Working Paper 62

NOTES ON ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY:
REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW BRUNSWICK
EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

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5/14

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Part I

The History, Structure and Activities

of the New Brunswick

Emergency Measures Organization

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I. History of E.M.O. in New Brunswick

The Canadian Emergency Measures Organization was established within the Privy Council Office in June 1957. In its early years, its activities were generally similar to the federal civil defence organization out of which it developed. In particular, E.M.O.'s early years were characterized by a nuclear attack orientation, that is, the organization devoted most of its energy to the devising of plans and preparations designed to counter the harmful effects of an atomic war. In the context of the international politics of the late fifties and early sixties, this orientation appeared relevant. In particular, such events as the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforced the perceived need for a strong civil emergency planning organization.

In 1965, E.M.O. became the responsibility of the Minister of Industry. At the same time, the international situation was changing appreciably. In the Kremlin, the colourful and dramatic shoe pounding antics of the Khrushchev era had given way to the more low key rule of the Brezhnev-Kosygin group. On the world front, the Cold War appeared to de-escalate, and peaceful co-existence seemed more probable. In 1968, the Strategic Arms Limitation talks began, reinforcing this more optimistic climate.

In this context, E.M.O. appeared to lose its sense of relevance. With the immediate threat now softened, it became impossible to maintain a widespread continuing interest in preparing for nuclear war. In addition, official thinking on the nature of nuclear exchanges changed. Where previously, plans had been based on the expectation that a nuclear attack, if it came would be sudden and unforeseeable, not it was thought that a preliminary period of rising tension and warfare would precede any nuclear bomb exchange.

In this context, it seemed no longer as important to have a pre-organized network of supplies and volunteers, as these could be recruited in time, if a nuclear attack appeared to be imminent. In the spring of 1968, the financial guillotine fell towards E.M.O., and Finance Minister Sharp recommended a cut of $2,000,000 in the national E.M.O. budget.

In New Brunswick, in the early sixties, the Emergency Measures Organization was divided into three segments based on Provincial, County and Municipal organizations each contributing to the costs with the Federal Government on a 75 percent, 12½ percent, 12½ percent basis. All efforts in this field were supervised and controlled by the Province, and depended mainly on volunteers. In 1967 there was a major change in the concept of Provincial Government operations, centralizing many of the responsibilities of the Municipal Government and dissolving the existing County Government system. At this time, E.M.O. became a sole provincial operation based on a Provincial Headquarters and five areas, each with its own headquarters and small staff.

After the 1968 Federal budget cut, the Provincial Government lost little time in initiating its own E.M.O. cutbacks. In the spring of 1968, the New Brunswick Government announced a major re-organization of the provincial E.M.O. From a separate entity, E.M.O. was absorbed into the Municipal Affairs Department, and the Deputy Minister of that department was appointed Provincial Co-ordinator. Staff was reduced to one full-time training officer, and his secretary. The inventory of equipment accumulated by New Brunswick E.M.O. was transferred to departments of government whose normal activities were allied to a number of responsibilities previously the sole jurisdiction of New Brunswick E.M.O. A member of the Provincial Government which initiated these measures explained, in an attack on the proposed expansion of E.M.O. four years later, that his government had decided that "there was very little these people could do or were asked to do."
There was no strong public reaction against these government moves, although scattered objections did appear. For example, in an editorial on April 12, 1968, the St. John, N.B. newspaper, The Telegraph Journal, questioned whether the provincial government had not been too easily influenced by a change in Ottawa's policy towards civil defence and whether New Brunswick's civil defence set up had not been dissolved too hastily. Two letters to the editor appearing in the same paper on April 17th and 22nd supported this position.

The next four years were necessarily a dormant period for New Brunswick E.M.O. There was no separate vote for funds for E.M.O. in the legislature and it was physically impossible for one full-time staffer to implement any widespread emergency planning operation. During this time, the organization can be seen as having reduced legitimacy and a low profile. Little publicity was given to the organization by the media, aside from an August 31, 1970 article in the Fredericton Gleaner which characterized E.M.O. as a "tightly-woven network of professionally trained people." From a budget of $180,000 in 1967, E.M.O.'s expenses dropped to $47,000 of which 75% was recoverable from Ottawa. Radiological defence and detection, formerly an important part of the provincial E.M.O. organization was turned over to the Department of Natural Resources. The only real change in organization during this time was the shifting of administrative responsibility for the provincial E.M.O. from the Deputy Minister to the Director of Administration in the Municipal Affairs Department.

