A NATION THAT IS RELIGIOUS

INDONESIA, THE AHMADIYAH, AND THE STATE’S SARA ECHOES

by

Daniel C. Bottomley

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Relations

Spring 2014

© 2014 Daniel C. Bottomley
All Rights Reserved
A NATION THAT IS RELIGIOUS

INDONESIA, THE AHMADIYAH, AND THE STATE’S SARA ECHOES

by

Daniel C. Bottomley

Approved:

Gretchen Bauer, Ph.D.
Chair of the Department of Political Science & International Relations

George Watson, Ph.D.
Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences

James G. Richards, Ph.D.
Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed:

________________________________
Alice Ba, Ph.D.
Professor in charge of dissertation

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed:

________________________________
Aaron Fichtelberg, Ph.D.
Member of dissertation committee

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed:

________________________________
Muqtedar Khan, Ph.D.
Member of dissertation committee

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed:

________________________________
Patricia Sloane-White, DPhil.
Member of dissertation committee
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A work of such (personal) magnitude as this cannot be undertaken without the support and guidance of friends and family. I would first like to thank my dissertation committee: Alice Ba, Aaron Fichtelberg, Patricia Sloane-White, and Muqtedar Khan for their thoughtful advice and patience throughout the research and writing process. I would especially like to thank Aaron, whose levity and constructive comments helped momentarily keep the dissertation stress monster at bay, and Patricia, whose insight really helped develop my voice and vantage point. A big thank you also goes to my chair, Alice Ba, who constantly reminded me to focus on the big picture and not go off chasing tangents (an arduous task to be sure). I would also like to thank the Institute for Global Studies and Nancy Guerra, who have shown tremendous support and encouragement throughout the writing process and kept me on course to (finally) finish what I had started.

Tony Rivera has been a great sound board throughout, and I cherish the conversations we’ve had and continue to have. Fun fact: Tony is the friend mentioned in the opening paragraph, so without him mentioning Indonesia and the Ahmadiyah a lifetime ago I might not have written this dissertation. Others to thank include Dustin Parrett, Ryan McCabe, Rachel Garcia, and numerous Political Science Graduate Students who made the program feel like a big cooperative instead of a competition.

Redhi Setiadi deserves so much credit for his help both in Delaware and Indonesia. From chatting with me in Indonesian over coffee at Brew Ha Ha to helping with translations to connecting me with Surabayan Ahmadis to helping me find a hotel
and letting me use his motorbike, Redhi has been a crucial supporter of my research and writing. *Terima kasih banyak Mas!* Others to thank on the Indonesian side of the world include Bu Peni, Pak Gatut, and my Indonesian instructors at Universitas Negri Malang (Mas Kusen, Mbak Ardhana, Mbak Risca, and Mbak Wuri) who helped prepare me for the arduous task of interviewing in Indonesian. *Kelas Lombok Yeaaaah!* A special CLS thanks goes to Amanda Buonopane for the great discussions on Indonesian research, pointing me in the right direction for publishing, and of course for introducing us to our rescue dog Louie.

I have to also send a thank you to my family for the love and support they have shown me throughout this process. They never asked me why it was taking so long to finish and always remained a positive influence. Earl Simon Semar’s attitude made me laugh during the most stressful of writing sessions, and he deserves his own thanks here. Special thanks also goes to my mom who taught me to keep going and not give up on my academic dreams. I may never be an engineer, but thank you mom for telling me that’s okay.

Lastly, I thank my wife/editor/amazing mother to our newborn daughter Mae, Caitlin. I’m finding it difficult to accurately describe how important you have been to getting this thing done, but just know that I would never be where I am today without you and I love you dearly. This dissertation is dedicated to you and Mae, truly.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. vii
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... viii

Chapter

1 AN INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
2 THEORY AND METHOD .................................................................................................... 59
3 KTP NATIONALISM AND THE FIRST SARA ECHO ......................................................... 102
4 LOCALIZED NATIONALISM AND THE SECOND SARA ECHO ............................. 132
5 YOUTUBE NATIONALISM AND THE THIRD SARA ECHO ................................. 170
6 A CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 207

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 240

Appendix

A IRB APPROVAL NOTIFICATION ............................................................................... 255
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Ahmadi mosque’s exterior. The office where we held our conversations is on the other side of the first floor green doors with the prayer room on the second level. The framed photos of the Indonesian President and Vice-President and the national symbol of Indonesia all appear directly above the doors pictured. Photo courtesy of the author........................................................................................................................................ 166

Figure 2: Photographs of the Ahmadiyah Caliphs from inside the Ahmadi offices. Note that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s picture hovers above the others. Photo courtesy of the author........................................................................................................................................ 167

Figure 3: Photograph of Mirza Tahir Ahmad and H. Amin Rais. Photo courtesy of the author........................................................................................................................................ 168

Figure 4: Framed portraits of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Vice-President Boediono, and the national symbol of Indonesia from inside the Ahmadi offices. Photo courtesy of the author........................................................................................................................................ 169
This study explores the Indonesian state’s role in the constitution, renegotiation, and regulation of Islamic and Indonesian identities through the Ahmadiyah controversy. The Ahmadis (a small sect whose beliefs regarding the Islamic Prophethood diverge from mainstream Islam) provide a lens through which state actions and non-elite reactions can be critically engaged and understood in Indonesia’s broader context and history. What it reveals is an Indonesian governing apparatus that continues to rely on SARA logics of discipline and control used under the authoritarian rule of Suharto despite Indonesia’s post-authoritarian transformations in government and governing. Through three cases of these SARA echoes of the past, snapshots of Indonesian nationalism emerge as the state’s evolving role in regulating Muslim identities in Indonesia and prosaic responses to the state can be better understood. Ultimately, the Ahmadi dilemma provides a partial glimpse into Indonesia’s ongoing national evolution and the means through which the nation is reproduced and disciplined.
Chapter 1

AN INTRODUCTION

The research you are about to read began with a simple phone conversation in 2008. While chatting with a close friend on politics and Indonesia, he mentioned a news report that had just came out about an Indonesian demonstration turning violent with several beatings caught on film and reported around the world. Having lived in Indonesia during the summer of 2006 and studying the language since then, I immediately wanted to know what he was talking about.

Here is what happened: On June 1st, 2008, a normally joyous occasion known as Pancasila Day was overtaken by violence during the festivities at the Indonesian National Monument (‘Monas’) in Jakarta. Pancasila Day is intended to commemorate Indonesia’s national ideology conceived under President Sukarno (1949-66), continued through the ‘New Order’ regime of President Suharto (1967-98), and has remained in effect during what is commonly called the post-Suharto Reformasi period (1998-present). In many ways, Pancasila has been the bedrock upon which the Indonesian national community was built and continues to regenerate in present times.

It was at the Monas site that the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam/FPI) brutally attacked a group of demonstrators advocating a position of
tolerance towards the Ahmadiyah, a small Islamic group whose beliefs concerning the Islamic Prophethood diverge from the mainstream. Having lived peaceably in Indonesia for several decades, the Ahmadiyah had recently come under heightened scrutiny from both FPI and the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI, a state sanctioned religious organization founded under the Suharto regime) prior to the Monas attack. With many of the victims still recovering from their injuries, the Indonesian government stepped into the escalating foray and issued a Joint-Ministerial Decree denouncing the Ahmadis for their divergent understanding of Islam and ordered the group to renounce their deviancy and return to the beliefs of conventional Islam (The Jakarta Post, 2008).

As someone unfamiliar with the situation, I was intrigued that a group such as FPI would attack not the persons who are committing the alleged deviant acts (in this case the Ahmadis), but rather those who advocate tolerance within Indonesia. However, as I began to read more about the situation and the unique position the Ahmadiyah occupy in Indonesia, I realized that FPI activities were not what was important, but rather the concept of Indonesia as a national community and the state’s connections to, and control of, Muslim affiliations and identities. As this empirical puzzle began to sort itself out and more pressing questions and puzzles emerged, my adventures in research began and have resulted in the dissertation you are about to read.
My driving empirical question is best thought of as follows: how does the Ahmadiyah controversy help us understand the Indonesian governing authorities’ role in the constitution, renegotiation, and regulation of the religio/national identity of Muslim-Indonesians and Indonesia writ large? Within this larger framework four important sub-questions emerged during the course of research: 1) What role does the post-Suharto Indonesian state have in ‘solving’ the Ahmadi dilemma?; 2) How is Islam integrated in Indonesia’s national identity?; 3) How are the Ahmadis constituted as ‘Ahmadi’s (What sorts of performatives are used in their constitution)?; and 4) What, then, are the implications for ‘Indonesia’ as a national community?

Second, there is the larger conceptual question guiding the empirics: How are the boundaries of Indonesian national identity and nationalism maintained, contested, disciplined, and differentiated through governmental Ahmadi actions and subsequent non-elite prosaic reactions? In essence, I propose using an Ahmadi lens through which to view Indonesia, and in so doing we are able to understand the limits of Indonesian Islam as it relates to the evolution of both the state and Indonesian national identity following the end of Suharto’s New Order regime. The Ahmadis, to be rather direct, are a community on the margins of Islam. By using a lens from the margins of
Muslim-Indonesian identity; we gain a unique perspective on Indonesia as a national community under the ‘stewardship’ of the state.

Through succeeding chapters, I will present what can best be thought of as snapshots of nationalism, brief openings in which we are able to view the Indonesian national community (however fleeting this may be), the Indonesian state’s evolving role in regulating Muslim identities in Indonesia, and the prosaic responses to state action and/or inaction. The commonality amongst these snapshots is an emphasis on symbolic acts and performatives that continually reproduce national identity and the Ahmadi’s religious position within Indonesia (although certain corporeal acts will be discussed too).

To provide focus and answers to the above empirical and conceptual questions, this dissertation’s case study chapters will focus solely on the Ahmadiyah Qadiani. ¹ While not representative of all Ahmadiyah groups, the Ahmadiyah Qadiani has been at the center of the religio-nationalistic debate under investigation. Three cases are offered that highlight the processes of nationalism and the disciplining of Islamic

₁ To simplify writing, maintain research cohesion, and adhere to the common Indonesian vernacular of not consistently differentiating Ahmadiyah groups, unless otherwise noted my use of Ahmadiyah or “Ahmadi(s) refers to Ahmadiyah Qadiani and not Ahmadiyah Lahore.
boundaries by the state for the sake of the Indonesian nation. All three cases are representative of what I have named SARA echoes.

The echoes refers to examples of the Indonesian state using the same logics of control over Islam and religious identity for the sake of the Indonesian nation evident throughout Suharto’s regime, albeit in diluted forms and manners. Taking the echoes as my unifying conceptual undercurrent, we are able to see their effects and paradoxes through the lived experiences of Indonesian and Indonesian-speaking communities. In this way, national reproductive processes are revealed, and ‘proper’ Ahmadi disciplining mechanisms are made clearer. The chapters are organized as follows: Echo Number One: KTP Nationalism; Echo Number Two: Surabayan Nationalism; and Echo Number Three: YouTube Nationalism. These cases represent diverse vantage points that when taken together provide a more holistic understanding of processes at hand than what could be gained otherwise. In other words, a broader portrait is revealed through the sum of the fragmented snapshots.

The remaining introductory discussion aims to contextualize the Ahmadiyah within Indonesian history and its contemporary Islamic tensions. First, I briefly discuss the Ahmadi’s understanding of the Islamic Prophethood that has been a source of consternation in Indonesia and elsewhere, and then differentiate the Ahmadiyah Qadiani from the Ahmadiyah Lahore. Often lumped together when discussing the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, the two factions have key theological differences, maintain
separate Indonesian organizations (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) and Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI) respectively), and are not equally (mis)treated by the Indonesian governing authorities or the Indonesian population writ large. To reiterate, my investigation highlights state actions and nationalist processes as they relate to the Ahmadiyah Qadiani and JAI, while the Ahmadiyah Lahore and GAI can be considered a potential avenue for further research.²

Then using the Ahmadiyah Qadianis' introduction to what would become Indonesia in the early 20th century as a starting point, I will discuss the mechanisms of Islamic control used by both the Dutch and Japanese occupiers (along with brief discussions of Islamic movements/organizations in the Archipelago during these eras), the creation of Indonesia as a national identity, and the incorporation of Islam in the state and nation following Indonesian independence (with special emphasis placed on suppressing Islam via Suharto’s SARA policy and the rise of civil Islam). I then survey the growth of what has been described as a ‘conservative turn’ (Van Bruinessen, 2013) of contemporary Indonesian Islam since the downfall of Suharto.

² For example, Indonesian governing authorities have clearly identified JAI as the offending blasphemous organization, not GAI. An analysis of intra-Ahmadi dynamics and their use of everyday symbols of nationalism has tremendous potential in understanding religious peripheries and the boundaries of national identity, but will not be engaged in this dissertation.
Of special note during this ‘conservative turn’ is the increasing authority of the aforementioned Indonesian Ulama Council; an organization that was first designed by Suharto to give Indonesian Islamic groups a (highly controlled) voice in Indonesian society but has in recent years taken to issuing fatwas against the Ahmadis and others (including liberals, secularists, and those who disagree with MUI’s view of Islam). Although Indonesian governing authorities are by no means required to follow MUI’s fatwas in regulating Islamic deviancy, the organization plays a key role in creating the ‘conservative’ context in which governmental decrees are being issued. Put differently, MUI and its fatwas act as avatars for Islam in Indonesia today. While this background is not the focus of this dissertation, it does inform the effects I explore through the SARA echoes and cannot be ignored.

This chapter ends with a restatement of the empirical and conceptual puzzles, the generative research questions therein, and my key findings. For now, let us turn to the genesis of the Ahmadiyah movement.

**Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the Finality of the Prophethood, and a Bifurcated Ahmadiyah Movement**

The history of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah movement began in modern-day Pakistan in the mid-19th century. In 1835, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was born in the small village of Qadian to a reportedly aristocratic landowning family, although his formal education was not representative of one with such noble birth. According to
his followers, Ahmad’s formative years were spent developing a deep love for learning and many of his days were spent engaging in scholarship and prayer. While this neophyte scholar pursued spiritual and academic endeavors, Islam on the Indian subcontinent was in a state of turmoil as British dominance and the challenge of Christian missionaries externally combined with intra-Islamic atrophy throughout the region. With a serious dearth of those willing to directly confront the missionaries, Muslim reformers and proponents were highly regarded and embraced in the greater Muslim community and among those most highly respected was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (Gualtieri, 2004).

At the outset, Ahmad was lauded for his continued success in promoting Islam vis-à-vis Christian missionaries and others. However, the respect earned by Ahmad early in his career soon turned sour as the Muslim community became mortified with his radical proclamations. Between 1868-1869 it was revealed to Ahmad through holy visions that God was pleased and would soon bless him to such a degree that royalty would bow before his presence. The steady stream of epiphanies continued, and Ahmad ultimately saw himself as a Prophet of Islam, one without human flaw in both activities and writings (Ahmad, 1996).

By declaring himself an Islamic prophet, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad challenged the very foundation of Islam, for the Seal of the Prophethood (Khatam al-Nabiyin) is one of the sacred tenets of Islam. According to Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad
was the final prophet to be seen on Earth until judgment day when Isa (Jesus) returns, and the Prophethood, which traces back to Adam in the Garden of Eden, was sealed upon the death of Muhammad. Thus, those who claim Prophethood status following Muhammad are not just wrong, but heretical in the eyes of mainstream Islam (Gualtieri, 2004).

Ahmad understood the precariousness of touching this ‘third rail’ of Islam and in his own writings distinguished himself from past Islamic Prophets. Ahmad argued that Muhammad was the last physical manifestation of a Prophet and indeed the Seal of the Prophethood is religious fact. However, there existed another path to the Prophethood through Zill (Zilliyyat), understood as complete and utter devotion to the Prophet Muhammad. This devotion is so intense that one loses their sense of being in the utter goodness of Muhammad and the devotee is rewarded by beginning to mirror the actions and essence of Muhammad. Ahmad explains this in his writings by stating that,

He who comes to God through this door is clad, by way of Zill. In the same mantle of Prophethood which is the mantle of the Prophethood of Muhammad. As such, his being a Prophet is not a matter for jealously, for he does not derive this status from himself but from the fountain of the Holy Prophet; and, that too, not for his own glory but for the glory and majesty of the Holy Prophet…my (Ahmad) Prophethood and Messengership is only by virtue of my being Muhammad and Ahmad,
and not in my own right; and I have been given this name because of my complete devotion to the Holy Prophet. (Ahmad, 2007, 4-5)³

Thus, Ahmad’s identity, soul, and very being cannot be understood without reference to Muhammad as devotion makes it impossible to distinguish the two. But at the same time, he is not the physical incarnation of Muhammad. In this reasoning, the body is the point of differentiation. Since he remains in the same physical form but has undergone a spiritual transformation, the Seal of the Prophethood is maintained. To the point, Ahmad wrote,

> Wherever I have denied being a Prophet or Messenger, it has only been in the sense that I have not brought an independent law nor am I an independent Prophet. I am a Messenger and Prophet only in the sense that I have received spiritual grace from the Messenger whom I follow, and, having received his name for myself, and through him, I have received knowledge of the unseen from God. But I have not come with a new law…I have been commissioned by God and I receive knowledge of the unseen from Him. Thus the Seal of Khatamun Nabiyyin remains intact, for I have received his name by way of reflection and Zill, through the mirror of love. (Ibid, 5-6)  

When making claims such as these, questions necessarily arise as to Ahmad’s relationship with Nabis and Rasuls. The differences between the two are explained by Muhammad Asad, who writes in his translation of the Qur’an that,

> …According to most of the commentators, the designation “apostle” (Rasul) is applied to bearers of divine revelations which comprise a

³ For full-disclosure, this passage was found at http://www.alislam.org, an Ahmadiyah Qadiani website.
new doctrinal system or dispensation; a “prophet” (Nabi), on the other hand, is said to be one whom God has entrusted with the enunciation of ethical principles on the basis of an already-existing dispensation, or of principles common to all divine dispensations. Hence, every apostle is a prophet as well, but not every prophet is an apostle. (Asad, 2003, 572)

While Ahmad agrees that Nabis are Prophets, he uses slightly different language for Rasuls, using the term, “messenger” instead. Moreover, he rejects the notion that Nabis and Rasuls are separated, and argues that,

…the literal meaning of Nabi is one who discloses the unseen after having been informed by God. Therefore, the title of Nabi would be justified wherever this connotation would apply. A Nabi has to be a Rasul, for if he is not a Rasul he cannot be the recipient of knowledge of the unseen. (Ahmad, 2007, 5-6)

What these excerpts demonstrate is that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad understood the severity of challenging the Seal of the Prophethood as a matter of Islamic theology, and developed a series of arguments to maintain its closure but allow for his claims to the Prophethood to be legitimate. Subsequently, the Ahmadiyah Qadianis maintain this approach as they believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was in fact an Islamic Prophet, albeit one without a law or religious book.

For the Ahmadiyah Lahore, the above discussion of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s status as a Prophet is irrelevant as the man was in no way, shape, or spiritual form a

_____________________

4 Which also represents the furthest we will discuss these issues as Islamic theology is not the focus of this dissertation.
Prophet. For this group, founded shortly after Ahmad’s death by Mulana Muhammad Ali, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prominent figure as a reformer (*mujaddid*) and source of inspiration for the group, but the Seal of the Prophethood is ironclad. Thus, we see that the Ahmadiyah Lahore are much closer to mainstream Islam than their Qadiani counterparts, and emphasize that despite what may be published, Ahmad was not a Prophet (Esposito, 2004).

The Ahmadiyah Qadiani interpretation of Islam was first introduced to Indonesia in the early part of the 20th century. Here, returning Indonesian religious scholars had traveled to India in order to study the group’s doctrinal beliefs and became convinced that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was in fact a Muslim prophet. Along with an Indian representative of the movement, Ahmadiyah Qadiani beliefs began to spread throughout the archipelago as disciples traveled first to Sumatra and then Java to proselytize in the mid-1920’s. The responses from Indonesian Muslims (who are primarily Sunni Muslims) to Ahmadi efforts were tepid as counter-arguments were not dynamic and the group achieved a handful of adherents. However, as Indonesian Muslims learned more about the Ahmadiyah perspective and teaching methods, more effective methods of countering Ahmadi efforts were developed in Sumatra, and new Ahmadi followers began to dwindle (Federspiel, 2001).

In 1925, the Ahmadis expanded their religious efforts to Java and engaged a number of Muslim organizations, most notably Muhammadiyah (discussed below),
who challenged the Ahmadi campaign as some of their members found the Ahmadi message appealing and joined the Qadiani sect. When Muhammadiyah leaders denounced the group as un-Islamic, some of its members who had moved towards the Qadiani perspective still believed the Ahmadiyah were legitimate and Islamic. These followers splintered off from both Muhammadiyah and the Qadiani message to form Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (the Ahmadiyah Indonesia Movement, otherwise known as GAI) in 1928. The splinter group was active in differentiating itself from the Qadiani and emphasized the Lahore perspective on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. As for the Ahmadiyah Qadiani, they too formed a religious organization in Indonesia that is known as Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation, otherwise known as JAI) (Federspiel, 2001, see also Zulkarnain, 2005, and Burhani, 2013).

Two important points emerge from this discussion. First, the Ahmadiyah movement cannot be defined as a monolithic perspective in Indonesia. The theological differences between the Ahmadiyah Qadiani and the Ahmadiyah Lahore are critical and real. We see that the Lahore perspective is much closer to that of mainstream Islam as they refuse to accept Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as anything but a spiritual reformer who provides religious inspiration and motivation. On the other hand, the Ahmadiyah Qadiani believe that the term Prophet and the Seal of the Prophethood are not as closed as other Muslims claim it to be. Here, the group
maintains that the Seal refers specifically to the body, the actual physical being. To amalgamate the two groups without acknowledging their differences is a critical omission.

To reiterate this point, the laws discussed later in this piece were passed with JAI as the target, not GAI. Whereas JAI has been limited in disseminating information and public displays of their religious identity, GAI has avoided the central government’s restrictions and is still free to display the word “Ahmadiyah” in the public sphere. Moreover, GAI’s official Indonesian mission language (www.ahmadiyah.org) emphasizes the GAI/JAI bifurcation by stating in no uncertain terms that there is no structural, organizational, or ideological relationship between the two groups and GAI cannot be held responsible for all of the controversy surrounding JAI.

Second, while the events under discussion in this dissertation are recent, the histories of Ahmadiyah Qadiani and Lahore are extensive. To understand the current conflict in the terms discussed above, we need to revisit the past and explore the unique relationship Islam in the broad sense has had with governing authorities and Indonesian national identity. In the following sub-section, I begin by discussing the role of Islam in the archipelago while under Dutch colonial authority in the 20th century (which is highlighted by Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje’s Dutch Muslim policies) and during the WWII Japanese occupation. I then transition to Islam’s place
in the struggle for independence (especially the Jakarta Charter). From there, I discuss the state’s treatment of Islam under the Sukarno and Suharto regimes as the definition of ‘acceptable Islam’ continued to be negotiated. Of special importance here is the emergence of Civil Islam and Suharto’s SARA policies. I then bring the sub-section to a close by discussing Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia by examining the increased independence of the quasi-governmental Indonesia Ulama Council and the ‘conservative turn’ in Indonesian Islam.

Throughout this overview I will also reference various streams of Islamic thought present in Indonesia throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Important organizations, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) have long contributed to the discussion of Islam in Indonesia, and are important signifiers of the modernist and traditionalist thinking that have become shorthand for discussions of Indonesian Islamic thinking. With that in mind, let us return to the Dutch East Indies of the early 20th century.

**Islam and the Early 20th Century Dutch East Indies: Apolitical Islam, Ahmadi Recognition, Ahmadi Condemnation**

During the twilight of Dutch colonial rule, serious revisions were made to what was considered the ‘proper’ role of Islam in the East Indies, thanks in large part to the efforts of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. As one of the founders of the Ethical Policy for Dutch colonialism, Snouck was troubled by the Dutch colonial authority’s
seeming lack of Islamic knowledge (e.g. assuming that Islam was organized through a hierarchical papacy that was threatening to colonial rule and entrenched with the pilgrimage to Mecca) and severe restrictions placed on Islam (such as placing limitations on who would be permitted to travel to Mecca), and published extensively to assuage fears of Islam and correct misconceptions that Muslims were not in and of themselves sworn to overthrow the colonial nonbelievers (Pringle, 2010, see also Benda, 1958).

Snouck was the first Dutch colonial leader of note to recognize the importance of *adat* (customary law) for the Muslims living in Dutch East India. As Islam diffused throughout the archipelago and become the prominent religion, it was forced to absorb and blend with local cultures and customs that (for Snouck) imposed certain limitations and restrictions on Muslims in social and legal realms. However, this is not to say that Islam was to be viewed as subsidiary to *adat* or as a passive vehicle for religious experiences. On the contrary, Snouck warned that Islam as a religious and political force was not to be taken lightly. Meaning that on the one hand Christian missionary activities were not likely to be successful, and (more important for this discussion) on the other, there was always a latent worry that a minority of Islamic ‘radicals’ would go on an Islamization mission across the archipelago and begin a ‘holy war’ against the colonial authorities to establish an Islamic regime. This was
especially true on Java, where Snouck argued that the peasants had absorbed just enough Islamic doctrine to justify doubting Dutch colonial authority (Benda, 1958).

So, for Snouck there was a delicate balance to be had vis-à-vis Islam and Dutch colonial power, Islam itself was not to be viewed as a religious threat, but rather political Islam (e.g. Islam and Islamic law used as a political force) was the enemy. Therefore, the solution was to allow Islamic practices to exist without suppression (especially concerning lifting the restrictions on making the pilgrimage to Mecca) any sort of Islamic practice that ventured into the political realm (especially Islamic law) was to be met with resounding force. Moreover, external Islamic factors were to be contained and removed (Ibid, see also Pringle 2010 and Bowen, 1996). Thus, under Snouck’s guidance,

…scholars and administrators in the Dutch East Indies began to distinguish between ‘Islam as worship’, which, resembling European notions of religion, was to be encouraged, and ‘Islam as politics’, which, contradicting European notions of what a liberal, civil society ought to be, and posing a real danger to colonial domination was to be opposed as ‘foreign’ and superficial, in contract to the deep, ‘native’ norms of culture and adat… (Bowen, 1996, pg. 12)

So, Snouck’s reorientation removed Islam from the margins of colonial society and Dutch rule, but only just so. What we see is that the religion itself is not an issue for maintaining colonial authority, but the entire colonial apparatus is undermined when the ‘natives’ bring their religion into the political realm. In other words, Islamic
worship was acceptable, going on pilgrimages was fine, but it needs to be kept apolitical.

It is in this environment that the Ahmadis arrived in the Dutch East Indies and spread from Sumatra to Java and other islands. For the Dutch, neither the Qadiani nor the Lahore sects were considered threats to their authority. For example GAI was registered by the Dutch as an official religious organization in 1930, and throughout the decade Ahmadi Qadiani representatives held public debates with Muslim clerics representing ‘mainstream’ Muslim organizations that were generally described as either Traditionalist or Reformist (Modernist) Islamic Organizations. Most notable of these were Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the aforementioned Muhammadiyah, which had also emerged in the same time period (Budiwanti, 2009; Hapsari, 2011; Burhani, 2013).

Highly organized and widespread, NU and Muhammadiyah have long dominated Muslim social and educational activities in the archipelago as they have become arguably the two biggest 21st century Islamic organizations in the world.\(^5\) Moreover, taken together, the modernist/traditionalist perspectives serve as a sort of

\(^5\) Survey results by Mujani and Liddle (2004) indicate that 9 million Indonesians strongly identify with Muhammadiyah while 38 million strongly identify with NU.
shorthand for Indonesian Islam in our current era. First organized in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Java, Muhammadiyah’s focus has long been on education and social works as the organization has (and continues to) establish hospitals, schools, and orphanages. Historically, Muhammadiyah’s reformist approach to Islam strives to, as Van Bruinessen put it,

…reform religious life by purging it of superstition, blind imitation of earlier generations, and beliefs and practices that are not supported by strong and authentic scriptural references. This includes especially relations with the spirit world, intercession by saints, and various forms of magic. (Van Bruinessen, 2013, 22; see also Asyari, 2010. See Alfian, 1989 for a history of Muhammadiyah under Dutch colonialism)

On the opposite end of the spectrum were NU and the traditionalists. Created in 1926 largely as a reaction to the reformist movement, its founding fathers’ perspective was born out of their dual role as religious scholars and traders and has

6 Although that is not to say that there is a rigid divide between the two perspectives in 21st century Indonesia as that would be a gross oversimplification. Indeed, the perspectives have become quite blended and other Muslim intellectual movements such as that of Nurcholish Madjid transcend the dichotomy.

7 Other reformist Indonesian organizations established under Dutch colonial rule include Al Irsyad and Persis (Persatuan Islam, or Islamic Union) the Ahmadiyah’s debates included a number of events with Persis representatives (Hapsari, 2011).

8 Which is not surprising considering NU’s base is in East Java and Surabaya (an important seaport and East Java’s capital). For more on East Java and its role in the current Ahmadi controversy, see chapter four.
since its founding been closely associated with traditional Muslim schools (pesantren) and education. However, education at an NU school is much different than what one would find in a Muhammadiyah institution as the teachers (kiai) have greater autonomy over what is taught, and understand Islam not just from what is written in the Qur’an or in hadiths, but also in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), pre-Islamic Javanese traditions, and in the value of,

…rituals such as the commemoration of the Prophet’s birth (Mulud), communal recitations of prayer formulas or of devotional poetry in praise of the Prophet, celebrations of the death anniversaries (khaul) of respected religious teachers and other saintly persons…They tend to be tolerant of the incorporation of local cultural forms of expression in their religious life. (Van Bruinessen, 22 see also Barton and Fealy, 1996, and Rickfels, 1981)

Notwithstanding this seeming tolerance of customs and traditions, strong condemnations of the Ahmadiyah from NU leaders emerged in 1930. Here, Muslim scholars at the 5th Congress of Nahdlatul Ulama in Pekalongan declared the group (amongst other condemning terms) apostates (murtad). Along with the previously mentioned condemnations of the Ahmadiyah, we see the group’s Islamic identity has been contested and revoked by Islamic organizations since colonial times (Budiwanti, 2009).

However, the Dutch colonial authority did not declare the Ahmadis apostates, ban the group from its religious activities in the public sphere, or physically remove them from the archipelago. Indeed, the Ahmadis continued debating other Muslim
organizations throughout the end of Dutch colonial rule as the Dutch essentially stayed out of the deviancy debates. Because this issue was over the spiritual role of Islam and what it means to be a Muslim (what beliefs are required and what central tenets are unassailable) not a challenge to the Dutch colonial authorities right to govern the East Indies, there was (following Snouck’s policy) not a crucial need for Dutch involvement.

While Snouck’s engaged policy towards Islam resonated in the archipelago, local Muslim leaders were upset over its implementation as the policy declined leading up to World War II. This included unrest over the Dutch policy of appointing nominal Muslims to administer Islamic institutions as well as banning polygamy practices (although the Dutch eventually reversed their position on the polygamy issue). Unfilled promises of funding Islamic Universities further deepened Islamic leaders’ Dutch resentment, but when the Japanese arrived during WWII, Islamic organizations suddenly found themselves a new ally and Islam found a place in the political sphere (Pringle, 2010).
The Japanese Occupation: Islamic Organizations Find a Political Ally

While on the one hand the Japanese occupation (1942-45) was especially brutal, it was also instrumental in bringing Islam and Islamic organizations into the foreground of political life (albeit in a highly controlled environment). Since at least the 1930’s the Japanese had been positioning themselves as friends and defenders of Asian Islam and understood Muslims and Muslim organizations as potential allies in their growing sphere of influence (Pringle, 2010, see also Hooker 2003 and van Nieuwenhuijze, 1958). Two prominent examples of this strategy are Muslim administrative appointments and the creation of Masyumi.

Although the Japanese maintained a much stricter form of oversight than seen during the latter days of Dutch rule, they were willing to appoint Muslims to various administrative positions. Resurrecting the Volksraad (Dutch-controlled Indies legislative council), the Japanese made sure to include a greater representation of Muslims and also gave Muslim leaders positions in the Office of Religious Affairs they never previously held (Pringle, 2010, see also Benda, 1958 and Anderson, 1961 for classic studies of this time period). Largely empty of wielding significant power

---

9 Especially when the WWII tide turned against Japan and the imperial power shifted its attention to pulling as much wealth as it could from the archipelago. One estimate (Kingsbury, 2005) is that approximately 300,000 inhabitants were sent to forced labor camps; with few of those returning after the Japanese reign came to an end.
(those appointed to the Office of Religious Affairs were at best civil servants) these positions nevertheless represented an important shift in the visibility of Islam and Muslim leaders in the governing apparatuses.

Nowhere was this shift more apparent than with the creation of Masyumi. Part of a larger propaganda campaign designed to aid in the war effort, the Japanese brought together a number of major Islamic organizations (including Muhammadiyah and NU) under an umbrella group known as Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). In subsequent years, Masyumi would become a powerful political actor in Indonesian politics until it was banned by President Sukarno, but the key point here is that the Japanese recognized the importance of Islam, Islamic organizations, and Muslim leaders as political actors and actively sought to incorporate (or co-opt, as the case may be) them into the political realm as opposed to maintaining the Dutch’s segregation policies (Ibid). Admittedly, these policies were more symbolic than anything, and it bears repeating that the Japanese occupation was brutal and overwhelmingly restrictive. ¹⁰ But by

¹⁰ Not to mention insulting to Muslims. For example, the Japanese demanded that all inhabitants participate in a symbolic bow to the Emperor during all public events. While the Japanese eventually relented to mounting pressure and lifted mandatory bowing during Muslim prayer services, the bows continued for all other events (Pringle, 2010 and Taylor, 2003).
blending Islam and governing apparatuses created a new reality that an independent Indonesia state and newfound national identity would need to negotiate.

**A National Identity is Forged, A State Emerges**

Discussions of a unified Dutch East Indies under a single ‘Indonesian’ banner trace its roots to the first decades of the 20th century. Originally coined by George Samuel as Indu-nesian, an ethnographic term to be applied to the various peoples occupying the East Indies (although Samuel went on to reject it as too general) others, notably James Logan, picked up on the concept to describe the archipelago in geographic terms. Although used sparingly throughout the late 19th into the 20th century by a number of Dutch and European Scholars (including Snouck from time to time) the term lay largely dormant amongst those who would come to be identified as Indonesians (Elson, 2008).

However, there was at the same time a small group of East Indies students studying in the Netherlands who came together as a non-discriminatory support group for all East Indies students (e.g. membership was not restricted to just the Javanese, Balinese, or any of the other islands). From these humble beginnings a sense of solidarity and ideational connectivity amongst the diverse island cultures emerged, and in 1917 we saw the first recorded ‘Indonesia’ used by an ‘Indonesian’ when R.M.S. Suryoputro used the term in a public welcome in the Hague (Ibid).
While these young scholars were cultivating the seeds of a national identity, the Dutch were further exacerbating national solidarity (albeit unintentionally) by: 1) continually discussing the reasons against Dutch East Indies independence (which brought the question of independence to the foreground and highlighted what needed to be done in order for independence to work); and 2) implementing Malay as the common-unified language amongst the indigenous populations to maintain a societal hierarchy of Dutch and non-Dutch speaking populations while also using a language that could be understood across the archipelago for administrative purposes.

