CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Civil disturbances are usually viewed as irrational and nonproductive. It is hardly surprising then that few scholars have bothered to consider their social consequences.¹ Little has been written, for example, about the social changes wrought by civil disturbances in the United States, even though they occurred in numerous cities throughout the country from the mid-1960's to the beginning of 1970. During this same period, similar expressions of discontent occurred in other parts of the world. In 1969, for example, a major disturbance struck the Caribbean island of Curacao.

Here we compare some of the changes generated by civil disturbances in the United States and Curacao. Such a comparison should be particularly instructive since the two societies are significantly different. The United States is a large, highly developed society, while Curacao is a small, developing one. Since the civil disturbances were political in nature, we will primarily compare them on this dimension. We will focus on their similarities and differences as expressions of political discontent, and on their relative success in achieving political change and reform. We will also make some observations about riot commissions, a frequent political consequence of civil disturbances. We wish to suggest that: (1) Civil disturbances, such as those which occurred in the United States and Curacao, are capable of producing change in society because they are either themselves social movements or part of larger movements. (2) In their drive for change, such protest movements are aided by "support movements," organized efforts by groups in society to facilitate reform, and are limited by countermovements -- organized social control efforts. (3) The differential success of the protest movements in the two societies can be largely attributed to differences in the protest movements themselves and their potential support base, and the countermovement or social control capacity of the societies.
The materials discussed in this paper are part of a larger study on collective violence. Data for this study were collected during field work in the United States and Curacao. Field work was conducted in several major cities in the United States during 1968, 1969, and 1972. The primary source of data in the United States was semi-structured interviews with members of black groups and organizations. Field trips were made to Curacao in 1969, 1970, and 1971. The primary source of data in Curacao was semi-structured interviews with key persons in labor, business, and political groups and organizations. In both the United States and Curacao, written materials, including newspapers, reports by government agencies and other documents, were analyzed and used as supplementary data. The emphasis here will be, however, on an overall interpretation of these events and their consequences.

The Setting and Violence in Curacao

Since there are several good descriptions available of the civil disturbances which occurred in the United States during the 1960's, here we will only discuss their character when it is necessary in making comparisons with the Curacao disturbance. Since less has been written about the disturbance in Curacao, we will begin our discussion with a brief description of the social setting in which it emerged and then the event itself.

With a population of over 141,000, Curacao is the most populous island of the Netherlands Antilles, which includes Aruba, Bonaire, St. Maarten, Saba and St. Barts. The Netherlands Antilles' capital, Willemstad, where the disturbance in Curacao was centered has a population of over 65,000. The Antilles has a semi-independent political status. It is a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, along with Surinam, another former Dutch colony. The central
government of the Antilles, headed by a prime minister, is considered autonomous only in local affairs. The kingdom government handles such important matters as foreign affairs and national defense.

Despite its beautiful Caribbean backdrop, there was considerable unrest in the Antilles, especially in Curacao, just prior to the 1969 disturbance. Discontent was expressed by some over the limited autonomy of the country because it was viewed as a continuation of its earlier colonial status. Antillean nationalists also voiced opposition to such things as the dominant role the Dutch played in the economic life of the society and the fact that Dutch was the official language rather than Papiamento, the native language. Many Antilleans were dissatisfied over local politics. The Democratic Party of Curacao had been in power in the central government for over 15 years and it was widely believed that it represented the interests of local whites and Holland. Curacao, like other developing areas, was also beset by serious economic problems. The need for unskilled workers had been significantly reduced in recent years, resulting in increasing unemployment; and nonwhites, who make up the bulk of the population, were hardest hit by this development. Radical groups accused the central government of being unresponsive to the economic plight of blacks and of preventing them from having an effective political voice.

The disturbance in Curacao grew out of a labor crisis on the island. Beginning with the early part of May 1969, labor unrest grew until by May 29, what had started out as a strike by a single union against a construction company for higher wages had begun to assume political and racial overtones and involve an increasing number of protesting workers and unions.

