failure to reach infinity by adding units. We may say, then, that nature evokes a sublime state of mind, when a phenomenon calls forth the idea of the infinite.

Kant seems to be speaking in terms of space, but there is no apparent reason why we cannot arrive at the sublime in terms of time as well. In fact Shelley, at the beginning of "Prometheus Unbound," offers an application of Kant's sublime in relation to time.

The sublime is really respect for our own destiny. In the idea of respect there is involved the thought that we should, but cannot quite, comprehend our vocation. Consciousness of the sublime is aroused by that which awakens in us the idea of reason. Our feeling of inability to attain to an idea which is a law for us, is painful. Imagination and reason are contrasted, but there is a harmony in the very contrast, for out of the conflict arises a deeper harmony, the consciousness of reason. The pain is purposive, for it brings about pleasure in the harmony of the faculties, in the harmony between the Idea of Reason and the judgment of the incapacity of the senses. It is a law of reason that we regard sensible nature as small in comparison with Ideas of Reason.

The dynamically sublime is not an inadequacy of the imagination to grasp more of the same kind of elements beyond a certain point; another element is introduced. In the case of the dynamically sublime nature is presented as might without dominion over us. The subject, however, must not be afraid of the fearful object, for the emotion of fear leaves no opportunity for forming a judgment about the sublime. The fearful object can be attractive only to the subject in security. The first reaction to the presentation of might is the feeling of impotence as an individual being of nature. Reassertion comes, however, through the non-sensuous standards of reason, with the unified infinite under it, in comparison with which nature is small. The satisfaction is in man's destiny, and the lack of seriousness of the danger implies no lack of seriousness of the sublimity of power. Kant gives as an example of the feeling of the sublime man's inherent admiration for the courageous warrior
who forges ahead in the face of physical danger. Something similar could be said of the nobility of self-sacrifice, as Schiller shows in so many of his dramas. Kant indicates further that the feeling for the sublime is awakened by the idea of God only in the man conscious of uprightness pleasing to God, or in the man who judges sternly his own faults and subjects himself voluntarily to remorse. Although culture of the esthetic judgment and cognitive faculties is necessary for the harmony of imagination and reason, the capacity for the sublime state of mind is rooted in human nature in the feeling for the moral.

Schiller follows Kant in his division of the sublime into two classes. He prefers, however, a different terminology:

In the case of the theoretically sublime nature is the object of cognition in opposition to the representative drive. In the case of the practically sublime it is the object of sensation in opposition to the preservation drive. In the former case it was regarded simply as a subject which should broaden our knowledge; in the latter case it was represented as a power which can determine our condition. Therefore Kant calls the practically sublime the sublime of might or the dynamically sublime, in contrast to the mathematically sublime. Because, however, it is not evident from the concepts dynamical and mathematical, whether the sphere of the sublime is exhausted by this division or not, I have preferred the division into the theoretically and practically sublime.

The second type, the practically sublime, is really of greater importance for Schiller, for he, as an artist, is interested not merely in the sublime state of mind itself, but also in its effects in the phenomenal world.

The theoretically great really broadens only our sphere; the practically great, the dynamically sublime, our power. Only through the latter do we really experience our true and complete independence of nature; for it is something very different, to feel oneself independent of the conditions of nature in the mere act of representing and in one's whole inner existence, from feeling oneself exalted over fate, over all chance and over the whole necessity of nature.

As Kant has shown, the fearful object must not arouse fear, for if the subject is overwhelmed with emotion, his sensible nature suppresses his reasonable nature completely. In order to realize the

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independence of the sensible world of which he, as a reasonable being, is capable, he must regard the object with detachment. In fear we suffer passively; in a sublime state we are inwardly active. Deserted by all power of physical resistance, we reassert ourselves through reason. However, such reassertion is hardly possible in the face of real danger. The feeling of our powerlessness as physical beings is very real.

The sublime frees man from the sensible world, wherein beauty chains him. In the experience of the sublime he discovers his moral power, his destiny as a moral being: "and the relatively great outside him is the mirror wherein he sees the absolutely great within him." 35

In the respects mentioned above Schiller has followed Kant rather closely, as he himself acknowledges on several occasions. However, his purpose in examining the theories of both the sublime and the beautiful is very different from Kant's. He is interested in the development of mankind. In man he recognizes a being who can will. As Lessing says: "All other beings must, man is the being that wills." Culture, according to Schiller, is responsible for educating man so that he can maintain his will. The sublime must join the beautiful in order to complete man's esthetic education, to teach him to fulfill his destiny as an human being. Although ultimately the beautiful character is subordinated to the sublime, Schiller asserts his freedom from the severity of Kant's ethical system in his statement that no sacrifice shall be made either by the senses or by reason. Without beauty, man would neglect his vocation as a creature of nature, and without the sublime, he would neglect his vocation as a reasonable being. 36

Zweierlei Genien sind's, die dich durchs Leben geleiten.
Wohl dir, wenn sie vereint helfend zur Seite dir gehn!
Mit erheiterndem Spiel verkürzt dir der eine die Reise,
Leichter an seinem Arm werden dir Schicksal und Pflicht.
Unter Scherz und Gespräch begleitet er bis an die Kluft dich,
Wo an der Ewigkeit Meer schaudernd der Sterbliche steht.
Hier empfängt dich entschlossen und ernst und schweigend
der andre,
Trägt mit gigantischem Arm über die Tiefe dich hin.
Nimmer widme dich einem allein! Vertraue dem ersten
Deine Würde nicht an, nimmer dem andern dein Glück!

35 Schiller, Werke, XII, 265 ff. (translations by the author).
36 Ibid., p. 281.