In 1970, there was flooding in the rural Miramachi area of New Brunswick, but this did not extend to urban areas of the province. Provincial E.M.O.'s role in this disaster was largely one of coordinating the handling of various damage claims.

During this period, however, there were currents of discussion between provincial and federal authorities which were to lead to a changed and renewed E.M.O. in New Brunswick.

For some years, provincial E.M.O. co-ordinators had felt that if the federal government could recognize that peacetime planning was relevant and closely related to wartime planning, that the likelihood of public acceptance of E.M.O. would be far more obtainable. In December 1969, a Federal-Provincial Conference of Ministers responsible for Civil Emergency Measures was held in Ottawa, and the provincial representatives stressed their interest in this new conception of E.M.O. This view was positively received by the federal Minister of National Defence, who since 1968 was now responsible for the national E.M.O. organization.

From that point in time, those in the province responsible for emergency measures attempted to convince the Provincial Government that it was impractical to continue to attempt to operate an organization with a skeletal staff and part-time personnel. In particular the importance of having an emergency health co-ordinator and an emergency welfare co-ordinator, both on a full-time basis, was stressed.

By 1972 their efforts to reconceptualize E.M.O. began to bear fruit. In the 1972-73 provincial budget, E.M.O.'s budget was set at $101,102 and plans for
an expanded new provincial E.M.O. announced. The Municipal Affairs Minister, who presented the estimates, justified this new set up on the basis that it was dysfunctional to the public safety to have a situation where there was no one to co-ordinate the efforts of fire and police departments, the army, private organizations, municipal organizations and others involved in coping with natural disasters.

The opposition in the House was highly critical regarding the creation of an expanded E.M.O. One opposition member claimed that the government was only building a bigger bureaucracy and wasting the taxpayers money, while another termed the establishment of a larger provincial E.M.O. "a farce." In general, the opposition felt that existing organizations such as police and fire departments could deal adequately with civil emergencies and natural disasters, and that the new organization would only get in the way.

Despite opposition criticism, however, the expansion of E.M.O. was approved in June 1972. The new organization was to include a part-time director (as before the Director of Administration for the Municipal Affairs Ministry), a full-time deputy director, a training officer, a planning officer, an emergency health officer, a stores clerk and three secretaries. An emergency welfare officer was to be added soon after. As before, the federal government was to assume 75% of the cost for paying this personnel. By the spring of 1973, this staff had been recruited.

Supplementary to the provincial E.M.O. organization, there was also a federal-regional E.M.O. director, appointed and paid by the federal government, and reporting directly to Ottawa. This regional director had as his prime responsibility the establishment and maintenance of liaison with the Provincial E.M.O. and Federal Government departments within the Province of New Brunswick and within the context of both federal and provincial emergency plans.

Also involved in New Brunswick Emergency Measures were municipal services representatives in each provincial district. This position involved acting as a liaison between the provinces and the municipalities in a number of matters, and acting as a district emergency measures co-ordinator was included as one of the prescribed tasks.

In April 1973, then, E.M.O. was a re-emerging organization in New Brunswick. Just as the new staff members were beginning to clearly understand their roles, but before they had a chance to carry out extensive disaster planning, and before E.M.O. had time to establish a solidly legitimate image in the eyes of the municipalities and organizations with whom they were to work, the 1973 flood occurred.
2. The 1973 St. John River Flood

On April 27, 1973, heavy rains in the St. John River Estuary triggered a response by provincial agencies which led to a new era of visibility and legitimacy for N.B.E.M.O.

Since E.M.O. had only recently been reexpanded, no formal, up-to-date disaster plans existed and most of the E.M.O. staff had only a limited idea of their realm of disaster responsibility. Few of the provincial officials from the various departments involved knew each other, so that, in its early stages, the emergency operations centre (E.O.C.) was not very centrally organized. However, E.M.O. staff anticipated the problems which would result if the flood response was not internally coordinated. In order to reduce this problem, E.M.O. made a concerted effort early in the response to assign tasks to various groups in the E.O.C. and had relevant information and requests funneled to them.

