CHINESE SOFT POWER AND CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES;
BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS

by
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CHINESE SOFT POWER AND CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES;
DIFFERING BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS

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ABSTRACT

In the past 10 years, China has increasingly used soft power as a tool to create goodwill and cooperation globally. After their economic success and rapid power gains through traditional hard power means, China has tried to cultivate a worldwide attraction through various methods, including their economic power, public diplomacy, international institutions, and through educational opportunities such as the Confucius Institute. The soft power viability of the Confucius Institute is questioned and highly controversial. What kind of effect does the cultivation of possible Chinese soft power resources like ideology, policy, and values have? What kind of effect does the Confucius Institute have on soft power resources? How is this demonstrated at the University of Delaware Confucius Institute? Through case studies taken from around the world and a University of Delaware case study, this research hopes to answer these questions of effect.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

As a worldwide institution, the Confucius Institute has the potential to be a driving force for Chinese language education and for Chinese soft power. This drive for Chinese soft power has been increasing since China recognized that they were not viewed positively by others. However, the Confucius Institutes that have been established have not quite met the expectations set out for them as a creator of soft power resources. Instead of being a catalyst, the Confucius Institute has only been a complement to other sources of Chinese soft power. It is arguable that the Confucius Institute has the potential for soft power creation but has not achieved it at this time.

The concept of Chinese soft power and the Confucius Institutes has been studied since the late 2000s, but the body of work is not too large. The research about the Confucius Institute varies widely, covering subjects from all disciplines, but this research will be focusing on the factors that directly affect the soft power implications of the Confucius Institute. This study begins with a review of the soft power literature available, starting with Nye’s original definition and further adaptations. The review will then move to specifically Chinese soft power and how it has manifested itself in efforts made by the Chinese government, such as the Confucius Institute. Because this institution is the focus of this study, background information will be introduced to familiarize the reader. Outside case studies will be used to show the benefits, criticisms, and possible soft power effects of the Confucius Institute that are already recognized in literature. Background information about the University of Delaware
Confucius Institute (UDCI) will then be introduced and the UDCI case study examined. This research will answer the following questions.

- What methods are being used to cultivate Chinese soft power resources?
- What do case studies in different regions highlight about the Confucius Institute program?
- How does the University of Delaware community view the Confucius Institute?
- What kind of effect does the Confucius Institute have on UD campus?
- What are the benefits and criticisms associated with the Confucius Institute?

The first function of the literature review focuses on defining soft power, starting with the original theories as published by Joseph Nye, follow-up publications from the International Relations community, and the subsequent replies from China policy scholars regarding Chinese soft power. The first two will be used to define the idea of ‘soft power’ as a concept, its limitations, as well as its benefits. The last category will be used to explain Chinese soft power in terms of the former definition, specifically on what differs and what stays the same within China’s use of it. All these perspectives are used to contextualize and place arguments about soft power for use in the later sections about the Confucius Institute, in order to examine if the Confucius Institute is truly a soft power resource.

The second function of the literature review focuses on placing the Confucius Institutes in context. This includes defining and giving background on the Confucius Institute, examining previous research, and examining case studies of other individual Institutes around the world. Case studies are used in this research to evaluate which
issues are shared between Confucius Institutes and to compare the University of Delaware Confucius Institute to these findings. In my research, several hours were spent looking for every available case study on the Confucius Institute. After reading these case studies, it would be determined if there was a connection to soft power through explicit mention of the term or if there was mention of linguistic, cultural, or ideological influence being expressed. There were some case studies that were not related to either of these concepts and were disregarded. All case studies that met these criteria were used for this research. Case studies are taken from different regions in order to compare on a global scale, including Africa, Asia, the Pacific, North America, South America, and Europe. Due to the variety of research questions used in these case studies, not every case study matches up perfectly to the comparisons made. But despite this, many of the case studies have overlapping conclusions.

The qualitative data section of this study was conducted through interviews on the University of Delaware campus. This was chosen as the data collection method in order to be able to ask questions for clarification or follow up as needed, something that would be missing in a survey. It also allowed for customization of the data, since different people have had different experiences with the Confucius Institute that might not be captured without further questions. The original goal was to reach out to 20 people for interviews, consisting of teachers, professionals, students, and Confucius Institute staff. In the end, 16 people were interviewed for this case study, 9 students and 7 teachers and professionals. A member of the Confucius Institute staff was slated to be interviewed but only consented to answering submitted questions. The interview questions focused on the interactions that the participants had with the CI in the past and their opinions of it, which can be found in Appendices A.
Additionally, a convenience sample survey was taken of University of Delaware students to see how many students in a sample would know about the Confucius Institute. After ascertaining whether the subject was a student at the University of Delaware, they were asked “Do you know what the Confucius Institute is?” This was necessary because it could help gauge how many students that the could be Confucius Institute reaching at the time. This survey was taken in the Trabant Student Center, one of the busiest places on campus, during the lunch time rush (1pm-2pm). Every student who was present and stationary in the lower levels of Trabant was asked.

The goal of this research is to conclude if Chinese soft power is possible on University of Delaware campus. In order to measure this, I will use three criteria, as listed below. These general criteria were informed by the research in the literature review to evaluate the University of Delaware Confucius Institute.

- How well is the Confucius Institute known?
- Are the experiences with the Confucius Institute positive or negative?
- Are the opinions of the participants changed by their interaction with the Confucius Institute?
- Is the Confucius Institute sustainable in its current situation?

Although this will not encapsulate the full potential of the UDCI and the impressions of it on campus, it will provide base information to expand from. Currently, there has been no case study completed on the Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware and this research hopes to begin filling that gap.
DEFINING SOFT POWER AND CHINESE SOFT POWER
Chapter 2

SOFT POWER AND CHINA

Resources of Soft Power

The first definition of soft power and its possible resources was published in 1990 by Joseph Nye. Over time, Chinese policymakers and academics eventually adopted their own soft power concept from Nye’s research. Since then, it has been used as justification for several Chinese foreign policy decisions designed to create cooperation with China.

Nye originally defined soft power in 1990 by contrasting it with traditional, realist hard power. Instead of using force to make other people follow the agenda that a country wants to promote, there can be a co-optive, or soft power that encourages other countries to follow this agenda of their own free will (Nye, 1990). After receiving attention from other academics, Nye revisited the subject in 2004, 2008, and 2011. These pieces expanded soft power’s original concept from a vague idea specific to US interests to an analytical tool that could be used around the world. Others have also taken his definitions and expanded them far from the topics it originally covered, which has led to an expansive library of soft power definitions and possible resources.

Originally, the resources of soft power were defined as “culture, ideology, and institutions” (Nye, 1990). In 2011, the definition of soft power was expanded to include traditional government resources that could be used for soft power. Such traditional resources include monetary wealth and military might, which was something that other publications criticized Nye for his “underestimation” of these resources in soft power (Nye, 2011; Lai, 2012).
In order to cultivate this soft power, there must also be certain conditions in place. The most important is that, in order to cultivate soft power, there must be a shared belief of what values are important in both countries involved. Soft power resources rely heavily on these compatible values, since culture, ideology, and institutions of a specific country are informed by the internalized ideals. Depending on the relationship, shared values can be highly contextual and must function as a two-way street between the two countries involved in the soft power transaction. If one country was to try and impose soft power resources on another that has contradictory ideals and values, these efforts would fall flat because of incompatible conditions. Alternatively, if the resources that are being pushed are acceptable within existing shared values, they will be more easily accepted. Without this condition, possible soft power resources are less likely to have an impact (Nye, 2008; Nye, 2004).

However, if the conditions in a country are open to soft power resources, it can help to create an environment where soft power resources can be more easily used to create a soft power effect (Nye, 2004). But once again, this is dependent on context. If the country that is trying to influence others is perceived as a threat, are corrupt, or rule illegitimately, the ideals that they are trying to spread will not gain any traction because of their reputation. China is one such country that has experienced the effects of a bad reputation and has had trouble using soft power because of it (Nye, 2011).

Since Nye, there have been others that have contributed to the soft power discussion. Many of these contributions criticize Nye’s definition of soft power as lacking and expand on it. Some of the most prominent changes are based on the weaknesses of the original definition of soft power and the lack of agreement on how to measure it (Wilson, 2008; Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber, 2010; Ji, 2016; Fan,
2016: Hayden, 2012). Additionally, when it was first conceived, the concept of soft power was based on and measured by the United States’ ability to wield this power. This led to criticism of Nye’s definition as a significantly Western standard which required adaptation to apply to non-western countries’ standards (Fan, 2016; Zheng and Zhang, 2012). There are also arguments concerning the contextualization of soft power and its resources. These include concepts like soft power’s dependency on the perception and whether soft power is on a spectrum that has hard power at its other extreme or if it is an entirely different concept ((Zheng and Zhang, 2012; Chitty, 2016). However, all conceptualizations here agree that soft power could be an influential power.

But in other cases, many have been able to expand on the original concept. Ji (2016) and Hayden (2012) agree that soft power is a dynamic tool. For example, the image that China has been selling to the world has shifted over time from the administration of Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping. Deng Xiaoping, in 1990, said that China should ‘hide its light and bide our time… never tak[ing] leadership’. Many Chinese presidents after Deng have followed this rule, but this has changed in the most recent years. China has felt comfortable enough to expand their image and dealings around the world, creating more and more soft power resources along the way. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China is now planning to ‘take center stage in the world’, instead of biding their time and plans to use soft power to aid them in this goal. Soft power is a tool that can be changed to fit the desired image, but regardless of the dynamics of soft power resources, its effects are not so easily changed.

