UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE
DISASTER RESEARCH CENTER

PRELIMINARY PAPER #17

HOW THE NEWS MEDIA VIEWS ITS AUDIENCE: STATION POLICIES IN CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND NATURAL DISASTERS*

Rodney M. Kueneman
and
Joseph E. Wright

*The research in this paper was done at the Disaster Research Center at the Ohio State University and was supported in part by PHS Grant 5 R01 MH-15-15399-04 from the Center for Studies of Mental Health and Social Problems, Applied Research Branch, National Institutes of Mental Health.

1/75

There has been a recent outpouring of writings and research in the sociology of mass communications (see, for example, Halmos, 1969; McQuail, 1969; Davison and Yu, 1974). But except for some case study work, such as by Tuchman (1973) and Paletz and Dunn (1969), relatively little has been done on operating practices of specific mass media organizations (see Bagdikian, 1974: 138) and local outlets in particular (see Gans, 1972: 698). This paper deals with a survey study of specific operational practices of radio and television stations in natural disasters and civil disturbances.[1]

Mass communications plays a key role in both describing and interpreting major events such as natural disasters and civil disturbances for the affected community. Since such major events could have far-reaching consequences, mass communication organizations have sometimes developed special policies to guide the reporting process. While codes and suggestions have been advanced for both civil disturbances (Schneider, 1968: 47-51) and natural disasters (National Association of Broadcasters, 1974), they apparently have not been widely adopted. For example, Quarantelli (1971) indicates that explicit policy changes for the coverage of civil disturbances were neither widespread nor extensive in his study of Ohio radio stations. A report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence also suggests a limited adoption of such guidelines (Baker and Ball, 1969). To date, little systematic research has been conducted on the attitudes of mass communications organizations in regard to their handling of civil disturbances and natural disasters, although some audience-oriented research (Jensen, 1972) has been done.

In this study, we focused on four types of questions: (1) How do radio and television stations expect their audience to respond to the news of such events? How does this preception of their audience affect their reporting procedures? Are

there any differences in the manner in which civil disturbances and natural disasters are reported as a result of their perception of audience response? (2) Is the report checking of such events different from normal report checking procedure? Is information withheld from the public during such events? (3) Do radio and television stations have special plans developed to guide the reporting of such events? What is the nature of these plans? Do they differ for civil disturbances and natural disasters? (4) Do radio and television stations make changes in their reporting procedures, station policies, or mechanical equipment as a result of their direct experience with such events?

The Sample

Our sample consisted of 72 radio and television stations from 12 cities around the United States. Cities were selected to represent four possible types of experience with civil disturbances and natural disasters, namely experience with: (1) civil disturbance only, (2) natural disaster only, (3) both civil disturbance and natural disaster, and (4) neither. The overall proportion of the various network and independent affiliation of stations in the United States was maintained in the sample. A wide range of city population sizes and station sizes (as indicated by station power) were also utilized. A fairly even split was maintained between radio and television stations. A combination of personal interviews and mailed questionnaires yielded data on 67 of the 72 stations. In general, an attempt was made to examine the effects of experience upon planning, audience perception, report checking, and both mechanical and operational changes in the individual stations. Experience variables included type of experience, going off the air due to experience, and the existence of a disaster subculture (an elaborate set of norms, values, and procedures for coping with natural disasters)[2]. Communit

variables included population size and percentage of blacks in the population of the city where the station was located. Mass communications variables included network affiliation and station size.

In general, reported relationships are significant at the .01 level with strength of association (phi) above .35. However, at certain points in the analysis low cell frequencies did not permit statistical testing.

Discussion of Findings

Perception of Public Excitability

News of civil disturbances and disasters is often thought to adversely affect the emotional stability of a large portion of any community. This study attempted to establish whether mass communication personnel shared the common assumptions that: (1) in the face of natural disaster people panic and (2) that civil disturbances are contagious events in which people become involved if they learn one has erupted. This was considered important since mass communications' perception of its audience would directly affect how it transmitted such news to that audience.