As a result of their foresight and initiative, E.M.O. emerged as the coordinating organization of the response. Consequently, the flood response ran smoothly and the various tasks generated by the flood were quickly and efficiently handled as they arose.*

The centrality of the E.M.O's involvement in this flood response contributed to the rise of a high degree of visibility and legitimacy for E.M.O. in the eyes of the provincial government, the media and much of the public. What had only a few months previously been a hotly disputed issue was now seen as a wise expenditure by all. E.M.O's expansion was stabilized by its own emergency response activities.

3. Current Organization

Since the flood response, N.B.E.M.O. has turned to its assigned emergency planning functions. In terms of its internal organization, N.B.E.M.O. has the following task allocations. The part-time director is essentially involved in the establishing of policy and the seeking of clearance and interpretation of N.B.E.M.O.'s jurisdiction. He is also involved in maintaining liaison with other provincial government departments concerning their emergency responsibilities.

The deputy director is tasked with the administrative and budget activities as well as being centrally involved in performing liaison and organizational work with provincial and municipal authorities and organizations in the establishment and maintenance of an active emergency measures program. He also supervises and gives advice in the production of emergency plans as well as assisting the director in the planning, organization, promotion and coordination of all emergency measures activities in the province.

The emergency health services planner is essentially involved in reviewing the needs, potentials and resources of emergency health services and assisting in the preparation of municipal and institutional health service plans. Part of this task involves preparing and conducting training courses in emergency health administration.

The emergency welfare services planning officer is involved in the organizing and coordinating of the provincial welfare services program. This involves the reviewing of needs, potentials and resources of emergency welfare services as well as assisting in the preparation of local welfare services plans.

The emergency measures planning officer essentially has the responsibility of developing, updating and coordinating all civil emergency plans in the province. The task of this planner is also to assist and advise other emergency services planners and local coordinators in their planning activities as well as to test the workability of these plans.

The emergency measures training officer is tasked with the development and coordination of emergency measures training activities in the province as well as giving assistance to other provincial emergency services officers and local coordinators in their training activities.
4. Current Activities

Turning now to more specific projects and progress to date, N.B.E.M.O. has been involved in the following activities since the flood. In the emergency health planning field, the demands since the flood have been enormous. Since hospitals need a disaster plan for accreditation, hospital administrators have been approaching E.M.O. asking for assistance in the developing and testing of hospital disaster exercises. Once establishing both interest and plans in the hospital, the E.M.O. planner is stressing the need of a community plan for use in conjunction with the hospital disaster plan. Thus much of the planner's efforts have been to encourage action by hospital board members and administrators in the initiation of community interest in disaster planning.

E.M.O. has also been able to strengthen the interest and receptivity of hospital administrators to planning by offering a Municipal Emergency Health Planning Conference. Representatives came from each hospital in the province, as well as from Fire and Police Departments and Federal Health Departments, to a two-day seminar to discuss the needs in the Emergency Health area. The emergency health planner has also been involved in the planning for and establishment of a provincial ambulance service, a facility clearly linked to both hospital and disaster contexts.

The demands in emergency health sphere have risen sharply since the flood and are of the nature that will require updating and regular exercising so that assistance from E.M.O. in the future will be needed on a regular basis.

Turning now to the emergency welfare sector, this planner has recently completed an emergency welfare services plan for the entire province. Using this basic plan, work can now be initiated to plan for emergency welfare services in the various municipalities throughout the province. Part of the E.M.O. thrust has been to increase disaster relevant skills in the various government departments. This is being accomplished in the emergency welfare sector by having Provincial Welfare employees attending courses at the Canada Emergency Measures College at Arnprior, Ontario.

In the realm of community disaster planning, the demand for assistance has been enormous since the 1973 flood. Communities who were disposed to planning in the past have requested assistance to review and update their plans. Communities who were apathetic to disaster planning in the past have seen the benefit and utility of planning and have also made requests to E.M.O. for assistance in the formulating of plans. The requests from French-speaking communities for assistance in disaster planning have risen sharply.