In regards to the ability of soft power to influence others towards certain goals and agenda items, most agree on one thing. Soft power can be powerful, but it is
subjective. It is something best used to conceptualize the influence that one country can have over others in limited situations (Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber, 2010; Ford, 2012; Hayden, 2012). Even Nye (2011) has qualified that soft power is not necessarily a theory, but an analytical tool to measure the ability of a country to influence the international environment. Even so, other countries have attempted to use this conceptualization to create an environment conducive to their goals on the international stage, including China.

**Why does China use Soft Power?**

China’s use of soft power, as a concept expressed through direct measures by the Chinese government, is not new to China’s history. In the past, Chinese dynasties have exercised a type of soft power through its tribute system, spreading Confucian systems of governing and ideological systems to neighboring countries (Wang [Jian], 2011; Fan, 2007). Although very directed measures, these efforts contained some of the elements of the modern idea of ‘soft power’. Several centuries later, the Chinese government is attempting to build its soft power resources as a tool to improve their relationship with the world.

Soft power was meant to be a theory used to retroactively analyze possible soft power resources because of its inability to be controlled by the influencing party. However, these possibilities have a high probability of falling short of the intended goal, so many of the Chinese soft power strategies discussed may not turn out to be an effective method. Soft power is not something that can be made to work because of the sheer number of variables it relies on. It relies on the audiences’ identity, history related to China, domestic politics, and several other unknown factors that depend on the person being exposed. This is not something that China can control. Policies can
be implemented, institutions can be created, but it is up to those outside of Chinese influence to find an attraction through these methods. China can only control the soft power strategies that it practices and hope that they create the intended effects. These strategies were implemented in the late 2000s, when soft power discourse was at its height and views on China were increasingly negative, and China’s attempt at active soft power measures have been frequently discussed since then (Jiang, 2008; Hayden, 2012).

The foremost reason that China is increasing its soft power capabilities is to create a positive image and a global understanding of China. This would allow China to build their power without as much opposition and ensure a peaceful global environment for their rise (Wuthnow, 2008; Jiang, 2008). In order to do this, China has been promoting several ideas to show themselves as a benign power that wants to improve the world and ensure that other countries can trust the actions of a powerful China. Such ideas that China has been advocating for include ‘Peaceful Development’, ‘Peaceful Rise’, and a ‘Harmonious World’. The first is meant to show China as a supporter of peaceful economic rise and sustainable development both in China and in other developing countries. The second two are intended to show that China can be a non-threatening country while rising to power and that they can cooperate with others to help create a peaceful world (D’Hooge, 2011; Barr, 2011).

These image improving efforts are a direct response to the ‘China Threat Theory’, which posits that during China’s rise to power, they will threaten the world order and cause conflict (Scott, 2012; Barr, 2011; Wang [Jian], 2011). China’s previous soft power deficit has resulted in widespread fear of what China could be, resulting in a deep lack of trust worldwide. Without soft power, China has had a hard
time creating a secure environment and has directly affected its material security. Fear of Chinese policy could, and probably already has, stagnated some of China’s abilities because of increasing global opposition. But, if China can create a better image with soft power resources, then some of the fearful imagery of China can be mitigated. This could potentially decrease opposition and allow for a more open global environment that does not see China as an active threat, but as a possible collaborator.

China wants to be seen as a victim of colonization, a developing country, and a peacefully rising power, but many agree with only the first two. Post-colonial countries with recently created governments are seen to have a tendency towards reactionary, violent action and unwise decisions because of a lack of experience. (Wang [Hong Ying], 2011; Huang and Ding, 2006). China was ‘colonized’ by Britain, Germany, France, and America through spheres of influence and unequal treaties in the early 1900s as well as Japan through their puppet state in Manchuria, with a government that was created 60 years ago. So, China is very sensitive toward the actions of others that could infringe on their sovereignty or question their legitimate right to rule. This sensitivity has informed Chinese policies that surround public protest, ethnic minorities, and territorial disputes. Which, subsequently, have resulted in events like the Tiananmen Square protests and the persecution of ethnic minorities. This has tainted the image of a peaceful power that China is trying to broadcast to the world, delegitimizing some of the soft power that China has hoped to use (Barr, 2011).

Soft power has its challenges as well as its benefits. It can help improve the image of a country, but if handled poorly, soft power efforts can also destroy any progress made on improving their reputation. Many authors have similar criticisms of soft power as a general concept and in practice. Soft power is slow to realize results,
dependent on perception, can cause resentment, and its outcome impossible to predict because of the sheer number of variables (Fan, 2007; Ford, 2012; Nye, 2004; Ji, 2016; Nye, 2011). However, these issues are multiplied when it comes to Chinese soft power. China has image, credibility, and governance challenges that can undercut the soft power efforts that they are making in the rest of the world.

Most countries have accepted the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the governing regime of China and only a few still recognize the exiled Republic of China (ROC). But many still question the credibility of the Chinese government, especially when it comes to the influence they project. Soft power is trusted most when it is through a third party that is not directly associated with the government of the origin country. However, most Chinese soft power is controlled by the government of China, which does not have a good reputation as an authoritarian regime. Chinese traditional values and ideals have the potential to be attractive have been in the past. However, the reputation of the Chinese government and their attempted use of traditionally Confucius values to justify their actions negates this possible attraction (D’Hooge, 2011). The association of these traditional values with a government that originally discredited Confucianism is a contradiction, and damages Chinese soft power because it is not perceived as a trustworthy. This lack of trust devalues the Chinese soft power efforts because of the perception that their soft power efforts are a heavy-handed attempt to sway the opinions of others (Ji, 2016). However, this active cultivation of soft power through government efforts is a signature of Chinese soft power and is unlikely to stop anytime soon.
Differences of China’s Soft Power Strategy

China’s soft power strategy is vastly different from Nye’s original definition of soft power in that Chinese soft power is a state directed strategy and is being actively cultivated as a developmental strategy (Cho and Jeong, 2008). China faces many threats by not cultivating soft power, such as the aforementioned ‘China Threat Theory’, and is now trying to actively create soft power in a short of a time as possible. Soft power takes time to realize, requires a positive perception to work, and its results cannot be predicted (Fan, 2007; Ford, 2012; Nye, 2004; Ji, 2016; Nye, 2011). So, by attempting to manufacture soft power resources as quickly as possible through Chinese foreign policy, there is no time allowed for soft power effects to develop positively or to be used effectively.

Chinese soft power strategy was largely created and pushed into Chinese policy from the late 2000s and forward. This is hardly enough time to gauge the true effects of soft power strategy or to see results from these measures. Because of this, it is difficult to talk about Chinese soft power as a concept because of how recently these policies have been established. Nye said, in his books on soft power, that it is a concept used to analyze strategy after an extended period of time. China has actively ignored this and has attempted to create soft power at the same time as they were becoming more involved on the world stage. However, the realization that soft power cannot just be created or control the perceptions of others is starting to emerge. Generally, soft power and attraction must be present before use of its resources, but China is trying to do both simultaneously to promote a positive image of China.

The underdevelopment and lack of planning that goes into Chinese soft power resources could hurt a positive perception of China. Soft power relies on the attraction and positive perception of the subject to have any effect. If China’s soft power strategy
was largely created to combat the negative perception of China globally, but time is not being allowed for effective soft power resources to develop, then is it an effective strategy? Without the effective development of soft power in perceptions of China, they will most likely remain negative even as policies requiring a positive perception move forward. Soft power cannot be predicted or directed because of its reliance on perceptions. By attempting to actively direct soft power strategy, China is walking forward essentially blind. The elements of others’ soft power strategy are being used but the results are not being allowed to surface before acting on it. For any policy that relies on soft power effects, this move could be potentially devastating, since the results are not known beforehand. So, even though China is using a sped up timeline in their soft power strategy, they expect the same results as previous, and unconscious, soft power strategies.

**Possible Chinese Soft Power Resources**

Even though Chinese soft power strategy differs greatly from Nye’s original outline, Chinese soft power resources do not differ as much. However, because of the different positions of the US and China in the world, Chinese soft power resources place more emphasis on results of soft power effects that were not as emphasized in the original definition. For example, Li (2008), with Zheng and Zhang (2012) assert that Chinese soft power focuses its resources of institutional power, multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and good neighbor policies to create and expand their soft power capabilities. Li and Worm (2010) categorize Chinese soft power resources into 6 categories; culture, political values, development models, international institutions, international engagement, and its economic template. Lampton (2008) defines these resources through the idea of ‘ideational power’, which is created through the
attraction of other countries because of intellectual, cultural, and spiritual qualities. He also includes an attraction to leadership traits and governmental legitimacy in his definition.

All of the above definitions include the elements of Nye’s outline of soft power resources but have a distinct emphasis on development, as China is considered a developing country. Because of this, China is using resources that Nye did not emphasize in his outline of possible soft power resources. Such examples are China’s developmental strategies, increasing involvement in institutionalism, and a strong legitimating force for China’s government. Nye’s strategy is mainly US-centric and has been adapted by China because of the differences between the two countries. For example, the US would have less use for soft power resources as a developmental tool than China would. Because China is attempting to actively cultivate soft power, they are reaching out to resources that normal soft power definitions do not frequently include to maximize their efforts. Some of its resources are a result of traditionally hard power tools such as aid and economic incentives, which are usually not a focus in Nye’s soft power definition.

