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ABSTRACT

THE HANDLING OF THE DEAD IN A DISASTER

In recent years, the topic of death and dying has become the subject of much social and behavioral science research and study. But one area which has not been as intensively studied as others is how the dead are treated by the living, especially sudden and unanticipated large numbers of the dead. In this paper we present a case study of the handling of 237 victims of a flash flood disaster. Our descriptive analysis incorporates two levels of behavior: individual modes of adjustment and the organized response of the community. An examination is also made of the factors affecting the respect accorded the "prerogatives" of the dead and the living, and the remarkably effective organized carrying out of this generally non-instrumental disaster task.
Death has come to life as a current "in" topic of attention and study. In the last few years death and dying has become the subject of popular college classes, journalistic articles, television talk shows and documentaries, and social commentators upon the contemporary scene. Not unsurprisingly, social science writing and research has also addressed itself to various aspects of the topic (see among others, sociologists such as Fulton, 1965; Blauner, 1966; Sudnow, 1967; Habenstein, 1968; Vernon, 1970; Chasin, 1971; Dumont and Foss, 1972; and other behavioral and social scientists such as Hinton, 1972; Fabian, 1972; Mack, 1973; Goldberg, 1973; Kastenbaum, 1974; Lifton, 1974; Mills, 1975; Kubler-Ross, 1975). A partial issue of *Craques* in 1972 was recently given over to the topic as well as a full issue of *Urban Life* (edited by Lofland, 1975).

While a wide variety of issues has been examined, some matters have received less attention than others. One area which has not been studied as intensively as others is how the dead are treated by the living. That is the focus of this paper.

Anthropologists, of course, have examined burial ceremonials and other rites for the dead. It is clear that normally the dead are accorded considerable respect by the living; such a custom is rooted deep in the pre-history of the human race being demonstrated in Neanderthaloid remains (Grinsell, 1955). But such a response is under usual circumstances of where death is generally expected and/or the numbers involved are relatively few at any given time. What of instances of sudden mass deaths? Almost no one has looked at how unanticipated large numbers of the dead in a given community are handled (see reviews of the literature: Kalish, 1965; Nettler, 1967; Friedsam, 1970; and Kutscher, 1974). That kind of response is also the focus of this paper.

The sudden appearance of a number of dead bodies is a prominent feature of most major disasters. How are such dead handled by the living? Given the problems of restoring normality which survivors are faced with, is there a suspension, at times of catastrophes, of the usual respect accorded the dead? What kinds of modes of adjustment and response are evoked by mass death? American society in its history has suffered few disasters where large numbers of people have been suddenly killed; but occasionally there have been instances where the dead have been in the three figures. The most recent such natural disaster was the Rapid City, South Dakota flood of June 9, 1972. As a result of heavy rains, a weakened dam above the city unleashed a torrent of water which killed 237 people. In some respects, the physical features of the disaster were unusual; the area hit by the flood was restricted to a narrow band adjacent to each side of the river. While the devastation was almost total in that area, everything outside, including major services such as those associated with utilities, transportation, etc., were unaffected.

The Disaster Research Center (DRC) sent three successive teams of researchers into the area. The major focus was on how the dead were handled. A total of 36 in-depth, open-ended interviews were conducted.
with organizational officials involved in the process. More specifically, the interviews concentrated on discovering how the dead were searched for, recovered, identified and prepared for burial.

In addition, two levels of data were gathered. In part, we collected information on how an organized and collective effort emerged in the community to handle the dead and on what was done by the groups that emerged to handle this task. In addition, the interviews attempted to discover the typical modes of individual adjustment that appeared in the search for recovery, identification and burial for such a large number of dead people. What follows then is a descriptive analysis that incorporates two levels of behavior: individual modes of adjustment and the organized response of the community.