Panic in Natural Disaster

Seventy-two percent of the stations in the sample stated that they were concerned that people might panic under a disaster situation and felt it necessary to treat such news in a special manner. The following comments from interviews are characteristic of their orientation: "When you have a hurricane or disaster or big fire or terrible explosion, some people are going to get excited." "You must be very careful that you don't overemphasize what's taking place." "I think you can create a good deal of panic if you're not very careful on the air; you

can scare people out of their wits." "We are caught in a dilemma: we try not to minimize the danger, yet try not to create panic."

Excitability in Civil Disturbances

Eighty-three percent of the stations studied were concerned that people may be excited by news of civil disturbance and felt that such news would tend to amplify such situations. The following quote from an interview expresses the potential problems that are envisioned:

> We had people who were thought to be respected members of the community, who had jobs, who lived in pretty decent homes, (who) joined (in) the rioting and became looters and snipers because all of a sudden there was an unleashing of the hatred for white people.

As a result, many stations developed policies which instructed personnel not to overplay such incidents; they were to be honest but conservative. They were not to use inflammatory quotes or recordings and were not to do anything which would inflame people or lead to new disorders.

There appears to be some discrepancy here between the mass communications' perception of its audience and observations of human behavior in natural disasters and civil disturbances. Gans (1972) suggests that this audience misperception may be a basic problem. Commenting more generally on audience research, he states that he has "been struck by the almost total lack of contact with and knowledge about the audience among the newsman" (p. 703). While the scope and degree of audience misperception is as yet u specified, the mass communications' perception of its audience has significant consequences in shaping the policies that guide the reporting of natural disasters and civil disturbances. Citing research in the area of natural disasters which is based on the study of over one hundred different disasters by the Disaster Research Center at The Ohio State University, Quarantelli and Dynes (1972: 67) concluded:

> Probably the most widespread myth about disasters is the belief that people will panic in the face of great danger. As a result of

> this belief, officials put out warning bulletins most cautiously. They frequently withhold the warning to the last minute in the belief that the inevitable irrational panic is only slightly less damaging than the disaster itself.
>
> The press often reports whole communities fleeing in panic on hearing of the approach of a flood or a hurricane. Systematic studies reveal the opposite behavior is more likely.

To a lesser degree, the perception of public excitability in civil disturbances is questionable (Skolnick, 1969: 147, 329-346). The oversimplifications of irrational, contagion, and convergence models of collective behavior are poorly supported by data. However, it must be noted that civil disturbances are grounded in issues and that support for such causes may motivate a minority to participate in collective violence if made aware of its ongoing existence. The extent of this type of involvement is as yet unresolved.

Baker and Ball (1969: 118) suggest that it is not the dissemination of news of a civil disturbance per se that escalates such an event. Rather, they suggest that certain mass communication practices may make coverage of civil disturbances damaging, namely: (1) dissemination of rumors, (2) coverage that informs potential looters and arsonists of the deployment of police or otherwise aids them in evading apprehension, (3) coverage that is apt to draw people to the scenes of disorder when police seek to disperse the crowd, and (4) the coverage of violence or other events likely to have high emotional impact on the viewer without providing perspective. Thus, while reporting civil disturbances requires special attention and greater discretion, it is not yet clear to what extent news of such events moves members of the audience to join in such activity.

The work of Singer (1968) and the Kerner Commission (National Advisory Commission on the Causes of Civil Disorder, 1968) suggest that the presentation of emotional sequences in the coverage of civil disturbances were readily recalled

although they represented only a small fraction of the total coverage of the event. This does not, however, necessarily indicate that the audience can be inflamed to join a civil disturbance; knowledge of a civil disturbance would probably also require a motive before it led anyone to such action. No conclusive evidence exists to support this hypothesis but it does pose a question worthy of further research.

In an effort to explain this discrepancy between perceived and observed behavior in civil disturbances and natural disasters, the effects of factors such as experience, network affiliation, and population size were considered.