**Soft Power Side Effects**

In China’s case, a major soft power resource comes from a traditionally hard power resource, which is China’s expanding economy and willingness to provide aid. During the time that China’s economy rapidly expanded, many countries started to associate the idea of wealth and prosperity with China, drawing job seekers and businessmen alike to the Chinese markets (Huang and Ding, 2006; Kurlantzick, 2007; Ford, 2012). This was especially true in Asia, where several countries began to see China as a ‘symbol of modernity in Asia’ as well as a ticket to a better life.
Most nations want to associate themselves with wealth and power, whether for the opportunities it may bring or improvement through association, and this practical move could bring possible soft power side effects with it. The economic need to be inside the Chinese markets has caused the adoption, or at least the grudging acceptance of Chinese norms by many businesses. The combination of the strength of the Chinese economy, the strict control the Chinese government exerts over their market, and the possibility of being prohibited from the Chinese market has caused many businesses and associates to soften certain opinions on issues that China is sensitive about (Ford, 2012). If China maintains their position in the forefront, it could also create soft power side effects through the attraction of a strong economy.

This also occurs in many countries that depend on economic aid, foreign investment, or a good relationship with China. (Li and Worm, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2007). With the advent of China’s new developmental system, coined the ‘Beijing Consensus’ by western scholars, China has ability to compete with western-led development efforts. To developing countries, this system has the potential to be more attractive than the western version, so many developing countries are turning to China to build their economies and infrastructure. The ‘Beijing Consensus’, through institutions like the Belt and Road Initiative, promotes developmental procedures with non-interference in a country’s government, low social costs, increased stability, and stable relationships throughout the development process that take the partner country’s needs into account (Wuthnow, 2008; D’Hooge, 2011). This process involves both economic aid and foreign investment directly from China to the developing country, encouraging cooperation from the developing country on the issues that China wants to promote. This allows China to create soft power resources as a by-product of hard
power resources. Because the monetary support they can offer states can influence public opinion in countries such as in Malaysia, and Ethiopia, hard economic power is important to Chinese soft power resources (PEW Global Attitudes Survey).

However, the issues with the Chinese business initiatives in foreign countries can undermine this resource’s power. Although China maintains strict control of Chinese businesses, there is a lack of operations oversight in foreign initiatives. Both the lack of oversight overseas and common business practice in China being exported with these projects can hurt potential soft power resources. China generally has a positive relationship with the countries they are helping, but increasingly there have been many instances of poor Chinese business practices that have damaged China’s image (Tang, Lu, and Li, 2011). As China gains power and influence in other countries, there is also fear that internal Chinese issues such as poor environmental and labor regulations, negligible respect for transparency and good governance, a lacking rule of law, inequality, low individual protections, decreasing standards of business morals and other such issues will spread to other developing countries through these projects (Kurlantzick, 2007; Lai, 2012). Even though the Chinese government directs a lot of China’s soft power resources, they cannot hope to guide the outcome of possible soft power side effects without eliminating the issues that are causing these criticisms.
Chapter 3
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SOFT POWER RESOURCES; MEDIA, INSTITUTIONS, AND EDUCATION

Soft power is frequently paired with and compared to public diplomacy, as it is meant to sway citizens of other countries to agree with a country’s diplomatic agenda. Public diplomacy is a tool used by governments to influence another country’s population to have a favorable opinion of their ideals, actions, and reputation (Wang [Jian] 2011; Nye 2008; Melissen 2005; Servaes 2012; Fan 2007). The actions taken by a government to ‘influence the public of foreign countries to create a favorable opinion of their ideals’ sounds very similar to the definition of soft power. Because of this, it is unsurprising that they are frequently paired in academic discussion.

Besides their similarity in definition, there is a relationship between public diplomacy and soft power. Since soft power is not a tool itself, but a resource to be created, there must be an original cause. Public Diplomacy is one of the tools that can be used to create soft power resources, filling the gap between resource and need. It is the establishing force of the media, institutions, and educational programs needed to cultivate soft power through government sponsorship.

Media as Soft Power

Media as soft power is tied to the use of public diplomacy as a soft power generator. The creation and manipulation of knowledge has become increasingly important in the so-called ‘information age’ because of its ability to change the minds of the public. In an increasingly interconnected world, it is the public that can influence governments and the ability of the internet to spread these ideas far and wide (Wilson 2008; Servaes 2012; Udo 2016). In order to effectively use media as a soft
power tool, it must be managed in a way that reflects well on the country in question without being propagandized.

Public diplomacy media must be credible, compatible, and consistent. To be credible, it must not be obviously biased and is most effective if provided through a third party instead of sponsored by a government directly (Kroenig, McAdam and Weber 2010). To be compatible, the promoted ideas must not be directly contradictory to the ideals and values of the target country (Kroenig, McAdam and Weber 2010). Finally, the media used must be consistent with the actions of the country that is disseminating the information in the first place (Nye 2008; 2011). If the media promotion of the country in question follows these three aspects, influencing the public opinion of the target country is much more likely to be successful.

China’s public diplomacy media could have an advantage over public diplomacy media of other countries. They can control the message of the media because the Chinese government controls the media coming out of China (Ford 2012). This means that, theoretically, China has control on both ends of the process. First, since they can control the output of Chinese media into the world, they can direct the promotion of China with better efficiency. Second, those who consume Chinese media will hear a consistent message. The Chinese government has attempted to use media as a tool to create an understanding of and to combat negative reporting on China (Wang [Jian] 2011; Jiang 2008). Realistically, this control of the media is only effective in domestic situations. Abroad, there are still many negative characterizations of China and its efforts worldwide from many different sources. Compared to Chinese media, which is known to be government-controlled, these negative views can easily outweigh the desired message.
However, China’s heavy-handed response to and foreign media coverage of past events reinforces the idea that China is a threatening authoritarian regime. One of the most poignant examples of this is the Tiananmen Square protests. As the protest worsened and became violent, Chinese police did not allow foreign journalists into the square and pressured them to leave the country (Lin, 1993). In fact, because of the ‘Great Firewall of China’, looking up information on the internet in China about the Tiananmen protest gives you no results. Instances like this have not centralized the message, but it has delegitimized it. If the rest of the world still views China as a controlling and violent authoritarian regime, attempted advertising of China as a country for peace will fall short of the mark. Instead, continued use of this media will further damage any soft power opportunities (Wang [Hong Ying] 2011; Hayden 2012; Ford 2012; Zhang 2011; Zhang 2010)

**Institutions as Soft Power**

China has been increasing their participation in institutions to promote a positive perception of Chinese policy. Most institutions that exist on a global level were created by western countries and there are few to none that are created by non-western countries. These institutions are set up to emulate the political goals and values of the founding countries and are an agenda-setting soft power tool (Nye 2004). This makes participation in international organizations a prerequisite for soft power manipulation on an international level for a few reasons. Participation in these organizations allows access to influence the decisions and norms, an easier spread of ideas and values, and a platform to show the ability of a country to handle and manipulate power.
For China, joining international organizations is especially important. Since the 1960s, they have increased their participation exponentially. China has been using their participation in international organizations to set an agenda and to promote the idea of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ (Wuthnow 2008; Huang and Ding 2006). Not only is this a soft power tool for China to gain respect and influence, but it is a legitimizing tool for their rise to power. Internationally, China has used peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and mediation through organizations like the United Nations to prove itself responsible (Wuthnow 2008; Kurlantzick 2007). Regionally, a rising China could also disrupt the balance in Asia. China’s participation in Asian frameworks and institutions goes a long way towards reassuring their neighbors. By participating in these organizations, China shows a willingness to work with their neighbors (Wuthnow 2008). If China can be involved in institutions without threatening them, other countries could feel more at ease with China’s rise.

An increase in respect from other countries and the consideration of Chinese goals could lead to an increase in soft power. However, China has not been able to reach the same level of influence on the international level as they have in Asia. Even with their participation in PKOs and mediation, many western countries have not been convinced completely that China can be responsible on the world stage. China has had slightly more success winning the approval of non-western countries due to its tendency to criticize some aspects of western-founded international organizations, but still has a long way to go on the global stage (Wang [Hong Ying] 2011).
Possible Outcomes

Since China increased their soft power efforts in the late 2000s, there have been mixed results over time. Below is a table of the most recent results of the Pew Global Attitudes survey, aggregated by region, comparing attitudes on China.

Table 1  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># “very favorable”</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># “somewhat favorable”</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># “somewhat unfavorable”</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># “very unfavorable”</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># “DK/Did not answer”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Australia is included in Europe in this table, due to the lack of ‘Pacific’ region surveys, data taken from Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database

Considering that the use of soft power is meant to change other’s views on a country in the positive direction, an opinion poll can assess if this has happened at all. Although this does not consider extraneous factors, such as regional history and previous sentiment, it can measure how these views have changed since the increase in use of Chinese soft power, without asserting that it must have been soft power to have done so.

Within Asia, China had gained some acceptance from other Asian countries (Cho and Jeong 2008; Huang and Ding 2006). However, as you can see from the table above, this is not always the case now. While the ‘very favorable’ response has
increased since 2008, so has the ‘somewhat unfavorable’. Countries like South Korea
and Japan, who already have historical grievances with China, have had their overall
opinion of China either stagnate or degrade over time. Malaysia is one of the few
countries in the Pew data that has significant warming in opinion toward China.

