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Disaster Research Center

FINAL PROJECT REPORT
#33

EMERGENT CITIZEN GROUPS IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES

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PREFACE

This is a report briefly summarizing a three and a half year project that extended from late 1981 until the end of 1984. As a global and general summary, it can be read by many audiences as an overall introduction to our work. However, this report is primarily aimed at disaster researchers and social and behavioral scientists who might want to know how we conducted our study and/or who might be interested in the inductively but empirically generated hypotheses and models we generated. With a heavy emphasis on research procedures and general findings, the report does not present much of the data as such. The more specific details, including the quantitative and qualitative data are given in the more specialized completed or planned papers and publications listed in an appendix to this report. Similarly, while we allude to some of the implications of our work, those policy makers, planners, and citizens concerned with disasters, will have to look at our other writings other than this volume, to derive concrete and specific applications of our research results.

The relocation of DRC from Ohio State University to the University of Delaware at the end of December 1984, while it did not interfere with the completion of the data gathering phase of the project, did delay more than would otherwise have been the case, the finishing of some of the more specific analyses and more specific topical papers that were planned. It is anticipated that the uncompleted anlaytical and writing work will be concluded in the coming months. However, there is no reason to think that the yet unfinished specifically oriented analyses will alter or modify in any significant ways the general findings summarized in the this final report, which is partly based on more than two dozen publically circulated specific analyses, as well as twice as many analyses presently available only in DRC internal documents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As with many Disaster Research Center (DRC) publications, what is generally reported here and more specifically elsewhere, represents a collective product. Many staff members of DRC contributed, directly or indirectly to the end product.

The day-to-day work was carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of advanced graduate students in sociology, anthropology, communication, and rural sociology. In varying degrees, the team members participated in the data research designing, the data gathering, the quantitative and qualitative data analyzing, and the data reporting activities. Kenneth Green was the field coordinator on the project. He and David Neal were on the project from start to finish and participated heavily in all phases. Also heavily involved in the data research designing and data gathering were Eric Ireland and Susan McCabe. In addition, Brenda Phillips, Jane Gray, Elizabeth Wilson, Nina Cochran and Mark Wenden helped in the data gathering. We want to acknowledge the contributions of all these staff members.

A special debt is owed to Kenneth Green and David Neal. Many of the substantive ideas of the study were developed by them. Their contributions to the work went considerably beyond their job requirements, and we want to thank them for their help.

Acknowledgement must also be made of the assistance of an Advisory Committee from outside of DRC. They were, with their affiliations at the time of the project:

Bobby G. Baines
Assistant Director
Disaster Services
American National Red Cross

Allan Franks
Chief, Public Interest Center
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency

James Kerr
Director of Research
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Fred Miller
Environmental Policy Institute

R. Jan Thompson
(National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters)
Refugee/Disaster Coordinator
Church of the Brethren General Board

Kathleen Tierney
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Of course the committee members had no direct responsibility for the research work, so any views expressed in this volume or other publications from the study, do not necessarily reflect the views of all or of any of the committee members. Nonetheless, we want to thank them for the suggestions and recommendations they advanced, some of which were very helpful in doing our work.

The National Science Foundation (NSF), and especially Dr. William Anderson, this study's research liaison between NSF and DRC, are also thanked. They were consistently supportive of the work from its inception to its conclusion, and did everything reasonably possible to facilitate the work. In more general terms, NSF is to be commended for its support of disaster research, and we hope that our study is similar to the typical high quality work and useful research results that the NSF program has produced in recent years.

It is very important that we acknowledge the help of the more than a thousand citizens and officials who cooperated with our field teams. Since the inception of DRC, its policy is to keep confidential the names of anyone providing data for the Center, and thus we can not list anyone in any identifiable manner. However, we want to note the assistance of all of them since the study would have been impossible without their participation and hope the research we undertook will eventually be useful to them in some way.

Last but not least, we must thank the support staff of DRC for all their work during the course of the project. In particular we must note the invaluable contributions of Connie Hand, the DRC Secretary when the Center was located at the Ohio State University; she competently handled most of the administrative details in the last several years of the project. After DRC relocated to the University of Delaware in January 1985, Karen Sicilia, the DRC Office Coordinator, capably undertook the ardous task of typing almost all of the final version of this report.

Since mine was the final decision on research and writing matters, any faults, shortcomings, and errors in this volume are, of course the responsibility of the author who was the Principal Investigator on the research project reported herein.

E. L. Quarantelli
DRC Director

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

An increasingly noticeable feature of American disasters is the presence of newly formed groups of private citizens concerned with preparatory and with post recovery aspects of community disasters. Generally unlike new groups which emerge during the transimpact period, these emergent groups have the possibility for having long lives, most attempt to influence the behavior of other organizations and agencies, and many have the potential, sometimes realized, of turning from emergent groups into established formal associations. In 1981, the Disaster Research Center (DRC) proposed an extensive and intensive three year study into this very little examined socio-behavioral phenomena which involves important public policy issues. The focus of the research was to be on the nature and characteristics of such groups, and the conditions associated with their emergence, and their effects upon the public sector, especially disaster related governmental agencies. Field studies in several dozen disaster events or situations were planned to obtain data via intensive interviewing, participant observing and systematic document collecting. Using a grounded theory approach, a model of the emergent phenomena was to be derived. This empirically grounded model was to be used to draw practical and applied implications for private citizens and public officials, as well as to ascertain what the findings indicated for the more generic understanding of social behavior in extreme situations of threat and danger.

The paragraph above summarizes what was our intent and thought when we launched our study. In the rest of the pages which follow in this volume, we summarize what we actually did and found.

In this introductory chapter, we present the background of the study as we had originally proposed it. The literature on the topic as it existed when we initiated our work, is reviewed. In Chapter II we set forth the research goals and objectives, as well as the research design used. This includes a discussion of the procedures and problems involved in our selection of groups for study, the field work actually conducted, and the data analyses undertaken. In Chapter III, we note what we found as to the characteristics of emergent citizen groups, especially their compositions, structures, and initial activities. In this as well as the next two chapters, most of our findings are presented in the form of propositions rather than described in a narrative text. The next Chapter, IV, is focused on the careers and consequences of emergent citizen groups. In the first part of the chapter we indicate how such groups originate and develop. In the last part we note the effects that result from their existence and actions, especially indicating their external effects. In Chapter V we look at the social conditions which are responsible for the appearance and development of the groups. We describe a model which integrates the various factors which are involved such as the extra-community setting, the perceived threat, the social climate, the social relationships, and the resources available in the situations which generate emergent citizen groups. The major conclusions of our work are indicated in Chapter VI. The implications of our methodology, the highlights or our more significant findings, and the high priority research questions for the future, are all briefly noted in this last chapter of the volume.

There are several appendici, including one which lists the communities in which we studied emergent citizen groups and another which provides copies of the field instruments used in our research.

This is intended as a summary volume. No attempt is made to present all the specifics of our work or our findings. Such details are presented in numerous other papers and publications, already written or projected and which are listed in one of the appendici.

We now turn to an account of the background of the study. What informal impressions or observations initiated our interest in the topic? Who already had said what about the problem? In the next section of this chapter, we indicate some answers to these questions.

Background of the Study

Our first attention to the question of emergent citizen groups resulted from a continuing series of informal observations made at DRC over the first 15 years of its existence. In the course of doing systematic work on other topics, we frequently encountered in the field citizens banding together or attempting to do so in connection with a variety of disaster related issues.

For example, in our work in Xenia, Ohio, we saw after a massive tornado disaster in 1974, citizens coming together to undertake a needs assessment survey of the community and to provide an outreach psychological support network. The two groups which emerged, the Disaster-Follow-Up group and the Xenia Area Interfaith Council, were later absorbed by a mental health delivery system which emerged in the area, made up of parts of the pre-impact mental health organizations in the community, and post-impact created groups of both a public and private nature (Taylor, Ross and Quarantelli, 1976).

We were not alone in making such observations. As the following accounts attest, the attention of practitioners, other researchers, and journalists were also sometime caught by the same phenomena.

For instance, Jagoda (1980) observed that in Glendora, California, some citizens in the community formed the DEAP (Disaster Emergency Awareness and Preparedness) Committee. DEAP sponsored town forums and clinics to make families aware of disaster problems and was particularly attempting to have the Unified School District in the area establish an earthquake preparedness program in each of the District's schools.

After a major flood in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania in 1972, two separate groups of local citizens were formed. One, the Flood Victim Action Council locally and publically fought 18 months for the rights of local residents enmeshed in day-to-day recovery problems. The other, the Committee United for the Future of the Wyoming Valley, worked quietly at the national level for passage of the National Catastrophic Insurance Act which retroactively covered the local flood victims (Wolensky, 1980).

In 1979, a number of private individuals formed a group, the Concerned Citizens for the Charlevoix Area, to protest a spent-fuel rod expansion of the Big Rock Nuclear Power Plant in their area. Later, because of lack of money,

the group dropped its Washington based law firm, and announced it would act as its own attorney in preparing an environmental impact statement (New York Times September 21, 1980).

The emergence of all kinds of new groups at times of disasters has long been casually observed. Popular descriptions of catastrophes frequently note the ad hoc groupings and committees which are formed in such situations as after the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 (e.g., Kennedy, 1963). The acknowledged first social science study of a disaster, that by Prince (1920) of the very destructive munitions ship explosion in Halifax, Canada in 1917 also alludes to the many committees which were created in the wake of the event. Since that time, practically every case study description or analysis of a major American disaster mentions, although usually only in passing, new groups operating in the trans or post-impact period of the emergency (e.g. see Form and Nosow, 1958; Bates et al, 1963; Committee on the Alaska Earthquake, 1970; Mussari, 1974). One very atypical study, on the Topeka tornado, does extensively describe transimpact and postimpact emergent phenomena of all kinds (Taylor, Zurcher and Key, 1970). Emergent groups have also been widely observed in many, although not all catastrophes outside of this country. They were noted for example, by DRC field workers in the earthquakes in Chile in 1965 and in Sicily, Italy in 1968 even though relatively absent in the 1963 Niigata, Japan, and the Iranian earthquake of 1968 (Dynes, Haas, Quarantelli, 1964; Kennedy, 1971; McLuckie, 1977).

The emergent groups that have been noted have varied widely in a number of ways. Two of the dimensions along which differentiations have existed eventually became important for our purpose. The groups have differed in their membership composition, such as whether they were made up primarily of private citizens or public officials. The groups have also differed in terms of the time of their appearance and the activities they have undertaken. Some have appeared when there has been only a threat of a danger, others have come into being in the trans or emergency time period, and still others have emerged only after impact or in the post recovery stage of a disaster.

We eventually decided to focus on groups that in the main involve private citizens, and on groups which emerge mostly in either the pre-impact, the preparedness phase of a possible disaster, or in the post-impact, the recovery phase of an actual disaster. We therefore left out of our study, emergent groups consisting primarily of public officials or of individuals acting mainly in their organizational work roles. Nor was our research to deal extensively with the many public and private groups which emerge during the trans-impact or immediate emergency time period of a disaster setting, those that engage in search and rescue, the providing of emergency medical services, the undertaking of damage assessment, the coordination of emergency operational tasks, and other immediately needed activities.

Several factors dictated our decision to focus only on emergent citizen groups in disaster preparedness and recovery activity. Some attention had already been given to emergent groups involving public officials. Two of the very first DRC field studies dealt with an emergent and informal coordinating group of officials during a flood in Montana (Yutzy, 1964) and after the Indianapolis Coliseum explosion (Drabek, 1968). As noted later, this work served as the springboard for the development by DRC in the middle 1960's

of a fourfold typology of organized behavior in disasters, namely that there are established, expanding, and extending organizations, and emergent groups in such crisis situations. For a decade and a half, this typology had implicitly oriented and guided much DRC work. However, most of the research done had dealt with the first three types of organizations. To the extent emergent groups had at all been looked at by DRC, it had been the new, informal groups made up of representatives of governmental or semi-governmental entities, or bureaucratic organizations. In short, at the time we initiated the research reported in this volume, we had already examined emergent groups peopled mainly by public officials or persons acting in their formal organizational work roles.

To be sure, disaster researchers outside of DRC had sporadically dealt somewhat with the involvement of private citizens in emergent groups. But the little attention here had been given mostly to the emergence of groups during the trans-impact or emergency time period. One of the earliest and best known case studies, attaining almost the status of a classic in the disaster literature, is a descriptive account of how a small social system with a division of labor and normative social roles emerged from an aggregate of originally 800 individual motorists stranded and isolated in a turnpike restaurant as a result of a blizzard (Fritz et al, 1958). In a seldom noted study, DeHoyos (1956) describes an even more elaborate new group structure developing at the height of the Tampico disaster. In his primarily narrative account of Hurricane Carla, Moore (1964) briefly notes a variety of activities of emergent groups, including those involving private citizens. As we were launching our new study, Drabek and his colleagues were concluding a major research project on organized search and rescue activities in disasters. They had examined private citizen groups involvement in the task, although much of their work dealt with the emergence of inter and multi formal organizational networks in the activity (Drabek et al 1981). However, no other current or projected study we were aware of at the time we initiated our work, had emergent groups of citizens as a research focus.

Apart from the relative lack of empirical research attention, there were still other reasons for focusing on emergent citizen groups in disaster preparedness and recovery activities. While emergent groups during impact time deal with very important tasks such as saving lives or coordinating community response, they are inherently short-lived, make little attempt to influence others besides their own members, and are extremely unlikely to become institutionalized as an established organization after the emergency is over. In contrast, the groups we intended to study have the potential for having long lives, most are trying to influence the behavior of other agencies and organizations--some very far removed from them in time and space, and it is always possible they will be institutionalized, that is, be turned from emergent groups into formal associations. As such, it can be argued that they are as important to study, if not more so, than the transimpact time groups which are ephemeral, and who will not contribute significantly to organizational, community or societal change. Neighbors collectively engaged in temporary levee building are not the same phenomena as those neighbors grouped together to prevent the building of a nuclear plant in their earthquake faulted area.

We also had reason to think emergent citizen groups will become even more prominent and important in future disaster preparedness and recovery activities in American society. Their increased visibility and activity is probably reflective of broad trends in the country on the rights of consumers, as emphasis on participatory democracy, and an interest in organized self help, that are some of the legacies of the social turmoil of the late 60's and early 70's (Boyte, 1980). Apart from any changes in popular beliefs and values about the rights and obligations of individual citizens to work together, there has also been an increase in local community and formal advocacy groups interested in activating and mobilizing private citizens. As Gilbert White at the July 1980 Natural Hazards Workshop in Colorado noted, a variety of public interest groups across the nation are consciously renewing their deliberate efforts to educate and train people in disaster preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. All these changes in the society auger that it should be anticipated that not only will emergent groups of citizens continue to surface in disaster situations but that they are very likely to increase in the future.

Not all emergent groups fit into the implicit or explicit classifications of the previous discussion. There are groups that emerge that are neither made up of governmental officials nor private citizens. Thus, after the Wilkes Barre flood, DRC field workers observed that a number of officials from the local banks, saving and loans and commercial corporations got together in an informal group to see if they could induce the Federal Reserve Board, some Congressional committees and other federal agencies to make certain decisions which would be important in the rebuilding of the downtown business district. However, we decided not to study these kinds of groups involving representatives of private business interests, unless there was also a very large involvement of private citizens with private individual interests.

It is sometimes difficult to easily assess when an emergent group has become institutionalized. The Love Canal Homeowners Association in New York was initially almost certainly an emergent citizen group. But with paid personnel, an office, a regular newsletter, even its very title at present, etc. should it and similar groups not be treated as established organizations? In general, although the full process of institutionalization was one of our research interests, we decided to primarily concentrate on the earlier stages of the existence of emergent groups.

Examples of and attention to emergent citizen groups tends to focus on those of a protest or confrontation nature. However, there are other kinds of groups. Even in civil disturbance situations, there can be emergent groups of both a conflict and an accomodation nature (see e.g. Anderson, Dynes & Quarantelli, 1974) which can be treated within a similar analytical framework (Quarantelli, 1970). The same would seem to be true of disaster situations. At least, we assumed we could and should look at both types of emergent groups, tne conflictive and the accomodative kinds.