Perception of excitability was found to increase from 58 percent without experience to 93 percent with any experience of disaster or civil disturbance ($p < .01$, $\emptyset = .40$). One hundred percent of those with disaster only experience generalized their perception of public excitability to include both types of emergencies, while only 62 percent of those with civil disturbance only experience generalized. The other 38 percent treated civil disturbances as a special case separate from natural disaster emergencies. Thus, direct experience with disasters and civil disturbances seems to intensify a misconception of public excitability by the stations which were studied. While further research is needed to resolve this dilemma, Quarantelli and Dynes (1972: 70) suggest a possible explanation by indicating that disasters are perceived as dramatic events and reported as such. They further suggest that, while a dramatic event may be factually reported, it is not representative of the larger patterns of activity.

Perception of public excitability was also found to be related to whether or not a station was affiliated with a network. Independent stations reported excitability perception in 63 percent of the cases, while an overwhelming 92 percent of the network stations reported perceived excitability ($p < .01$, $\emptyset = .40$). This

finding would seem to indicate that network guidelines tend to increase the perception of excitability. A possible explanation of this network effect may be an overall conservative tendency of the networks in order to avoid difficulties with the Federal Communications Commission which might arise if they should be suspected of contributing to panic behavior or helping to inflame civil disturbances. While no satisfactory resolution is possible based on the data of this study, the sources of mass communication misperception in such significant community events should be probed further in the interests of more representative reporting of human behavior in stress situations.

Interestingly, size of city seems to affect the conservative approach to public excitability. In smaller cities 94 percent of the stations reported perceived excitability, but in the largest cities (over two million) only 70 percent of the stations reported excitability ($p < .05$, $\emptyset = .32$). Thus, while stations in cities of all sizes are conservative, such things as competition in the largest cities appear to outweigh somewhat the normally exaggerated perception of public excitability. It is not clear exactly how this occurs.

Report Checking

Reports of disaster or civil disturbance tended to be more strictly checked than reports normally are. Clearly these stations viewed such news as a special event requiring special consideration. Little difference in report checking for these two types of events was found. Eighty-five percent of the stations indicated stricter than normal procedures for disaster and for civil disturbance report checking. Both types of report checking were found to be related to the perception of public excitability. Civil disturbance report checking was stricter than normal for 56 percent of the stations who reported no perceived public excitability and

climbed to 91 percent in the case of stations who reported perceived excitability ($p < .05$, $\phi = .37$). The comparable figures for natural disaster report checking were 44 percent climbing to 89 percent ($p < .01$, $\phi = .42$). Both show approximately the same pattern.

Thus the perception of public response to such events seems to be reflected in the special care given to checking out reports of these occurrences. In 91 percent of the cases, stations indicating a perception of excitability for their audiences also reported the use of stricter than normal report checking procedures. Based on their perception of the audience response, this strictness is a logical position. Furthermore, the controversial debate over whether mass communication news coverage contributed to the Watts and Detroit riots made the networks and local stations sensitive to the delicacy of such news events.

In addition, civil disturbance report checking was found to be significantly related to the size of the population of the city in which the station was located, while disaster report checking was not found to be related. The basic difference in civil disturbance report checking was between cities under a million (averaging around one-half million) and cities clearly over a million. Stricter procedures for civil disturbances climbed from 65 percent for the smaller cities to 92 percent for the larger cities ($p < .01$, $\phi = .34$). No significant difference was found between the cities just over a million and those of several million, although there was some indication that the largest cities tended not to be as strict as the medium-sized ones. Thus, while predominately stricter procedures were employed, the size of the system within which the station operated also seemed to have an effect. One possible explanation is that stations in small cities are more aware of the credence to give to their sources, whereas in medium-sized cities stations rely more on formal spokesmen and must exercise more care in cross-checking in

their normal operation. The occurrence of a major event requires even more conscientious efforts by the medium-sized cities. However, it is likely that the largest cities must maintain a constantly high standard of report checking, due to the inability to maintain validating relationships with any but a small segment of their sources. In addition, the competition in a major market may work against professional standards.