In Africa, when Chinese development initiatives first began, there was an
increasingly positive view of China (Tang and Li 2011). In the recent survey results,
there are increasing opinions of China as ‘very unfavorable’. But even with these
results, China remains mostly favorable for those who answered the question. In the
West, it is assumed that some of China’s soft power efforts have fallen flat because of
the perception that China is a threat (Wang 2011). However, this is not necessarily the
case shown in the data above. In both the Americas and Europe, there are fluctuations
in the data that are not expected.

The aspect I would like to highlight across all regions is the recent existence of
respondents in the ‘no response’ option. Previously, in all regions listed above, there
were no respondents in that category. In the 2017 data, there are significant numbers
of refusals to respond in most regions. This could be an increase in ignorance of those
who were taking the survey, but this is unlikely because of the previous willingness to
respond. So, it is possible that Chinese soft power is affecting the world but has more
of an effect on the reservation of opinion instead of expressing it.

Overall, there is most likely limited soft power outcomes from China’s efforts.
As soft power is a subjective concept, it is virtually impossible to control the results
that one gets from soft power resources. Although there is always the possibility of
soft power from things like economic aid, public diplomacy media, international
institutions, and educational opportunities, these possible resources have not proven to
be a substantive factor. If anything, the soft power that China can wield creates a sphere of neutrality, meaning that there is less willingness to openly oppose China. This does not necessarily mean that these opinions are changing to be positive like China hoped. But, either way, it is a step toward creating a more welcoming environment.
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AND SOFT POWER
Chapter 4

EDUCATION AS SOFT POWER; THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE PROGRAM

The Confucius Institute (CI) is a non-profit organization administered by The Office of Chinese Language Council International, also known as Hanban, since 2004. As of 2017, the CI has established over 1500 outposts in 142 countries (Gil, 2017; Peterson, 2017; Confucius Institutes). Internationally, the CI works to teach participants about Chinese language and culture in hopes of building a better understanding of China. Exchanges facilitated through the CI then bring dedicated students of Chinese from all over the world together in China to create personal connections. This, in turn, is meant to promote the creation of a ‘harmonious world’ and positive relationships with China. Theoretically, this education could increase positive global understanding, global engagement, and China’s soft power resources (Lahtinen, 2015; Tin-yau Lo and Pan, 2016; Wheeler, 2013; Gil, 2017).

Background Knowledge

The idea of an institution that teaches culture and language to improve global relationships is not new. In fact, several countries have also created similar institutions, including Italy, France, Britain, Germany, Poland, Spain, Korea, Japan, and Turkey, to influence others through education (Leung and Du Cros, 2014). However, the expansion of the CI spread much quicker and farther than other such institutions. In the past 14 years, the CI has grown to outnumber all other cultural institutions (Confucius Institutes). The second largest cultural institution is the Alliance Francaise with 850 centers established over 2 centuries, making the CI the largest network of cultural institutions in the world.
Outside of its rapid growth, the other relatively unique aspect of the CI program is the method of establishment. Generally, a CI is set up between two universities as a joint venture. The CI is created in the host country with the assistance of a Chinese university. Both universities are meant to work together as ‘sister’ universities, sharing academic and personnel exchanges. The main responsibilities of the host university are to provide the venue for the Confucius Institute, administrative staff, a foreign director, and some funds or in-kind exchange of goods. The Chinese university, in cooperation with Hanban, provides the teachers, a Chinese director, resources, and most of the funding. Generally, CIs have a startup fund of $100,000 with grants that can be given in following years based on performance and the need of the university. These institutes are set up as non-profit institutions under the jurisdiction of both the host country and China (Peterson, 2017; Tin-yau Lo and Pan, 2016; Gil, 2017; Hubbert, 2014; Lahtinen, 2015; Hartig, 2012; Hartig, 2015; Zhao and Huang, 2010).

On a day to day basis, the CI is run by the Chinese director, the foreign director, and the Chinese teachers. A board of directors also guides the CI and usually consists of half host country and half Chinese members. The division of the directors and the board is meant to facilitate communication between the host university and their Chinese counterparts. The teachers are responsible for teaching the Chinese classes and organizing events for students. Some universities use the CI teachers to teach for-credit classes at the university, but the majority hold non-credit Chinese classes. Many CIs teach classes for those in the community as well, usually with an associated fee that is supposed to support the CI’s programming. Also, many CIs have cultural programming that introduces those who participate to cultural activities such
as Kung Fu, calligraphy, and folk dance (Peterson, 2017; Tin-yau Lo and Pan, 2016; Gil, 2017; Hubbert, 2014; Lahtinen, 2015; Hartig, 2012; Hartig, 2015; Zhao and Huang, 2010; Starr, 2009).

**Ideological Concerns**

A major criticism of the CI is the involvement of Hanban in establishing these institutions, and how that could affect transparency and censorship. Because Hanban is directly affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, the board of directors is made up of government officials. Although Hanban itself is a non-profit agency for the promotion of Chinese culture worldwide, the connection between Hanban and the Chinese government is too close to overlook for many. Hanban controls and oversees all programming, budgeting, resources, teacher selection, and contract negotiation within these programs (Peterson, 2017). A copy of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institute program on the Hanban website guides the creation of CI around the world. Of all documents, this is probably the closest to the contract of the CI that is easily accessible. In the Constitution itself, there are a few concerns. The first of which is the clause that says that the CI must

“abide by the laws and regulations of the countries in which they are located, respect local cultural and educational traditions and social customs, and they shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China.” and that “the Confucius Institutes shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of Confucius Institutes.” (Constitution and By-Laws)
The assertion that CI activities cannot conflict with the laws and regulations of China is often highlighted because of the censorship laws that could apply.

President Xi, on the 10th anniversary of the CI program in 2014, commended the program on its efforts “toward world peace and international cooperation” and urged the program “to push forward the advancement of human civilizations and people’s heart-to-heart exchange, to jointly create a more beautiful tomorrow” (Hartig, 2015). President Xi mentions international cooperation and a more beautiful tomorrow, referencing the ideal of a ‘harmonious world’. In fact, members of the Chinese government have been quoted saying that the CI is an important part of Chinese propaganda policy, China’s soft power, and foreign policy initiatives (Peterson, 2017; Sahlins, 2015).

China wants to foster an international environment that helps China become more influential in global decision making. The cooperation of China with their neighbors for economic success and geopolitical influence means that they must work to keep good relationships, potentially opening the door for voluntary censorship (Lahtinen, 2015; Hartig, 2015; Barr, 2011). The CI case studies of Finland, Germany, and the US all mentioned instances of censorship in order to avoid offending the CI attached to the school or Hanban (Lahtinen, 2015; Hartig, 2011; Hubbert, 2014; Peterson, 2017). The most sensational case study regarding censorship was the study of the New York and New Jersey CIs by the National Association of Scholars. The researcher attempted to contact, interview, and visit several campuses that had a CI attached and received little to no response. In several instances, these meetings were cancelled with little to no warning when there had been a positive response before. Several directors were contacted and only one was open to responding to questions.
However, the most significant instance was the removal of the researcher from the campus during a classroom visit, in which a Dean came and escorted her back to her car, telling her that she could not visit any more classes (Peterson, 2017). Although most instances of censorship are not of this nature, the need of the university to remove a researcher that was sitting in a class is significant.

Several studies have also mentioned concerns and instances of censorship, including the restriction of research at universities and omission of unsavory politics (Starr, 2009; Peterson, 2017; Hartig 2015; Zhao and Huang, 2010; Yang, 2010; Portman and Carper, 2019). One such case was in a study of a CI in California, where CI teachers taught Chinese at a college preparatory school and were not portraying a contemporary picture of China. Instead, the history of China after 1949 omitted several key events and the textbooks used for Chinese class were ‘idyllic’ and ‘inaccurate representations of modern China’ (Hubbert, 2014). Across the world, there have been incidents of infringement of academic freedom as well. A scheduled lecture from the Dalai Lama in North Carolina, a Falun Gong art exhibition in Tel Aviv, and the European Association of Chinese Study’s meeting program were all censored in some way because of the direct or indirect influence of the CI (Sahlins, 2015; Peterson, 2017). These examples are cause for concern because it shows that the possible risk that the CI poses toward academic freedom can be weaponized.

Very rarely does Hanban directly interfere, but this raises the question of what possible outcome the school is willing to self-censor for in order to avoid. A few say that money for the school, when needed badly enough, becomes a coercive measure in favor of self-censorship because of the possible consequences. Other consequences that could play a factor in this are reduced funding for exchanges (outside of the
funding given to the CI), increased visa denial, lower numbers of Chinese students being sent to that school, and, in the worst cases, black listing (Peterson, 2017; Tin-yau Lo and Pan, 2016).

After the publication of the National Association of Scholar’s report on Confucius Institutes in 2017, the US Senate began to investigate this program, concluding that the CI program needed more transparency (Portman and Carper, 2019). This investigation has been preceded by just under a dozen Confucius Institutes shutting their doors on US campuses, including North Carolina State University, University of Iowa, and Pennsylvania State University. It is not always sure whether it is for ideological or practical concerns (Redden, 2019). But the perceptions of the Confucius Institute are important to its continued existence. If perceived as a ideological threat, many universities bow to pressure from right wing sources to close down the apparent threat.