To summarize our focus was to be on groups, not individuals. Our interest was on collectivities whose members are mostly acting in terms of their private citizen roles. Our concern was with those emergent groups that are non-governmental and whose members are not behaving in terms of some prior formal organization. We would be looking at groups that developed primarily in the preparedness and in the recovery phases of disasters. While studying

the full career cycle of the groups, we would particularly examine the earlier stages of the development. We would include in our study emergent groups that are both of a conflictive and an accomodative nature. The need for this kind of systematic research is indicated in that overall syntheses and inventories of the disaster literature barely mention emergent phenomena (e.g. Barton, 1970) or only deal with emergence at transimpact time (e.g. Mileti, Drabek and Haas, 1975: 71-75), a period excluded from our study.

Review of Previous Studies

Much of the earlier synthesizing work in the disaster area implies that an understanding of individual behavior and of formal organizational behavior could provide a comprehensive picture of the human response to acute community crisis (e.g. see Beach, 1967). Thus, Barton in his important theoretical volume (1970) advances a distinction between the "mass assault"--which consists of the aggregate of individual and small groups actions--and the activities of formal bureaucracies, and proceeds to discuss the relationship between mass and organizational behavior. However, this approach, as Stallings (1978:88) notes is too simple. It has ignored two consistant field observations. There frequently is organized behavior in emergency situations which is not part of the response of any formal organization. A typical example is initial search and rescue activity which is often undertaken by informal teams (Fogleman and Parenton, 1959; Hershiser and Quarantelli, 1976). Also, many formal organizations undergo a metamorphosis at disaster times and reappear in radically new structural and functional forms. The rigid, bureaucratic nature supposedly characteristic of many formal associations is sometimes temporarily replaced by a rather different and more flexible kind of social organization.

These two very general observational impressions, while noted in the pioneer field studies of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago (Marks et al, 1954), and in the work undertaken and supported by the Disaster Research Group of the National Academy of Sciences (e.g. Baker and Chapman, 1962) were not at first systematically followed through. However, in the early days of DRC, an initial attempt was made to conceptually build on the consistent observations that at the emergency time of disasters, emergent groups appear and many existing organizations assume drastically altered configurations. A four fold typology was first advanced by Quarantelli in 1966 (see also Dynes, 1975). It assumed that organized behavior in disasters could use either old or new social structures and could undertake either old or new tasks. Cross classifying these two dimensions produces four distinct types of organized groupings as indicated in the table:

		STRUCTURES: OLD	STRUCTURES: NEW
TASKS: OLD		Established (type I)	Extending (type II)
TASKS: NEW		Expanding (type III)	Emergent (type IV)

For various reasons, the typology itself was never further developed, and only much later was an effort made to deduce a series of interrelated hypotheses or propositions implicit in the formulation (see Stallings, 1978). Nevertheless, as said earlier, much work at DRC was guided by the typology, leading to three somewhat different research thrusts. It was applied to describe and roughly predict the characteristics and problems of different formal organizations in disasters (e.g. Dynes, 1975). Efforts were also made by using the two key dimensions of structure and tasks to order and predict disaster related adjustments within single organizations (e.g., Brouillette, 1970); a fairly recent empirical study elaborated on this considerably (Bardo, 1978). Finally, the existence of the typology led to a few studies and essays attempting to deal with the emergence and crystallization of emergent groups.

This last effort in turn has two additional distinguishing features. Some researchers have attempted to provide an empirical base for Type IV or emergent groups. Yet in an unfortunately premature way, the focus has been more on the later stage conditions associated with crystallization and institutionalization, rather than on the characteristics of emergent groups, and the early stages of emergence. For example, Forrest (1974) briefly describes the features of some emergent groups in post-impact periods, but concentrates more on trying to develop an analytical framework explaining the evolution of their structural differentiation. Similarly, Ross and Smith (1975) likewise focus on the circumstances associated with the crystallization phase of the emergence of an Interfaith Disaster Recovery Group after the Wilkes Barre flood. In further work on emergent ecumenical disaster recovery groups, Ross (1980) primarily examines the post-crystallization conditions associated with the development of their interorganizational relationships. These and similar studies have added to the small empirical base of knowledge about emergent groups, although they generally have provided little understanding of the characteristics of emergent groups and the early stages of their appearance. An exception is a fine non-DRC case study by Zurcher (1968) which deals extensively although only with one small informal debris clearing group that emerged during the recovery period of the Topeka tornado.

Attempts have also been made to tie the concept of emergent group closer to collective behavior notions in sociology. One theoretical article argues that the concept of emergent groups is a major way of linking collective behavior theory and organizational behavior theory in sociology (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1968). Operating at a macro level and using a somewhat secondary data kind of analysis, Parr suggests that certain social structural features which have been loosely proposed as important in general collective behavior emergence, might be related to the appearance of emergent groups in 11 disasters he examined. At a similar macro level, but using more primary data, Verta Taylor (1976) analyzed in collective behavior terms the emergence of a new organized system of delivering mental health services in the wake of the Xenia tornado. In a non-DRC study, Nigg, (1979) also utilizing a collective behavior framework, analyzed seven emergent or grass root citizen groups in earthquake prediction situations in California. But these studies were the exception in the literature at the time we initiated our research, and even these do not exhaust all that is involved in a collective behavior approach to a problem, nor have they provided enough significant data to lead to modifications in the theoretical ideas of the collective behavior area.

As noted, we felt that the corpus of collective behavior literature could be of great use if it were more systematically applied to the problem. This cannot be fully detailed here, but the following may suffice to partly document the point. While there is currently little consensus on most theoretical and conceptual aspects of the field of collective behavior (see e.g. Aguirre and Quarantelli, 1983;Granovetter, 1978; Lofland, 1979; Marx, 1979; Zurcher, 1979) probably all of the invloved specialists would agree that the specialty is concerned with the creation and coming into being of new forms of social arrangements and structures. No other area in the social sciences has such a major concern and this has been true since the field developed (e.g. Park and Burgess, 1924; Blumer, 1939; Turner and Killian, 1972). Furthermore, the field of collective behavior within the last fifteen years has undergone a renaissance with the advancement of many new ideas and approaches (Marx and Woods, 1975).

Following are some examples of relatively recent notions which we thought might be fruitfully brought to bear upon our research focus on emergent citizen groups. The development of new organized social groupings is dependent on their capability to organize resources; this idea is derived from the resource mobilization perspective (Zald and McCarthy, 1979). Related to this is the view that there has occurred a "professionalization" of social movements in America. That is, that established interested parties pre-exist many crises and are ready to move in with specialized knowledge and skilled personnel to exploit and otherwise help develop organized protests activities (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). The view has also been increasingly expressed that the crystallization and legitimation of new social forms is partly dependent on the interaction of the emergent group with relevant social control agencies and factors (e.g. Smelser, 1963; Marx, 1970; Tilly, 1978). As a last example, recent work in the collective behavior area has argued that to understand the growth of new social groupings, it is necessary to turn from explaining recruitment solely on the basis of motivational or social psychological theories, and to turn to concepts of social networks or other structural features of the environment in which the behavior is taking place (e.g. Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980). It is also perhaps not amiss in arguing for the value of a collective behavior approach in looking at emergent groups to note that two texts (Brown and Goldin, 1973; Perry and Pugh, 1978) and a reader (Pugh, 1980) in the field of collective behavior, use research findings in the disaster area very extensively and organize whole chapters of the books around the topic. The potential value of applying the collective behavior perspective, therefore, would appear to be substantial.

However, the potential has nowhere been realized. As already suggested, the specific study of emergent groups has lagged in a variety of ways. Extremely few emergent groups have been systematically studied in the field. In the work of Forrest (1974), Verta Taylor (1976) and Nigg (1979) is laid aside, and the study of the Topeka tornado is not counted (Taylor, Zurcher and Key, 1970), systematic research on the problem up to 1981 can be said to be almost nonexistent. Also, there has been very little concerted attention, theoretical or empirical, to the nature, parameters and initial dynamics of emergent groups with a leaping over to attempts to analyzing the later conditions supposedly leading to crystallization and institutionalization. But it is premature to try to develop explanatory principles or career models when it is not clear what it is that is being explained in the first place, a major criticism made of much of the work in the area of collective behavior (e.g. McPhail, 1978),

but equally applicable in the disaster area (see also, Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Additionally, such explanatory principles, analytical frameworks and theoretical models as had been advanced up to 1981, had not, with exceptions, been initially guided by what already exists in the sociological and other social science literature. Too often, for example, collective behavior notions have been grafted on after an analysis has been instituted, rather than using the collective behavior literature to structure the description and analysis in the first place. Least open to these criticisms is the one empirical report that was most useful to our proposed work, namely the study by Nigg (1979) part of Turner's (1980) research on earthquake prediction consequences in southern California. In about the ony pre-impact study done on the topic, she describes seven emergent groups, advances a five fold typology of such groups, suggests the emergence process can be seen as resulting from a combination of cognitive and social situational factors, and also attempts within a collective behavior framework to account for the non-emergence of collective action.

The collective behavior perspective at the time we initiated our work also seemed to be of more value than that offered by another sociological specialty, the study of formal and voluntary organizations. A major criticism of this field is that it has not examined how new organizations and associations come into being. Although the need to deal with the emergence of new social groups was called for in an important but overlooked book of half a century ago (Coyle, 1930), it is only in the last few years that work on the topic has started to appear. In fact, in a volume just published in 1980 on issues in the creation, transformation, and decline of organizations, it is said in the preface that "until now organizational research and theory has done little to answer such questions because most studies have examined organizations at only one point in time and have assumed that organizational structures are relatively fixed. This new book remedies these difficiences by focussing explicitly on the dynamics of organizational change, success, and survival" and that "one of the shortcomings of current research is that most studies concern established, relatively mature organizations. Yet creation is often the most important period in the life of an organizaiton" (Kimberly et al, 1980). However, this work is a very rare exception. Such writings which touch on the development of new organizations usually deal with only very macro level factors, such as how the national state may affect the process (see Aldrich, 1979). About the only systematic and extended writing in the formal organizational area which looks at the dynamics of organizations in disasters is the text by Haas and Drabek (1973), but it does not really address the emergence of new social forms.

For our research purposes the body of literature on altruistic, helping and other proactive social behavior (e.g. Macaulay and Berkowitz, 1970; Staub, 1978; Smith and Macaulay, 1980) also appeared of limited value. Relatively little such research has been conducted in the disaster area; most has been on participation in existing organizations during normal times (Wolensky, 1980). To the extent that these and related disaster studies such as on volunteerism have been undertaken, they have focused on the psychological states of individual actors rather than addressing the issue of the development of the collectivities which might have been involved (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1980).

Overall, the existing literature up to 1981 provided us with a very weak empirical base, little knowledge, or even conceptual clarity about the generic nature of the phenomena, and failed to clearly approach emergent groups with an explicit theoretical scheme. However, as indicated in the earlier part of this chapter, the persistent sighting during field work by ourself and others, of citizens banding together and creating groups, before, during, and after disasters, suggested an important topic for study. Furthermore, even these vague observations allowed the making of some distinctions and differentiating between the groups, so as to allow a sharper focus when we turned to a systematic study of the phenomena, as we will describe in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH GOAL AND DESIGN

In this chapter we generally set forth our research goal and indicate the research design we used. More specifically, under research goal we discuss our specific research objectives, the research strategy we used, and the research results we anticipated. Our research design is outlined in the last part of the chapter and includes an account of our data gathering and data analysis. In this last section of chapter, we also note some of the changes in design we made in the process of doing our work, and a few of the problems we encountered in data gathering in the field.

Research Goal

Our general research goal was fairly simple and straightforward. We wanted to learn as much as we empirically could about the phenomena of emergent citizen groups. We wanted to integrate and place these findings in a larger context, that is, a theoretical model of some kind, and we also wanted to derive the implications of our model for private citizens and public organizations--what it meant for them if the model correctly integrated the research findings about the emergent groups we studied. In other words, we intended to learn about a particular pheonmena, to interpret what we learned, and to indicate the significance of our interpretation.

The phenomena of course was emergent citizen groups or in the acronymn we will use from this point on, ECGS. As already noted in Chapter I, new groups of private citizens concerned with preparatory and post-recovery aspects of actual and potential disasters, are an increasingly noticeable feature of American communities. These emergent groups or ECGS were our central focus.

It is rather noticeable that certain events with disaster potential generate the formation of citizen groups, especially if there is a supporting social structural setting of some kind. For example, the incident at Three Mile Island led to the emergence of groups around the nuclear plant to protest the decontamination measures; these groups were strongly supported by the already existing and more formal organizations which are parts of the "anti-nuclear" movements in the country. As another instance, by law and policy, citizen participation is mandated in the water resources planning activities, including flood protection and dam building, of the U.S. Corps of Engineers (Brown and Baumann, 1980). This can lead as it has done in Bolivar, Ohio to a number of homeowners living in a floodplain banding together to fight an eviction order sought by the Corps, and attempting to get the U.S. Congress to pass legislation to allow residents who already live near certain dam sites to be exempt from such eviction orders (Columbus Dispatch, April 6, 1980). However, specific events are apparently not always necessary to generate citizen groups. For example, a few years ago in Los Altos, California, neighbors living in geographic areas involving 30 or fewer homes, started to meet in informal groups to evolve a plan to provide survival assistance to one another in the event of a severe earthquake. The groups of

neighbors jointly planned a series of actions from checking on one another's properties and welfare in case of major emergencies, to selecting a nearby park as an evacuation site if the locality was affected by earthquakes (Masedo, 1980).

All of the above examples have one thing in common: the coming together in formal and informal groupings of private citizens concerned with some preparedness and/or recovery aspects of actual or potential disaster from some natural agent or technological accident. However, our overall research goal was to go beyond merely observing as was done in the examples just cited, that some kinds of citizen groups will emerge in some kinds of actual or potential dangerous situations, and they may have some kinds of effects. We wanted to go beyond merely drawing some superficial impressions from a few anecdotal accounts; our goal was to establish in a systematic fashion from solid empirical data what we could ascertain about ECGS. For that, we needed more specific research objectives, and it is these that we will now discuss.

Research Objectives

We initially had three major specific research objectives when we started our study. They were:

(1) to establish the characteristics of ECGS,
(2) to identify the major social conditions associated with the emergence of such groups, and
(3) to ascertain some of the more manifest consequences of those citizen groups which do emerge.

Under characteristics we were interested in ascertaining the nature and kinds of emergent groups including such elements as their structures (e.g. their vertical, horizontal and network dimensions) and their processes (e.g. their intra and inter group activities and interactions) as well as the different organized forms they may assume. Under conditions our concern was with the factors, internal and/or external associated with the appearance (or non-appearance) and continuation of emergent groups including what circumstances are responsible for when, where, and why emergent groups do and do not appear and survive. Under consequences we wanted to selectively look at some of the more manifest external effects of emergent group including how and in what ways they may be influencing public agencies and organizations with which they interact.

Characteristics, conditions and consequences were all to be attended to in our study, but in descending order of research priority. This differential emphasis was suggested by several considerations: without knowing what has to be explained little is served by focusing first on explanatory conditions, the tracing of consequences generally requires more of a longitudinal examination than is required for the ascertaining of conditions, there are some hints in the literature about characteristics but practically nothing about the conditions for and consequences from emergent groups; pragmatically, it is easier to collect data on characteristics of phenomena that about other features.

Furthermore, as we were into the first months of our research we added a fourth research objective. This was to depict the careers of ECGS, that is, we decided to see if there were any typical paths in the initiation, formation, and development of ECGS. While looking at careers had been mentioned in our research proposal, it had not been visualized as a major research objective, and the initial research design slighted obtaining much data relevant to the problem. We added this objective because the initial data we gathered in our field work indicated we were studying ECGS at different times in their life cycles, and that somewhat varying characteristics, conditions, and consequences were associated with different time periods. Therefore, to capture better the dynamics of ECGS we decided to also study their careers. As we shall note later, this not only involved obtaining a historical picture of the development of all the ECGS we studied, but led us eventually to do a limited follow-up restudy of all the ECGS we looked at in the first place.

Given our four research objectives of studying the characteristics, the careers, the conditions, and the consequences of ECGS, what research strategy did we use? We turn not to a very brief discussion of the atypical strategy that we employed.

Research Strategy

Much, although not all of our research design, involved implementing what in current sociological research is known as the grounded theory research approach (as developed over the last 15 years by Glaser and Strauss, 1965, 1967; Glaser, 1978). Given the very poor state of empirical and theoretical knowledge about ECGS, it seemed valid to attempt to organize our research around a grounded theory research approach, albeit a modified one of the kind which has characterized the traditional DRC field research work of the last two decades (Quarantelli, 1981). Thus, we were primarily interested in the generation of theory and hypotheses about ECGS, rather than any verificational or testing effort. Our concern was mostly with developing an empirically grounded substantive theory or model derived from data about a particular pheonmena (in this case ECGS) rather than attempting to deduce a model from a formal theory about abstract categories. Put another way, we saw our strategy as one primarily of using an inductive process aimed at deriving generalizations from the empirical data. Thus ours is a study which developed propositions and model; it is not one which attempted to test hypotheses or a theory.