No plans of course existed in the community prior to the disaster for handling a large number of dead. In fact, there was great difficulty in developing any organized effort in the immediate emergency period, the night of the disaster (the flood occurred at about ten in the evening). During the first 24 to 36 hours, the search and recovery of the dead was done in an unorganized and quasi-individualized fashion. By quasi-individualized we mean that many of the 155 bodies recovered during this period were located by members of the police and fire departments, as well as the local national guards, but often their actions were as much the result of individually-decided courses of action as they were organizationally determined. Many of these bodies were brought in by family members and friends of the deceased as well as by people who "just happened upon" a body.

These bodies were delivered to the two functioning funeral homes, causing a massive strain on their resources. The third funeral home in the city was temporarily inoperative due to slight flooding; however, its services were restored about a day and a half after the flood occurred. Though the two operating funeral homes were extensively over-burdened, these first bodies were cleaned and prepared for identification within a 36-hour period. This was accomplished with some help from morticians outside the community as well as from local volunteers.

A somewhat more coordinated effort was organized with respect to the dead about a day and a half after the flood. There emerged four somewhat separate but interrelated groups to handle the problem. Most of our data focuses on this stage of the response, i.e., after the more organized community effort began.

The Emergent Groups

The response was coordinated by an ad hoc group composed of a county commissioner, the county sheriff, a local national guard representative, a local judge, and a probation officer. These were the major individuals involved though it was a flexible group sometimes including others on particular projects. In retrospect, the primary focus appears to have been to define the task areas and then to furnish a general program of action. Accordingly, there emerged three other well-defined groups:
a missing persons group headed by the probation officer, an identification group headed by the judge, and a seven-man search-and-recovery group headed by a national guard officer.

The search and recovery group.

Perhaps because of the intrinsic nature of the task, the search activity was less specifically organized. That is, searching for bodies was a somewhat random process that depended to a great extent on volunteer information as to probable location. In fact, the coordinating group strongly encouraged volunteer searching since it was felt that a great deal of such assistance was needed to locate all bodies. There were some attempts to systematize the search process. Mechanical "sniffers" were obtained in addition to trained dogs that were supposed to be capable of detecting odors emanating from deteriorating corpses. However, these proved less than successful since at times they failed to discriminate the deteriorating flesh of humans from other animals. Attempts were made to specify likely places by taking into consideration such variables as the number of bodies previously discovered, distance from flood zone, density of population in the locality, nature of the flooding in the area, and other more particularized factors thought relevant. Finally, after most of the bodies had been recovered, debris clearance crews were cautioned to maintain a sensitivity to the chance discovery of additional bodies. Thus, though the search procedures were less organized in the sense of being assigned solely to a specific group, the procedures used proved effective since volunteer efforts were quite extensive, and since information which tended to systematize the search was collected from many sources.

Nevertheless, one seven-man team was the core of the search and recovery effort. This group was made up of individuals officially connected with the police and national guard. However, membership in this group was voluntary; that is, a man could decide to discontinue his work with the group and not suffer any sanction. There was some turnover in membership the first day or two but after that the composition of the group stabilized. The team's membership remained the same for several weeks.

The team responded to reports of bodies being located as well as searching in areas where it was suspected that corpses might be found. The men interviewed on this team characterized their attitude towards this task as simply "a job to be done" and one man further noted that "it was not all that bad." In the beginning this group responded to all reports that a body had been located. However, it was discovered that about half of these "findings" were inaccurate and an attempt was made to first verify that a body had been found rather than just some suspicious odors. When bodies were located, an attempt was made to collect and preserve all identifying objects or characteristics associated with the body. Under this category was included body location, clothes, watches, purses and wallets, intact hands and fingers, for finger printing, etc. This information was then sent to another group which was in charge of the identification process.
The identification group.

The identification group was headed by a local judge. He had been chosen, among other reasons, because it was thought his presence could nullify legal problems that might arise from mistaken identifications or the ignoring, because of practical reasons, of the legal requirement that a coroner had to be present before a body could be moved. The participation of the judge, or so it was thought, would allow searchers and transporters of the dead bodies to operate with a little more latitude.