On May 29, a group of strikers and union leaders marched to Fort Amsterdam, the seat of the Antillean government in downtown Willemstad, and held a demonstration while their spokesmen were heard by a labor mediator from the social and
economic affairs department. They expressed concern that the government was pursuing a policy of keeping wages low in order to attract foreign investors. By the evening of May 29, the strike had spread to the heart of industry in Curacao, the Royal Dutch Shell Company which operates a large oil refinery on the island. During the night and in the early hours of the next morning, striking workers stopped some cars and harassed persons identified as "European Dutchmen," i.e., Dutchmen who had recently come from the Netherlands as opposed to persons of Dutch ancestry born in the Antilles. Some harassment of white supervisory personnel also occurred at Shell. The major conflict, however, did not occur until several hours later on May 30. On that day at 7:00 a.m., an estimated three to four thousand striking workers began a protest march on the government after initially gathering at the entrance to the Shell refinery and hearing speeches by union leaders, some of which were highly critical of the government’s lack of support for black workers. As the crowd moved toward downtown Willemstad, stores were looted and cars were turned over and burned. Before the crowd reached the downtown area, it was met by the police. The under-manned police force was unable to contain the crowd. However, during the ensuing confrontation, one of the key union leaders was shot, and when many of the leaders of the march left with him for the hospital, the bulk of the crowd moved toward the downtown business district instead of marching on the government as had been originally intended. The rioters broke up into smaller crowds and moved among the retail stores breaking windows, looting, and setting fires. The voluntary corps, Curacao’s militia, was called to duty and a curfew was established. On June 1, 3000 Dutch Marines were flown from the Netherlands to bolster the local security forces. The toll of the "May Movement" was two persons dead with 78 injured and dollar damage estimated between 35 and 40 million dollars.
Similiarities Between the Disturbances in the
United States and Curacao

The disturbances in the United States and Curacao were alike in several important ways. They were attacks upon traditional societal arrangements which worked to the disadvantage of nonwhites and the economically depressed. And they became increasingly political in character as they evolved, with protestors articulating more specific demands and grievances. In Curacao, for example, the actions of the crowds were at first largely proto- or semi-political, only hinting at the changes that were sought by the participants. However, on the night of May 30, the grievances and political changes desired by the protestors were brought into sharper focus as labor leaders presented the government with an ultimatum to resign or else a general strike would be called. Thus, the disturbance took on the character of a social or political movement, rather than an isolated episode of violence. As in Curacao, the initial demands of participants in the disturbances in the United States were often vague, but, like their counterparts in Curacao, protest leaders in the United States helped transform the uprisings into more organized political protest by specifying demands and calling for such changes as greater political representation for blacks, more and better jobs, and in some cases even demanding the resignations of mayors, police officials and other authorities. Furthermore, the disturbances in the United States, like the Curacao protest, were not merely isolated events but part of a social or political movement.

Given these common features, we might expect the consequences of the disturbances in the two societies to be somewhat similar. Indeed there were such similarities but, as we will indicate later, there were some important differences as well.
Similarities in the Immediate Changes