Seeing as the only native-speakers of Malay were from a small enclave on Sumatra, the indigenous populations were fortuitously presented with a unifying language absent the political baggage of Javanese or any of the other island languages that could be viewed as an example of intra-archipelago dominance. With this as the background setting, a national congress was held in 1926 to declare the existence of Indonesia as a national identity and Indonesian national persons (Pringle, 2010; see also Elson, 2008, Kahin, 2003 and Alisjahbana, 1966).

However, these newfound Indonesian nationalists were not the only group working to achieve independence from the Dutch. During the same period movements dedicated to establishing Islamic or Marxist states (as well as their splinter groups)
populated the Dutch East Indies. Emerging as a key leader for what would become the ‘Secular Nationalists’ was Sukarno. A pragmatic nationalist, Sukarno recognized that the three underlying group identities (nationalist, Muslim and Marxist) needed to put aside their differences and ideological conflicts in the name of national autonomy so that the colonial occupiers could be removed and an independent Indonesia could be achieved (Sukarno, 1977).

Further echoing the primacy given to national togetherness, Mohammad Hatta argued in 1930 that the idea of Indonesian unity is necessarily antithetical to uniformity in political thinking. Instead, the struggle for independence must pursue a policy of education in which, “…the population groups of the various islands must be made to realize that they belong to one and the same nation, the Indonesian nation” (Hatta, 1977, 326). What we see with these excerpts is a newfound primacy given to the Indonesian nation, a highly contentious identity that lacked saliency but was necessary for independence.

Needless to say, Muslim leaders were especially suspicious of this idea of nationalism and argued that Sukarno’s perspective was a facsimile of western

---

11 Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) for example, formed in 1912 and managed to unite the two factions until the Marxists split from the organization in 1920 over irreconcilable ideological differences (Reinhardt, 1971).
approaches to which separation (and, one may argue, subservience) of religion to the nation was required. On this point, Robert Hefner writes for these leaders,

Islam…provides a more meaningful basis for fraternity than Western-derived notions of ethnicity and socialism. In addition…Islam is not merely a matter of individual piety and private belief, like modern Christianity. It is a civilization social order, which is to say a complete and self-sufficient “system” unto itself. Its components cannot be artificially separated from one another, as Western liberalism’s separation of religion and state would require. (Hefner, 2000, 39 see also Effendy, 2003)

While Sukarno’s perspective emerged as the predominate approach to national unity, the debate over Islam’s role in the Indonesian nation continued as the state became more and more of a reality. In an attempt to maintain influence in the archipelago and support for their faltering war efforts, the Japanese declared their support for an independent Indonesian state in 1944. In 1945 the Japanese furthered these efforts by establishing a committee of highly vetted Indonesians to explore preparing the nation for Independence and start work on a constitution. It was here that Sukarno officially enunciated the principles of Pancasila that would become Indonesia’s national ideology, and a compromise was reached between committee factions over the place of Islam in Indonesia. Formalized in the working draft of the Indonesian Constitution’s Preamble (later known as the Jakarta Charter) on June 22, 1945, Indonesia’s leaders attempted to maintain cohesion amongst the committee members and ensure Maysumi’s continued Pancasila participation by stating that only
Muslims could be the Indonesian Head of State. Moreover, seven crucial words were attached to the charter’s deity description: all Indonesians believe in god, with Muslims obligated to carry out Islamic law (Hosen, 2005, see also Elson 2013, Pringle, 2010, Naustion, 1992, and Boland, 1982).

The Japanese, who still controlled the Indonesian territories, balked at the Muslim requirement for Heads of State as Christians in the eastern islands would never sign onto such a discriminatory provision. So the provision was removed from the Constitution, and as the document was finalized the day after independence was declared (August 17th, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrendered to Allied forces). The committee in charge of validating the Indonesian Constitution (the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI) decided to amend the Preamble and leave out the Islamic law stipulation in the final draft while also specifying that Pancasila’s belief in god requirement referred to a belief in one god (Elson, 2013, see also Elson 2009, and Ricklefs, 2008).12

The symbolic and practical implications of this decision are quite important to understanding the relationship between Islam, Indonesian national unity, and the

12 The five tenets of Pancasila are as follows: 1) Belief in One God; 2) Just and Civilized Humanity; 3) Indonesian Unity; 4) Democracy; and 5) Social Justice.
Indonesian State at the outset of independence. An explicit Islam and its requirements for Muslims became softened for the sake of national inclusiveness and a cohesive national constitution. Here we see traces of Dutch Islamic policies under Snouck whereby Islam is relegated to the background, but the key difference is that the decision was made for Indonesian national unity, not to better control colonies. The creation and widespread acceptance of a newfound Indonesian nation that has Islam but is not Islamic demonstrates a monumental ideational shift in the archipelago, and one that cannot be understated. For those leaders who demanded formal recognition of Islam in Indonesia, the adoption of Pancasila without the Islamic law provision was a defeat to their cause. However, the existence of the Jakarta Charter provided (and continues to provide) a precedent for putting an Islam grounded in Islamic law in the foreground of Indonesian society for Muslim-Indonesians. Moreover, not everyone bought into the idea of an Indonesian Islamic state, and Nationalist/Muslim tensions became more pronounced as time marched on.

13 Although Indonesia would still need to fight a war of independence against Allied forces who wanted to reassert Dutch control of the archipelago following Japan’s defeat that lasted until the Dutch recognized Indonesia in 1949. The most famous battle of this period, The Battle of Surabaya, will be discussed in Chapter 4, but if the reader is interested in learning more about the war for Indonesian independence against Allied Forces, please see Ricklefs, 2008, Reid, 1974, and Drakeley, 2005.
Early Efforts for an Islamic State

The initial years following the declaration of Indonesian independence further exacerbated these differences as desires for an Islamic Indonesia continued in earnest. The Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) movement is the most prevalent of these efforts as decentralized groups (primarily in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh) came together in order to achieve the same general goal: create the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, often abbreviated NII). Led by S.M. Karatosuwiryo, the Masyumi Politician who emerged as the leader of Darul Islam, the movement declared in 1948 that the Indonesian Republic was dead as NII represented the true Indonesian revolution.

As the Dutch finally conceded all territorial claims, Darul Islam continued their fight for an Islamic state against Indonesian governing forces. However, with the capture and subsequent execution of Karatosuwiryo in 1962, the movement lost its critical leader and began to fizzle out (although a Darul Islam underground movement persisted throughout the Suharto regime, and has resurfaced from time to time.

14 Thanks in part to Indonesian leaders accepting the Renville Agreement which ceded West Java territory to the Dutch in exchange for a certain qualified independence. When the Indonesian military pulled out, Indonesian Islamic Militants remained to continue a guerilla campaign, and Karatosuwiryo emerged as their key leader (Dijk, 1981, see also Kingsbury, 2005, and Temby, 2010).
throughout the 21st century). All told, 15,000-40,000 people died in the Darul Islam revolts as the Indonesian National Army (including a young Lt. Col. named Suharto, who had an entire battalion defect to Darul Islam in 1955) became quite distrustful of those committed to an explicitly Islamic state (Fealy and Hooker, 2006; Pringle, 2010; Van Bruinessen, 2013; Temby, 2010).

In addition to the military campaigns waged by Darul Islam, Islamic political parties still mainly organized under the banner of Masyumi15 eagerly awaited their opportunity to run in parliamentary elections so that Indonesia could be reassembled with an explicitly Islamic foundation. Change in this case was to come through Indonesian governing institutions rather than armed conflict. However, when elections were held in 1955,

…just under 44 percent of voters registered support for Muslim parties, half the tally some Muslims had expected. In the Constituent Assembly elected to draft a new constitution to replace the provisional unitary constitution of 1950, the failure of Muslim groups to attain numerical superiority meant that the Assembly remained gridlocked on the question of the place of Islam in the state. (Elson, 2010, 330)

From the vantage point of the Indonesian governing authorities, we see that using Islam for explicitly political purposes (or in the case of Darul Islam, an insurgency) were not popular amongst the governed and/or widespread in the early

15 Which NU left in 1952 to form its own political party, thus leaving Masyumi squarely in the modernist Islam camp (Fealy, 2007).
years of the Republic. An ambiguity existed in how exactly Islam was to be incorporated in the Indonesian state that repeated the debates seen in the 1945 constitution and the revisions to the Jakarta Charter. No doubt Islam was a powerful force in Indonesian society during this timeframe, but it was an Islam under certain hazy conditions.

Sukarno’s subsequent actions provided lucidity as to how the government would incorporate Islam into the state. In 1959, he dissolved the Assembly working on a new constitution, reinstituted the original 1945 Constitution (which to reiterate did not include the Jakarta Charter’s Islamic law provisions), and in 1960 eliminated Masyumi because of their purported activities in leading a failed anti-Communist rebellion (Ibid).

So, from the earliest days of independence Islam remained a source of faith and inspiration for Indonesian Muslims but remained marginally influential in the political arena. Discussions of an Islamic state were objectionable to President Sukarno, members of the Indonesian national military, and Indonesian voters. The lack of support for Islamic political parties combined with a strong belief in national unity to undermine efforts at forming an Islamic state. With the rise of Suharto, the state would emerge as the nation’s ultimate guardian.
New Order, The SARA Logic

With the fall of Sukarno and rise of the New Order regime of former President Suharto (1966-1998), religion and Islam in particular was not just marginalized, but explicitly subjugated.\textsuperscript{16} Beginning in the 1970’s, discussions of SARA\textsuperscript{17} (ethnic, religious, racial, and tribal issues) issues in the public sphere were considered taboo and subject to severe punishment. The reason for this was straightforward: Pancasila (or at least Suharto’s interpretation of it) created a holistic national identity; all other diverse (or potentially divisive) ideational constructs were necessarily subordinate. In other words, all Indonesians were Indonesians first and foremost. For the sake of this homogenous national identity and to maintain order, stability, and tranquility for the greater Indonesian national community, any public discourses that the state viewed as disruptive to national identity must be prohibited as the modern Indonesia was meant for the modern Indonesian (e.g. no Muslim-Indonesians or Catholic-Indonesians, only Indonesians) (Bertrand, 2004; Yoon, 2006; Thung, 2004; Rosaldo, 2003).

\textsuperscript{16} The fall of Sukarno, the rise of Suharto, and the resultant communist purge is far too complex for me to do it justice in this dissertation. If the reader is interested in learning more about it, I would recommend s/he read Hughes, 1968 and Vittachi, 1967.

\textsuperscript{17} Suku, agama, ras, antar golongan

33
Examples of this national cohesion above all else approach to Indonesian society included the government’s introduction of a *Pancasila* indoctrination program (known as P4), the creation of *Pancasila* Moral Education (PMP) in the 1970’s and the adoption of mass organization legislation (*Undang-Undang Nomor 8 tahun 1985*) in the mid-80’s that forced all social groups (including NU, Muhammadiyah, JAI, and GAI) to accept *Pancasila* as their sole ideological foundation (Porter, 2002; Purdey, 2006).\(^{18}\) Along with legislative mandates was severe repression of media outlets where any mention of SARA issues were scrubbed clean by government censors. Dissent was often met with violent oppression and severe human rights violations. One of the more famous examples of this is a case from 1984 where Indonesian armed forces killed 28 Muslim demonstrators who were incensed over the soldiers despoiling their mosque by entering it without taking their shoes off, but there are numerous other examples of the New Order making dissenters disappear as violent suppression was the preferred technique to solving SARA disputes (Ibid, see also Siegel, 2006, Eklof, 2004, and Hill and Sen, 2005).

\(^{18}\) JAI was acknowledged by the Indonesian government as a legal entity in a 1953 Minister of Justice decree and announcement in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia, GAI was registered by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1963 (Burhani, 2013, see also Zulkarnain, 2005).
However, despite severe crackdowns on impromptu demonstrations/dissent, Suharto would allow for certain Islamic grievances to be addressed, albeit in a highly controlled environment where national unity was in no way threatened by religious organizations.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover Suharto created The Indonesia Ulama Council to give Muslim leaders a forum to issue recommendations for the government to follow and issue fatwas for the Muslim population in Indonesia (within certain state-determined parameters, of course). For much of the New Order period then, the SARA logic dominated Indonesia as open dialogue was sacrificed by the state for national solidarity, stability, and tranquility. In other words, Indonesia as a national identity was \textit{all} that really mattered (Bertrand, 2004 see also Emmerson, 1976).

Returning to the previous discussions, the New Order regime and the SARA logic mirror the goals of the external occupiers. In all instances the primary ends were societal stability and control, but the means of getting there varied. For the Dutch this meant keeping Islam and Islamic organizations separate from the political sphere, for the Japanese, this meant incorporating Islam and Islamic organizations into their (repressive) political sphere. During the SARA era these two principals were blended

\textsuperscript{19} Who were continually reminded (warned) of the dangers they ran by challenging \textit{Pancasila}.\hfill
together to produce a system that strictly enforced an apolitical Islam, but one that could be expressed in (highly controlled) public forums.

However, the key difference between SARA and what came before it is the existence of, and sacrifice for, the Indonesian nation. Whereas the Dutch and Japanese were external occupiers of the archipelago, SARA came about by and for Indonesian national identity. Control was not based on the perpetuation of a colonial holding or an Asian empire. Instead, it was based on the idea of an Indonesia, one where national unity was the most important ideational construct and all threats to said unity must be eliminated. Thus, the creation and maintenance of an Indonesian nation represents a critical disjunction from previous eras as the new ‘modern’ Indonesia and Indonesians were to be kept together at all costs regardless of the effect on (or detriment to) Islam. With the decline and downfall of Suharto, one might assume that SARA has ended, but the logic still reverberates in Indonesia vis-à-vis the Ahmadis in the form of SARA echoes.

**The Growth of Civil Islam**

Shifting perspectives for a moment, Islamic organizations/groups/movements did not suddenly disappear during the New Order. Indeed, groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah still existed, and despite Masyumi’s dismantling under Sukarno its political leaders were still active in Indonesia. Under the repressive Suharto regime Muslim leaders understood that it was of little use to challenge the state directly, as
that would most assuredly result in a severe governmental response. Instead, there came to be a focus on religious appeal programs (known as *dakwah*) in Indonesian society. In so doing, the hope was that Islam would have a place in the public sphere while still being under the strict control of a state determined to preserve national unity at all costs. Much as we have seen during past eras, Muslim groups adapted to the governing machinations in the archipelago. However, in this case two groups emerged that, while agreeing on the utility of *dakwah* programs, maintained different goals for Indonesian Islam (Hefner, 2001, see also Barton, 1997).

On the one hand were Masyumi’s former leaders, who were interested in building a mass movement in order to retake the state and institute an Islamic reorientation. *Dakwah* was viewed in utilitarian terms; it could be used to build a widespread following to challenge the state’s control. On the other hand were young western-educated intellectuals who viewed the Islamic state as an exercise in futility. Led by Nurcholish Madjid (and also NU’s Abdurrahman Wahid, who would go on to become President following the New Order’s collapse) in the early 1970’s, this faction advocated a cultural approach to Islam that blended western and Islamic traditions and pledged allegiance to Indonesia while also promoting,

… Muslim devotion, to find in Islam cogent answers to practical social problems, to desacralise purely temporal and non-transcendental aspects of Islam, and to strengthen Muslim influence in society within the political restraints of the New Order, while at the same time
strongly supporting religious tolerance and pluralism. (Hefner, 2000, 115, see also Kurzman, 1998, Dalacoura, 2003, and Barton, 1997)

Emerging as ‘Civil Islam’, Madjid realized that the Islamic community was partly responsible for its lack of influence in the New Order, and instead of repeating past failings (as seen in the failures of Masyumi, Darul Islam, and others) a different approach was necessary. New and old organizations were needed to promote a spiritual revival amongst the Indonesian Muslim community, not political parties. Creating an Indonesian Islamic state was misguided and imprudent for the Indonesian context. Instead, if Muslims wished to have any sort of political clout they needed engage in politics by alternative means. Meaning, there needs to be a focus on a Muslim civil society that would offer a counterforce to the power and strict control of the state while at the same time promote pluralism, social justice, and other traditions commonly associated with civic republicanism in western democratic thought (Hefner, 2001, see also Barton, 1997, and Fealy, 2007).

While these groups deliberated the worth of an Indonesian Islamic state, the late 70’s and early 80’s saw an Islamic revival in Indonesia despite the SARA restrictions and increased state involvement in Muslim organizations. While fundamentally out of the Indonesian political structure, Muslim organizations nevertheless proved quite adept at negotiating the state’s political terrain (ex. Muslim organizations successfully campaigning against a national lottery). Moreover, as the
political arena was essentially shut-out, Civil Islam with democratic and pluralistic orientations became increasingly popular (especially amongst the younger generations) and support for Masyumi’s leaders waned. Sensing that the tides were changing and that the growth of Civil Islam was a potential threat to his regime, Suharto shifted gears in the New Order’s twilight to accommodate a more pious Indonesian national community (Hefner 2000; Hefner, 2001 see also Schwarz, 1994, Abdillah, 1997, Effendy, 2003).

**Relaxed Restrictions, Reformasi**

In the late 80’s and early 90’s, Suharto eased religious restrictions as a growing comfort with Islam in the New Order government developed. This included relaxing some of the restrictions on Muslim practices, such as allowing Islamic garments (specifically the *jilbab*, an Islamic-head scarf) to be worn by publically educated students, the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association, launching a state Islamic bank, and Suharto (an *abangan* (nominal) Muslim) famously making the hajj in 1991 (Bertrand, 2004 see also Hefner, 2008, Emmerson, 1989, and Riddell, 2002).  

---

20 Regarding SARA media censorship: in the 90’s, the explosion of audio-visual content throughout Indonesia overloaded government censors who simply did not have the human capacity to review so much programming (Hill and Sen, 2005). This
Moreover, Suharto began ingratiating himself with conservative and modernist Muslim leaders in an attempt to balance the scales against the growing popularity of Civil Islam and its pluralistic bend. Soon, Muslim leaders from both camps were defending the New Order policies and came to support Suharto with a renewed vigor during the mid-90’s. For example, when Suharto launched a massive offensive against pro-democracy forces in 1996 that resulted in Megawati Sukarnoputri being forced out of her opposition party’s headquarters, modernist leaders argued that the opposition was under the spell of communism, a serious accusation to be sure.21 Further, as the Indonesian economy hit crisis status in 1997 and protests against Suharto mounted throughout the archipelago, Muslim modernists continued supporting the regime and accused these pro-democracy movements of being anti-Islamic.22 This was quite the surprising accusation considering Suharto’s longstanding mistrust of Islam, but it also demonstrates how effective he was at forming alliances with certain Muslim leaders (Hefner, 1997; Hefner, 2001).

phenomenon has increased exponentially with the internet revolution, and will be further discussed in chapter five.

21 See Hughes (1968)

22 See Pepinsky, 2009 for an excellent commentary on the New Order’s collapse during 1997-98 and the economic interests behind it.
While we can debate the motivations for making this ‘Islamic turn’ without ever reaching a definitive conclusion (especially following Suharto’s death in 2008) the reasons are extraneous to what we are discussing here. Whether for self-preservation or a genuine religious awakening, Suharto reversed course for the Indonesian state and started on a path that ran contrary to the long-running SARA program. Instead of viewing Islam as a potential threat to national unity, certain Islamic and Muslim elements/groups were incorporated in the state’s stewardship of the Indonesian nation (or at the very least experienced a détente of sorts). SARA, it appeared, was on the decline and with the fall of Suharto in 1998 a growing inclusivity emerged throughout the state.

During the early Reformasi years, Confucianism was reinstituted as the sixth recognized religion (Suharto made the decision to cease its recognition in 1979) and open discussions of SARA issues were permitted (Aris et al., 2004). The previously restricted public sphere, it seemed, had opened for dialogue, and the ubiquitous imperative to preserve Indonesian national identity at all costs dissipated. Suddenly, Indonesians were able to convey ideational differences; fragmentations that were earlier viewed as demoralizing to the national project. In other words, the dynamism in Indonesian national identity awoke from Suharto-induced hibernation as ideational connections transformed.
Coinciding with these social openings and newfound religious influence in the public sphere were opportunities for Islamic-centered political parties to run candidates for office. However, Indonesian voters have remained consistent in their preference for non-Islamic political parties. Between 2004 and 2009 patronage for Islamist parties and those parties which are based on Indonesian Islamic social organizations remained tepid at best. Further, voter support for PPP and PKS (parties that support the creation of an Islamic state) actually declined, going from a combined 15% of the vote in 2004 to 13% in 2009 (Saiful and Liddle, 2009, see also Lee, 2004).

This trend has continued throughout Indonesian elections. At the provincial level, the two strongest performing parties in gubernatorial elections by July 2008 were both explicitly secular in nature (PDI-P and Golkar). In the other cases, coalitions were formed not for ideological purposes, but to win elections. Moreover, in the same time period Golkar and PDI-P were time and again the biggest single party winners with 52 and 28 positions respectively (out of 335). PKB and PAN, parties based on Indonesian Islamic organizations, won a combined 10 elections while PPP and PKS won only seven. Simply put, victories were determined by coalition building based on voting math rather than religious convictions (Ibid).

After Suharto’s exit Indonesians have both been afforded the opportunity for public discussions of SARA topics demonstrated a continued preference for non-
Islamic parties that traces back to the 1950’s. Still, sanguine evaluations need to be tempered; for as Elson writes

…the place of religion, and specifically the influence exerted by Islamic organisation and Islamic ideas, in Indonesian politics and statecraft will continue to be a matter of contention, tension, even rancour. Rather than arriving at any finalised dispensation, there must be a symbiotic, continually renegotiated connection between the affairs of state and of religion, since the socio-political concerns and interests of most Indonesians are now so routinely connected to religious matters, and because religion is so deeply embedded in Indonesia’s national identity. (Elson, 2010, pg. 339)

Moreover, since 2005 a ‘conservative turn’ in mainstream Indonesian Islam was apparent as the Islamic views espoused by Madjid and others were largely rejected and replaced with an adherence to strict orthodoxy. For example during NU and Muhammadiyah’s 5-year congresses both organizations saw the ‘liberal’ elements of their boards removed (including some leaders who had given a lifetime of service to the organizations) and throughout Indonesia a number of groups and Muslim leaders emerged who were intent on eliminating so-called ‘deviant’ groups from Indonesian Islam (Van Bruinessen, 2011). Nowhere was this more clearly observed than in the Indonesian Ulama Council, whose composition and fatwas have grown increasingly conservative, especially as they relate to the Ahmadiyah. In the next section, I explore MUI and its institutional role in influencing the current direction of Indonesian Islam.
MUI: Providing Context to the ‘Conservative Turn’

Created by Suharto in 1975 and originally composed of government-appointed representatives of mainstream Indonesian Muslim organization, MUI’s role during the New Order period was to act as an intermediary between the state and Muslim communities. On the one hand, MUI issued recommendations to the government on sensitive issues and Islamic matters, but these were non-binding with the state often ignoring MUI’s recommendations. On the other hand, MUI was tasked with explaining the state’s policy decisions to the Muslim community to garner support for the regime and strengthen Islam within the state’s Pancasila framework. While theoretically there was supposed to be a two-way conversation between MUI and the government, in many ways MUI acted as Suharto’s Islamic ambassador during the New Order as it issued a number of fatwas antithetical to the beliefs of the larger Muslim community (such as supporting birth control in certain contexts) as well as refusing to engage the government on controversial topics.23 While the greater Muslim community had a lack of confidence in MUI, it nevertheless supported the

23 Others have described MUI during the 70’s and 80’s as Suharto’s primary institution for neutralizing political Islam (Porter, 2002) and the body best representative of Suharto’s bureaucratization of Islam (Hooker, 2003). For more on this, see Sirry (2013).
idea of an entity that could represent the community’s interest to the governing authorities (Van Bruinessen, 1996; see also Van Bruinessen, 2011).

Following the New Order’s demise, MUI moved toward independence from the Indonesian government and began asserting its own Indonesian agenda that included much more conservative Islamic elements despite MUI’s stated approach of “softening the hardliners, hardening the soft-minded” and its continued state support (Ichwan, 2013, pg. 61, quoting K.H. Ma’ruf Amin; Sirry, 2013). Admittedly, this was not an overnight development. During the presidency of B.J. Habibie (1998-1999) MUI was especially active in supporting the presidency as a means to legitimize the new Indonesia, but beginning with Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and continuing through succeeding years MUI has grown increasingly autonomous, self-interested, and continues to promote what Ichwan has called ‘puritanical moderate Islam’ (Ichwan 2005 and 2013).

This MUI Islamic orientation has four defining characteristics. First, MUI has become more legalistic and bold in its determination of halal and haram (acceptable and forbidden) acts and objects. MUI’s certification powers primarily relate to foodstuffs but have also ventured into banking, insurance usage, and political
leadership. Second, the composition of MUI has undergone a transformation as it has recruited and absorbed more radical elements of the Indonesian Muslim community. While groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU are still involved in MUI (albeit with conservative leaderships), other newer organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and FPI have become prominent organizational members. Compounding this issue is that MUI does not have a fixed membership process and since the fall of Suharto has used a quota system based on the number of Muslim organizations rather than the number of members for each Muslim organization to grow the number of Muslim organizations represented in MUI. Moreover, MUI has a ‘one organization, one vote’ policy that gives small groups such as FPI disproportionate representation and influence in MUI since they considered the equals of Indonesia’s large-scale groups. These structural issues combined with the explosion of conservative Muslim organizations in Indonesia and an overall lack of institutional oversight has provided a

24 Although MUI has been careful not to challenge the Indonesian state as Islamic or UnIslamic, a shrewd decision to be sure considering the history we have already covered.
space for radicalized elements to enter and assert control over MUI rulings. (Ichwan 2013, Widiyanto, 2013, and Human Rights Watch, 2013; see also Ropi, 2010).25

Third, MUI has increased its morally conservative presence in the public sphere through not just its rulings or recommendations, but also protests, demonstrations, and interceding in legal and political processes. For example, MUI was instrumental in creating anti-pornography legislation in Indonesia and actively worked to cease production of Indonesia’s version of *Playboy*. Finally, MUI has grown increasingly exclusive in its orientation towards the Indonesian national community. As opposed to thinking in national terms (e.g. we need to do what is best for Indonesia and Indonesians) MUI is chiefly concerned with defending the interests and identity of the *ummah* (e.g. we need to do what is best for Indonesian Muslims). While MUI still accepts an Indonesian state based upon the concept of *Pancasila*, the organization has adopted Islam as its ideology from 2000 onwards, and issued a series of decrees that demonstrate both Islamic boundary setting and MUI’s divisive societal elements in July 2005 (Ichwan 2005 and 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Hasyim, 2011, see also Gillespie 2007 and Olle 2009).

25 This is written with the caveat that Ahmadi organizations and other minority Muslim groups are not allowed to join MUI. More will be said on MUI’s discriminatory decrees later.
With these decrees, we begin to see the ‘conservative turn’ apparent in MUI and the greater Indonesian Muslim community. In a momentous decision, MUI issued a series of fatwas prohibiting religious pluralism, secularism, and liberalism and forbidding the practice of inter-religious prayers in Indonesia because these phenomena have created discomfort amongst the Indonesian population. In other words, the act was issued in order to determine how best to alleviate society’s ills and give guidance to the Muslim community in order to protect Islam (Sirry, 2013, Ichwan 2013, Widiyanto, 2013).

The key issues with these fatwas are both a lack of justification (MUI quotes nine Qur’anic passages to justify banning religious pluralism, secularism, and liberalism, but does not state what quote is intended to support which argument) and definitional ambiguity. The meanings of ‘pluralism’, ‘secularism’, and ‘liberalism’ are not fully transparent and left to the reader’s individual interpretation. Some scholars decided that MUI rejected all kinds of pluralism, secularism, and liberalism, not just the religious varieties. While others argued that the fatwa opposed religious pluralism in particular but all forms of secularism and liberalism were also to be rejected.26 As the controversy erupted MUI was forced to issue a clarification to state

that they were rejecting religious pluralism’, ‘religious secularism’, and ‘religious liberalism’ (pluralism, secularism, and liberalism within a religious framework).

However, this clarification came too late as the proverbial Pandora’s box had been opened and no authority had (or has) the means to completely control the resultant interpretations (Ichwan, 2013).

Also in 2005, MUI issued a scathing decree concerning the Ahmadi’s Muslim identity that updated its previous 1980 ruling and came just weeks after a mob attacked the Ahmadi headquarters in Jakarta and ended up destroying property and injuring several Ahmadi members. In the earlier ruling, MUI declared (without reference to the Qur’an or hadiths (Prophetic traditions)) that the Ahmadi Qadiani were considered excommunicated from the Islamic community as they are deviants intentionally misleading Muslims, and that MUI expects to be in continual contact with the Indonesian government on the Ahmadi issue. While the 1980 fatwa was unclear on what about the Qadiani was deviant and on what basis MUI was making this decision (as well as if it also applied to the Ahmadiyah Lahore) the 2005 fatwa provided clarification as well as increased anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Here, the Qur’an and

It also bears noting that not all MUI members agreed with this decree, and liberal groups such as *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL, Liberal Islam Network) exist in Indonesia to promote ‘progressive’ Islam. See Sirry (2013) for a discussion of the interplay between Islamic streams of thought in Indonesia and the resultant ‘war of ideas’.
hadiths were referenced extensively (as were other Islamic institutions) to emphasize the Ahmadi’s deviancy, the Qadiani/Lahore divide was ignored as both groups were considered heretical, Ahmadis were called on to return to the Muslim fold and the true teachings of Islam, and the Indonesian government was called on to stop the spread of Ahmadiyah teachings/beliefs in Indonesia by banning the groups, closing down their religious centers, and forcing them to cease all Indonesian activities (Ropi, 2010).

The key takeaway from both the 1980 and the 2005 fatwas is that while MUI may issue decrees denouncing the Ahmadis as deviant, the organization still needs the Indonesian state to act. Following the 1980 decision the state’s response was muted at best as it refrained from a widespread implementation of MUI’s recommendation. While the Ministry of Religious Affairs did issue a circular in 1984 stating that Ahmadiyah Qadiani deviate from mainstream Islam in Indonesia and that all Ministry of Religious Affairs offices should keep a close eye on the Ahmadi community to maintain societal stability and religious harmony, it lacked authoritative ‘teeth’. For instance, the Minister of Religious Affairs did not issue the notice (a lower-level bureaucrat did) and the document itself was not meant for popular consumption as it was akin to a Ministry internal memo. Commenting on the document, Ropi writes that its use “…signified that the government intended to keep the dispute over Ahmadiyah as being merely an internal Muslim affair rather an acute national problem, which
required the involvement of a more authoritative governing body.” (Ropi, 2010, pg. 302)

But we also have to remember that in 1980 SARA was in full effect as Suharto’s *Pancasila* was being institutionalized throughout the archipelago. In 2005, the situation was much different as MUI was emboldened by Suharto’s demise, and the Indonesian governing authorities have chosen to act. In so doing, we see echoes of Suharto’s SARA logic as Indonesian governing authorities reassert control over this religious matter.

**In Sum…**

To wrap up this sojourn through history, I offer several important takeaways. First, the question of governing authorities ‘controlling’ Islam in the archipelago has been a constant presence. While different ruling bodies had different strategies, the need for a strategy was always there. Second, the creation of Indonesia as a nation and its subsequent independence represents the critical juncture in the archipelago. Instead of serving at the behest of external authorities, societal sacrifices were made by and for a truly national Indonesia. Third, the existence of an Indonesian nation was used by Suharto and the New Order regime to justify extreme SARA policies and maintain a strict ideational hierarchy; with national unity serving as the pinnacle of success and the state serving as its guardian. In other words, for the sake of national harmony and the nation itself, the state must maintain strict controls.
Fourth, as Suharto’s authority waned and Civil Islam grew in prominence to challenge the New Order, Islam in general and certain conservative and modernist Islamic elements more specifically experienced a revival in the public sphere. The view of Islam as a monolithic threat to national unity was replaced with a more accommodating perspective (at least for some groups) and SARA policies were relaxed. Fifth, with the downfall of Suharto we saw Indonesia become more open to religious differences and SARA discussions (while still maintaining an aversion to religious political parties), but then more closed as the ‘conservative turn’ of Islam and MUI established stricter boundaries for Muslims in Indonesia. The accommodation of different perspectives seen in Civil Islam has been replaced with austere definitions of what Islam is and who Muslims should be. At the same time, the Indonesian governing authorities have utilized SARA’s logic of control over Islam and the Ahmadiyah for the sake of national harmony.28

It is in this context that I explore Indonesian governing authorities’ actions (or inactions as the case may be) regarding the Ahmadiyah and the impact of these to understand: 1) The post-Suharto Indonesian state’s role in ‘solving’ the Ahmadi

_________________________

28 I write this sentence with the caveat that Civil Islam has not disappeared and an understanding that Indonesian Islam is not, nor has it ever been, a monolithic entity. When making these statements, I am referring to the majority perspective seen in the public sphere.
dilemma; 2) The integration of Islam in Indonesia’s national identity; 3) The
constitution of Ahmadis as ‘Ahmadi’s (the performatives used in their constitution);
and 4) The implications of the Ahmadi dilemma for ‘Indonesia’ as a national
community. To restate the larger conceptual question, subsequent chapters will
explore how the boundaries of Indonesian national identity and nationalism are
maintained, contested, disciplined, and differentiated through Ahmadi related
governmental processes representative of SARA’s echoes and subsequent societal
responses.

Subsequent Chapters

Following the theory and methods chapter, my ‘case study’ chapters were
selected for their diverse nationalist vantage points and are presented as reverberations
of SARA’s logic. By focusing on a few critical locations and cases, I am able to
approach the material from a different perspective and methodological commitment
than others who have studied this topic (namely Yanug Hui, 2013 and Menchik,
2011). The chapters start with the national echo, then move to Surabaya, East Java

29 Yanug Hui, Jeremy Menchik, and others scholars whose works are in progress
(namely Kikue Hamayotsu and Saskia Shäfer) looks at the Ahmadiyah in relation to
Indonesian religious intolerance from primarily non-state, quasi-state, or decentralized
state vantage points. My work flips the narrative and examines state controls of Islam
and the Ahmadiyah as they relate to the symbolic disciplining of the Indonesian nation
and the resultant SARA echoes that appear in both national and sub-national state
for a regional echo, and ends in the fragmented world of cyberspace to examine what happens when SARA and governing authorities are absent.

In chapter three, I return to where we started: the 2008 Joint-Ministerial Decree. I bring in Indonesian national identification cards (Kartu Tanda Pendidikan, commonly known by the initialism KTP and currently being refitted with electronic biometric measures to form e-KTP) to demonstrate the contradictions in SARA governing law when it comes to the Ahmadiyah and the need to incorporate everyday examples of Indonesian national identity. On the one hand, there is the law that comes just short of banning the Ahmadis and in no uncertain terms calls the group deviants who do not represent the Islamic faith. On the other, KTP is a constant reminder that one is: a) an Indonesian citizen recognized by the government as members of the Indonesian national community; and b) a member of one of the six officially recognized religions in the archipelago.