In doing our work we used sensitizing concepts to gather empirical data obtained through theoretical sampling, the use of a constant comparative methodology and flexible research techniques--four major features of any grounded theory approach. This report is not the place to discuss these four features (also a paper is planned which will specifically address our use of the grounded theory approach in our particular work). However, to give some flavor of the grounded theory approach we used in our work, we provide the following quotations from the literature. In terms of grounded

theory:

> The sociologist trying to discover theory cannot state at the onset of his research how many groups he will sample during the entire study...The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different groups pertinent to a category is the category's theoretical saturation. Saturation means that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated. He goes out of his way to look for groups that stretch diversity of data as far as possible, just to make certain that saturation is based on the widest possible range of data on the category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 61).

Although this is the principle, it is noted that there are qualifications and that the very act of gathering data creates stopping points. In our study of emergent groups, what we initially learned provide focus since:

> Theoretical sampling...does not require the fullest possible coverage of the whole group except at the very beginning of research when main categories are emerging--and these tend to emerge very fast. Theoretical sampling requires only collecting data on categories for the generation of properties and hypotheses..the sociologist should sample a category until confident of its saturation, but there are qualifications. All categories are obviously not equally relevant and so the depth of inquiry into each one should not be the same. Core theoretical categories, those with the most explanatory power, should be saturated as completely as possible. Efforts to saturate less relevant categories should not be made at the cost of resources necessary for saturating the core categories. As his theory develops and becomes integrated, the sociologist learns which categories require the most and least saturation, and which ones can be dropped. Thus, the theory generates its own selectivity for its direction and depth of development. (Glazer and Strauss, 1967: 70).

Our very sampling procedure, that is theoretical rather than statistical randomness, incorporated the constant comparative methodology advocated by the grounded theory research approach. As will be noted shortly, we obtained data on multiple emergent groups in a variety of natural and technological

disaster contexts. The constant comparison of many groups quickly drew our attention to similarities and differences among the ECGS studied, whether our focus was on characteristics, careers, conditions and/or consequences.

> From these similarities and differences [can be] generated the theoretical categories to be used, their full range of types or continuum, their dimensions, the conditions under which they exist more or less, and their major consequences (Glaser and Strauss, 1965:8)

In addition, the differences and similarities among groups was used to generalize relations among the categories which of course became the hypotheses necessary for our substantive model building and theory development.

In concluding we can say that our strategy was to develop a model of the characteristics, careers, conditions and consequences of ECGS which was rooted in empirically grounded data collected by research procedures most appropriate for the phenomena being studied. For reasons already implied, the study of ECGS required an openness in approach, including the need to allow for empirical determination in the field rather than making arbitrary prejudgements in the research design. This openness is possible in a grounded theory approach.

Apart from a research goal and research objectives, we also had visualized what would be our research product. We now turn to a discussion of this matter.

Projected Research Product

Any observer of the disaster scene in American society in the last decade can not but have observed the increasing prominence of pre- and post-impact emergent groups of citizens pursuing a wide variety of goals. In fact, the involvement of organized groups of citizens has also caught the attention of public officials and agencies. Several years ago, the head of FDAA asked the DRC directors for an explanation of the greater militancy exhibited by disaster victims with respect to the aid they received from federal agencies, and why organized protests about the assistance appeared to be on the increase. When FEMA was being established, its officials not only emphasized the importance of voluntary groups in disaster situations, but additionally noted the need to deal with the "consumerism" of relief and recovery services. Even more recently, in July 1980, FEMA established within itself a Division of Intergovernmental Relations and Consumer affairs to insure "consumer participation in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's policy, programmatic and rulemaking functions will occur at all stages in the progess" (Federal Register 45:112, June 9, 1980, p. 38892). This could be interpreted as an explicit recognition that the general effort of groups of consumers to claim their rights in all areas of life, is now manifesting itself also in mass emergencies.

Given the above, when we started our work, we visualized it as useful for more than a research audience. In the broadest sense we saw our study as of potential value and information for:

(1) actual or potential individual disaster victims who are or could be members of emergent citizen groups;
(2) disaster planners, policy makers, decision makers and others in relevant organizations, especially governmental ones, involved in disaster preparedness planning and recovery activities, such as FEMA, USGA, NOAA, NWS, etc. as well as those in the private emergency sector; and
(3) the disaster research community some of whom could be studying questions and problems which might be informed by our study results.

The last audience indicated is probably the most understandable for it is the traditional one for most research, that is, any work done is seen as contributing to the corpus of scientific knowledge and theory and useable by future researchers. We certainly saw our eventual research product in this light, but perhaps it is useful to emphasize that we also thought it could have more direct application. As indicated earlier, in a very basic sense a most fundamental question was to be addressed by our study: what organized role can interested citizens play in disaster policies? As such, our work dealt with an inherently significant public policy issue which however has generally been ignored. To the extent actual and potential individual victims have been studied it is to examine what happens to them rather than to see what they may affect. We instead intended to look at possible proactive behaviors rather than just reactive reactions, and from the perspective of actual or potential sufferers rather than from the viewpoint of helpers only. Our work was going to provide information to citizens on how they may best organize themselves to have effects on disaster preparedness and/or recovery.

On the other side, we also thought governmental and other public and private groups who deal with citizens should, as a result of our study, be better able to understand the situation in which they have to operate. Furthermore, if we take seriously the principle advocated by researchers that plans should be adjusted to people and people should not be forced to adjust to plans, an obvious implication is that there must be knowledge of what concerns potential victims with respect to actual or possible disasters. The proposed study was going to provide some such knowledge. Also, while the study was focused on American society we felt that probably many of the findings might be valid for other urbanized and industrialized societies.

Thus, the model we saw our research as producing was seen as potentially being used to draw three kinds of general implications: applied, research, and theoretical. Our intent from the start of our work was to eventually derive what our model meant in practical and operational terms for private citizens and the public organizations that have to deal with ECGS. What

the model suggested for future disaster research and what it indicated for collective behavior and related theoretical notions in sociology was also to be examined at the conclusion of the research. This last was seen as including the advancement of suggestions on theory testing and verification through a quantitative methodology, and how the substantive model in the future might be used for formulating formal theory.

Clearly implied in all of this is that while we saw ourselves as producing only one research product--the observations and findings from our study--eventually we saw the end result being used in different ways. This summary final report is in one sense, the final product. But in another sense, it is simply the base for the production of a variety of other publications which have been or are in the process of being written to address what we see as the interests and concerns of the different audiences indicated above.

Given our research goal, research objectives, and projected research product, how did we actually gather the data for our study? We turn now to a discussion of our research design.

Research Design

In the original research proposal, we said that after assembling and training a research team, we would proceed to: (1) explicate the conceptual issues; (2) build a guiding framework for the study; (3) select the situations we would study; (4) establish our data gathering techniques; (5) advance some ideas about data processing and analysis; and in the last stages of the work, (6) develop an overall comparative model about emergent group phenomena; and (7) draw the theoretical, research, and applied implications from our observations and findings.

We discuss what we actually did with respect to these matters under the rubrics of: data gathering and data analysis.

Data Gathering

Our research objectives necessitated picking a sample of ECGS, deciding who to contact in the communities being studied, determining the kind of information we required, and designing the field instruments. We now discuss these matters including some of the problems encountered.

Locating ECGS for study was the first field task. A prerequisite to this was an initial definition of what we wanted to consider as being ECGS. In the very early stages of the project, ECGS were conceptualized as consisting of private citizens who were informally or formally organized at the local community level to pursue either general or specific non-emergency kinds of goals with respect to actual or potential disasters.

This indicates that our interest was only in relatively recently formed groups of private citizens, and not those organizations whose members were part of formal associations or not of very well established social movements

ECGS which operate on other than a local basis were excluded; thus, we did not study primarily extra-community oriented groups (be they at a regional, state, or national level). Our focus was on those local groups which appear before or after a disaster, and not on those which emerge during the emergency time period, such as search and rescue teams. Under "disasters" we included all actual and potential incidents as enumerated in the federal disaster law, but we also did include those ECGS who were attempting to get certain presently marginal threats (e.g., toxic wastes,landslides, etc.) defined as within the scope of the law.

In the first few months of the project, an ever increasing list of ECGS which might possibly be studied was assembled from a variety of sources. Some had been identified in earlier DRC work on other research questions. Advisory Board members suggested still other possibilities for study. Most of the major researchers in the United States in the area of collective behavior were surveyed and asked if they were aware of any emergent citizen group relevant to our research; a few were able to provide names. However, the largest number of ECGS for possible study were identified for us by public organizations, those federal, state, and local community agencies whose responsibilities usually involved contact with citizen groups. Some private sector sources (such as public interest groups and national citizen organizations concerned with environmental problems) also provided some names, but, as a whole, the private sector was a surprisingly poor and disappointing source of information about local level emergent citizen groups. We had anticipated the private groups could have identified more ECGS than they proved capable of doing so. Also, as the field work progressed, members of the emergent citizen group (ECG) being studied and local community officials who were contacted were asked about their knowledge of the existence of other groups, which they were sometimes able to provide.

On the basis of the master list assembled, certain ECGS were tentatively selected for field study. Various criteria were considered in the selection process. For one, we decided to choose about 60 percent of our ECGS from those involved with natural disaster agents, and the rest from those with technological or human created agents. An effort to sample also on the basis of pre- and post-impact origins of ECGS, did not prove empirically viable. A wide diversity of possible disaster agents was also sought, along with communities in different sections of the country, and involving the full range of the rural to the urban continuum. Priority was, however, given to selecting for early study, ECGS located in areas known to be particulary vulnerable to disasters. Thus initial studies were conducted in certain localities in California, Texas, and Kentucky. This was done to insure that if such localities were hit by disasters during the course of our study, we would have base line data available on the ECGS in those particular areas. To avoid unique aspects of a particular locality, a decision was made not to include more than seven ECGS in any given state, and no more than two ECGS in any particular given community (defined as a different legal jurisdiction). Similarly, we included no more than eight ECGS oriented to a particular kind of disaster agent. Specially sought out, but with only limited success on our part, were earthquake oriented

ECGS and those primarily peopled by minority group members. A list of the localities studied is provided in the Appendix to this report.

Before actually sending a team into the field, tentatively selected ECGS were checked to see if they were appropriate for the Center's research. Long distance phone calls were made to known group members as well as to other local sources such as mass media personnel, officials in disaster and emergency agencies, and other knowledgeable informants such as county extension agents. In some cases, the inquiries led to our removal of the group from the initially chosen sample. These were cases where the imputed ECG turned out to be otherwise, or in some respect did not meet our earlier established criteria for ECGS.

From the initiation of the study, it was decided that at least four categories of persons would be normally contacted at the local level. These included all the key or core members of the ECG, a selected range of peripheral members, key public and/or private officials who had to deal with the ECG being studied, and relevant mass media personnel in the community. Most such persons were interviewed in depth when a DRC field team went to the specific locality. Usually as a minimum personal contact was made with representatives in each of the four categories noted above. As much documentary data as possible was collected; this ranged from group newsletters and minutes to articles of incorporation and copies of group letters. Mass media accounts of group behavior (some of them going back to group origin) were often available. In a few instances it was possible for DRC field workers to undertake participant observations at group meetings or other activities of ECGS.

Two different interview guides were developed for the open ended and in-depth interviewing undertaken. There was one guide for members of ECGS, and a modified one for other persons in the community (i.e., for community officials, mass media personnel, etc.). The guides themselves taped the basic dimensions of the framework we used, namely, the career, characteristics, consequences, and conditions involved in the ECG under study. Generally, we wanted to know the history of the group from the time of its inception to the present, including any incorporation activity, the structural and functional composition of the group including its major interactions with other groups, what effects (if any) the group had in its community, and how certain conditions such as the availability of resources influenced the group origin, development, and survival. The perspective sought was that of the interviewee, be this a core or a peripheral group member, a community official or someone from one of the mass media. The interview guide was intended to assure adequate topic coverage while at the same time allowing the interviewee to talk spontaneously and in an unstructured fashion.

All persons interviewed were additionally asked to fill out a disaster probability scale for their area, i.e., to make an assessment on a 0 to 5 scale of the probability of their area being hit by one of 21 kinds of possible natural and technological disaster agents. Another scale which was also administered attempted to tap the perceived relative influence

of 29 kinds of community agencies and organizations, including the ECG itself, on the problem focus of the ECG being studied.

The field team also had a documents checklist. This enumerated the kinds of possible documents, usually of a written nature, which should be sought from the ECG being studied, and the mass media, governmental agencies, and private organizations otherwise contacted in the community. The checklist included a range of items from ECGS budgets, to legal briefs, to radio station tapes, to task force reports, to disaster plans. (Samples of copies of field instruments are provided in the Appendix).

Our field operations went well. Almost all ECGS selected cooperated fully. Agreement to allow tape recordings when we attempted to do so was all but universal, except on the part of an occasional member of an anti-nuclear plant ECG (but even they provided interviews). The great majority of non-ECGS officials and individuals contacted were very cooperative in providing information and documentation. For any given ECG, typically about 20 field contacts were made, of which at least a dozen were usually open-ended interviews. In all, about a thousand interviews were conducted.

The material gathered in the field was also systematically processed when it was brought back to DRC. This was to insure that any gap in information was noted so that missing material could immediately be obtained via phone calls or by mail, and also to make certain that data which was to be mailed to DRC was actually received. To protect the security of the data, it was stored in DRC files separate from other Center files.

In the initial phase of the work we increased the number of ECGS we intended to study from about two dozen to 50. After some field work had been undertaken, it became clear that there was considerable diversity in the ECGS we initially encounted, and also that we were studying them, at different time points of their careers. To assure capturing this diversity and range, we early decided to obtain data on at least 50 ECGS. In acutality, we gathered some information on about 54 ECGS but in some cases the data were incomplete because they involved ECGS which were disappearing, or otherwise in the dying phases of their careers.

We eventually also obtained a second set of systematic data from about 50 ECGS. We primarily conducted a follow-up telephone survey of almost all the ECGS originally studied. Our objective was to ascertain what changes, if any had occurred in the groups since we initially studied them in the field (at least one year but usually a little more time passed between our two contacts with ECGS),

A short interview guide derived from a preliminary analysis of our first wave data was used. At least three but usually four persons originally interviewed in the field were recontacted in the phone survey, with at least one of those being a core group member and another one being an outsider to the group. Cooperation was usually very good, although in a few cases, especially of dying ECGS, we had considerable difficulty in tracking down specific informants or respondents we wanted.

Finally, apart from the telephone follow-up, there were about ten instances in which we did further field work on specific ECGS. These were mostly instances of ECGS located in areas that had been impacted by a disaster since our field work in the community. No field guide was used in this part of the fieldwork but our general intent was to obtain additional data on the careers of the groups, and to see if the disaster in any way had influenced the careers of the ECGS involved.

Data Analysis

The data analysis undertaken actually involved a different series of analytical efforts. The more general of these are summarized in the chart.

	1 Field Impressions	2 Systematic Analyses	3 Comparative Analyses
Careers			
Characteristics			
Consequences			
Procedures	Observations and team consensus	Detailed data reading and differentiated synthesis	Holistic/macro views and typologies
Objectives	FIELD REPORT	CASE STUDY	MODEL

Thus, for each ECG studied, a quick and brief field team report was prepared. This is an internal DRC document not available to anyone other than DRC personnel. The field trip report describes the nature of the community studied, and past disaster threats and/or experiences of the locality, but it primarily concentrates on the career or history of the ECG studied, as well as its characteristics, conditions, and consequences. The field report also contains a general evaluation of the data the field team had obtained as well as any other relevant observations. The field reports were all based on field impressions and observations and were intended primarily to provide an initial start towards the analyses undertaken as part of systematic case study writing. Field reports were normally prepared within a week after the DRC team returned from the field.

As projected, we developed a format and started to write systematic case studies. The initial field report on each ECG was used as a starting point for additional analytical work which was expanded into a systematic case study. The analysis consisted of listening to all the interview tapes obtained, reading all the documents collected, looking at the quantitative scale results, and otherwise examining any and all data we had on a particular ECG. To insure uniformity of coverage, an outline was prepared for use by those doing the analysis and writing.