In most cases the identification was made using the prosaic evidence available: the individual was recognizable and known by someone on the identification team, or had already been identified by friends or relatives previous to the recovery of the body, or the wallet or purse would contain identification material. However, in many cases the body was discovered de-clothed (due to the force of the flood) and unrecognizable due to the body’s deterioration. In such cases sophisticated resources were brought to bear. These included individuals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State Department of Criminal Investigation who provided technical assistance in this identification process. Finger prints were taken, body marks cataloged, and dental records recorded. Many local volunteers also assisted in this process, making certain that objects associated with a particular body were not lost or improperly recorded. After all the body’s identification traits were collected and cataloged, this information was checked against the missing persons list.

The missing persons group.

The probation officer, assisted by others, was charged with preparing and updating a list of identified dead and missing. In the first few days the list had ballooned to over 2,000 persons as friends and relatives of persons simply thought to have been in the area phoned in their concerns from all over the country. Since Rapid City is located near a popular tourist area, this convergence of requests for information was even heavier than is usually the case in disasters (see Fritz and Matthews, 1957 and Stallings, 1971 for discussions of information convergence). At any rate, the number was drastically reduced after a systematic attempt was made to verify the status of each person on the list. This was usually accomplished by simply calling a friend or relative of the person on the list who generally reported that they had just heard from them and that they had not even been in the area. After the missing persons list had been reduced to a more realistic number, it and the identification-traits information were placed on a computer to facilitate matchups. In this manner, very rapid and successful correlation occurred with proper identification the result. There were only a few mistaken identifications.

The coordinating group.

This ad hoc group generally coordinated the whole process from hunting for bodies to the preparation of bodies for burial. The members of this group coordinated the activities of the search and identification groups with the actions of the funeral homes and the volunteers associated with
them. An integrated effort was facilitated by actions taken independently by the three funeral directors. They agreed that the normal competition between the homes would be eliminated. Provisions were made to provide a "moderately priced" funeral for all affected. The same type of casket was provided with the same kind of cement vault, and minimal cosmetics were applied. Viewing time was reduced usually to a single viewing by close relatives and often only when specifically requested. Thus, although there was a reduction of choice with regard to funeral arrangements, it was generally felt that such a reduction was necessitated by the large number of dead. Two of the three funeral directors, however, did evidence some misgivings about these procedures, feeling that relatives might in retrospect feel they had not "properly" handled the burial since few choices were afforded to them. But the data collected does indicate that at least during this period of time the reduction of these kinds of choices was not felt to be overly important in light of the emergency situation. The funeral directors assisted in the identification process by insuring that all identifying objects remained with the correct body until this information could be cataloged. Finally, after the recovery, identification, and burial preparation were completed, the body was buried, usually in a short 15 to 30 minute graveside ceremony.

How were the dead handled by the living? It is clear that in the absence of established organizations to do the work, the community quickly generated four new groups that could deal with the problem. These groups, despite the non-instrumental nature of their task, mounted a major effort. The problem by most criteria was handled quite well. This contrasts with the usually slow development of other kinds of emergent groups in disasters, their frequent lack of resources, and their general ineffectiveness in carrying out tasks.