**Practical Concerns**

Since the establishment of the CI in 2004, Hanban has been criticized about the long-term sustainability of the CI program. The rapid growth and initially high demand for the CI has raised issues regarding the financial stability of the institutes and the quality of teachers and materials. This lack of resources has the potential to decrease the ability of these institutions to teach and hold events. Because language learning and cultural competence are based on perception of the audience, the success of programs such as this depend on how many people they can successfully reach. This can change the effectiveness of the CI in their host country and negate effects of soft power if powerful enough. (Gil, 2017).
The educational opportunities that the CI offers are in demand in many countries. Due to the increase in importance of the Chinese economy globally, many feel the need to study Chinese. This is echoed in the CIs of Germany, Peru, Australia, Kenya, Cameroon, Japan, and South Africa, which encompassed eight out of the twelve studies examined (Hartig, 2011; Park, 2013; Gil, 2017; Yang, 2010; Hartig, 2012; Wheeler, 2013; Nordtviet, 2011; Leung and Du Cros, 2014). There were several reasons given for the study of Chinese, but most of them revolved around an increase in globalism, increasing employment opportunities, or improvement through education. For many universities, it is the easiest way to study in China and further their language skills. This was the case in at least Kenya and Cameroon, where scholarships to travel abroad to China are few and far between. Through the Confucius Institute, more of those students have this opportunity (Wheeler, 2013; Nordtviet, 2011).

The two major issues under discussion are the quality of education and potential financial dependence. Quality of language learning in the CI depends on the teachers and the materials used in the CI. For the teachers, the Confucius Institute program is a short-term but not well-paid engagement to teach in another country. Because of this, most of the staff attracted by this opportunity are young and inexperienced. This lack of experience could lead to lower quality lessons, negatively affecting the ability of the CI to teach Chinese (Leung and Du Cros, 2014; Tin-yau Lo and Pan, 2016; Starr, 2009; Zhao and Huang, 2010).

Additionally, this attraction only applies in certain countries. For countries that are not a preferred destination, there are few teachers willing to live and work there. This also decreases the potential quality of Chinese language learning, in contrast to
the higher demand for educational opportunity in those countries (Starr, 2009; Hartig, 2015; Zhao and Huang, 2010; Gil, 2017). Most notable is the Kenyan CI at the University of Nairobi. Although the CI is the only place on campus to learn Chinese, it was said to be subpar and unable to prepare students to use Chinese as a marketable skill unless they go to China to study. The lessons were said to be inconsistent, mainly computer based, and unstructured, so most of the benefits of the CI on campus were negated (Wheeler, 2013; Gil, 2017). The far reach of the CI also hinders the quality of teachers. When placing teachers, the CI does very little to prepare them for the language and culture of another country. This was especially highlighted in the case study of the University of Helsinki CI by the former director. She notes that the collaborative working styles of the Finnish staff and the hierarchical style of the Chinese staff are different, which led to constant miscommunication and conflict. In addition, there was no shared strategy or values, making the working environment between the two groups constantly conflicted (Lahtinen, 2015).

Besides the quality of the teachers that staff the CI, the quality of the teaching materials, such as textbooks, is also questionable. For many CIs in the non-English speaking world, the teaching materials are less than helpful because most Chinese textbooks are only available as Chinese translated to English. Additionally, there is no standard for textbook creation besides the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) tests administered by Hanban, and that standard is not always applied (Tin-yau Lo and Pan, 2016; Hartig, 2015; Zhao and Huang, 2010). This lack of development in Chinese language learning standards in languages other than English reduces the effectiveness of the CI in many countries. This, combined with the lack of ability of many teachers to speak the local language, means that for many students that cannot speak English,
Chinese language instruction is not very effective and therefore impedes the mission of the CI and the justification for its sustainability.

The monetary support that the CI offers for the establishment of the institution at a school concerns many because of possible financial dependence on CI grants and the probable inability of the CI to be self-sustaining. A CI is established with $100,000 and an in-kind exchange of resources with the expectation of self-sustainability after 5 years (Constitution and By-laws). However, several universities welcome the CI into their school in order to obtain extra funding or scholarships they need and would not have the ability to self-fund the CI without the grants from Hanban. Additionally, much of the programming of US-Chinese exchange is dependent on CI funds in order to take place, so without the help of the CI, many universities would not be able to fund these kinds of exchanges (Peterson, 2017; Wheeler, 2013; Nordtviet, 2011).

**Potential Criteria of Confucius Institute Cases**

Between all these cases, there are a wide range of findings, and it is difficult to come to a conclusive way to measure the success of a Confucius Institute from them. However, from these cases there are three general criteria that will be highlighted moving forward.

First are the kind of experiences that members of the community have with the Confucius Institute, positive or negative. In many of the cases above, there were mixed reactions to the CI efforts on their respective campuses. Since soft power requires an attraction to the soft power resource to have any effect, the experience that the participant has with the CI itself is important. If they experience extreme censorship or a refusal to adapt to local practices in higher education, this could leave a negative impression and fail to have any soft power effect. Conversely, if there is a
positive reaction to the experience of CI programming, then there could be a soft power effect, and this could mean that this CI is a potential soft power resource. It is not definite that it will be from only this criterion, within the case studies examined, none of the participants said that the Confucius Institute was an attractive force for them. It was the language learning that was, and the CI is just the vehicle for the language resources.

Secondly, a positive change in opinion on China from a participant’s interaction with the CI could signify the creation of a successful soft power resource. The main goal concerning Chinese soft power is to create a sympathetic and open global environment for China, and this requires a change in opinion for many because of established negative perceptions of China. So, if a participant changed their opinion of China to a positive one because of CI programming, this could be an indicator of soft power resources at work. If this opinion changes negatively, or doesn’t change at all, then the CI in question would not be an active soft power resource.

Finally, the last criterion is if the Confucius Institute is sustainable at its current point. Each CI is meant to be self-sufficient after the initial 5 years of startup and to replace staff every 2-3 years with new teachers. Soft power resources are something that develops over time, so in order to the CI to be a viable soft power resource, it must last for a longer period of time. If the CI proves to be unsustainable because of the inability to fund itself, or because it isn’t needed at the university, or there aren’t enough teachers, then it could not be a soft power resource. If cultural institutes like the Alliance Franciase can last for over a century, the Confucius Institute must also last to create a soft power effect.
Chapter 5

THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE (UDCI)

The Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware (UD) was officially launched in the Fall of 2010 jointly by Xiamen University, University of Delaware, and Hanban. According to the former President of UD, there were several reasons for UD to establish a Confucius Institute on campus.

“The Confucius Institute at UD will advance several of the University of Delaware's most important goals, including expanding UD's international reach and amplifying its impact, strengthening global partnerships, and developing collaborative initiatives in international and transnational issues. Through the institute, we'll build interest and competence in Chinese language and culture and instigate a deeper appreciation of China's global importance not just among members of the University community, but throughout the state and region… the Confucius Institute also will build a strong bridge between the University and the private sector, fostering economic scholarship and entrepreneurship. (Bryant, 2010)”

For the University of Delaware, there were multiple reasons for this establishment, despite the already existing Mandarin Chinese offerings. At its founding, the UD Confucius Institute was hoped to be a mutually beneficial venture that could enhance the outreach and cooperative ability of both Xiamen University and University of Delaware. The comments of officials from Xiamen University were focused on the
aspect of creating new friendships as well as echoing the new opportunities educate others about Chinese language and culture (Bryant, 2010).

Echoing these sentiments in their mission statement, the UDCI is mainly focused on the teaching and programming concerning Chinese language and culture for the university and the surrounding community. Outside of UD, the UDCI has held programming in other Delaware locations, including the Osher Lifelong Learning Center, Delaware School for the Deaf, Caesar Rodney School District, and Governor’s School. In addition to programming, the UDCI was involved in the founding of the Delaware Chinese Teacher Association. There were attempts to reach out to these programs, which were not answered. While these programs are ongoing, this study will focus on the effect of the UDCI on the UD community, because most of the programming occurs on campus (“Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware.”).

Several types of programming are offered at the Confucius Institute. The first are the classes offered to the University of Delaware faculty, students, and spouses. At first, classes consisted of basic Chinese courses once a week for a semester and were available to the faculty and spouses. Over time, classes such as Taiqi, Opera, Chinese Movies, Calligraphy, and a student ‘Chinese corner’ were added to the offerings, usually for a semester or two before ceasing to be available. These classes are not available for credit, but rather for practice outside of class for students and a resource to learn for faculty. The most recent class offering that was published on the UDCI website is for the Spring of 2019, with two beginner Chinese classes for faculty and alumni (“Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware.”). These two classes seem to be the core classes that are held regularly.
The UDCI also holds several events on campus, usually around 10 in a calendar year. Most are culture based, including open calligraphy sessions, Taiqi demonstrations, lectures on cultural aspects of China, and holiday events such as the Spring Festival. There are a few lectures a year that touch on contemporary topics and the hosting of the China Town Hall on politics surrounding China sponsored by the National Committee on US-China relations. These events range from small scale gatherings for lectures to large community wide attendance at the annual Spring Festival Gala. In the last 9 years, excepting 2011 (for which no data were found), there have been 87 recorded events sponsored by the Confucius Institute on campus (“Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware.”; Bryant, 2011). However, over the past couple years the number of events has been dropping. This past semester, there were only 2 events advertised by the Confucius Institute.