The contradiction comes into play because there are no restrictions placed on the Ahmadiyah for which religion they must choose nor is there a ‘none of the above’ option for Indonesians who are not members of any of the six religions. While belief is not necessarily part of this equation (a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘Islam-

apparatuses as well as amongst cyberspace users. My goal is not to disprove these scholars but rather add to their works by incorporating a different perspective. I would encourage the reader to examine all of these scholars’ works as they are excellent.
KTP’ the Ahmadis demonstrate a case where belief and self-identification are of upmost importance. Here, we see that the Indonesian governing authorities have given Ahmadis the means to challenge the 2008 Joint-Ministerial Decree on an everyday basis by showing that just like every other mainstream Indonesian Muslim they have “Islam” marked on their national identification cards.

The methods for this chapter rely on both textual analysis of the Joint-Ministerial Decree (which I and others have translated into English) and interviews with Indonesian government officials in Malang, Indonesia during the summer of 2012 as well as interviews with Ahmadi members in Surabaya, Indonesia also in the summer of 2012. Taking place at a local government office where one applies for KTP, the interviews with the government official focused primarily on the process for obtaining KTP and also discussed the religious requirements of the card. By combining texts with lived experiences, a robust picture of the Indonesian national identity as it relates to national laws and the tensions therein comes to light.

Chapter four primarily focuses on the city of Surabaya for a discussion of the East Java Governor’s action against the Ahmadiyah. Here, Governor Soekarwo clarified the 2008 decree as it relates to East Java by further forcing the Ahmadis to the margins of religious society. This included eliminating all JAI identification on the exterior of mosques and other buildings, banning the group’s public activities, and prohibiting distribution of Ahmadi materials. In this chapter, I explore the East Java
Decree as representative of the decentralization era in Indonesia and that the Governor’s Decree has the effect of challenging the national apparatus when it comes to protecting the Indonesian nation. This has created further ambiguity as to the Ahmadi position within Islam and Indonesia proper. While the Governor’s Decree was issued and intended to provide stability and tranquility for Indonesians living in East Java, my research reveals that it has in fact been a destabilizing phenomenon whereby the disconnect between official condemnation and implementation is exposed.

Textual analysis of the Governor’s Decree and in-depth conversations with representatives of the East Java Ahmadies and members of the Ahmadiyah community living in Surabaya reveal a case where, despite the visibility of Governor Soekarwo’s Decree and its condemnation of the Ahmadiyah, everyday life has not drastically shifted for the Ahmadi members I interviewed. In other words, the law is symbolic of protecting Islam and the Indonesian national identity as it exists in East Java, but beyond taking down signs, the routine machinations of religious life are still present. Thus, the robustness of the Ahmadi paradox is revealed and the transitory nature of Indonesia as a national community is exposed.

Chapter five examines a visceral attack on Ahmadi members in Cikeusik, Banten from 2011 that was recorded and uploaded to YouTube and explores reactions to what happens when governing control disappears and counterpublics have a forum
to interact with each other to discuss said video. While the attack itself was quite explosive, my focus is not on the recording itself but rather people’s comments about the recording. This is done to shine a light on narratives that are often overlooked as well as demonstrate the everydayness of nationalism in cyberspace. The anonymity YouTube provided for commenting on the video allowed for raw linguistic explosions, but in a featureless manner. Resultant consequences from commentators were muted since attribution in the physical realm is difficult: who is saying what is hard to determine. There is a certain freedom of expression when commenting or uploading videos to YouTube, but its location in cyberspace and the obfuscated nature of YouTube comments facilitates a certain insipidness that allowed for analysis.

The video I analyzed had a wide array of comments, mostly in Indonesian and translated to English for analysis, posted to discuss the video and its implications. Through the use of atlas.ti, a qualitative research computer program, I was able to conduct an in-depth content analysis in which several common narratives appeared from the text; I did not start the research with a keyword list in mind as I wanted the text to ‘speak’ to me and learn how this certain cyber community understands the Ahmadiyah as it relates to state controls and the Indonesian nation.

Chapter six brings the dissertation to a close and summarizes what I was able to uncover during the course of my research. These revelations are as follows: 1) Despite not being in power for over a decade, the Suharto logic for governing religion
remains visible in the Ahmadi dilemma; 2) Indonesian nationalism is best thought of as an elite-centered process that is perpetuated by ‘common’ Indonesians who continually keep the national identity alive; 3) The Indonesian governing apparatus has a severe lack of consistency when it comes to protecting the national identity from the perceived threat the Ahmadis pose; 4) Indonesia is in and of itself a transitory nation; and 5) The means of ‘proper’ ideational disciplining and SARA controls as they relate to the Ahmadiyah are reserved for the symbolic rather than physical realm. I then offer several pathways for ending the Ahmadi paradox and ultimately show that Indonesia is at a crossroads when it comes to religious differences and the Indonesian national community with no easy settlement in sight; which is exactly what is needed in its current reconstitution.

One final note before moving to chapter two: I am not trying to say that this research gives a comprehensive view of nationalism, Islam, or the governing authorities in Indonesia. Saying such a bold statement is beyond the pale of what my research is aiming for or capable of achieving. Instead, my intent is to temporarily isolate the phenomena in order to better understand meanings and gain further insights into the reconstitution of Indonesia. Then, this work can be situated within the larger literature on nationalism and on Indonesia so that a clearer picture of the whole may be revealed. With that caveat in mind, it is now time to discuss some theory.
Chapter 2

THEORY AND METHOD

The purpose of this chapter is to further clarify the terms and concepts described in chapter one and provide an overview of my preferred research method. The chapter itself is broken into three parts. In part one, I offer a brief summary on my use of terms such as ‘nationalism’, ‘nation’, ‘performatives’, and the like. This is done to clarify how I understand the more jargon-y phrases populating this dissertation as well as set up part two’s survey of nationalism.

My overview of nationalism and national constructs begins with Hans Kohn’s groundbreaking work in 1944 and is divided into two sub-categories: 1) Those interested in where nationalism and the nation ‘comes from’; and 2) Those interested in how these concepts perpetuate. As will be evident, my work falls primarily in the latter category.

Reacting to the nationalism-as-process literature, I take a holistic view and argue that elite and non-elite practices work in tandem to continually reconstitute Indonesian national identity. Nationalism is not solely an elite-driven phenomenon that focuses on so-called ‘high culture’ (architecture, monuments, paintings, and the like) or elite actions as seen in the writings of such notable scholars as Eric Hobsbawm
and Benedict Anderson. Instead, I argue that while elites play an important role in nationalism, the phenomenon is also reliant on laypersons to absorb and disseminate the nation through every performative action (seen in the works of Michael Billig and Lisa Wedeen, amongst others). In other words, a combined elite and non-elite analysis refines our understanding of Indonesian nationalism as highly visible acts/decrees/etc. play out in non-elite fragmented contexts.

Undoubtedly, Indonesia itself was a product of elite efforts (as we saw in chapter one) and national cohesion as it relates to the Ahmadiyah is presumably maintained through SARAesque legislative actions that keep the group on the margins of Islam. The logic of marginalization initiated under Suharto remains when it comes to what is considered destabilizing or disruptive Islamic religious issues at the macro, micro, and median levels. However, these efforts can and do emerge as contradictory and rely on ‘the masses’ to continually reconstitute the nation and abide by the embedded SARA logic. In other words, I take the elitism in nationalism as a starting point, but then study its national performance.

The third section offers a concise survey of the research methods used in collecting the ‘data’ under analysis. While discussed in passing at the end of chapter one the methods have provided guidance for conducting scholarship and it is important to discuss these as it relates to the research at hand. I conclude this chapter by bringing the subsections together to provide a comprehensive view of the
conceptual and theoretical scaffolding for this dissertation. For now, I begin with a synopsis of the dissertation’s key definitions.

A Discussion of Terms

Terms such as nationalism, nation, state, and the like abound with interpretations and meanings. To set up the conceptual framework for this and succeeding chapters, this sub-section will define the core concept of nation and then move into my understanding of nationalism, the state, and performativity before exploring them in more detail.

When I use the term nation or national community, I refer to it in the sense of an *Imagined Community* (to borrow from Benedict Anderson), in that it is an ideational concept centered on a sense of belonging and membership. What I mean by this is that the emotive connection to a national identity is crucial to understanding the state’s justification for its Ahmadi actions and/or inactions as well as the responses from non-elite laypersons. To understand this connection, the discussion is focused on the diffusive symbols of the Indonesian nation as they appear in legislative acts, amongst the Indonesian population, and in cyberspace. Through these symbols and their deployment, I argue that one is able to view certain snapshots of the Indonesian nation from the vantage point of the state ‘wearing’ an Ahmadi lens.

This leads to the second important term in this dissertation: nationalism. I define nationalism as the symbols and practices that continually constitute and
reconstitute the Indonesian nation. Discussions of national identity are sometimes difficult to research and describe as one can never ‘see’ a nation (or any identity for that matter), but the symbols of national identity (Independence Day celebrations, large-scale parades, museums of national history and/or cultures, national flags, etc.) are quite visible. However, these only reveal a portion of nationalism’s processes.

While noting the importance of flag waving at any Independence Day celebration, for example, my focus is not so much on the spectacles themselves, but rather on the time in between events. Here, I take a page from Michael Billig’s work on the subject and call it *Banal Nationalism*. To put it differently, we are able to see snapshots of the nation not just by waiving a flag during important national festivals, but by seeing the flag in a dilapidated classroom or as a pin worn on a businesswoman’s lapel on a random Tuesday in March.

The theoretical underpinnings of nationalism can be traced to the concepts of performatives and performative utterances. My use of these terms are heavily influenced by the works of (originally) J.L. Austin and (more recently) Lisa Wedeen, and focus on the action of everyday symbols and words as they constitute national identity. My argument is that while often ignored because they are not bombastic or highly attended, these actions ‘do’ things that have a dramatic impact. Moreover, their consistency is what sets these performatives apart from their celebratory counterparts. Because they are visible each and every day they become invisible in a sense, but
through this invisibility the national identity is continually reconstituted between large-scale parades, ceremonies, rituals, and the like.

As for the Indonesian state, I approach it as a multi-level governing apparatus that has traditionally been self-identified as the ‘Guardian of the Nation’ at the national level but has undergone important post-Suharto transformations. As we saw in chapter one, the state-as-steward perspective has a longstanding history in Indonesia whereby freedoms (religious or otherwise) were sacrificed for the sake of national cohesion and harmony; a sort of nationalism at all costs. All other identities (religious, ethnic, etc.) were subjugated in order to push for a sense of national unity and ensure its perpetuation. In the past 15-plus years since Suharto’s New Order regime was dismantled, Indonesia has undergone a series of procedures to diffuse governing authority at sub-national levels through decentralization\(^30\), and as a result these sub-national bodies have challenged the national government as the sole stewards of the Indonesian nation (discussed in chapter four). But nevertheless the state-as-steward approach to the nation remains in effect vis-à-vis ‘legitimate’ Muslim beliefs, which is contributing to the Ahmadi paradox in unexpected ways as SARA echoes permeate the cases under investigation.

\(^{30}\) Indonesian Islam taking a ‘conservative turn’ with MUI actively pursuing its own interests (primarily as the defender and definer of the Muslim community in Indonesia) independent of the state is also related. However, MUI is still reliant on the state to act.
To summarize, the following concepts appear quite often in the remainder of this dissertation: 1) Nation; 2) Nationalism; 3) Performatives; and 4) State. While I may use these terms in various contexts and cases, their definitions remain consistent throughout this piece. In the next section, I offer a survey of nationalism that is to a certain degree western-centric, but highly relevant to the Indonesian case. Throughout my writing I will offer Indonesian examples to contextualize the theories for Indonesia. With that in mind, I dive into my theoretical construct,

Nationalism: Concepts and Foci

Evidence of nationalism’s existence dates back to the 18th century (or longer, depending on the perspective), but the study of nationalism largely went under-theorized and underrepresented in academia until the mid-20th century. Prior to World War I, nationalism was examined in the realm of philosophers and ethicists. Political and social scientists, especially within the liberal and Marxist traditions, all viewed nationalism as ephemeral. This was a fleeting historical quirk that would soon wither away and be replaced with a reorganized international order. In other words, nationalism was present but not taken seriously for systemic inquiry and theory building (Smith, 1998, see also Özkirimli, 2000).

However, developments in the study of nationalism took a more scholarly turn with Hans Kohn’s The Idea of Nationalism in 1944, which for the first time began to
critically engage nationalism as a concept and, along with Carleton Hayes, ushered in a new period in the study of nationalism.

Kohn’s bifurcated definition of nationalism lays the groundwork for future debates over its origins. In his first definition, Kohn writes that,

Nationalism is inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding – without a complete revision of the position of ruler and ruled, of classes and castes. The aspect of the universe and of society had to be secularized with the help of a new natural science and of natural law as understood by Grotius and Locke…This new class found itself less bound by tradition than the nobility or clergy… (Kohn and Calhoun, 2005, 3)

Here we see the importance Kohn places on the origins of nationalism. Nationalism is reliant on a new understanding of the world, one in which the natural and the eschatological are compartmentally distinct. In other words, a revolution was needed before nationalism could be located.

Further,

The growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses into a common political form. Nationalism therefore presupposes the existence, in fact or as an ideal, of a centralized form of government over a large and distinct territory…Nationalism is unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. (Ibid, 3)

In this case the state, understood as a visibly defined territory with a central government, is essential for the emergence of nationalism. Without the state acting as a unifying force within its own territory, the populous has no incentive to coalesce into
one particular shape of peoples known as the nation. Clearly, this understanding of nationalism traces its roots to the enlightenment period in Western Europe and the volunteerist nature of entering first, the state (as indicative in a centralized government) and second, the “common political form” of the nation (see Smith, 1998).

The alternative approach to nationalism is understood as a ‘cultural’. The difference between the two is defined as follows,

Where the third estate became powerful in the eighteenth century…nationalism found its expression predominantly…in political and economic changes. Where, on the other hand, the third estate was still weak and only in a budding stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as in Germany, Italy, and among the Slavonic peoples, nationalism found its expression predominantly in the cultural field. Among these peoples, at the beginning it was not so much the nation-state as the Volksgeist and its manifestations in literature and folklore, in the mother tongue, and in history, which became the center of the attention of nationalism. (Ibid, 4)

For Indonesia, we see elements of both forms. The Dutch laid the groundwork for an Indonesian state by giving a roughly defined territory that was to be governed by a central authority and (nominally) incorporating indigenous peoples in the governing of said territory. Moreover, the creation of a ‘mother tongue’ for the archipelago was an unintended consequence of the Dutch: a) not wanting indigenous persons learning

31 The Volksraad advisory council that was later dissolved by the Dutch and resurrected by the Japanese is perhaps the best example. While non-binding on Dutch decision-making, it did incorporate indigenous persons into territorial governing (Benda, 1958).
Dutch for fear of them thinking they were their colonial occupiers’ equals; and 2) needing a language understood by the vast majority of indigenous peoples for the purposes of governing and administration (Pringle, 2010, see also Alisjajbana, 1966). This combined with the small group of East Indies students studying in the Netherlands discussed in chapter one helped bring forth the idea of an Indonesia that had a shared history, culture, language, and state governing archetype.\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover, Kohn is hinting at an important distinction between understandings that have triggered long-standing debates on the origins of nationalism. On the one hand, there are those who argue a position of continuity. In this case, nationalism is seen as an evolution of earlier ethnic communities; with Anthony Smith and John Armstrong representative of its most famous proponents. The other side, which will be discussed momentarily, sees nationalism as a product of modernity, a phenomenon necessarily linked to the economic, political and discursive innovations of the time.

Anthony Smith argues that nations emerge through protracted historical processes that both predate the modern era by centuries and coalesce around shared memories and traditions of populations who would become the nation. Providing the definitive definition of the nation and nationalism from Smiths ethno-symbolist perspective, Smith writes,

\textsuperscript{32} Although this shared history was a simulacra considering Indonesia did not exist until the 20th century. More will be said on this later.
By the term *nation*, I understand *a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single economy; and common rights and duties for all members*. By the term *nationalism*, I understand *an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation”*. (Smith, 2000, 3 (italics in original) see also Smith 1999, Hutchinson and Smith, 1999)

John Armstrong’s essential contribution to this discussion is that examples of ethnic consciousness permeate long before nationalism was conceptualized. Only through a wide-lens historical perspective can we avoid the trappings of modern-day conceptions of nationalism that does not allow for the inherently shifting terrain of identities and national boundaries. This position understands the nation as a shifting phenomenon that does not have some sort of ‘root’ upon which the nation grows. Rather, the nation itself is a mechanism of differentiation, a permeating process through with the internal is defined through and in opposition to, an external. Thus despite its mobility, national boundaries are real, tangible, and dense (Armstrong, 1982 see also Özkirimli, 2000).

On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find scholars situating nationalism squarely within modernity. Despite many of the scholars associated with this perspective (notably Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Tom Nairn, Eric Hobsbawm, Elie Kedourie, and Paul Brass) situating their works in differing theoretical contexts,
in each case the analyses proceed from the belief that nationalism is a product of modernity’s economic, political, and discursive transformations (Jones, 2008).

Gellner’s work proves to be quite useful in that he provides an erudite definition of nationalism that can be seen, in varying degrees, throughout the modernist scholars. He writes,

In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest. (Gellner, 1983, 1)

Kedourie emphasizes the constructed nature of nationalism and national identity, and that the overriding theme in nationalism is undying loyalty to the nation. In this case, nationalism is an expression of a national identity, to which allegiance is paramount. Gellner comes to a similar conclusion as to the origins of nationalism, stating that it is a self-evident fact that nationalism is invisible in earlier historical periods; the hunter-gatherer societies of human history up to 19th century Europe were simply not applicable to the concept (Lessnoff, 2002).

To put it differently, nationalism is the lynchpin to the nation, it provides the supreme political legitimacy in the modern era and demands the submission of ethnic boundaries to its overarching preeminence and the nation becomes the ultimate trump card. Yet, differentiation is still crucial to understanding these concepts. Namely, the
nation is a unique phenomenon that exists via exclusion and discipline. National boundaries are necessarily supreme and must be recognized as such. The enclosure must be solid and readily apparent.

A further refinement of this point comes from Benedict Anderson, who defines the nation as an,

\[ \ldots \text{imagined political community} \ldots \text{imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because other members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion...The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations...It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm...it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. (Anderson, 2006, 6-7) } \]

Anderson’s definition has become standard thoroughfare for studies of the nation, and is the understanding I use when describing nations. But beyond this concept there are certain congruencies between ethno-symbolist and modern conceptualizations: both perspectives regard national boundaries as mediating internal vs. external subjects. They are the dividing lines which determine who is ‘in’ or ‘out’.

For Indonesia, this boundary line has traditionally been under the purview of the state, who determines both who is a member of the Indonesian national community and how best to maintain this national unity in the face of existential/ideational threats.
While the fall of Suharto provided an opening for other sub- or non-national entities to contribute to its preservation, the basic logic of perseverance remains: the nation is a real ‘thing’ and must be protected.

Because of Indonesia’s inherent ideational (tribal, ethnic, etc.) diversity, which is to be expected with an archipelago of over 10,000 islands, sub-national identities are potentially divisive for the national community. Under Suharto, these threats were dealt with via SARA policies. In post-Suharto Indonesia, there is a sense of accommodation for certain groups (Muslims as represented in MUI being the prime example) but only just so. Note that MUI does not in and of itself issue legal decrees for the Indonesian nation. Its authority is restricted to a certain segment of the population: Muslims. It is the state who has the authority/societal control to determine how best to preserve the nation and in what manner; as it was during the SARA era.

As a national entity, undoubtedly Indonesia has a certain Java-centrism that permeates its ruling bodies and mythmaking tradition. Moreover, the Javanese concept of power that predates the modern era and is discussed in the next section does help us understand the decision-making and governmental structures in both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. However, to simply argue that Indonesia is an outgrowth of Javanese traditions omits key aspects of the national constitution (recall

33 Although MUI rulings have provided justification for others’ violence as detailed in Sirry (2013) and Olle (2009).
that the Indonesian language was the native language of a small population on Sumatra, not Java), and to simply assume a Java-centrism misses many of the intra-Javanese tensions discussed in chapter five. Moreover, to speak of an Indonesian nation is utterly reliant upon modernity as it did not exist until the 20th century.

For my work, the question is not whether Indonesia can be spoken of in one manner or the other, but rather what can be drawn from both perspectives in order to understand the nation as it relates to state (in)actions towards the Ahmadiyah. When we think of the nation in Anderson’s terms and follow the boundary setting processes from both perspectives, a picture of Indonesian nationalism comes into focus.

**Nationalism Processes and Javanese Power**

Regarding the processes of nationalism, both approaches discussed previously deploy similar understandings but also create similar analytical blind spots. Nationalism is often viewed as an instrument for elites to wield in dominating a society (Brass, 1991), with specific attention paid to so-called ‘high culture’ at the expense of the everyday nature of nations’ reconstitutions and performative constitutive elements.

Eric Hobsbawm demonstrated in *The Invention of Tradition* that while our modern understanding of the British monarchy may appear to have antediluvian origins, is in fact a product of the late 19th and early 20th century. The ‘invention’ is
exemplified in the concept of nationalism and nation used to connect a completely novel organizing principle with past epochs.

The culmination of this process was found in the late 19th century. Because of citizens’ expanded access to the political arena, the use of traditions to corral this newfound democracy of the masses was necessary. Through a wide array of disciplining mechanisms (public education, construction of monuments, etc.), nationalism emerged as a replacement for earlier mechanisms of social cohesion (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992, see also Özkirimli, 2000). In this example, national cohesion processes are found in certain elements of ‘high culture’. Grandiose monuments and systems of education facilitate both unity and acquiescence to the nation and are further subject to elite manipulation.

Anderson’s approach also preferences the culturally elite in national reconstitutions. For example, the development of the printing press and the assertion of ‘modern’ dress in the biblical artwork of the time represented a break from the past for burgeoning national communities and ushered in a new national epoch (Anderson, 2006). Relating this discussion to Indonesia, elites and the use of high culture are quite relevant to the archipelago through Anderson’s earlier analysis of Javanese power.
While recognizing the cultural differences and nuances readily visible in Java\textsuperscript{34}, Anderson provided an ideal type-classification of pre-colonial Javanese conceptions of power that may not have been in the historical records of the island, but were nevertheless both coherent in applicability and differentiated from European counterparts. In brief, European power is conceived as: 1) Abstract (power is relational rather than concrete); 2) Heterogeneous (there are multiple sources and patterns of power); 3) Limitless (one can build power relationships indefinitely); and 4) Uncertain (the legitimacy of power is something to be questioned). Traditional power from the Javanese vantage point is the polar opposite and despite centuries of colonial rule by European and Japanese empires, remains influential in modern times (Anderson, 1972 and Anderson, 1990).

From a Javanese vantage point, power is: 1) Fixed (it is not relational but rather real, a ubiquitous phenomenon independent of human interactions that provides sustenance and energy to the world); 2) Homogenous (because of the nature of a fixed power its sameness radiates); 3) Permanent (power in and of itself exists in a stable state; it neither moves outward or inward (although the distribution of power may fluctuate, the amount of power remains the same)); and 4) Neither good nor evil

\footnote{This caveat is expressly stated in footnote eight of Anderson, 1972, 4-5 and footnote nine in Anderson, 1990, pg. 20 (which is essentially a reprint of the earlier writing).}
(because power has been and always will be the ‘divine’ source of energy, it has no moral connotations as morality is a concept that came later)(Ibid).

On the exercise of power, Anderson notes that in the Javanese tradition it is not so much about deployment of power but rather its accumulation, one works to harness the power of the cosmos inwardly rather than its outward exhibition. Rituals exhibiting this perspective have an ancient tradition in Java, be it in exercises of meditation or fasting, in traditional Indonesian shadow puppet (wayang kulit) stories or in possessing objects believed to be shaped via the power of the universe. The kris (a short jagged dagger that is the traditional possession of Javanese men) for example was said to be forged simply through the heat radiating from the thumbs of truly powerful kris-makers. By harnessing the power of the universe and tapping into its essence, one can truly do amazing acts (Anderson, 1990).

The consolidation of power in rituals and ceremonies is apparent throughout Indonesian independence. Shadow puppet shows, for example, still attract large audiences to this day, and objects said to contain power are often consolidated in the hands of powerful Indonesian political figures (seen especially in the presidential palace during Sukarno’s reign). More to the point of our discussion is power’s impact on national processes as seen in the Sukarno and Suharto regimes.

By holding a number of public spectacles (mass rallies, symbolic matches, etc.) that revolve around the pinnacle of Indonesian high culture (Sukarno himself) the
effect was to demonstrate his consolidation of power from a wide array of sources and also to demonstrate the strengthening of the Indonesian nation as deployed by Sukarno. To this point, Anderson writes,

In effect, many of Sukarno’s political rallies, ostensibly designed to convey a particular message to the population or to demonstrate the president’s popular backing, were no less important as methods of accumulating and demonstrating power from the willing submission of so many thousands of persons. The greater the extent to which different and even hostile political groups could be brought into these ceremonies, the greater the real and perceived Power of the master of ceremonies. (Anderson, 1990, pg.27)

So Sukarno was able to demonstrate his power in the traditional Javanese sense by concentrating divergent groups in large-scale ceremonies towards a specific purpose: the Indonesian nation and himself as the nation’s caretaker.

During the New Order Suharto carried on this tradition as his governmental structure took on a form indicative of Javanese power. The government’s corporatist framework made the General its central foci in a largely successful effort to stymie Indonesian Islamic organizations (at least until Suharto’s latter years). Borrowing from Donald Porter, corporatism can be generally defined as,

…a system of interest representation that results in the ‘planned integration’ of a society’s associational interests into the decision-making structures and policy arena of the state. The state plays a leading role in regulating, creating, and setting the ground rules for the organised internal activities of given interest categories, and the external interactions between ground and between those groups and the state. (Porter, 2002, pg. 9)
Here, the state is the primary actor in a society and determines what kind of actions/activities are available to society in the public sphere. In Suharto’s case, that meant instituting a rigid SARA standard, designing the elite-driven *Pancasila* indoctrination program to neutralize potential political forces that could challenge national unity, and remaking Jakarta as the center of political ‘high’ culture which all other cities and islands must look to for inspiration and guidance. When viewed in relation to Javanese power, the Suharto’s corporatist structure reflects the need for centrality personified in a single ruler (Anderson, 1990).\textsuperscript{35} Although the corporatist hierarchy has been somewhat dismantled thanks to a number of decentralization programs, the national government still assumes a central position for religious matters that may or may not pose a threat to the Indonesian nation and despite MUI’s growing social influence, maintains its position as the ultimate authority for national religious matters.\textsuperscript{36} So in post-Suharto Indonesia there is still an

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{35} The concept of *mandalas* is also relevant to this discussion of power radiating from a centralized location. See Kingsbury (2001) for more details.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{36} Although a number of sub-national decrees have challenged Jakarta’s position as the sole governmental arbiter of the Ahmadi’s threat to national unity (see chapter five for more details).
\end{flushleft}

77
inward-looking perspective from the central government as decision-making radiates from Jakarta.

However, spending too much time on the historic traditions of Javanese power and other representations of ‘high culture’ overlook many of the nuances of our current era. Tim Edensor writes that,

…the overwhelming focus on myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, religious beliefs, customs and languages postulates a reductive view of culture. The huge emphasis placed on the ways in which language, traditions, emblems, festivals and sacred places epitomize continuity offers an overly historical approach which may well capture the processes undergone in some cases, but cannot account for the extremely dynamic and ambiguous contemporary constructions of national identity. (Edensor, 2002, 9)

In other words, there are diffusive processes of national constitution and reconstitution in a society that go far beyond ceremonies and shared histories. It is, as Edensor wrote, a case of cultural reduction. The social, non-elite aspects are often lacking in studies of nationalism. These aspects often facilitate the nation’s reproduction and occur after the ceremonies have ended and the streets have been cleaned. In essence, one needs to be cognizant of the diffusive nature of nationalism; the fragmented processes and performatives that together continually signify and re-signify the nation.

However, that is not to say that elite-oriented approaches are not without merit as they relate to Indonesia. A focus on spectacles, ceremonies, Javanese power, and
elite cultures are quite helpful in understanding state controls of Islamic identity and disciplining Indonesian national unity. But to be sure the performative aspects of legislative rulings, the use of deviancy to assign the Ahmadis a certain category, and the Indonesian governing authorities’ SARA echoes are also a part of the narrative and need to be explored. In the end, my point is that these are not mutually-exclusive categories.

**Performatives from Austin to Wedeen**

In the following, I detail the origins of performatives as well as the definition I intend to use in the dissertation. In brief, while several understandings and divisions have emerged as to what performatives are, thus making clarity difficult, I use the term as defined by Lisa Wedeen in *Peripheral Visions*.

Beginning with J.L. Austin and accelerating through various works by such luminary thinkers as John Searle, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, and others, performatives have found renewed interest amongst scholars of nationalism and offer innovative methods of analysis (see Loxely, 2007 for an excellent summary of these methods and use of performativity in the social sciences and humanities). Austin’s work can be seen as the theoretical forbearer to Lisa Wedeen. Therefore, this section begins with Austin’s understanding of performatives, the problems therein, the revised treatment offered by Lisa Wedeen and its connection to the reproduction of nations as detailed by Michael Billig and Tim Edensnor.
In Austin’s work, a performative utterance is one where the act of saying a word or phrase is in and of itself the performance, a sort of determinate act (provided that these words are uttered in a particular social context). For example, when a jury finds the defendant guilty and declares, “We find you guilty of crime x” they are simultaneously making a statement, declaring the guilt of said person, and performing the action of assigning guilt. In this and other cases, such as christening a boat by breaking champagne across its hull, declaring ‘I do’ in a wedding ceremony (Austin’s examples), or when the Ahmadiyah are declared deviants by MUI and (more importantly) the Indonesian state, the persons involved have an active engagement in the action itself, this is not mere reporting (Austin et al., 1979, see also Austin, 1975).

The acts of speech Austin discusses by way of performatives are subsequently divided between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. That is to say, as Butler notes, “…actions that are performed by virtue of words, and those that are performed as a consequence of words” (Butler, 1997, 44). Put differently, illocutionary words have instant impact, an immediate stimulus, such as the examples listed above, while perlocutionary acts exist as the resultant effects (sometimes unintentional) that follow. Continuing with the judicial example, the act of declaring the defendant’s guilt could be considered an illocutionary force, but the feelings of guilt, the realization of criminality, or whatever effects the defendant may experience can be considered perlocutionary.
Butler points out the complications in this type of classification. Namely, it is incredibly difficult to distinguish between the two as ambiguity is a constant presence and stability is fleeting (Butler, 1997). Shifting from illocutionary to perlocutionary is readily apparent and interconnected, and while it is helpful to divide these categories for the sense of understanding the parts analysis necessarily proceeds through examination of the whole (Edensor, 2002).

Lisa Wedeen’s use of performatives provides an erudite definition that avoids much of the ambiguity issues in Austin’s work. She argues that the performative practices citizens deploy in the ‘everyday’ goings on within a nation, “…produce specific logics and generate observable political effects” (2008, pg. 15, see also Wedeen, 1999). She clarifies this concept in the following way,

Practices are actions or deeds that are repeated over time; they are learned, reproduced, and subjected to risk through social interaction…the importance of everyday practices to nationalism (as well as to other kinds of political imaginings) does not reside simply in the meanings they signify to their practitioners, but also in the ways in which they constitute the self through his or her performance as an explicitly national…person…Through the repeated performance of practices…the person’s desires, understandings, and bodily comportment come to acquire a particular, recognizable form…Nationalist actions…may be understood as performatives because they enact that which they name, a national self or subject. (2008, 16-17)

So in this case, repetition of certain patterns related to national identity construct national persons irrespective of what these practices mean to the persons
performing them. One example to illustrate this point is the wearing of a subtle flag pin on one’s lapel. The flag’s meaning to the wearer can vary tremendously (patriotism, etc.), but the act itself constitutes the wearer as a national person in the sense that they are sporting a symbol of a national community on their body; they recognize the nation as something real and they as nationalist persons are part of said nation. Thus, nationalism and national persons are produced and reproduced.

Bringing the discussion back to Indonesia, national performative practices are seen in the restrictions placed upon the Ahmadiyah by the Indonesian government in order to maintain national unity as well as MUI’s fatwas against the Ahmadiyah (and others) to define ‘proper’ Indonesian Muslims. For the latter, MUI’s fatwas and other recommendations provide the basis for Indonesian Muslims to act and behave in certain manners to further entrench their religious identity within the national construct. MUI’s denouncement of religious pluralism/liberalism/secularism, emphasizing their halal certification authority, supporting and encouraging the use of Indonesian Islamic Banks, and combating purported Ahmadi deviancy have helped usher in the ‘conservative turn’ in Indonesian Islam but has also constituted Indonesian Muslims in certain forms. In other words, within the national construct repetitive behavior (endorsed by MUI) constitutes certain Muslim identities, which
appeal to a certain understanding of national unity and ultimately reflect in what it means to be a Muslim in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{37}

But again, MUI’s responsibilities do not include preserving the national community, for that is the state’s exclusive realm. So when MUI makes recommendations on Ahmadiyah deviancy, the state determines what national actions are required whether it follows the recommendations of MUI or not. With the decision to declare Ahmadis deviant, the state simultaneously assigns both religious and national categories; as members of the national community Ahmadis cannot practice their beliefs in public because of their Muslim deviancy and its threat to national harmony. Repeated over time, this performance of alienation enacts the national conduct of Ahmadis, the ‘proper’ treatment of Ahmadiyah by other members of the national community, and ultimately, SARA’s echo.

Wedeen’s work can also be seen as a reinterpretation of nations and nationalism that challenges many modernist assumptions. While admitting that Benedict Anderson has helpfully distinguished the differences between nationalism and other forms of collective feelings of incorporation, Wedeen argues that Anderson and subsequent scholars inspired by his work failed to recognize the multiplicity and dynamism of identities one ‘inhabits’ during their life. By grounding nationalism so

\textsuperscript{37} For more on this point as it relates to the use of apostasy to stifle Muslim dissent, see Laskowska (2012).
strongly in secularism, these scholars create in effect a kind of ideational blind spot for understanding the lived experience of nationalism as it is processed by members of the national community.