In both the United States and Curacao, the disturbances resulted in changes within and outside the communities of the protesting groups. Within the nonwhite communities in the two societies, for example, the protest ushered in periods of innovation and experimentation. A willingness to try new solutions to old problems resulted in the emergence of many new groups and organizations. Within a few weeks of the disturbance in Curacao, some of the protestors formed a new political party, the May 30th Labor and Liberation Front, to challenge the established parties. The Liberation Front ran on an anti-Dutch platform and promised to work for a government which would be responsive to the laboring class rather than to what it referred to as a business and colonial elite. The labor party also emphasized the need for the development of a more positive Antillean identity. Over a year later, MAN, a second party was formed. This party appealed to Antilleans of African descent for support and hoped to continue the aims of the May disturbance. The Curacao disturbance also led to the formation of new labor unions which promised to boost the wages of Antilleans, and an upsurge in the membership of established unions. There was also a significant increase in union militancy. Similarly, within the black community in the United States new economic, cultural and political groups calling for self-determination for the black community were born following the urban uprisings. In Los Angeles, the militant cultural organization US was formed, as well as SLANT, a group with a black power ideology. In Detroit, a militant organization known as the Citywide Citizen's Action Committee was created for the purpose of achieving black control of the black community. In Chicago, black police officers organized the Afro-American Patrolmen's League to protect the interests of the black community in police affairs. The urban uprisings in the United States also played a role in the
emergence of militant black unions and black student organizations. These important changes emerged within the protesting communities in both the United States and Curacao because dissidents believed that existing groups and organizations were incapable of solving their problems.

Societies cannot ignore protesting groups. They must react to them. Given the threat they posed to traditional social arrangements, then, the protest movements in the United States and Curacao forced established groups and authorities into making certain adjustments. And in broad terms the adjustments made by established groups and authorities in the two societies were similar. That is, on the one hand efforts were made to make certain changes and reforms in response to some of the grievances articulated during and shortly after the disturbances, but on the other hand actions were also taken to counteract and limit protest activity. From the standpoint of the protesting groups, such consequences represented gains and losses.

Turning first to Curacao, the May disturbance led to some significant reforms. Labor and nonwhite Antilleans secured more political power and recognition. The almost total domination of the central government by the Democratic Party was brought to an end when in the wake of the disturbance a coalition of labor unions forced the government to resign. In a special election which was held a few months later, the newly formed labor party won seats in the Staten, the Antillean legislative body. The Liberation Front then became part of a new coalition government and one of its founders became a minister in the new cabinet that was formed. Other political reforms attributable to the May 30 disturbance include the appointment of blacks to such high public offices as prime minister and governor of Curacao, and the creation of a labor department within the central government to handle labor grievances and to work toward labor reform.

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The Curacao disturbance was also responsible for many nonpolitical changes. Prior to the unrest, the business community generally had taken Antillean workers and labor unions rather lightly since they lacked organization and resources. After the May upheaval, however, employers became less insensitive to labor. The new union militance following the disturbance enabled such groups to negotiate an unusual number of wage hikes in Curacao. Some businesses also attempted to become more Antillean. Shell, for example, began encouraging its non-Antillean employees to speak Papiamento and offered courses to those who could not speak the local language. Shell also increasingly replaced foreign staff members in technical and managerial positions with Antilleans. Shell and another company in cooperation with Curacao's island government organized a training program to increase the number of skilled workers on the island so that fewer such persons would have to be recruited from elsewhere. The disturbance was also the catalyst for the establishment of a public investment organization in Curacao, the Curacao Development Corporation (CODECO). The goal of the corporation was to get as broad a representation as possible -- e.g., from labor, government, business and the general public -- to work toward and invest in the industrial and business development of the island. The cost of shares in the corporation was purposefully kept low to permit their purchase by the average worker and thus hopefully provide this segment of the population with a sense of involvement in the economic life of the society.

Reforms are made grudgingly in societies and Curacao was no exception. Established groups relinquish power and privilege only to the extent that they feel it is necessary to do so. Thus from the standpoint of the protestors, unintended changes also resulted from the disturbance and related protest activity. Some of the changes made by established groups and authorities, for example, were designed to counteract and limit the power of dissident elements or to shore up their own
lagging power. For example, the Liberation Front was successful at the polls because it cut into the strength of two of the major parties in Curacao, the National People's Party and URA. These two parties subsequently merged in an effort to recoup losses suffered at the hands of the Liberation Front. The prime minister, who was driven out of office and later from the Democratic Party because he was blamed for the May disturbance, formed a new party in an attempt to recapture some of the influence he had previously enjoyed in Curacao politics. And along with the various reforms we have mentioned, the government also responded to the May disturbance with efforts to strengthen the capacity of the police and the voluntary corps to control future rebellions. Experts were secured from the Netherlands to reorganize the police department. Police officers were given increased riot training and new riot squads were formed. The police department's intelligence force was enlarged and new communication equipment was secured along with such items as anti-riot guns and helmets. The voluntary corps was given more formalized riot control responsibilities than it had had prior to the disturbance. A riot plan was written and corps members were given riot training for the first time.