Lastly, the Confucius Institute of UD acts as the first contact point and testing center for students who want to study in China. Included in this are opportunities to study in China for a semester or year fully funded, to earn a Ph.D. in Chinese studies, or to get a master’s in teaching Chinese. In these cases, the UDCI acts as a filter and a resource to apply for these opportunities, usually requiring the formal recommendation of the Confucius Institute for the student involved. As well as the recommendation, most scholarships to study in China require proof of some type of Chinese language skill. The Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (汉语水平考试), also known as the HSK, is the only test that fulfills these requirements. This test is administered most often by the Confucius Institutes, and this is the case at UD. Additionally, there are shorter trips that are available to students as well that do not require such a lengthy application process, such as the two-week US-China student forum (“Confucius Institute at the
University of Delaware.”). For those in the University of Delaware community who want to study abroad in China, the Confucius Institute is one of the main opportunities to do so because UD does not have direct exchange program with a Chinese university. This forces students to be reliant on the UDCI and outside programs, instead of in-house programs.

Currently, the UDCI is staffed by the University of Delaware provided director and three guest teachers. This means that the staff of the CI is not full; there is no co-director from China and there has not been since 2016. Additionally, in the past there have been more teachers, student assistants, and an assistant director to manage everyday tasks, all of which are currently vacant. It is not known why these positions have been unfilled, but it is possible that there are less funds or demand for staff of the UDCI. So, for an Institute that has previously managed around ten events a year, classes, scholarships, and fellowships, there are currently only four people to manage these all of them. Going forward, it is uncertain if the same level of management will be kept up with the small staff or if new staff will be hired.
Chapter 6

CASE STUDY INTERVIEWS

In order to evaluate the initial impact of the Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware, a convenience sample of students from the busiest student center on campus was surveyed. This first survey was taken in order to measure how aware UD students are of the Confucius Institute. This survey was necessary to determine the possible soft power effect that the Confucius Institute has on UD campus by measuring the approximate population that the Confucius Institute could reach. If UD students had not heard of the UDCI, then there is little chance that there could be any soft power effects from it. Below is a table detailing the answers given;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>26 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (.007%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>115 (79%)</td>
<td>1 (.007%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did Not Answer</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 145 people surveyed, 80% of the population answered negatively. Some of the 19% of those who answered positively answered with yes, but with a qualifier, such as “I’ve heard of it, but I don’t know what they do” or “I see it when I walk to class.” However, the majority of that 19% simply answered yes. Although this survey is lacking in responses of University professors or staff, it is primarily the students of the University that the services of the Confucius Institute are tailored for, excepting the beginner Chinese classes. Because of this, this survey can be taken as a
small snapshot of the larger knowledge of the UDCI. As of 2018, there are 24,120 students enrolled at the university. If only 19% of students know what the CI is in the first place, then that means that the UDCI only reaches around 4,500 people of that population. This number is already a low percentage, but with the declining number of events held each year and increase in vacant staff positions, this awareness could drop even more. The Confucius Institute rarely markets itself and many participants that I spoke to in interviews only went to one event over their years at the University of Delaware.

This data is a key restriction to consider before discussing the qualitative interviews that were completed. Without knowledge of what the Confucius Institute does or what they offer to students on campus, the impact of the Confucius Institute is already limited. So, it is safe to assume that any results that come out of the qualitative interviews will be only applicable to 19% of students within University of Delaware. This reduces the chances of the University of Delaware Confucius Institute having a soft power effect on campus because with a small audience, influence from the CI would be fairly negligible, depending on how much the students interacted with the CI.

With such a low rate of awareness, qualitative interviews were restricted to participants with previous knowledge of the Confucius Institute to determine if it created any soft power effects. The overall population that were eligible to be interviewed was centered on the majors and areas of UD that are pertinent to Chinese culture and the international community. This is also demonstrated in the qualitative interviews, because all subjects were either members of internationally related majors, Chinese language students, or both.
The qualitative interviews were focused on the subjects’ experiences, interactions, and knowledge of the Confucius Institute. Over the course of this project, there were 16 interviews completed, split between students, teachers, and professionals at the University of Delaware. Recruitment emails were sent out to related departments, such as students from the Center for Area and Global studies, International Relations, Chinese and other internationally related programs. The 9 students who were interviewed were taken from those who are attending UD or graduating within the past 3 years. The 6 teachers had participated in or interacted with the CI within the past year, and generally worked with China or internationally related subjects. There were 8 general questions asked, allowing for open ended response, with follow up questions to clarify. The analysis of these interviews will be divided based on the interview subjects’ opinions of the Confucius Institute in general, events, classes, overall benefits, and overall consequences. Students tended to focus on the services and events that the CI could offer them, while most of the teachers’ and professionals’ interactions focused on CI resources for their students and the collaboration between their departments and the CI.

Originally, this study planned to include interviews with Confucius Institute staff. However, this was not able to be included. A personal interview was not permitted and instead questions for the CI director had to be submitted through the UD Marketing and Communications department. When answers were sent back, they were pro forma and echoed information that was already available on the UDCI website, contributing nothing new to this research. A teacher had also responded to a request for an interview, but never responded again after initial contact.
Confucius Institute Impressions

All the interviews started with the same question; How did you hear about the Confucius Institute? For the students I spoke to, the answers varied, but there were a few answers that stood out. Most students heard about it through classes from their professors, in the form of relevant events or tutoring. Out of the 9 students spoken to, 6 of them heard about the Confucius Institute in this manner. Other answers included knowledge from before starting at UD and from University of Delaware orientation activities. The promotion through related classes is the majority of attention that the Confucius Institute receives.

Figure 1  How did you hear about the Confucius Institute?

The professors that advertised Confucius Institute events were teaching a China related subject, not just language, and were helping to help their students understand the subject matter through an external resource. The professors themselves, or the ones that I was able to interview, heard about the resources that the Confucius institute offered and their events through interdepartmental collaboration or by being asked to promote events and tutoring.

Overall, most of the participants identified the main goals of the Confucius Institute as an outreach program for Chinese language and culture education. A few
highlighted the connection between the Confucius Institute program and the Chinese government. However, when asked, those who were aware of the connection did not see the Confucius Institute as an influencing power, but more of an institute to further the student’s or professor’s goals. The political tension regarding the Confucius Institute was recognized but was usually dismissed as of lower concern than the benefits that were brought to those respective individuals. Those who attended events usually said that it was not an influencing power because it just deepened the views that they already had without changing them.

This is a negative point against the possibility that the UDCI has soft power effects on campus. If CI programming does not change opinions in a positive light, as is the goal of Chinese soft power resources, then it is not a soft power resource on its own. For the UDCI at least, it is a complement to other Chinese soft power resources that act as a the catalyst, whether it is a high school teacher, a school exchange, or simply having Chinese-speaking friends.

For the students, the main interest was in the educational opportunity that these events presented. Below are all the reasons given for attending events through the CI.

Figure 2  Reasons for Participating in Confucius Institute events
The students that attended had various reasons for doing so. These included increasing cultural knowledge for study abroad, an interest in history of East Asia, and specific topic interests, depending on the event. A couple said that although they were interested in the Confucius Institute to learn about Chinese culture, they emphasized that there was a disconnect between culture and country. So, instead of being influenced to internalize a more positive view of China, students were able to parse between them, dividing the positively viewed Chinese culture and the negatively viewed Chinese government. For China’s soft power goals, this is counterproductive. It separates a potential soft power resource from the image they want to improve, reducing the possible soft power effects.

This was an interesting conclusion. The ability to see the Confucius Institute and Chinese culture as positive, but the Chinese government as negative, works against the goal of creating attraction to solve China’s image and legitimacy problems. It is a form of soft power resources, but not necessarily the one the China is looking for. Regardless, this does show the potential of the UDCI to act as a soft power resource not only for Chinese cultural attraction, but the entire concept of China in the future. But before this can happen, there would have to be major changes, which is something that takes time and is unlikely to have an effect soon.
Events

Most participants that I spoke to had attended at least one Confucius Institute event. The events of the University of Delaware Confucius Institute normally fit into three categories: food, entertainment, and education.

Figure 3  Kind of Events Attended

The first category is exactly what it sounds like; an event open to the public that offers free food to college students. The second, which can be grouped with the food category at times, was entertainment. These two types of events made up 75% of the events that participants attended. These types of events usually focus on festivals, showing off traditional food or traditional activities. For example, the Confucius Institute holds events every year for the Spring festival and the Mid-Autumn festival. The former is the CI’s most successful event of the year, a large gala of traditional Chinese performance by the Chinese members of the community and international students. It is well attended by over 500 people a year from the community and is the most recognizable event (“Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware”). The latter is usually a food and entertainment-based event and is much smaller, normally restricted to Chinese language students looking for extra credit or the Chinese
international students on campus. This type of event is often paired with a hands-on activity such as dance, music, or crafts. Entertainment events, because they are a combination approach of performing, learning, and doing, were noted as the most engaging and enjoyable type of event held by the Confucius Institute.