Case studies were approximately 25-30 pages long. The initial part of the case study provides general community background information (e.g., the socio-economic, the socio-political, and the socio-geographic features of the community in which the ECG is located, as well as the disaster history of that community). The bulk of each case study, however, is organized around a descriptive account of the career of the ECG, its characteristics, the consequences of group activities, and the conditions which seem responsible for the emergence, growth, and survival of the group. A synthesis, in other words, was made of the differential data on these matters, although for time reasons it proved impossible to completely finish before the end of the research project, all 50 projected case studies.

The field reports, case studies, and all the other data obtained were qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed in a variety of ways. Some of the analyses were specific and have been or will be reported in more specific papers than in this general report. (See the listing of already published or planned publications in the Appendix). Among specific topics examined were the following: differences between rural and urban based ECGS, the special features of earthquake oriented ECGS, similarities and differences between the ECGS we studied and other disaster oriented emergent groups, types of umbrella organizations of which ECGS are sometime a part, blame assignment by ECGS, "vested interests" and ECGS, non-emergence of ECGS, resource mobilization activities of ECGS, ECGS and their vertical and horizontal social ties, local newspapers and the emergence of ECGS, the political activities of ECGS, the relationship of ECGS to other organizations, the gender composition of ECGS, ECGS and collective behavior theories, a typology of ECGS, public official views of ECGS, etc, as well as several aspects about the methodological procedures and problems in studying ECGS.

In addition, and the core of this final report, there were more general analyses. We moved toward our theoretical model by doing three substantive comparative analyses. Along one line, by using all the field reports and the completed case studies, we were able to identify the more important substantive themes, findings or observations from our data. We were also able to put together empirically derived sets of propositions organized under our four Cs--that is, the characteristics, careers, consequences and conditions of the ECGS we studied. We were also able to derive the major elements which might be involved in an explanatory model of the emergence of ECGS. The end result of these three analytical activities primarily resulted in the general findings and observations to which we now turn in the next three chapters (although as in the case of the more specific analyses, there are or will be other publications from the general analyses; see the listing in the Appendix).

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS OF EMERGENT CITIZEN GROUPS

In this chapter we primarily highlight the more important characteristics of ECGS. We report on three major topics: the social compositions of ECGS, their structures, and their initial activities. In the last two cases, the summary of our empirical findings presented in propositional form, are subcategorized into more specific features. Under structure we indicate what we generally learned about different types of ECGS, and certain aspects of their division of labor, hierarchy, and formalization. Under activities we note our general observations about the attempts to organize ECGS, their resource mobilization efforts, and how ECGS try to affect decisions and policies.

To avoid endless qualifications, propositional statements are presented in an "ideal type" format in the Max Weber sense, meaning that generalizations are advanced about the different phenomena as though the phenomena existed in pure form. Thus, while it is improbable that all of our observations would be found in everyone of the empirical cases we actually studied, or in all ECGS, the depiction is as valid as we can make about an ideal type ECG, or ECGS in general. Similarly, we examined ECGS at different time periods of their development. Not all findings are equally applicable for all time periods; generally, we usually portray (unless otherwise specified) an ECG which has formed and has reached a point of formalization in structure, but which has not yet institutionalized; that is, which has not developed routine and established behavior. Our focus is on the emergent phase or stage of ECGS. Finally, almost all propositions are advanced independently of most others. In reality of course there are often interactional and synergistic effects among and between the behavioral aspects alluded to in each proposition, but for exposition purposes, these are usually ignored in this chapter. The model presented later in Chapter V attempts to relate and integrate a number of the more important factors, which are individually set forth in this and the following chapter.

Composition

1. The typical ECG has less than a hundred members, but the range is from a dozen to several thousand people.

2. Since membership rosters are rarely kept, the number of members is almost always an estimate and probably on the high side in terms of persons who consider themselves members.

3. Participation in ECG activities does not correspond to what might be indicated by formal (e.g., dues paying) or psychological (i.e., identification with group) membership. In general, there are more participants (over time) than members.

4. There are usually three general kinds of participants in ECGS:

- a small very active core;
- a somewhat larger supporting circle who can be mobilized for specific tasks; and
- a great number of primarily nominal supporters (who may pay dues, receive newsletters, attend an occasional meeting, etc).

In some cases, nominal supporters do not even consider themselves group members (but may nonetheless participate, e.g., by signing a petition).

5. Many ECGS have non-member participants such as public officials, technical professionals, or mass media reporters who provide information, knowledge, advice, or other resources to the group because of their sympathy with the group.

6. In all ECGS there is a very active core of members--seldom more than a half dozen in number. In some cases, the core is all there is as far as active membership is concerned. Outside of the core participation in group activities tends to be episodic and sporadic in most groups.

7. Participation in ECGS is almost always a very part time activity, but core members often devote large blocks of time to the group, and the work may be more than full time for an occasional core member or two.

8. Core members are usually early joiners of ECGS, and tend to remain in the group for very long periods of time. There is little turnover of core members except for some occasional "burn out" cases, or as a result of moving out of the area (for reasons independent of the problem focus of the ECG).

9. Core members have only very general perceptions of most other members; whereas, core members are very salient to other members who often have only general impressions of others in the group.

10. Outsiders who deal directly with ECGS, such as community officials or mass medial personnel, seldom distinguish between perceived membership and participation, or recognized different kinds of participants in the ECG.

11. In most cases ECGS have a disproportionate number of women members. The core and its leadership is also disproportionately female.

12. While married couples--both partners--are oftem members of ECGS, one partner is usually less active (frequently the male).

13. While all adult age ranges are represented in ECGS, the typical member is in the 30-40 age range.

14. While retirees are not prominent as whole in ECGS, an occasional retiree may have a key role in an ECG, usually because of specialized knowledge.

15. ECGS are drawn primarily from the middle class (white collar or sometimes from mobile members of the working class (blue collar). The lowest socioeconomic levels are seldom involved in emergent groups and never comprise the core or noticeable membership.

16. There are occasional ECGS made up of upper middle and lower upper class background. These tend to be more structurally complex than groups with other social class composition.

17. Members of ECGS tend to be property owners.

18. Minorities in American society are very poorly represented in ECGS.

19. Many although not all ECGS are neighborhood based, i.e., draw their members from a particular neighborhood. This usually occurs where the issue or problem around which the ECG is focused is neighborhood-specific. ECGS involved in more community wide issues draw from a wider geographic base, but there is still a tendency for membership to be drawn from clusters of specific neighborhoods.

20. Membership in ECGS tend to reflect lifestyle (i.e., social class position, social linkages, social experiences, etc.) more than it does personality or demographic characteristics.

Structure

Types

1. There are at least two major types of ECGS:

   - specific tasks oriented groups which are likely to be but not exclusively, post-disaster groups, and are focused primarily on personal and self interests of their members;
   - broader community oriented groups which are more likely to be pre-disaster groups, and are concerned mostly with raising community awareness of a possible threat or disaster.

   The first type also tends to have limited goals, and is inclined to have exclusive membership. The second type is more likely to have open ended goals, and will tend to have inclusive membership.

2. The specific task oriented ECGS tend to be centralized in a neighborhood or area; the more community-oriented groups tend to draw their members from the community generally although not from all areas of a community (because of the social class composition of most ECGS).

3. Task-oriented groups, on the average, are smaller than community-oriented groups.

4. Another major distinction between ECGS is between those engaged in conflict with other groups, and those in non-conflict situations.

5. The majority of ECGS are in conflict situations.

6. A cross-classification of the conflict/non-conflict dimension and the orientation dimension results in a fourfold typology of ECGS:

    (1) non-conflict task-oriented ECGS,
    (2) conflict task-oriented ECGS,
    (3) non-conflict community-oriented ECGS, and
    (4) conflict community-oriented ECGS.

Division of Labor

1. The core of emergent groups almost always involves a division of labor, often in terms of the particular personal skills core members have. The division of labor is therefore often sharp because roles are not easily interchangeable.

2. The division of labor tends to be more elaborate in community oriented ECGS.

3. The division of labor in ECGS has more to do with externally oriented behavior than with internally oriented behavior; this reflects the strong instrumental activities of ECGS and their weak maintenance activities.

4. There is seldom any division of labor beyond the active core and its supporting circle in the largest of ECGS.

5. The division of labor elaborates only up to a certain point in most ECGS; in some cases, a more complex division of labor may be replaced by a simpler one.

Hierarchy

1. There seldom is any actual hierarchy in the core even though there may be a formal hierarchial order as a result of having formal officers or positions. The exception to this is when there is a charismatic leader who often is the original founder of the group; in that case such leaders have more influence than others in the core. Degree of influence also appears to be related to the ability of core members to mobilize resources.

2. The formal or official hierarchy of ECGS does not necessarily reflect core membership or different degrees of influence in the core. The formal officers are often not the informal leaders and frequently have no public visibility.

3. Leadership often falls upon rather than is taken over by initial core participants, that is, it evolves slowly and informally.

4. Leadership is fairly stable in most ECGS especially among those who are informal leaders or members of the core.

5. There is both internal group pressure and self imposed pressure to "downplay" leadership. The word "leader" is often avoided and emphasis is placed on the democratic nature of the ECG.

6. Conflict groups tend to be less democratic in procedures and are more hierarchial in structure than non-conflict groups.

7. Conflict groups are more vertically and horizontally structured than non-conflict ECGS.

8. For lower level participants, who are under practically no group or organizational surveillance, there are only very diffuse role expectations.

Formalization

1. ECGS with higher level socioeconomic members start out more organized and formalized than groups with lower level socioeconomic members.

2. There are varying degrees of formalization. Some ECGS only develop an informal structure; a greater proportion sets up a formal organization, and most formally incorporate.

3. Formal incorportain means that the ECGS have a chapter, formal group position, and nominally at least, an initial membership roster. Incorporation also generates a certain amount of bookkeeping, leads to the opening of a bank account and the use of letterhead paper.

4. Formalization does not seem to be related to task or community orientation, but conflict groups tend to be more formalized.

5. Outsiders tend to take seeming symbols of formalization--such as a group name or a title used by a member (e.g. Chair of a committee)--as an indication of ECG formalization, whether this is the case or not.

Activities

1. Among the major activities of ECGS are attempts to organize the group, to mobilize resources, and to bring about decisions and policies favorable to the group.

2. ECGS seem to seldom engage in primarily symbolic or expressive actions; they are heavily instrumentally oriented (with the possible exception of anti-nuclear plant groups which are atypical ECGS in that they have a strong ideological base).

3. The major activities of ECGS are carried out by the active core, but in the majority of ECGS the core can regularly mobilize a significant proportion of the non-active members for public show of numbers (e.g., showing up at a special meeting, participating in some public activity of the group, writing letters, etc.).

4. ECGS have far more internal disagreements and conflicts about what courses of action to follow, than are usually publicly visible. Internal differences are played down. Dissenters tend to leave the ECG rather than to create a schism and a new group.

5. Some ECGS are peopled by newer residents in an area. This sometimes leads to a clash or confrontation with longer time residents seen as controlling and/or not effectively using the local governmental structure to solve the perceived problem. Especially in smaller communities this may lead to a wider community conflict between the newcomers organized in an ECG, and longer established residents. In such cases, activities broaden out to those relevant to community cleavages, and go beyond those involved in a dispute over a controversial problem.

Organizing the Group

1. Organizing ECGS involves an early clarification of goals and objectives, and the development of initial strategies and tactics.

2. Although such organization is a never ending activity, it is not visualized by the first core members, and it takes a long time before there is a recognition that goals and objectives, and strategies and tactics, may have to be modified or changed often during the career of the ECG.

a. Goals

1. Most ECGS initially have only very broad and vague goals (e.g., "being able to live in a safe place").

2. Such goals since they involve matters of security and health (which usually directly affect the family home and life of ECG members) are implicitly deemed unassailable or unchallengeable by anyone, and certainly not by public officials or agencies with responsibility for the safety of citizens. Thus, ECGS view a typical initial goal as locating the responsible authorities who can take the action necessary to solve the problem.

3. Almost all issues raised by ECGS in initial approaches to outsiders are perceived as being ignored or rebuffed, or as resulting in reactions not addressing their issues. This is often a correct perception.

4. In conflict situations ECGS are initially frequently seen by those private or public sector officials approached, as being uninformed or narrowly biased about the issues, and unrealistic or simplistic in solutions proposed or goals sought. This too is often a correct perception.

5. Redefinition of goals frequently occur after early group emergence.

6. Goals of ECGS are far more likely to expand or change than to contract or remain static.

7. A major manifest activity of almost all ECGS (once formed) is awareness creation. Although perhaps not originally, the awareness creating function comes to be perceived as very important, and will be maintained even if other goals are changed. Core members come to believe strongly that creating or maintaining awareness of the threat or danger they perceive in the situation is crucial to holding the interest of those already members of the ECG, to obtaining more recruits for the ECG, and to convincing those officials who need to be informed and impressed about the problem around which the ECG is focused.

8. The higher the socioeconomic level of core members, the more focused are the goals from the start.

9. Redefinition of the goals of ECGS, also often involve a reconsideration of the means the ECG should use. In some cases, the focus on means may overshadow the old or new goals, as matters of strategies and tactics come to the fore.

b. Initial strategies and tactics

1. Questions rather than demands constitute the bulk of the initial communications from ECGS to governmental agencies; demands appear later.

2. ECGS often have little idea where decisions relevant to their problems are made, and thus many early actions are often misdirected. In time, some core members usually get fairly knowledgeable about the organizational decision-making process in their communities, but correct identification of sources of power does not necessarily translate into the evoking of desired decisions or policies.

3. While intended results do not always follow, many ECGS appear to believe that being a "squeaky wheel" is an appropriate strategy, as long as the actions undertaken will not be interpreted as radical by the large community. While usually avoiding confrontation, most ECGS appear to prefer operating in public rather than working behind the scenes.

4. Many ECGS undertake a great deal of correspondence, especially initially; phone calls and personal visits to officials tend to occur later.

5. Conflict ECGS (especially core members sometime learn to use mass media reports as pressure on officials; in some cases such news stories have been provided by mass media personnel who are covert supporters of the goals of the ECGS involved.

6. Even sympathetic governmental officials see as unproductive ECGS tactics which may force key officials to be put on the defensive.

7. Common sense attitudes and beliefs about the value and helpfulness of different strategies and tactics seem to dictate what will be used, far more than productivity of earlier usages or availability of resources.

Mobilizing Resources

1. Resource mobilization includes recruiting new members, holding meetings, distributing newsletters, and obtaining resources.

a. Recruitment

1. Recruitment of new members is seldom given a high priority in the great majority of ECGS.

2. Such recruitment as is undertaken tends to be sporadic, haphazardous, and unorganized.

3. Recruitment into some ECGS is handicapped because some potential members see public emphasis on the group problem as possibly generating more personal problems, such as reducing real estate values, which might make it more difficult for them to relocate later if the collective problem is not solved.

4. There is a tendency for early ECG recruitment to be for more members, and for later ECG recruitment to be for specific expertise.

5. The recruitment potential differs in the two types of ECGS. Task-oriented groups usually have a delimited number of people they could recruit, but in most cases they do not have to convince people there is a problem. Community-oriented groups typically have a much wider base of people they could potentially recruite; however, they frequently have to convince potential recruits there is a problem.

b. Meetings

1. In most ECGS, meetings are regularly held at least by the core; larger membership meetings are held far less often.

2. There are far more informal than formal meetings, and it is at the informal meetings that decisions are usually made and policies are typically set.

3. Core group decision-making is almost always informal and highly democratic, except in some instances where there is a charismatic leader. In some cases agendas are usually pre-set by the core although nominal democratic procedures extend to all group activities; more often the core uses the larger ECG meetings primarily to ratify core decisions.

4. Formal ECG meetings are usually informally run with little attention to parlimentary procedures. Voting by balloting is rare, and secret voting almost non-existent. Decisions by seeming consensus is the norm.

5. Formal meetings tend to be held more often during the early stages of group development.

6. Turnout for meetings drops off substantially after a while, but some particularly relevant happening may generate a high turnout for the next meeting.

7. Concern over obtaining larger group approval is genuine among most cores, although lack of overt objections at meetings is often taken as a sign of approval.

c. Newsletters

1. Most ECGS attempt to provide a newsletter or some publication for their membership. The production of such material is usually the creation of one or two persons.

2. The longer an ECG exists, and the higher the socioeconomic backgrounds of members, the more likely a newsletter is published.

3. Newsletters are used as a device for the dissemination of information desired by key core members.

d. Resources

1. The great majority of ECGS have very little money, but they also need very little to operate. Funding is not a major problem for the typical ECG because even though money could be used, it is normally not crucial.