Using a basic planning guide, the E.M.O. planning officer has acted as a resource to these communities and has given them advice on how they might best plan for their situation. At present, requests are clearly outstripping E.M.O.'s resources to meet them. In the future, E.M.O. visualizes meeting these needs whence the updating of these plans can again be initiated.

The Emergency Measures training officer has been involved in various activities since the flood. In the summer of 1973, using students, he was involved in the
documentation of all possible emergency shelter spaces in the province. Thus all fallout shelters and usable space for the province have been catalogued.

The training officer has also worked with the R.C.M.P. auxiliaries, helping them reorganize their structure and attempting to assist them in maintaining their high level of interest. His activities also include radiation monitoring education and the conducting of rescue courses for members of the Departments of Forestry and Natural Resources.

The E.M.O. staff have also been involved in a number of other activities. The staff have been attending special courses at E.M.O. College on a regular basis in an attempt to increase their expertise. They have also encouraged mayors from various communities throughout the province to attend the college in an attempt to cultivate interest in and knowledge of disaster planning.

E.M.O. has now set up one floor of their building as an E.O.C. and have developed the aids and plans necessary to quickly activate and operate it in time of emergency. A plan and proposal have been drawn up and submitted for a mobile E.O.C. unit. E.M.O. feels that since its jurisdiction is province-wide, that a mobile field E.O.C. would be helpful for an effective response headquarters for disasters too far from the stationary E.O.C. to be adequately handled there.

E.M.O. has also been involved in a seminar with the Civil Defense Organization of Maine in an effort to update and create closer contact and mutual aid agreements. It is hoped that by use of these informal agreements that a greater pool of resources will be available in the event of a large calamity.

In the spring of 1974 a Disaster Committee was established with representatives from the various Provincial Government departments. This Committee has exercised simulated emergencies involving the members in their respective activities, and has responded to rising water on the St. John River and ice jam flooding north of Edmundston and in several areas along the Restigouche River.

E.M.O. was also requested to create a fuel oil contingency plan as the energy crisis became more severe. As a result, a full-time temporary staff member was hired and has since been designing a home heating oil allocation system.

Contingency planning with Canadian Forces and the R.C.M.P. has continued also. An arrangement has also been made with the Provincial Departments of Highways and Forestry to link E.M.O. within their communications system. As a result, E.M.O. now can request information from any sector of the Province, greatly strengthening its communications ability.

Another major activity which E.M.O. has initiated since the flood has been a province-wide attempt to locate and catalogue various types of disaster and emergency relevant equipment, both in the governmental department and private sphere. An attempt is being made to work up arrangements which would allow this equipment to be committed to an emergency response.

Besides these planning activities, E.M.O. has also responded to some small flash flooding conditions in various sectors of the province and has some staff
member on 24-hour call so that an immediate response will be possible for other emergencies.

In light of the above, it is clear that N.B.E.M.O. has already accomplished a great deal since the flood and also that large demands will continue to be made on them. The large size of its jurisdiction and the economic and municipal growth within it will create in the future a continuing need to plan, replan and update emergency planning in local communities.

Most recently, in the first week of May, 1974, rising waters in the St. John River resulted in an activation of E.M.O. Headquarters in Fredericton and the evacuation of 107 persons to the emergency welfare centre. Flood response measures were also carried out by E.M.O. co-ordinators in Edmundston and Campbellton.
Part II

An Analysis of The Problem of Legitimacy in Public Organizations
I. The Problem of Legitimacy in Public Organizations

The relation of the public organization to the legitimatization process is unique. Unlike the business corporation, the government organization has an indirect economic relationship with the public. As Walmsley and Zald point out, the recipient of services is usually not the immediate funder; and the taxpayer thus finds it difficult to discern linkage between his taxes and the benefits accruing from organizational output.

For this reason, the legitimacy of the government organization is more closely linked with internal political life than with general public acceptance. In this context, the elected members of the legislature, other government organizations and other levels of government become the relevant others in the existence of the public organization; and it is these bodies which most powerfully affect its legitimacy and survival. Public opinion, may, of course, still have a strong influence, but this is most often brought to bear through the intervening agency of political exchange.