In the United States, too, from the standpoint of the protestors, both desired and undesired changes resulted from the disturbances of the 1960's. On the plus side, political, business and civic leaders in the United States became more responsive to black grievances. Some local political authorities saw the need to hire more black police officers, organize community relations groups, and to establish ghetto city hall offices ostensibly to give ghetto residents easier access to local government and reduce their sense of isolation. Urban task forces were formed to tackle some of the myriad political, economic, and social problems which plague black Americans. In some cities, leading white businessmen, educators,
and government officials joined with black leaders to form problem-solving groups like the New Detroit Committee and the Committee of Concern in Newark. Public and private organizations also endeavored to improve employment and educational opportunities for blacks. And efforts were made to improve housing for blacks and to expand recreational programs in some communities. The federal government enlarged or initiated new programs in several communities following the uprisings. The Office of Economic Opportunity was a major supporter of these programs. Many new black groups and organizations received much of their financial backing from federal agencies and private sources such as corporations and foundations who, because of the disturbances, felt the need for some change and reform in the society.

Yet, as in Curacao, there were also actions taken in the United States to counteract and resist the potential power of the black protest movements. For example, white segregationist groups emerged in the wake of the protest. Also, steps were taken by authorities to increase the capacity of law enforcement agencies to control future disturbances. Riot plans were written, riot training for law enforcement personnel was greatly expanded, and new riot control equipment was purchased. There is evidence which suggests that the major response to the rebellions in many cities in the United States involved such social control measures.

**Relative Success of the Disturbances**

These, then, were some of the similarities in the changes wrought by the protest in Curacao and the United States. We can now consider the relative success of the protest efforts in the two societies. This has to be done cautiously, however. It is not clear, for example, whether the May protest in
Curacao was more or less successful than the protest movements in the United States in solving some of the economic problems of the poor. Even with the prodding from the movements, programs established in the two societies for this purpose were meager and inadequate given the size of the task. It is safe to say, however, that the Curacao protest had greater immediate political effect than the disturbances in the United States.

The political changes generated in Curacao by the May protest by no means altered the basic position of the masses. Yet, the changes appear to have been more significant than those which came in the wake of the protests in the United States. This seems so, even if we only consider the fact that the government was overthrown in Curacao whereas this was never a real possibility in the United States. However, other things also lend support to this conclusion. As noted, the Curacao protest produced two genuine reform parties, the Liberation Front and MAN, and both won legislative seats and championed the rights of the poor and the working masses. Labor acquired more political influence in Curacao as a result of the May protest. Furthermore, blacks were appointed to the highest government offices following the disturbance. It does not seem that the recent disturbances in the United States had this type of immediate political impact.