As such,

By overgeneralizing the relationship between secularism and nationalism, scholars miss certain critical implications of their own work. Discourses, whether they concern piety or national solidarity, evolve. And because identities are fluid and contextual, human beings can and do experience their lives in terms of multiple temporalities or time frames. Thus nationalism often develops in tandem with other ideologies or master narratives, and sometimes combines with them. (Wedeen, 2008, 14)

Thus in Wedeen’s understanding of nationalism, there is no pre-existing static category of ‘nation’. Instead nation and nationalism are dynamic phenomena that often amalgamate and disintegrate based upon a multitude of narratives. Accordingly, to give primacy to nationalism at the expense of other ideational issues (Islam in this work being the prime example) blinds us to the details of nationality combining with other experiences of collective cohesiveness that produces blended political experiences.38

38 Post-Colonial and Post-Structural Scholars of nationalism take a similar approach to Wedeen (see Chatterjee, 1995 and Campbell, 1998 and 1998 for excellent works in these streams of thought) as have certain ethno-symbolists of late (see Hutchinson, 2005) but have been omitted from this survey of nationalism to avoid diluting the discussion and meandering through too many literatures. However, one theme that emerges from scholars in these traditions is that western-centric concepts cannot be
This is especially pertinent in post-Suharto Indonesia. During the New Order, Islam and all SARA issues were suppressed in the name of the nation. However in the current era, Indonesia has seen an interspersing of religious, cultural, and national identities. It is of no small measure that the Indonesian government refused to significantly act upon MUI’s 1980 fatwa but did act following MUI’s 2005 decision (albeit three years later). What can be gleaned from this decision is the evolving relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state as further accommodations are given to Muslim groups. One way of framing this is to say that the Indonesian state is reacting with Islam rather than against, but again the state maintains its preeminence on defending the Indonesian nation and still has the legitimate means to discipline the Indonesian national community using SARA logic.

Further, the reproduction of the nation along fluidic cultural lines avoids much of the reification seen in the other perspectives reviewed. Whether one considers the nation as inherently connected to the socio-economic occurrences that mark modernity, the outgrowth of an essential archaic culture, or a combination, there is an underlying assumption of isolation. That is to say, the nation and nationalism are transported to non-western experiences wholesale. Indeed, divergent Indonesian and European histories, experiences, and conceptual understandings may affect nationalist processes and elite/non-elite tensions in different ways. For one such investigation involving the Indonesian concept of power as it relates to the west, see Anderson, 1978, and Anderson, 1990.
viewed in fatalistic terms removed from the multiplicity of ideational experiences that mark human existence (see Spencer and Wollmann, 2002 for further discussion of these points). By understanding the interconnectivity between political experiences, Wedeen demonstrates that the nation combines with other social identities. To put it succinctly, nations are contingent upon active cultural practices. However, while dynamic in nature these activities are often so routine that they can be overlooked and ignored by the persons carrying out said activities.

In *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig explores these themes and argues that many of those living in Western nations view expressions of nationalism as the work of peripheral ‘others’ who have yet to complete the nation-building process (see also Navaro-Yashin, 2002 and Weiss, 2001 for examples of nationalism in extreme crises). Nationalism, so the argument goes, only emerges in extraordinary times. Suddenly, symbols of the nation are prominently and ubiquitously displayed in a wide array of contexts (flags affixed to cars, the repeated playing of the National Anthems, etc.) only to disappear once the crisis is over.

For Billig, this crisis-centered outlook misses the everyday acts that reproduce western nations. Crises may come and go, but in between these explosive events western nations sojourn onwards with daily reproductions of nations that contain a national citizenry, albeit in a manner so accustomed to the citizenry that they hardly notice (Billig, 1995, see also Özkirimli, 2000).
Tim Edensor echoes Billig’s criticisms of nationalist scholars for their focus on the spectacular at the expense of the ordinary. As previously mentioned, Edensor’s *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* criticizes many scholars (including, Anderson, Smith, Gellner, and Hobsbawm) for their reductive understanding of culture and argues that their focus on formulaic ‘high’ culture perspectives (traditions, official understandings, etc.) provides a culture of stasis and exclusion. Popular culture (which I maintain also includes YouTube) is subsequently introduced as an amelioration through which traditional cultural elements (ceremonies, etc.) are disseminated, sustained, and interact that ultimately highlight the concept of a nation; albeit in fragmented and challenged ways (Edensor, 2002).

These writers demonstrate an emphasis on that which is commonly overlooked when using an elite-centered approach to nationalism. But to reiterate an earlier point, this does not mean that these perspectives are dichotomous. Rather, they exist on a spectrum. By incorporating elite and non-elite analyses, a more holistic picture of nationalism comes into focus as the tensions and interactions between approaches are revealed and analytical blind spots are diminished. Instead of viewing elite and non-elite approaches as mutually exclusive, I view the approaches as mutually constitutive. That is to say, elite-centered approaches certainly tell parts of the national narratives, but everyday performatives ‘fill in the gaps’ of nationalism as it is absorbed and acted through by non-elite actors.
The Indonesia case provides a great illustration of the dynamism in elite and popular perspectives of nationalism. Indonesian politics emphasized a top-down approach whereby the directives and national activities were mandated from the President (*Pancasila* and SARA policies being the most palpable examples), and while more authority has been delegated to sub-national governments in post-Suharto Indonesia the logic of controlling religious issues by the state remains intact. However, in order for these activities to commence the public is needed to both absorb and perform the symbols, rhetoric, activities, etc. throughout the Indonesian national community. Accordingly, what may be seen as tensions between top-down and bottom-up approaches to nationalism are mitigated when understood as parts of the nationalist whole.

In sum, my theoretical underpinnings are indebted to the works of scholars from a wide array of camps and perspectives. For this research, it is best to consider elite approaches as providing the stimuli for ‘the masses’ to internalize and act upon. Moreover, I look at government actions as performative acts in their own right, boundary setting for ‘proper’ behavior of Indonesians vis-à-vis the Ahmadiyah, and the basis for everyday nationalism as national persons are constituted in a wide array of (and sometimes contradictory) manners.
Methods

In addition to adopting Lisa Wedeen’s usage of performatives and nationalism, I follow her work by grounding this dissertation in what is commonly described as interpretive methods and more specifically, ethnographic work. These include careful readings of translated Indonesian laws, examinations of Indonesian national identification card usage, and research on YouTube that was used in such a way that the text was able to ‘speak’ to me and certain narratives began to ‘emerge’ without utilizing preexisting static narrative categories. Short-term ethnographic interviews and fieldwork in Surabaya, East Java was also incorporated, and taken together create a more robust picture of the questions under investigation as the Ahmadiyah dilemma becomes situated in the larger context (Taylor, 1987).

Ethnography as a specific term (as well as ethnographic interviews and ethnographic fieldwork) has been the subject of intense debate for several decades (see Stocking, 1992, Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, Atkinson and Delamont, 2008, and Schatz, 2009). To clarify my position, I define ethnography rather broadly as socially grounded research that incorporates observations, interviews, and interviewer

experiences in the places and spaces one is interested in as much as possible so that we may gain perspective on the phenomenon under study that would be otherwise inaccessible (Joseph, Mahler, Auyero, 2007, Wacquant, 2003). Meaning, it is of paramount importance that if one is studying a group, political organization, etc. the researcher experience the context and setting in which these bodies operate while also interacting with said groups. In this way, the researcher gains valuable lessons and insights that are virtually impossible to achieve if one were following the central tenets of qualitative research often found in political science methods texts.40

Essentially, my position is that through ethnographic interview techniques and fieldwork we are able to achieve what Clifford Geertz (1973) popularized as ‘thick’ description.41 Although understandings of what composes a thick description is subject to debate (Ponterotto, 2006, Holloway, 1997, Schwandt, 2007, Alexander, 40 This includes primarily King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, but also to a certain extent George and Bennett, 2005, and Brady and Collier, 2010. See Wedeen, 2009 for an excellent analysis of the King, Keohane, and Verba deficiencies as it relates to ethnography and interpretative methods.

41 Geertz’s work also represents the classic example of interpretive methodologies and ethnography being incorporated in Indonesian studies. In brief, Geertz (1973) argued that in order to understand localized Balinese cockfighting, we must also incorporate broader cultural issues (Balinese symbols, expressions, institutions, etc.) into the research.
Smith, and Norton, 2011) Ponterotto has provided an erudite working definition of the concept when he writes that,

Thick description refers to the researcher’s task of both describing and interpreting observed social action (or behavior) within its particular context. The context can be within a smaller unit (such as a couple, a family, a work environment) or within a larger unit (such as one’s village, a community, or general culture). Thick description accurately describes observed social actions and assigns purpose and intentionality to these actions, by way of the researcher’s understanding and clear description of the context under which the social actions took place… (Ponterotto, 2006, pg. 543)

Here we once again see how important context is in conducting ethnographic studies and generating thicker descriptions than what could be achieved by simply reporting facts absent context. In other words, by ‘going there’, sharing in the experiences, and observing certain milieus, the researcher’s understanding of social phenomena becomes clearer.

Building off of this discussion on what ethnography is, it is also valuable to briefly clarify what ethnographers do. Essentially, the role of the ethnographer is that of an information gatherer. Meaning, the processes are not limited to writing down and analyzing what is being said (or not said), but also how and where these communications occurred and observing social phenomena as they unfold. These

42 This is representative of what could be called a thin description. On this point, see Ponterotto, 2006, Holloway, 1997, Denzin, 1997 and 2001.
processes can also include document and photographic collection/analysis as well as other materials that can be used to elucidate the issues related to the study. Atkinson and Hammersley (2007) have provided a useful typology of ethnographic work that also speaks to my work with legislative acts and YouTube.

In brief, the authors describe ethnographers as: 1) Conducting research in the field as opposed to creating specific conditions and structures through which the study takes place; 2) Collecting data from a multiplicity of sources but relying heavily on participant observation and unstructured interviews/conversations; 3) Allowing the collected data to ‘speak’ to the ethnographer as there is not a fixed research design and categories for interpreting information emerge out of research process itself; 4) Focusing on a few small-scale cases to achieve a more in-depth understanding; and 5) Interpreting, “…meanings, functions, and consequences of human actions and institutional practices, and how these are implicated in local, and perhaps also wider contexts” (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007, pg. 3).

For the present study, the research and data collection method discussed above was utilized to the greatest extent possible. Using Atkinson and Hamersley’s...

43 Related to this is the concept of abductive reasoning commonly used in interpretive methodologies and ethnographies that emphasize generative questions through the research process and sorting out the empirics and the theoretic at the same time instead of privileging one over the other. See Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012 for an in-depth treatment of the term.
structure, I as the researcher: 1) Conducted research in East Java, Indonesia; 2) Utilized legislative acts, identification cards, and cyberspace for gathering information/data but also actively engaged the Ahmadi community in interviews and conversations; 3) Allowed the research process to unfold absent static ideational categories or preconceived research questions; 4) Focused on Ahmadi leaders in Surabaya to better understand their lived experiences; and 5) Situated the collected data within the larger context of national and sub-national governmental action to understand how it is implemented at the local level and how meaning-making of Ahmadiyah deviancy ‘operates’.

An interpretative and more specifically ethnographic perspective on research and interviews were used in every interaction I was fortunate enough to have with members of the Indonesian Ahmadi community referenced in the case studies, as well as in analyses of legislative decrees and YouTube commentary. Admittedly, my limited timeframe and interactions with members of the Ahmadi community in Surabaya did not lend itself to a ‘truly’ thick description of their lived experiences, but I was able to gain valuable insights and perspective on the dilemma and glimpse (if only for mere moments) the intricate state/Islam/nation relationship that is the focus of this dissertation.

Additionally, the extensive literature on ethnography provides certain ‘shortcuts’ for expediting the ethnographic process while in the field. One technique I
found especially helpful was utilizing local friends to act as connectors and research facilitators as described in Handwerker (2001). These facilitators were tremendously helpful in identifying members of the Ahmadi community who would be willing to speak with me, as well as sitting in on a few interviews to both initiate and accelerate to the greatest extent possible the rapport process necessary for ethnographic interviews (Spradley, 1979). From these initial contacts I was able to quickly ‘tap into’ the Surabayan Ahmadi community (at least to a certain extent) and continue interviewing a number of Ahmadi members; a technique commonly referred to as snowball sampling (Wedeen, 2008).

Moreover, interview techniques that are the bedrock of ethnographic work were understood before engaging in fieldwork and used while interviewing members of the Ahmadi community. This included a commitment to open-ended in-depth questions while also observing interviewee reactions and noting the social setting and cultural contexts within which these interviews occurred (O’Reilly, 2012, Heil, 2001, Soss, 2006, Spradley, 1979).

For example, I took many opportunities to visit the Surabayan mosque’s surrounding area to better situate it in the local context. In many cases, non-Ahmadis

44 Although he uses the phrase “research assistant”, which I do not think accurately represents the relationship between researcher and local facilitators.
that lived and/or worked near the mosque and were willing to talk to me were unsure of its precise location (I myself got lost on several occasions trying to find it despite having the address in hand) and I soon discovered that the mosque itself ‘lived’ in a very unremarkable locale with little everyday attention paid to it. In this way, the purported deviancy and public banning of the Ahmadis was ‘hiding in plain sight’ which aided in understanding the local context and provided further research insights.

As to my line of questioning, interviews were conducted in Indonesian and began with short pleasantries then moved to discussions of the legislative decrees cited in this dissertation. From there, I had no set standard with which to move and instead asked follow-up questions based upon responses and topics raised by the interviewees. I was not in a position to ‘interrogate’ the interviewees but rather to have conversations that all started in the same general area but then explored a number of unexpected topics and themes discussed later in this piece (O’Reilly, 2012).

Ahmadi interviews referenced in this dissertation involved eight interviewees who participated in conversations with me in locales throughout Surabaya, East Java in August and September 2012. The Ahmadi community in Surabaya was quite

45 Two examples of where the conversation deviated that proved to be significant to my research were Ahmadis invoking Pancasila to solve the Ahmadi dilemma and Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi alike stating that Indonesia is a nation that has religion, not a religious nation.
difficult to access on my own, so I relied on local contacts in journalism, academics, and politics to discuss the situation from their vantage points, provide local background information on the situation in Surabaya, and ultimately connect me with JAI and the Ahmadis. The only demographic consideration I used when trying to establish interviews with Ahmadi interviewees was that they were in fact Ahmadiyah community members. However, the interviewees were all influential figures in the Ahmadi community (including the Imam and local male and female JAI representatives). Due to their influential positions they were in positions to speak on the topics concerning this dissertation, and well qualified to provide significant answers. The interviewees skewed overwhelmingly male (I only spoke to one female Ahmadi member, but this woman is quite important in the local community). However, the answers they provided were consistent irrespective of demographic breakdown.46

Interviews were typically in group settings with the number of Ahmadi participants ranging from two to six per session. The length of time for each interview was typically between one and two hours and were either arranged beforehand or alternatively occurred without prior notice in and around the Ahmadi Surabayan

46 Note that this study met with IRB approval and protocol prior to being conducted. Because of the sensitive nature of the Ahmadiyah issue in Indonesia, I will refrain from using the actual names of those interviewed.
The first arranged meeting I had with Ahmadi members took place at a restaurant in a popular mall for breaking Ramadan fast where I was accompanied by a local Surabayan who facilitated the meeting. The Ahmadi members and I then followed up our discussions with meetings that occurred without our mutual acquaintance in less public locales to change the social setting, confirm consistency of answers, expand upon topics discussed in our prior meetings, and with the permission of the interviewees, use a recording device to chronicle the interview.

Holding the initial meeting in a mall restaurant that included a wide array of non-Ahmadi Indonesians also provided an important context for our discussions as the interviewees were virtually ignored by the larger mall community. In terms of dress and attire, the Ahmadi representatives were not displaying outward signs of their affiliation with JAI, which would have been a violation of the governmental decrees. This allowed the purported Ahmadi deviancy to be invisible as the representatives ‘blended into’ the larger Indonesian population and provided the initial framework for understanding how governmental decrees impact the lives of Surabayan Ahmadis; a

47 The group dynamics also demonstrated certain hierarchies amongst the larger collectives regarding who spoke more often than whom (younger leaders tended to speak longer, with the Imam rarely speaking). While this observation is important to note, it is not the focus of this dissertation but instead represents a potential avenue for future research.
topic that emerged from this initial conversation and continued in the larger group interviews.

For mosque-based interviews, I arrived unannounced for the initial meeting during Friday prayers which allowed me the opportunity to observe an Ahmadi prayer service48 and meet with the leaders afterwards in the mosque offices (see chapters three and four). In subsequent interviews I once again arrived without giving prior notice and held meetings with smaller groups (although at least two community leaders attended all interviews).

Having the mosque serve as the social context within which our interviews took place was incredibly important to understanding state controls of Islam and the Ahmadiyah dilemma as it represented: 1) A centralized location where Ahmadi members could be identified and interviewed; and 2) Allowed me access to the ‘behind the curtain’ world of Ahmadi activities that had been banned by both national and provincial decree. In so doing, I was able to: a) Catch glimpses of everyday life as it appears in the mosque both during Friday prayers and during the week; b) Better understand how the local Ahmadi community leaders understand their congregation’s role in Islam and the greater Indonesian nation; c) Probe issues of how life for these marginalized persons has changed following the government officially recognizing  

48 Which mirrored all prior Muslim prayer serviced I had witnessed up to that point.
them as deviant Muslims; and d) Observe certain symbolic and performative acts/occurrences within the mosque’s walls and beyond that demonstrate how the community is negotiating the restrictions placed upon it and its interconnectivity with the Indonesian state and nation that perpetuate long after I returned home. Taken together, we can begin to see how Ahmadi community members are constituted within their place of worship and gain crucial responses to the questions discussed in chapter one.

In sum, this sub-section has identified both my commitment to methods used in a similar vein as Lisa Wedeen, my understanding of ethnography as it relates to this dissertation, the benefits of using ethnographic interviews, and techniques to gaining ‘thick’ descriptions. Finally, I discussed whom I interviewed, where these interviews took place, where the conversation generally began, and for how long these interviews typically took place while also maintaining interviewee confidentiality. While this dissertation benefitted tremendously from my ethnographic commitment, my research is by no means the last word on this subject as it is limited to a timeframe over two months that necessarily limit the number of interviews possible.

However, the comments made by members of the Ahmadi community and the social/political/discursive context in which these comments occurred say much about the questions at hand. The ethnographic fieldwork and interviews informed discoveries made through analyzing YouTube comments and legislative acts, and the
research project benefitted tremendously from its use despite the admitted shortcomings. Reporting facts, conducting formal standardized interviews, and using large-\(n\) studies based on the scientific method all contribute to the discussion but are inappropriate for my research. Thus, my commitment is to using an interpretive framework and ethnographic methods.

**Conclusion**

The three objectives of this chapter were to: 1) Clearly identify the key terms and phrases pervading the dissertation; 2) Survey the literature on nationalism and situate my work amongst its scholars while maintaining a focus on Indonesia; and 3) Briefly discuss the methods utilized throughout this piece. Combined with chapter one, a clearer picture has (hopefully) emerged on what exactly I am trying to accomplish.

Subsequent chapters take up these themes and view Indonesian nationalism and the Indonesian nation primarily from the vantage point of the Indonesian governing apparatuses and the impact of its performative acts. To avoid confusion, simplify things for the reader, and maintain a consistent narrative, the case study chapters are organized based upon SARA in echoes that move farther and farther from its original form. The first of these focuses on the national picture and explores contradictory SARA policies for the Ahmadiyah in post-Suharto Indonesia. In this case, the government is simultaneously condemning Ahmadis for their divergent and
disruptive Islamic beliefs and giving them the means to express their Indonesian Muslim identities. I will examine the intersection between the Joint-Ministerial Decree discussed in the introduction and Indonesian identification cards which require that all citizens pick one of six officially recognized religions with no restrictions on who can make each individual choice.

For the Ahmadis, the choice is simple: they are Muslims so their identification cards must say ‘Islam’. Thus, they have a document that constantly (and banally) reconfirms their state-sanctioned belonging to the Indonesian national community and membership in the Indonesian-Muslim community. The implications of this Joint-Ministerial/KTP contradiction for religion categories, Indonesian nationalism, and the state’s authority to assign identities are numerous, which I will now explore.
Chapter 3

KTP NATIONALISM AND THE FIRST SARA ECHO

Eight years ago marked the beginning of an ambitious campaign by the Indonesian government. With the passing of Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2006, Indonesian National Identification Cards (Kartu Tanda Pendudukan, or KTP) were to be changed dramatically. This and subsequent legislation refined the rules and procedures of E-KTP, as it came to be known, which added Indonesian citizens’ fingerprints and retinal scan measures on a microchip within the card itself in addition to the more traditional information found on identification cards (photographs, addresses, etc.). Further, this legislation set the goal of registering 172 million Indonesians for E-KTP by the end of 2012. These additional measures were designed to reduce corruption and fraud throughout the archipelago, but also ensure that the identity of KTP-carrying Indonesians was valid and true. In other words, the government wanted to make certain Indonesian citizens were who they claimed to be (Priyanto, 2012).

49 A version of this chapter is, at the time of this writing, in the process of being published in Contemporary Islam: Dynamics of Muslim Life. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2
E-KTP has caused quite the number of controversies for a variety of reasons. Delays in launching the program put the deadline and several political careers in jeopardy. Delivering the necessary scanning equipment to outposts has proven to be most difficult, prompting Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi to declare that he would resign if the program was not executed within the allotted timeframe (Sihite, 2012). These debates along with ones on more Orwellian grounds have put the program in question. However, instead of analyzing what may be going wrong with the program or what information has been added, I will discuss here an important issue on what has remained. Namely, E-KTP maintains the continued religious requirements of its non-electronic predecessor and traces its roots to the strict religious controls of the SARA era. Indonesian citizens are still required to choose from a government-sanctioned list of recognized religions in Indonesia that are prominently displayed on their identification cards: 1) Islam; 2) Christianity; 3) Catholicism; 4) Hinduism; 5) Buddhism; or 6) Confucianism.

While religious minorities not represented in one of these six religions may have the option of leaving their religious choice blank, the religious requirement remains intact as the E-KTP campaign weaves its way through governmental appendages (Wardi, 2012). For these minority groups, the Indonesian government is not explicitly recognizing their religious preferences as an official religious category (see Arifin, 2010 for a discussion of this). However, for other groups these
identification cards present the opportunity to demonstrate their identities as
Indonesians and as members of one of the six officially recognized religious
communities. In the case of the Ahmadiyah, the religious component of these national
identity cards reveals both a SARA echo and the performative paradoxes therein.

This chapter explores the role of Indonesian National Identification Cards in
the dual construction of Ahmadiyah as both Indonesian nationals as well as Muslims
in Indonesia. The paradox between these identities emerges because the national
government, the traditional steward of nationalism and the arbiter of the role of
religion in Indonesia, concurrently denounces the Ahmadiyah as deviant Muslims (as
seen with the 2008 Joint-Ministerial Decree), while at the same time giving them the
means through which they may self-identify as Indonesian Muslims through KTP
applications and the cards themselves. In other words, they are rejected as Muslims
by the prevailing authorities for the sake of national unity and tranquility while being
allowed to assert their Islamic identity by this same body who finds it necessary to
maintain control over citizens’ religious options. Through this paradox, we gain
further understanding of the evolving nature of religious controls and nationalism in
the post-Suharto Indonesian state.

I will proceed as follows: First, I briefly situate Indonesian national
identification cards within the growing prevalence of identification systems in the 21\textsuperscript{st}
century. From there I offer an examination of the Joint-Ministerial Decree and its role
in officially marginalizing the Ahmadis. With this document, the national government has both denounced the Ahmadiyah as deviant and categorized the group as less-than Muslim for the sake of national unity and community tranquility. In so doing, the government is reaffirming its self-appointed role of national steward, its superiority over religious issues, and assigning/enacting the Ahmadis a religious identity outside the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ Islam in Indonesia. In other words, the national government has the authority to assign religious identities to its citizens, but it can also take those identities away.

However, KTP provides an everyday performative outlet for the Ahmadiyah where they can officially assert their Islamic identity and continually reconstitute their membership in the Indonesian Muslim community. As opposed to demonstrating, protesting, or issuing petitions to express a religo-national identity, KTP is an ideational affirmation that hides in plain sight. Because of its ubiquity throughout Indonesia KTP’s ideational importance is often overlooked, but that is why it is so important. In the second section, I offer a synopsis of KTP that includes its history as well as the application process, how it is used in Indonesia, and the religious requirements of KTP and their implications on constituting religious/national identities. Finally, I link KTP to the reconstitution of Indonesian nationalism and argue that while KTP is often ignored or overlooked, it nevertheless provides a
constant reminder of the state’s authority to determine who Indonesians are as citizens and religious persons.

I conclude by showing that the contradictory nature of the governmental action illuminates the contradictory nature of Indonesian nationalism at a time of continued transition for the Ahmadiyah, the Muslim-Indonesian community, and ultimately the Indonesian national community. These inconsistencies have done little to stymie the Islamic tensions in Indonesia and have in fact exacerbated the ‘conservative turn’ in Indonesian Islam discussed in chapter one. The essence of my argument is this: while the Indonesian government has in the past been proactive in setting religious boundaries for the sake of nationalism, Islamic issues in Indonesia have shifted the state into a reactive position while still abiding by the SARA logic. This shift demonstrates the newfound interconnectivity between religion and Indonesian nationalism preserved by the state: what was once adversarial has now become woven.

Information for this chapter was gathered primarily through two separate channels. First, there is a textual analysis of the Joint-Ministerial Decree. While originally produced in Indonesian, I translated it into English and compared my translation with several others readily available in cyberspace to ensure accuracy.50

50 See for example http://www.humanrights.asia/countries/indonesia/laws/ministerial-decree-against-jai-2008 as well as http://www.thepersecution.org/world/indonesia/docs/skb.html. For full disclosure, the
Second, my interviews with members of the Ahmadiyah community in Surabaya, East Java and an Indonesian Office Supervisor whose agency is responsible for issuing KTP (akin to an Indonesian version of a Department of Motor Vehicles office in the United States) in Malang, East Java were conducted over the summer of 2012 to better understand the process of acquiring identification cards and their everyday use.

In the case of the Ahmadiyah, interviews were conducted in a Surabayan mosque office over sweet tea that included discussions of KTP with several members and leaders of the Ahmadi community. To coincide with these interviews, I also met with a local Ahmadi spokesperson on separate occasions to further discuss the issues in more personal settings without so many people involved in the interviews. To get a sense of KTP from the state’s vantage point, I met with the Supervisor in his Malang office for an hour-long conversation on KTP and why the Indonesian government finds it necessary to ‘control’ the religious identity of its citizenry. As will be seen in the following sections, the interviews were quite revealing and further reinforced the idea of SARA echoes.

latter website is dedicated to documenting cases of persecution against Ahmadis, but their translation is consistent with others, including my own.

Our conversations were not limited to KTP, as will be discussed at length in chapter four.
Once limited in reference to authoritarian regimes (Suharto’s New Order, for example), necessities of waging war, or historically unique circumstances, national identification systems have exploded in the 21st century as state governing apparatuses have implemented these systems as critical modes of governance. Much of this growth can be understood through the development of ‘electronic government’ (or e-government) that coincided with late 20th century technological advances. The design of e-government was intended to fill the need for identification systems outside of the states’ purviews (finances, etc.). Along with issues of national security (which were accelerated following the September 11th attacks on the United States), e-government necessitated newfound identification systems throughout the world that now exist in well over 100 countries (Bennett and Lyon, 2008).

Related to this is the ‘card cartel’ of passports. Originally coined by John Torpey, the card cartel refers to the monopolization of power by the state which not only controls the means of violence (to paraphrase Weber), but also regulates the movement of individuals. While Torpey’s work is focused primarily on the global passport system, he does recognize the impact internal passports and identification cards can have on the rights of citizens as well as how to recognize or ignore members of a national citizenry. My work on KTP explores the recognition of national citizenry noted by Torpey by examining the impact identification cards have
on the everyday ‘regulating’ of Muslim identities of those KTP-carrying members of
the Indonesian national community and how this undermines the state’s power in
declaring the Ahmadis deviants (Torpey, 2000, see also Bennett and Lyon, 2008,

While interest and administration of identification systems throughout the
globe is trending upwards, implementation of these systems varies tremendously based
on place and space. There is no set standard for what information is to be included
(biometric or otherwise) or what is the most pertinent information (gender, religious
affiliation etc.). Because of this, individual case studies are necessary to fill in the
gaps, improve our understanding of identification cards in national contexts, and
explore the ideational and transitional boundaries created through the interplay of
identification cards and government rulings.

So, potential avenues for further research based on KTP include comparing the
impact of Indonesian identification cards with other identification systems by
exploring how these systems impact on national identities in localized settings. Before
engaging in this type of scholarship, the first step is to understand how KTP and its
religious requirements further entrench the everyday religious controls of the state and
its contribution to Ahmadi paradoxes in Indonesia. In the next section, I discuss
Ahmadi deviancy as determined by the Joint-Ministerial Decree, the restrictions
placed on Ahmadis that reinforce the idea of public and private activities, the
precautions for Ahmadi safety in the decree, and then connect the Ahmadi issue with KTP’s religious requirements and the dissertation’s broader themes.

*Aliran Sesat (Deviant Sect)*

June 9th, 2008 saw the Indonesian government offer renewed challenges to the presence of the JAI Ahmadiyah organization within Indonesian national boundaries. On this day, the Minister of Religion Affairs (Muhammad M. Basyuni), the Attorney General (Hendarman Supandji), and the Interior Minister (H. Mardiyanto) issued Joint-Ministerial Decree Number: KEP033/A/JA/6/2008 as a warning and order to the Ahmadiyah and to the general Indonesian public. Beginning with several points on the historical relationship between religion and the Indonesian state, the ministers posit that while the Indonesian state guarantees freedom of every person to have religion and worship according to religious dictums, these religious performatives and rituals must be undertaken with respect to the law and Indonesians in general so that the community, the state, and the Indonesian nation all maintain tranquility. In other words, religious practices are acceptable, so long as they occur within the purview of the state so that Indonesian national unity and harmony remains intact.

Accordingly, all persons within Indonesian borders are prohibited from publically advocating any and all religious interpretations that are deemed deviant (*sesat*) from the principal teachings established in the six officially recognized Indonesian religions. While the Indonesian Government has made several attempts at
resolving the religious differences perpetuated by the Ahmadis, these attempts have proven unsuccessful and accordingly, this decree is necessary in order to maintain religious harmony and national unity (Peringatan, 2008).

Respecting the precedents set in Indonesian legislation that allows for the decree to be legal and legitimate, the ministers go on to declare that JAI members are ordered to discontinue dissemination of their deviant beliefs so long as they maintain their Muslim self-identification. Namely, they must cease recognizing prophets after Muhammad if they are to call themselves Muslims. Any JAI member who does not comply is subject to penalties as described in relevant laws; which extend to government and district government officials who are required to ensure the decree’s implementation. Regarding the Indonesian general public, it is their responsibility to ensure religious harmony and tranquility within the Indonesian nation. As such, they are forbidden from conducting unlawful activities against JAI members. Any citizen or community member who ignores these warning and attacks JAI members is subject to penalties as described in relevant laws (Ibid).

Three salient points emerge from the decree. First, according to the Indonesian government, who to reiterate, traditionally take on the role of the Indonesian nation’s stewards, JAI practitioners are deviant Muslims so long as they maintain their self-identified Muslim identity. Because Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was not a prophet in any form, shape, or appearance, any and all persons who claim he was are guilty of
deviance. To maintain their ‘Muslimness’ while challenging the Finality of the Prophethood besmirches and denigrates Islam, which in turn undermines community harmony and ultimately, wounds the Indonesian nation. Therefore, proselytizing in any Indonesian public form is unlawful, illegitimate and subject to criminal charges.

Second, declaring Ahmadi deviancy has an important performative effect that continually constitutes the national personhood of the Ministers issuing the decree and the Ahmadis themselves. For the Ministers, this national personhood is constituted by way of their state authority. Because they hold positions of power in the state and maintain official supervision over religious issues, it is within their purview to declare groups deviant for the sake (and perpetuation) of the nation. While the decree represents the national manifestation of this authority, the state control does not simply disappear after the Ministers declare Ahmadi deviance. On the contrary, it is a continual process that builds upon itself so long as the Joint-Ministerial Decree is not repealed, with the Ministers themselves persistently reconstituted as the state’s authorities on religious matters. In this way, the Ministers are simultaneously enacted as national selves (e.g. for my Indonesian national community, we must declare the Ahmadis deviant) and constituted as the representative sources of state religious controls for identifying what it means to be a Muslim living in Indonesia.

The decree’s constitutive elements for the Ahmadiyah do not challenge their standing as members of the national community per se since they are still considered
Indonesians, but it does indicate that their religious deviancy is a threat to the unity and tranquility that makes Indonesian nationhood possible in the first place.

Curiously, it is that the Ahmadi’s national identity that is actually strengthened since they are expected to *sacrifice* open religious practices for the sake of the nation and its survival. However, asking the Ahmadis to sacrifice cannot be seen as an outright ban on the group as nowhere in the decree does it say that the Ahmadiyah are strictly prohibited from practicing their beliefs privately.

In essence, this is a declaration intent on protecting the national public sphere, a call for tranquility in which private activities are given certain freedoms, but interactions outside of these exclusive spaces must be controlled in order to ensure the stability of the nation. In this way, the Joint-Ministerial Decree aims to protect the religious freedoms of Indonesian citizens. Yet at the same time, if the group seeks to hold religious ceremonies and other religious practices in public, they must conform to the tenets of the Indonesian Muslim majorities if they declare their identity as Muslim. In other words, differing religious practices behind closed doors are tolerable, but to enter the public forum proves to be an intolerable act.
Still, the decree provides mechanisms through which the Ahmadiyah are to be protected. Recall that days before this ministerial action was released, a group widely associated with FPI attacked demonstrators advocating tolerance towards the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia while also commemorating the 63rd anniversary of Pancasila. The perpetrators’ rationale behind this attack was that Islam was under attack by the Ahmadi’s deviant beliefs and it must be protected at all costs. Not only are the Ahmadis guilty of defaming Islam, but all those who ‘support’ the group are also culpable. This violence was viewed as an initial warning that the government must ban the Ahmadis and Islam must be secured in Indonesia (Jakarta Post, 2008).

The Indonesian Ministers’ Decree addresses some of the issues and concurs with the overall premise that the Ahmadiyah are deviant and threaten Islam. However, the determination of whom is deviant and undermining the religion, and what to do about these threats are decisions first and foremost for the government to make, it is not the job of non-governmental Indonesian groups, organizations, MUI, or individuals to decide the Ahmadi’s fate. The perpetrators are therefore subject to local law enforcement.

52 The Joint-Ministerial Decree also provides an escape route of sorts for Ahmadis to end their deviancy: renounce Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet and return to mainstream (e.g. state-sanctioned) Islam. More will be said on this topic in the concluding chapter.
Despite this caveat, protection of the Ahmadis has been woefully neglected (which will be explored in more detail in chapter five)\(^5^3\), but the essential point is that some of the highest officials in Indonesian government are considered the state’s religious arbiters. Provisions in this decree determine: 1) What a ‘proper’ Muslim is in Indonesia by way of defining deviancy; 2) Who is permitted to enforce the Muslim identity in Indonesia; and 3) How the state’s control of religious issues is perpetuated in the national community. In this way, the Indonesian government maintains the proprietary position over Islam evident throughout Suharto’s reign, and is representative of a SARA echo. However, in attempting to assert control over Muslim-national identity in the Ahmadiyah case, the Indonesian government has produced a paradox in which highly visible and controversial legislation performed over time comes into conflict with banal governmental processes as illustrated in KTP.