Several things stand out about the groups that emerged to handle the dead, especially when viewed against other kinds of organized responses that typically develop after a major community disaster. The emergence of new groups to handle new disaster-generated tasks is a very usual occurrence in these and other kinds of crisis situations (see Quarantelli, 1970). But in almost all other cases the emergent groups come into being to handle instrumental problems that bear directly and immediately on the physical well-being of the survivors. Victims have to eat and be sheltered and, in general, certain household and work routines have to be restored as quickly as possible if life is to go on; similarly at the community level, debris has to cleared, utilities reestablished, etc., so that the material basis of the community is restored enough so that collective actions can be undertaken. Emergent groups sometimes appear to deal with these individual and group tasks if established organizations will not or can not deal with them. But in almost all cases the new tasks carried out by the new groups are of a highly instrumental nature. The searching for and other handling of the dead has little of such a direct and instrumental character; in fact, in the vast majority of instances the removal of corpses is not even necessary for public health reasons. As personnel from relief agencies outside an impacted area sometime comment, "it doesn't really make too much sense to dig up the dead to go and bury them again, but that's what people seem to want."
Yet, in this disaster not only did four relatively non-instrumental groups come into being, but they also involved a considerable use of time, effort, and personnel. The handling of the dead was not a minor activity. By most criteria, the community mobilized substantial resources to deal with a problem which was not, in the material and instrumental sense indicated above, that necessary to be dealt with to restore personal and social routines. In another sense, of course, the generation of the emergent groups and their massive effort strongly suggests that some very important non-instrumental functions were being met.

Finally, the whole process of handling the dead was (again compared with the way most emergency tasks are accomplished in most disasters) remarkably effective. In about a week and a half almost 237 bodies (about half the yearly rate of burials in the community) were recovered, identified, and buried. There were few mistakes: several mistaken identifications quickly corrected, a man embalmed where it was requested he not be, etc. Most importantly, the missing persons list and the identification-traits list were closely matched. After three and one-half weeks when the search was discontinued, only three persons remained unaccounted for. However, it was generally thought that these bodies had been washed down the river and hence would probably never be recovered. Moreover, the identities of these persons were thought to have been accurately established.

The Response of Community Members

As just indicated, several groups emerged to handle the problem of the dead in this disaster. But there were also some distinctive behavioral patterns in the response of those community members participating in the process. It was a process in this particular case which was communitywide in some respects.

The disaster in Rapid City generated a widely and socially organized response to death. This is in contrast to the normal situation where the death of an individual usually involves only a family, close friends of the deceased, a mortician, a religious actor, and peripherally some medical or health personnel. The community's response involved a large segment of the city's population. Volunteers helped in the search, identification, and burial preparations. Naturally, many in the community were intimately involved by having lost a family member, friend or acquaintance in the flood. And members of many organizations were often involved by being part of the organized effort. In this case then, the organized effort is to some extent a distillation and partial reflection of the community's relationship to the dead. Of course, the kind of organization evident imposes some constraints on the types of actions that can occur. This will be discussed more fully in the concluding section.

The most prominent attitude in the living's relationship to the dead was one of respect. This attitude surfaced in the interviews conducted as well as being plausibly implicit in the actions described. One of the primary mechanisms for accomplishing this attitude was individuation. That is, it was deemed important to treat each body in as individual a manner as possible. Of course, this proviso was balanced with the neces-
sity to maximize the effectiveness of the recovery operation. For example, although the recovery team thought it would be "more appropriate" to transport each body individually, they settled on two or three as the number of bodies that could simultaneously be transported to the funeral homes. The organized and often sophisticated efforts to identify and provide the proper name to the correct body can be seen as another example of individuation. Finally, the importance of this individuation norm can be seen by the swift and effective squelching of a mass burial story that surfaced a couple of days after the flood. When this became evident to the coordinating group it was quickly denied via the town newspaper. Essentially what seems to be important in this individuation is that the body is located or placed socially via a name, geographically via a grave site, and moreover that this placing occurs not only at the end point (grave site) but additionally en route to the end point. It is also significant to note that the reduction of burial choices as mentioned in the previous section apparently did not radically detract from this placing process.

In addition, other norms were evident that facilitated the fulfillment of a respectful posture vis-a-vis, the dead. Attempts were made to limit the mutilation of the body as it was removed from debris. Usually debris removal was not begun in an area until it was thought that all the dead had just been removed, thus reducing the chances of accidental body mutilation by large debris removal equipment. The operators of these machines were also instructed to wait for the arrival of the transport team should a body be uncovered, thus insuring that more expert care might be taken in the body's removal. In the funeral homes the bodies were cleaned by volunteers as well as by the funeral home personnel. Few, if any, cosmetics were used though partial embalming did occur. In this situation respondents reported that attempts were made to insure the "dignity" of the body by covering it, as well as by keeping it off the floor while it was being stored. (The great numbers of dead necessitated their storage in a garage area of a funeral home till they could be cleaned, identified, and placed in a casket for burial.) The covering characteristic was also evident in other situations. For example, the recovery team requested and obtained a closed vehicle in which to transport the dead. In the first few instances an open vehicle had been available and was used, but as more bodies were found, the change was made.