2. Most ECGS generate funds primarily from dues and voluntary contributions of members; this is sometimes supplemented by money obtained from informal activities such as bake or garage sales or car washes.

3. Meeting space for most groups is sometimes provided by established religious groups who otherwise are seldom important in the development of ECGS.

4. Money is far less important as a group resource than are nonmaterial factors such as information, specialized knowledge, access to key persons, etc.

5. Non-monetary material resources such as space for meetings, paper for newsletters, typing assistance, etc. are primarily obtained through the voluntary donations or offers from or through members of the ECGS.

6. Sympathetic local college or university faculty members sometimes are sources of specialized knowledge, especially about the nature of the threat with which the ECGS are concerned.

7. One or two core members will often, as a result of individual reading, library or newspaper research, and/or finding of knowledgeable individuals, become a considerable repository of relevant information for the ECGS.

8. Extremely few ECGS are able to obtain grants from either public or private sources. Occasionally they directly or indirectly get access to community development funds, but almost always their operations are outside of the criteria necessary for grants.

Affecting Decisions and Policies

1. Affecting decisions and policies includes identifying the officials and organizations who might be able to do something about the perceived problem, actually contacting the relevant parties, and joining in like or common efforts with other groups.

A. Identifying relevant parties

1. The initial general approach of ECGS to other groups seems to rest on the assumption that some definite group or official "out there" ought to be able to "help" the group.

2. Almost without exception, ECGS initially have little knowledge about whom they should approach with their problems.

3. The "help" sought in the initial "shotgun approach" is often undefined and unclear to the ECGS themselves.

4. Initially ECGS use a "shotgun approach" in approaching groups, organizations, and agencies which they think might be able to "help" them in some way. The consequence is that a variety of public and private groups are approached, as well as officials at different levels (usually those more visible).

5. An occasional knowledgeable core member can short-circuit the "shotgun approach," but even sophisticated individuals often find it difficult to identify who should be approached first.

b. Contacting others

1. Initiative in making contacts with other groups and organizations is usually taken by the ECG. At times, after the group is informed, it may be contacted by some relevant national level organization or

public interest group. Government agencies and officials almost always wait to be contacted by ECGS.

2. There are major quantitative and qualitative differences in ECGS in conflict situations as compared with non-conflict situations. The former tend to attempt a greater number of, and usually more powerful, organizational contacts than the latter.

3. Most ECGS (especially those in a conflict situation) make repeated contacts with organizations; initial lack of response or an inadequate response does not serve as much of a deterrent. There is a strong tendency for many ECGS to keep previously approached groups and individuals on a mailing list (and approach them in a later letter-writing campaign or petition submission) even when earlier approaches have not been fruitful.

4. Elected more than appointed officials are more likely to go through the motions of listening to questions and complaints from ECGS; at least, they are more likely to provide some kind of feedback, such as an acknowledging letter.

5. Where women are the core leaders, there often is an internal core perception that the ECG is at a disadvantage in dealing with bureaucracies and governmental units. In some cases, this is a correct perception because some officials do tend to discount women leaders.

6. Private organizations which become the object of attention of ECGS do not appear to differ substantively in their reactions from public or governmental organizations, but they sometimes mount a seemingly more systematic public relations campaign in response.

7. In some localities and in certain sections of the country, the private organizations involved in conflicts with ECGS, often have the little disguised support of some governmental entities at the local and/or state levels.

c. Joining with other groups

1. Local ECGS almost always avoid identification with the traditional established political parties in the community; this partly reflects the differing political affiliations or leanings of the membership of typical ECGS. One consequence is the avoidance of crosspressure on many ECGS members.

2. ECGS generally maintain a single-issue posture, leading to their reluctance to align with other local and extra-local groups with different goals, since that might lead to diffusion of group attention or surfacing of differences of opinion on other controversial issues.

3. While a single-issue ECG reflects the typical situation, there are instances of multiple ECGS oriented toward similar problems within a given community.

4. In multiple ECGS situations, coalitions may be formed among the ECGS involved. However, ECGS in the same locality are more likely to cooperate than to develop coalitions, even if involved with the same problem. ECGS usually demonstrate strong internal concern over losing their autonomy of action.

5. Sometimes, in a multiple ECGS situation, core members of the different ECGS will join together in an umbrella type community wide organization. This frequently results in loss of public visibility of the local or neighborhood ECGS, as outsiders tend to respond to the larger umbrella organization.

6. While some umbrella organizations form for the purpose of disseminating information, others attempt to bring about common, often explicit political action. In the latter case, the umbrella organization may become part of or be associated with established community action groups. This is not always functional for the ECGS involved as their particular concerns become subordinated to larger but often distant issues.

7. More typical is for local ECGS to develop extensive horizontal networking through contacts with and at times establishment of coalitions <u>across</u> rather within communities.

8. Horizontal networking with other local emergent groups is important. Ideas of how to proceed and who to contact are often derived from such networking.

9. In coalition or cooperative situations, credit is sometimes claimed by an individual ECG for what has been done collectively.

10. Whether in a coalition or cooperative effort, the contact between the organization is usually undertaken by a few core members of the participating ECGS. Mergers of ECGS is almost unknown. Even at public hearings, where many groups are represented , members of different ECGS sit apart with members of their own group.

11. Specific core members are often appointed/designated as boundary personnel with other organizations.

12. Non-core members in ECGS appear to have little understanding about the complex nature of the relationships between their groups and others.

CHAPTER IV

CAREERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EMERGENT CITIZEN GROUPS

In this chapter we first set forth most of our summary findings about the dynamics or longitudinal aspects of ECGS, that is, their careers, and conclude with a depiction of the consequences of such groups. We initially summarize what we learned from our research about the origins of ECGS. This is followed by a set of propositions about the stabilities and the changes which we noted in the careers of these groups. Separate attention is then given to summarizing our findings about the formalization process of ECGS. Next, one very noticeable feature about the careers of ECGS is explicitly selected out for attention; this is the very strong tendency of ECGS in their lifetimes to become conflict groups. Finally, in the last part of this chapter we summarize our selective findings on the consequences of ECGS. We discuss both external and other consequences, although only certain aspects of the former were part of our explicit research objectives.

Some of the propositions advanced in the earlier part of this chapter on careers are similar to a few of those stated in the previous chapter. This should hardly be surprising for the characteristics of any phenomena are partly the dynamics of that phenomena caught cross-sectionally or at a fixed point in time. However, there is a stronger link between the statements in this chapter which are variants of those stated in the last chapter, and the number of new propositions that are advanced. The common element between both sets of observations is that ECGS need to be seen as social entities which emerge, develop, and crystallize, or in more general terms, that they evolve in predicable ways.

Careers

In this section of the chapter we present our summary findings about the origins, changes and stabilities, and the formalization of ECGS, as well as the tendency towards becoming conflict groups.

Origins

1. In the great majority of cases, ECGS do not have an identifiable date of origin; most groups develop out of informal conversations over extended periods of time.

2. Those most heavily involved in earlier conversations are very likely to become the core of the group when it emerges.

3. Initial conversations usually occur in the immediate neighborhood or locality of the perceived problem.

4. Mass media stories often provide the initial impetus for early conversations about a problem.

5. Initial participants usually do not see themselves as leaders in the activity. However, initiatives on their part influence others to expect them to continue to take the lead.

6. The development of a collective consciousness (almost what will be the core members) that there is an unrecognized problem by others, is a crucial step in the emergence of ECGS.

7. The first time media personnel pay attention to the activities of the emerging group is also very important. It tends to confirm among the participants that what they are discussing is significant.

8. Some early participants in the first stages of development of ECGS often have some minor prior organizing experience; such persons, however, are not necessarily among the core members, nor are they present in all cases.

9. Prior social networks are crucial in the early stages of the development of ECGS since most interaction is with known others, often along primary group lines.

10. The rare largely male peopled and led ECG seems to occur in situations where very specific occupational skills or experiences are perceived as crucial to early group development.

11. In the first stages of ECGS, there is much groping for structure and goals. There is often confusion over means to use as well as ends.

12. Many emergent groups work with the initial belief that if they indicate there is a problem, government officials will provide solutions. At first, groups do not look for acknowledgment of the problem; that is taken for granted, but one consequence is that in the long run, public acknowledgement of the existence of a problem is eventually and frequently taken as a group victory.

13. ECGS often have substantial difficulty in initially establishing who has jurisdiction for their perceived problem or issue.

14. Little disagreement is evident in the preliminary stages of ECG formation, because there is an absence of clarity of goals and means. Uncertainty of goals and means rather than disagreements or conflicts characterizes the early stages of internal group interaction.

15. There is a significant amount of goal redefinition in the early stages of ECGS; in fact, in many cases it might be more accurate to say that the first phases of many ECGS involves attempts to make their goals explicit.

16. In the early stages, even sophisticated and knowledgeable members of ECGS often do not know what organizations to contact and which individuals or officials to approach.

17. There is often a random or shotgun approach to seeking help by mail correspondence from local, state, and federal sources. Officials ranging from township level officials to the President of the United States are approached, usually with negligible response.

18. ECGS as they first develop initially tend to consider who the group should approach and only then develop group goals.

19. Mass media attention of any kind is important in reinforcing the early developmental stages of emerging groups.

20. There is a tendency for one core member eventually to keep and/or collect information about the origin of their ECG, but by that time almost early written documents of any kind of a historical nature have been lost.

Changes in Stabilities

1. ECGS tend to grow to a certain size, subsequently leveling off at an early stage. The major growth occurs relatively soon after their initial formation.

2. Growth in size usually means later recruits are less committed to group activities. The early joiners are more committed.

3. Growth in size reinforces the perceptions of ECG leaders that they are involved in a viable effort.

4. Organizational problems generated by membership growth are seldom considered in the early stages of group emergence.

5. In almost all cases, recruitment of new ECG members is handled in an informal manner, is sporadic in appearance, and does not become more systematic over time.

6. Leadership is fairly stable in most ECGS, especially among informal leaders or members of the core.

7. Informal leaders almost always precede the emergence of formal leaders.

8. The relative composition of members of ECGS is fairly stable through the history of the group, but group stability seems independent of that composition.

9. Stability of leadership in most ECGS allows a cumulation of experiences that tends to make the group more sophisticated in its operation. However, this knowledge is of an oral kind, for relatively little is ever recorded or written down especially in the early careers of ECGS.

10. ECG stability is derived more from structure than from function.

11. Core members are far more aware of group changes than other members who tend to see greater ECG stability.

12. Outsiders have little awareness of changes in ECGS and tend to continue to react in terms of first impressions.

13. The more active the ECG, the more likely it is perceived as radical, but most ECGS make conscious efforts to avoid being labeled as radical.

14. Adoption of a name is an early group action which seems related to a perceived need for the outside world to have something upon which to focus.

15. Acronyms are consciously sought in most groups; outsiders often do not know the full name of the ECG.

16. The division of labor developed by ECGS usually results from early informal discussions among core members. The basic division of labor initially created remains the basis for later elaborations or modifications.

17. In the early stages of ECGS there is a closer relationship between the informal and formal structure than there is later. Because of "burnout," democratic procedures, and other internal factors, the group members occupying formal positions tend to change, leading to a greater discrepancy between the informal and the formal ECG structure.

18. ECGS that start out or quickly become conflict groups almost always maintain this posture.

19. Few ECGS develop in a linear fashion, either in terms of a greater division of labor or more formalization.

20. ECGS with single and fixed goals tend to have simple structures; those with multiple and changing goals tend to have more complex structures.

21. ECGS are not subject to being taken over by other groups so there are no problems of maintaining autonomy. In fact, intergroup interaction, because it involves time and effort, tends to result in less interaction over time.

22. If specific goal achievement is blocked, most ECGS will develop new goals. Thus, if a plant cannot be stopped from being built, the next goal might be participation in the safety monitoring process.

23. Group activities increase and decrease in seasonal cycles, with summer being a low point of activities. Spring is the most active, followed by Fall. Winter does have some activity, but the Holiday season breaks up the flow of activity.

The Formalization Process

1. Formalization of an ECG is seldom a thought-out-process. The implications of such a development are rarely considered.

2. Formalization often apparently reflects outside influences rather than internal group dynamics.

3. ECG formalization tends to occur relatively early in the group history, often soon after or concurrent with the adoption of a group name.

4. Formalization and incorporation seem to be encouraged by the involvement of ECGS in coalitions, or of core members in umbrella groups.

5. Formal incorporation is not always explicitly assessed. However, there are times when ECGS are incorporated because of perceived legal benefits (e.g., collection of money by a non-profit organization, less probability of personal libel suits, etc.).

6. Core members almost exclusively are involved in the decision to incorporate; other ECG members are seldom consulted except in a nominal sense.

7. Lawyers are almost always brought into ECGS incorporation activities, but lawyers as lawyers are not generally salient or otherwise important in most group activities.

8. What incorporation involves is little understood outside of the core; in fact, non-core members usually do not know any details about the incorporation, and not infrequently are unaware that the group has incorporated.

9. The charters of most ECGS are relatively simple.

10. Extremely few ECG members know what the group charter actually states; many do not know one exists.

11. A major advantage of incorporation is the subsequent greater public visibility to the ECG although that is seldom an intended objective.

12. Incorporation tends to create a greater formal division of labor in ECGS.

13. No disadvantages are perceived, either prospectively or retrospectively, from the incorporation of ECGS.

14. The incorporation process does appear to help an ECG crystallize in the sense of helping to create "we feelings", a group boundary, and an entity to which outsiders react to as a collectivity.

15. An often unintended consequence of incorporation is the generation of a hierarchy of formal officers.

16. A major advantage of formalization is that by giving corporate entity to an ECG, it gives more public visibility to the ECG which sometimes leads to an overestimation of size and activity.

17. Failure to incorporate appears related to factors such as small group size, lack of clarity of group goals, and uncertainty about group methods.

18. ECGS involved in non-controversial goals are unlikely to incorporate.

19. ECGS which cease to function do not formally dissolve the corporation.

Conflict Aspects

1. There are major differences between ECGS in conflict situations compared with ECGS in non-conflict situations.

2. While it is the rare ECG which starts out with a hostile relationship to others, there is a strong tendency for both task and community oriented ECGS to develop into conflict groups. Although not all ECGS become conflict groups, a majority do.

3. Being ignored or rebuffed is a very important factor in ECGS becoming conflict groups.

4. ECGS involved in conflict situations are subject to heavy criticism; response to this sometimes absorbs most of the group's time and effort: on occasion this also deflect the ECG from its external goals.

5. Especially in conflict oriented ECGS, outsiders tend to equate one core member with the group, and assume that person is fully representative of the ECG.

6. Except in conflict situations, ECGS seldom receive direct external criticisms.

7. Once publically visible, ECGS are often approached by outside interest groups or issue institutions. This tends to reinforce a conflict orientation.

8. In conflict situations, initial clashes tend to be with appointed officials, and only later with elected officials.

9. Elected officials do not ignore ECGS, even in conflict situations where the government officials disagree with the group. But this is not the perception of core members of ECGS.

10. The relationship between ECGS and community officials may develop into a "we-they" relationship, but some personal sympathy and support for groups problems and goals frequently is present although often unrecognized by the ECGS involved, in all sectors and all levels of the governmental structure.

11. The mass media play an important role regarding interaction between ECGS and other groups, especially in the case of conflict groups.

12. In conflict situations, opponents of ECGS are often perceived as operating unfairly, if not illegally.

13. In conflict situations, ECGS are frequently defined by outsiders as being uninformed.

14. Conflict relationships seldom turn into less conflictive ones as such, but the ECGS may disappear, or the controversy may be settled by some outside factor.

15. If anything, there is greater social distance and mutual misperceptions as the conflict evolves.

16. At times the conflict between the ECGS and local officials may spread into other controversial community issues, but this is not a common outcome.

17. Some early participants in ECGS involved in conflict, tend to come from a background of prior political or organizing activity, but this also is an atypical rather than typical pattern.

18. ECGS members are less likely to accept a conflict relationship as "normal" than are community officials.

19. Conflict extremely seldom escalates to the point of any kind of individual or collective violence.

20. Violence of any kind is deemed inappropriate by the great majority of members of ECGS.

What are the conditions responsible for the characterisitcs of ECGS, and their careers and consequences, as we have depicted these so far. The next chapter turns to an exposition of our view on the conditions that underlie the coming into being of ECGS.