Several factors would seem to explain the different political impacts of the disturbances in the two societies. These include: social organizational differences in the protest movements themselves; the two societies' different social control capacities which were related to their dissimilar levels of development; the differences in the size of the communities from which protestors were drawn; and the societies' dissimilar historical experience with collective protest. First, even though the disturbance in Curacao tended to move from protopolitical violence to political action as the protest movement in the United States had done, in Curacao this more quickly assumed a more organized political
This was due in part to the involvement of key prior existing groups, the labor unions, at the very beginning of the protest in Curacao. The unions served as the core for more organized political behavior. Curacao was structurally conducive to the emergence of political as well as economic protest activity by the labor unions. Because economic development is so vital in developing societies like the Antilles, the government, rather than business and industry, often establishes policies of direct concern to labor unions, such as those relating to wages and labor-management relations. As a result, labor unions often had to directly enter the political arena if they were to make changes in their economic situation. The Antillean government had pursued a policy of encouraging industries to stabilize wages in order to attract new investors. In such a context, when economic institutions or arrangements are not clearly differentiated from political ones, economic issues become political as well, and protest which is initially economic or protopolitical in nature may evolve into a more political form. Thus in the wake of the May 30 violence and destruction in Willemstad, the unions, declaring that the social and economic policies of the government had failed, formed a coalition and forced it to resign. The success of the labor coalition led to even more organized political activity, i.e., first the formation of the Liberation Front and later MAN.

The dissimilar political significance of the disturbances in the two societies also seem to be related to their different social control capacities. A large and highly developed society like the United States has a far greater capacity for controlling dissidence and thus avoiding change and reform than a small, developing society like Curacao. The United States has both the technical and organizational resources for minimizing disruption over the long run. Whereas the Antillean government had to rely on outside assistance in quelling the violence.
in Willemstad, the United States, with its well trained police, armed forces and National Guard units, handled the internal threats to its stability with relative ease. The differential development of the two societies along these lines is underscored by the fact that sometime after the May 30 violence in Curacao the United States supplied the Curacao police with riot equipment.

Following the disturbance in Curacao, some dissidents threatened renewed violence if reforms were not made. The Antillean government could hardly take a chance on further violence. The police had performed poorly in trying to contain the May 30 disturbance, and the voluntary corps was a small, nonprofessional organization. Also, since under the kingdom government structure Holland controls all military forces, the Antillean government did not have regular military troops at its disposal for emergencies like civil disturbances. The prospects of Curacao again receiving military aid in the event of another outbreak of violence were not good since the Dutch had been worried earlier about world opinion and possible charges of neo-colonialism when they committed troops to Curacao following the May 30 violence. The fact that demonstrations had been held in the Netherlands protesting their actions made the Dutch even more sensitive about this issue. Thus the need to avoid more violence because of the Antillean government's uncertainty about its ability to contain it underscored the necessity for granting some reforms. The Antilles' status as a developing rather than a developed society, then, opened the way for some political reforms.

The size of the communities from which the protests in the societies drew their support also undoubtedly had some bearing on the different outcomes. Unlike in the United States where blacks comprise only about 11 percent of the population, the vast majority of the inhabitants of Curacao are nonwhite. Thus it was more difficult for authorities in Curacao to ignore demands for change and reform since they were coming from those who were part of the majority community in the society.
Finally, perhaps of some significance too in their varying political response to the collective protest, were the different historical experiences of the United States and Curacao. The United States has had a long history of riots, rebellions and protest movements. In addition to racial disturbances, the United States has experienced anti-draft riots and movements, abolition movements, slave rebellions, and a stormy history of labor-management relations. This history would seem to mitigate to some extent the impact of the black protest movements of the 1960's. Curacao, on the other hand, has not had a similar history of civilian protest and rebellion. Relations between the races have been considered good, i.e., without overt conflict, when compared with other multi-racial societies. Furthermore, there has not been a history of labor turmoil on the island. This unfamiliarity with protest may have contributed to the disturbance being viewed more seriously in Curacao and thus increasing the opportunity for more change and reform.

**Riot Commissions**

One final aspect should be added in our comparison of the political effects of the disturbances in the two societies. One of the political consequences in both countries was the appointment of government commissions to investigate the disturbances. Such commissions were told to seek the causes of the violent outbreaks and to recommend measures to prevent their recurrence. The most well known riot commission appointed in the United States during the 1960's was the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, more commonly referred to as the Kerner Commission; this commission was established by the President in 1967 following the outbreak of disturbances in several cities in the country. The Kerner Commission was a highly complex organization which included eleven commissioners appointed by the President and numerous staff members, researchers
Six of the commissioners were elected public officials and the others were leaders in important institutional areas of American life such as labor and civil rights. The commission's data gathering efforts included conducting hearings and field research in riot cities.