Finally, a relationship was found between natural disaster report checking and network affiliation. Stricter procedures were reported by 68 percent of the independent stations, but by 91 percent of the network affiliates ($p < .05$, $\phi = .29$). Further research is required to determine whether network policies are major determinants of the station's stricter report checking policies or whether this is largely due to the perception of the local station personnel.

Withholding of Information

The perception of public excitability was found to be strongly related to the withholding of information ($p < .01$, $\phi = .93$). It seems clear that the perception of the anticipated audience response directly affects the release of information concerning such events.

The overall tendency is to withhold information especially for civil disturbances (reported by 80 percent of the stations). While information is sometimes also held in natural disasters (reported by 16 percent of the stations), it is clear that civil disturbances are generally not reported while in progress. Some stations made this an explicit policy. For example: "Put nothing on the air while an incident is in progress, to avoid drawing crowds. Give police time to bring things under control, if they can." Thus, while the stations tended to perceive public excitability for both events, information was withheld more often for civil disturbances. A statement of broadcasting policy by one of the stations hints at

the possible underlying dynamic:

> It is our conviction that a civil disorder story, particularly one involving racial strife, is different from any other kind of story in that broadcast coverage of it may materially affect its development, intensity, duration and outcome.

However, Baker and Ball (1969: 104) suggest that the withholding of information can be dysfunctional for the community:

> The most important function the news media serve during periods of civil disorder is communication of accurate information. Almost invariably, if a modicum of journalistic responsibility is exercised, the information relayed by the news media will be more conservative than the rumors that would circulate in its absence. When suggesting non-coverage, most critics overlook the possibility that the information that will dominate is more likely to escalate violence than media coverage.

The withholding of information of potential natural disasters can also result in the loss of life or increased property damage in some instances. For example, faced with the problem of crying wolf, community officials occasionally refrain from warning of a possible flood so as not to generate panic and when the warning is finally given, too little time remains to move or protect porperty. Thus, while it is essential to relay such information discretely (e.g., in general terms or neutral language), it is equally essential to transmit such information. Failure to do so may cause a station to lose credibility, may nurture rumor transmission growth, and may leave unsuspecting members of the public vulnerable to danger they would otherwise avoid. While some policies have been developed to guide the dissemination of such information (National Association of Broadcasters, 1974; Baker and Ball, 1969), the perception of public excitability may hinder the acceptance and implementation of such policies by the media.

Planning for Civil Disturbances and Natural Disasters

While both types of events put the community under stress, different types of planning are reported. About the same percentage of stations reported any planning

for civil disturbances (70 percent) as for natural disasters (73 percent). However, 75 percent of the civil disturbance planning is put into general terms compared to only 55 percent of the disaster planning. Civil disturbance plans tended not only to be general but also to be unwritten (40 percent), while disaster plans were most often written in specific terms (28 percent). Most stations appeared to treat civil disturbances as unique events for which they could not be specifically prepared. As a result they tended to have general, unwritten plans or no plans at all. Baker and Ball (1969: 118) have suggested that all news organizations give serious consideration to codifying specific guidelines to direct the handling of civil disturbances: "Although no set of guidelines will cover all eventualities, the more specific they are and the more they are discussed within the news organizations, the greater the probability that the reporter or correspondent under stress will adhere to them." Whether the policies should be specific or general is as yet an open empirical question; the findings of this study suggest that many stations have general or unwritten plans to guide the coverage of a civil disturbance.

Natural disasters are much more predictable in terms of their size, impact location, and effects. A number of variables were found to be related to disaster planning: population of the city, experience, network affiliation, station size (power), and the presence of a disaster subculture. Since no inherent difficulty existed to inhibit formalization and specification, disaster plans seem much more sensitive to the population size of the community. The smallest cities tended to have stations with either no plans at all or specific plans (both 39 percent). The largest cities' stations tended to have general plans (56 percent). Finally, it was the middle-sized cities who tended to have stations with specific plans (67 percent) ($p < .01$, $\phi = .35$).