Consequences

The consequences of ECGS, as of any social phenomena, are multiple. Thus,

there are short and long run effects. There are outcomes which are intended and those which are not. Certain results are manifest, others are latent. Consequences can be internal or external to the ECG. There are differentiated effects of all kinds.

A full inventory of all actual consequences would be massive, but that was never the intent of our study effort. Our systematic research was primarily focused on what external effects, if any, the ECGS had on the public officials with whom they interacted. Therefore, our summary remarks about consequences will be mostly about what we shall call external effects. However, in the course of doing our work, certain non-external effects were consistently even though almost inadvertently observed. Thus, after stating the propositions about external effects, we will mention a few of the more important of what could almost be called serendipitous findings.

External effects

1. The great majority of ECGS can be said to have effects, but relatively few can be said to be successful in terms of the ultimate goal of removing or preventing the threat around they are focused.

2. If an emergent group crystalizes, it has effects at least to the extent that public and private organizations have to react to it in some way.

3. Some ECGS are successful in achieving their major goals if the objective is one primarily of mobilizing resources in a non-conflict situation.

4. Almost all ECGS eventually heavily emphasize their awareness-creating function, especially for outsiders.

5. ECGS which become established almost always achieve a degree of success in getting the issue defined as a social problem, but few ECGS attain their initially formulated goals.

6. Being able to organize is itself an accomplishment, although very seldom recognized as an initial goal.

7. Goals of ECGS are far more likely to expand than to remain stable or contract.

8. Self perceived achievement of group success tends to lead to expansion of group tasks.

9. ECGS are more likely to advocate nonstructural rather than structural changes.

10. ECGS are more successful in achieving short term as over against long term goals. Thus, they may get task forces established, hearings held, or the passage of certain legislation.

11. Getting public recognition that there is an issue, is often a major accomplishment although seldom the original or prime goal of an ECG.

12. While ECGS are often successful in drawing attention to a problem, this may be a function of time because the longer the group lasts, the more likely it is to evoke attention.

13. The higher the socioeconomic status of ECGS members, the higher the probability of group survival, achievement of successes, and diffusion of issues.

14. When ECGS take on new issues, they are not necessarily disaster relevant, but they are of local interest.

15. The overwhelming majority of ECGS are concerned about presenting a "radical" image (the substance of which varies in different parts of the country) and consciously avoid actions which might be so interpreted by outsiders.

16. ECGS tend to disseminate notions of fear or doubt concerning public or coporate management of controversial issues, rather than other types of substantive information.

17. Public officials not infrequently perceived ECGS as self-appointed "troublemakers" interfering with the lawful, orderly, and efficient processes of government or industry. The result is moral indignation on both sides.

18. Highly issue oriented groups (for examples, on technological problems) are most likely to be viewed by public bureaucracies as threats to the operations of the governmental unit.

19. Success of any kind by conflict ECGS is very seldom acknowledged by those in opposition to them.

20. ECGS are very heavily instrumentally rather than symbolically oriented (except possibly for anti-nuclear plant groups which atypicially have far more of an ideology than other ECGS and thus at times engage in expressive rather than instrumental activities).

21. Once publically visible, ECGS are often approached by outside interest groups or issue instituations with an existing conflict orientation. However, not all approaches are positively reacted to, and cases of outright rejection of outside groups is not infrequent.

22. Many ECGS do not consider their initial activities as political, but almost all conflict oriented ECGS and even some non-conflict ones eventually perceive themselves as involved in political actions in the broad sense of the term.

23. Almost all ECGS see the governmental rather than the political system as where they should direct their efforts, at least initially.

24. Many ECGS do attain a degree of legitimacy, that is they are eventually seen as having the right to make their case; however, this does not occur to all of them, and some are perceived by outsiders as illegitimate for all of their careers.

25. Group size per se does not seem an important variable in the perceived legitimacy or power of ECGS.

26. Local ECGS in the same locality are more likely to cooperate than to develop coalitions even if engaged in the same activity. Credit is sometimes taken individually for what has collectively been done.

27. Most ECGS once crystallized tend to remain in at least nominal existence for long periods of time, but perceived lack of any success of any kind will lead to the cessation of group activities.

Other Effects

1. The family life of core members is frequently negatively affected, especially in conflict ECGS.

2. Internal conflict within ECGS sometimes stems from resentment over the public attention given to one core member.

3. Core members in conflict situations are often surprised at what they perceive as questioning of their motives.

4. Core members often develop a great awareness and sensitivity to the activities of similar groups elsewhere; their perceptual world expands considerably.

5. The work and complexity of organizing a group is usually badly underestimated by initial core members.

6. Many core members in the long run develop self conceptions of themselves as more competent and capable than they had realized.

CHAPTER V

CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENT CITIZEN GROUPS

This chapter pulls together our summary findings about the conditions which are associated with the appearance and development of ECGS. Our presentation is in two parts. In the first part, as in the preceeding two chapters, we present a series of statements or propositions regarding specific factors or conditions which our data indicate are related to the emergence of the kinds of citizen groups we studied. The second part of the chapter, as a result of a pulling together of our observations, presents an analytical model--it primarily focuses on five general conditions which our work concluded affected the characteristics, careers, and consequences of ECGS. Links between the different factors or conditions are indicated.

Specific Conditions

1. A significant turning point in the early stages of the emergence of ECGS is the collective consciousness that there is a perceived problem which is not recognized or acknowledged by others, especially those in positions of governmental responsibility.

2. The unwillingness to answer questions, to indicate sympathetic interest for the problems of ECGS by those organizations and officials approached is often perceived by the group leaders as an attempt to deny legitimate citizen concerns, or as a cover up of possibly inept, negligent, or illegal actions by the organizations approached.

3. Perceived inadequacy of response to group inquiries is a major factor in solidifying ECGS and determines many of their tactics and activities.

4. Definitions of the problem as a disaster (actual or possible) one are more acceptable and understandable in some sections of the country than others.

5. Some communities have more of a history of non-disaster oriented citizen groups than others; those that do, appear to generate more disaster oriented ECGS.

6. Prior social networks are crucial in the early stages of ECGS since most interaction is with known others, often along primary group lines.

7. Three factors seem particularly important in the initiation and development of emergent groups. These are initiatives by core leaders, events which are defineable as threats, and supportive activities by the mass media.

8. If group formation is to be successful, the early leadership has to take much initiative. However, initiative will not be enough to generate an ECG without a supporting social climate resulting from an event defined as a danger or a threat in some way.

9. There must be a defining event for an ECG to form, either in the form of an actual dangerous happening or an acceptable definition of a possible threat. This is a necessary catylist in most cases.

10. Sometime potential recruits resist a disaster perspective because they do not see how that perspective does or could affect them personally.

11. Particularly important is the making of potential ECG members aware that there is no adequate response system for disaster preparedness or for handling disaster consequences.

12. Mass media stories about an actual or potential local threat or danger can serve as "precipitating factors" in the formation of ECGS.

13. Mass media attention serving to define the issue as a problem, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to lead to the emergence of ECGS.

14. While mass media attention is often important in the generation of ECGS, it is crucial in their development because it defines the issue, gives visibility to leaders, and often provides a focus.

15. The perceived legitimacy of ECGS and the issues they raise depend to a great extent on the quality and quantity of news accounts in the local mass media.

16. In conflict situations, some components of the local mass media often operating covertly frequently provide information, advise, and support to active core members. But sometime media personnel are manipulated by ECGS.

17. Very local mass media can be important; it can provide information on who to contact and also in drawing the attention of one local group to others.

18. When experts openly disagree on possible disaster outcome, this weakens the appeal of ECGS to potential members.

19. Public officials, as compared to their organizations, are sometimes favorably disposed and supportive of ECGS in conflict situations.

20. Any kind of response from elected or appointed officials tends to reinforce ECGS in to taking further action.

21. Responses from elected officials more than from appointed officials aid in giving ECGS legitimacy.

22. Elected public officials are publically more sensitive and responsive to ECGS than appointed bureacrats, but some personal sympathy and support for ECGS problems and goals frequently exist in all sectors and all levels of the governmental structure.

23. Elected officials tend to be more responsive and supportive of ECGS than non-elected officials even though the emergence of a group in a local area frequently puts the local government in a poor light.

24. Support by lower level echelons and professionals in government agencies for emergent groups differs in different sections of the country.

25. Even the attention of researchers to ECGS is sometime taken as an indication of the legitimacy of ECGS.

26. Researchers are sometime seen by ECGS as a possible resource, that is, "someone on their side".

27. Core leaders who have pre-ECGS access to community or organizational power holders are important for the success of ECGS.

28. Local groups also learn from one another as the result of appearing at the same hearings or by being on talk or panel shows.

29. Sometime the approach to other groups preceeds the actual formation of an ECG. The example of other ECGS may serve as a model for the formation of the ECG.

30. While ECGS often have knowledge of state and/or national level organizations; the higher order organizations are seldom important to the local emergent group.

31. There may be vertical interaction among the organizations, but from a functional perspective, this interaction often serves only as an indicator of legitimacy for the local ECG.

32. Extra local organizations seem to have little knowledge of local groups other than their possible existence. They tend to use local groups in counts to exaggerate their own numerical strength, and to try and affect legislation at state and national levels.

33. The supra community citizen groups and networks have little direct input and influence on local ECGS, but many local ECGS develop extensive horizontal networking.

34. National or public interest groups are seen as providing symbolic rather than actual help, and are not that important in the early stages of ECGS.

35. ECGS are usually wary of letting national voluntary associations or public interest groups get closely involved or identified with the local situation.

36. Local ECGS in relating to national level organizations tend to be protective and attempt to have the locals do the work. There is a great reluctance to turning work over to outsiders.

37. Local branches of state and national level organizations often involve the same persons as members.

38. ECGS particulary get involved in conflict situations where there is disagreement among experts or where core members have a strong ideology.

39. Conflicts have their roots in the perceived existence of alternative solutions to the problems of ECGS.

40. Technological disaster agents appear to have more potential for generating conflicts in ECGS than do other kinds of disaster threats or dangers.

An Explanatory Analytical Model

In the preceeding pages, we have advance numerous empirical derived propositions about various aspects, mostly the 4Cs of ECGS. Although some of the statements were qualified, all were set forth as if they were independent of one another. In this part of our report, we attempt to pull together the generalizations about the conditions associated with ECGS, and try to indicate how some of the factors might be generally related to one another. In other words, we present the outlines of an analytical model.

In this explanatory framework, five general conditions or factors appear to be significant:

a legitimizing social setting;
a perceived threat;
a supportive social climate;
a facilitating set of social relations; and
the avaliability of certain non-material resources.

Our explantory model assumes that any given non-material resources always represent part of a larger extra-community setting. This setting affects all that goes on within a given locality. Particularly important are the supra-community groups and networks concerned with similar issues and problems. At the local community level, members of ECGS perceive

certain threats, which can be thought of as the demands in the situation.

Demands always occur in a particular kind of social environment or social climate; the social climate being the relevant set of norms, values, and beliefs existing in the local community. Within that environment there exists certain patterns of social organization or social relations; this organization being the links and institutions which constitute the relevant pattern of social interaction in the community. Certain capabilities or resources are available within that community. Resources are human and material assets such as the personnel, knowledge, and access availability.

In graphic terms we can visualize these elements:



Some of the specific conditions which seem important are selectively illustrated in the following impressions:

A. Extra-Community Setting

Supra-community citizen groups and networks appear to have little direct input and influence on local ECGS. Indirectly, however, they affect the emergence, development, and survival of ECGS by indicating that the locally expressed concern must be legitimate because it is given attention elsewhere. General knowledge of state and/or national level organizations by ECGS may suggest the need for local political action which is not usually in the forefront of the formation of local ECGS. Also, ECGS are wary of letting national organizations or public interest groups get closely involved or identified with the local situation. However, the existence of the non-local groups does frequently indicate to the ECGS that their local issue is part of a national problem.

B. Threat

There is a perceived threat that may or may not correspond to so-called objective reality (the perception socially given highest legitimacy). There must be a defining event to launch the ECG, either an actual dangerous event (i.e., a disaster) or an acceptable definition of a possible threat. The danger must be seen as threatening the home and the family of actual or potential victims. The perceived failure of the community, especially governmental officials, to acknowledge or recognize the threat is a significant factor in the early stages of the emergence of ECGS. The perceived inadequacy of responses to group inquiries about the perceived problem elicits a collective consciousness which helps to solidify ECGS.

C. Social Climate

Citizens believe that particular governmental agencies (and sometimes private corporations) have certain responsibilities for safety and health. Such organizations are expected to respond appropriately, especially if approached by citizens claiming their right to protection. It is implicitly assumed that women (with traditional concerns for health and safety problems which may directly affect their homes and children) are acting properly by taking the lead for official action. Inability to locate relevant decision makers quickly results not only in the "shotgun approach," but also a growing sense of outrage that officials are unwilling to act. Implicitly, there is often a conflict situation when the representative democracy ideas of elected and appointed officials clash with the participatory democracy ideas of members of ECGS. Concern about presenting a "radical" image (which varies with locality) constrains some ECGS, and not only are there attempts to use traditional means, but political activities are increasingly used to affect decisions and policies.

D. Social Relations

The emergence of ECGS is crucially dependent on prior social networks, as pre-formation and early group interaction takes place with known others, often along primary group lines. Involvement of mass media personnel, many of whom establish social ties with core members, often determines whether ECGS will crystallize and develop. While mass media attention is often important in the generation of ECGS, it is crucial in the development process because it defines the issue, gives visibility to leaders, and indicates group legitimacy. There is a strong tendency for ECGS to try and maintain autonomy and independence from any other groups, although horizontal networking with other local emergent groups often provides ideas of how to proceed and who to contact. Internally, the heavy involvement of core members sometimes strains their family relationships, especially if there is a different degree of participation on the part of the husband and wife.

E. Resources

Money is not necessary for the emergence, development, and survival of ECGS; however, some access to non-material (e.g., information, specialized knowledge), an non-monetary resources (e.g., sufficient space for an ECG meeting, etc.) is important. ECGS with members from the higher socio-economic levels who tend to have such resources or who can get them, tend to have an advantage in forming. Group size per se does not seem to be an important variable in the actual or perceived legitimacy or power of ECGS (as seen by outsiders) but some core members think numbers are important.

With this, we conclude the presentation of our general findings about ECGS. We now turn in a concluding chapter to a discussion of the implications of what we have found.

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This last chapter briefly summarizes the general major conclusions we draw from our study. It is divided into three parts. We first make remarks about our research design and our general methodological approach to the study. We then highlight our major substantive findings, those we consider most significant with respect to each of the 4 Cs, namely, the characteristics, careers, consequences, and conditions of ECGS. We conclude the chapter with a short statement about the high priority research which should be conducted by anyone interested in building upon our findings.

Methodological Conclusions

At the conclusion of our study, what can be said about our research design and general methodological approach? In overall terms, the design appears to have been an appropriate one, and the grounded theory methodology was productive of both empirical generalizations and an analytical model. Neither the design nor the approach was perfect, as we shall shortly illustrate, but in retrospect we would not make other choices if we had the opportunity to start the study afresh. Let us briefly illustrate why we reach this position.

We achieved our research goal of learning about ECGS, were able to place the findings in a larger analytical model, and see important implications from our conclusions. More specifically, we were able to arrive at a number of empirical generalizations or propositions about our 4 Cs. Thus we were able to advance 115 different major generalizations about the characteristics of ECGS, 82 generalizations about their careers, 33 about their consequences, and 40 about their conditions. Some might prefer to speak about these generalizations as hypotheses rather than propositions, but in either case, we were able to generate 270 empirically based statements (and actually hundreds more if the propositions or hypotheses generated in specific analyses are included in the court). Some of the propositions are, of course, fairly self evident and to be expected--but many are not; and there were more than a few which were counterintuitive or surprising.

The use of a grounded theory methodology also appears justified. Not only did we derive from the data, the propositions or hypotheses just indicated, but, we were also able to generate from that same data an analytical model, which we described in the last chapter. This model not only links a number of the key statements that were data-generated, but advances a series of explanatory statements about the dynamics of ECGS.

After our study, it is no longer possible to say that there is a weak empirical base about the phenomena of ECGS, or that there is little knowledge of them, or that the phenomena lacks conceptual clarity, or that there is no theoretical scheme available to apply to the phenomena. The research done has materially advanced us with regard to all four matters.

The use of sensitizing concepts to gather empirical data obtained through theoretical sampling and the employment of a constant comparative methodology and flexible research techniques--the essence of our research design--and grounded theory approach, helped us to make this advance.