A riot commission was established by the Antillean government in October 1969. Four Antilleans and three Dutch members were appointed to it. The seven member commission included four sociologists, an engineer, a lawyer, a retired judge, and a government employee with a doctorate in theology. The commission gathered data on the May 30 violence and its causes through confidential interviews with citizens of Curacao. All segments of the island were invited to present their views. Some public hearings were also held by the commission.

What role did the commissions in the two societies play in the changes we have discussed? Were they successful? If success is judged on the basis of their effectiveness in securing government action on their recommendations, then perhaps they were equally unsuccessful. Lipsky and Olson, for example, minimize the significance of the Kerner Commission and other riot commissions that were established in the United States because they have generally failed to convince government authorities of the need to implement their major recommendations. Like the Kerner Commission's report, the report of the Antillean Commission which was released in May 1970 was met with official silence by the government. Some changes were eventually implemented in Curacao that had been suggested by the commission in its report. For example, the government appointed a person with police experience to head the police force in Curacao. The commission was highly critical of the actions of the police during the May 30 violence and suggested the need for such a change. Also, as recommended by the commission, the government began making fewer appointments based on patronage. It is difficult to conclude,
however, if these changes were made because of the commission's recommendations, although this view was expressed by some of those on the commission. But, even if such changes were made because of the efforts of the commission, the vast majority of its recommendations failed to be implemented.

Yet a different conclusion might be reached regarding the success of the Antillean Commission and similar American commissions if they are judged on a slightly different basis. Campbell, for example, suggests that the true test of the significance of commissions lies in whether or not they present important facts about national problems to those in positions of power and to the general public. From this perspective, Campbell suggests that the Kerner Commission did meet with some success. The work of the Antillean Commission did differ, however, in one interesting respect from that of the Kerner Commission. The Antillean Commission wrote a hard-hitting report in which the problems of the society were clearly spelled out, especially those relating to politics. Unlike what many critics felt the Kerner report failed to do, the Antillean Commission's report specified what were thought to be the government's contribution to the underlying and immediate causes of the May 30 violence. This included statements about political patronage and favoritism, governmental isolation from the masses, especially labor, and police incompetence. A number of factors contributed to such forthrightness. First, the composition of the commission was important in this regard. As noted, there were Dutch as well as Antillean members on the commission. Thus even if the Antillean members had come under pressure from local authorities to tone down the criticisms of the Antillean government, it might have been difficult to do so given the presence of the Dutch who would have been less affected by such pressure. Perhaps even more significant was the fact that the administration which was in power at the time of
the violence was no longer in office and thus could not exert pressure on the
commission to deliver a report which cast it in a favorable light. Finally, the
commision was prodded by radical factions to objectively portray the shortcomings
of government in the Netherlands Antilles. It is interesting to note that the man
who had been initially appointed as head of the commission resigned before its
work was completed. Prior to his resignation, he had come under heavy fire from
radicals.