Smaller communities can be handled more often without specific plans. If planning is seen as necessary, it can be made specific for stations in both small

and medium-sized cities. However, stations in large cities have difficulty in making specific plans due to possible variations in the size of the event itself. Another important factor which was not addressed in this study would be the predictability of various natural disaster agents. One would expect more general plans for stations which experience disaster agents of undefinable impact location or magnitude (e.g., tornado or earthquake) and more specific plans for more predictable disasters (e.g., floods). Thus it may be that civil disturbances and natural disasters are not qualitatively different phenomena in terms of planning but rather in their predictability for planning, and future research specifying the disaster agent experienced would allow a test of this hypothesis.

In fact, the relationship between civil disturbance and natural disaster planning is largely linear. The sheer occurrence of plans for one can be predicted from the other almost 80 percent of the time. But, if prediction as to whether the plans will be specific or general is desired, the linear prediction accuracy drops to approximately 60 percent which is still respectable. This decrease in accuracy is due to the slight bias of civil disturbance plans against being specific, so that specific disaster plans are found with general civil disturbance plans 50 percent of the time.

Thus, planning as a necessary or useful activity for such significant events may be a value generally shared by radio and television managers. If this is the case, then population size of the community and predictability of the stressful event should account for much of the variation in planning. While the results of this study suggest such an explanation, no conclusive decision can be made yet.

In a related vein, a total lack of planning occurred most often among those stations with only civil disturbance experience (50 percent) and was lowest for those with only disaster experience (8 percent). Experience of both events resulted in 19 percent not having any plans, and experience of neither event resulted in 25

percent not having any plans. It appears that civil disturbance experience retards disaster response planning, even if natural disasters have also been experienced ($p < .05$, $\phi = .50$).

Disaster planning was also found to be related to network affiliation. Without network affiliation only 47 percent of the stations reported any disaster planning, while with network affiliation this rose to 83 percent ($p < .01$, $\phi = .36$) The nature of the planning also changed dramatically. Only 22 percent of the independent stations indicated specific disaster plans, but 50 percent of the network affiliates reported having them ($p < .001$, $\phi = .40$).

Station size (power) was found to be related significantly to disaster planning Sixty-four percent of the smallest stations (one kilowatt for radio stations and around 50 kilowatts for television stations) had no disaster plans compared to only 8 percent of the largest stations (50 kilowatts and over for radio stations and 1300 kilowatts and over for television stations). However, of the smallest stations, 50 percent had specific planning while of the largest stations only 36 percent had specific planning, indicating a tendency for specific planning to decrease as station power increases. Although one would expect bureaucratic tendencies to increase with increasing size with accompanying increase in planning, apparently the largest stations occur in large cities where the effects of natural disasters are less predictable and these stations are unable to produce realistic specific plans.

Disaster planning was also found to be significantly related to the presence of a disaster subculture. Lack of planning decreased from 38 percent without a disaster subculture to 15 percent with one. Specific planning increased from only 15 percent without to 52 percent with a disaster subculture ($p < .01$, $\phi = .41$). Communities in which an elaborate set of norms, values, and precedures have been

developed to deal with a natural disaster have had frequent exposure to disasters. Thus, more specific plans become possible and necessary, and are likely to be encouraged by community officials.

Civil disturbance planning appeared to be related to the proportion of the black population in the community. As the black proportion increased, the occurrence of planning also increased: from 44 percent to 78 percent. Similarly, the nature of the plans changed. Specific plans were not reported by any station in cities with under 10 percent blacks in contrast to 50 percent of the stations in cities with over 20 percent blacks.

Changes Due to Experience

It would be expected that stress events like civil disturbances would have definite effects upon the community and upon most organizations, particularly those with public responsibilities. In regard to mass communication organizations, one might ask whether these changes were of an operational or a mechanical nature. Twenty-one percent made no changes, 48 percent made mechanical changes, and 58 percent made operational changes (28 percent made both mechanical and operational changes). Therefore, almost 4 out of every 5 stations made changes of some variety.