This is not to claim that all was perfect or that our results are conclusive. There are some questions which can legitimately be raised about our work. For example, the sensitizing concept of ECG which we used left us uncertain at times whether certain groups we encountered during our research, should or should not have been treated as instances of ECGS. Our theoretical sampling biased us to looking at survivors, the more successful of the ECGS. The constant comparative methodology while clear in principle, was very difficult to do in fact. Flexible research techniques partly resulted in very uneven accumulation of field data from different ECGS. From these examples, it should be clear that we claim no perfection in our research processes and products, but only that we were very satisfied in the quality and quantity of what we were able to inductively generate.

We should also note that we were more satisfied with our data gathering than our data analyzing. Some of the unbalance is simply a function of time; if as much time had been spent on analyzing the data as we spent on gathering the data, not only would this final report be much better, but we think we would have substantially better substantive findings. On the other hand, the imbalance is not just a function of the time which was given to the work required. Inductively derived data of the kind we obtained does not lend itself well either to qualitative or quantitative analyses. Our procedure and objective of going from field reports to case studies to models was a productive way of proceeding, but took far more time and effort than had been visualized.

On balance, however, we do conclude that our research design and methodological approach was more than acceptable. The pluses of so proceedings more than outweigh the minuses. We would not hesitate to recommend to other researchers to follow the same path, but one implication of our remarks is that they should ahead of a study attempt to think through some of the difficulties that we encountered in our work. After research has started, it is usually too late to seek solutions to problems.

Highlights of Substantive Findings

Of all of our general findings, which were the more significant ones? Different criteria can be used to indicate the significance of observations made. A conclusion can be considered significant because it was not anticipated or was surprising. Another finding could be considered significant because of its weight, its importance in understanding the phenomena. Or an observation might be seen as significant because the data for it was so strongly supportive. We used all three criteria in singling out the generalizations which we now briefly discuss.

As to characteristics of ECGS, were were impressed by our findings that

in many respects, whatever their nominal size, most ECGS in terms of behavioral functioning, were really small groups. It was also interesting to observe that participation in ECGS was more extensive than membership. The criticality of the core also stood out, as well as the female domination of ECGS (a point we shall return to later).

Structurally also, certain features of ECGS appeared particularly significant. One was the sharp difference between conflict and non-conflict which was cross-cut by a task or a community orientation. However, probably one of the most dominant impressions was that the democratic structure of ECGS was far more nominal than real. In one sense, ECGS are not very grassroots organizations. On the other hand, there was clearly observable social pressure to be "democratic."

Some of the initial activities of ECGS also appeared to be significant. ECGS are clearly instrumentally oriented groups. Their initial goals are very broad and vague, and only start to acquire some specificity when ECGS see themselves unexpectedly rebuffed by those they approach. On the other hand, ECGS are overwhelmingly reformist rather than revoluntionary in their views; veering away from anything which could be perceived as "radical" was easily observed. Also, rather surprising, was the relative lack of importance of money as a necessary resource for almost all ECGS.

As to careers of ECGS, their evolvement in many cases to becoming conflict groups, was an observation that could not be missed. As equally noticeable was what we called the "shotgun" approach of ECGS in their initial seeking support for their goals. Also we did not anticipate that while there was a tendency towards the formalization of ECGS, they showed little linear development. Less surprising was our continual observation of how ECGS developed a collective consciousness and crystalized when they perceived that others did not even seem to recognize the threat or danger they saw themselves as facing. But the role of the mass media throughout the careers of ECGS was probably the most significant of all the observations we made, especially the covert support some mass media personnel provided to certain of the groups.

That most ECGS had few direct successes in achieving their goal of eliminating threats was not surprising, but was very strongly documented by the data we obtained. On the other hand, we had not at all anticipated that most ECGS become politically oriented in the way we noted in an earlier chapter. Significant too was the tendency of ECGS to eventually define as successful goals, their ability to organize themselves, and to get organizational or community recognition that the issues they raise were social problems. A serendipitous but very interesting finding was how ECGS could negatively affect the family life of core members.

What appeared significant as to the conditions necessary for ECGS, was their multiple nature. It is clear a combination of several factors have to be present for ECGS to have a chance to emerge. How certain aspects helped provide the necessary legitimacy for ECGS was also noticeable. Rather unexpected was the lack of direct importance of national public

interest groups in the operation of local ECGS, although the national groups did have some indirect consequences. Looming as very significant in conditions as well as other areas, were mass media operations.

Apart from the conclusions themselves, a number of implications could be drawn. However, in this report we shall merely allude to them, since they are or will be discussed in detail in the more specific writings drawn from the study. Some of the methodological implications of course were mentioned in the first section of this chapter. There are applied implications, both for members of ECGS and the organizational and community officials who interact with such groups. Thus, we have noted how the perceived insensitivity of officials to the questions of newly developing ECGS can help crystalize such groups. If this is true, there is clear implication in this of how officials might more appropriately act. On the other hand, many core leaders of ECGS under estimate the sympathy and personal support they have among such officials, and thus fail to take advantage of that fact.

Finally, there are implications for various theoretical views in the social sciences. Some of the more relevant ones were discussed in the first chapter of this report. Thus, collective behavior views about the importance of social networks, for instance, seemed confirmed by our work. On the other hand, writers on resource mobilization will find only partial support of their view in our research; for example, money is less important for local ECGS than they might predict. Still other theoretical views, such as about the importance of personality or personal factors in leading or joining such groups as ECGS, appear inconsistent with some of our observations.

Actually, we would not feel comfortable in either finding full confirmation or rejection of any theoretical view just from the findings of our study. Much more needs to be researched. We turn now in concluding this report to the kinds of future research which ought to be undertaken.

Future Research

If we or others were to continue the work we initiated in our research, what should be the next major thrusts, or what aspects ought to have priority in study? There are a number of possibilities which might have considerable payoff, and that should have high priority for study. Let us mention six of them, although not necessarily in any rank order.

The study of <u>non-emergence</u> of ECGS would seem worthwhile pursuing. In the study being reported on in this volume, we actually did look at several instances of abortive attempts to initiate ECGS or where conditions seemed conducive to their appearance but where none were present. While we were not too successful in our own efforts, it is clear that more intensive studies of such situations would help to clarify and refine the conditions we consider necessary and sufficient for the generation and development of ECGS.

A major problem in such a study would appear to be how a researcher goes about studying a non-phenomena, something that does not exist. In reality, this is not as difficult as might appear at first glance. One is to look at situations where ECGS were initiated or attempted to be formed, but failed to develop or crystallize. The same searching procedures we used to find existing ECGS (described in Chapter II), can be used to locate aborted groups or ECGS which are dying very early in their careers. The other approach to non-emergence is to find situations which seem to have all the conditions our analytical model indicates are needed for the production of ECGS, but in which there are no ECGS. Post impact situations of major disasters where victims have undergone major losses, or pre-impact situations where community residents are at risk from some major hazard are obvious candidates to use to initiate a search.

Another major research question which ought to have high priority, is why ECGS are so female based and led. There are no self-evident reasons why almost all ECGS have a majority of women members, and why the core leadership is in most instances also made up of women. We think we have fairly well documented this characteristic of ECGS, but we went little beyond the finding in our study.

It is, of course, possible to venture hypotheses. Perhaps the appearance of feminism and the women's movement is a social climate context that is partly responsible. The implication is that disaster related ECGS are simply mirroring or reflecting larger social trends. Such an explanation is a historically or situationally based one. On the other hand, it might be hypothesized that women are in the forefront of ECGS because they have more discretionary time, and also because the threat or danger that is the focus of ECGS frequently is perceived as a direct threat to the health and home of those affected, especially children--a traditional concern of women. This line of explanation assumes a traditional division of labor insofar as sex roles are concerned and how gender and cultural values are linked. That two somewhat inconsistent although equally plausible hypotheses can be so easily set forth, indicates how little we know of the problem and the necessity of better and more focused research on the question.

Still another major research issue is the role of the mass media in the careers of ECGS. As we noted, especially in the case of conflice-oriented ECGS, the activities of mass media organizations and/or personnel were often very crucial in the development of the groups. There ought to be studies examining this question in condiserable more depth than we were able to achieve in our own work.

We think at least two aspects of this topic would be particularly worthwhile pursuing. Certain mass media personnel often covertly help ECGS. Given that this seems to violate the normative standards and the supposed objectivity of journalism, it should be useful to study who are the journalists who take on such a covert role, and what motivates them? Studies of how and why mass media organizations decide to make their local ECGS a part of their "news" coverage, would also appear to be of interest to pursue. The literature on mass communication does offer suggestions on how mass

media organizations create "community agendas", but the applicability of that general notion would have to be specifically examined in the case of disaster oriented ECGS. If careers of ECGS are markedly influenced by the operation of the mass media, we ought to know far more about the relationship between the two kinds of social organization than we do.

Still another research question which needs further attention is why ECGS are so differential in their consequences. In terms of external effects the range is from total failure to total success in achieving the goal of neutralizing the perceived danger or threat. As we noted, there is far more failure than success; but, nonetheless, there are a variety of consequences.

Here, again, rather different hypotheses could be advanced to account for the observed differential effects. It might be said that outcomes vary depending on the strategic and tactual means used, and the resources mobilized. Certainly in our study we observed substantial differences among ECGS with respect to these matters. On the other hand, it could be hypothesized that differential effects result from differences in the social control agencies involved, and the various social climates in different communities in which there are ECGS. This would attribute greater influence to external factors, whereas the first hypothesis seems to emphasize internal factors. Clearly, more and better research is needed to start sorting out the differential weights of different factors which seem to be associated with differential consequences.

We would also assign high research priority to the development and testing of analytical models which attempt to integrate the sets or combinations of conditions which are associated with the development of ECGS. We presented one such model in the previous chapter. It is one we inductively derived from our data, which generally pulls together our specific observations. However, we have also indicated that there are differences between conflict and non-conflict ECGS. We have implied that there may be different career paths, and we have just restated that ECGS have differential consequences.

Even if our overall analytical model is an acceptable one, it needs testing against new data. The model clearly needs refinement to account for all the differential aspects we have just mentioned. It probably also would need modification to account for non-emergence. In addition, the question of conditions for ECGS ought to be approached deductively as well as inductively. There are various analytical models in sociology and the social sciences which could be examined and applied to ECGS. Only by such a contrasting kind of approach will it be possible to move towards some kind of judgement about which model is best for studying ECGS.

Finally, a comparison ought to be made between disaster oriented ECGS and other kinds of emergent citizen groups. What are the similarities and differences between them? In fact, if the study of ECGS is to contribute empirically and theoretically to our understanding and knowledge of social phenomena in the generic sense, this is a necessary approach to take.

Just as existing sociological theory and research contributed to our study of ECGS, the results from this and related studies must eventually feed back to the disciplinary base. Once that is done, it will be much easier to make an assessment of the validity and usefulness of the findings and conclusions we have reported in this volume.

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APPENDIX

A. List of communities in which emergent citizen groups were studied.

B. Sample of field instruments used.

C. Outline used for writing case studies

D. Papers and publications from project.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF COMMUNITIES IN WHICH EMERGENT CITIZEN GROUPS WERE STUDIED

Barbourville, Kentucky---Floods
Baytown, Texas---Hurricanes
Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania---Floods

Blountville, Tennessee---Hazardous Wastes
Bumpass Cove, Tennessee---Hazardous Wastes
Cardington, Ohio---Tornado

Centralia, Pennsylvania---Coal Bed Fires
Cincinnati, Ohio---Landslides
Cincinnati, Ohio---Nuclear Plant

Cleveland, Ohio---Nuclear Plant
Darrington, Washington---Floods
Deer Park, Texas---Hazardous Wastes

Fairfield Ohio---Floods
Ft. Wayne, Indiana---Floods
Galveston, Texas---Hurricanes

Grand Island, Nebraska---Tornado
Gulf Shores, Alabama---Hurricanes
Hall County, Nebraska---Tornado

Harlan, Kentucky---Flash Floods
Houston, Texas---General Disasters
Inverness, California---Landslides

Knoxville, Tennessee---Hazardous Wastes
Laguna Beach, California---Landslides
Lake County, Illinois---Nuclear Plant

Lee County, Florida---Hurricanes
Los Angeles, California---General Disasters
Menlo Park, California---Earthquakes

Mentor, Kentucky---Nuclear Plant
Milton, New Jersey---Uranium Mining
Mobile, Alabama---Floods

Montgomery County, Maryland---Nuclear Research Reactor
North Ft. Myers, Florida---Hurricane
Oak Ridge, Tennessee---Synfuels Pollution

Oakland, California---Earthquakes
Pacifica, California--Landslides
Pasadena, Texas---Hurricanes

Pasadena, Texas---Hazardous Wastes
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania---Air Pollution
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania---Landslides

Salt Lake City, Utah---Floods
San Francisco, California---General Disasters
Skaget County, Washington---Floods

Toledo, Ohio---Nuclear Plant
Vincetown, New Jersey---Water Pollution
Wayne, New Jersey---Radioactive Wastes

Wilmington, Ohio---Hazardous Wastes
Woburn, Massachusetts---Air Pollution
Woburn, Massachusetts---Hazardous Wastes

Yellow Creek, Kentucky---Hazardous Wastes

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE OF FIELD INSTRUMENTS USED

Included are:

1. One of the Master Interview Guides Used with members of ECGS
2. The Disaster Probability Ratings Scale
3. The Influence Scale
4. The Longitudinal Assessment Follow-Up Form

DRC INTERVIEW GUIDE
ECGS-2

Introduction---handout information sheets on DRC and on study
give very brief background on DRC and on study
we are there to learn from the person and organization
we have much to learn since we are just starting out (or in that locality)
whatever we learn is CONFIDENTIAL (meaning...)
but we will eventually provide feedback to all who cooperate (see information sheet)
if no questions, let's get started--you don't mind being tape recorded, do you?
there are 10 general questions and two checklists I want to ask you about.

CAREER OF THE GROUP

Question #1 Would you tell me the history of your group, from the very beginning?

--date of origin
--who involved (NAMES)
--place of conception
--origin of idea
--initial leaders
--other significant dates
--influence, prior organizing experience
--influence, prior social networks
--influence, precipitating event
--early stages activities, including aborted activities
--early stages, signs of disagreements
--early stages, clarity of goals and means

Question #2 Has the group changed or pretty much stayed the same since it started?

--changes in size
--in composition
--in division of labor
--in hierarchy (leaders)
--in recruitment
--adoption of a name
--reasons for changes in all of above
--any problems from changes
--any advantages from changes
--if group very stable, what accounts for

Question #3 (If incorporated) What led to the formal incorporation of the group?

--reasons it was done
--when it occurred
--what actually was done
--what does charter say (COPY)
--what difference it made-pluses, advantages
--what difference it made-minuses, disadvantages

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUP

Internal features--composition

Question #4 What's the makeup of this group, who is involved?

--any membership roster (COPY)
--focalized or diffuse in community

--current size
--# and % active members
--sex, age, minority %s
--any full-time, paid members
--nature of dues, if any
--criteria for membership
--if formalized, officers (NAMES)
--use of group symbols

Internal features--structure
Question #5 Who does what in the group?

--division of labor, horizontal (CHART)
--hierarchy, vertical (CHART) formal and informal leaders
--degree of formalization
--presence of internal networking
--presence of active core
--control of resources
--decision making processes

Internal features-functions
Question #6 What are the main activities (functions) of the group?

--what does core do
--attention paid
to recruitment
to autonomy maintenance
to record keeping
to intragroup conflicts
--how episodic/everyday are actions
--nature, frequency, place of meetings (MINUTES)
--internal communication
--core contacts with other members
--publications (COPY)

Question #7 With what other groups does your group interact?

--who (local and extra local)
--reasons, purposes, why
--nature of interaction
--duration, persistence
--major contacts
--mobilization of ECG in relation to other groups (e.g., demonstration)
--relationship to other emergent groups, local and extra local
--relationship to mass media

CONSEQUENCES FROM THE GROUP
Question #8 In what way(s) has this group had any effect?

--intended and unitended effects
--positive/negative outcomes
--results in political, legal, governmental areas
--perceived points of influence
--definition of success
--perceived failures
--reasons advanced for success/failure
--when would group be unnecessary

CONDITIONS FOR THE GROUP

Question #9 What resources does your group have?

--what is perceived as resources (material and nonmaterial)
--availability of material resources (COPY BUDGET)
--perception of nonmaterial resources
--how are resources mobilized and used
--any internal conflict over resource use
--local and nonlocal sources of resources

Question #10 How is your group perceived by outsiders?