Respect was also the dominant attitude in all those relationships where death formed the context of the relationship. In the identification process, the relative or friend of the deceased first went to the group in charge of the missing persons list which also had access to the descriptive characteristics of the recovered bodies. Using this information this group would narrow down the possibilities. Then the family member or friend (a friend was preferred in this first identification) was taken to the funeral home and met by a social worker, a member of the clergy, or the funeral director. The person was then shown a limited number of bodies in order to complete the identification. In this situation great care was taken to reduce the necessity of viewing a large number of bodies, and also to provide some social support and sympathy for the identifier. One funeral director noted, however, that few people "broke down" during this process and that usually the identifier seemed "relieved" that the person had been recovered and was now fully accounted for.
More generally, the effective manner of body recovery and identification fulfilled the obligation of manifesting respect for unknown others who had a more intimate relationship with the deceased. We have identified two objects of respect in the previous examples: (1) the body and (2) the other, whether it be known, unknown, present or absent from the immediate situation. In the second case, respect or deference was rendered to the other in an unambiguous fashion. However, the data collected from informants and respondents in this case study presents a more ambiguous picture when the body is the object of respect.

Though the dominant attitude was one of respect, many examples of avoidance behavior were also noted. The belief that the unrecovered human bodies presented more of a health hazard than other animals (though this belief was not universal, especially not among the health officials) and were basically "more unclean" is such an example. Additionally, the tasks associated with the transportation of corpses were thought to be unpleasant at best. It is interesting to note that this group was the most professionalized in the sense that no volunteers were sought; rather, individuals from the police department and the national guard were chosen, individuals who have a reputation for the stalwart accomplishment of sometimes unpleasant duties. Several members of the team noted that they attempted not to "look at the bodies, especially the face," to generally ignore the bodies and thereby suspend the affective ties to the body that the respect theme implies. The times when this suspension was jeopardized usually were the cases involving small children where as one member put it, "Kids were the hardest, since most of us had kids of our own."
These actions can perhaps be interpreted by noting that such a suspension enabled the team to efficiently complete its instrumental duties emotionally unencumbered. Of course, this implies that the body, while an object of respect, is also an object that is best avoided if possible.

However, as the body achieved a name and gradually moved from cleaning to burial -- from an initially displaced to a placed position -- the respect rendered to it appeared to increase. For example, although it was considered inappropriate for bystanders to touch the body when it was as yet unrecovered, volunteers freely washed and cleaned the bodies after they had been delivered to the funeral homes. Health and identification reasons were given as reasons for the policy to not touch the bodies. And though the identification reason was justified, since any moving of the body might destroy characteristics that could help in the identification process, the health warning was exaggerated except in those cases where extensive bodily deterioration had occurred. Finally, the necessity for covering the body, transporting it in a covered vehicle, etc., can either be interpreted as preserving the "dignity" of the body or as protecting the sensitivities of the onlookers by shielding them from an unpleasant and unwholesome sight.