**KTP: The Ubiquitous Religion/State/Nation Nexus**

During the struggle for independence discussed in chapter one, Indonesia’s founding personalities realized that an archipelago of its size would have difficulty maintaining national cohesion once the fighting was over. The fear of separate and fragmented states build around island-specific identities was quite real, and several stratagems of solidarity were deployed to sustain the embryonic Indonesia. During the

\(^{53}\) See Millie, 2012 for an erudite commentary on this issue
New Order, these strategies were accelerated and institutionalized through both SARA policies and cultivating a corporatist central government with bureaucratic extremities throughout the islands. One example of this bureaucracy, as well as a constant reminder of citizens being part of a larger nation in Indonesia, was the institution of KTP identification cards. This section analyzes the importance of KTP for Indonesian religio-national identity and argues that while it is often overlooked and taken for granted these cards serve a critical role in the performative reproduction of an Indonesian national community and the state’s role in controlling religious identities within Indonesia. I begin with a brief synopsis of the legal functions of KTP and its religious requirements.

**Identification is Needed**

KTP has traditionally served as an internal passport for Indonesian citizens. Along with a citizen’s photograph on the card is the *Nomor Induk Kependudukan* (NIK), an individualized number specific to each Indonesian citizen. NIK functions as the base of Indonesian identification. By law, in order for citizens to apply for a passport, driver’s license (SIM), taxpayer identification, land rights, etc., they are required to have their NIK on hand. As mentioned at the outset, E-KTP additionally requires that citizen fingerprints are to be loaded onto a microchip implanted in the card. The Indonesian government judges these biometric identification cards beneficial for the citizenry in the following ways: 1) They create a single identity card
that can be used within the state; 2) This identity cannot be forged or duplicated because of the biometric safety measures; and 3) The card can be used to identify voters in elections (Apa dan Mengapa KTP, 2011). To put it succinctly, KTP ensures a ‘proper’ Indonesia, one where an authentic citizenry is produced and maintained.

The origins of KTP as a ubiquitous phenomenon in Indonesia trace to the beginnings of Suharto’s New Order. Prior to the military coup that put Suharto in power, the Kartu Keluarga (Family Card) was the most commonly used governmental identification card, which contained no photographs and simply listed family births and deaths. Moreover, the card was not required to be on one’s person when traveling or attempting to access governmental services nor did it carry the importance KTP would come to represent for authenticating Indonesians. However, with the rise of Suharto the state took a much more proactive stance on controlling religious issues and initiated a KTP policy in which citizens in certain regions of the nation were required to carry identification at all times. This was done mainly to differentiate non-communists from former members of the Indonesian communist party (PKI, which was banned by Suharto and purged from Indonesia). The identification cards of those who were previously affiliated with PKI or who had been imprisoned for political reasons displayed special marks to both differentiate the carrier from the rest of the population and face discrimination whenever interacting with the governmental bureaucracy (Strassler, 2010).
These actions were typical of the New Order regime at the time and entrenched the state as both the guardian of, and the definitive Indonesian institution for recognizing threats to, the nation. To quote Karen Strassler, “The identity photograph became an idiomatic shorthand for the state’s assertion of its power to authenticate who was a citizen and who fell outside the fold of state recognition and protection” (Ibid, 138). To put it differently, KTP validates the national community as upheld by the state apparatus. More importantly, it is an ever present reminder of who is worthy of the state’s safeguards as national persons, and whom is not.

While originally focussed on the communist threat, KTP quickly evolved to encompass religious issues and further echoes the SARA policies and institutionalization of Suharto’s Pancasila discussed earlier. In 1977, KTP laws required that religion be included, and a subsequent 1978 directive stated that religious identification was limited to a choice between the five officially recognized religions of the state.\(^{54}\) To leave an answer blank was to essentially declare atheism, which under the New Order equaled communism and severe discrimination, if not a threat a life threatening choice. Moreover, this shift in KTP religious requirements meant that indigenous religions (animist, etc.) were subsumed and repressed, as they were deemed detrimental to national cohesion and the ‘new’ Indonesia (Ibid).

\(^{54}\) At the time Confucianism was removed by Suharto as an official religion but restored during Reformasi.
Curiously, a development counter to the efforts of the Indonesian government occurred in which the official identity one holds as a result of KTP is an inauthentic representation of one’s true religious identity. The citizenry simply has to go through the motions of selecting a religion but genuine belief is irrelevant. Amongst the Indonesian citizenry, it came to be known as Islam-KTP, a Muslim in KTP-name only. Also represented in a popular Indonesian television program of the same name that ran from 2010 to 2011, Islam-KTP reveals the discrepancy between one’s lived religious experience (or lack thereof) and their governmental life. Here, it is possible to be recognized as a Muslim by the Indonesian government, but nevertheless drink alcohol, believe in an animist traditions, eat pork, gamble, or engage in any other activity Indonesian Muslims would overwhelmingly view as taboo.

However, rumors ran amok about KTP being used to discern whom to attack during bouts of religious violence in Indonesia. Strassler notes the 1999 conflict in Ambon led to rumors about gangs of Muslim militants stopping citizens and demanding to see their identification in so-called KTP raids. These raids mirrored the actions of the police, who conducted similar searches in order to ensure identification card consistency and had the effect of appropriating the authenticating powers from the state. Whether or not these raids actually took place is irrelevant, their importance lies in exposing weaknesses in the government’s recognition authority. To wit, Strassler maintains that, “Such appropriations of the state’s authority to conduct raids,
like popular irreverence toward the KTP’s truths, point to the limits of the state’s arrogation for itself of the role of recognizing agency and to the unintended reverberations of state practices of identification in everyday life” (Ibid, 144-45).

This “everyday life” feature of KTP may demonstrate weakness in the Indonesian government’s ability to determine national cohesion and one’s place within said nation despite the state’s best efforts to maintain control of religions (especially Islam), but it also represents a constant reminder of both the state and the nation. For many who self-identify with Islam-KTP, marking the Islam box on their identity card application is simply an empty motion designed to appease the government, whose appendages are not concerned with belief but rather declaration.

During my interview with the supervisor at a KTP location in Malang, East Java, Indonesia, I asked directly about the religious requirement on KTP. His response was that it was very important to the government that its citizens have religion. The critical point in his response was that it was not about belief; it was about the ritual of filling in an option regardless of one’s actual religious affiliation. When discussing the lack of Animist or Jewish religious options on KTP applications, the supervisor became noticeably uncomfortable and restated the position that it is important for Indonesians to have religion. The basis for these comments was a commitment to Pancasila. Because the national ideology has as one of its pillars a belief in one god, it is necessary for the Indonesian national community to have
religion, albeit in a state controlled environment where religious affiliation is only understood as it relates to Indonesian national identity.

However, whether or not an Indonesian citizen is an active member of one of the (now) six officially recognized is irrelevant so long as that citizen goes through the process of religious self-identification. While this gives further credence to the rise of Islam-KTP, the Ahmadiyah paradox is categorically different. These individuals wholeheartedly believe in Islam and self-identify as Muslims; it is not an empty ritual to choose Islam on their identification cards but rather an official reaffirmation of their Muslim identities within the Indonesian nation, as notarized by the Indonesian government.

‘Indonesia’ KTP

In the process of everyday life, KTP may not appear as a critical structure. One may go days if not weeks without having to show the card to anyone. It simply inhabits one’s wallet, purse, backpack, etc. Yet, its omnipresence, often overlooked, represents one’s membership in the national community, and the state’s right to control the religious affiliation of Indonesians. Islam-KTP highlights persons who do not believe what they enact, but behave as if they do. From the government’s perspective, that is all that is needed as the religious controls are based on actions, not belief. So long as the population accepts the government’s authority to determine official religious choices, and abides by KTP conventions, then all is well. However,
the Ahmadiyah represent a group who are not acting as if they believe, but rather as they unconditionally believe.

Throughout their long history in Indonesia and beyond, the Ahmadiyah consistently self-identify as Muslims. Despite pressure from other Islamic organizations and the Indonesian government, the Ahmadis continue to understand themselves as unconditional members of the Islamic community. They are not fallen or deviant Muslims who have sullied the religion, for they already are blanketed in the faith and have national identification cards to demonstrate that verity.

On KTP applications, there is no mention of the Ahmadiyah or any other religious groups save the six officially recognized. Once the application is complete and citizens receive their cards, they have an officially recognized document with their self-described religious affiliation imprinted on the front. Since there are no restrictions on who can choose which of the six religions, choice is open to the applicant’s discretion, whether the Indonesian government has declared a group deviant or not.

During my interviews conducted in Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia in 2012, I asked members of the Ahmadi community about KTP and the question of their religious affiliation. They seemed to be amused by such a silly question, but politely answered, “Islam”. Their reaction to my question reveals their self-identification as Muslims, despite governmental decrees to the contrary, as well as the importance of

122
the everyday on identity affirmation. For this Ahmadi community the idea of any other religious choice is simply absurd since it would be a violation of their Muslim identity.

Because the Indonesian government classifies the Ahmadis as deviant Muslims but offers its deviant citizenry constant reminders of their non-deviance as well as their legally recognized place in the Indonesian nation, underlying tensions in which contradictory edicts designed to perpetuate the Indonesian national identity and the state’s controlling authority foster certain performative contradictions. This in turn reveals the Janus-faced nature of Indonesia and a SARA echo seen today.

**Conclusion: Closed Openness and Indonesian Paradoxes**

The preceding discussion reveals a number of salient points regarding the paradoxical stance the Indonesian national government is taking towards the Ahmadis and how this relates to the Indonesian national community. First, KTP and the Joint-Ministerial Decree harkens back to the SARA era in the realm of religious controls and state power. While there is more openness in Indonesia post-Reformasi in that religious issues are allowed to be made public, this openness is not unconditional. Relics from the past maintain their influence on designating Muslim-national identities amongst Indonesian citizens.

However, to say that that Indonesia is the same as it ever was regarding religious openness proves to be severely myopic as it misses several key
transformations. The issue is one of legacy: SARA has dissipated but the
machinations through which it was deployed are maintained and the logic lives on in
the Joint-Ministerial Decree (e.g. for their own safety and for the sake of the nation the
Ahmadis must sacrifice their public displays of religious identity). By relegating the
Ahmadis to a behind-the-curtain worship, the Ministers are attempting to keep
deviancy hidden from the Indonesian national community. In other words, total
separation has proven to be futile and has resulted in a Janus-facing Indonesian
apparatus; one where openness is tempered by continued reliance on Suharto-era
reasoning. This Janus nature also helps us understand the second salient point
emergent from the previous discussion: the evolving relationship between religion and
the nation’s guardian.

Under Suharto the state designed a hierarchical apparatus where it proactively
dominated religious issues, organizations, and identities. While this was not always
effective and unintended consequences were abundant (such as the rise of Islam-KTP)
legislation reveals the hands-on nature of Indonesia during the Suharto years,
defended as it was for the sake of national unity. However, in the last years of
Suharto’s reign and especially during Reformasi, Islam and Muslim organizations
have left the SARA-induced societal margins and entered the Indonesian foreground.
As chapter one’s discussion highlighted, there is a certain impetus for action against
the Ahmadis in Indonesia directed by MUI, who has also actively pursued its own
agenda independent of the state and grown increasingly provincial over the interpretation and practice of Islam in Indonesia due to a wide array of sources touched on earlier.55

It is in this environment that the Joint-Ministerial Decree was issued. In some senses it does represent a reaction to MUI’s 2005 fatwa as it followed that body’s recommendation to declare the Ahmadis deviant (which includes all of the performative repercussions discussed) but also reinforced the state’s control over Islam by: 1) Not banning the group outright (despite the wishes of MUI) as that would violate the central tenets of Pancasila and the Indonesian nation; and 2) Reinforcing the state’s role as the sole arbiter of Islamic practices in Indonesia and the legitimate authority to negotiate the Ahmadi deviancy. While the Joint-Ministerial Decree can be viewed as the state taking a reactive position to Islamic issues in the archipelago as opposed to the preemptive actions and forced cohesion under the Suharto regime, the

55 To list the factors discussed in chapter one: 1) Suharto’s courtship of Islamic organizations in the final years of his rule that counterbalanced groups that embraced civil Islam; 2) Suharto easing SARA-era restrictions for more conservative practices Islam in the public sphere (Muslim clothing, etc.); 3) The expulsion of liberal elements in NU and Muhammadiyah’s leadership; and 4) The growth of conservative Muslim organizations in Indonesia whose votes are of equal standing as that of much larger organizations; and 5) A desire to separate MUI from its past as a megaphone for the state’s Muslim policies. Note that this is not a comprehensive list of the reasons for MUI and Indonesian Islam’s ‘conservative turn’ (that would be a different discussion than the one I engage in here) but it does provide context in which the state is (performatively) acting.
Indonesian state nevertheless maintains its right to protect the Indonesian nation; the guardianship may have changed hands but make no mistake, guardians are still present.

The preceding discussion’s impact on Indonesian national identity can be summarized as follows: the Indonesian government is still determined to control national cohesion and maintain its traditional role as stewards of the nation by issuing judgments on intra-Islamic ideational issues. The government also maintains that Indonesian religions can be divided into six static categories, but said judgments are obfuscated by routine state activities that demonstrate the implicit dynamism in religious identities as well as that of the Indonesian national community.

The Indonesian government’s religious categories are designed as fixed binary choices whereby the citizenry may only select one religion. One is a governmentally certified Indonesian Muslim if the Islam box is marked, but also a non-Muslim if another choice is selected or the religion section is left blank. KTP is a constant reminder from the Indonesian government that its citizens are 1) Indonesians; and 2) Certified members of Indonesian religious communities. Thus, in the administration of KTP, the Indonesian government provides for its citizens a national community to be part of and controlled religious identities that said citizens are free to choose from.

The Ahmadi paradox undermines the state’s efforts to control religious categories and religious deviancy. The Ahmadis are national persons (as Indonesians
who hold KTP) and have official documentation of their Islamic identity, but the Joint-Ministerial Decree is quite specific: the Ahmadis are not Muslims, they are deviants. If an Ahmadi identifies as a Muslim, KTP reaffirms and maintains this self-identification as well as membership in the Indonesian nation through everyday performative practices. Thus, the state’s use of religious categories is revealed to be ambiguous, fluidic, and problematic, as is its idea of an Indonesian nation.

These processes are indicative of a nation and national community whose position vis-à-vis religion is in continued transition, and the Ahmadis role in this transition is cause for consternation as one recent E-KTP registration example has highlighted. In the West Nusa Tenggara province, where Ahmadis have been living in government shelters since neighboring villagers destroyed their homes in West Lombok, the local administrative government moved the Ahmadis to the very bottom of their E-KTP registration list despite repeated attempts to register. The head of the local administration bureau argued that E-KTP registration was not a priority for those considered to be, ‘troubled’ although he also noted that eventually, the Ahmadis would be allowed to register (Jakarta Globe, 2012).

This has put the local Ahmadi community in difficult position due to their inability to access undocumented KTP citizenship. Without this document, the group’s members cannot obtain licenses to drive automobiles or (in the Lombok case), access government-sponsored discount fee programs for hospitals. Ahmadi members
initially made KTP filings five years previously but have been continually denied identification cards because of registration technicalities (Jaw Pos Nasional Network, 2012).

Many questions are raised with this particular case (internal refugees, etc.) but relating to my work, Ahmadi Indonesian citizens are being denied access to both KTP and E-KTP registration and as a result are being denied access to everyday expressions of their state-recognized Muslim identity. While this is but one example, the push for E-KTP is putting questions of nationalism and the Ahmadi dilemma forward in ways that they may not have otherwise been. By moving the Ahmadiyah to the bottom of the registration list, the local Indonesian government officials are exacerbating the Ahmadi’s transient position in Indonesia as their Muslim status is called into question.

On an immediate level, this has dire consequences for Ahmadi’s access to hospitals and other needed resources in Indonesia. Without these identification cards in place, potentially damaging health problems and other localized crises may arise. On a more abstracted level, interrelated questions of national and religious identity emerge for the Ahmadiyah as delays in identification cards restrict everyday performative actions. Curiously, local officials did not categorically deny the Ahmadi’s right to possess identification cards, as they said registration will occur at some point. From the vantage point of the Indonesian governing apparatus, delays reveal a subjugation of religious affirmation of sorts that uses jarringly similar logic of
SARA and the Joint-Ministerial Decree: problems must be marginalized to maintain harmony. In other words, the Ahmadi paradox is ‘resolved’ through restriction, but this restriction is indicative of a bygone era. Moreover, the undefined nature of when this group of Ahmadis will be able to finally register for E-KTP demonstrates the continued transitory nature of Islam in Indonesia and ultimately the Indonesian nation as protected by the state.

The government still actively works to determine who is a Muslim-Indonesian in both salient national edicts and routine administrative activities. But in a post-Suharto world these activities occur in more open spaces and subject to influences that are not totally controlled by the state. The Ahmadi issue is a flashpoint for the continued renegotiation of the Indonesian national community, the Indonesian Muslim community, and the state’s control of both. What this chapter has demonstrated is that the SARA-inspired policies can and do undermine each other as the state seeks to end (or at least marginalize) the Ahmadiyah’s potential to redefine Islam in Indonesia.

Meaning, the Indonesian state is in an untenable position of exerting control over the situation by declaring the Ahmadis deviants, but simultaneously granting this group the means to resist governmental authority. Because of this lack in governmental consistency, the question of where the Ahmadiyah ‘fit’ in Indonesian Islam remains ambiguous, as does the state’s role in determining an answer based on a woebegone SARA logic in a much different Indonesia. While the state asserts its
traditional role as the national steward and SARA discipliner, it is in fact the state itself that is being disciplined by the Ahmadi issue as Indonesia continues its post-Suharto renegotiation.

In the next chapter, the second SARA echo takes this state construct and drops it down a level by localizing the Ahmadi issue in Surabaya, East Java. Following in the wake of the Minsters declaring that Ahmadis deviant Muslims, sub-national governments began to implement regional laws against the dissemination and publication of Ahmadiyah beliefs that both refined the position of the state and provided context to the decisions rendered by the central government. One of the earliest of these was instituted by Governor Soekarwo of East Java, who cited the Joint-Ministerial Decree and justified his actions based on a commitment in East Java to national cohesion, stability, and ‘Indonesia’s’ continual survival.

Putting these effects in a larger context, I will show that this is indicative of a larger trend of decentralized governing that has marked Indonesian history since the end of Suharto and a pathway through which sub-national governments can also protect the Indonesian national community. Unlike the corporatist framework perpetuated under Suharto56, I offer a brief synopsis of decentralization as it relates to the subject at hand, and show that despite the state governing apparatuses experiencing

56 Which as the reader may recall also mirrored the traditional concept of Javanese power.
transformations of sorts, Indonesia still exhibits the basic SARA logics of religious control from national and sub-national state vantage points. To examine the prosaic impact of these SARA echoes, I will further incorporate my discussions with Surabayan Ahmadis. Through these conversations, a picture developed that showed the state’s effectiveness at institutionalizing the Indonesian nation as a ‘first amongst equals’ when it comes to citizen identities, but also the interconnectivity between Islam, the state, and Indonesia through their performative permeations.
Chapter 4

LOCALIZED NATIONALISM AND THE SECOND SARA ECHO

On February 28th, 2011, East Java’s Governor Soekarwo issued a decree from Surabaya to further clarify the Ahmadi position in his province. With the issuance of Governor’s Decree Number: 188/94/KTPS/013/2011, Soekarwo determined that Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia members were a cause of social unrest in East Java and therefore, must be restricted. Basing his decision on the Joint-Ministerial Decree discussed in the previous chapter, the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, and other materials, Soekarwo’s ban prohibited the dissemination of Ahmadi teachings, be they in oral communications or in publications online and/or in print. Moreover, the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia organization nameplate was banned from being used in the public sphere or placed on mosques, Musholas, and other locations in East Java. Ultimately, the JAI organization faced an East Java ban of all of its public attributes/Indonesian Ahmadi identifiers.

While the legality of the decree has been contested by Ahmadis and supporters of religious tolerance under the freedom of religion provisions found in the Indonesian Constitution (Jakarta Post, 2011), the central government determined that they would not challenge the Governor’s actions so long as it did not violate a ‘higher’ regulation.
or decree such as the Joint-Ministerial Decree (Jakarta Globe, 2011). Shortly after Soekarwo’s decision, the Governors from West Java and South Sulawesi joined in banning the Ahmadis by Governor action (Dipa, 2011).

This action on the part of Governor Soekarwo has important implications and serves as case study of the sub-national state’s SARA echo seen outside of Jakarta and the impact of government decrees on Ahmadi everyday life. In this chapter, I explore these issues and provide a localized snapshot of nationalism and government controls of national unity as it occurs on an everyday basis in Surabaya. Whereas the previous chapter examined these issues from a national vantage point, chapter four refines the picture by using a sub-national governmental perspective and explores Ahmadi reactions to governmental actions, Islam, and ultimately the Indonesian national community.

What I argue here is that the East Java legislation has the effect of challenging the national apparatus as the sole stewards of the Indonesian nation. This sub-national government is effectively disciplining nationalist narratives on the control of Islam in Indonesia which impacts the manner through which national identity becomes reconstituted. Thus, further ambiguity regarding the Ahmadi position within Islam and Indonesia proper is observable. While the Governor’s Decree was issued and intended to be a stabilizing force in order to pre-empt violence towards Ahmadis
living in East Java, it has in fact been a destabilizing phenomenon as a disconnect exists between official condemnation and decree implementation.

Moreover, the specters of the Suharto-era power dynamics are on full display in East Java following the Governor’s action. Despite decentralization efforts since Reformasi designed to dismantle Suharto’s corporatist framework and create a more equivalent system of authority between Indonesia’s regional authorities and Jakarta, the logic of power, discipline, stability, and security implemented during the Suharto regime for the sake of national maintenance still reigns supreme. On this point, the Surabaya case provides a unique position to analyze this issue by being part of Java and Javanese culture (often viewed as the ‘internal colonizer’ of Indonesia and one that decentralization has attempted to ameliorate) yet far enough removed from Jakarta that the antediluvian history of resistance towards the national capital in politics and culture remains a part of Surabayan culture.

Through conversations and interviews with Ahmadis living in Surabaya, a case is revealed where despite the visibility and Soekarwo’s decree condemning the Ahmadiyah for their deviancy, everyday life has had little to no change as the Ahmadis have found pathways for religious endurance in Surabaya. In other words, the law is symbolic of protecting Islam and the Indonesian national identity as it exists in East Java, but strict enforcement of said decree is lacking. The routine
machinations of life as they existed in pre-decree Surabaya remain largely intact along with the strong symbolic presence of the state and the Indonesian nation.

The following discussion begins with a brief synopsis of Surabaya and East Java as it relates to Jakarta and its historical resistance to West Javanese influence, both politically and culturally, since the struggle for an independent Indonesia. From there, I discuss the Governor’s action in further detail while delving into the motivations behind issuing the decree as well as its focus on stability and social harmony.

After examining this governmental action, I incorporate interviews conducted with East Javanese Ahmadis that occurred in Surabaya throughout August and September, 2012. These conversations, which occurred at an Ahmadi mosque as well as in public forums and restaurants revealed much about the state’s controls of Islam and Indonesian nationalism as it relates to the Ahmadiyah controversy. I conclude by tying the components together to reveal further clarity on the SARA echo and the disciplining of Indonesian national identity through governmental and Ahmadi performatives.

Curiously, Ahmadi representatives suggested that the best solution to their current position was not renouncement of deviancy, but a return to what they argued Indonesia had lost: Pancasila. In the final section, I examine this issue in more detail
to better understand the dynamics in Indonesia and the impact nostalgia has for Indonesia today.

_Why East Java, Why Surabaya?_

During research decisions must be made as to where one conducts interviews and why certain locales are chosen over others. I made the decision to focus my fieldwork in Surabaya as opposed to any of the other Indonesian locations for a number of reasons. Most prominent amongst these is an observable pattern created amongst Indonesian provinces once Soekarwo’s decree went into effect. As mentioned earlier, shortly after the decision in East Java came down Governors from other parts of Indonesia followed suit in banning Ahmadi activities within their jurisdictions. More work can be done on comparing decrees and the Ahmadi’s lived experience, but the East Java and Surabayan case serves as an important first step for future research.

Moreover, the East Java case complements my other case study chapters by making use of fieldwork and interviews that took me throughout Surabaya to discuss the issues under analysis with those most directly affected by governmental decrees. This chapter’s analysis is best viewed as maintaining the state’s vantage point, but uses an intermediate analysis between the top-down KTP investigation that focused on national laws and identification cards and the bottom-up examination undertaken in the next chapter. In so doing a more holistic picture comes into focus.
Moreover, conducting an analysis of Surabaya and East Java demonstrates continued intra-Java tensions that predate Indonesian independence by centuries. To reiterate, since colonial times Surabaya has had a tenuous and stifling relationship with Jakarta, both when it was the seat of Dutch Colonial Authority and then as the capital of Indonesia. A common misnomer in writings about Indonesia is that Java is the colonizer of the archipelago, the seat from which Indonesia’s power radiates (Kingsbury, 2005). However, this underlying essentialization of Java omits the existent nuances and differences between East and West Java. As will be discussed below, Surabaya has an ancient history independent of Indonesia and/or Jakarta that emerges in important ways. Reading the Governor’s Decree through an approach of differentiation with Jakarta and the national government offers a reinterpretation of the Ahmadi status within East Java and in turn, Indonesia as a national whole.

Finally, focusing on East Java allowed for a much ‘thicker’ analysis. Using a snowball sampling method enabled me to make contacts throughout the province, tap into resources previously unknown, and conduct interviews with various journalists, scholars, and Ahmadis living in Surabaya to better understand the context and performatives related to the SARA echoes and Indonesian nationalism. Multiple sites

57 Not to mention the ethnic differences considering West Java and Jakarta is the traditional home of Sundanese and East Java is ethnically Javanese (Pringle, 2010).
may have allowed for a more widespread analysis, but this would have necessarily lacked the depth achieved by staying in one locale.

The next sub-section explores Surabaya and East Java’s position in greater Indonesia by providing a brief history of the city and its underlying tensions with Jakarta. I end by reaffirming my choice for using Surabaya and East Java as a vantage point for understanding the Indonesian state and nation through an Ahmadi lens.

**Surabaya: Intra-Java Tensions**

Situated on the Northeast corner of Java and with easy access to important shipping lanes throughout the archipelago, Surabaya is a key regional seaport for Indonesia through which trading and commerce has flourished for several centuries. “Sparkling Surabaya” as the city is called in promotional materials has a rich and vibrant history based upon its trade and legend as a city of heroes.58 Second in population and economic power to Jakarta, Surabaya has for several decades held a tenuous relationship with *Ibu Kota* (capital city).

During the fight for independence in the mid-20\(^{th}\) century, Surabaya was spoken of by many as the ‘birthplace of the revolution’ despite independence national

58 In terms of Islamic organizations discussed previously, NU has been and continues to be the predominant organization in Surabaya and East Java. See Bush (2009) for more on this topic and a discussion of NU’s role in Islam and Indonesian politics. As the focus of this chapter is not on Islamic organizations in East Java, I will refrain from engaging in this important (but ultimately tangential) discussion.
leaders like Sukarno maintaining their seat of power in Jakarta. More prominently, Heroes’ Day is celebrated every November 10th to commemorate the struggle for independence and coincide with the Battle of Surabaya, the first large-scale battle following the declaration of Indonesian independence by Sukarno and Hatta on August 17th, 1945. Here, Indonesian forces fought against WWII allies trying to reassert control over Indonesia following Japan’s defeat and loss of control over the archipelago. Occurring under the local leadership of Sutomo as opposed to Sukarno or any other leaders who were organized in Jakarta, the battle revealed many underlying tensions between West and East Java. After the death of the British Commander A.W.S. Mallaby, Sukarno delivered a speech apologizing for Mallaby’s death and implied that Surabaya was in essence corrupting the independence struggle while ordering the cessation of hostilities. Local Surabayans, who had previously demonstrated disappointment with the national government, were furious that Sukarno would suggest such a thing as Sutomo inspiring their continued rage through passionate speeches and ardent proclamations (Frederick, 1989).

Two salient points are revealed by this episode. First, while controversial at the time, the Battle of Surabaya became a source of national unity and pride as it was the impetus behind Heroes’ Day; a day for all Indonesians to commemorate their struggle for independence and the repulsion of external threats. At the same time, the event itself symbolizes tensions within Java and hostility towards the national
government and those who hold seats of power in Jakarta. While Heroes’ Day is a national celebration honoring brave Indonesians and provides a sense of national cohesion, it is built upon an occasion of national breakdown as internal Java strains were exposed.

Moreover, the tensions were built not on origins, but on presence. Sukarno was in fact a ‘native son’ of Surabaya (he was born there in 1901), but his experience and cultural life took him to Jakarta where he presided over the Indonesian independence movement from the other side of the island. The Battle of Surabaya and its repercussions demonstrate that just because Sukarno was an important national political figure and born in Surabaya does not mean that Surabayans would simply fall in line and provide their unadulterated support. Because Sukarno’s positions and presence evolved in such a way so that preference was given to Jakarta as Indonesia’s political and national epicenter (with Sukarno himself presiding over Jakarta’s accumulated power) tensions emerged between Java’s two biggest cities irrespective of Sukarno’s past.

Economically, Surabaya and Jakarta represent the two largest centers of commerce throughout the nation, but trade has favored the capital since the mid-20th century.

59 Sukarno himself was the son of a Javanese father and Balinese mother and was educated in a predominately Dutch secondary school before attending university in Bandung. See Legge (2003) and Penders (1974) for more information.
century. Thanks to the advantages of Surabaya’s geographic location within Java, including easy access to fertile grounds, close proximity to two navigable rivers (the Brantas and Solo), and an unparalleled harbor with naturally deep waters to accommodate large ships throughout the year and in all weather conditions, Surabaya became the most populous city in Java and its largest navigable port (Dick, 2002).

However, due to economic shifts in Java, notably Surabaya’s over-reliance on a plantation-based economy that in effect undermined the city’s economy as usable land became a scarce commodity; plantations moved west in the 20th century and underwrote the rise of Jakarta. Owing to the dwindling plantation revenues and subsequent lack of purchasing power, investments in Indonesia became heavily biased towards Jakarta from the 1930s onward. After independence and the subsequent centralization of Indonesia’s government in Jakarta, this pattern of favoritism grew exponentially (Dick, 2002, see also Jackson and Pye 1978). Surabaya has a rich history as a port and an economic powerhouse during the time of plantation-based economic growth, but became a city in decline as economies changed and power and decision making became centralized on the other side of the island.

Surabaya and Jakarta also represent the two traditional centers of inter-island trade within Indonesia as each city utilized distinctive spheres of influence, with Jakarta reaping larger benefits. In the years after independence, Jakarta held tremendous trade influence over the more affluent western Indonesia zone, notably
Sumatra and West Kalimantan. Surabaya’s influence was oriented towards the east, including South and East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara, which after independence stretched from Bali to Timor (Dick, 2002). Combined with the economic growth of Jakarta and centralization of political authority in the city, the favored inter-island trading partners led to the dominance of Java by Jakarta which in turn dominated the archipelago. Thus, it is not just Sumatra, Kalimantan, Bali, Sulawesi, and the outer Indonesian islands aggravated by the conventional economic and political dominion of Jakarta, but so too was East Java despite sharing an island with the capital.

Culturally, Jakarta has had a totalizing effect on Indonesia. This was especially true during the New Order regime where national identity was forged in Suharto’s likeness and protected at all costs. To say that this new culture was representative of Indonesia proper, or even greater Java, was a severe misnomer as it was both Jakarta-based and elite-centered. All governmental appointments were regulated by the state, with key leadership offices (Internal Affairs, etc.) situated in close proximity to the president’s residence. Within popular culture, television and radio content were predominately developed and recorded in Jakarta. While this was done in part to maintain strict SARA regulations over content (Hill and Sen, 2005), it also had the effect of viewing Indonesian through the Jakarta prism where information on the archipelago was generated, formatted, and disseminated from the capital.
Simultaneously, representations of the cultural diversity apparent throughout the nation were built in Jakarta. One such example that continues to this day is the Indonesia in Miniature theme park that purportedly exhibits the diversity of cultures (Javanese and otherwise) within Indonesia. While the park continues to be a popular destination in the capital city, the original costs to build and operate the park were at the expense of the outside provinces and demonstrated the primacy afforded Jakarta (Dick, 2002).

To summarize, despite sharing the same island, Surabaya and Jakarta have a longstanding historic and economic rivalry that is still in existence today. Linking this discussion with the dissertation’s themes, we see that the state’s Islamic controls and disciplining of Indonesian nationalism had reverberated outwards from Jakarta. Jakarta was and in many ways still is the ‘seat of power’ in which decisions concerning national cohesion and religion radiate outwards despite the lack of a sole authority figure/authoritarian ruler.

Once more, the totalizing force of Suharto is no longer in power, but the bureaucratic tentacles of his regime remain. However, non-Jakarta Indonesia is far from a passive recipient. There is an inherent dynamism in the interplay between Jakarta and non-Jakarta Indonesia as it relates to religious controls and national unity. Historic tensions in the Surabaya-Jakarta relationship reveal much about regulating Islam, national disciplining, and sub-national resistance. In the case of the East Java
Governor’s Decree, it refines and filters the Joint-Ministerial Decree issued from the central government and simultaneously offers a newfound channel to resist Jakarta’s traditional totalizing force and power.

While the centrality of Jakarta to Indonesian power was more visible during Suharto’s rule (see Jackson and Pye, 1978) the centralized specter remains as Jakarta is still the most populous and powerful Indonesian city. Surabaya and East Java more generally offers a premier vantage point in order to understand the evolving nature of the state’s Islamic controls due to its location on the same island as Jakarta but also its historical resistance to the capital and its contestation of Jakarta-centrism in the archipelago.

In his discussion regarding compulsory Pancasila courses and civil service ceremonies under the Suharto regime, H.W. Dick provides an erudite lesson on the benefits of studying East Java when he writes, “Because the pressure came from Jakarta, there emerged a complicit sense of provincial solidarity, perhaps more effective where it was never enunciated. East Java and Surabaya were thus an excellent vantage point” (Dick, 2002, 460). For similar reasons, East Java and Surabaya offers an excellent opportunity for my case study because it is similar to Jakarta as the seat of the national government, yet also quite different so as to provide a contrasting sub-national case.
With that in mind, I turn to a discussion of post-Suharto decentralization efforts that have been implemented throughout the archipelago in order to break from the Jakarta-down corporatist model of governance. The East Java Governor’s Decree is then examined to show the continued prevalence of SARA logic in modern-day Indonesia. Next, I explore the impact East Java governmental actions have had on an Ahmadi mosque in Surabaya and the resultant performatives. The chapter ends by discussing the relationship between East Java, the state governing apparatuses’ control of Islam, and Indonesian national identity.