Within the political sphere, an organization's legitimacy is affected by a number of general factors.

A primary consideration is that of whether a specific government department or agency is able to fulfill functions which other existing organizations cannot subsume within the universe of their activities. In New Brunswick, this was the primary issue in the political discussion of whether it was advisable to strengthen the provincial E.M.O. organization or not. To ensure survival then, an organization must clearly establish the need for its survival or risk "functional co-optation" by other organizations.

In public organizations, whose activities are basic to public well-being and safety on a day-to-day basis and whose absence would bring immediate public protest, legitimacy is seldom a problem. On a municipal level, for example, the public works department or the sanitation department seldom face legitimacy problems (unless these services may be performed more cheaply and efficiently by private firms). On the other hand, there are other government departments whose presence must be more actively justified. These can be of two types.

Some departments are almost totally planning oriented with few tasks which actually require them to provide direct public services. In such cases, it is often the perceived serious need for research in a particular area, for example, urban development, which initially gives rise to the formation of an appropriate organization.

A second type of organization is that which has a capability of providing direct public services under crisis situations but otherwise engages in other activities, especially planning. The existence of such organizations can depend on two kinds of factors. In some instances, the crisis or emergency is perceived as being so probable.

or serious that vulnerability through lack of a defensive organization cannot be risked. Military organizations are frequently based on this feeling. In other instances, the skill or expertise of an organization may be seen as so necessary in preparing for an emergency, that that agency is thought to be worthwhile, even though it shifts from preparatory to coping tasks only infrequently.

If the perceived seriousness of the threat declines, or if preparation and planning are not seen as being of importance any longer, or if organizational expertise is no longer recognized, then the legitimacy of an organization may be questioned. This is the problem frequently faced by civil defense agencies such as E.M.O. Within the context of limited finances, strong political opposition or continuing public questioning, such organizations must actively re-establish its legitimacy before its relevant others.
II. Factors Undercutting Legitimacy

Organizations often tend towards a type of inertia once they have been firmly established and tied into existing organizational networks. However, under changing political or economic conditions, factors can arise which undercut the supporting plausibility structure of an organization, cast doubt on its continued legitimacy, and threaten its persistence. Under such circumstances, the organizational purpose must change in order for the organization to adapt.

Change in Organizational Purpose

The initial goals of an organization are often linked closely with the reasons behind its creation. For example, the Emergency Measures Organization was initially developed to assist the public in coping with the effects of sudden nuclear attack, as well as to ensure the continuity of government in the aftermath of the nuclear confrontation. This scenario assumed that immediate planned response would be mandatory, and thus stockpiling sufficient emergency resources became a fundamental goal for E.M.O.

As international politics changed, the role of organizations such as E.M.O. changed also. With an increasing probability that a nuclear attack would not be sudden, but prefaces by mounting tensions, and even, perhaps, conventional warfare, the need for emergency stockpiling was reduced and the activation time for emergency measures was extended. Consequently, E.M.O.'s purpose was questioned, and with it the legitimacy of the organization.

As Sills has demonstrated in the case of the public service agency, an organization faced with loss of purpose can successfully redirect itself to new goals and thus re legitimatize its existence. What is required here, however, is acceptance of this goal recognition not only by the membership but also by those external actors who finance the organization. In the case of E.M.O., initial suggestions that the organization become involved with peacetime disasters to augment its wartime orientation were not accepted at the Federal level, nor in many cases at the Provincial or Municipal levels. Under these circumstances, with goal redefinition having been rejected, E.M.O. was left in a position where its structure, size, and in some cases its existence were no longer viewed as being justified.

Thus, organizations faced with a reduction, loss, and/or unsuccessful redefinition of goal will tend to have a loss of legitimacy.

Perceived Need for Services

There are many organizations which have been designed to respond to emergency situations. For example, Fire Departments have the task of responding to threats when they arise but do not always need to carry out a daily delivery of services to the community. They do, however, respond on a regular basis to major threats to the

community and thus a staff and stock of equipment are maintained. Emergency Measures and Civil Defense Organizations exist in locations where the environment poses regular threats to the areas of their jurisdiction and they are usually called on to respond to a threat or actual impact of a disaster agent at least once in a four or five year period. For example, tornadoes are an almost annual occurrence in Kansas, and thus in Topeka one finds a Civil Defense Organization which is highly justifiable.