Conclusion

Political disturbances are often accompanied by periods of social
innovation within and outside protesting communities. The political behavior
started during disturbances does not necessarily terminate with the dissolution
and control of hostile crowds. Thus the depiction of crowds as isolated events
is often patently false. In the wake of many disturbances, new groups are formed
within the protesting communities and new solutions are sought to old problems.
Also, pre-existing groups and leaders rally around emergent crowd activities.
What we are suggesting, then, is that disturbances are not isolated events but
often become the focal point for the emergence of new social or political
movements. Freeman suggests that networks of organizations are crucial for the
crystallization of new movements.22 Our study provides further evidence of this.
In both Curacao and the United States, pre-existing and emergent groups combined
in loosely linked networks which sustained the protest activities beyond the
brief life of the violent crowds. The crystallization of such networks or
movements were important consequences of the disturbances in both the United
States and Curacao.
The emergence of disturbances also results in some restructuring outside the protesting segments of society. Civil disturbances include, after all, what Blumer,23 and Turner and Killian24 refer to as acting crowds or what we would call political crowds--emergent groups which are primarily aimed at acting on or changing some external situation. The disturbances in the United States and Curacao upset the earlier accommodative relations which had evolved between groups and created a fluid situation. This provided the opportunity for some reforms and adjustments. These were aggressively sought by the networks of pre-existing and emergent groups which coalesced around the disturbances. However, the two societies also responded to the challenge from the protesting groups with social control measures, including the use of force and later by strengthening social control organizations. Masotti and Bowen use the term "system capacity" to refer to "the willingness and ability of the regime to respond to threats of civil violence with force or with reform, or with both."25 The importance of this dimension can be seen in our comparison.

In societies where there are those who challenge the status quo there will always be those groups who stand to lose something if reforms are made, as well as those organizations who are expected to enforce norms regarding how attacks on the status quo can be made. Thus when disturbances occur, some segments of society become involved in countermovements and control activities, rather than support movements. White segregationists groups were formed in the United States in the wake of the disturbances and in Curacao some established political groups took actions to combat the growing strength of the new labor party that had evolved from the disturbance. And both societies made efforts to enhance their social control capabilities. The countermovement as one aspect of a society's response to civil disturbance is perhaps best exemplified in the case of the United States.
In the United States during the 1960's some white neighborhoods formed self-protection groups. Also, professional law enforcement organizations throughout the country secured massive amounts of riot control equipment, expanded their riot training, developed an anti-riot ideology, and created a body of knowledge on riot control which was shared through professional publications, conferences, meetings, and informal contact.

The crowd violence which took place in Curacao had more immediate political impact than that which occurred in the United States partly because of the inability of Curacao to mount what was believed to be an effective countermovement and the feeling that, given its developing status, it would not be able to do so in the event of further violence. Curacao, for example, had to rely upon Holland for military support. And as Bude has noted, crowds and political movements can be most successful when the presence of the military is not felt.26

Most societies, even if they have the resources or ability to do so, are unwilling to respond to actual or potential internal protest simply by applying counterforce. Thus at least some effort toward reform will usually be forthcoming from various sectors of society following significant group protest. Such efforts may take the form of symbolic or token changes as well as those with some substance. At any rate, they provide protestors with encouragement, legitimacy, and financial assistance. We suggest the name "support movement" for those sectors of society which in one fashion or another try to deliberately facilitate a protest movement's goal attainment. As this discussion of the reform efforts following disturbances in the United States and Curacao indicates, many groups may comprise a support movement. It may include, for example, both civic and newly emerged groups like the New Detroit Committee and those government agencies like civil rights commissions who are primarily linked by their concern for the issues.
raised by protestors and who attempt to aid them through financial assistance and moral support. Riot commissions can also be viewed as part of support movements to the extent that they attempt to legitimize the aims of protestors even though rejecting their tactics. They may do this by locating the goals of the protestors within a society's value system and by advocating changes which would enable the aggrieved group to achieve such goals in acceptable ways. Both the Kerner Commission and Antillean Commission functioned in this way, even while calling for some control measures to be taken. The basic thrust of the reports produced by these commissions, however, was a call for reform. The emergence of support movements, then, is an important consequence of disturbances. They indicate that a society has some potential for reform and without their emergence it is doubtful that reform can be achieved. Thus, the ultimate consequences of civil disturbances for change within a society are a result of the interaction between the countermovement and the support movement, and not in the intensity of the hostile crowds.
FOOTNOTES

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5. See, Anderson, op.cit.


9. Ibid., pp. 154-156.

10. Ibid., p. 156.


12. Ibid., p. 151.


17. Ibid. -21-
18. Ibid., p. 21