Changes were found to be related significantly to three variables: perception of public excitability, disaster experience, and the presence of a disaster subculture. In addition, whether or not the station had gone off the air due to an emergency appeared to be related.

Seventy-eight percent of the stations reporting no perception of public excitability indicated that they had made no changes of any kind, while only 9 percent of those reporting any excitability indicated no changes ($p < .001$, $\phi = .64$) This is quite a dramatic reversal, largely stemming from those stations who perceive a generalized (both civil disturbance and natural disaster) excitability

in the public. Without this generalized perception, any changes are likely to be mechanical; with it, mechanical only changes are the least likely type to be made.

A possible explanation of these results may be that with the experiencing of a major community stress event, mass communications personnel may realize how serious the results would be if public excitement was allowed to occur. Thus, while no widespread observation of panic or violence may be in evidence during such an event, the perception of such a possibility may initiate changes in building security and field operation procedures. While other operational and mechanical changes can be accounted for due to the physical effects of such events, further research should show that the media perception of public excitability plays a significant role.

Changes were found to be significantly related to disaster experience but not to civil disturbance experience. Changes were reported for 60 percent of the stations without any disaster experience, while 94 percent of the stations with disaster experience reported changes ($p < .01$, $\emptyset = .37$). That the differentiation between type of experience is useful can be seen when disaster only experience is contrasted with civil disturbance only experience. All stations with disaster only experience made changes while only 56 percent of stations with civil disturbance only experience made any changes.

Changes were also found to be related to the presence of a disaster subculture. Without one, 66 percent of the stations reported changes, while with a disaster subculture, 91 percent indicated that changes were made ($p < .05$, $\emptyset = .30$). Communities which have developed subcultures do so because of regular experience with natural disasters. Thus one would expect more change in stations in a more frequently impacted environment.

The data suggests, as expected, that going off the air occasions dramatic shifts in the occurrence and nature of changes. Twenty-seven percent report no changes if they have not gone off the air, while only 8 percent report none if they have gone off the air. In addition, without going off the air, operational changes are much more likely than mechanical changes, and the most common kind is operational only. In contrast, with the experience of being forced off the air, no station reported operational only changes, and the most common change reported was mechanical only.

Conclusion

The findings reported in this study suggest that: (1) mass communications personnel may generally misperceive their audiences by attributing to them the quality of heightened excitability in stressful situations, (2) based on this perception, mass communications organizations tend to utilize policies of stricter report checking and the withholding of information so as not to frighten or inflame their audinece, (3) planning tends to be more specific for natural disasters than for civil disturbances, and (4) any changes induced by experience with such events tend to be mechanical rather than operational in nature. Civil disturbances and natural disasters affect each variable differently with civil disturbances viewed as more likely to result in public excitability and thus treated more conservatively.

In past research, the focus of interest has tended to be on the structural constraints limiting the reporting of disruptive community events by media organizations, and little attention has been directed to the effects of editors' perceptions of their audiences. For example, studies have demonstrated that: (1) the value preferences of newsrooms reflect those of top level executives of a station (Breed, 1955; Garvey, 1971), (2) the dependence of media organizations on the output of news sources without means for independent checking creates a strong bias in the

news in favor of groups who enjoy power and affluence (Bagdikian, 1974), (3) media elites have close interpersonal relationships with political elites and the elites of other types of business, and in many instances their members are, or consider themselves to be, part of these other circles (Bogart, 1974), and (4) voluntary blackouts tend to reflect the alliance of the press with the wielders of community power (Paletz and Dunn, 1969).

The major thrust of this research has been to suggest that in addition to structural factors constraining the reporting of disruptive community events, the socio-psychological factor of perception plays a significant part in reporting procedures. Bagdikian (1974) suggests that there are two contradictory images of the public used by mass communications personnel: an audience can be viewed as social peers or as an uneducated, undiscriminating, and unaware mass. This research tends to suggest that this latter caricature is more frequently entertained and that it has direct consequences for the reporting of natural disasters and civil disturbances.