There are, however, those areas where although there is a high probability of a disaster agent impact, a disaster may occur only once in a ten to twenty year period. The existence of an organization designed solely to respond to this probable impact will find its justifiability as being problematic. Indeed, as the lapse of time increases since the last impact or serious threat of impact, the plausibility of such an organization decreases. It is also usually the case that a series of threats also lose their effects if not fairly regularly interspersed with a direct impact of some magnitude. It has been observed regularly in the Disaster Research Center studies that while the objective threat may remain constant, the psychological complacency of the community generally tends to increase proportional to the time elapsed from the last impact. This complacency tends to make the justifiability of an Emergency Measures Organization decrease proportionately, especially when its total raison d'être centres around the response to this disaster. This, then, is one major condition which can lead to reduced legitimacy for a public organization such as E.M.O.

Financial Cutbacks

Financial cutbacks to an organization can sometimes be the result of an evaluation of that organization's cost-benefit ratio. Certain events may have directed attention to this organization in particular, and resulted in financial cut-backs. There are, however, other conditions resulting in financial cut-backs which can form independently of the performance of an organization. For example, periods of heavy deficit spending, recession or depression tend to lead to a search for ways to reduce spending by cutting back or eliminating organizations whose size and/or existence seemed more defensible in other times. What was seen as a benefit under more favourable financial conditions may now become a luxury. What may have been perceived as a reasonable expense may now be seen as unjustified. Under these conditions, organizations which formerly may have been seen as a justifiable expenditure may now have their legitimacy undercut by general budgetary considerations.

The financial cut-back phenomenon has a special effect across governmental levels when cost-sharing programs are in operation. For example, the Federal Government may agree to finance 75% of the cost of a Provincial Emergency Measures Organization and the Province may feel that 25% of the cost of the total cost may be reasonable enough in the cost-benefit ratio and agree to establish a Provincial E.M.O. If however, the Federal Government cuts its support drastically, it forces the Provincial Government into a position where the justifiability of their E.M.O. may have to be reevaluated since its cost for the perceived benefits may have been increased substantially. Thus, any previous Provincial Government policy on the justifiability of the E.M.O. program must now be reformulated. Based on the relative weights of other factors affecting E.M.O.'s legitimacy, the organization may be maintained, cut back or eliminated.
Performance

Under certain conditions, a poor performance of an Emergency Measures Organization may lead to its liquidation. At other times, a poor performance may lead to a change in personnel in the organization or at the very least, a demand for changes in existing plans. If, in a disaster impact situation, no organization is able to meet the problem due to its magnitude, the legitimacy of an E.M.O. probably will not be affected; it may even be enhanced. If, however, it is perceived that the emergency could have been handled by the E.M.O., but not by any other emergency relevant organization, the existence of the organization itself may not be threatened but the personnel may be changed. Perhaps the most direct way that the legitimacy of an E.M.O. could be undermined would be the situation in which an E.M.O. was seen to fail in its performance while another emergency relevant organization was seen as extending its regular operations to meet the demands of the disaster. Or equally devastating would be the situation where a number of other regular organizations were seen as being collectively effective while an E.M.O. was seen as playing a minor role. Performance under certain crisis conditions can thus have a variety of effects on the legitimacy of an E.M.O.

The last two possibilities are particularly devastating since they are most often seen as alternate ways for an area to develop a response capability for a disaster without a specific organization being created to meet the perceived need. It is often felt that by a rational, planned extension of normal governmental activities, that emergency relevant and other governmental organizations are capable of responding to a natural disaster simply by responding in a manner similar to that employed in coping with emergencies handled in their normal sphere of operation. This idea has some appeal under any circumstances but clearly is seen as a more viable alternative when a response of that type has already been implemented successfully.