--perceptions of respectability
legitimacy
personnel
resources
--is group seen as ideological
--other operative factors

Conclusion---let me ask a final question: If you were doing our study, and you wanted to understand your group, what is the most important thing about your group which you would concentrate on?

OK, is there anything else important about your group which we should know but have not talked about.

Give out first, disaster probability scale, second, influence scale.

Termination--turn off tape recorder
thank respondent/informant
listen to what person is saying at the end
indicate you/we may be back
ask if any other important person we should talk to

COPY all material that may be possible to copy
Obtain any document(s) which may be available or find out how can get
Remember to record all relevant participant observations
Be sure scale instruments have all relevant information on them
Do <u>you</u> have all information about the person you should have

Disaster Research Center
National Survey
Influence Scale

Directions: We would like to know how important you think each of the following officials and groups is in influencing what will happen to the goals and objectives of your own group. Would you please circle the number which corresponds to what you think is the degree of influence each has. Please circle according to the following six point scale.

0-Do not know
1-No influence
2-Little influence
3-Moderate influence
4-Much influence
5-Very great influence

How do you rate the degree of influence of : (circle number)

CITY COUNCIL	0	1	2	3	4	5
CITY MANAGER	0	1	2	3	4	5
CITY MAYOR	0	1	2	3	4	5
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS	0	1	2	3	4	5
COUNTY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL COURTS	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL DISASTER SERVICE AGENCY	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE COURTS	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE DISASTER SERVICE AGENCY	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE EPA (or equivalent agency)	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE GOVERNOR	0	1	2	3	4	5
STATE LEGISLATOR	0	1	2	3	4	5
FEDERAL COURTS	0	1	2	3	4	5
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY	0	1	2	3	4	5
FEDERAL EPA	0	1	2	3	4	5
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	0	1	2	3	4	5
OTHER FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES	0	1	2	3	4	5
U.S. CONGRESS	0	1	2	3	4	5
U.S. CORPS OF ENGINEERS	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL BUSINESS INTERESTS	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL CHURCHES	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL MASS MEDIA	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL CITIZEN GROUPS IN GENERAL	0	1	2	3	4	5
LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES	0	1	2	3	4	5
YOUR OWN GROUP OR ASSOCIATION	0	1	2	3	4	5

1/82

Code Number 1 9 8 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Disaster Research Center
National Survey
Disaster Probability Ratings

Directions: We would like to know what you consider the probability of certain kinds of disasters occurring in your community in the next ten years. Would you please circle the number which corresponds to the probability that the disaster listed will occurr in your community in the next ten years. Rate the events listed in terms of the following six point scale.

0-Not applicable to my community
1-Not probable
2-Low probability
3-Moderate probability
4-High probability
5-Nearly certain

How do you rate the probability of: (circle number)

AVALANCHE	0	1	2	3	4	5
DAM BREAK	0	1	2	3	4	5
DROUGHT OR WATER SHORTAGE	0	1	2	3	4	5
EARTHQUAKE	0	1	2	3	4	5
EXPLOSION IN CHEMICAL PLANT	0	1	2	3	4	5
FLASH FLOOD	0	1	2	3	4	5
FOREST OR BRUSH FIRE	0	1	2	3	4	5
HURRICANE	0	1	2	3	4	5
MUD OR LANDSLIDE	0	1	2	3	4	5
NUCLEAR WAR	0	1	2	3	4	5
PIPELINE EXPLOSION	0	1	2	3	4	5
PLANE CRASH IN COMMUNITY	0	1	2	3	4	5
RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR PLANT ACCIDENT	0	1	2	3	4	5
RIVER FLOOD	0	1	2	3	4	5
SLOW TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE OR CONTAMINATION	0	1	2	3	4	5
SMOG EPISODE	0	1	2	3	4	5
SUDDEN TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE OR SPILL	0	1	2	3	4	5
TORNADO	0	1	2	3	4	5
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT-RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL	0	1	2	3	4	5
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT-TOXIC CHEMICALS	0	1	2	3	4	5
WATER POLLTION	0	1	2	3	4	5

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Code Number 1 9 8 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

LONGITUDINAL ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP FORM

Event #: _____ Disaster Agent: _____

ECG Name: _____

Location: _____

Date: _____

Person Contacted: _____ Affiliation: _____

Interviewed by: _____

****
* *
* Note: Familiarize or Re-familiarize yourself with the case *
* before calling. *
* *
****

-COMMENTS-

(Probe: What's been going on with the group since we visited you in _____? etc?, etc.?)
month

Your assessment based on the conversation (circle one):

1 = No Change

2 = Little to Some Change *(go to LAFF-1 on reverse)

3 = Great/Significant Change

LAFF-1

Legend: NC = No Change, IC = Insignificant Change,
SC = Significant Change

	(Circle One)			Comments
A) CAREER: "changes in ...				
1) Group goal(s).....	NC	IC	SC	
2) Group Size/Composition.....	NC	IC	SC	
3) Organization Table (DoL/Hierarchy).....	NC	IC	SC	
4) Leadership.....	NC	IC	SC	
5) Incorporation.....	NC	IC	SC	
B) CHARACTERISTICS: "change in...				
1) % of Active Membership.....	NC	IC	SC	
2) Staffing (paid volunteer).....	NC	IC	SC	
3) New "expert" member(s).....	NC	IC	SC	
4) Meeting Schedule.....	NC	IC	SC	
5) Networking with other groups.....	NC	IC	SC	
6) Work relations with other groups.....	NC	IC	SC	
C) CONDITIONS: "changes in...				
1) Resources.....	NC	IC	SC	
2) Impacts from public elections.....	NC	IC	SC	
3) Outsider's perceptions of the group....	NC	IC	SC	
D) CONSEQUENCES: "changes in ...				
1) Group accomplishments.....	NC	IC	SC	
2) Group activities.....	NC	IC	SC	
3) Issue involvement.....	NC	IC	SC	
4) Areas of Influence.....	NC	IC	SC	
5) Perceptions of successes or failures...	NC	IC	SC	
6) Number of Groups in the community.....	NC	IC	SC	
7) Kinds of Groups in the community.....	NC	IC	SC	

E) OTHER REMARKS: "changes in ...

APPENDIX C

OUTLINE USED FOR WRITING CASE STUDIES

I. GENERAL COMMUNITY BACKGROUND

A. Describe the socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-geographic features of the larger community in which the ECG exists, and if applicable the more specific locality or even neighborhood in which the group is predominately centered

Socio-economic includes such matters as social class, lifestyle, ethnic concentrations, work force base, demographic features, etc.

Socio-political includes jurisdictional boundaries and complexities, governmental entities and processes, relevant aspects of the power structure and informal political features of the community etc.

Socio-geographic includes topographical and physical features of the area, aspects about the specific threat(s) or danger(s) around which the ECG is organized, particular zones of vulnerability, etc.

B. Describe the known history of threats and disasters especially in the more specific locality mentioned above. In particular, indicate anything known about the specific disaster agent around which the ECG is organized. If a post-disaster ECG, indicate what is known about the physical and social impact of the disaster. Analyze the disaster probability scale results for the group.

II. THE EMERGENT CITIZEN GROUP

Career

A. Describe the history of the group from its inception to the present time.

Cover origins, including who initially involved and source of idea. Give dates and names if possible. Background network linkages and organizing experience of those early involved should be noted. Indicate early stage activities including abortive actions and where initial efforts first directed. How much recruitment? How clear were goals and means? Do core members, other members, and outsiders have same perception of history?

B. Describe the changes and stability of the group through time.

Indicate how dynamic the group has been--has there been much change or has the group been fairly stable. If changes, in what areas: composition, size, division of labor, hierarchy, etc.? Where did group name come from? When was it first used? Indicate reasons for changes, and any problems resulting from the changes. If stable, note what accounts for the stability of the group. Do core members, other members, and outsiders perceive the group dynamics in the same way?

C. Describe the formal incorporation of the group.

When was there first signs of formalization? What were the signs? Indicate when incorporation was done, and steps actually taken to incorporate. What were stated reasons for incorporation? What does charter

actually state? Note factors which seem associated with the incorporation. Give manifest advantages and disadvantages attributed to formalization. What effects also on everyday activities? How is formal incorporation perceived by core members, other members, and outsiders?

Characteristics

A. Describe the current characteristics of the group.

Indicate its composition. Give size, demographic makeup of membership, distribution of members in community, relative proportion of active and passive members, etc. Are there full-time members? Paid members? Note criteria of membership including dues, etc. How clear are group boundaries? Indicate group symbols, logo, etc. How do core members, other members, and outsiders perceive the group composition?

B. Describe the structure of the group.

Spell out its division of labor and whatever hierarchy (formal or informal) it has. How much internal networking exists? Indicate degree of formalization present. Note presence of an active core, informal and formal leaders and their relationships to one another. Who controls group resources? Indicate decision making process in the group. How clearly and similarly is structure perceived by core members, other members, and outsiders?

C. Describe the internal activities (functions) of the group.

Indicate the major actions undertaken by the group. In particular, spell out what the core actually does. Are there everyday activities or is group action more episodic? How much attention is paid to recruitment, maintaining autonomy, record keeping, intragroup conflicts, and other internal matters? Note nature, frequency, purpose of group meetings. Where do they take place? How else does group keep its membership informed on what is going on? What is degree of contact between core and other members? Indicate similarity and differences of perception of internal activities on part of core members, other members and outsiders.

D. Describe the external activities of the group.

Indicate with whom the group interacts. Note any relationship with other local emergent groups, higher level citizen or public interest groups, established community groups, local governmental agencies and political entities, "local opponents", etc. With what extra community groups does emergent group have contact? For both local and extra community contacts note frequency, nature of contacts, etc. What are purposes of contacts--e.g., obtaining resources, meetings criticisms, influencing decisions, forming alliances, or what? Does group attempt to mobilize group members for contact with other groups by way of to mobilize group members for contact with other groups by way of letter writing, attendence at public meetings, demonstrations, petitions, etc.? In particular, what is nature of relationship of group to mass communication outlets and personnel? How are external relations of group perceived by core, other members, and outsiders?

Consequences

A. Describe the effects of the group.

Cover both intended and unintended effects, positive and negative outcomes. Focus especially but not exclusively on political, governmental, and legal areas. Are these areas were group directs most of its activities aimed at achieving results? What does group see as possible points of leverage or influence? What is defined as success? Does group perceive itself as having failed in any respect? Indicate reasons advanced for lack of success (or failures). Have there been any negative outcomes? Does group distinguish between attainable and unattainable goals? When would group see itself as unnecessary? Are there any differences in perceptions of outcome between core members, other members, and outsiders?

Conditions

Unlike in the case of career, characteristics, and consequences; the conditions effecting a group are more of an analytical rather than descriptive nature. However, we can lead into the analysis by noting the nature of the resources available to the group, and how the group is perceived along certain lines.)

A. Describe the resources of the group.

Indicate both material and non-material resources or capabilities. If budgets are available, give details on material resources. From within group, what and how are non-material resources perceived (e.g., specialized knowledge, contacts with influentials, etc.). How are resources mobilized and used? Are resources purely local; are any used from extra community sources? Indicate perceptions of resources on part of core, other members, and outsiders.

B. Describe how the group is perceived from outside.

In particular, note how the outside perceives the respectability, the legitimacy, the ideology, the personnel, the resources and other relevant aspects of the group. What does core perceive as effecting group responses? What do other group members see as influencing group behavior? Use the influence scale results for the group.

III. ANY OTHER RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS

Add descriptive or analytical material which does not fit in elsewhere. Also use this section to make an evaluation of the quality and quantity of the data for the particular case study. Indicate where there are gaps or questions which we might be able to fill in by follow up effort. Make assessment if longitudinal study might be worthwhile on group; if so, indicate along what lines such research might be undertaken.

APPENDIX D

PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS FROM PROJECT*

A. In published or written form.

1. K. Green. Big Press-Little Press Roles in Grass Roots Citizen Organizations. Careers for the Group or Careers for the Journalists? Paper at Annual Meeting of the Western Social Science Association, April 29, 1983. Albuquerque, New Mexico.

2. K. Green. A Case Study Analysis of the Relationship of Local Newspapers and Disaster Related Groups. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #86. 1983.

3. K. Green. Disaster-related Grass Roots Organizations: Sociological Implications of Collective Action in the Hinterland. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Rural Sociological Society. August 25, 1984. College Station, Texas.

4. K. Green. Grass Won't Sprout Without Roots and Other Important Supports: Some Observations on the Non-Emergence of Citizen Groups in Disaster Prone Areas, Paper at Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society. April 6-9, 1983. Atlanta, Georgia.

5. K. Green. Implications of Rural-Urban Differentiation: A Study of Local Grass Roots Organizations in Disaster Situations. Ph.D. Dissertation. Ohio State University. 1984.

6. K. Green. An Organizational Perspective of Rural-Urban Differences: A Study in Cases of Grass Root Systems. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society. April 13, 1984. Knoxville, Tennessee.

7. K. Green and E. Ireland. A Case Study of Disaster-Related Emergent Citizen Groups: An Examination of "Vested Interests" as a Generating Condition. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #77. 1982.

8. K. Green and E. Ireland. Impacts and Implications of Spontaneous Citizen Organization: A Case Study of Selected Emergent Californian Disaster Groups. Paper at Conference on Landslides and Flooding in the San Francisco Bay Region. August 23-26, 1982. Stanford University. Palo Alto, California.

9. K. Green, D. Neal, and E.L. Quarantelli. Disaster-Related Emergent Citizen Groups: An Examination of Their Relationships to Other Organizations. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #94. 1984.

10. S. McCabe and D. Neal. Gender Composition in Social Movement Organizations: The Predominance of Women in Emergent Citizen Groups in Disaster. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #85. 1983

11. S. McCabe and D. Neal. The Predominance of Women in Emergent Citizen Groups in Disasters. Paper at the Annual Meeting of the North Central Sociological Association. April 30, 1983. Columbus, Ohio.

12. D. Neal. Blame Assignment in a Diffuse Disaster Situation: The Role of An Emergent Citizen Group. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #78. 1982.

13. D. Neal. "Blame assignment in a diffuse disaster situation: A case example of the role of an emergent citizen group." Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2 (1984): 251-266.

14. D. Neal. Resource Mobilization in the Case of Emergent Citizen Groups in Disaster: Some Needed Modifications of the Existing Theoretical Perspective. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #83. 1983.

15. D. Neal. A Structural Analysis of the Emergence and Non-Emergence of Citizens' Groups in Disaster Threat Situations. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #79. 1982.

16. D. Neal. Types and Functions of Community and Regional Social Movement Organizations with Grassroot Social Movement Organizations: A Look at Emergent Citizen Groups in Disaster. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #84.

17. D. Neal. "Types and Functions of Umbrella Organizations for Local Social Movement Organizations: A Look at Emergent Citizen Groups in Disasters." Sociological Research Symposium XIII. (1983): 119-122.

18. D. Neal and S. McCabe. Emergent Citizen Groups in Disasters and Their Political Activity: A Look at Natural Hazard Situations. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper # 90. 1984.

19. E.L. Quarantelli. Earthquake Preparedness Citizen Groups: Their Atypical Nature and the Conditions for Their Emergence. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #87. 1983.

20. E.L. Quarantelli. "The Preparation of Citizen Groups for Earthquakes: The Atypical Nature of Such Groups and the Conditions for their Emergence. Proceedings of the Eight World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Volume 7 (1984): 901-908.

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22. R. Stallings and E.L. Quarantelli. A Research Look at Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management. Disaster Research Center. Preliminary Paper #92. 1984.

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B. In draft or planning stage

1. An overall monograph summarizing the work accomplished and written primarily for the disaster research community and to be published as one of the DRC Book and Monograph series.

2. A specially written booklet for emergent citizen groups, presenting the general results of our study.

3. A non-technical primer for formal organizations, especially government agencies, indicating our general research results and the implications for organizational activities in disaster preparedness and recovery.

4. Several specially written brief papers indicating the general thrust of the study for widely circulated general non-technical disaster-oriented publications or publications which might reach policy makers and emergency personnel and public interests groups.

5. Articles for professional social science journals with focus on such topics as: public officials' views of citizen groups; the trilogy of big government, big industry, and big public interest organizations, and the problems of the local citizen group; a fourfold group approach to community problems; citizen groups--an extension of the citizen role in potential disaster situations; citizen groups via economic and via political power; and the problems of citizens group participation in community life or politics.

*Does not include the dozens of field reports and case studies written which are Internal DRC documents and are not presently available for public circulation.