**Decentralizing Governing Authority and Ambiguities in Authority**

Indonesia began an auspicious decentralization campaign in the aftermath of Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 and the collapse of the New Order. During this time, there was a very real worry that Indonesia as a cohesive nation would fall along with Suharto as the Jakarta-centric ‘strong man’ political system dissolved. In 1998, Indonesia saw much greater demands for local autonomy as ethnic and religious conflicts, long taboo under the SARA banner, emerged from the background and exploded into violence in such places as Maluku and Kalimantan. Natural resource rich provinces, whose profits benefited Jakarta at the expense of locals, joined in the calls for more autonomy. The Suharto vacuum had the effect of creating an opening for protests, demonstrations, and instability while concerns about the disintegration of
the Indonesian government were validated (Hadiz, 2005, see also Berger and Aspinal, 2001, Butt, 2010).

Responding to this worry, the Indonesian government issued a flurry of legislation to roll back the national government apparatus and strengthen regional autonomy for provinces and cities (see Turner et al., 2003 for an in-depth analysis of the early decentralization legislation). Here, a two-tiered regional governing system was created with provinces on one tier, and districts/cities on the other, with each given authority to make their individualized laws with accompanying legislative and executive branches of government. While creating a massive expansion of legislation and rules narrowly tailored to regional locales, decentralization also had the effect of greatly inflating the number of lawmaking bodies. In 1998 (the year before decentralization was initiated by Suharto’s chosen successor, BJ Habibie) there were about 292 local governments not counting Jakarta. By 2009, that number had grown exponentially, with 33 Indonesian provinces, 484 districts and over 1000 lawmaking bodies with further increases likely as regions become further divided (Butt, 2010).

In theory, these laws are to be sent to the national government and are subject to scrutiny either through bureaucratic or judicial review by the national government and the Indonesian Supreme Court to ensure compliance with the Indonesian Constitution and established standards of the national government. However, in practice the local lawmakers do not always deliver their laws for review. Most laws,
save for tax issues and local governments illegitimately raising revenues, are largely passed unnoticed and without review. While it is still unclear precisely why review has been restricted to financial matters, potential explanations include a lack of human capital to review the overwhelming number of laws being passed and/or dedication to the decentralization concept by allowing free reign in issue areas other than financial matters. Nevertheless, the trend is to allow decisions to stand at the lower levels of government and not review or overturn these laws (Butt, 2010).

Reactions from those in the national government towards Governor Soekarwo’s decree have paralleled this trend. Patrialis Akbar, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, was quoted as saying that since the national government had already spoken on the matter in the 2008 Joint-Ministerial Decree, Governor Soekarwo was within his rights to act and implement the Ahmadi ban in East Java. The decision to support Soekarwo repeats the national refrain that freedom of religion does not imply freedom of religious interpretation and that Ahmadi restrictions are not banning religion, but instead disciplining a bastardization of Islam as it has been recognized by the state. In other words, there is a standard of what Islam is and the state is the one to determine what that is. Deviation from the standard and dissemination of the deviant orientation is tantamount to undermining Islam’s very foundation. Therefore, the Ahmadi ‘threat’ must be rectified by Indonesian governing bodies both big and small (Pasandaran, 2011).
Taking a more understated position on the East Java decree, but one used to maintain the superiority of the national government, Home Affairs Minister Gawaman Fauzi agreed that the Governor was within his rights to put restrictions on the Ahmadis, but that these restrictions must be in line with regulations occurring at higher levels of government, in this case the Joint-Ministerial Decree. Gawaman also stated that the restrictions will be evaluated by the national government but the evaluation, assuming one has occurred (which is not guaranteed), have yielded no changes to the decree and the East Javanese regulations concerning the Ahmadis are still part of provincial law (Ibid, 2011).

When evaluating the wording of the decree, care is given to ensuring the decree’s compliance with both national judgments and the Indonesian Constitution. The provincial decree first recalls specific articles in the 1945 Constitution that relate to religion in Indonesia, as well as decades-old provisions used to justify actions against the Ahmadis (see Platzdach, 2011 for further analysis). Subsequent post-Suharto decentralization laws that give legal authority to the provinces and localities throughout Indonesia are also considered by Soekarwo. Here, the governor supports his position by stating that Indonesian citizens are responsible for observing and creating social order amongst religious communities in East Java for the sake of Indonesian unification and national unity. In other words, the East Javanese are responsible for Indonesia’s national community within their provincial borders.
Further, because the Ahmadiyah can be a source of societal imbalance and community unrest in East Java, the Ahmadi activities that may cause a disruption in the public order are to be prohibited. The Ahmadis, in line with the Joint-Ministerial Decree, are thus prohibited from dissemination teachings in oral, written, or electronic formats. Moreover, the use of JAI as it pertains to the overarching Ahmadi organization cannot be displayed in public places or on mosques, Musholas, educational institutions or using JAI in any form (Langaran, 2011).

The language interplay reveals several related issues. First, there is the interplay between national and regional governments’ post-decentralization efforts that emphasizes referencing the central government’s acts. Local and regional laws are allowed to commence with little to no interference so long as they do not interfere with monetary issues, and in this case, go through the proper channels of citing national laws and activities. Because the Governor’s actions pay proper homage to the central government, action from Jakarta is unneeded.

Second, unlike the Joint-Ministerial decision, the Governor’s Decree minimizes its discussion of those attacking the Ahmadis or using violence against them. In the national law, there is a specific warning to those who may want to retaliate against the Ahmadis. For the benefit of religious harmony, peace, order, and stability of Indonesian society, citizens must not act against Ahmadi followers. Those that ignore this warning are subject to sanctions. In East Java, no mention is given to
those who wish to act against the Ahmadis. The national peace, tranquility, and stability at the heart of both pieces of legislation appear differently in East Java. Whereas the national level sees stability as having two components, the purported blasphemers and those reacting to said blasphemy, the East Java legislation is focused solely on the blasphemers. Thus, protection of the Ahmadiyah is superfluous when compared to the stability offered by mitigating their societal threat (Ibid).

Third, as we have seen in previous chapters, the underlying SARA logic that was the hallmark of Suharto’s regime and the Jakarta-centralization project has dissipated but not disappeared. What is most at stake in East Java is not the freedom of religious interpretation, but of social constancy and the mitigation of invalid understandings of Islam. In other words, the Indonesian governing apparatuses are charged with the task of correcting unorthodox practices deemed detrimental to both Indonesian Islam and Indonesia itself. Granted, it is unfair to compare the scale of violence and force used during Suharto’s reign to the decentralized Indonesia of today, but the consistency in logic when it comes to negotiating religious interpretations cannot be ignored. So while decentralization has strengthened regional and city governing authority, the use of that authority utilizes the same SARA rationalization to maintain stability in national unity.

However, SARA logic is now reserved for deviant sects as opposed to Islam as a whole. We see the Indonesian government’s efforts towards the reproduction of an
Indonesian national community focused on subsuming what are considered deviant sects of Islam rather than viewing Islam as monolithic antagonist. The previous top-down system maintained firm control over Islam since it was viewed as a national existential threat by those in charge of the state. In the current era, Islam as holistic religious system has experienced a categorical shift for its uses and deployment in the public sphere.

Religious unorthodoxy, however, is still viewed as unacceptable and must be firmly dispelled. Because East Java Ahmadis *may* cause problems and social unrest, Ahmadis religious practices are inappropriate for the province and Indonesia writ large. It does not say they *are* causing problems, an important distinction to make. Thus, the relationship between Islam and the state may be different than it was in the past, but state controls of Islamic practices remain as Islamic deviancy has been thrown into the spotlight and SARA’s echo reverberates throughout East Java (Ibid).

Thus far in this chapter, attention has been given to the Governor’s legislation as it related to the Jakarta-centric national government and decentralization project. The next sub-section draws from my experiences in Surabaya during the summer of 2012 and the interviews I conducted with members of the Ahmadi community to give a more robust picture of the subject at hand.
Islam, the State, and Indonesian National Identity As Seen By Ahmadis

During a Friday Jum’ah prayer in September, 2012, I had the opportunity to visit an Ahmadi mosque in Surabaya and converse with members of the Ahmadi community, including the local Imam and others. The mosque, Majid al-Nur60, is tucked away on a nondescript alleyway surrounded by residential homes occupied by non-Ahmadi Muslim neighbors and sits a few blocks from one of the prevalent shopping malls in the city.

In compliance with the edicts of the East Java Decree, there were no signs on the exterior to indicate that it was a mosque associated with the Ahmadiyah as these had been removed the same day the decree was issued (Wahyudiyanta, 2011). The only indication of religious activities visible from the alleyway entrance is a simple hand-painted banner indicating that this building was indeed a Muslim place of worship, with the first floor being used as an office and the second being the prayer area.

The exterior reveals much about the ambiguity of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. While signs indicating a connection to the Ahmadiyah are prohibited for public display, the place of worship itself is still referred to in Islamic terms as the Ahmadi are permitted to refer to the building as a mosque. Thus, the connection to Islam is _______________________

60 Note: Majid is the Indonesian word for mosque
maintained and the state’s controls are upheld so long as the Ahmadi affiliation (and purported deviancy) is kept out of the public eye. In other words, the Ahmadi are allowed to pray in a mosque, just not an Ahmadi mosque. It is the descriptor that, at least from the legislative standpoint, is the problem for public displays. So in effect, the contradictions in national laws discussed previously also apply to regional statutes, as the status of Ahmadiyah as Indonesian Muslims remain undefined and inconsistent.

Upon arriving at the mosque, I quietly entered the building, took my shoes off, and sat in the back of the prayer space to observe and wait for Jum’ah prayers to conclude. After prayers had ended, I and several Ahmadi members (including the Imam) sat in their offices over sweet tea to discuss the role of religion in Indonesia, Indonesian nationalism, and the dilemma currently facing Ahmadiyah members in Indonesia. Our conversation began with a discussion of life post-East Java decree.

The assembled Ahmadis maintained that life had not changed drastically since the regional government issued the restrictions. One example I noticed to reinforce their statements was the distribution of Ahmadi written materials. While the exterior of the mosque revealed no connection to the Ahmadiyah, the interior had several books, flyers, and newsletters that could be easily distributed to any interested passerby. I in fact was allowed to take as many documents as I wanted after our discussions were completed.
Again, we see that the Ahmadi have found several ways to work around public restrictions and maintain their religious activities in Surabaya while still abiding by government decrees. They are not spreading their beliefs or activities in public per se or making a religious display, the written materials are simply available inside the mosque for anyone to sample should they enter. Ahmadis are still able to disseminate messages in East Java, albeit passively and in a subtle manner; a dissemination by other means.

This sentiment on life being essentially the same was also shared in separate interviews with a local Ahmadi organization representative. Here, the representative argued that Governor Soekarwo’s Decree was reality quite weak in its implementation. Despite its strong wording and condemnation of the Ahmadiyah as disruptions to social harmony, overall life had changed little as the Ahmadis made slight adjustments to their public activities. Moreover, the law’s constitutionality was called into question as it was argued that the Governor lacked the authority to issue such an edict.

While we did not go into the specifics of this argument, the logic behind this position has been discussed by others and is based primarily on authority. Despite the decentralization process in post-Suharto Indonesia, the central government has maintained its supreme authority over religious issues. Therefore, any edicts or regulations that are issued from a sub-national level are automatically unconstitutional,
even if they are designed to clarify what the national government had determined. In other words, the only legitimate authority in religious conversations is the central government. Other governing bodies violate the constitution of Indonesia when involving themselves with religious matters. Thus, there is a challenge to provincial authority over jurisdiction and rights. It is only the central authority who may negotiate the religious terrain in Indonesia; all other bodies are banned from doing so (Lam, 2011).

Returning to my conversations at the mosque and with Ahmadi spokespersons, I asked what role the police have had in enforcing the decree and what sort of protests had emerged following Soekarwo’s actions. The hosts responded that there was one non-violent protest and that was it as far as demonstrations went.

On the question of police, the Ahmadis have stated that there have been no problems. Beyond requesting that the Ahmadi sign be removed from the front of the mosque, the police early on maintained a presence to ensure that Ahmadis were safely allowed to enter and that unwanted disturbances and social harmony would be maintained from reported ‘thugs’ (preman) who were also present and represented a potential disruption (Wahyudiyanto, 2011). During my visit a year later, there was no police presence at the mosque, nor were there ‘thugs’ present during the Friday prayer session.
We then discussed the mass of laws regarding Indonesian Ahmadi members, and the response I received was rather intriguing. For the Ahmadis interviewed, recent religious laws were said to be unnecessary and redundant, for Indonesia already has solved its quandaries and already has all the laws it needs when facing questions of religion. When asked what this law was, the response was one word: Pancasila. The national ideology, often viewed as a tool of the first two Indonesian presidents, was looked upon as the ultimate answer to the religious issues facing the Ahmadiyah, the greater Muslim community, and Indonesia as a national community.

The Ahmadis quoted to me the national slogan ‘Unity in Diversity’ as the means to resolving the quagmire on their status as Muslims. If the Indonesian people and the Indonesian government would remember their roots, remember the unifying force of Pancasila and its importance in bringing together the diverse peoples of Indonesia (including the Ahmadiyah), then the social harmony described time and again in legislation would be achieved and balance in Indonesia could return.

My separate interviews with local Ahmadi spokespeople revealed a similar answer. I asked directly what would be the solution to the Ahmadi dilemma, how exactly could the violence, symbolic or otherwise, be removed from the Indonesian equation. After pausing a few beats, Pancasila was viewed as the answer. Here, it was argued that Indonesia had lost its way, had forgotten its roots, and neglected the unity that brought the national community together in the first place. As a result,
issues like those currently facing the Ahmadiyah have been intensified and created a more fragmented body. To counteract this, the Indonesian national community needs to look to the past to solve the problems of today and return to *Pancasila* to unify the national community once again. Emphasizing the point, one Ahmadi spokesperson declared that *Pancasila* was his life and the epicenter of Indonesian activities. To think of Indonesia in any other form would be an exercise in futility. Thus, the only way to understand Islam or oneself as an Indonesian was to do it through *Pancasila*.

In deploying *Pancasila* to bring peace and harmony and asserting its primacy in Indonesia, the Ahmadis engaged in an important performative act: the larger national community’s ideology and founding principles are enacted to bring to a close the conflict enveloping Indonesian Ahmadis. In so doing, the Ahmadi members interviewed constitute themselves as national persons and rightful members of the Indonesian national community. Through these nationalist actions, to once again paraphrase Wedeen, a discovery of a national self is enacted and the continuation of an Indonesian national community emerges regardless of the decentralization in government and state controls of Islam.

Relatedly, the mosque interviews further entrench the concept of a national community through the presence of everyday symbols and pictures of the nation and the state apparent in the mosque office. While conducting my interviews, there were several important photos and displays throughout the mosque’s office. On one wall
were photos of the community’s leaders. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as the founder, had his photo noticeably higher on the wall than subsequent leaders, who were organized in a single column underneath. On another, there was a prominent photograph of Mirza Tahir Ahmad (the deceased 4th successor to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as leader of the Ahmadiyyah movement) meeting with Amin Rais (the former leader of Muhammadiyah and prominent Indonesian politician who was instrumental in forcing the resignation of Suharto in 1998) meeting in Jakarta in 2000.

The photograph seemed to be especially important for the Ahmadis as it simultaneously captured a moment where their central leader was connected to both a mainstream Indonesian Islamic organization and an important Indonesian political figure who helped usher in the post-Suharto reform movement and subsequent easement of SARA. In this one picture the weaving of religion, the state, and the Ahmadiyah was personified in two individuals meeting for beverages and discussions. This was an especially prominent moment especially considering the current state of affairs.

Relatedly and more specific to Indonesian nationalism was what hung above a set of locked doors that had obviously been there for quite some time judging from the aged frames and fading colors: Portraits of the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, his Vice-President, Boediono, and the national symbol of Indonesia, a garuda clutching the ‘Unity in Diversity’ slogan in its talons. This was intriguing to
me as the central government had been proactive in marginalizing the Ahmadis from Islam yet symbols of this same government were carefully hung the office doors. My question was why a religious community, after being so restricted and isolated, would still display pictures of the national leaders and symbols of Indonesia? I asked my hosts if there was a nationally mandated law that these symbols were required to be displayed in offices throughout Indonesian places of worship.

They responded that it was not a law in the sense of the government demanding action, but rather an internalized law. In other words, there is a sense of obligation to display state and national symbols in the office, so much so that the community treats it as if it were actually law. Through this small act much is revealed about the Indonesian nation and its intricate relationship with the state’s control of Islam and the Ahmadiyah. First, the display represents a constant reminder of the Indonesian state and national community’s presence. Similar to Billig’s example of a flag hanging in front of a post office on any random day in *Banal Nationalism*, the portraits are a bland tableau of sorts, one whose inherent latency provides for the perpetual reconstitution of the Indonesian national community.

That is to say, nationalism’s presence reverberates within the Ahmadi mosque offices. Despite all of the pressures surrounding this group there still is a sense of belonging. Indonesia as a national identity is still a powerful unifying force and one that the Ahmadiyah self-identify with. The display acts as a reminder of belonging,
one in which the Ahmadis are part of not just the Muslim community, but also the Indonesian national community. These marginalized peoples who are castigated due to their perceived religious deviancies are nevertheless still constituted as national persons and maintain their ‘Indonesianess’ as an ideational marker. Second, the portraits of Indonesia’s top government officials reveal a continual reminder and internalization of the power state leaders hold. Moreover, despite decentralization efforts and granting more autonomy to sub-national governments, the primacy from Jakarta remains. Small banal rituals such as hanging portraits in an office signal where power is consolidated and who is the proper steward of the national community.

Lest we neglect the role of Islam in this discussion, when wrapping up my conversations with Ahmadi members, I inquired about the role religion plays in the constitution of the Indonesian national community and the response was quite enlightening. When asked if Indonesia was a religious nation, they quickly responded by saying that no, Indonesia is a nation that is religious. This response is far from mere semantics as it uncovers an important distinction: religion, and specifically Islam, is not what the Indonesian national community is, but what it has.

In sum, conversations with Surabayan Ahmadi members revealed compliance with the national and provincial ordinances in public, but within the mosque’s walls there remains a sense of normalcy with pamphlets and materials still readily available for consumption by other means. Because the group has accepted the state’s authority
to control Islam in the public sphere (as it had during SARA) and acts accordingly, the Indonesian governing apparatuses are not engaging the issue further. Moreover, decentralization and the freedom to more openly discuss religious issues post-Suharto are not indicative of absolute provincial religious sovereignty. In this way, the capital’s power has transformed, but remains intact.

Finally, the role of religion in the constitution of an Indonesian national identity is not totalizing for those being marginalized. Religion, specifically Islam, is still an attribute of the Indonesian nation, but it is likened to a possession rather than an essential element. In this way, the Pancasila indoctrination program and SARA policies instituted by Suharto can be viewed as successful: The Indonesian national community still comes first even for those who are asked to sacrifice their public religious practices for the sake of the nation.

**Conclusion: Shifting Fault Lines, a SARA Echo**

The Ahmadi circumstances in East Java are necessarily complicated and embody several divergent themes. However, through all of the fluidities seen in the preceding discussion, there are consistencies in logic from the legislative viewpoint as well as that of the affected persons. Namely, SARA rationality of removing religious discussions from the public sphere for the sake of national harmony and stability is still in operation. The examination of Soekarwo’s actions towards the Ahmadiyah mirror those of Suharto in that religious discussions and public reexaminations of what
it means to be a Muslim in Indonesia are to be considered dangerous as they disrupt the regular conduct of life in the archipelago.

However, if the group adheres to the spirit of the law and is careful to not upset societal harmony, than all is well. It is the public nature of their actions that creates problems. The private sphere remains the place of Ahmadi worship. Therefore, as the general restrictions against public displays and affiliations with Islam have eased overall in Indonesia, ‘deviant’ groups who do not adhere to the state’s determination of Islam must stay in the background (where most Muslim organizations were during the SARA era) and keep their religious values out of the purview of the general public.

A recent example taking place after my time in East Java further reinforces this point. In May of 2013, a reportedly spontaneous mob of over 100 in the Gempolan village of Tulungagung, East Java vandalized a local Ahmadi mosque. While no one was killed, the mosque’s windows and front door were destroyed (Jakarta Globe, 2013). Commenting on the vandalism, Governor Soekarwo stated that the vandals were wrong to attack the mosque, but the Ahmadis have to remember to be careful when worshipping as it can trigger intense emotions from the surrounding community (Jajeli, 2013). While this case demonstrates a different experience for Ahmadis living in a village as opposed to what was discussed in Surabaya, the consistency of Soekarwo’s message is clear: violence and vandalism is wrong, but the Ahmadiyah’s actions can upset the larger community so they have to be careful on where and how
they worship. While they are free to pray and practice their religious beliefs, the onus is on the Ahmadis to figure out how to worship without creating public unrest, an arduous task to be sure.

Framing Soekarwo’s message in state control terms, it is the means of disciplining that is crucial in understanding the Ahmadi paradox. While symbolic violence and performative acts (protests, labeling the group deviant, etc.) and restrictions of movement are acceptable, when this violence targets property or Ahmadi bodies the ‘line in the sand’ as it were is crossed. In response, a sort of counter-disciplining narrative emerges whereby physical violence is condemned while symbolic violence is simultaneously strengthened.

In Soekarwo’s case, it is to decry the destruction of property but also justify its existence. This sort of performative double-speak reveals much about the peculiar space occupied by the Ahmadis as well as an important cross-cutting theme: corporeal violence against the Ahmadis and their property is bad, but understandable considering their deviancy and threat to national stability.

Returning to Soekarwo’s provincial law, it continues the longstanding history of the Indonesian government determining what is and what is not religion. But in the post-Suharto decentralization era, East Java’s Governor has taken it upon himself to become the nation’s regional guardian. In so doing, he has effectively challenged the
national government and the capital by asserting authority over religious matters where previously there were none.

To challenge sub-national governing assertions, the Ahmadis and certain Indonesian constitutional scholars argued that these religious decrees have no bearing on Indonesian law as they are unconstitutional. Only the central government has the authority to rule on religious issues. Thus, in this case we see a call for recentralization, a reversal of Indonesian governing activities for the last several years, and for Jakarta to reassert its authority over the provinces. In other words, the solution offered in this case is a roll back and return to a much stronger national government based on the Pancasila practices of the past.

In my final case study, I explore what happens when the state gives up its right to control Islam and assign deviancy by examining a particularly brutal attack on an Ahmadi community in 2011. Filmed by a local Indonesian who witnessed the attack and posted the video YouTube, this violence drew outrage from a number of users who posted their thoughts in the comments section. Viewing these statements made for one particular video as important performative acts that constitute users as national persons irrespective of their physical presence in Indonesia, I examine SARA’s echo as it relates to a certain cyberspace community. Taking a page from Tim Edesnor’s work, I argue that pop culture can and does impact national identity, especially in Indonesia.
While the anonymity of YouTube gives posters free reign to say things without physical repercussions, or misrepresent who they are in the ‘real world’, none of that matters for chapter five. I am interested in the narratives posters are deploying, not whether or not they are true: it is the comments that are important, not the facts. Moreover, censorship can and does happen on YouTube as it is not necessarily discursive anarchy. This censorship is critical to understanding Indonesian nationalism as it draws upon SARA logics on a micro level (albeit in the macro forum of cyberspace). Religious comments that are deemed inflammatory and debilitating to the conversation are removed to maintain stability and community tranquility.
Figure 1: The Ahmadi mosque’s exterior. The office where we held our conversations is on the other side of the first floor green doors with the prayer room on the second level. The framed photos of the Indonesian President and Vice-President and the national symbol of Indonesia all appear directly above the doors pictured. Photo courtesy of the author.
Figure 2: Photographs of the Ahmadiyah Caliphs from inside the Ahmadi offices. Note that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s picture hovers above the others. Photo courtesy of the author.
Figure 3: Photograph of Mirza Tahir Ahmad and H. Amin Rais. Photo courtesy of the author.
Figure 4: Framed portraits of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Vice-President Boediono, and the national symbol of Indonesia from inside the Ahmadi offices. Photo courtesy of the author.
Chapter 5

YOUTUBE NATIONALISM AND THE THIRD SARA ECHO

February 6th, 2011 marked one of the most visceral displays of citizen opposition to the Ahmadiyah in Indonesian history. On this day in Cikeusik, Banten, an angry mob descended on an Ahmadi community and demanded that the group disband and that their place of worship must be destroyed because of the group’s deviant beliefs. Refusing to leave, both the Ahmadis and their opposition continually escalated the conflict by throwing stones and exchanging unpleasantries (to put it mildly). Then suddenly, the conflict exploded. The angry mob (approximately 1,000 people) attacked the Ahmadis (numbering about 20) and beat group members with machetes, bamboo sticks, and rocks. Three Ahmadis perished in the assault, along with five others being seriously wounded as limbs were hacked off in the assault. Even after death the mob continued its assault, with video recordings of the event posted on www.YouTube.com showing dozens of people stoning the partially stripped corpses (Budisatrijo, 2011, Saragih, 2011).

During the attack, the intervention of local police forces was muted at best, idle at worst. The video shows a police presence in which an officer attempts to assuage the attackers and deescalate the conflict, but the police presence (approximately 20
officers) paled in comparison to the overwhelming anti-Ahmadiyah forces descending on the scene. Still, some observers argue that this is of little concern for the victims, and argue that the Indonesian government as a whole (from the President and Ministers down to police forces and other street level bureaucrats) has executed a policy of benign neglect when it comes to protecting religious minorities within the Indonesian national community (BBC, 2011).

Unfortunately, the original video posted of the attack has been deleted from YouTube. However, like many videos, pictures, comments, etc. that are uploaded to the internet or posted on YouTube they never truly disappear as subsequent users can save the content and upload it themselves. This chapter examines one of these subsequent videos that primarily targets an Indonesian-speaking audience. My intent is not to analyze the visceral attack itself, but to examine the comments and discursive narratives used by the YouTube community about said attack and explore the SARA echo through an absence of governmental control. In other words, this chapter examines the narratives surrounding an extreme situation where the Indonesian government has relinquished its control of Islam and Islamic deviancy while other elements move in and assume those powers. I maintain that these comments, made

61 The video can be accessed at http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DnT7RrOTHoZw%26feature%3Drelated
primarily in Indonesian and then translated into English, reveal much about the Ahmadi situation in Indonesia and SARA’s echoes.

Through these comments religious issues, symbols of the Indonesian government, revulsion with visceral violence, SARA controls, and others combine to show how national identity can be constituted and reconstituted in the Web 2.0 world of YouTube. Whereas previous chapters maintained a state-centric perspective, this chapter inverts the approach and looks at the issues from a state-absent vantage point. So while cohesion is maintained in the sense of focusing on the state, it is inaction that is the point of emphasis and analysis, not action.

Ultimately, I argue that Indonesian nationalism has become embedded in contradiction where the restrictive influence of the Suharto regime remains, but is paradoxically found within open dialogue. On the relationship of this chapter to Indonesian nationalism, we see an inversion of the national motto of Indonesia. Diversity is in fact changing unity, and a reconstituted Indonesian national community emerges in cyberspace.

This chapter will move forward as follows: first, I situate YouTube and cyberspace amongst the more general literature on pop culture as a critical site for identity formation, counterpublics, and nationalism. I then locate the discussion

62 For a discussion of Web 2.0 see Birdsall, 2007.
within an Indonesian context and show that pop culture mediums helped mollify Suharto’s SARA censorship in early 90’s. The subsequent internet revolution has created a tech-savvy national community of cyberspace users/consumers. Following this, I argue that YouTube as a discursive medium is critical to understanding Indonesian state controls of Islam and Indonesian nationalism due to both the inherent anonymity and routine nature of its videos’ comment sections. As several scholars have taken note of, YouTube has become an important internet hub for celebrations of the bombastic and the everyday. This section also details the methods used for knowledge accumulation and acknowledges potential pitfalls to using YouTube as a research location.

Next, I detail my use of the qualitative research software atlas.ti, which was used for its open coding function that allows for the text’s themes to emerge and then be organized into narrative families. In so doing, a more holistic reading of the text is accessible than if one approached the research with preexisting codes or narrative categories. My method revealed several embedded themes regarding religion, religious organizations, the state, and ultimately the Indonesian national community. All of which contribute to this dissertation’s findings.

In particular, four narratives emerged among the YouTube commentary: 1) Religiosity, Inter-poster Vitriol and the Ahmadi Position; 2) Navigating Front Pembela Islam (the aforementioned FPI); 3) Symbols of the Indonesian governance;
and 4) An Indonesia microcosm. I conclude this chapter by tying the narratives together and situating this discussion within the larger dissertation themes.

**Popular Culture and Counterpublic Performances**

Cultural scholars have made tremendous strides in the analysis of everyday practices in popular culture, including cyberspace, as a method through which communities are created, replicated, and differentiated. Joke Hermes, for example, has written extensively on popular culture as a site of cultural citizenship for minority groups that is much more constitutive than the exclusionary sphere of formal political action (Hermes, 2005, see also Hermes, 1995, Hartley, 1999, and Burgess and Green, 2009). For Hermes, popular culture provides three important aspects to citizenship.

First, it offers a sense of comfort and communal belonging to those whom consume said culture. Second, popular culture proves to be continually captivating through all of its incarnations, be it actively consumed or passively absorbed. From, “…popular fiction, pop music, dedicated websites for TV series, much loved media stars, or computer games” the power of popular culture, “…allow us to fantasize about the ideals and hopes that we have for society, as well as to ponder what we fear.” Finally, popular culture is a linkage between public and private spheres, one in which the borders become ambiguous and challenged which makes it the, “most democratic of domains in our society, regardless of the commercial and governmental interests and investments that co-shape its form and contents” (Ibid, 3).
This view of popular culture as a fragmentation mechanism that dissolves the boundaries between public and private, external and internal, is carried over to cyberspace; a site of everyday practices that in one regard, acts as a potter’s wheel in the shaping of ideational jars. But at the same time, these ideational jars are subject to destruction and mutation based on users’ perceived core values. Cyberspace, to keep the analogy going just a bit longer, spins the ideational clay and allows for the hands of users to be creative and destructive, shaping and shattering.63

The ideational blending highlighted in cyberspace can be used as an exploration of nationalism. David Harvey’s pre-internet work underscored the post-modern compression of time and space. The themes he explored have been taken up by several others regarding cyberspace and the devaluation of physical location therein (Harvey, 1989 see also Hauben and Hauben, 1997, and Kitchin, 1998), and Edensor complements this position by reminding us that the declines of national identity as critical constructs are greatly overblown. The reasoning Edensor puts forward is that national identity reconstitution is not solely reliant on physical presence within a state or certain national boundaries.

Diasporas are critical to perpetuating identities because of the inherent ideational challenges faced when coming in to contact with a sort of otherness (e.g.,

63 On this point, see Gajjala and Birzescu, 2010.
being a ‘stranger in a strange land’). Dispersed persons who maintain an ideational bond with a national community simultaneously reinforce their national identity and experience a multitude of differences as they navigate ideational borderlands. From these differences, new national constructions can emerge as national identity combines with other ideational constructs. Thus, even if placement is external to physical boundaries, the nation is continually performed and reconstituted, albeit in unexpected ways and manners. To put it differently, place may be fluctuating, but space remains (Edesnor, 2002).

Closely linked to this discussion is the idea of counterpublics. Popularized in Nancy Fraser’s 1992 response to Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere (e.g. a space in which political participation is engaged through intersubjective public discourse/reasoning) counterpublics represent subordinated groups who lack access to Habermas’s essentialized public arena. These are people who lack spaces for intragroup discussions on their most pressing needs as well as pathways for meeting those necessities. Instead, what forms are subaltern counterpublics in which, “…subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 1992, pg. 123; see also Warner, 2002).

64 This is also a critical point made by Wedeen and discussed in chapter two.
While Fraser’s work does well to introduce the concept, there exists an ambiguity regarding what precisely makes a counterpublic counter-to-the-public as opposed to a sub-group/public/community/etc. The political element and calls for reform in Fraser’s primary example (late 20th century U.S. feminism disseminated through a wide array of pop culture mediums) resonate for Michael Warner, but he argues these examples do not distinguish a counterpublic from other group types and that the use of ‘subaltern’ proves to be a curious choice since it is unclear how these publics would be categorically different from other publics (U.S. Christian fundamentalism, and youth culture are two examples Warner provides). Because of this, Warner removes the use of subaltern and defines counterpublics as maintaining,

…at some level, conscious or not, an awareness of its subordinate statues. The cultural horizon against which it marks itself off is not just a general or wider public, but a dominant one. And the conflict extends not just to ideas or policy questions, but to the speech genres and modes of address that constitute the public and to the hierarchy among media. The discourse that constitutes it is not merely a different or alternative idiom, but one that in other contexts would be regarded with hostility or with a sense of indecorousness…Friction against the dominant public forces the poetic-expressive character of counterpublic discourse to become salient to consciousness. (Warner, 2002, pg. 86, see also Squires, 2002, and Asen, 2000)

Framing counterpublics in an Islamic context that differs tremendously from the liberal-democratic tradition Fraser spoke to, Charles Hirschkind’s fieldwork examined the practice of disseminating tape recorded popular Islamic sermons throughout Egyptian cafes, homes, small businesses, and public transportation
systems. Contra Habermas, Hirschkind argues that the spread of these recordings represents not a space for political opinion created via intersubjective reason/debate, but rather a diffusive piety disciplined through ethical speech. Because of its transcendent nature, this generative counterpublic is indicative of a cross-cutting Islamic public that enters both public and private spheres and erodes the state/society distinction popularized amongst public sphere scholars. Accordingly,

In their objects, styles of reasoning, and modes of historicity, the entwined deliberative and disciplinary practices that constitute this arena reflect the way Islamic notions of moral duty and practices of ethical cultivation have been mapped onto a national civic arena by Muslim reformists over the course of the last century…As opposed to the private reader, whose stillness and solitude became privileged icons of a distinct kind of critical reasoning within the imaginary of the bourgeois public, it is the figure of the ethnical listener – with all of its dense sensory involvements – that founds and inhabits the counterpublic…” (Hirschkind, 2006, 107; see also Hirschkind, 2001)

The similarities of Hirschkind, Warner, and Fraser can be found in the constitution, dissemination, and disciplining practices of counterpublics. Alienated or subordinate cultural groups (irrespective of their self-identification) react against an assertive body through performative practices that transcend forums/locales/spaces (e.g. Egyptians listening to services in their bedrooms or late 20th century feminist authors giving bookstore readings). These practices have the effect of disciplining members of the counterpublic as well as that of the public as the counterpublic’s discursive elements are brought from the margins into the foreground.
Bringing the state into this discussion, the ‘counter’ in counterpublic is representative of exclusion, be it in political power and/or political discourse.\textsuperscript{65} For Indonesia during SARA’s zenith the state’s intense control over Islam facilitated a widespread counterpublic network as discussions of Islam (and Islamic deviancy) were kept separated from the Indonesian community and subjected for the sake of that same national community. With the fall of Suharto and Reformasi ushering in a newfound incorporation of Islam into the public, the total number of counterpublics declined. But a spotlight was shown on those that remained, including the Ahmadiyah\textsuperscript{66}. Here, MUI and other organizations have castigated the group as deviants and exhibit newfound political power with the ‘conservative turn’ in Indonesian Islam, but with the state’s use of legislative decrees against the Ahmadi and officially declaring the group deviants Muslims, a strong statement is made as to who has ultimate authority over Indonesian religious controls irrespective of Indonesian Islam’s current context, and discursive power is reabsorbed by the state at the expense of not just the Ahmadi (who are the ones being declared deviants) but

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{65} On this subject, Asen and Brouwer write, “The power frequently denied counterpublics consists not only in the capacity to induce or compel actions from others, but power in the Arendtian (1958) sense of that which arises when citizens act jointly” (Asen and Brouwer, 2001, pg. 3).
\end{quotation}

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{66} See Bollestoff (2005) for an excellent Indonesian counterpublic investigation on the Indonesian gay community.
\end{quotation}
also MUI and others. Thus, we see that exclusion is fluidic and that former counterpublics can return from whence they came, if only for a moment.