Clearly, other factors are involved in the change in the legitimacy of an E.M.O., but it is felt that the above conditions are often the crucial considerations which can, in harmony or independently, make the legitimacy of an E.M.O. problematic.
III. The Role of "Relevant Others"

In the case of a government organization such as E.M.O., legitimacy is often a fluid quantity, distilled from the interaction between five sources -- 1) the public, 2) the media, 3) the legislators, 4) other levels of government, and 5) other emergency relevant organizations.

As previously stated, the public is not normally concerned with this question of legitimacy. If however, a section of the electorate suffers a direct loss during an emergency, and if this is linked in the public mind to the failure of a government organization to perform adequately, then a public outcry against that agency may develop.

More often, however, it is the media in its "surveillance" role which helps to establish the legitimacy of the public organization. In cases where media criticism combines with political opposition in the Legislature, then there will be especially strong pressures in the organization to justify its goals and tasks. Similarly, if the media opinion becomes at one with public feeling, then a similar pressure will be created.

In New Brunswick, the press was generally not influential in this way. Rather, than question the need for E.M.O., there appeared to be some measure of support for it. However, the issue was not one which was seen as requiring continuing editorial comment, and thus the question of the organization's legitimacy was left to the legislators. When E.M.O.'s legitimacy was re-established after the flood, the media, by extensive coverage, helped to solidify this new plausibility. Clearly, however, to be an effective influence in determining the legitimacy of a public organization, the media must 1) initiate a sustained effort in terms of editorial coverage, 2) forge a positional coalition with another "relevant other" in the life of the government organization.

Other emergency relevant organizations do not have a direct effort in determining the legitimacy of the public organization. However, by resisting the co-ordination efforts of the organization in question, or by intriguing to co-opt its tasks, another such organization can greatly reduce the effectiveness of task performance. As a result, questions may arise as to the capabilities of the public organization. On the other hand, as was the case in New Brunswick, if other emergency relevant organizations defer to the expertise of the government organization, then this is a visible demonstration that the latter has a confirmed authority and legitimacy.

Other levels of government can also indirectly act to influence the legitimacy of the public organization. Especially in situations where the organization is financed on a cost sharing basis, a change in policy at one level of government can spur a change at another level, especially if relevant financial arrangements are involved.

Finally, within the body of legislators themselves, the relations between the Government and the Opposition can affect the position of the government organization. If the Government has a comfortable majority, and if it supports the organization,
then problems are not likely to arise. If, however, the Government has only a minority, and if it depends on either third party support or on keeping a low public profile in order to survive through the next election, then Opposition charges that a government organization is not justifiable, is incompetent, or is overextended may have more serious implications for organizational survival. In New Brunswick, the political situation was such that the Government was able to carry through on its plans for the revitalization and expansion of E.M.O. despite Opposition criticism.

Legitimacy, therefore is highly dependent upon environmental factors, especially political ones, outside its own immediate sphere of activities.
IV. Factors Facilitating Legitimacy

Throughout the preceding examination of the phenomenon of legitimacy, factors and conditions facilitating legitimacy have been implied or alluded to in passing. This section will be essentially an attempt to deal more directly with those central factors which seem to facilitate the legitimacy of an organization such as E.M.O.

1) There must be the perception of continuing disaster vulnerability. Clearly an area which is threatened regularly and impacted often by disaster agents has a need for an organization to respond to the problems and can most easily justify such an organization. It seems clear that the objective, highly probable threat of a major disaster alone is often perceived as insufficient grounds for the maintenance of an E.M.O. especially when the last major disaster is not within the active memory of those who approve the budgets. A series of threats without a disaster impact also tends to encourage complacency and helps to undercut the perceived legitimacy of an E.M.O.

2) All organizations must to a certain degree justify their size, their proposed budget, etc., but organizations whose legitimacy may be perceived as more questionable can reduce the problematic nature of their justifiability by presenting the best cost-benefit ratio possible. Organizations can help to maintain their legitimacy by operating with a level of staff, facilities and equipment which can be readily justified as essential in order to carry out the activities which they are involved in. It is more difficult to criticize an organization with a low profile, limited resources and a highly defensible budget. It seems clear that this factor alone is not a sufficient condition to ensure legitimacy, but a failure to meet it could focus unwelcome attention on the organization and raise questions as to its legitimacy. At times, then restraint regarding organization expansion can be an effective defense mechanism against cost-wary critics.