It would be useful for future study to reformulate the research question in such a way as to assess the various structural and social-psychological pressures on mass communication personnel which lead to non-representative reporting of stress situations, especially civil disturbances. The effects of competition, sensationalism in news reporting, and experience in natural disasters and civil disturbances must be more clearly specified.

However, as a final cautionary note, while civil disturbances and natural disasters may be similar phenomena for reporting purposes, the reduction of misconceptions of human behavior in stress situations would probably have differential impact in the future reporting of natural disasters and civil disturbances. There would be no reason to report natural disasters in other than a normal manner, but there would always be strong structural pressures to suppress information related to civil disturbances.

FOOTNOTES

1. The research reported in this paper is part of a larger series of studies on radio and television station operations in major community emergencies conducted by the Disaster Research Center at The Ohio State University. For other studies in this series, see: Adams (1974), Brooks (1970), and Waxman (1973).

2. For detailed treatment of the concept of disaster subculture, see Wenger and Weller (1973).

REFERENCES

Adams, David
1974 "A Description and Analysis of a Radio Station Operation during a Forest Fire," Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper #14 (Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University).

Bagdikian, Ben H.
1974 "Professional Personnel and Organizational Structure in the Mass Media" in W. Phillips Davison and Frederick T. C. Yu (eds.), Mass Communications Research: Major Issues and Future Directions (New York: Praeger Publications).

Baker, Robert, and Sandra Ball
1969 Mass Media and Violence (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office).

Bogart, Lee
1974 "The Management of Mass Media" in W. Phillips Davison and Frederick T. C. Yu (eds.), Mass Communications Research: Major Issues and Future Directions (New York: Praeger Publications).

Breed, Warren
1955 "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis" Social Forces 33.

Brooks, J. Michael
1970 "A Sociological Study of Commercial Broadcast Organizations" Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University.

Davison, W. Phillips, and Frederick T. C. Yu
1974 Mass Communications Research: Major Issues and Future Directions. (New York: Praeger Publications).

Gans, Herbert J.
1972 "The Famine in American Mass Communications Research: Comments on Hirsch, Tuchman, and Gecas," American Journal of Sociology 17 (January): 697-705.

Garvey, Daniel E., Jr.
1971 "Social Control in the Television Newsroom," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.

Halmos, Paul
1969 "The Sociology of Mass Media Communications," Sociological Review Monograph 13 (January).

Jensen, Carl
1972 "The Use and Abuse of Media in the Aftermath of a Disaster: An Analysis of the 1970 Southern California Fires," M.A. Thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara.

McQuail, Denis
1969 Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications. (London: Collier-Macmillian).

National Advisory Commission on the Causes of Civil Disorder
1968 Report (New York: Bantam Books).

National Association of Broadcasters
1974 A Broadcaster's Guide to Planning for a Natural Disaster (Washington, D. C.: National Association of Broadcasters).

Paletz, D. L., and R. Dunn
1969 "Press Coverage of Civil Disorders," Public Opinion Quarterly 33.

Quarantelli, E. L.
1971 "Changes in Ohio Radio Station Policies and Operations in Reporting Local Civil Disturbances," Journal of Broadcasting 15 (August): 644-651.

Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes
1972 "When Disaster Strikes," Psychology Today 6 (February): 67-70.

Schneider, Lawrence
1968 The Newsman and the Race Story (Seattle, Washington: School of Communications, University of Washington).

Singer, Benjamin
1968 "Journalism and the Kerner Report: The Report's Critique of Television," Columbia Journalism Review.

Skolnick, Jerome
1969 The Politics of Protest: Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. (New York: Ballantine Books).

Tuchman, Barbara
1973 "Making Heros by Doing Work: Routinizing the Unexpected," American Journal of Sociology 79.

Waxman, Jerry
1973 "Local Broadcast Gatekeeping during Natural Disasters," Journalism Quarterly 50, no. 4 (Winter): 751-756.

Wenger, Dennis, and Jack Weller
1973 "Disaster Subcultures: The Cultural Residues of Community Disasters." A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the North Central Sociological Society, Cincinnati, Ohio.