The last category is education, consisting of either a lecture by a visiting scholar or a forum. This was the least popular, with only a few mentions. A few events mentioned by participants that were assumed to be Confucius Institute events were not associated with them, but usually with the Center for Area and Global Studies or International Relations/Political Science. These lectures usually cover topics related to the history of China or non-political contemporary subjects. The one exception to this is the China Town Hall that is sponsored every year by the Confucius Institute, which discusses contemporary Chinese politics. These educational events are usually about niche topics, so there are not as many who are interested in attending. On average, around 10-20 people attend these events. The larger entertainment-type events demonstrating very general cultural topics appeal to more students. It was noted by several people that there were budget and organizational different between the first two categories of events and this category. The former was frequently said to be organized, staffed, and planned well overall. However, the presentation type events were last minute, rushed, and not as well planned or attended.

The most successful events that the University of Delaware Confucius Institute holds are generalized events aimed at a larger public. However, it is doubtful that these surface-level events are enough to create any kind of soft power effect. For soft power, one must share similar goals as the country in question, and these events do not promote this kind of sympathy by themselves. It is possible that these kinds of events
will encourage attendees to travel to China, an experience that is more likely to create a soft power effect, which makes the CI a stepping stone towards soft power effects.

**Confucius Institute Classes**

The low quality of classes reflected in other Confucius Institute case studies globally is also present at the University of Delaware. Only 2 participants interviews attended any of the Chinese classes offered by the UDCI. Both explained that the usefulness of the class they attended was marginalized by the varying fluency of the participants involved. Instead of learning from the class, one participant was recruited to help teach those attending the class because of the major difference between their fluency and the others. Because there was no similar fluency level across classes, it was described as difficult by both participants to practice the conversation skills that were meant to be gained. With University of Delaware Chinese classes, most students in one class have similar fluency, which allows for level growth. However, the growth of students in the Confucius Institute classes would be sporadic and depend on the previous experiences of the students.

Additionally, class quality is dependent on the teacher. One participant noted that the teaching style of the two teachers they took classes with were very different. The first focused on using skills gained during class time while the following teacher focused on vocabulary acquisition. This contributes to an uneven learning curve, dependent on what the teacher thinks is important, and could leave important skills behind. Between Confucius Institutes and Hanban teachers, there is no exact standard or curriculum to follow when teaching Chinese. Without a standardized teaching format, there is little chance of improvement for the CI Chinese classes.
The ability of the UDCI to teach Chinese also seems to be decreasing as time passes as well. From personal memory, four years ago there were more teachers working at the Confucius Institute than there are now. Currently, there are 3 teachers when there were 5 or 6 in residence in the past. This loss of ability is also demonstrated by the previous classes that were available that have now been discontinued; Taiji, Gong Fu, calligraphy, folk dance, Chinese conversation corner, and higher levels of Chinese language classes have all been discontinued at the UDCI. Usually, these classes are cancelled due to a lack of students who apply for them or a change in teachers. With the marketing issues that the UDCI faces, many people do not know when the UDCI has classes, so few apply. This, plus the already existing Chinese department at UD creates little demand for these classes. Now, only two semester long classes are available, and both are only beginner Chinese classes.

**Benefits of the UDCI**

Most participants interviewed had positive views of the Confucius Institute. These positive views mean that the Confucius Institute has potential to be a soft power resource in the future. If there was an overwhelmingly negative opinion of the Confucius Institute, there would be serious doubt if the UDCI could be a soft power resource. But here, there is potential. Students, however, had very different concepts of these benefits than the teachers did. Mostly, the students’ focus was on the events, for the education opportunities, and the study abroad opportunities that having a CI on campus offered. The University of Delaware, which is marketed as the first US school to offer study abroad, has no current offerings in their study abroad programs in China. However, the Confucius Institute offers full scholarships to UD students through Hanban. Therefore, the Confucius Institute has become a replacement study
abroad for those who are interested in Chinese study abroad. It also serves as a testing center for the HSK test, which is usually a required step before acceptance into any China-sponsored study abroad program, making it convenient for UD students. These Confucius Institute study abroad programs were the only aspect of the Confucius Institute that appeared to change Chinese soft power outcomes in a positive direction. Those who had been to China in the past said that the experience of interacting with Chinese people and living in China was what changed their views. So, the main resource that the Confucius Institute could use so far to generate soft power is study abroad experiences. These programs are much farther than just a surface level understanding of Chinese culture and have a greater chance of building understanding.

For those who work at the University of Delaware, the Confucius Institute has different benefits than what are first obvious to the students. In the foreign language department, the presence of extra Chinese teachers means that they have a built-in stopgap for any staff shortage they may have with the Chinese classes at the University of Delaware. If a Confucius Institute teacher takes over 1 or 2 sections of low-level Chinese classes a semester, that means that the department can use the money that would have been used for hiring an extra teacher on other projects and materials. The only thing the UD professors need to do is train the CI teachers in how to teach the department’s curriculum. The CI teachers also help with Chinese tutoring on campus and with China-relevant clubs on campus through advice or event sponsorship. Professors normally only have a limited number of hours in which they can help students with questions and outside projects. But the Confucius institute offers tutoring for those who need extra help, which takes some of the burden off the UD professors.
Other internationally related departments at the University have also mentioned benefits of their association and cooperation with the Confucius Institute. Through the events that they hold, the Confucius Institute enriches the international scene of the University of Delaware. They usually cooperate with other departments to put on events, depending on the relevant areas or the topic being discussed. This allows for students of the university to experience other cultures and possibly pique their interest in other countries. This cooperation also means that not only student, but staff exchanges, can take place between the University of Delaware and Xiamen University.

**Criticisms of the UDCI**

While interviewing participants, there were not many negative impressions or comments about the UDCI. The few issues that did emerge were focused around UDCI infrastructure and miscommunication between the university and the institute. These instabilities detract from the potential of the UDCI to be a soft power resource because it cannot be long-lasting with structural and communication issues, and longevity is something that is required for soft power effects to be present.

There have been increasing issues regarding the amount of staff, classes, and events from the Confucius Institute. There could be many reasons for this, including decreased funding over the years, recent visa issues, staff not being replaced in a timely manner, or decreasing attendance at Confucius Institute held programs. A few people that are more familiar with the Confucius Institute noted that the advertisement for any event outside of the new year gala is usually last minute and sparse, meaning lower attendance rates, and could be affecting the support that the Confucius Institute receives. Without attendance numbers, new teachers are not provided, funding is not
maintained, and the ability to hold events would be lessened. Considering the goal of the Confucius Institute is to spread the knowledge of Chinese language and culture, the loss of these functions reduces their ability to fulfill the goal of the Confucius Institute program, making it structurally unstable.

Between the Confucius Institute and other collaborators, there are also miscommunication issues. UD staff participants who were interviewed voiced that there were occasionally misunderstandings during collaborative projects. Events that were collaboratively sponsored, but run by the Confucius Institute staff, would end up not fulfilling the agreed upon purpose. Additionally, there are concerns about the value placed on event quality. The expectation was that the events would be based more on quality of the event rather than the quantity of events held. This was not the case in all situations and, ultimately, was something of concern to some members of University of Delaware. Like in the case of the University of Helsinki’s Confucius Institute, communication and collaboration could be hurt at times by cultural differences between the UD staff and the CI staff.

**Outcomes**

The University of Delaware Confucius Institute is a potential Chinese soft power resource, but at the current moment is not creating any significant soft power effect on campus. Within the roughly 20% of UD’s population that the CI reaches, there are mostly positive views of the UDCI, but there is little capacity to change the opinions of the participants or create a sustainable institution on campus. So, by only meeting one criterion, it can be said that the UDCI has the potential to be a soft power resource, but for now is only a complement to other Chinese soft power resources.
The one exception to this is the study abroad scholarships that the UDCI can recommend students for. These study abroad scholarships were the only thing related to the Confucius Institute that the participants said changed their opinion to a more positive one. So, this is a source of potential soft power resources, but one that is not frequently used at the UDCI. There are many other college programs that offer study abroad in China, so many students choose to go another route because they have not heard of the Confucius Institute scholarships available. This, along with the functionality of the CI study abroad scholarships, could be a topic of future discussion.
Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS

Nye’s co-optive ‘soft power’ is desirable for many reasons. The ability to create power from attraction is a tool that could save money, lives, and effort that hard power traditionally uses. As a country that is on the rise globally, China needs all the power that it can muster to achieve its goals. So, it is understandable that the focus of Chinese soft power is on creating a stable and welcoming international environment for gaining power. While China has faced major image issues in the past, they are slowly working toward a more hospitable environment. Using hard power side effects, public diplomacy media, international institutions, and educational opportunities, China is trying to persuade others that it can be a responsible power on the world stage.

It is doubtful, however, that it will be achieved as soon as they wish it to be. Firstly, soft power is a strategy that takes time to work and is entirely unpredictable. Although China is attempting to directly harness soft power resources through active promotion of soft power strategy, it is unsure if these efforts will bear fruit because of its currently unknown effects and uneven timeline. Additionally, the contradictions of Chinese policy reinforce images of illegitimacy and untrustworthiness, which harms the ability of soft power resources to have an effect. Chinese control of public diplomacy media has turned against it and delegitimized the message, resulting in inconclusive soft power outcomes around the world. Institutional participation could assist, but it is not enough to convince western countries that China will be responsible on a global level. Although there has been some acceptance regionally, historical issues in Asia or issues with Chinese development in Africa hinder results of Chinese
soft power. The only objective result of these soft power efforts is the increased unwillingness to speak about true opinions of China worldwide.