The Cikeusik attack captures many of these tensions as the state’s benign presence and willingness to let others define the terms of Ahmadi deviancy show vitriolic interplays between publics and counterpublics. Indonesian popular culture and media outlets represent the forums where these discussions can be said to ‘play out’ after the physical violence has ended. Since the twilight of Suharto’s reign Indonesia has seen an explosion of discursive mediums as the number of media outlets have grown tremendously. By the 1990’s, Indonesian media included massive newspaper conglomerates, over 700 privately-owned radio stations, five private national television networks (in addition to the state-operated networks) and transnational networks. Because so much content existed, the state’s ability to control information eroded as different points-of-view disseminated throughout the archipelago (Hill and Sen, 2005).^67

^67 The Ministry of Information became such a vestigial bureaucracy that it was dismantled by President Wahid, with little impact on Indonesian media culture (Hill and Sen, 2005).
Similar to Hirschkind’s study, Indonesians are participants in the dissemination of counterpublics (be they ‘ethical listeners’ or otherwise) as SARA discussions (especially Islamic discussions) emerged in a wide array of popular culture mediums in post-Suharto Indonesia (Huda, 2012, Weintraub, 2011, Daniels, 2013, Hoestery & Clark, 2012). With the internet revolution of the mid-90’s, the spaces in which these performative negotiations happen have grown exponentially as popular culture in Indonesia has become increasingly technologically oriented and predisposed for scholarly inquiries. While analyses of traditional Indonesian culture such as wayang kulit, Indonesian shadow puppet performances, gamelan, Indonesian musical performances, and magic in Indonesian villages can fill entire libraries, studies of Indonesian popular music, cyberspace activities, and overall popular culture are infrequent (Heryanto, 2008).

In sum, this sub-section has demonstrated the importance of popular culture and counterpublics for understanding the Indonesian Ahmadi issue and the group’s purported deviancy. In post-Suharto Indonesia, SARA’s logics exist, but in an absence of overwhelming governmental controls over pop culture and Indonesian media outlets. Because of this, circumstances arise where the Indonesian government

---

68 See Bollestoff’s chapter in Mankekar and Schein (2012) for erudite discussions on the dissemination of Zines and the interplay between gay (in the Indonesian-language sense of the word) Indonesians and sexual citizenship in the Indonesian national community.
is unable to arbitrate Indonesian Islam and Islamic deviancy and Ahmadi judgment and judgment of the Indonesian government’s responsibly over the issue is debated on YouTube.

*YouTube Performance*

YouTube is at the forefront of Web 2.0, an evolution of cyberspace in which user participation is of upmost importance. Without YouTube users uploading videos and, in the case of this study, posting their thoughts on said videos and actively engaging the greater YouTube community, its significance would disappear. Moreover, YouTube’s existence is in and of itself a celebration of both the bland and the bombastic. It is an avatar for cyberspace itself.

The ability to connect diaspora communities, counterpublics throughout the world and maintain national identities is prevalent throughout YouTube, as the site can be seen as an expressive conduit through which national identities are enacted and national persons are constituted. Moreover, the blending of public and private realms and the transportation of ideas, identities, and counterpublics absent large-scale media outlets seen before YouTube reemerge on the website, albeit at much faster rates.69

Here, we see many of the connections YouTube commentaries have with the technologies of previous epochs. Returning to Benedict Anderson’s work for a

__________________________

69 On this point, see Benkler, 2006.
moment, the dissemination of print technologies was paramount for nationalism to spread as the written word allowed for the diffusion and access of ideas regarding community and national cohesion (Anderson, 2006). In a similar fashion, YouTube and the internet revolution has allowed for a similar pattern to unfold as ideas, videos, and performances emerged for a widespread audience.

Further, there is congruence between both the printed medium and YouTube in the anonymity they can provide. Whether pseudonyms are being used to influence the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in *The Federalist Papers*, or to insult others on a website, a similar freedom is accessible in which raw linguistic explosions are possible. Resultant corporeal consequences from one’s speech are muted since attribution in the physical realm is difficult, who is saying what is hard to determine. In both cases, there is a certain freedom of expression to engage others, but because of YouTube’s location in cyberspace this engagement can diffuse and incorporate a worldwide audience in a much more rapid fashion (Burgess and Green, 2009, Strangelove, 2010, Lange 2008, Vergani and Zuev, 2011).

To put this conversation in an Indonesian perspective, YouTube is one of the Top-10 most popular sites visited in the archipelago, and the Indonesian population is becoming increasingly internet-savvy as internet cafes/shops (*Warung Internet*) permeate Indonesian cities. Moreover, Indonesia is home to the third largest number of Facebook users in the world (having been surpassed by India in 2012 for the 2nd
largest national Facebook community). As of July 2012, 30 million Indonesians aged 14 or older were using the internet with the number on an increasingly upward climb (Guharoy and Morgan, 2012, Hill and Sen, 2005, Yung-Hui, 2012).

What can be gleaned from this data is that: 1) YouTube is a popular online destination for Indonesians; and 2) More and more Indonesians are using the internet. This correlation demonstrates growing opportunities for Indonesians and non-Indonesians alike to comment on the Ahmadi dilemma and the Indonesian state, thereby performing Indonesian nationalism for other unknown users in a virtual community.

In sum, my use of YouTube as a medium for Indonesian nationalist discourses and SARA analyses is linked to past insights, but what makes the site unique and interesting for analysis is its instant connectivity and usage. Whereas access to printing presses is necessary for print distribution, persons with an internet connection and a keyboard are able to comment on YouTube videos and engage in performative nationalism virtually instantaneously. In this way, the elite-driven phenomena in Anderson’s work are allowed to be broadened and encompass a wider audience not reliant on being physically within Indonesian state borders.

*The Anonymity Question*

While I view YouTube as a particular discursive vehicle, there are difficulties in using it for analytical purposes. Most notably, one has tremendous difficulty
‘knowing’ who is posting and what exactly are their ‘genuine’ motivations for making remarks, inflammatory or otherwise. Commonly understood as ‘Keyboard Warriors’ or ‘internet trolls’ individuals have certain freedoms to characterize and self-identify themselves as, say, extroverted brutish giants who purposefully use inflammatory rhetoric in order to incite emotional responses from others (commonly referred to as ‘trolling’), but in the non-cyberspace reality, these same individuals may be meek introverts who shun face-to-face interactions.

Users can be combative bullies, supportive friends, or anything in between. The choices are numerous. Life outside of YouTube may be quite different, but in this world, users have autonomy to decide how they are to be perceived. Taking a page from Nicholas Hookway, we see that the ‘honesty’ of bloggers (and by extension YouTube commenters) is irrelevant because,

Even if bloggers do not tell the ‘truth’, these ‘fabrications’ still tell us something about the manner in which specific social and cultural ideas such as morality are constructed. Here issues of ‘truth’ are not really at stake as the emphasis is on how the constitutive elements of blogs work to produce ‘particular effects’. (Hookway, 2008, 97)

I can never know the motivations for posting because the posters are anonymous and I have not communicated with them directly to find out why they said what they did (or if they even remember saying it, for that matter), but that is exactly the point. Whether this type of behavior is a form of escapism, internet addiction, or other phenomena
motivating comment posting, it does not matter to my analysis. Neither does knowing who these posters are outside of cyberspace. I do not seek to uncover the reasons for remarking on the video (nor can I), but rather the impact these comments have on Indonesian state controls of Islam, national identity, and the processes through which Indonesian nationalism perpetuates.

It is the performative processes that are important here, not users’ lives outside of cyberspace or their reasons for watching and posting about a certain video. By commenting on such a brutal event in Indonesia that blends symbols of religious conflict, the Indonesian governing powers, and Indonesian nationalism in such an amorphous medium, YouTube users are in effect opening a window to view their everyday performative practices of Indonesian national identity.

Still, the choices are not without consequence as censorship is possible. Uploaded videos that violate copyright laws or are deemed inappropriate (including pornography, gratuitous violence, animal abuse, and others) may be age restricted (the video under analysis here, for example) and only accessed after confirming that the YouTube consumer is over the age of 18. Additionally, YouTube’s staff may

__________________________

70 If the reader is interested in learning more about internet addiction, see Douglas et al., 2008 and the source material they cite.
ultimately remove a video. This is done primarily through “flagging” in which viewers report abuse of the rules, a sort of community watch program.\footnote{For more information on the proper user conduct, see the guidelines established by YouTube at \url{http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines}. YouTube has acknowledged the viciousness commentating can take throughout its website, and has announced that it is reformatting the entire commenting system whereby the newest comment will not automatically be placed at the top of the comment thread. This along with a revised moderator tool is designed to facilitate conversations instead of the verbal sparring and permeating vitriol (Baldwin, 2013). Whether this stymies commentating or not remains to be seen. Either way, it is irrelevant to material under investigation here.}

Moreover, comments can be disabled and/or removed by the persons uploading videos and user profiles may be deleted. Even if this occurs, there is much to be learned from the decision to terminate comments and/or user profiles. This censorship may be seen in two regards: 1) A performative by way of repression; and in certain cases 2) A throwback to SARA logics on a micro-level.

To recap: popular culture is incredibly important to understanding identity formation and Indonesian nationalism, and YouTube’s comments section and performative features act as a channel for nationalist expression and help fill in these gaps. While Indonesian-speakers live in a post-Suharto era where there is freedom to openly discuss religious issues, there is a dark side to this liberty as it has allowed for an increase in the use of vitriolic language. Viewed as a whole, the comments demonstrate serious tensions amongst the Indonesian national community over
religious issues, the Indonesian government, and religious organizations. Taken together, we can catch glimpses into the evolving reconstitution of the Muslim-Indonesian and Indonesian national community.

**Techniques Specific to this Chapter**

As mentioned earlier, the original video posted to YouTube was, unfortunately, deleted before I could save the comments for further analysis. However, several users had saved the video to their computers and different versions of the video reemerged. When scouring YouTube for these new videos, two criteria were important as I was choosing what video to analyze: 1) The amount of comments; and 2) The language by which the comments were being expressed – namely Indonesian.

By focusing on those who speak Indonesian, my intent is to reduce the impact of other language speakers who may represent vastly different cultures and national communities. The internet is a vast open space in which physical locale does not greatly limit rhetorical influence. Language comprehension is one way to filter out these messages. Admittedly, there are non-Indonesians who understand the language (me, for example) and have the ability to follow the conversation and influence it. Nevertheless, it still provides a way to identify or narrow down the cyber community to Indonesia. Similarly, the use of Indonesian as the preferred language is a strong
indicator that the intended audience is Indonesians, not Americans, Japanese, Pakistanis, or any other national ideational group.\footnote{Difficulties emerged in translating Bahasa Gaul (a sort of Indonesian slang and text-speak) that was often found in the comments section, but I have enough experience in the language and access to Indonesian language resources that helped understand many of the nuances of this writing style. In the instances where something was ‘lost in translation’, I was aided by native Indonesian-speakers who helped explain the idioms being used and relate it to an English saying. Of course, not everything has a literal translation from Indonesian to English, and any translation errors are completely my own.}

Once a video was found that met my criteria the entire comment thread was copied into a Microsoft Word document. As YouTube is a constantly evolving cyber community with users continually commenting on videos, other users’ comments, etc., it was necessary to isolate the video’s comments in a certain timeframe to perform an analysis. In other words, I am temporarily isolating a naturally dynamic phenomenon for the purposes of analysis (or ‘bracketing’), and then taking this knowledge and plugging it back in. In this study, all 2011 comments (the same year that the attack occurred) were included in the analysis, and all posts from 2012-on were omitted\footnote{While not included in the analysis, the post-2011 comments coincide with the narratives reviewed below and reinforce the arguments in this dissertation.}

Once the translations were completed, I uploaded the document into atlas.ti for content analysis. The use of atlas.ti to analyze nationalism on YouTube has been done before as a survey on a number of videos (Vergani and Zuev, 2011) but for the reasons

72

73
discussed previously I took a different route for the sake of an in-depth analysis of the comments. My content coding used the open coding feature that does not require the researcher to have fixed categories in which content is forced into. On the contrary, open coding allows for the text to ‘speak’ to the researcher as narratives emerge. This was also necessary due to the nature of commenting on a video and engaging in inter-poster dialogue. Because one post could have multiple narratives involved and represent different coding categories, a means of catching these nuances was necessary. From there, the content was organized into narrative families based on their similarities and then explored to better understand how they relate to the Indonesian national community of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia74.

**YouTube Narratives and the Disciplining of Indonesian National Identity**

What emerged was an analysis of 419 codes. Of these, 14 were marked as spam and 44 were comments that had been removed. The removal of comments proved to be quite illuminating of SARA’s microprocesses and will discussed below.

Many of the comments posted in reaction to this video reveal a disgusted internet community with 133 codes demonstrating condemnation of the attacks. The brutality of the event repeatedly generated such descriptions as ‘savage’, ‘sadist’,

74 I would be glad to share the source material and atlas.ti analysis with the reader. In fact, I would welcome it if there are any improvements that could be made to the translations as the themes discussed are always in need of further refinement.
‘barbarians’, and ‘animals’. But within this framework, the reasons for disgust and outrage varied tremendously, which is where the conflicts and contestations that represent the disciplining of the Indonesian national community arise. These themes can be broken down as follows: 1) Religiosity, Inter-poster Vitriol and the Ahmadi Position; 2) Navigating Front Pembela Islam (FPI); 3) Symbols of the Indonesian governance. In total, these themes operate within and through 4) An Indonesia microcosm.

1) Religiosity, Inter-poster Vitriol, and the Ahmadi Position (137 codes)

Beyond revulsion towards the attack, posted dialogues revealed narratives organized under the theme of religiosity, inter-poster vitriol and the Ahmadi position in Islam. Of the 137 codes in this category, 25 were related to comments on the Ahmadiyah, 25 were coded as attacking Islam, 54 codes defended Islam, and 33 codes represented the Inter-poster Vitriol.

The attackers were condemned for misrepresenting the Islamic faith, and Islam was defended against attacks deployed by self-identified Christians writing in Indonesian. On the former, comments repeatedly distance Islam from both the events captured on film and the attackers themselves. Users noted that Islam does not teach the use of violence as depicted, as well as the religion itself being one of peace and tranquility.
The use of the phrase ‘Allah Akbar’ while striking an unarmed Ahmadi triggered intense abhorrence including epithets towards the attackers and an understanding that the perpetrators believe in a deviant ideology of ignorance that only gains courage when invoked with a large group. Specifically, accusations of misunderstanding Islamic jurisprudence, Islam itself, and God emerged as commonalities throughout this theme. There was a need to defend Islam against this type of action, a desire to prove to the greater Indonesian-speaking YouTube community viewing and posting on this video that these ‘barbarians’ are a misguided lot who bastardize Islam and in so doing, are unrepresentative of the greater Indonesian Islamic community. Thus, what needs to be done is blame the assailants themselves, not the religion they purportedly represent, as some chose to do.

On the latter issue of inter-poster vitriol, users such as self-identified Christians used the comments section as an opportunity to vent their purported hatred of Islam and instigate an explosive conversation on the merits of both religions. Besides comments that, to put it bluntly, stated that ‘Islam is shit’ the religion was accused of accepting these beatings as an inherent part of the religion, which at its base is unadulterated savagery and worship of Satan. Further, Islamic leaders were seen as acquiescent to this sort of behavior and the religion they represent was viewed as a
more serious threat to Indonesia than communism.\textsuperscript{75} These posters believed that the religion has no place in the nation and needs to be erased, for it is simply not appropriate for Indonesian proper.

Attacks on Islam would have been significantly larger had it not been for the majority of one particularly hostile poster’s comments being removed. The ones that were left were argumentative and sought to denigrate Islam and Muslims in general. Several commentators noted this by writing that the particular user was merely a provocateur intent on generating an acerbic debate. The deleted comments, however, reveal much about the nature of discussion on YouTube and intimately show the new reality of talking about religion in the Indonesian national setting.

In this way, we see the interplay between counterpublics and publics as discussions of religious matters have been allowed to enter the public sphere in Indonesia that are no longer relegated to the margins of Indonesian society. But with this opening, there comes the liberty to denigrate and purposefully tear down religions, especially in the realm of cyberspace where anonymity reigns supreme. Christians, a minority in Indonesia, can attack the majority and challenge them in a way that would have been impossible two decades ago.

\textsuperscript{75} For an early history of Indonesian communism, see McVey, 2006.
Still depending on the forum one uses to voice their displeasure at Islam to an Indonesian-speaking audience, speech can be censored and comments can be removed. Hence, there is an occasion where discussions on religious issues are allowed to permeate, but in a controlled environment where one’s comments may be censored if deemed inappropriate. Thus, individual users and the greater YouTube community may represent the antithesis to SARA because these discussions are occurring in an open space. But on the other hand, these deleted comments demonstrate a SARA microcosm, one without the Indonesian government and its representatives’ involvement. The performative practices learned and repeated in a far gone time remain observable in cyberspace, leading to a case where SARA is gone, but its echo is still applicable. The politics of the past can still be seen in the actions of the present.

Regarding the comments directly addressing the Ahmadiyah, commentators actively distanced Islam from the sect’s belief system. Although perhaps undeserving of this sort of attack, and in a minority of cases defended based on their humanity, the preponderance of discussions portrayed the group as being guilty of impersonating Islam and being unrepentant sinners. In one particular case, the Ahmadis were directly accused of instigating the conflict that led to this beating by residing in a village where they were banned and ignored the warnings of impending danger. Because of their divergent understanding of the Prophethood (noted by one user as
being akin to certain Christians advocating polytheism) the Ahmadiyah are defacing Islam for the masses and are a hazard to the religion. Because of this, the Ahmadis are escalating tensions in Indonesia and are a community that cannot operate under the banner of Islam.

By way of a resolution, comments suggest two alternatives: repent or renounce. If the Ahmadis repent, admit their misguided ways, and return to the fold of the greater Islamic community, reconciliation is possible. If this is not done, than a renouncement of their Muslim identity would demonstrate adherence to an independent religion distinct from Islam and solve the problem. If neither of these actions is taken, then the worry is that the Ahmadiyah will spread and further besmirch Islam.76

Thus, an environment exists in which the beating itself is castigated, but the reasoning behind said attack is explained in such a way as to put the impetus on the Ahmadiyah to change rather than accept the group as equal members of the Islamic community. The assailants, however misguided or unrepresentative of Islam they may be, are violent because of the Ahmadis assertions to Muslimness. If this assertion is amended, tensions will dissipate. However, these tensions are not heightened on their

76 The same resolution has been advocated by MUI and in the legal decrees described previously.
own and may dissolve into the background of the national consciousness was it not for one group repeatedly escalating the situation: FPI.

2) Navigating Front Pembela Islam (FPI) (26 Codes)

Recall that FPI is an organization in Indonesia calling for a purification of Islam and the forceful removal of such groups as the Ahmadiyah for their purported erroneous beliefs. Directing their anger at FPI, commentators argued that the organization was ultimately responsible for this attack. “Manipulation” was a word common throughout these posts as FPI was accused of radicalizing Indonesian Islam and instigating violence. One example called the organization ‘bin radicals’. Puns on the FPI initialism portrayed the group as representative of the devil and doing Satan’s work in Indonesia. The overall picture painted was one of outright hatred of FPI, for they misrepresent Islam and are not needed. Only tertiary defenses of FPI posted by a few individuals asked for temperance towards the group.

This theme reveals first, that FPI support does not have a large presence in the commenting community or alternatively, pro-FPI comments were deleted (which may

77 Although FPI is not a focus of this dissertation, it would be negligent to not acknowledge that the YouTube commentators discussed the group to such an extent that a certain anti-FPI narrative developed that relates to the religo-national relationship.

78 For example, one comment stated that “FPI=Front Pembela Iblis”, which translated into English means FPI= Satan Defenders Front
go back to the previous point on SARA’s YouTube presence). While perhaps not physically protesting FPI in the streets or participating in massive demonstrations against the organization, commenters are expressing their distaste for FPI in a public discursive forum, albeit from behind a computer screen. Thus, a sort of oxymoronic condition is revealed where posters are privately condemning in public.

Second, FPI represents a severe departure from the Indonesian Civil Islam articulated by Madjid and others and is an extreme example of the ‘conservative turn’ of Indonesian Islam described in the introduction. The spiritual revival has been replaced with a move towards purification and overt political action that does not run candidates for political office, but seeks change through force of will.

The actions of FPI leadership were also scrutinized and compared to the more ghastly tactics used by Suharto. Specifically, FPI leaders are allegedly responsible for mysterious disappearances and killings that are reminiscent of Indonesia’s period of authoritative rule. Whether these accusations are grounded in truth or not is irrelevant, the point is that political practices of the past are being invoked to criticize and undermine actions of the present.

The animosity towards FPI reveals shifting fault lines in the relationship between Islam, the state, and the Indonesian nation. While there is an opening for religious organizations to operate in Indonesia, interpretations of Islam (strict or otherwise) are subject to challenges and ideational combat by the Indonesian
government and in other forums. There may have been regime change, but history continues to inform today’s Indonesian national community and the symbols of Indonesian governance.

3) Symbols of Indonesian Governance (36 codes)

Included in this family are both elected officials, such as the president, and non-elected officials, such as police officers. Overwhelmingly, Indonesian governance was viewed as not only indifferent to the victims, but also responsible for the violence itself. Accountability emerged as a common theme, with some calling for the Indonesian military forces (TNI) to intervene. The presence of police officers at the site of the attack appeared especially infuriating for this YouTube community. Refusing to fire warning shots or ending the attack led to calls of cowardice and insanity towards the police and that Indonesian laws and justice had vanished. Users also noted that in Australia or other nations, the police would not have hesitated to shoot the perpetrators once the attacks began. If Indonesia is to be considered a law abiding state, so they argued, then its police officers are responsible for upholding said laws. For those officers that are responsible for allowing this attack to happen, Allah will provide just punishment.

Because of President Yudhoyono’s apparent inattention to the growing religious intolerance in Indonesia, many judged him responsible for this attack. Calls were made for the president to assert his power and dissolve religious organizations
that were instigating religious fanaticism, including FPI. In an intriguing twist, and one that follows the common thread of historical political processes reemerging in the YouTube dialogues, one commentator argued that had this occurred under the rule of Suharto, there would not have been a meek response from the state. This almost wishful nostalgia for a past in which SARA issues were not allowed to be discussed in public forums the likes of which this poster was using seems contradictory at first. But taking a second glance, this revelation exposes an important double-edged sword for modern day Indonesia.

In one aspect, the comments section itself is a revelation for openness because it enables Indonesians and the greater Indonesian speaking audience to participate in religious discussions. Despite some taking the opportunity to hurl religious insults and post derogatory comments, having the capability to generate candid dialogue within a widespread community, both within Indonesia and beyond, speaks volumes. Advances in technology have made such layers of speech possible and also uncovers the evolving nature of Indonesian nationalistic language in which criticisms of the government and SARA issues are largely unobstructed.

Yet, censorship can happen and is apparent throughout these comments, be it through the video poster’s discretion or otherwise. Classified by several YouTube community members as provocative, these removed comments demonstrate the problems with having open discussions. The ‘wrong’ types of remarks create issues
similar to the ones in the video itself, although varying tremendously in scope and intensity. As such, there is an underlying nostalgia for the SARA era when problems like these were obfuscated and swiftly mitigated. Hence, a contradiction appears in which the posters use a particular form to advocate its antithesis.

Of course, SARA as an Indonesian policy was designed to maintain national unity and social tranquility. As has been shown, the political reverberations still affect discussions of religious issues in the form of official governmental action. Yet absent state involvement others are allowed to discipline the Ahmadi religious issues in their own ways, which triggered emotion-laden responses from commentators and observable performative practices. My final YouTube theme investigates these connections with a focus on ‘Indonesia’ as a performative national community.

4) An Indonesian Microcosm (29 codes)

The national coat of arms and motto makes for an important metaphor of Indonesia as a whole. “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” or “Unity in Diversity” is an important concept to maintain in Indonesia because of its inherently diffusive nature (both geographically and culturally) and its appeal to Indonesia’s 20th century nationalist origins. Despite local and regional variances, the idea of an Indonesian national community can be a uniting force for all Indonesians to coalesce around. Be it through indoctrination, force, or otherwise. Through the archipelago’s variety there is a common thread: ‘Indonesia’ as a national construct.
SARA pushed differences to the wayside for the sake of unity as these issues were viewed as so emotionally charged that the nation could not be held together if they were out in the open. This opinion carried over to the YouTube comments when one seeming outsider claimed that the Ahmadi attack was the result of the Indonesian peoples’ fragile emotional state when discussing SARA issues. Because of their lack of control, Indonesians are always susceptible to devolving into violent confrontations with one another when religion becomes involved in the discussion.

However, this was not the majority opinion when considering this attack in a nationalistic framework. Belief in diversity as a unifying force exemplified in the Indonesian constitution and the Indonesian coat of arms perpetuated throughout postings. Questions about where Indonesian diversity has gone permeated as posters wondered what was to become of Indonesia as a national community. Blame for this lack of diversity included the previously mentioned themes, but also demonstrated both their combined impact and the fragmented nature of this national community.

We see a Janus-faced phenomenon that combines performative practices from SARA and post-SARA state eras that are continually renegotiating the idea of Indonesian identity. The continued impact of SARA has been detailed, but I would like to discuss the more recent performative practices emergent in YouTube dialogues.

First, there is the provocative aspect in which posters grab attention by debasing people, religions, etc. Having an audience, however fleeting that may be,
allows for insults that otherwise may not occur. A freedom one can utilize regardless of their physical location and cultural restrictions therein. This ‘trolling’ exercise by ‘Keyboard Warriors’ may have the intent of inciting others in the YouTube community, but the practice is not limited to this particular video. Evidence of trolling can be seen throughout cyberspace, be it on internet message boards, comments on newspaper articles, social networking sites, and other public/counterpublic outlets. However, in this particular instance, this diffusive practice is used to constitute and influence national persons.

The wide array of verbal assaults, whose targets incorporate several groups and religions, enact a national self through acrimony. The offending individual may be dismissed as a mere provocateur by some or engaged with by others, but the virtual context in which these performances occur demonstrate an Indonesia in which religious discussions are heated and result in a polarized Indonesian national community. Instead of unification through differences, the national community and subsequent national subjects exhibit distress.

Yet, distress does not necessitate the demise of Indonesian identity, as the internet also creates a space to vent frustrations and assign blame as posters have a voice and audience where they may otherwise have none.

Not every YouTube user who commented on this video utilized it as an opportunity to provoke others into a virtual war with words, and this forum reveals an
outlet for non-political leaders and/or non-governmental officials/bureaucrats to share their thoughts and experiences on the attack and the broader implications for the Indonesian national community. In this way, what is revealed in the comments about the attack on the Ahmadiyah is a microcosm of ‘Indonesia’ in which religious issues that were previously restricted are discussed in a virtual public square. The government, religious organizations, and religions themselves are openly criticized and even in some cases, vilified. This is the new reality that runs contrary to the previous restrictive dialogue.

Finally, illuminated here is a reconstitution of the Indonesian national community based upon, not adversarial to, religious issues. The combination of religion and nationalism is one that has a longstanding history, but is also one with an established hierarchy: nation before religion. This was done to ensure solidarity with an amalgamation of peoples who had few inherent connections with one another. Yet since the fall of Suharto, religious issues have taken on more prominent roles in Indonesian society. While the national slogan remains ‘Unity in Diversity’ what unifies Indonesians is being challenged. FPI, MUI, and others advocating conservative Islam propose solidarity through a purification of Islam to the dismay of both Muslims advocating liberal or Civil Islam and Indonesian-speaking Christians. The place of religion, specifically Islam, has become hotly contested as the Indonesian state advocates its dual position of national guardian and Islamic arbitrator. The
difference is that technological advances and cultural transformations have changed the national context in which the state operates. What was once settled under Suharto has been ripped asunder, and despite over a decade of post-Suharto Indonesia, the debate is far from being settled.

**Conclusion: Diversity in Indonesian Unity**

Restrictive yet free, the elimination of SARA yet a continuation of SARA logic, the use of open conversation to remember fondly a time when there was none, this chapter has demonstrated the contradictory nature of Indonesian nationalism at a time of continued transition. Negotiating the terrain, Indonesian-speakers of all kinds posted their thoughts about a particularly brutal attack on an Ahmadi community that emerged on YouTube and further elucidated the diversity at the heart of Indonesia.79 Some sought to challenge users on their beliefs and debase Islam and other religions as the tools of savages, to which responses were returned in kind.

Others challenged the Indonesian government for their seeming lack of interest in the attack and also blamed FPI for escalating religious tensions throughout

79 As a postscript, criminal prosecutions of those perpetrating the beating based on the YouTube video did come about. Twelve people were charged on a number of accounts including assault and inciting a riot. However, the sentences for those found guilty were between three and six months with many released after 15 days due to time served. In fact, an Ahmadi security adviser who had been severely wounded when his hand was nearly severed by a machete received a six month sentence for incitement and served more time than many of the attackers (Millie, 2012).
Indonesia. Ultimately, settlement of this issue remains to be seen, but that is exactly
the point. Through the unexpected changes a renegotiated Indonesia is emerging
where instead of these issues being taboo, they are exposed to the world, warts and all.
These debates can generate a restless citizenry, but restlessness embedded in the
transitive Indonesian national community.

In a curious finding, the dark side of openness and religious dynamism comes
to light. While there are opportunities to have religious discussions in a cyberspace
forum, the Indonesian and Indonesian-speaking community is now forced to negotiate
divergent beliefs in the public sphere in a completely different manner that blends the
private with the public. SARA restrictions, a lack of media outlets, and pre-internet
Indonesia meant that open religious conversations could not happen. However, with
these new freedoms latent religious matters and their resultant counterpublics have
come to the foreground in the Ahmadi issue as the group’s Muslim identity and
Indonesian activities have been challenged and marginalized. By discussing what
Islam is in cyberspace it has also been revealed what Indonesian Islam is not.

Still, despite all the arguments and despite all the anger, the commonality
throughout the comments was revulsion towards the perpetrators. What was to blame
for said attack triggered heated exchanges, but the unifying force was repudiation of
the savage beatings that demonstrate the limits of Ahmadi disciplining and indicate a
reversal in the national motto. Instead of ‘Unity in Diversity’, here is ‘Diversity in Indonesian Unity’.
Chapter 6

A CONCLUSION

This dissertation’s central premise is that by viewing Indonesia through an Ahmadi lens we are able to understand the limits of Indonesian Islam as it relates to the evolution of both the Indonesian state and Indonesian national identity following the end of Suharto’s New Order regime. Through utterances, symbolic gestures, and legislative acts surveyed in the preceding chapters, key insights have been gained as to what constitutes a state ‘certified’ Muslim within the Indonesian context, the paradoxical relationship between the Ahmadi religious community and Islam, and the performative disciplining of Indonesia proper.

By maintaining a state-oriented vantage point that examines its (in)actions, a wide array of performative practices have revealed a picture of sorts that includes Indonesian national identity and the disciplining of its boundaries. While at first glance these snapshots may seem distinct in what they can offer, they do in fact demonstrate certain underlying connections and themes that help us understand the peculiar place of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. From a developed awareness of the Ahmadi position, we gain a more robust understanding of Indonesia proper as it relates to the subject at hand. Ultimately, the Ahmadi paradox has revealed a
transitive Indonesia whereby the logic behind Suharto’s SARA policies and practices have not disintegrated into the past, but have rather been echoed in the sentiments of custom, culture, and governmental commandments.

More generally, the preceding discussion speaks to the processes through which national identity is identified, enacted, sacrificed for, and disciplined by the state and its performative reverberations. Nationalism is a diverse phenomenon that operates in a multitude of manners and through a wide array of channels. Giving primacy to elite-oriented perspectives or to isolate national reconstitution from other ideational markers (specifically Islam) only tells part of the story. My goal with writing this dissertation has been to make a small contribution in filling these gaps and building on our understanding of the idea of Indonesia. In this concluding chapter, the key findings will be summarized and discussed at length.

Finding Number One: The SARA Echo, a Return to the Past

The SARA echo clearly represents the unifying thread of my work as it still permeates Indonesia despite over a decade of post-Suharto history. In the YouTube chapter, overwhelming disgust and sadness was captured amongst the unique posting community, but we also saw demands for the Indonesian government to act, calls for a return to SARA policies, and in a micro-foundation of SARA censorship, deleted comments. The armed forces and President Yudhoyono were specifically targeted for their inaction, both for refusing to intervene during the attack as well as for ignoring
the religious issues permeating Indonesia. Disciplining (both symbolic and corporeal) powers were vacated by the state and left to others, making the filmed attack possible. Accordingly, a stronger government presence when negotiating religious attacks was demanded by several commentators, and as was demonstrated in one instance, nostalgia for Suharto era-tactics to eliminate the problem by returning Islam in its totality to the periphery of Indonesian society and reintroducing strict SARA policies.

Further, Indonesia’s religious history was cited to help make sense of the chaos by saying that Indonesians lack control of their emotions when discussing religious issues. Essentially, SARA policies and censorship were endorsed as they would not allow these sorts of conversations to happen in the first place. These tactics of censorship were prevalent throughout the comments section through deletion and also speaks to the limits of discussing religio-nationalistic issues in cyberspace amongst publics and counterpublics.

YouTube comments provide another forum for discussing religious issues related to and/or generated by Indonesians and those who speak the national language. Yes, some took the opportunity to insult and malign, but having the capability to create a far reaching dialogue through a digital medium speaks volumes to the freedoms of speech one may find in cyberspace. Yet censorship is still part and parcel of the process. Free expression only goes so far on this YouTube page, be it through the video poster’s discretion or otherwise. Removed comments reveal the problems
with having open discussions, especially in the intersection of religion, the state, and nationalism apparent in the dialogue. The ‘wrong’ types of remarks that are described as provocative are removed from the community’s dialogue as they were deemed inappropriate and destabilizing to the ongoing conversations. While the act itself is not representative of SARA, its underlying logic of using censorship to maintain community tranquility is. Hence, the YouTube comments represent a microcosm of SARA logic echoed in behavior and conduct.

The KTP and East Java chapters showed a willingness by the state to assert control over religious conflicts through issuing decrees and regulating Ahmadi activities, but SARA enforcement mechanisms are suspect. At the national level, legislation comes into conflict with national identification that reaffirms Ahmadiyah Muslim identities. While the Joint-Ministerial Decree and (E-)KTP maintain the state’s authority over religious issues, there is a clash in the authority’s operation.