Conclusion

It is evident that one can properly characterize the organized response to the handling and disposition of the dead in this disaster situation as having been carried out quite effectively and with respect for the "prerogative" of the dead and the living. Moreover, the organizational structure -- which provided mechanisms for the flow of information.
among the particular task groups (e.g., the computer to correlate the information from two groups assigned different but complementary tasks, or the policy to preserve identifying characteristics as a supplementary task in the transport and burial preparation groups) and specific groups associated with specific tasks -- contributed to the effective response. But perhaps most importantly, each of the groups, by simply affecting an efficient operation, demonstrated and accomplished the value of respect for the dead and living. This was especially true in the transportation group where an affective relationship with the body could be suspended, and was true in the identifying and missing persons groups, since their ultimate task did provide respect by providing a name for the body. Essentially effectiveness and respect for the dead appear to be compatible goals, though the case is not without exception. Compromises were needed, e.g., the decision to carry three rather than just one body at a time, or the decision to reduce the number of burial choices. There is certainly a balancing situation being accomplished.

Respect for the dead has its limits as is perhaps evidenced by the more ambiguous attitudes adopted toward the dead in contradistinction to the living. As is true in most cultures, society seems to opt for the living. But there are limits also to the respectful deference accorded the living who are in mourning. The community in this disaster situation held a communal mourning ceremony about two weeks after the flood, thus closing the official or community bereavement period. The balancing of the efficiency and respect goals does present a problem in a specific situation. But it seems that as a practical problem the solutions can be worked out in accordance with the particular desires of the community involved. What occurred in Rapid City was simply that the problem (though never expressly stated) was addressed -- usually with a high priority given to the "proper" completion of the task. And individual, "placing" and other actions manifesting respect for the living and dead were evident and fulfilled the "proper" completion.

Whether the same kind of organized response and reaction to the dead would occur in other societies with different pre-disaster values about both the dead and the living is unknown. But Disaster Research Center studies in both Italy and Iran of disasters involving several thousand casualties in each event do provide some impressionistic support of the idea that the treatment of the dead by the living might have some pen-human aspects to it. Strong, almost violent resistance occurred when the authorities indicated that they might resort to mass burial (for the Italian situation, see Quarantelli, forthcoming A) where differential treatment of individualized corpses might be abandoned.

On the other hand, while there might not be cross-cultural differences, there still might be some social situation variations in the handling of the dead. The Rapid City disaster was a localized phenomenon creating disruption and tragedy in a small city. There was physically delimited property damage but large loss of life. Consequently, the situation may have comparability only to other like situations, i.e., small cities where loss of life is the major effect of the disaster. In a larger city many of the tasks performed by local volunteers having a more probable personal relationship to the deceased as friends or relatives would probably be performed by more professionalized actors or volunteers.
having little if any personal relationship to the "clients." Thus the
effectiveness element in the previously mentioned balancing equations
might become more prominent with a consequent reduction in the respect
element (especially with regard to those aspects of the respect element
that incorporate a direct affective bonding to the objects of the respect).
Finally, in a situation where property damage was also acute, one might
expect a less pronounced high priority assignment to efficient and re-
spectful disposition of the dead and consequently with the analytically
oppositional element in this value dyad, respect for the living.

Footnotes

1. As far as we have been able to ascertain, there is not a single em-
pirical social science study on the handling of the dead in disasters.
None are listed in the most up-to-date inventory of disaster studies
(Quarantelli, forthcoming B) and there appears to be but two general
sociologically-informed essays (Pine, 1969; 1974) which describe
the handling of the dead in the atypical catastrophe of a plane crash.

2. There is no overall study available of this disaster. The closest
can be found in two doctoral dissertations. The first by Waxman discusses
primarily the response of the radio and television stations to the flood
and the second by Mileti (1974) deals with some aspects of the warning
process.

3. The DRC field procedures and the results of its research are reported
in a variety of sources. (As examples, see Quarantelli and Dynes, 1970;
Dynes, Quarantelli and Kreps, 1972; and DRC, 1972).

4. This is not to imply that all emergent groups which are slow in sur-
facing are not able to mobilize community resources, or are ineffective.
For exceptions, see Forrest (1974), Ross and Smith (1974), and Taylor,
Ross and Quarantelli (1976). But some show the same pattern as exhibited
by the four emergent groups in this disaster. But that pattern is not
the typical one, and that is the point of our emphasis.
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