China’s attempts to create soft power through Confucius Institutes have fallen somewhat flat for two reasons. The first is the relative newness of the Confucius Institute. As an institution that is less than two decades old, the soft power effects that it could have cannot be expressed fully in such a short time period. But, in the time that it has existed, the Confucius Institute has also had issues that block the creation of soft power effects. Many case studies illustrated these ideological and practical issues of the CI. Censorship, lack of transparency, unsustainability, and low quality of education in the Confucius Institute program hinder its soft power abilities. Most people go to the Confucius Institute because of their established interest in China and rarely gain that interest from CI efforts. So, instead of being a catalyst, they are a companion resource to those with this attraction already. This is not creating soft power or growing the population of people with an attraction to China.

This was supported in the case study of the University of Delaware. Most students had not heard of the Confucius Institute before on campus, and those who had were in restricted to a few small sub-groups on campus. Of this population, a large majority were involved with the international side of campus or Chinese language learning and mainly interacted with the CI through events that aligned with their already-established interests. Staff of the university interacted with the CI because of their jobs, and although there was some who saw value in the Confucius Institute on campus, their main role interaction with the Confucius Institute was to promote activities to interested students.
On a positive note, most saw only benefits in the UDCI, as it is a main resource for Chinese tutoring, Chinese cultural events, study abroad scholarships, and language testing. This lends credence to the idea that the UDCI could be a soft power resource, but the structural issues and inability to sway opinion on campus hinders the UDCI from this capability. In the future, the Confucius Institute may be able to reach such potential, but only after extensive changes. However, the situation of the UDCI is specific to that Confucius Institute. Each CI has their own relationship with the campus it resides on and develops its own operating system within that situation. So, although the UDCI seems to share some elements with other case studies, it is hard to reliably generalize.

To expand on these conclusions in the future, a few paths should be pursued. In-person interviews with teachers and the director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Delaware were requested but did not come to pass. So, this study could give a more accurate picture of the situation at the UDCI if more involved participation from the Confucius Institute was able to be included. Additionally, if studies over time were compiled to see the growth and change of the Confucius Institutes, this would be of great help to research like this.

An increase in sample size of case studies would also benefit this study. While researching others who had done similar work at Confucius Institutes around the world, there was a limited number of comparisons available. In addition, these studies varied in their research question, and did not all have soft power as a focus. When more time has passed, it would be beneficial to compare case studies with similar research questions from the beginning of the Confucius Institute program to the more
recent case studies. This way, a more generalizable conclusion can be drawn for future work.

As such a young program, the Confucius Institute cannot be fully measured at this moment in time, and not enough research has been done around the world for it to truly be meaningful. If the Confucius Institute program lasts into the future, there will be monumental changes. In order to truly last, the Confucius Institute program will have to work toward fixing its ideological clashes and sustainability concerns. Not fixing these issues could easily lead to the dissolution of the program itself and a loss of potential educational resources to many.
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60


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S9 Interview, In-person Interview, February 2019


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Appendix A

Interview Questions

- How did you hear about the Confucius Institute?
- Have you ever attended an event associated with the Confucius Institute? If so, what event?
- What was your impression of the event?
- Would you go to another event?
- What was your impression of the Confucius institute?
- Have you ever learned Chinese before?
- Why did you start learning Chinese?
- On a scale of 1-10, 1 being the least knowledgeable and 10 being the most knowledgeable, how did this event educate you on Chinese culture?
- Did this event change how you thought about China?

Variations on questions:

- What benefits does the CI bring to UD? Any consequences that you have seen?
- How do you view the CI now as opposed to when you first heard about it?
Appendix B
Aggregated Pew Global Attitudes Data

Survey question; Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...China [855]

Data shown was taken from the 2018 version of this survey question. Only countries that had data from 2008 or 2007 as well as 2015 forward were taken into consideration, in order to compare the change in opinion. An asterisk next to the country name means that not all the data was national data.

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Appendix C

IRB Exemption Letter (Text only)

DATE: November 12, 2018
TO: Leanne Voshell, BA
FROM: University of Delaware IRB
STUDY TITLE: [1201574-1] Chinese Soft Power and Confucius Institutes; Differing Benefits and Consequences
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project
ACTION: DETERMINATION OF EXEMPT STATUS
DECISION DATE: November 12, 2018
REVIEW CATEGORY: Exemption category # 2

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this research study. The University of Delaware IRB has determined this project is EXEMPT FROM IRB REVIEW according to federal regulations.

We will put a copy of this correspondence on file in our office. Please remember to notify us if you make any substantial changes to the project.

If you have any questions, please contact Renee Stewart at (302) 831-2137 or stewartr@udel.edu. Please include your study title and reference number in all correspondence with this office.
Appendix D

Informed Consent Form

INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Project: Chinese Soft Power and Confucius Institutes; Differing Benefits and Consequences

Principal Investigator(s): Leanne Voshell
You are being invited to participate in a research study. This consent form tells you about the study including its purpose, what you will be asked to do if you decide to take part, and the risks and benefits of being in the study. Please read the information below and ask us any questions you may have before you decide whether or not you agree to participate.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
The purpose of this study is to understand the impact of the University of Delaware Confucius Institute (CI) on campus and the impressions that those in the University of Delaware community have of the CI.

- This study will be used in a student thesis and is part of a larger body of study concerning the Confucius Institutes
- This study aims to understand the potential impact of the Confucius Institute and its programs on campus as well as the merits and problems concerned. In addition,

You will be one of approximately 20 participants in this study. You are being asked to participate because…

- You are part of the University of Delaware community and have interacted with the Confucius Institute on campus before. Participants have been pulled from many areas including international students, Chinese language students, teachers, and the general UD population at large.

WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?
As part of this study you will be asked to……

- Take part in an interview and answer questions on your impressions and opinions of the UD CI
- Participation involved; one interview that will be about 15-30 minutes in length

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
The Principal Investigator does not expect your participation in this study will expose you to any risks different from those you would encounter in daily life.

WHAT IF YOU ARE INJURED DURING YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY?
- There is no injury foreseen from participation in this study, but if you are injured during research procedures, you will be offered first aid at no cost to you. If you
need additional medical treatment, the cost of this treatment will be your responsibility or that of your third-party payer (for example, your health insurance). By signing this document, you are not waiving any rights that you may have if injury was the result of negligence of the university or its investigators.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS?
- You will not benefit directly from taking part in this research. However, the knowledge gained from this study may contribute to our understanding of the impact that Confucius Institutes have on the Universities they are associated with.

HOW WILL CONFIDENTIALITY BE MAINTAINED? WHO MAY KNOW THAT YOU PARTICIPATED IN THIS RESEARCH?
- Identities will be made confidential with all identifying information being removed as soon as possible with the exception of the informed consent form.
- Participants will be coded by number instead of name and the code list will be kept in a secure location.
- Consent forms and paper records will be kept in locked filing cabinet in secure location and electronic records and recordings will be kept on a password protected and secure server.
- The research team will make every effort to keep all research records that identify you confidential. The findings of this research may be presented or published. If this happens, no information that gives your name or other details will be shared.
- Names and identifying information will not be a part of the recording; all recordings will be coded. The only people that will be able to listen to these recordings will be the principal investigator and the thesis advisor. Recordings will be kept indefinitely, but not published.

The confidentiality of your records will be protected to the extent permitted by law. Your research records may be viewed by the University of Delaware Institutional Review Board, which is a committee formally designated to approve, monitor, and review biomedical and behavioral research involving humans. Records relating to this research will be kept for at least three years after the research study has been completed.

WILL THERE BE ANY COSTS TO YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH?
There are no costs associated with participating in the study.

WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION?
There is no compensation.

DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
Taking part in this research study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to participate in this research. If you choose to take part, you have the right to stop at any time. If you decide not to participate or if you decide to stop taking part in the research at a later date, there will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your decision to stop participation, or not to participate, will not influence current or future relationships with the University of Delaware.

As a student, if you decide not to take part in this research, your choice will have no effect on your academic status or your grade in the class.

If, at any time, you decide to end your participation in this research study, please inform our research team by telling the investigator in person or by emailing Lmv@udel.edu.

WHO SHOULD YOU CALL IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS?

If you have any questions about this study, please contact the Principal Investigator, Leanne Voshell, at (302)-233-3229 or Lmv@udel.edu or her advisor at aliceba@udel.edu.

If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Delaware Institutional Review Board at hrsb-research@udel.edu or (302) 831-2137.

Your signature on this form means that: 1) you are at least 18 years old; 2) you have read and understand the information given in this form; 3) you have asked any questions you have about the research and the questions have been answered to your satisfaction; and 4) you accept the terms in the form and volunteer to participate in the study. You will be given a copy of this form to keep.

_____________________________  __________________________
Printed Name of Participant    Signature of Participant

_____________________________  __________________________
Person Obtaining Consent        Person Obtaining Consent
          (PRINTED NAME)                        (SIGNATURE)

OPTIONAL CONSENT FOR ADDITIONAL USES OF AUDIO RECORDINGS

I voluntarily give my permission to the researchers in this study to use audio recordings of collected as part of this research study for publications, presentations,
and/or educational purposes. I understand that no identifying information beyond that contained in the recording will be provided to educational/scientific audiences and the recording itself will remain confidential.

__________________________________________
(Signature of Participant OR Parent/Guardian)   (Date)

__________________________________________
(Printed Name of Participant OR Parent/Guardian)