3) The size or type of the jurisdiction of an E.M.O. can also affect its legitimacy. If an area is threatened by a number of disaster agents on a regular basis, it need not be geographically large to support an E.M.O., provided a justifiably large amount of property and number of lives may be potentially jeopardized. A small area with little property or a low population density has more difficulty justifying the need for a full time protective organization. However, by enlarging the jurisdiction of the organization to a regional level, the existence of the organization may be justified, since more life and property is being protected for little extra cost. Also a larger jurisdiction increases the probable frequency of disasters with which the civil defense agency must cope, thus making it appear more worthwhile and legitimate. This effect seems most influential in environments which are perceived of as largely free of severe disaster impacts.

4) Closely linked with the two preceding factors, the maintenance of a regular viable service to the area of jurisdiction is perhaps one of the most powerful factors affecting legitimacy. For an E.M.O.'s legitimacy is perhaps most critically undercut by the perception that they offer the community little benefit between disasters. Therefore, any extra activities which can be assumed by an E.M.O. which are beneficial to the community help to undercut the power and truth of such statements.
Many disaster related activities have been carried on by the numerous Civil Defense and Emergency Measures Organizations in this regard. For example, in a large city in the southwestern United States the Civil Defense Organization has an elaborate communications service which channels all emergency calls, requests for information and action, community relations calls, rumour control center calls, etc., to the relevant organization. Thus the organization offers a 24 hour, 7 days a week service which not only justifies its existence but also helps to centralize its position in times of community response to a disaster impact.

E.M.O.s have also become involved in many emergency related tasks. The fuel allocation contingency planning is an example of the short run type of activity which can be allocated to an E.M.O. which possesses planning skills and resources. The involvement of E.M.O.s in hospital accreditation ambulance services, and hospital planning seminars are all tangible benefits which the communities often receive. Large jurisdictions with many communities allow a continual disaster planning to be carried out, since the updating and expansion of disaster plans is a necessity on a regular basis. Hospital accreditations also share this cyclical pattern so that a regular planning and accreditation program constantly generates work for an E.M.O., provides an opportunity for it to give the communities a tangible benefit and also helps to further legitimate the E.M.O.

5) The various departments of government often are faced with problems which are of a magnitude which require systematic planning. It is helpful for an E.M.O. to be visible as a planning facility which may be asked to plan for emergency-type problems for the government. Thus a high degree of visibility within all departments of government may increase an E.M.O.'s legitimacy. As a result an E.M.O. may ultimately be perceived as the organization to be turned to when emergency-type contingency planning of all types is necessary. Clearly, the competent design of such plans would not only increase an E.M.O.'s legitimacy, it would also increase its reputation as a skilled planning resource.

6) In E.M.O. jurisdictions of a large size, with many municipalities, it seems helpful for E.M.O. to engage in continuing interaction with these municipalities. Not only does this allow for better disaster planning but municipalities are a source of power which can enhance or undercut the legitimacy of an E.M.O. If, for example, the government was considering the elimination or reduction of an E.M.O., the positive support of the municipalities could be instrumental in a decision to keep the provincial E.M.O. organization. If E.M.O. is seen by municipalities as a useful, skilled and necessary entity they can perhaps lend an E.M.O. invaluable support. If however, the municipalities have a negative view of the usefulness of E.M.O., they could help to seriously undermine the legitimacy of the organization.

7) Perhaps one of the most central facilitating factors in the maintenance of legitimacy for an E.M.O. is the continued competence in a disaster response. It is clear that this is an E.M.O.'s main raison d'être and if it were to fail in this task, it could have serious repercussions for its legitimacy. The importance of a good response has been shown throughout this paper as a necessary condition for legitimacy. In certain disaster prone environments it is usually a sufficient condition; in less
disaster prone environments other activities may be necessary to maintain an E.M.O.'s legitimacy. But under all conditions an adequate response to a disaster is essential since an E.M.O. is placed in a highly visible position within the community and basic perceptions and attitudes will be formed then which will be called upon in less favourable times and will contribute significantly to the question of the legitimacy of E.M.O.