On the one hand, central government leaders declare in no uncertain terms that: 1) They are the ultimate authorities on the practice of Islam in Indonesia; and 2) Restrictions are necessary since the Ahmadiyah are deviants and upset national stability/tranquility by proclaiming that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is an Islamic prophet. Yet KTP provides Indonesians the freedom to choose (from the state-approved list) their religious membership. In essence, the national government is providing agency to the Indonesian populace to self-identify their faith. So for groups deemed deviant,
they maintain a connection to the mainstream through an everyday reminder of their belonging via KTP. In other words, KTP provides a forum, however commonplace it may be, to declare that they are both Indonesian and Muslims regardless of legislation from the national or sub-national levels. This paradoxical situation uncovers a government whose past includes strict control over religious issues, a desire to preserve that dominance, but a context in which the national government, and its key officials have far less rule over Islam in the public sphere. In other words, the Indonesian government is still determined to control national cohesion and maintain its traditional role as stewards for the nation by issuing judgments on intra-Islamic ideational issues and maintaining static religious categories. However, said judgments are obfuscated by routine state activities that demonstrate the implicit dynamism in national and religious identities. SARA exists, but only as an echo of its former self.

Putting aside the constitutional arguments against the Governor’s Decree, its enactment demonstrates SARA logic at the sub-national level. Despite decentralization efforts of the past several years, the patterns of governing developed under the Suharto regime remain. The SARA rationality of removing religious discussions from the public sphere for the sake of national harmony and stability is still in operation. Religious discussions and public examinations of what it means to be a Muslim in Indonesia have been deemed dangerous to the functioning of the collective as it is a disruption to everyday life.

211
In the case of the Ahmadiyah in East Java, it is not their beliefs that are the problem, but rather the public display of those beliefs. If kept behind closed doors and out of the purview of those in the community who might be offended, then Ahmadi worship is free to proceed. As restrictions against public displays and affiliations with Islam have eased, those classified as ‘deviant’ (especially as determined by governing authorities) are in a sense left behind on the margins and asked to sacrifice their public activities for the national good. Deviancy as it is defined in Indonesia keeps the Ahmadis in the background to ensure their religious values are out of the purview of the general public. So instead of being applied to all religions and Islam, the SARA logic is narrowly tailored for internal national outsiders.

Locating the SARA echo in a larger context, chapter four saw an Ahmadi leader suggest that Indonesia needs to return to the national ideology when navigating religious issues and Ahmadi subjugation. Because Pancasila has been lost, Indonesians have in a sense forgotten what it means to be a member of the national community. By remembering their roots, so to speak, the ‘Diversity in Unity’ and the fragmented national community seen as a hallmark in post-Suharto Indonesia can be enriched and religio-national ideational issues such as the one facing the Ahmadiyah can be lessened. Thus, the solution to the Ahmadi dilemma lies in Indonesia’s history and a return to what made Indonesia whole in the first place.
The nostalgia seen here and in the discussion of Indonesia’s past on YouTube reveal an underlying theme that the national community was ‘in a better place’ when religion was subjugated to the national identity and religious discussions were not allowed for public consumption. By maintaining a top-down approach to national cohesion at the behest of the central government, Indonesia’s stability and perpetuation was preserved and ensured.

However, with cohesion came the severe SARA restrictions and Islam as a whole was subjugated to a certain national ideal. Not only were the Ahmadis subjugated to the Indonesian nation during the pinnacle of Suharto’s power, but so were all religions and religious groups, a sort of discriminatory equality across the board. To completely divorce Pancasila from its New Order deployment omits its ideational grounding and evolution. Moreover, it attempts to unravel the twisting of Islam and Indonesian national identity that has occurred since the end of Suharto’s rule, and obfuscates the ideational dynamism that has been (sometimes painfully) observable as the Indonesian national community is reconstituted and disciplined in new ways.

In sum, the findings indicate that the meaning of Islam in Indonesia and what it means to be a Muslim-Indonesian are fluidic ideational constructs that are not readily discussed in public. While restrictions against Islam in a general sense have relaxed, there is still a palpable uneasiness with open religious conversations that critically
examine the definition of Islam in Indonesia and make specific targeting of Ahmadi deviancy and marginalization by the state possible. There is worry that these sorts of dialogues can undermine the social harmony and stability of the Indonesian national community and put the entire national construct in danger. Therefore, censorship is legitimated and implemented while returning to Indonesia’s past is seen as a viable solution. So SARA logic vis-à-vis religious discussions are still displayed, but the target has shifted to those on the religious fringes. At the same time, those on the fringes continue seeking the return of *Pancasila* while ignoring its SARA connections and subjugation of Islam in total.

**Finding Number Two: Elite Nationalist Processes Work, But Then What?**

Undoubtedly, the concept of Indonesia as a national community was created, utilized, and manipulated by the archipelago’s elites. Chapter one revealed that the word ‘Indonesia’ and the idea behind it lacked a ‘real’ history. It was primarily a 20th century construct popularized by Sukarno and others who imagined its past in speeches and declarations. Moreover, Sukarno and Suharto were well known to use political rallies in order to demonstrate consolidated Javanese power, which was effective partially through nationalist rhetoric and thinking (Anderson, 1990). In this sense, nationalism has been used as an instrument for elites to create and then maintain control and social cohesion.
An important finding is that despite the downfall of Suharto and the opportunity for Indonesia to fragment, the sense of national cohesion has continued. Part of understanding how this is possible has to be seen in the effectiveness of Sukarno and Suharto in creating and institutionalizing *Pancasila* and affirming the primacy of the nation above all other ideational affiliation. But the question necessarily arises as to how this has continued after the New Order’s end. By focusing on the state’s controls over Islam and overlooked symbol uses and rhetoric by Indonesians of different statuses, the nation is continually reconstituted. Elites reinventing history and scholars maintaining a focus on ‘high culture’ is very helpful for understanding how nations become solidified, but it only reveals half of the story. Accordingly, the preceding chapters have taken a more holistic approach to the topic of nationalism that incorporates both elite and non-elite performatives to understand how the Indonesian national community is transforming and being reconstituted as it relates to the Ahmadi dilemma.

In cyberspace, there is an existential crisis when it comes to ‘Unity in Diversity’ as the national motto of Indonesia. The overwhelming shame exhibited in comments towards the conduct of these perpetrators led to many asking where their Indonesia had gone. The diversity popularized during the long fight for independence had disappeared for many of these posters. While commentators casted about for who is responsible for this lack of diversity, blame does not get to the heart of the matter.
Rather, what is important is the recognition that there is a national community, there is an Indonesia that has adopted the ‘Unity in Diversity’ motto, and it must not be forgotten. Nostalgia is an important force throughout these comments, as is the belief in diversity as a unifying national strength.

Admittedly, the verbal assaults and discursive vitriol peppered throughout seem at first glance to undermine the national community but actually it gets to the same position while enacting national selves. In this case, it comes about through maliciousness that debases others to emphasize one’s legitimate position in the national community. The point here is that cyberspace is a forum of expression, one in which non-elites (and counterpublic members) can discuss religion and its ideational implications. The conversations illuminate a continuing reconstitution of the Indonesian national community, albeit interwoven with Islam in a way unseen during the Sukarno and Suharto regimes.

The elite-centered approach to nationalism also helps us understand the Joint-Ministerial Decree as a tool to both emphasize the point that the state still maintains control over religious issues, and that for the sake of national harmony, stability, and cohesion it is imperative that Ahmadi religious activities be removed from public forums. Here high-ranking officials in the Indonesian central government are exercising their authority to marginalize a group’s religious practices and wield the nation as the justification for these actions. Because Ahmadi practices are unsettling
to the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Indonesia, action is necessary to preserve Indonesia writ large.

However, completely banning the group would also go against the ideals of Indonesia. Religious rights are universal human rights guaranteed by the state, and all citizens have the freedom to express their religious views. But in the act of worshipping Indonesians shall respect the rights of others to go about their everyday lives in the community, nation, and state without excessive distress. So the state, as guardians of Indonesia and arbitrators of Indonesian Islam, allows for diverse religious practices as long as they are not upsetting to the machinations of life amongst fellow citizens. When disruptions occur, the state has the authority to restrict for the betterment of the whole community. Thus, the nation is used to justify not banning the Ahmadis, but marginalizing them.

KTP highlights this paradox while also filling in certain gaps omitted by the Joint-Ministerial Decree. Whereas YouTube comments exposed a reactionary nationalism, KTP provides us a different framework. Indonesia, as was it was defined by both Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi Indonesians, is a nation that is religious, it is not a religious nation. This is an important distinction to be sure, and one that KTP emphasizes. Here, one is ascribed their national identity as officially recognized members of the Indonesian community, but are recognized as having some sort of religious affiliation (however superficial this may or may not be).
This is true even for those categorized as deviants. Their actions may be deemed subversive and undermining of the national project, but religion is still a must for these ‘wayward’ Muslim-Indonesians. However, with KTP those considered deviant have a forum to express their normalcy: Ahmadis are Muslims just like any other Muslim in Indonesia and they have documented proof. Thus, there are certain dynamisms within static religious categories that are often ignored, and a paradox exists where one can simultaneously be deemed deviant by elite-centered decrees but accepted as an official Muslim in prosaic bureaucratic regulations. What results is a friction between high-level bombastic decrees and the everyday machinations of state identification.

In isolation, KTP demonstrates elite-centric nationalism as national belonging and religious affiliation is determined by a central authority. Again, the origins of KTP’s religious requirements go back to Suharto-era politics and directives to assert control over religious issues: a SARA remnant. But by plugging KTP back into the modern Indonesian societal context the relics of the past are now providing an everyday reconstitution of national identity and religion that undermines 21st century decrees. By combining approaches, it is possible to expose contradictions and gain a more holistic view of the evolving nature of the Indonesian governing authorities’ role in the constitution, renegotiation, and regulation of Islam in Indonesia and Indonesia writ large.
In East Java, the symbols created by the state and institutionalized under previous regimes still resonate with Indonesians, even those deemed deviant. In the Ahmadi mosque office, the national symbol of Indonesia hangs between photographs of the President and Vice-President, a tableau of nationalism if there ever was one. Again, one can read this as an effective manipulation by political leaders. Despite all of the pressures being put on the Ahmadiyah, there is still acquiescence to nation and in turn, the state. Indeed, this case truly shows an internalization of state power: there is no need for a law demanding symbols of the nation and the state because the people in this case believe it to be apropos.

Accepting this premise, the next question is to ask but then what. Yes, there has been internalization where the Ahmadis felt the need to hang these symbols above their door, but then they are ignored. The group was surprised that I was even bringing up the photographs and the garuda, which is where the ‘then what’ question becomes clear. The ubiquity of these symbols, their boring existence in the mosque, continually reconstitutes the nation in the background of life. It is not a historical reinvention, a parade, or a protest. It is in the banal that the nation continues. Elite-oriented studies can help understand how national symbols ‘get there’ but combining this with prosaic performatives helps us understand what happens once those symbols are displayed and needs to be included in the discussion.
In sum, this dissertation has contributed to the literature on nationalism by demonstrating a bridge between perspectives. For its criticisms, elite-centered approaches do help us understand much about nationalism and national identity, especially in Indonesia. However, these understandings have gaps and lack robustness, especially regarding how nations perpetuate. Thus, I incorporated diffusive approaches to nationalism so that a clearer picture on identity and its reconstitution is presented. Elites were very effective in constituting the Indonesian nation and getting the people to ‘buy into’ the concept, but the national community continues in ways outside the purview of presidents or the political caste. These constitutions need to be recognized for their importance, which is what I have attempted to do here.

Finding Number Three: A Lack of Government Consistency

By opening religious discussions in Indonesia and through the process of governmental decentralization the purported Ahmadi deviancy has resulted in inconsistent government action. The Indonesian governing authorities have announced their authority to dictate religious standards and continue to do so by restricting the number of official Indonesian religions and relegating Ahmadi activities to the margins of religious society. While it is clear the Indonesian government maintains is privileged position over Islam, these governing controls are sending, at
best, mixed messages when it comes to determining where the Ahmadi religious identity is situated in the Indonesian national community.

In cyberspace, commentators noted the lack of governing authority to halt the attack and bring the perpetrators to justice. Overwhelmingly, the seeming indifference demonstrated by police officers by not intervening or even firing warning shots while the attack was underway lead to severe condemnations of the officers and questioning whether or not Indonesian law even existed. The police are responsible for upholding the laws of Indonesia. If they do not then the entire state apparatus comes into question as the state vacates its disciplining powers and others fill in that space. Additionally, the cohesiveness and tranquility used to justify the Indonesian state’s controls also comes into question.

President Yudhoyono was criticized for his apparent lack of empathy towards the victims and his inattention to the growing religious intolerances in Indonesia. As commentators made calls for Yudhoyono to assert his authority over religious organizations and religious issues in Indonesia, an absence of action resulted in concern for the nation. The Indonesian government has the authority to control religion and Islamic issues, but when that authority is not used it raises questions.

The KTP chapter best highlights these Ahmadi inconsistencies by demonstrating how overlooked government regulations and big-event decrees create ideational conflict. The religious component of Indonesian identification cards has
such a longstanding tradition and is so commonplace that it is assumed to be just another part of the process. It is simply a box that needs to be checked in order to receive one’s national identification card. The changeover to E-KTP has essentially done nothing to amend the process as religious affiliation is still on applications and the cards. However, my central point here is that the religious component has tremendous importance when it comes to the Ahmadiyah and their apparent Islamic deviancy.

With Governor Soekarwo’s actions in East Java, we see potential inter-level discord between the central and provincial governments. Since decentralization began in earnest, much has been said about the newfound authority sub-national governments have in overseeing their regions, cities, etc. But when venturing into religious territory and Ahmadi banishments, the question of who is in charge necessarily arises. For the Ahmadis, the answer came quickly: Governor Soekarwo’s Decree was unconstitutional, for only the central government has the authority to make religious rulings.

Yet in this case, the central government has, as of yet, not pursued action to challenge the East Java Governor. Because the law was written to be in concert with the Joint-Ministerial Decree and other national rulings, the decision has been allowed to stand. In so doing, further insights into the evolving nature of Indonesian governance are gained. Additionally, as long as the national decree is used as legal
In summation, the governmental inconsistencies exposed are ones of acquiescence. The central authority, according to the viewpoint exposed by the Ahmadis and human rights lawyers, is the sole proprietor of making and implementing religious decrees. Yet there is no challenge to other lower-level governing bodies’ religious rulings despite the central government’s continued proclamations of being the supreme authority when it comes to religious matters. In turn, sub-national governments continued religious assertions are further empowered and when inattentive to the Ahmadi issue others are allowed to set the parameters and form of disciplining deviancy.

Finding Number Four: Indonesia is a Transitory Nation

The Ahmadi controversy’s implications reveal a transitory Indonesian national community with ambiguous boundaries. The present is a time where Islam is active in the public sphere and certain elements have created a conservative Islamic context. SARA is gone, and the changes initiated in the twilight and aftermath of Suharto’s reign has transformed the Indonesian nation. Where there was an adversarial relationship between the state in its role as national stewards and Islam, the relationship has become more interwoven, but only just so.
When it comes to the Ahmadiyah, the nation/state/Islam relationship is tested, and we see a national community negotiating its past into an unclear future. This is a time of transition, but what that transition will become is still being sorted out as the Ahmadi paradox becomes further entrenched. In cyberspace, the case study showed Indonesian-speakers of all kinds posting their thoughts about a particularly brutal attack on an Ahmadi community and truly demonstrated the diversity inherent in Indonesia. We were able to delve much deeper into the conversations, going beyond rudimentary ‘trolling’ expeditions to expose the renegotiation of a national community wrestling with the question of where Islam fits in Indonesia and the state’s role in tailoring that fit.

This attack, as violent and as brutal as it may be, represents a flashpoint in Indonesia’s transition struggles and exposes to the world (thanks to YouTube and the virtual forum it provides) what was once suppressed and forbidden. Responsibility for the attack triggered heated exchanges between publics and counterpublics as the conversation devolved into several sub-topics and tit-for-tat arguments. But what united commentators was their revulsion towards the perpetrators. Thus, there is certain cohesion, even in the fragmented world of cyberspace, but the ideational terrain has been transformed and continues to evolve.

In many ways, this dissertation has revealed the dark side of openness and dynamism. While there are new opportunities to discuss publically what Islam means
and Indonesians are permitted to wear religious clothing, the Indonesian national community must negotiate divergent beliefs in the public sphere in ways it never has had to before. Because there were so many regulations and restrictions placed on religious discussions under Suharto, these conversations were not had as the state framework would not allow it. However, with newfound religious freedoms, the Ahmadiyah issue has been thrust into the spotlight as their Muslim identity and national activities become scrutinized and challenged. So to discuss what Islam is in public is to also discuss what Islam is not. In so doing, the Ahmadis are further marginalized and in some cases, violently attacked.

On the topic of defining Islam, the state continues to exercise its role as stewards of the nation but the landscape has undergone monumental shifts. While the Suharto regime came to a sudden end, there has not been a complete break from the past. Similar logic and justification are still used, but the state’s power is not the same. Instead of being able to dictate to the rest of the nation the proper role of Islam in Indonesia (e.g. a private religious experience exercised in either controlled public spaces or behind closed doors), the Jakarta-centric government offers official confirmation of Islamic deviancy and defines expectations for Ahmadis residing in Indonesia. Public Ahmadi teachings must be sacrificed for the best interest of the Indonesian nation as the Ahmadis are subjected to SARA-era constraints in order to secure Islam in Indonesia. So in this sense, the ruling authority of the state and its
ability to assign ideational categories *determines* deviancy but cannot *dismiss*, and this speaks to the evolving nature of Indonesia as a national community.

Religion is not a critical attribute of Indonesia as a national community, but instead it is something all Indonesians must possess (whether they believe in it or not). Indonesians are to hold religion and identify with a religious group, but religion is not the essence of the Indonesian nation. And yet, in the Ahmadi case there is a real contestation what is being possessed. While KTP reveals that having religion does not equal being religious, the definition of what it means to be a ‘religious Indonesian’ is up for debate. In an interesting twist, the thing that is being possessed is defining the Indonesian, which is then reflected in the Indonesian national community. Said differently, the state renegotiating Islam in Indonesia as it relates to the Ahmadiyah is also renegotiating the Indonesian national community

In essence, this discussion of Indonesian nationalism reveals a transitive nation, one where the disciplining ghosts of the past and the static ideational categories therein are mitigating the dynamism of the present as the place of Islam is in flux. With the downfall of Suharto, the easing of religious restrictions begun in the early 1990’s accelerated as religious organizations suddenly had more space to express their opinions and demand state action against those who deviated from the norm.

These actions demonstrate a still active SARA perspective on Islam as a static religious category that can be controlled by the state and subsumed to the national
ideal. Because the Ahmadiyah understand prophets and the Prophethood differently, yet maintain their Muslim identity, they need to either recant their beliefs or call themselves something different; an inclusive view of Islam that challenges the status of Muhammad as the last prophet is simply going too far.

Yet, the same mechanisms from the Suharto-era that attempt to control Islam in Indonesia also provide the performative means for leaving the ideational margins. By assuming that there is only one kind of Islam, especially in KTP regulations, it eliminates differences and essentializes what it means to be a Muslim in Indonesia regardless of proclamations, decrees, or any other opinions on the matter. The dynamism of religion is observable in Indonesia, and it has now been placed in the foreground as the Indonesian national community and the state negotiate and renegotiate Islam’s inclusivity.

Here is where the tensions of the past meet today’s Indonesian quandary as the nation continues to transform. The religious tradition in Indonesia is a strong one as there is an intrinsic need and desire for religious spirituality (superficial as it may be) throughout the nation. Religion is something to be encouraged but it also must be controlled for the sake of cohesion and togetherness. The control, as in the Ahmadi case, takes on many forms, but the premise here is that people are free to worship how they want so long as it is in the private sphere. Once something is made public that goes against the national standards (created through government action as well as
those of religious groups, assemblies, MUI’s growing authority, and the commonly held definition of the Islamic Prophethood throughout Indonesia), then the entire nationalist project becomes weakened.

But the issue with these controlling mechanisms is that Indonesia does not have the massive security apparatus it once had, due in part to decentralization but also due to easing state controls over Islam and other religions. Moreover, cyberspace and the internet revolution are making these massive control projects passé as religious ‘blasphemy’ is easily transmitted and accessible. Yet the idea of control remains in the state as well as Indonesian speakers in cyberspace, but control only goes so far. A complete and total banishment would create a constitutional uproar, as it undermines both the spirit with which the Indonesian Constitution was drafted as well as its proscribed governing rules. While there may be a wish for the Ahmadiyah to simply go away and leave Indonesia, it has proven thus far to be unattainable (Alimi, 2011).

In sum, the Ahmadi issue is forcing a critical reexamination of the state’s relationship with Islam and the national community due to the challenges of maintaining static religious categories which are inherently dynamic. As such, Indonesia in total can be viewed as a state of transition one in which the bonds of the past are echoed in the present.
Finding Number Five: The Means of Discipline

While Indonesian national identity (and all national identities for that matter) is continually reconstituted and difficult to view in total, various processes through which its boundaries are maintained, contested, disciplined, and differentiated can be seen momentarily. In relation to the Ahmadiyah and Islam, a number of these disciplining means have been observed. First and foremost, it bears repeating Lisa Wedeen’s insight that national identity often combines with other ideational constructs as they become mutually constituted. Through the Ahmadiyah controversy, we are able to catch glimpses of the renegotiation of Indonesia as a national identity based upon the state’s action and inaction towards intra-Islamic issues. The performative constitution of the Ahmadiyah has emerged as an existential threat to both Islam and the Indonesian national community.

Whereas NU, Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Ulama Council have long distinguished the Ahmadiyah from Islam (e.g. disciplining the boundaries of Indonesian Islam by identifying deviancy) the recent influx of state legislation declaring the group a deviant sect aims to protect the entire Indonesian national community.

Nevertheless, by assigning the words ‘deviant sect’ to the Ahmadiyah, the Indonesian governing apparatuses and others are simultaneously emphasizing the group’s disruptive power to Indonesia’s national unity and maintaining Ahmadi
connections to Islam. The use of deviancy is a key performative act as it highlights their lack of Islamic identity but does not completely remove it. We are witness to a ‘fallen Muslim’ scenario where Ahmadis certainly are not to be considered Muslim, but their religious identity is not completely separated from Islam either. Thus, deviancy creates an ambiguity that the Ahmadis occupy and simultaneously reject as the group asserts their Muslim identity without qualifiers.

The implications for Indonesia as a national community are threefold. First, the Ahmadi legislative acts (and also KTP) reemphasize the state’s stewardship and disciplining power over Indonesian ideational borders. While the Joint-Ministerial and Governor’s Decrees show a sort of disciplining ‘turf war’ over controlling perceived ideational threats, they are united in the idea that Indonesian unity, tranquility, and above all else identity take primacy. Islamic ideational issues that may threaten ‘Indonesia’ must be disciplined in order to strengthen national borders. Second, the decrees assume there are finite religious and national borders, which ignores the inherent fluidity of both. By maintaining static religious categories in the state and attempting to funnel all Indonesians into these categories, unity is undermined as issues of deviancy that purportedly undermine the national project are incorporated into the officially recognized religions without provisos.

Third, Ahmadi members have taken the state’s actions and flipped the national narrative to defend their position. Although overlooking the history of Pancasila
neglects its grounding, using the national ideology as the solution to Ahmadi problems returns national identity to the epicenter of society, restores the primacy of Indonesian national unity above all else, and reinforces Indonesian national borders that are to be protected by the state. In this case, the Ahmadiyah seek to be understood as Muslim-Indonesians instead of Indonesian Muslims, a subtle difference but an important one. When deviancy is ascribed to the Ahmadiyah, it in fact undermines *Pancasila* by fragmenting the national community and ignoring the group’s strict adherence to the national ideology and support for the state’s stewardship. Thus, for the sake of *Pancasila* and the Indonesian national community, the use of deviancy must be halted and restrictions against the group should be lifted.

Locating the previous findings and Ahmadi controversy within the boundaries of Indonesian national identity, we see glimpses into its maintenance, contestation, and disciplining. Ultimately, the means of disciplining are performative rather than physical. Violent acts against Ahmadis and their property were viewed as insupportable. Even in the declarations of Ahmadi deviance, we see protections in place for their physical well-being. To attack the group with bamboo sticks or destroy their property is a savagery that goes beyond the limits of what is ‘acceptable’ in the Indonesian national community. Thus, we see the maintenance of Indonesian boundaries through performative disciplining rather than physicality.
The governmental restrictions further emphasize this point. Recall that the group has not been banned from Indonesia. Rather, restrictions have been put in place to limit their ability to disseminate literature and publically use the JAI moniker. It is the public Ahmadiyah symbols (banal or otherwise) that are viewed as debilitating, not the Ahmadis per se. To ban the group outright, enter their mosques, and forcibly remove the organization would also disrupt the Indonesian national community and undermine the national project.

Moreover, the onus is put on the Ahmadis themselves for negotiating the Indonesian terrain and worshipping within its boundaries. Despite viewing assaults on persons or property with disdain, the underlying theme we have seen from the Indonesian governing apparatus is that these confrontations are understandable all things considered. Recall that when discussing an attack on an Ahmadi mosque, Governor Soekarwo’s response was that vandalism is unacceptable, but the Ahmadis have to remember to be careful when worshipping as it can trigger intense emotions from the surrounding community (Jajeli, 2013). So the Ahmadis are responsible for inflaming emotional responses, and they need to figure out where and when to practice their beliefs without creating a national imbalance.

Put another way, there is a fine line for disciplining the Ahmadiyah. The group can be restricted, but not banned. They can be identified as deviant, but physical altercations based on that deviancy are not allowed. They can be considered
victims, but are partially responsible for being victimized. Thus, the means of Ahmadi disciplining and consequently the disciplining of Islam and Indonesian national borders are highlighted through performative practices as all three identities continue to be negotiated.

*What about the Ahmadis?*

The final sub-section asks the following question: how do the Ahmadis ‘get out’ of the current situation. I have identified four potential avenues through which the Ahmadi paradox may be diminished. First, the Ahmadis could abandon their belief system, renounce Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet, affirm the Seal of the Prophethood, and embrace ‘mainstream’ Islam. Essentially, this is a performative utterance that effectively eliminates the sect and demonstrates that they are ‘legitimized’ Indonesian Muslims in the eyes of the state and Indonesian governing authorities. In some instances this has already been done as some Ahmadis have reportedly indicated that they want to return to mainstream Islam and reject their Ahmadi beliefs in signed written statements. In Ciaruteun Udik village, Bogor, West Java, 33 villagers were reported to have left the Ahmadi sect, with the village head taking credit and boasting his triumphs in converting the deviant sect members (Rayda, 2011).

However, the likelihood of such an act happening without some sort of coercion is small. The Ahmadiyah already identify as Muslims, to embrace another
perspective is redundant and impossible. The group cannot reject and embrace its religious identity at the same time. Returning to the Ciaruteun Udik example, in the time leading up to their renouncements, Ahmadi homes were reportedly ransacked and damaged. Further, following the conversion of four Ahmadis, local officials were accused of making harassing phone calls at all hours of the day and paying visits to other Ahmadi families in order to convince them that renouncing their beliefs was in their best interest, a claim contradicting statements made by the village head that the group returned to Islam without coercion. The Ahmadi source went on to present a counterfactual: if there was no coercion in the village would Ahmadis be rejecting their beliefs in signed affidavits? Her answer was a resounding no (Rayda, 2011). This first option has some credence as a possible pathway, but it is being allegedly used as a bullying technique.

What is curious about the Ciaruteun Udik case is the emphasis on process rather than belief. Sworn statements are being used as proof of success, but as seen with KTP in this dissertation and more eloquently in Lisa Wedeen’s discussion of the politics of ‘as if’ in Ambiguities of Domination (1999), belief in what one is saying, signing, or displaying is secondary to the process of speaking, signing, or displaying. Whether or not the Ahmadis are actually rejecting the sect is irrelevant so long as they maintain the pretense and demonstrate that as Indonesians they reject deviant beliefs and return to the accepted Islam of the Indonesian national community. Moreover, the
KTP chapter demonstrates why not all Ahmadis are going through the ‘conversion’ process. Ideational belief is a strong phenomenon, and to recant one’s religious belief under what may be false pretenses may very well represent an existential challenge to these self-identified Muslims; it is not simply an Islam-KTP scenario (a topic worth exploring in future research to be sure).

However, the key for this option is that an official procedure be the focal point of this ideational dilemma, which brings us to the second option. Taking the official renouncements a step further, the Indonesian governing authorities could issue a complete ban of the group. Instead of restricting public activities, movements, or encouraging mainstream Muslims to occupy Ahmadi mosques and lead prayers in order to convert, as has happened in West Java (Rayda, 2011), a complete ban would eliminate the need to call the Ahmadiyah deviant. By using the word deviant there is the underlying assumption of restitution in that the Ahmadis can return to the fold and be accepted as equal Indonesian Muslims so long as the deviancy is eliminated. By issuing a total ban of the group and maintaining a separation of Islam from the Ahmadiyah, the stewards of Indonesia as a national community may solve the problem via ideational amputation. 

80 This is similar to what Pakistan has done with its passport applications. Here, if one checks that he or she is a Muslim, they also have to check a supplemental box saying that they are not Ahmadiyah members (Gualtieri, 2004). Pakistan is not the
In the era of decentralization discussed regarding East Java, a total ban could very well create a constitutional crisis. As noted, Ahmadi leaders and Indonesian supporters of religious tolerance have discussed the illegality of the Joint-Ministerial Decree and subsequent regional and local legislation as they may violate the Indonesian constitution’s guarantee of religious freedoms. To force the Ahmadiyah out of Indonesia or forcibly remove their Muslim identity could be seen as unconstitutional and a violation of the very tenets that maintain Indonesian national unity.

Moreover, if this type of legislation were to emerge in a sub-national level, the question of who has legitimate authority over religious issues becomes even more apparent as decentralization tensions could be exacerbated tremendously. This also helps us understand why we have not seen complete bans of the groups in either the Joint-Ministerial or Governor’s Decrees. Instead there are restrictions combined with ‘encouragement’. A complete ban of the group by the state is replete with problems that impact the very idea of Indonesian national ideology and Indonesian nationalism.

Along the same lines of government involvement, a further embrace of the SARA echo could be used to push all religious issues to the margins in the name of focus of this dissertation, so I will limit its discussion to a footnote and demonstrate that there is a precedent for states banning Ahmadi members in this fashion.
national stability. Here, restrictions on discussing religious issues in public could once again be used to control what is being said and how religious identity is expressed. Essentially, this would represent a return to the Suharto era politics of justifying complete public sphere suppression in the name of national cohesiveness in an attempt to prevent open ideational discussions devolving into violent acts and rhetoric.

Although there are a few supporters of SARA’s complete return, evidenced in the YouTube chapter, the current process of decentralization makes it difficult to consider restrictions on such a massive scale. Simply put, while similar governing logics are used today as they were under Suharto, Indonesia’s government apparatuses are much different today. To suddenly recentralize and overtly repress would reverse the trends seen since the downfall of the New Order. Despite the continued appearance of SARA logic, a complete return to the Suharto era in order to fix the Ahmadi problem and eliminate religious tensions seems unlikely.

Finally, tolerance could emerge as the national ethos and the Ahmadiyah could be, if not accepted and fully embraced, simply left alone. Here, there would be an easement of restrictions and the group could express their beliefs irrespective of perceived deviance. In this instance, the deviancy may perpetuate, but its effects would be muted due to an overarching framework of understanding (as Pollyanna-ish as that may be). While they may never be considered Muslim by the larger Muslim-
Indonesian community, allowing the group to worship without intervention or banishment could improve the turbulent position of the group.

This is partly the argument made by Ahmadi leaders in East Java when they argued that *Pancasila* is the solution to religious ills in Indonesia. Through this interpretation, there would be an Indonesia that still maintains its belief in a singular god, but one that is open to worshipping in whatever ways, means, or rituals deemed appropriate. National harmony and stability is guaranteed by the state and maintained since the belief in one god is not being challenged, but the religious scaffolding surrounding that singular deity remains fungible.

However, this option would necessitate a kind of secularity unseen in Indonesian state history. Determining acceptable religious behavior has been and continues to be under the purview of the governing authorities, hence the regulation restricting Ahmadi activities. Thus, the renegotiations of Islam in the Indonesian national community continue as the Indonesian nation remains in transition. To conclude, let us return to an erudite comment from R.E. Elson cited earlier,

…the place of religion, and specifically the influence exerted by Islamic organisation and Islamic ideas, in Indonesian politics and statecraft will continue to be a matter of contention, tension, even rancour. Rather than arriving at any finalised dispensation, there must be a symbiotic, continually renegotiated connection between the affairs of state and of religion, since the socio-political concerns and interests of most Indonesians are now so routinely connected to religious matters, and because religion is so deeply embedded in Indonesia’s national identity. (Elson, 2010, 339)
What we have seen with the Ahmadiyah question is a confirmation of Elson’s quote as the Ahmadi paradox has revealed important glimpses into state controls of Islam and the reconstitution of Indonesian national identity. To put it differently, Indonesia is at a transitory crossroads, with no easy settlement; which is exactly what is needed in 21st century Indonesia.
REFERENCES


Penganut Ahmadiyah Tak Bisa Bikin e-KTP. http://www.jpnn.com/read/2012/11/04/145760/Penganut-Ahmadiyah-Tak-Bisa-Bikin-e-KTP-


Alexander, Jeffrey C., Smith, Philip, Norton, Matthew, & Brooks, Peter. Interpreting Clifford Geertz : Cultural Investigation in the Social Sciences (First edition.)


University Press.


Guharoy, Debnath, & Morgan, Roy. (2012). Analysis: The truth about Internet usage
in Indonesia. *The Jakarta Post*


Pub.


248
Larangan Aktifitas Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di Jawa Timur Guberbur Jawa Timur


Temby, Quinton. (2010). Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah. Indonesia, 89.


Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.


Government, The Australian National University.
APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

DATE: April 12, 2012
TO: Daniel Bottomley
FROM: University of Delaware IRB

STUDY TITLE: [309907-1] Performing Nationalism: the Ahmadiyah, Liminality, and the Constitution of 'Indonesia'
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project

ACTION: APPROVED
APPROVAL DATE: April 12, 2012
EXPIRATION DATE: April 11, 2013
REVIEW TYPE: Expedited Review

REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited review category #7

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this research study. The University of Delaware IRB has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a study design wherein the risks have been
minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

This submission has received Expedited Review based on the applicable federal regulation.

Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of the study and insurance of participant understanding followed by a signed consent form. Informed consent must continue throughout the study via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations require each participant receive a copy of the signed consent document.

Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this office prior to initiation. Please use the appropriate revision forms for this procedure.

All SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported to this office. Please use the appropriate adverse event forms for this procedure. All sponsor reporting requirements should also be followed.

Please report all NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this study to this office. Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of
three years. Based on the risks, this project requires Continuing Review by this office on an annual basis. Please use the appropriate renewal forms for this procedure.

If you have any questions, please contact Jody-Lynn Berg at (302) 831-1119 or jlberg@udel.edu. Please include your study title and reference number in all correspondence with this office.